Faculty of the Social Sciences,
University of Nigeria Nsukka

2020 Virtual Conference on "Critical Issues and Challenges to Sustainable Development in Africa"

BOOK OF PROCEEDINGS

FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA

2020 International Virtual Conference on Critical Issues and Challenges to Sustainable Development in Africa

#FSS2020CONFERENCE

A total of
312
Papers presented

A total of
692
Participants across the globe

A total of
43
Technical Panels

A total of
143
Female participants

A total of
549
Male participants

Participants from
Across
the globe

zoom

Number of days
2 Days
27th-28th October 2020

In Partnership with CLEEN FOUNDATION ...Justice Sector Reform | UNESCO Abuja Regional Office, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization | *....Support from* NPSA | Baywood FOUNDATION

LOC Members of the 2020 Faculty of the Social Sciences Virtual Conference on "Critical Issues and challenges to Sustainable Development in Africa"

1. Prof. Aloysius-Michaels Okolie (Dean)
2. Prof. Chidi Nzeadibe (Associate Dean)
3. Dr. Chukwuedozie Ajaero (Chairman)
4. Mr. Chikodiri Nwangwu (Secretary)
5. Dr. Freedom Onuoha (Chairman, Publicity Sub-Committee)
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19. Mr. Ekwezuo Chukwudi
20. Mr. Okechukwu Eme
21. Mr. Kelechi Nnamani
22. Mr. Clinton Nwoke
23. Ms. Nkemdilim Anazonwu
24. Mr. Celestine Udeogu
25. Mr. Aloysius Odii
26. Mr. Kelechi Okpara
27. Mr. Famous Nwankwo
28. Ms. Juliana Onuh
29. Mr. Favour Uroko

Table of Contents

THEME FOUR
COVID-19 Pandemic: Experiences and Responses

THEME FIVE
Public Health, Quality of Life and Wellbeing

THEME SIX
Gender and Development

THEME SEVEN
Urbanisation and Sustainable Cities

THEME EIGHT
Livelihoods and Food Security

THEME NINE
Climate Change: Vulnerability, Resilience, Mitigation, and Adaptation

THEME TEN
Bio-Diversity, Environmental Management, and Conservation

THEME ELEVEN
Governance, State Institutions and Justice

THEME TWELVE
Power-Sharing, Quota System, and Federal Character

THEME THIRTEEN

Religious Fundamentalism and Crisis of Value

THEME FOURTEEN

Terrorism, Insurgency and Organised Crimes

THEME FIFTEEN

Political Economy and Social Policy

THEME SIXTEEN

Poverty, Inequality and Social Exclusion

THEME SEVENTEEN

Population Dynamic and Displacement

THEME EIGHTEEN

Public Procurement, Public Finance, Accountability and Monitoring

THEME NINETEEN

Diaspora and Remittances

THEME TWENTY

Environmental and Social Safeguards

THEME TWENTY-ONE

Education, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BY THE DEAN, FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA, PROFESSOR ALOYSIUS-MICHAELS OKOLIE AT THE 2020 VIRTUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY THE FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, ON 27TH THROUGH 28TH OCTOBER, 2020.

The Vice-Chancellor, University of Nigeria, Nsukka
Deputy Vice-Chancellors and Principal Officers of the University
Distinguished Professors and Members of the Academic Community
Lead and Keynote Papers Presenters
Special Guests and Conference Participants
Distinguished Academic and Administrative Staff of the University of Nigeria,
Gentlemen of the Press
Great Lions and Lionesses
Ladies and Gentlemen

It gives me great pleasure to present this welcome address to such a distinguished and august audience on the occasion of the 2020 Virtual International Conference of the Faculty of the Social Sciences, the largest Faculty in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is instructive to note that the Faculty has been repositioned to instigate and promote productive research, teaching and community service. Our primary goal is to deepen and focus our research endeavours toward making necessary impact in the highly competitive world of knowledge. I therefore commend the choice of the theme of the conference Critical Issues and Challenges to Sustainable Development in Africa. This theme is both appropriate and timely as it captures the essence of the current pedagogy and research in the Social Sciences globally. It also aligns with the vision of the Vice-Chancellor to bequeath a truly international and research-driven University renowned for social and policy relevance in today's Africa.

The theme of this year's event also reinforces our conviction to engage with a plurality of socio-political, economic, security, health and environmental issues that challenge sustainability of development and to seek solutions to these challenges especially during the prevailing COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, the themewas carefully selected todeal with the fundamental problems being faced by developing economies and respective leaderships in Africa. It therefore reflects the continuous struggle to bring to harmony the principles and practice of Sustainability and Neoliberalism in current development discourse in spite of the global challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, insecurity, and economic strangulation.

Ladies and gentlemen, permit me to reiterate that the Faculty of the Social Sciences has remained at the forefront of cutting-edge research in economic, social, political, environmental and cultural issues as well as in exploring the nexus and linkages among the knowledge spheres. It is noteworthy that within the past one year, the Faculty has made some remarkable and striking achievements in capacity building, research and publication. The Faculty was recently ranked among the Best Faculty of the Social Sciences in the World as a result of the quality of her researchers and research output. Some of her researchers have published groundbreaking papers in the First Quartile-indexed journals globally. They have also contributed a respectable quantum of human capital to Global Institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and national agencies while some faculty members are currently serving as visiting scholars and researchers in some top universities across the world. Today, our Faculty has produced a large number of Alexander von Humboldt and Fulbright Fellows. The range of collaborations of staff of the faculty has also remained on the increase. The number and quality of our graduate output has continued to be on the increase at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Some of our graduates are prominent players in the political, economic and social spaces across the globe leading important government MDAs, development agencies and the private sector.

The Faculty of the Social Sciences has continued to collaborate with global institutions such as UNICEF in organizing Conferences, Workshops and in mounting postgraduate programmes in Social Policy. The Faculty has recently played host to researchers from universities in Germany, South Africa and Norway while academic staff of the Faculty have also benefited from such exchange visits. I am also pleased to report that some members of staff of the Faculty are currently undergoing doctoral and post-doctoral training in South Africa, UK, Germany and Kenya. This will contribute in no small measure to building the critical mass of expertise of the Faculty to effectively tackle 21st century sustainability and research challenges while also having trickle down effects on the quality of teaching and learning in the Faculty. We are not done yet. We shall consolidate on these gains and proceed to institute the Faculty as a global intellectual hub for research, networking and collaborations; and subsequently achieve our target of establishing a Centre of Excellency in our great Faculty.

APPRECIATION

I would like to thank immensely the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Professor Charles ArizechukwuIgwe for the unflinching support he gave to the Faculty towards organizing this conference. I also acknowledge in a special way the Local Organizing Committee (LOC) for this conference led by Dr. Chukwuedozie K. Ajaero for the incisive and painstaking efforts and dedication they have brought on board to ensure the resounding success of this first virtual Conference of the Faculty. My appreciation also goes to the CLEEN Foundation for collaborating with the Faculty to organize this conference and to Baywood Foundation and the Nigeria Political Science Association (NPSA) for their support towards the conference. I congratulate the Faculty of the Social Sciences for attracting this galaxy of globally recognized scholars to our University. I also thank the Lead paper presenter, Distinguished Professor Peter Okebukola who is the Former Executive Secretary of the National Universities Commission (NUC) and the Special Guest Speaker, ProfessorOnwubiko “Biko” Agozino of the

Virginia Tech University, United States of America. I also appreciate our Lead paper presenters, Professor Okechukwu Ibeanu, a National Commissioner with the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) Abuja and Professor Cheryl Hendricks of the African Institute of South Africa (AISA), Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and University of Johannesburg, South Africa for graciously accepting to participate in this Virtual International Conference. Lastly, I wish to thank all Heads of Department and Colleagues in the Faculty for the unparalleled cooperation and support that led to the successful hosting of this Conference.

It is my earnest hope that this conference will generate a quantum of ideas, methodologies and actionable recommendations for sustainable socio-economic and political development of the continent in a neoliberal era. Distinguished participants, I welcome you to this unique intellectual harvest and wish you all successful deliberations.

I thank you all for listening.

Professor Aloysius-Michaels Okolie
Dean, Faculty of the Social Sciences

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BY THE VICE-CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA, PROFESSOR CHARLES ARIZECHUKWU IGWE, AT THE FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 2020 VIRTUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, HELD ON 27THTHROUGH 28TH OCTOBER, 2020

The Chairman of the occasion
Deputy Vice-Chancellors and Principal Officers of the University
Dean of the Faculty of the Social Sciences
Distinguished Professors and Members of the University of Nigeria Senate
Special Guests and Conference Participants
Distinguished Academic and Administrative Staff of the University of Nigeria,
Gentlemen of the Press
Great Lions and Lionesses
Ladies and Gentlemen

On behalf of the Management of the University, I warmly welcome you all to the 2020 Virtual International Conference of the Faculty of the Social Sciences. We particularly welcome the Keynote Speaker, the Lead Paper presenters, the Special Guest Speaker and all the participants in this Conference. I am sure that this Virtual Conference will provide a serene and conducive environment for serious conversations that will undoubtedly inform Socio-Economic Development policy in the continent of Africa.

I recall the immediate past International Conference of the Faculty of the Social Sciences in 2019 on the theme Globalization and Socio-economic Development in Africa. The choice of that theme reinforces our conviction to engage with a plurality of socio-political, economic and environmental issues that challenge sustainability of development and to seek solutions to these challenges especially during the post-2015 development era. Thus, the theme of this year's event Critical Issues and Challenges to Sustainable Development in Africa is very apt and reflects the continuous global and continental challenges that Africa has been facing in the quest to bring about Sustainable Development in the continent.

I am pleased to note that papers at this conference have been proposed from the economic, social, political, environmental and cultural dimensions. Thus, the conference and its outcomes promise to contribute immeasurably to global Sustainability in an era of the COVID-19 pandemic, dwindling resources, conflicts, an ever-increasing population and urbanization with its attendant consequences. I am glad that the largest and one of the oldest faculties in the University, the Faculty of the Social Sciences, is hosting this important conference. This conference is coming at a time when our continent, Africa is facing multiple socio-economic and political challenges arising from global structures and processes of change largely driven by public health issues, insecurity, neoliberalism, climate change and migration. Consequently, I believe that the products of this conference will help to chart a new course in evolving development policy in Africa. I therefore wish the faculty a great success in this critical venture.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA

This year, the University celebrated its 60th Founder's Day event. Over these past sixty years, the University has continued to grow from strength to strength and has led the way in human capital development in Africa. The recent Convocation Ceremonies of the University, attest to this as in one instance, 7,830 first degrees, diplomas and certificates of the university were awarded to deserving graduands including 132 First Class graduands. In addition, 1,523 postgraduate degrees and diplomas of the University of Nigeria were awarded to deserving graduands. This comprised 340 doctorate degrees, 1027 Masters degrees and 156 postgraduate diplomas.

The University has continued to promote global visibility through its innovative teaching and research. The University of Nigeria has consistently maintained its enviable position as the number 1 university in Nigeria based on the Google Scholar Citations which ranks Universities based on research output evident in the number of cited quality publications. In addition, Academic linkages have been established with universities and research institutions in Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Israel, Japan, China, USA, Taiwan and South Africa. The University is also currently hosting the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Biotechnology Centre.

The Resource and Environmental Policy Research Centre (REPRC), was also recently established following a very painstaking and highly competitive evaluation and accreditation process to serve as a research, capacity building and policy advocacy centre on resource and environmental policy issues in Nigeria. The REPRC is an Environment for Development (EfD) Initiative centre, the only one in Nigeria funded by the EfD Initiative based in Gothenburg University, Sweden. It is worthy to acknowledge the role played by some members of the Faculty of the Social Sciences in achieving this global feat.

Recently, the University of Nigeria won the World Bank-funded Africa Centre of Excellence for Sustainable Power and Energy Development (ACE-SPED), after a very competitive and months-long rigorous World Bank experts' evaluation process, involving about 134 proposals from Nigeria and many other proposals from the West and Central African sub-region. My administration is committed to sustaining and improving on these achievements of our University that have continued to project our image as a global brand in research while also impacting on the society.

THE FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The Faculty of the Social Sciences has carved a niche for itself in research and publication. Recently, the Faculty was ranked among the Best Faculty of the Social Sciences in the World as a result of the quality of her researchers and research output. In this regard, I am happy to report that academic staff of the Faculty have continued to contribute to this drive for global competitiveness and visibility of our University through their productive international collaborations and research outputs. The Faculty also has a number of Alexander von Humboldt Fellows. Several other staff of the Social Sciences are currently undergoing doctoral and post-doctoral training in the South Africa, UK, Germany, Kenya and several other countries. This, no doubtshall contribute remarkably in building the critical mass of expertise of the Faculty to effectively tackle 21st century sustainability and research challenges while also having trickle down effects on the quality of teaching and learning in the Faculty.The Faculty of the Social Sciences is also collaborating with United Nations agencies such as UNICEF in organizing Conferences, Workshops and in mounting postgraduate programmes in Social Policy. This administration shall consolidate and expand on these concrete achievements.

APPRECIATION

May I seize this medium to congratulate the Faculty of the Social Sciences led by Professor Aloysius-Michaels Okoliefor organizing this conference and attracting globally recognized scholars to our University. We also thank the Lead paper presenter, Distinguished Professor Peter Okebukola the Former Executive Secretary of the National Universities Commission (NUC), the Special Guest Speaker, Professor Onwubiko Agozino of the Virginia Tech University, United States of America, the Lead paper presenters, Professor Okechukwu Ibeanu, a worthy alumnus of the University and National Electoral Commissioner at the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) Abuja and Professor Cheryl Hendricks of the African Institute of South Africa (AISA) and University of Johannesburg, South Africa for accepting to participate in this Virtual International Conference. I also appreciate the partners and particularly UNESCO for their positive interventions. The University is ready and willing to partner and collaborate with UNESCO and related agencies in furthering our efforts aimed at human capacity transformation. It is my earnest hope that this conference will generate a quantum of ideas, methodologies and critical recommendations that will instigate sustainable socio-economic development of the continent. I, therefore, wish you all a very fruitful and successful conference and do hereby declare the Faculty of the Social Sciences 2020 Virtual International Conference open.

I thank you all for your participation.

Professor Charles Arizechukwu Igwe
Vice-Chancellor

A WELCOME ADDRESS BY MR. LAMINE SOW, THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, UNESCO MULTISECTORAL REGIONAL OFFICE FOR WESTERN AFRICA IN ABUJA

The Vice Chancellor, University of Nigeria Nsukka, Prof. Charles Igwe,
The Dean of The Faculty, Prof. Michael Okorie,
Director of Research, Prof. Obinna Onwujekwe,
Executive Director, CLEEN Foundation Dr. Benson Olugbuo,
Country Director, Baywood Foundation Barrister Ojielo,
Distinguished Keynote Speaker, Professor Okebukola,
Lead Paper Presenters Prof. Okechukwu Ibeanu And Prof. Cheryl Hendricks,
Special Guest speaker Prof. Biko Agozino
United Nations Colleagues Present,
University of Nigeria Nsukka community
Distinguished Participants and panelists

On behalf of UNESCO, it is my pleasure to welcome you to this virtual conference on "Critical Issues and challenges to Sustainable Development in Africa ".

To the Faculty of Social Sciences, I would like to express our thankfulness for this gesture which I hope will pave way to a new cooperation paths and subsequent partnership.

Many thanks to all the organizations who have joined in this conference at this critical moment for a critical reflection on challenges of attaining the SDG BY 2030.

Last, but not least, I would like to reiterate our congratulation to all participants gathered here for your presence and I have no doubt that you will actively contribute to the answers we sort for. Indisputably, through the submission of your abstracts, you have already contributed to the foundation of this robust agenda which will guide the deliberation for the 2 days. I thank you.
My job here is very easy as it is to welcome all of us, but I want to reiterate that the theme of the conference goes at the heart of UNESCO's mandate for the advancement of SDG 2030 which is guided by the principles of equity, inclusion and gender equality whilst promoting creativity and critical thinking.

As UNESCO'S Director General said in his speech on "UNESCO moving forward the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development"This agenda aspires to ensure prosperity and well-being for all women and men, while protecting our planet and strengthening the foundations for peace.

Sustainable Development represents the most universal, ambitious and comprehensive agenda ever seen, to leave no one behind. This is a paradigm shift that requires us all to act in new ways. Alongside is the production of knowledge, the effective use of research through a strengthened research-policy nexus which can improve evidence-informed public policy, guided by universal values and principles, based on human rights and ethical principles; that enhances public services and raises the level of public debates.

Indeed, this is an area UNESCO is willing to partner with Universities subsequently and especially with a citadel of learning like yours (University of Nigeria, Nsukka).

I have no doubt that the deliberations of this conference will support our working together to find ways to promote 2030 Agenda for sustainable development for our common good In Africa.

Without further regressing with my task here, I want to Wish you a fruitful discussion and always remember that Words are important, but action is the only thing that will bring about the real change.

I thank you for your kind attention.

ADDRESS BY CLEEN

Goodwill Message from the Executive Director of CLEEN Foundation to the Faculty of Social Sciences University of Nigeria, Nsukka on the occasion of the 2020 Virtual Conference on Critical Issues and Challenges to Sustainable Development in Africa organised by the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Nigeria, Nsukka in collaboration with the CLEEN Foundation, 27 27 October 2020

Protocols

On behalf of the Board and Management of CLEEN Foundation, I want to sincerely welcome everyone to the 2020 Virtual International Conference on Critical Issues and Challenges to Sustainable Development in Africa, organised by the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Nigeria, Nsukka in collaboration with the CLEEN Foundation.

The CLEEN Foundation (formerly known as Centre for Law Enforcement and Education) is a non-governmental organisation established in January 1998 with the mission of promoting public safety, security and accessible justice through the strategies of empirical research, legislative advocacy, demonstration programmes and publications, in partnership with government, civil society and the private sector. CLEEN Foundation is in special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in New York, United States of America since June 2020. CLEEN Foundation has observer status with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights based in Banjul, The Gambia. In addition, the National Human Right Commission awarded the CLEEN Foundation the 2019 Human Rights Award (NGO Category) in a recognition of our activities in the country.

We want to congratulate the Faculty of Social Sciences for this International Conference which anchors on the critical issues and challenges of sustainable development in Africa. It will be recalled that in 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals or Global Goals were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly designed to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all by the year 2030. Goal 16 focuses on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, which is very relevant to this conference as we discuss the issues and the aftermath of the #ENDSARS protests in Nigeria which actually looks at Police reform, good governance, justice and accountability in Africa. We should also be mindful of the effects of COVID-19 pandemic which has exacerbated issues of human rights and economic freedom in the country. This conference offers a good platform for cross-fertilisation of ideas between scholars, policy makers, government officials and the private sector. We are confident that the outcomes and conclusions of the conference will be beneficial to citizens in the African continent and other parts of the world.

As we are very much aware, Nigeria currently grapples with different layers of insecurity. The National Security Strategy of 2019 which was presented to Nigerians by President Muhammadu Buhari states that Nigerian youths make up 63% of the population. This is an issue of serious concern as the government has failed to take into consideration the issues of unemployment, inequality, poverty and lack of opportunities for the youth population.

I believe the papers that would be presented will support the government in terms of fashioning out ways of ensuring the attainment of the sustainable development goals in Nigeria.

As an Alumnus of the University of Nigeria, I want to commit that CLEEN Foundation will continue to support the activities of the University in the pursuit of her motto which is 'To Retore the Dignity of Man'. I wish all participants a successful deliberation. May God bless the Federal Republic of Nigeria and heal our land.

Thank you and may God bless you all.

Benson Chinedu Olugbuo, Ph.D.
Executive Director
CLEEN Foundation

PREFACE

On behalf of the Local Organizing Committee (LOC), it is my pleasure to present the Book of Abstracts for the international conference on the theme “Critical Issues and challenges to Sustainable Development in Africa”. This is the first time the Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Nigeria, Nsukka organized an international virtual conference. This was due to the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has made it impossible to organize the usual biannual face-to-face conference of the Faculty.

The international virtual conference had 21 sub-themes, which included (i) Development: Theoretical Issues and Praxis (ii)Africa and the Global Political Economy (iii) COVID-19 Pandemic: Experiences and Responses (iv) Livelihoods and Food Security (v) Climate Change: Vulnerability, Resilience, Mitigation and Adaptation (vi) Gender and Development (vii) Terrorism, Insurgency and Organized Crimes (viii) Poverty, Inequality and Social Exclusion (ix) Biodiversity, Environmental Management and Conservation (x) Public Health, Quality of Life and Wellbeing (xi) Education, Innovation and Entrepreneurship and (xii) Social Policies and Development Strategies.

At the end of the two-day conference, 312 papers were presented in 43 Technical Sessions. The participants were made up of 143 female participants and 549 male participants. I, therefore, wish to acknowledge the collaboration and inputs of UNESCO Abuja Regional office towards the success of the conference, and more especially with regard to the publication of special journal issues and this book of abstracts emanating from the conference. I am grateful to CLEEN Foundation, Abuja for coordinating the technical aspects/ hosting of the ZOOM virtual platform used in the conference. I also acknowledge the partnership and gracious supports we received from Baywood Foundation and the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA).

I will not end these introductory remarks without appreciating our Chief Host and the Vice Chancellor, University of Nigeria, Prof. C.A. Igwe for granting approval for the conference to hold. I also appreciate the Host and Dean of the Faculty, Prof Aloysius-Michaels Okolie for deeming us fit to anchor the virtual conference as the LOC members. My thanks also goes to the Conference Keynote Speaker, the Lead Paper presenters and the Special Guest Speaker for graciously honoring our invitation to be part of the conference.

Finally, I wish to appreciate all our participants. Without you, the conference would not have held. To members of the LOC, you did very well and I really appreciate our collective efforts towards making this conference a success despite numerous limitations during the peak of the COVID-19 Pandemic. I hope that the contents of this Book of Abstracts will serve as a very good resource and source of knowledge to every reader.

Chukwuedozie K. Ajaero
Chairman, Conference Local Organizing Committee (LOC)

THEME ONE
DEVELOPMENT: THEORETICAL ISSUES AND PRAXIS

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF AFRICAN CONTINENT AND THE WAY FORWARD

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Abstract

The African continent has remained largely underdeveloped regardless of the presence of huge natural resources (gold, cocoa, bauxite, oil, diamond, timber) and human resources based. Several decades after the end of colonialism, most parts of Africa is still fighting with problems such as high poverty rate, corruption, lack of basic infrastructural facilities in all sectors of the economy, unemployment, high mortality rate, political instability and insecurity of lives and property. This paper considered modernisation and dependency theories, however the view of dependency theories was adopted in considering the causes of African Continent underdevelopment. The paper found both endogenous and exogenous factors of colonialism and the scramble for African continent, world capitalist, corruption, geographical location and weak institutions, as responsible for Africa's underdevelopment. The paper therefore recommended among others, that African countries should evolve policies that are development oriented and aimed at reducing corruption and poverty.

Keywords: Third-world countries, Colonialism, Exploitation, Development and Underdevelopment

Introduction

There is no doubting the fact that Third World countries are naturally endowed in both human and non-human resources. It is rather pathetic that some of these countries are so underdeveloped despite the natural resources advantage. The plundering of the resources of these countries during colonial administration has largely been responsible for this present situation. Some of the counties in the Third World have found their path to development while others, mainly in Africa, have not. There exist a number of reasons deduced to the present condition of Africa which might be termed as development crisis. This is because the continent has remained largely underdeveloped regardless of the presence of huge natural resources such as gold, cocoa, bauxite, oil, diamond, timber and human resources. Several decades after the end of colonialism, most parts of Africa is still battling with problems such as high poverty rate, corruption, lack of basic infrastructural facilities in all sectors of the economy, unemployment, high mortality rate, political instability and insecurity of lives and property.

Development discourse is made up of a web of key concepts. 'It is impossible to talk about development without referring to concepts such as poverty, production, the notion of the state, or equality. These concepts first rose to prominence during modern Western history and only then have they been projected on the rest of the world' (Sachs, 1992, 5). For example, Ghana is touted as one of the best democratic and politically stable countries in Africa and Nigeria, the most heavily populated African country, according to the United Nations Human Development Report in 2011, ranked 135 and 156 respectively out of 187 countries (UN, 2011). Against the background of Africa's development crisis, spurred the debate on how to solve the crisis of development in Africa. This debate has been a blistering one and is dominated by two main related themes, namely: the argument over the actual meaning of the concept of development and the appropriate pathway to development (Ikenna, 2009). However, despite the discrepancy among scholars, global policy makers and institutions over these issues, numerous attempts have been made to understand and solve the crisis of development in Africa.

Thus, this paper is to examine the causal factors for the Africa's underdevelopment, with special focus on the diverse causes of African underdevelopment and possible pathways for the realisation of development in the African continent.

Conceptual Explanation

Development

The exact meaning of development in the terrain of development studies has been plagued with intense controversy as to what is development, for whom and by whom. These controversies notwithstanding, there are a plethora of definitions propounded by various scholars to capture the meaning of development from their perspectives and their ideological orientations. The term, development, has been used in several ways. Traditionally, it was equated with growth of per capita income. Since the 1970s, other indicators of development have become widely used by development scholars and development agencies such as the World Bank, IMF, etc. The meeting of basic needs (or, equivalently, reduction in absolute poverty), the creation of modern employment opportunities, and the achievement of a less unequal distribution of income have all become important criteria in determining the level of development (Todaro & Smith, 2003).

Emphatically, Todaro and Smith (2012:16) opined that:

> development must, therefore, be conceived of as a multi-dimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and national institutions as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of

> poverty. This presupposes that development is not purely an economic phenomenon but rather a multi-dimensional process involving reorganisation and reorientation of entire economic and social system and it is a process of improving the quality of all human lives with three equally important aspects, which are basic components or core values which serve as a conceptual basis and practical guideline for comprehending the inner meaning of development. These core values are, sustenance, self-esteem and freedom, and these represent a universal goal sought after by individual and society.

The above definition of Todaro and Smith can be equated to freedom which is in tandem with Sen (1999) notion on development that development strictly converse to that of economic point of view. He noted that all individuals are gifted with certain set of capabilities while it is simply a matter of realising these capabilities that will allow a person to escape from poverty and their state of unfreedom. The un-freedom as opined by Sen comprises lack of education, illiteracy, poor health, malnutrition, etc. He subjects the fundamental assumption of development viewed from purely economic point of view with emphasis on economic growth and GDP, by arguing that income poverty should not be the single most important factor in determining development because there are equally other important dimensions to development, hence the concept of development being a multi-dimensional concept. In considering what should constitute the freedom, Sen (1999) submitted critical interpretations of freedom by examining five elemental forms of instrumental freedoms: political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security and lays emphasis on the fact that, the five forms of freedom are complementary, interrelated and inextricable. This shows that individual freedom must comprise of the five elements for an individual to realise his or her potentials. However, this paper sees development as the qualitative and quantitative improvement in all aspect of human endeavour comprising the economic, political, cultural, environmental, and social, etc.

Underdevelopment

Underdevelopment is not the absence of development, because every people have developed in one way or another and to a greater or lesser extent. Underdevelopment only makes sense as a means of comparing levels of development. It is very much tied to the fact that human social development has been uneven and from a strictly economic viewpoint some human groups have advanced further by producing more and becoming wealthier (Rodney, 1972: 21). Underdevelopment can also be explained in terms of relationship of exploitation of one country by another. All the countries classified as underdeveloped in the world were exploited by others. The underdevelopment with which the world is now preoccupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist and colonialist exploitation. Rodney (1972: 22), therefore, concludes that:

> *If underdevelopment were related to anything other than comparing economies, then the most underdeveloped country in the world would be the USA, which practices external oppression on a massive scale, while internally there is a blend of exploitation, brutality and psychiatric disorder.*

For the purpose of this study, underdevelopment means a situation where a country or region is responsible for development challenges of another country. An example is Europe destroying the basis of Africa's development.

Theoretical Framework

In an attempt to explain the development gap existing between the developed and underdeveloped countries, modernisation and dependency theories are considered in this study. The tenets of these theories are considered. However, the view of dependency theory is adopted in considering the causes of underdevelopment of African continent.

Development theory thus refers to the leading theories and many rival and subsidiary theories that critique, revise, sum and offer broad explanatory frameworks on development (Pieterse, 2009). Thus, a development theory has both a development concept and a development strategy associated with it. Development theories are also often inter-disciplinary and problem-oriented. Modernisation theory is one of the theories that explains pathway to development and gains fame in the 1950s. Modernisation theory emerged in the 1950s as an explanation of how the industrial societies of North America and Western Europe developed. The theory argues that societies develop in fairly predictable stages though which they become increasingly complex. Development depends primarily on the importation of technology as well as a number of other political and social changes believed to come about as a result. For example, modernisation involves increased levels of schooling and the development of mass media, both of which foster democratic political institutions. Transportation and communication become increasingly sophisticated and accessible, populations become more urban and mobile, and the extended family declines in importance as a result.

According to modernisation theory, endogenous factors in the countries, such as traditional, illiteracy, the traditional attitude of the population, agrarian structure, the low division of labour, the lack of communication and infrastructure, etc., are answerable for underdevelopment. Differences in structure and historical origin are considered of little importance; international dependencies are not taken into account. Rostow's five stages of economic growth feature predominantly in the1950s. In his classic work titled: *The Stages of Economic Growth*, Rostow outlines an optimistic scenario by positing five stages of economic development which all societies in one point in time will transcend to realising development. These stages are the traditional stage, the pre-condition for take-off, the take-off stage, and drive to maturity and, lastly, the stage of mass consumption (Rostow, 1990). Despite the contribution of the modernisation school of thought to development discourse, it is criticised of being eurocentric, development not a linear process, ignored the history and culture of different group of people and society, etc.

Following the flaws in modernisation theory emerges the dependency theory to explaining development and underdevelopment. This school of thought regarding development and underdevelopment discourse emerged in the 1960s. Dependency was defined as a 'situation in which a certain number of countries have their economy conditioned by the development and expansion of another' (Greig, Hulme and Turner, 2007; Dos Santos, quoted in Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1978: 544). One scholar whose name keeps ringing a bell with the mentioning of dependency theory is Andre Gunder Frank. In his classical piece titled: *The Development of Underdevelopment,* Gunter postulates that the underdevelopment of undeveloped countries or part of the world is a ramification of the unequal and unfavourable conditions they found themselves in, in the world capitalist system. To understand why a nation is poor and underdeveloped, it is futile to examining the values and attitudes endogenous to an individual but more pertinent to exploring the role a nation performed in the world capitalist system (Greig, Hulme and Turner, 2007). The dependency theory turned the modernisation theory on its head by rejecting the argument that any relationship between the traditional and the modern societies would culminate into mutual benefits or gains. For them, the possibility of peripheral development is hindered by this relationship (Greig, Hulme and Turner, 2007).

Greig, Hulme and Turner, (2007) and Frank (1970: 8) illustrate how poorest countries and most remote part of Latin America had been historically linked to the world capitalist system and how this relationship and contact between tradition and modernity led to underdevelopment. So, in a nutshell, the main thrust of the dependency school of thought in expatiating development and underdevelopment discourse has to do with core-periphery relationship in the world capitalist system and how the system has a negative repercussion on the periphery states. Gunder Frank used the core-periphery nexus to refer to the industrialised/developed and underdeveloped/poor nations, respectively.

The Nature of Underdevelopment of African Continent

The current state of African development which has been described by scholars as a development crisis cannot be explained from one perspective but several perspectives of exogenous and endogenous factors which have plagued the continent for decades. One of the exogenous causes of African underdevelopment widely alluded to by many scholars in the literature has to do with colonialism and the scramble for African continent in 1880. Most African countries have been colonised by the British through the policy of indirect rule and the French through their policy of assimilation. According to Simensen:

> ....colonial rule as opined by can be regarded as the next phase of Africa's integration into the international system. European policies varied considerably between regions and over time, from a brutal period of conquest at the end of the 19th century to active development efforts following the Second World War.

Colonialism is linked to African underdevelopment from the perspective of exploitation of precious natural resources from the continent of Africa which is used to develop the jurisdiction of their colonial masters at the detriment of the African countries. For example, Ghana was colonised by Britain and numerous resources including gold, diamond, bauxite, timber, etc., are being exploited to the benefit of Britain. But the question is what about Ethiopia who has never been colonised before in its history but is still underdeveloped. One conspicuous feature of Ethiopia's level of development is that it is lagging behind to even countries that have been colonised, for example Ghana. So, the question is: is colonialism important in explaining African underdevelopment? Yes, to a lesser extent, since there are other equally important factors which are endogenous to Africa' underdevelopment. The world capitalist system in which the African countries find themselves in also accounted for Africa's underdevelopment. This school of thought is widely supported by the dependency school of thought pioneered by Gunder Frank. It is argued that, it is not the existence of the world capitalist system *per se* which is shaped by neoliberal policies of free market, minimal role of the states, but has to do with the role played by individual states in the world capitalist system.

The African countries played a very weak role in the world capitalist system with focus on production of raw materials with less or no value which affects their relationship in the world market. In the 1980s, the IMF and World Bank presented a unified package, often in the form of an Economic Recovery Programme, as a condition for African countries to find a way out of the debt crisis. Central to this package is the rolling back of the state from the control of the economy, and encouraging rather a facilitator role. Olutayo & Omobowale (2007) state that capitalism which was endorsed in the colonial and the latter part of the 1960s is now perceived as a hindrance to development. In laying greater importance on market forces for the distribution of resources, some of the policies that most African countries have now endorsed since the 1980s include: significant devaluations, removal of government subsidies and price controls, cuts in public expenditure with deep public sector retrenchments, privatisation, relaxation of foreign exchange controls, an increase of interest rates to real levels, the withdrawal of protectionist measures and an increase in agricultural producer prices.

Apart from the exogenous factors accounting for Africa's underdevelopment, there are equally important endogenous factors causing underdevelopment in Africa. One of such endogenous factors is corruption. Today, most African nation-states have been independent for forty years. Unfortunately, at forty, many of these nation states have made either minimal progress or stagnated, in terms of socioeconomic growth and development. Despite the fact that the continent's problems are multifaceted, corruption, particularly in countries where it has become an integral part of the social fabric, is a major handicap to their development efforts. Corruption may be defined simply as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain (Ineke, 2010; Transparency International, 2006).

The financial resource involves in these corrupt deals could have been channeled into useful project that will help to stimulating growth and development in African countries. It is also important to take note of the fact that no single regime or government in Africa after independence has been excluded from corruption saga, being rumour or truth. Taking Ghana for instance, there were corruption rumours leveled against ex-President Kufour regime of purchasing a mansion (Hotel Kufuor), kickbacks at the seat of government from contractors, Sekyi Hughes (former Speaker of Parliament) looting government bungalow, sale of lands to NPP ministers and cronies, etc. Under the late Professor Mills regime, there exists corruption allegations and greater one include the Woyome saga which is currently on going in court, Mabey and Johnson saga which led to firing of some ministers under his government – Dr. Sipa Yankey, etc. This corruption allegation from Ghana is to buttress the point that, though Ghana has been touted as the most democratic country and beacon for African continent, there are still challenges of corruption which is thwarting its economic as well as its democratic gains. The question is, if Ghana being touted in such colour is riddled with corruption challenges, how much more other African countries?

Africa's geographical location is another factor that accounts for the continent's underdevelopment. This factor is endogenous to African because it has nothing with external forces having their influence on the continent, hence its underdevelopment. Most of the African landmass lies within the tropical climate with no access to either the Atlantic or the Indian Ocean. This made the vast areas of the interior continent home to malaria and tsetse fly which afflict humans and animals, respectively. This made some researchers including Bhattacharya on the causes of African underdevelopment to test the hypothesis of malaria as the dominant cause of the underdevelopment in the continent. In particular, Bhattacharya, in Kumo (2009) argues that malaria and other tropical diseases have fatal as well as debilitating effects on human population in Africa. It negatively affects productivity, savings, and investments in physical and human capital and directly affects economic performance of the continent. It is important to note that significant achievement has been chalked in the area of improvement in health on the African continent as portrayed by Bhattacharya but more has to be done.

Furthermore, weak institutions in African countries are used in explaining causes of underdevelopment in the continent. This is also an endogenous factor in explaining the divergence in developed and the less developing and underdeveloped countries. Increasingly, research has shown that weak, missing or perverse institutions are the roots of underdevelopment. Other explanations for development, such as technological innovation, investment, or years of schooling are not associated with higher rates of economic growth (Shirley, 2005; Easterly, 2002). The vast majority of Africans today live in countries that have failed to create or sustain strong institutions to foster exchange and protect persons and property. Most of African countries are suffering from these problems but a point must be made that, there are some countries whose institutions are weaker that others (Sudan, Congo, Somalia, etc.) Individuals in these countries enforce most bargains using informal mechanisms—private armies; threats to reputation; ostracism—and they have little trust. The state is either too weak to prevent theft of property by private actors, or so strong that the state itself threatens property rights and personal independence. Individuals and organisations face a high risk that they will not be able to realise a return if they invest in specific knowledge, skills, or physical assets, so they refrain from investment; production, innovation, and productivity are low and the economy festers (Shirley, 2005).

Conclusion

In a nutshell, the development-gap between the developed (core) and the underdeveloped (periphery) countries has remained an issue among development experts, scholars, politicians and students of development studies. Various development theories of different nature – meta and micro – narratives on development have been advanced but the gap between the developed and the underdeveloped countries is widening by days. Various factors have been advanced for African underdevelopment comprising both endogenous and exogenous factors of colonialism and the scramble for African continent, world capitalist, corruption, geographical location and weak institutions. Despite the above causes, there is still hope for Africa's development. For Africa to develop there is the need for:

- emphasis on strong institutions in African countries;
- there should be adequate transfer of technology to the continent;
- Africans should ensure that they strategically position themselves in the world capitalist system; and
- in addition, African States should evolve policies that are development oriented. These should aim at reducing poverty and inequality. This is particularly in Africa, where there is no linkage between policy formation and policy implementation.

The Way Forward for Africa's Development

It is a desire for all African countries to be at par with the developed countries thus the suggestion of some ways for propelling development on the continent of Africa. First and foremost, culture and development nexus should be looked in their development effort. They should adopt policies, programmes and technologies that are appropriate and compatible with their cultures. Culture is defines by Granato et al and quoted in Selington and Smith's book as 'a system of basic common values that help shape the behaviour of the people of given a society'. Some economists have confronted culture and found it helpful in understanding economic development. Perhaps the broadest statement comes from the pen of David Landes: Max Weber was right. If we learn anything from the history of economic development, it is that culture makes almost all the difference. Elaborating on Landes's theme, Japanese economist Yoshihara Kunio writes, "One reason Japan developed is that it had a culture suitable for it (Harrison, 2006). It is, therefore, important on the part of African leaders to focus on their culture in relation to development from economic perspective, Sen's perspective on development, etc. The culture and development nexus brings to mind the Confucian ethics which is a contemporary theory linking economic development to cultures of some countries as a ramification of observation of some countries economic progress since the World War II. Example of such countries includes Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc. Therefore, it is essence on the part of African countries to look inward to their culture in development effort. In fact, there are certain elements of Africa's rich cultural heritage that has led to the evolution and mastery of technical knowledge with respect to the arts, textile industry, craft, music technology and food technology, in which most African societies have made some progress, and have attracted cross-geographic exchange and interaction (Ogungbure, 2011).

As part of culture, Africans should patronise made in African goods and reduce their taste for foreign goods which is eroding gains that should have been made by African countries should they patronise what is produced in their countries. Secondly, emphasis on strong institutions in African countries can be a panacea for African development and not having strong political leaders as it pertains in Africa. This is in tandem with statement by President of USA, Barack Obama, when he he met late President Mills of Ghana in 2009 and stated that Africa needs strong institutions and not strong leaders. Having a strong institutions can help fight against corruption since the system will be tight to address issues of corruption of whatever form – political corruption which is paramount in Africa as well as corruption in the civil service, etc. In addition, to combat the pernicious problem is putting in place appropriate anti-corruption and legal machinery; and prosecute without fear and favour. The low incidence of corruption by the governing elites in countries like Denmark, New Zealand, Sweden, Singapore, Finland, Iceland and the Netherland is present, thanks to rational legal bureaucratic practice, is evidence that corruption can be contained (Uneke, 2010). And this cannot be achieved if there exists no strong institutions an, therefore, having strong institutions in Africa will be in the right direction toward development.

In addition, transfer of technology is another pathway which can aid in Africa's development. Technology is basically defines as an application of scientific knowledge to practical problems whilst transfer of technology on the other hand has to do with the processes by which technological knowledge moves within or between organisations and countries; it can be international technology transfer. Technology transfer is an important means by which developing countries can gain access to technologies that are new to them. For example, the acquisition of foreign technologies by East Asian newly industrialised countries, coupled with endogenous technological learning efforts to accumulate the capability to change technologies have been key factors in their rapid technological and economic development. African countries can do the same but definitely there are challenges of acquisition and mastery of technology, both costly and time-consuming, acquired technologies often need to be adapted to local conditions hence the issue of appropriate technology. All in all, transfer of technology can help African countries in all aspect of their economies toward development.

The last but not the least forward matching for the African countries when it comes to development has to do with strategically positioning themselves in the world capitalist system being perpetuated by globalisation and its compelling forces. In order for globalisation to have positive impacts on Africa's development, national governments must have the choice to choose among apt monetary, fiscal, trade, macroeconomic and other economic and social policies without heavy-handed intrusion by the developed countries and the multilateral institutions these countries control. In short, a more democratic international economic and political environment is a *sine qua non* for sustained and broad-based economic development to take place in Africa.

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INDUSTRIAL AGGLOMERATION DETERMINANTS IN ENUGU STATE, NIGERIA AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

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Abstract
The aim of this study is to examine the determinants of industrial agglomeration in Enugu State and its likely contributory effects to achieving post 2015 development Goal. This study is necessary because the even development of diverse forms of industries in the state will induce economic development, multiplier effect, poverty reduction and lasting prosperity for all. The Study adopted cross sectional survey design using both primary and secondary sources for data collection. 394 copies of questionnaire were used to elicit information from industrialist on the determinants of industrial agglomeration in the study area. Data acquired from the field work was analyzed using descriptive statistics such as percentages, mean and non parametric method such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Result of the non parametric analysis revealed that five(5) major factors determines the agglomeration of industries in the area and they are industrial linkages, low transaction cost, economic factors of production, governance and institutions and infrastructural facilities. The outcome indicates that for industries to be attracted, located and sustained in the area, the entire five factors must be available and adequate to some an extent. Thus for SDG 1,8 and 9 to be achieved in the state, stakeholders in industrial development affairs should focus on this factors to attain the maximization of industrial development potential of the state.
Keywords: Industrial agglomeration, Sustainable, logistic regression, determinants, Nigeria.

Introduction

Geographical concentration of industries is one of the most striking features of economic activity in both developed and developing countries (Burki and Khan, 2013). Prominent examples exist of such concentration across the globe such as agglomeration of Computer software development at Silicon Valley, Toyota city in Japan and Detorit in the United States, Route 128 Dalton, garment industry in New York (Colgan and Baker, 2003; Nakajima, Saito and Uesugi, 2012). It was the classical work of Marshall (1920) that first provided a classified schema to interpret why firms tend to cluster at certain locations, in spite of rising input prices and fierce competition among them. Developing viable industries is an avenue to economic growth and development. Industries agglomerate in certain location for various reasons such as proximity to raw material, access to labour, capital, market, etc. Whatever be the reason(s), one or two of these factors must attract and favour the operation of industries to maximise profit. When many industries are concentrated in a place, it is called industrial agglomeration. Industrial agglomeration according to (Zhao, 2017) is defined as the concentration of enterprises within a certain space in order to obtain agglomeration benefits mainly caused by the specialised economy, the labour market and the economic externalities. Similarly, it serves as a conducive micro-environment for supporting cooperation between firms, for knowledge transfer, sharing and transformation of innovations that will enhance their competiveness (Steskal, and Hajek, 2011 and Matatkova and Stejskal, 2012). The rationale for industrial agglomeration lies in the mutual advantages firms within such agglomeration stand to gain such as labor market pooling, customer-supplier interactions and knowledge flows (Kerr and Kominers, 2015).

Industrial agglomeration generates a lot of benefits to individual firms and people living around the agglomeration. Its benefits to other firms come in two ways:

- it could be a factor for attracting new industries in an area; and
- industries within the agglomeration also enter into different alliance and collaboration that will make them more profitable.

For benefits to the people, it provides employment opportunities, development of infrastructures, and human capital development through training. Hence, the benefits that result from industrial agglomeration are necessary in realising the sustainable development goals (SDGs). This means that lack of industries will pose as a challenge to realising the post-2015 development goals by 2020 in Enugu State. Industrial development is related to almost all the sustainable development goals but for the purpose of this study, we focused on SDG 1, 8 and 9.

- *Goal 1, Target 1(1.1)* – By 2030 eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than \$1.25 a day. The emphasis as it relates to this study is that inadequate industrial development in Enugu State will pose a challenge to achieving SGD 1 target 1 of eradicating extreme poverty. The reason being that extreme poverty cannot be reduced in an economy devoid of industries;
- *Goal 8, Target 6(8.6)* – By 2030, substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training. We state emphatically in this study that part of the initiative for reducing the proportion of youth not employed is through development of diverse industries that will gainfully employed the youths;
- *Goal 9, Target 1(9.1)* – Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and trans border infrastructure to support economic development and human well being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all; and
- *Goal 9, Target 2 (9.2)* – Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and by 2030, significantly raise industry's share of employment and gross domestic product in line with national circumstances and double its share in least developed countries. Again, the emphasis is on industrialisation, employment opportunities, GDP and developing

industrial agglomeration in the state and Nigeria at large remains the answer to employment opportunity, industrialisation and increase in GDP.

It is unfortunate that most previous studies on SDG have not been able to clearly link industrial agglomeration and SDG. Previous studies focused more on sustainable manufacturing (Berawi, 2019), industry 4.0 (Rivera, Hermosilla, Delgadillo and Echevenia, 2020, Mishra and Maheshwari, 2020). The perspective of the previous research is a mirror of areas that have attained industrial development unlike our study area where industrialisation is still far from being achieved. Thus, we embarked on this study to ascertain the determinants of the industrial agglomeration in the state because these determinants when developed will lead to the industrialisation and development of the area. The study, therefore, is important because it brought out the actual factors that determine the agglomeration of industries in the state. Thus, the outcome of the study will serve as instrument for planners, policy makers and stakeholders saddled with the responsibility of industrial development to be more focused in their developmental plan.

Literature Review

Industrial agglomeration as a factor for the location of new firms and as a strategy for industrial development has received the attention of many scholars and researchers. As noted earlier, the concept of industrial agglomeration was studied by economist scholars such as Marshal, Weber, Perroux, Isard, Jacobs, Hoover and recently Porter and Krugman in the *New Economic Geography Framework* (Von Hofe and Chen, 2006, Jackson, 2015). In fact, the concept of industrial agglomeration and cluster, in particular, has become the central policy paradigm in economic development during the past decade (Colgan and Baker, 2003). Nathan and Overman (2013) based on their study on agglomeration, clusters and industrial policy concluded that industrial policy focus on industrial agglomeration will create industrial development. Gordon and McCann (2000) conclude that the concept of industrial clusters has attracted much attention during the past decade, both as descriptive of an increasingly important phenomenon and as a basis for effective public intervention in the economies of lagging city regions.

Thus, based on the significant of industrial agglomeration, diverse literature have laid emphasis on its determinants such as economies externalities, knowledge spillover especially tacit knowledge (face-to-face communication), market, linkages in the form of inter-firm transaction, capital-good market externality, technology diffusion and specialisation as reasons behind industrial agglomeration (Nakajima, Saito and Uesugi, 2012 and Alfaro and Chen, 2016. Also, Puga and Venables (1998) using a model based on three ingredient: transport cost; increasing return to scale; and presence of input and output between firms are of the view that industrial linkages creates industrial agglomeration. He, Pan and Chen (2016) revealed that the driving forces of industrial agglomeration are economic globalisation, decentralisation of regional competition and rebuilding of regional advantages. Wang and Goldsmith (2013), on studying the Chinese food processing industries, discovered that labour pool, scale economies and proximity to market were significant to industrial agglomeration. The study by Narjoko (2008) revealed that industrial agglomeration is driven by natural market forces, infrastructure and supporting activities, the availability of skilled labour and professionals and the size of domestic markets.

Kathuria (2016) also, on studying the locational choices of 66 manufacturing industries in 21 Indian states with the help of Ellison-Glaser Index, discovered that factors that determine agglomeration of firms are infrastructure, coastline and labour market pooling. He, Zhu and Zhu (2010) opined that per capita GDP, road and railway density, ratio of non-state-owned economy, ration of government expenses to GDP, number of development zones, social capital and law enforcement, trade barrier are the provincial characteristic that affect the extent of industrial agglomeration in China. Also, He and Wang (2010) opined that natural advantages, spillover effects and institutional advantages based on data from the annual survey of industrial firms in 2005 in China determines industrial agglomeration. He and Romanos (2015) examined the influence of vertical industrial linkages, horizontal linkages and corporate taxation on spatial agglomeration using discrete count data regression model and result show that linkages affect industrial agglomeration. Cojocaru and Ionesen (2016) are of the view that factors which affect industrial clusters are competent work force, specialised suppliers, knowledge dissemination and entrepreneurial activity, the inter-dependence between entities, the organisational cultures or the local demand. Not much work had been done on determinants of industrial agglomeration in Nigeria and its link to the SDGs thus the birthing of this study to fill the lacuna created.

Methodology- Study area and data collection

Sample Selection

Our sampling unit comprises of firms within the industrial agglomeration. For this study, **we purposively select 1 LGAs** from the 17 LGAs that made up Enugu State See Fig 1.



Fig 1: Enugu State showing the sampled LGAs.

The two LGA are Enugu East and Udi LGA. From the two LGAs, we further purposively select two localities Emene from Enugu East and Nsude form Udi LGA, based on the fact that majority of the industries are clustered in this areas.

Sample Size – The sample size comprises of all the registered firms within the two localities selected. The record by Enugu State Chambers of Commerce and Industry (2017) on the number of industries both small and medium scale industries, large industries and our pilot survey show that all industries are estimated to be about 547 industries . We distributed our questionnaire to all of them but only 394 were fully returned showing about 72% response rate. Furthermore, we selected one staff in each of the industries to fill our questionnaire section on determinants of industrial agglomeration, forms of industrial agglomeration in the area and its benefits which will translate to achieving the SDGs. Thus, our sample population comprises of 432 respondents from the firms.

Data Collection – The data for this work was sourced from be from both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources of data will consist of Field observation, questionnaire, while the secondary sources of data will be from journals articles and government publications from relevant agencies like Enugu State Chambers of Commerce and Industries, Manufacturing Association of Nigeria, Nigeria Bureau of Statistics and Corporate Affairs Commission.
Data Analysis – Data collected from field work was analysed using descriptive statistics such as percentages, mean, standard deviation. Further, we ran a PCA analysis on the 17 variables that might likely determine industrial agglomeration in the area. The essence is to bring out the underlying dimension of the determinants of industrial agglomeration.

Result and Discussion

The analysis of frequency distribution of the determinants of industrial agglomeration in Enugu State

From table 1, it is observed that economic factors of production have high means of above 4.0 which is greater than the average mean of 3.0 which is average. The respondents also perceived them as very important with high percentages. The economic factors as identified from the table are capital (4.22), raw material (4.23), market (4.23) and availability of labour (4.16).

Table 1: Frequency Distribution of Determinants of Industrial Agglomeration in Enugu State

Variable Code	Variable Description	Very important	important	Undecided	Not Important	Extremely Not Important	mean	STD Dev	Variance
B1	Provision of Tax Incentives	27(6.7)	46(11.4)	67(16.7)	111(27.6)	142(35.2)	2.24	1.25	1.56
Variable Code	**Variable Description**	**Very important**	**important**	**Undecided**	**Not Important**	**Extremely Not Important**	**mean**	**STD Dev**	**Variance**
B2	Presence of adequate transportation system	27(6.7)	73(18.2)	37(9.2)	127(31.6)	130(32.3)	2.23	1.29	1.67
B3	Steady power supply	25(6.2)	71(17.7)	36(9.0)	134(33.3)	128(31.8)	2.31	1.26	1.61
B4	Proximity to suppliers	184(45.8)	157(39.1)	27(6.7)	21(5.2)	5(1.2)	4.25	0.89	0.80
B5	Presence of skilled and unskilled labour	183(45.5)	136(33.8)	41(10.2)	21(5.2)	5(1.2)	4.16	1.00	1.00
B6	Availability and access to capital	188(46.8)	139(34.6)	41(10.2)	21(5.2)	5(1.2)	4.22	0.92	0.85
B7	Attitude of local communities	97(24.1)	132(32.8)	76(18.9)	67(16.7)	5(1.2)	3.54	199	1.41
B8	Presence of adequately equipped industrial estate and parks	101(25.1)	122(30.3)	87(21.6)	59(14.7)	25(6.2)	2.30	1.20	1.44
B9	Adequate communication facilities and network	24(6.0)	72(17.9)	34(8.5)	133(33.1)	131(32.6)	2.30	1.26	1.61
B10	Potential for linkages in the area	185(46.0)	157(39.1)	27(6.7)	20(5.0)	5(1.2)	4.26	0.88	0.78
B11	Availability of market	190(47.3)	137(34.1)	41(10.2)	22(5.5)	4(1.0)	4.23	0.92	0.84
B12	Access to raw material	189(47.0)	137(34.1)	42(10.4)	22(5.5)	4(1.0)	4.23	0.92	0.85
B13	Low land cost in the area	139(34.6)	123(30.6)	60(14.9)	86(21.4)	30(7.5)	3.86	1.10	1.22
B14	Low investment cost	114(28.4)	151(37.6)	60(14.9)	53(13.2)	16(4.0)	3.74	1.13	1.28
Variable Code	**Variable Description**	**Very important**	**important**	**Undecided**	**Not Important**	**Extremely Not Important**	**mean**	**STD Dev**	**Variance**
B15	Distance of the area from the CBD	83(20.6)	171(42.5)	47(11.7)	62(15.4)	31(7.7)	3.54	1.20	1.46
B16	Supportive local authority	100(24.9)	123(30.6)	88(21.9)	58(14.4)	25(6.2)	3.54	1.19	1.43
B17	Government Institutions presence(legal, security)	103(25.6)	120(29.9)	86(21.4)	59(14.7)	26(6.5)	3.55	1.21	1.47

Source: Field work, 2020

Again, variables reflecting the effect of industrial linkages exhibited high mean that is above 3.0. The variables are proximity to suppliers (4.25) and potential for linkages (4.26) in the area. Hence, the table showed that economic factors and industrial linkage effect is important for industrial agglomeration. Economic factors are important because they are important for initial start off of any industry. The cost of acquiring them, determines the productivity, profitability and sustainability of industries in an area. Furthermore, industrial linkages since it could stand as a factor for attracting new firms in an area leading to more agglomeration. The linkage might be in the form of supplier of inputs, subcontracting, strategic alliance, knowledge, and technology linkages.

Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of the determinants of Industrial agglomeration in Enugu State

Table 2 show the result of the Principal Component Analysis with the 17 variables and their corresponding component loadings. The variable with significant loadings of +/- 0.600 was selected. Out of our 17 variables, 14 variables loading significantly on 5 components with Eigen values greater than unity. This extracted 5 components together explained 78.27% of the total variation in the determinats of industrial agglomeration in Enugu state, the remaining 22% is left for the minor components and redundancies.

Table 2: Results of Varimax Rotated Principal Components Matrix for Determinants of Industrial Agglomeration in Enugu State

Variables	Components				
	I	II	III	IV	V
Provision of tax and financial incentives	.050	-.101	.148	.076	-.434
Availability of transportation facilities	-.022	.465	**.847**	.053	.015
Availability of power supply facilities	-.029	.467	**.856**	.040	.022
Proximity to suppliers	.502	.150	-.130	**-829**	.074
Presence of skilled and unskilled labour	**.804**	.333	-.087	-.249	-.124
Availability of Capital	**.900**	.293	-.108	-.219	-.124
Attitude of the local community	.284	-.498	.151	.143	-.026
Presence of adequately equipped industrial estate	.475	-.747	.404	-.039	.089
Adequate communication facilities and network	-.068	.474	**.842**	.055	.054
Potential for linkage in the area	.495	.160	-.139	**.828**	.068
Availability of market	**.890**	.305	-.093	-.226	-.118
Access to raw material	**.897**	.287	-.107	-.218	-120
Low land cost in the area	.138	.170	-.095	-.163	**.724**
Low investment cost	.166	.159	-.094	-.121	**.725**
Distance of the area from the CBD	.222	-.016	-.090	.106	.173
Supportive local authority	.478	**-.742**	.413	-035	.097
Government institutional facilities(security, legal)	.467	**-.747**	-407	-.033	.093
Eigen Value	4.404	3.058	2.805	1.672	1.369
% of explained variance	25.905	17.990	16.498	9.833	8.051
Cumulative variance	25.905	43.895	60.393	70.226	78.277

Source: Field work (2019) *Significant loadings =/- 0.60

From table 2, component I has an Eigen value of 4.404%, a percentage of variance of 25.905 and a cumulative percentage of 25.905%. The component load significantly on and positively on four variables. They are labour (0.786), capital (0.882), market (0.872) and raw material (0.879). From the variables, it indicates that economic factors of production are important and significant to industrial agglomeration in Enugu State. Hence, we named the component the effect of economic factors of production.

Table 2 shows component II with an Eigen value of 3.058 and explains 17.900 percent variation and a cumulative percentage of 43.895%. The component load significantly and negatively on 3 variables. The variables are presence of well equipped industrial estate, support from local government authority and security. Since all these variables suggest the issue of governance and government institutions, we named the underlying dimension the effect of governance and institutions. This component indicates negative showing that urban governance efforts towards industrial agglomeration is not yet felt.

Component III with an Eigen value of 2.805 explained a percentage variance of 16.498%; together with component I and II explained a total cumulative percentage variance of 60.383%. This component loaded significantly and positively on three variables namely availability of transportation facilities, power supply facilities and communication facilities availability. This shows the important of infrastructural facilities in determining industrial agglomeration in Enugu State. Hence, we named the component infrastructural facilities because infrastructure refers to basic framework of road, power, water supplies and communication, etc.

As shown in table 2, component IV has an Eigen value of 1.672 and explains 9.833% of variance and 70.226% of cumulative variance. The component loaded significantly and positively on two variables Proximity to suppliers (0.829) and potential for linkage (0.828). This indicates the effect of industrial linkages amongst and between firms in leading to industrial agglomeration in Enugu State. Industrial linkages takes place in such place through sub-contracting, strategic alliance, input sharing, bulk purchasing, tacit knowledge spillovers, etc. These forms of linkages reduce transaction cost and increase the productivity and profitability of industries.

Lastly from table 2, component V has an Eigen value of 1.369 and explains 8.051% of variance and 78.277% of cumulative variance. It loaded significantly and positively on two variables low land cost (0.721) and low investment cost (0.697). The components suggest the effect of transaction cost as determinants of industrial cost. Land is important for industrial agglomeration and observation from the field show that the environment of the industrial agglomeration is that of sub-urban where land cost and investment cost is likely to be low compared to the Central Business District.

Table 3: The relative strength of the determinants of industrial agglomeration

Component Identification	***Index of component activity***	***Relative contribution (%)***	***Cumulative contribution of components (%)***
I	Economic factors of production	25.905	25.905
II	Effects of Governance and institutions	17.990	43.895
III	Infrastructural facilities	16.498	60.393
IV	Industrial linakges	9.833	70.226
IV	Transaction cost	8.051	78.277

Our finding reveals that five major factors determine the agglomeration of industries in Enugu State. They are economic factors of production, effects of governance and public institutions, infrastructural facilities, industrial linkages and transaction cost. The implication of the result indicates that economic variables such as labour, capital, market forces, raw material availability and cost of land which are factors of production have powerful effect on geographical concentration of industries in the study area. The result conforms positively to the findings of previous works done on determinats of Industrial agglomeration in other parts of the world (Gezici, Yazgi and Metin, 2013; Ercole and O'neil, 2017, Ellison et al, 2010, Min and Kudo, 2013 and Najkar, Kohansal and Ghorbani, 2020).

In particular, Ercole and O'Neil (2017) found that in Indonesia, that economic-related factors are the dominant sources for the expansion of sectors and firms. The outcome of the study still authenticate the importance and significant of economic factors in location and agglomeration of industries. Also, Fernandes (2012) found that in India, that governance, infrastructure and availability of skilled labour as important of industrial agglomeration

Lastly, linking our findings to the SDGs: Goal 1, Target1, reducing poverty, Goal 8 Target 6, increasing the proportion of youth in employment; and Goal 9, Target 2, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation, there is need to develop all the five determinants of industrial agglomeration in the state. In particular, the economic factors of production of land, capital, and labour market should be improved upon to attract more diverse industries to the state. Furthermore, Goal 9, Target 1 which focuses on infrastructural development is also inevitable in industrial development.

Consequently, infrastructures such as roads, airports, railways, industrial parks, communication facilities should be provided to attract more foreign direct investment in the state and increase the ease of doing business. United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (2016) linked inclusive and sustainable industrial development to job creation, sustainable livelihood, technology and skill development, food security and equitable growth. These factors which industrial agglomeration and development develops are key reqirements for eradicating poverty by 2030. Moreover, the UNIDO Report 2016 found all these our goals and targets as studied in the work to have direct relevance to achieving the SDGs by 2030.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Industrial agglomeration is an industrial organisation system that improves on the industrialisation and development of any nation. Our paper provides evidence of factors that determines industrial agglomeration and development in Enugu State. The outcome of the study reveals that the determinants of industrial agglomeration are economic factors of production, governance and institutions, infrastructure, industrial linkages and low initial investment cost/transaction cost. The essence of this findings is that these factors when developed will strengthen the potential of the state to attain industrial development and onwards transmission to realising the SDGs of industrialisation, provision of employment opportunities, infrastructural development and eradication of extreme poverty by 2030. Based on the findings, we recommend:

- Economic factors such as capital should be enhanced by establishing industrial development funds to provide financial assistance to industrialist.
- Infrastructures meant for industrial agglomeration such as the industrial parks/estate should be developed through private-public partnership (PPP) with adequate amenities to attract more firms to the state.
- Efforts should be made by government to show case the state through social media for attracting more industries through foreign direct investment (FDI).
- Government should creating enabling environment for industrial development through easy industrial registration system, providing tax incentives.
- Industries with more linkage effects should be attracted to the state.

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PHILOSOPHY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

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Abstract
This paper examines the roles of philosophy, within the context of development, in Nigeria, with a view to showing that despite the religious, economic and moral challenges Nigeria is facing, today, philosophy can play a crucial role with regards to the sustainability of her development. Philosophy represents a method of reflective, rational and constructive thinking or reasoned inquiry, while development defines the ability of a people to appropriate their total essence, in a total manner, as a people – a holistic vision in which they assume the control or their own destiny. Attempts are made to articulate the concept of development and the essential roles of philosophy. These two concepts will be critically examined to show how philosophy plays out with regard to sustaining development in Nigeria. The paper will adopt the method of historical hermeneutics and textual analysis/exposition.

Keywords: Philosophy, development, sustainability, critical thinking, values, Nigeria

Introduction

Nation-building is no simple process. "History has demonstrated the difficult effort needed to unite a people under a government and to create among them a stable cultural, economic, political, and social community" (Davis and Nwaiwu, 2001). Admittedly, the "process has been especially strenuous, where the people to be united include diverse and large groups, distinguished by their customs, languages, or separate identities"(Davis and Nwaiwu, 2001). In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, most of the nations that achieved independence during the decolonisation of the 1950s and 1960s have continued to face the challenges of galvanising the forces and harnessing the resources for meaningful and sustainable national development (see Davis and Nwaiwu, 2001). This point underscores the fact that building an ideal nation is a difficult task, which requires an approach that is holistic. Certainly, all facets of human activity must be harnessed, while all indices of development and nation-building must be taken care of. In doing this, the role of philosophy in creating a meaningful and sustainable national development cannot be over-emphasised.

Plato and Aristotle recognised that for a comprehensive development to take place, in any society, all aspects of reality (all fields of study) must be acknowledged. This makes it highly imperative to recognise the essential role of philosophy in the development questions of Nigeria and Africa, in general. Until the recent past, every systematic pursuit of knowledge was regarded as philosophy before they started branching off, the last of them which was psychology (see Nwala, 2011). This is why up untill today, every holder of Ph.D is regarded as a Doctor of Philosophy, which is an acknowledgement of the root of knowledge (Ojimba and Chukwuma, 2018: 2). Thus, the essential role of philosophy in building sound minds and developing a society of civilised individuals cannot be over-emphasised. This implies that the entire onus of sustainable development largely depends on philosophy. This paper, therefore, argues that despite the economic and religious challenges Nigeria is facing, today, philosophy can play a crucial role in maintaining and sustaining the positive impacts of her development.

Previous studies have focused on the economic and political aspects of development, but the philosophical orientation and attitude to meaningfully manage and sustain the gains and positive impact of this development needs to be further examined. This paper is an attempt in such a direction. To accomplish its purpose, the paper is divided into four sections. Section one takes a look at the concept of philosophy and section two gives an overview of the idea of development. In section three, the essential roles of philosophy in sustaining development in Nigeria is examined, while section four embodies the conclusion. The work adopts a library-based research method. It made use of textual conceptualisation and hermeneutics in its analysis.

Conceptualising Philosophy

The first line of Aristotle's Metaphysics has it that “all men by nature desire to know” (Aristotle, 1991). This offers an insight into what philosophy is all about, as the love of knowledge. Admittedly, this Aristotelian assertion presupposes that man, by nature, is curious to know. Thus, man is a homo episteme – a being of knowledge. This aligns with the etymological view of philosophy as the love of wisdom. Although, there is no unanimity in the definition of philosophy, the word, philosophy, etymologically speaking, is coined from two Greek words, *philos* and *sophia,* meaning love and wisdom, respectively. Therefore, philosophy, as hinted above, is the love of wisdom; and a philosopher is a lover of wisdom. Philosophy is further conceptualised as a logical inquiry into the nature of reality. Similarly, Dewey views it as the critical reviewing of familiar things– an unceasing effort to discover the general truth that lies behind the particular facts. This definition lends credence to further conceptualisation of philosophy as representing a method of reflective, rational and constructive thinking or reasoned inquiry. This rational, critical and constructive thinking is an indication of the role philosophy can play in sustaining the development of a nation, as well asits essential roles in nation-building (Ojimba and Chukwuma, 2018).

An Overview of the Concept of Development

Development is a buzz word, which has elicited assorted definitions. Basically, it has been understood as “man's ability to appropriate his total essence in a total manner, as a whole man” –“a holistic vision in which man assumes control of his destiny” (Nakpodia, 2011, p. 67). Furthermore, taking a look into the concept of development, Claude Ake maintains that it is “the process by which people create and recreate themselves and their circumstances to realise higher levels of civilisation in accordance with their choices and values" (Ake, 1996, p. 25). In addition to the definitions of development given by Nakpodia and Ake, Haaftan construes it as "a qualitative change" (Haaftan, 1997, p. 5). This is why he defined development as "a process of more or less gradual change, resulting into what can be reconstructed as one or more qualitatively different stages for which the prior stages are necessary conditions" (Haaftan, 1997, p. 18).

John Rawls conceives development from the perspective of improved justice (Rawls, 1972). This perspective of development displaces the focus of development discourse from the popular economic standpoint (Ojimba and Chukwuma, 2018, p. 302-5). The implication of Rawls' view of development is that development cannot be reduced to material needs and progress; it must be extended to human and social well-being. Thus seen, development is conceived by Rawls within the context of self-realisation. This captures exactly the role of philosophy in development. Therefore, philosophy offers the platform for any society or individual to determine or realise itself/himself. This finds practical application in the philosophic courage of Nelson Mandela of South Africa in fighting the apartheid regime in his country during his time.

Development is further viewed by Walter Rodney as economic and political self-reliance. Rodney posits that Africa's underdevelopment is traceable to the menace of colonialism, slavery and western imperialism (Rodney, 1972). Rodney's definition gives the impression that Africa would be developed, if the people are freed from western imperialism and gain a reasonable level of economic and political stability, as well as self-reliance. However, this dream of self-reliance and stability will only materialise, if the philosophical principles of sound-thinking and reasoning are imbibed. This is because, a country can only develop, if the citizens believe in themselves, carefully appropriate their essence and reason within themselves. Philosophy can comfortably furnish the individual and the society with the above capacities.

Some authors view development from the perspective of improved leadership. It was in this respect that Achebe posited that the cause of Nigeria's and, by extension, Africa's underdevelopment is the unwillingness of her leaders to be responsible and rise up to the challenge of personal examples, which are the hallmarks of leadership (Achebe, 1983). Achebe's comment reinforces Plato's position on leadership in *The Republic*: "no country can develop, meaningfully, except philosophers become kings, or kings are led by divine providence to become philosophers" (Plato, 1997). This further buttresses the important role of philosophy in the development questions of Nigeria and Africa, in general. On the other hand, Friedrich Nietzsche gleaned development from the angle of robust and strong "will to power" (Nietzsche, 1967, p. 330). According to him, a society or individual is categorised as "developed" if such individual or society harbors a strong and robust "will to power". This "will to power," for him, is a dynamic and dialectic principle, which is deeply-rooted in the process of endless becoming and interpretation (Nietzsche, 1967). This conception of development gives the impression of endless and continuous struggle. It implies that for a country to develop, properly, such a country or society should not give up in its quest for continuous improvement. Philosophy, no doubt, can furnish a society with the virtues of perseverance and determination, which are the hallmarks of sustainable development.

The Essential Roles of Philosophy in Sustaining Development in Nigeria

Development has to do with qualitative and, sometimes, quantitative changes in the lives of people, group or an individual. At the national level, there is an improvement in the general wellbeing of the people, while at the individual level, this manifests itself in form of "increased skill and capacity, self-discipline, greater freedom, responsibility and material well-being" (Rodney, 1972, p. 9). Philosophy represents a critical tool in the development and growth of any nation. Some people are of the view that philosophy, for instance, engages itself in abstract speculation and, therefore, irrelevant in sustaining development. However, it is our opinion, in this paper, that it is a grave mistake to entertain such thought. This is the reason why Omoregbe argues that "it is a dangerous illusion to think that philosophy has no effect in practical life" (Omoregbe, 2003, p. 193). This paper is an attempt to counter such negative opinions about philosophy as well as project philosophy as the engine of sustainable national development.

One of the factors required for the development of any nation is critical rationality. This requires the members of such society to examine, critically, their actions before taking decisions. This is because a developed nation is nothing but an aggregate of critical minds. This informs the Socratic dictum that "an unexamined life is not worth living." Philosophy instills in the individual, critical rationality and enables him to act accordingly. It enables the individual to do willingly what others would do because of the fear of the law. This brings to mind the Platonic maxim that knowledge is virtue, while vice is ignorance. Philosophy helps the individual develop and act in accordance with the right reason. Thus, the acquisition of philosophic knowledge, in a given society, will certainly enhance positive human knowledge in such society (Anichebe, 2005). This also informed why Plato opines that either philosophers become kings or, kings become philosophers, if orderliness and discipline were to prevail in a society (see Plato, 1997).

The development of a sound moral is a *sine quo non* for the growth of any nation. This is because any nation that is suffering from moral bankruptcy will never attain any meaningful development. Philosophy is a critical factor in the development of good morals in the society, which is an important aspect of sustainable national development. This is because there can be no meaningful development, if the members of the society are morally retrogressive and underdeveloped. "Immorality breeds corruption and irresponsibility, which constitute an obstacle to sustainable national development" (Anichebe, 2005). An unbridled corruption, among the populace, stampedes economic, political and even the social development of any nation. Consequently, only an ethical re-orientation, which philosophy offers, will restore sanity, self-discipline and orderliness in the society, as well as galvanise and mobilise the forces needed for sustainable development.

For any development to be sustainable, even at the level of the individual, there must be a unity of the self within the self. This implies that for a person to develop, for instance, there must be a critical, as well as a constructive self-understanding. This lends credence, once more, to the Socratic dictum that "an unexamined life is not worth living." This emphasises critical self-understanding. Similarly, the state is an extension of the self and this is why Aristotle views it as "a giant person." As an extension of the self, the state also needs a critical understanding of itself in order to institute meaningful and sustainable national development. Philosophy is a very potent tool for self-understanding. This is why Ricoeur (1978) is of the view that "philosophy is a form of critical pedagogy aiming to bring about a democratic economy, just society and good life." These factors are ingredients of sustainable national development. Thus, philosophy provides the forum not only for reflection on our tradition and history, but in determining who we are, and what our prospects for the future are. This is because the moment one understands who he is one can extend such knowledge to the societal level and eventually create a wave of true sustainable national sentiment. Arguably, knowing one's self estimated the finding of a sense of meaning, and understanding the reason for being. But, since the African and, in particular, the average Nigerian, has been influenced by the western values (see Anyaehie and Ojimba, 2020), his ignorance about his reason for being makes him incapable of threshing out the good influences from the bad ones – something that can drive his nation to the desired stability and integrated sustainable development. Philosophy represents the tool for self-understanding and direction as well as a solution out of this maze of confusion (Ikuli and Ojimba, 2019).

A strong philosophy education is very relevant in sustaining the development of a nation and Nigeria, in particular. This is because if the teaching of values at the elementary and secondary levels appears to be very functional, at the university or the tertiary level, it is expected not to be functional anymore, but speculative, meaning, philosophical. This is the reason why Lyotard states that "the teaching of philosophy is generally recognised tobe the basis of all university activity" (Lyotard, 2003, p.8). He explains that "philosophy must restore unity to learning, which has been scattered into separate sciences in laboratories and in pre-university education; it can only achieve this in a language game that links the sciences together as moments in the becoming of spirit, in other words, which links them to a rational narration, or rather meta-narration" (Lyotard, 2003, p. 261).

UNESCO understands the role of philosophy in the sustenance of national development and expresses its importance in the following words: "what is the teaching of philosophy, if not the teaching of freedom and critical reasoning? Philosophy actually implies exercising freedom in and through reflection because, it is a matter of making rational judgments and not just expressing opinions; because it is a matter not justof knowing, but of understanding the meaning and the principles of knowing; because it is a matter of developing a critical mind, rampart par excellence against all forms of doctrinaire passion" (UNESCO, 2007, p. ix). Thus, the programme of UNESCO in integrating philosophy in all levels of knowing, including primary and secondary schools, is worth considering. Nigeria, no doubt, will witness sustained national development, if the teaching of philosophy is adopted at levels of knowing.

The business of philosophy is ideas and ideas are very necessary in understanding ourselves. This is why Adler refers to ideas as basic and indispensable in the understanding of our society as well as the world we live in. He expresses it as such:

> Ideas, as we shall see presently, constitute the vocabularyof everyone's thought. Unlike the concepts of the special sciences, the words that name the great ideas are, all of them, words of ordinary, everyday speech. They are not technical terms. They do not belong to the private jargon of a specialised branch of knowledge. Everyone uses them in ordinary conversation. But, everyone does not understand them as well asthey can be

> understood, nor has everyone pondered sufficiently the questions raised by each of the great ideas. To do that and to think one's way through to some resolution of the conflicting answers to these questions is to philosophise (Adler, 1981, p. 3-4).

In line with the above quotation, philosophy, therefore, aims at the "logical clarification of thoughts… [and being] not a body of doctrine but an activity… [thus a work that] consists essentially of elucidations" (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 30). This means that it is an eye-opener – "it does not result in 'philosophical propositions,' but, rather, in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy, thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: it is, therefore, the task of philosophy to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries" (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 30). This is an indication of how philosophy can be relevant to sustaining national development in Nigeria. Thus, the importance of philosophy in realising our dream for sustainable national development in Nigeria cannot be overemphasised. Oftentimes, the Nigerian politicians use different confusing political ideas, languages and terminologies and invariably end up confusing the electorate, instead of the logical clarification of their political or campaign ideas to the masses. This demonstrates lack of sound philosophic education. This is what often results in political fake promises and confusion of the masses. If the Nigerian electorate, starting at all levels of their political education, as well as the Nigerian politicians, themselves, are exposed to sound philosophic education, the tendency for critical questioning, by the electorate, to the politicians, during their campaigns, and the Nigerian politicians' logical clarification of their political ideas to the electorate, will always be there and will definitely result in sustained commitment to political promises by the Nigerian politicians, which will, in turn, give rise to sustainable national development in the country.

The speed of globalisation and the advancement of technology have made a constant re-examination and reevaluation of our culture in relation to contemporary realities a philosophical imperative (see Oluwagbemi-Jacob and Ojimba, 2018, 76-89). Bearing in mind the dynamism and flexibility of culture, this re-examination will culminate into a synthesis of the past and present for a more humane and civilised culture. Admittedly, philosophy 'serves to challenge a people's view of themselves and their condition as a pre-condition for redefining who they are and what they can be" (cited in Anichebe, 2005, p. 133). This presents the philosopher as a physician of the culture (see Ojimba, 2016, 142-6). Using his analytic, constructive and logical tools, the philosopher purifies the aspects of cultures that have become anachronistic, obsolete and out of touch with contemporary realities (Ojimba, 2016, 142-3). For instance, before now, it was believed (in Africa and some parts of Nigeria) that sickle cell children were possessed by evil spirits (Ogbanje), who use them to torment their parents. Also, in the past, in Nigeria and some other parts of Africa, when a king died, heads of human beings were buried with him, because, it was believed that those human beings would continue to serve him in the grave. Philosophy challenges these pre-established values not as deeply rooted in the nature of things, but as human constructs. With this, philosophy fine-tunes the culture for positive sustainable development.

One of the greatest problems of the world is the phenomenon of terrorism. In Africa, different terrorist groups have emerged with different political and religious undertones. In Nigeria, in particular, the mayhem meted out by Boko Haram to the Nigerian people is unprecedented. In the northern part of Nigeria, people can hardly sleep with their two eyes closed. Incessant slaughtering of people has become the order of the day. Most Nigerians, who lived freely in the north, before this period, have relocated, leaving their hard-earned property because of the fear of losing their lives. Some have been thrown into abject poverty because of this ugly phenomenon. There is no denial that no nation can fully develop and appropriate its total essence and destiny in a situation of fear, war and lack of freedom. This has been a clog in the wheel of development of Africa and Nigeria, in particular. This is moral bankruptcy which is ravaging the country; and it is lack of respect for human dignity. Philosophy, through one of its branches, ethics, can deliver us from this moral bankruptcy and teach us how to respect the sanctity of human life.

Plato recognised the importance of philosophic training and education in piloting the affairs of the state. This is why he was convinced that no nation would freely develop and totally appropriate its destiny, unless philosophers become kings (leaders) or kings (leaders) are led, by divine providence, to become philosophers. Plato's choice of leaders, as philosophers, has become imperative in today's Africa and Nigeria, in particular. Thus, for any leader to truly appreciate the essential ingredients of leadership, such a leader must undergo a thorough philosophic education and training. This is also why Friedrich Nietzsche recommends the superman (the philosopher), who is an embodiment of critical literacy, strength and wisdom (see Ojimba and Bruno, 2019; Oluwagbemi-Jacob and Ojimba, 2018) to pilot the affairs of his time. This underscores the importance of philosophy in development of Africa and Nigeria, in particular.

It is a truism that before any meaningful and sustainable development will take place in any nation, there must be a thorough overhauling and re-orientation of the mind. This is exactly what Nigeria needs at the moment and philosophy offers this essential service. To illustrate, the current ethnic rivalry witnessed in Africa and Nigeria, in particular, is a serious cause for concern. The mass burial that took place, not long ago, in Benue State of Nigeria, only shows nothing but a country without any hope of a meaningful development. The massacre of Benue people, by Fulani herdsmen, depicts a country without a future. A situation where the life of a cow is equal to a human being is unacceptable. The average Fulani man and the average Benue man see themselves as cat and dog. They construe themselves as two parallel lines which can never meet. There is no need saying that no meaningful development can take place in a situation like this. All one needs is a robust dialogue, an ethical re-orientation and attitudinal change. Philosophy, no doubt, can offer all these essential services. This is because, a developed society is nothing but an aggregate of sound minds and philosophy provides this forum for the training of sound, wise and civilised minds. This buttresses the critical role of philosophy in development, and African leaders should devote more resources to the expansion and development of philosophic training and education as no continent can do without philosophy.

The distribution of COVID-19 pandemic palliatives also shows a country, which is in dire need of leadership morality and leadership skill. The hording and siphoning of food items, including the sharing of money, call for serious concern. Mismanagement of funds donated by well-meaning Nigerians and other international organisation indicates a serious decay in the leadership system. This phenomenon presents a picture of a nation clearly lacking in morality. It is a fact that no country can develop, positively, and meaningfully sustain her development, if it is totally lacking in morality. Philosophy, as earlier hinted, through one of its branches, ethics offers this. A developed country is nothing but an aggregate of morally sound minds and philosophy, through ethical orientation and training, offers this moral soundness to the society.

The *end-SARS* protest carried out in Nigeria not long ago by the youth, is an indication that the country is tired of her leadership structure and constant underdevelopment witnessed by it. No sustainable development can be recorded, if the leaders of any nation mortgage the future of their youths, who are the strength of the nation and where police brutality and injustice are the order of the day. It is a fact that no positive changes will be recorded, if the people's consciousness has not reached a certain level of awareness where they can ask critical questions and demand for answers from their leaders. The attainment of this critical stage of consciousness, where vital questions can be asked and answers demanded from the leadership, by the led, regarding some fundamental issues, is where philosophy becomes essential. This is because philosophy instills courage, strength and bravery into the led which results in demanding answers to certain issues of governance and other aspects of life, which ultimately results in positive changes and sustains the tempo of development. This level of consciousness, engineered through philosophic orientation, is exactly where the Nigerian youths are operating, which has resulted in the *end-SARS* protest.

Conclusion

This paper set out to examine the essential roles of philosophy in sustaining development in Nigeria with a view to showing that despite the religious, economic and moral challenges Nigeria is facing today, philosophy can play a crucial role with regards to the sustainability of her development. To accomplish this task, the paper has conceptualised philosophy, articulated the concept of development as well as the essential roles of philosophy in sustaining development in Nigeria. It noted that it is high time Nigerian leaders accorded philosophy its rightful place in the development questions of Nigeria, and until this is properly implemented, the Nigerian State will continue to wallow in the darkness of development.

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THEME TWO
AFRICA AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

AFCFTA AND THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTIONIST NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES: A STUDY OF GHANA AND NIGERIA RELATIONS

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Abstract
The study examined the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), created by the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, which went into force on May 30, 2019 with the major goal of deepening the economic integration of the continent to create a single market similar to the European single market. It employed data derived from secondary sources to conduct a historical and qualitative analysis of relations between Ghana and Nigeria. With the regional integration and rational choice theories as its theoretical foundations, the study found that despite the African Continental Free Trade Agreement and the subsisting 1979 ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of People, Goods and Services, the two countries continue to pursue protectionist economic policies to the detriment of these agreements to which they are signatories. It concluded that the continued protectionist economic policies by member states may become the albatross of the AfCFTA if measures are not taken to encourage member states to jettison such protectionist policies. *Inter alia*, the study recommended that the African Union should lay more emphasis on the continental peer review mechanism to ensure the full cooperation of member states towards the achievement of AfCFTA's lofty goals.
Keywords: Continental free trade agreement, protectionist economic policies, rational choice, regional integration, single market.

Introduction

The idea of an economically integrated Africa could be located in the anti-colonial movements which birthed Pan-Africanism and the philosophy of the brotherhood of all Africans (Kuhnhardt, 2008; UNCTAD, 2015). With the wave of independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the political and economic integration of the African continent was the major driving force of the Casablanca bloc, a major group of African countries comprising Libya, Egypt, Mali, Ghana, Guinea, Algeria and Morocco. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was founded in 1963 as the umbrella body of independent African states, also had the cooperation of all African states as one of its main objectives (Kuhnhardt, 2008; UNCTAD, 2015).

In 1980, the OAU adopted what is referred to as the 'Lagos Plan of Action' which sought to ensure the economic integration of the continent through the promotion of trade amongst African countries. Subsequently, in 1991, the Abuja treaty came into force and it led to the creation of the African Economic Community (AEC), patterned after the European Economic Community (EEC) and which aimed at developing free trade areas on the continent. In 2002, the

OAU metamorphosed into the African Union (AU) and the objectives of the AU revolve around the economic integration of the African continent (Oyeranmi, 2014). The pursuit of these objectives led to the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

For this study, the pursuit of achieving the economic integration of the African continent is a lofty ideal. However, with a focus on Ghana and Nigeria relations, this study argues that past and present realities indicate that the continued protectionist economic policies of African countries may remain the Achilles heel of the AfCFTA.

Theoretical Framework

This study is founded on two main theoretical premises. The first one is the regional integration theory. This theory was popularised by eminent scholars including Ernst Hans, Leon Lindberg, Joseph Nye and Phillipe Schmitter (Schimmelfennig, 2018). Regional integration is defined as "the attainment, within a territory of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population" (Laursen, 2008: p. 4). From this definition, the basic assumptions of the Regional Integration Theory are that regional integration ensures:

- rapid economic development in the integration region;
- the strengthening of the institutions of the integrated states;
- promotion of intergovernmental relations in the region; and
- the enhancements of security, solidarity and stability in the region (Bolanos, 2016; Laursen, 2008; Schimmelfennig, 2018).

For instance, the main objective of the AfCFTAis "create a single market for goods, services, facilitated by movement of persons in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent and in accordance with the Pan African vision of "An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa" enshrined in Agenda 2063" (Onwuka & Udegbunam, 2019). From the basic assumptions of the regional integration theory, it can be inferred that the main purpose of regional integration is to enhance the rapid development of the economies of the states in the integrated region and that of the region as a systemic whole (Bolanos, 2016). This assumption finds full expression in the AfCFTA. As its name and vision show, economic imperatives, more than any other considerations, led to the establishment of the AfCFTA.

This study is also founded on the rational choice theory. Gary Becker is generally regarded as the scholar who developed the theory to become very acceptable to the academic community (Ogu, 2013). While the theory states that individual are responsible for taking rational decisions, this ideas can also be extended to the state as decision makers for the state are expected to be rational beings. The basic argument of the rational choice theory is that decisions are usually taken after the costs and benefits of all possible actions on issues are considered and that the actions with the lowest costs but with the greatest benefits will become the decisions to be taken by decision makers. Thus, only the decisions that will ensure the developments of the state will be taken by the decisions makers (Harris, 2007; Ogu, 2013; Sato, 2013). Though this theory has been criticised for assuming that all decision makers are rational while there are many examples to the contrary, the theory still remains a good analysis framework for understanding the motives behind the decisions making by states.

In the context of this study, the protectionist economic policies of Ghana and Nigeria, despite the fact these countries are signatories to the AfCFTA Agreement and the inhibitions of such protectionist economic policies to the free flow of goods and services in West Africa, can only be as a result of the perceived benefits of such policies to the individual states.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)

African Heads of State and Government, at the 18th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in January 2012, took the decision to establish a Continental Free Trade Area. To actualise the decision taken, African leaders met at an Extraordinary Summit on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which was held in Kigali, Rwanda in March 2018 and in which forty-four (44) countries out of the 55 AU member states signed the Agreement establishing the AfCFTA. Nine (9) other countries subsequently signed the Agreement bringing the total number of signatories to 54 remaining only Eritrea as the country yet to officially endorse the Agreement. The Agreement establishing the AfCFTA went into force on 30 May 2019 and the operational phase was launched in July 2019 in Niamey, Niger (Onwuka & Udegbunam, 2019).

The general objectives of the AfCFTA

The objectives of AfCFTA can be categorised into two: general and specific. On one hand, the general objectives are to:

- create a single market for goods, services, facilitated by movement of persons in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent and in accordance with the Pan African Vision of "An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa" enshrined in Agenda 2063;
- create a liberalised market for goods and services through successive rounds of negotiations;
- contribute to the movement of capital and natural persons and facilitate investments building on the initiatives and developments in the State Parties and RECs;
- lay the foundation for the establishment of a Continental Customs Union at a later stage;
- promote and attain sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development, gender equality and structural transformation of the State Parties;
- enhance the competitiveness of the economies of State Parties within the continent and the global market;
- promote industrial development through diversification and regional value chain development, agricultural development and food security; and
- resolve the challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships and expedite the regional and continental integration processes.

On the other hand, the specific objectives the AfCFTA are to:

- progressively eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods;

- progressivelyliberalise trade in services;
- cooperate on investment, intellectual property rights and competition policy;
- cooperate on all trade-related areas;
- cooperate on customs matters and the implementation of trade facilitation measures;
- establish a mechanism for the settlement of disputes concerning their rights and obligations; and
- establish and maintain an institutional framework for the implementation and administration of the AfCFTA. (Onwuka & Udegbunam, 2019).

The above general and specific objectives of AfCFTA guarantee free movement of persons, goods and services in a bid to deepen integration on the continent. This aspiration is further boosted by the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons which was a major document endorsed by African leaders at the Kigali Extraordinary Summit in 2018.

However, AfCFTA is projected to be of immense benefits to the African continent. As Cofelice (2018: pp. 32-33) succinctly puts it, the implementation of AfCFTA is expected to:

> increase intra-African trade by 52%, compared to 2010 levels, by 2022, thus reducing the gap with intraregional trade quotas currently characterizing Asia (51%), North America (54%) and Europe (67%). In the short term, the main beneficiaries of the AfCFTA would be small and mediumsized enterprises, that today account for 80% of the continent's companies. However, in the medium to long term, the benefits will extend to all African citizens, who will achieve a welfare gain estimated at 16.1 billion dollars, especially favoring women (who currentlymanage 70% of informal cross-border trade) andyoung people,who could benefitfrom new job opportunities. The intra-African economic and commercial growth would mainly affect the industrial and manufacturing sectors, thus demonstrating AfCFTA's potential role in guiding the structural transformation of African countries.

Ghana-Nigeria Relations: A Historical Analysis

Ghana and Nigeria could be described as two of the most important countries in West Africa. Ghana has the distinction of being the first country to gain independence in West Africa (1957). She is a core member of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), which provides the structural framework for the AfCFTA in the West African Sub-Region. She was one of the first set of countries to sign the AfCFTA agreement and she also houses the secretariat of AfCFTA. Nigeria is the most populous African country and the headquarters of ECOWAS is also located in the country. Ghana and Nigeria also have strong historical and cultural ties as the two countries were colonised by Britain.

Despite the strong historical and cultural spheres, Ghana and Nigeria relations have been largely characterised by hostilities to each other's nationals and periodic expulsions and deportations of these nationals as a result of protectionist economic policies. In the early 1900s, Ghana had become the destination of choice for many Nigerians, especially the Yoruba from Southwestern Nigeria, as a result of its stable economy occasioned by the fact that it was the largest producer of cocoa in the world; that cocoa was fetching good prices in the global market; that there was considerable mining of gold and bauxite in the country; and that the buoyant economy made possible widespread and massive construction activities in the country leading to massive job opportunities in the country (Aremu & Ajayi, 2014; Olaniyi, 2007). Aremu and Ajayi (2014) report that Nigerians constituted the largest single group of immigrants in Ghana and because of their business acumen, they became an economic force to be reckoned with in the country leading to jealousy and hostilities by Ghanaians.

Aremu and Ajayi (2014) and Olaniyi (2007) date these hostilities to between 1932 and 1935 when the Okyeman, the traditional council of Akyem Abuakwa in Ghana (then known as the Gold Coast) petitioned the British Colonial Government to deport non-Ghanaians from its area of influence as a result of the refusal of some Nigerians to cooperate with it on the cocoa holdup against European firms. The Okyeman had ordered cocoa traders in Akyem Abuakwa to stop selling cocoa to the European firms in order to curtail the predatory acts of the European firms but some Nigerian cocoa traders refused to abide by this order and continued to sell cocoa to the European firms leading to the notion that Nigerians were collaborating with the Europeans to dominate and exploit Ghanaians. This notion led to the petition of the Okyeman that:

> people from Nigeria and other places should be made amenable to the customary laws of the various states in which they reside and that any act of insubordination on the part of any such strangers should, with the sanction of Government, be punished by deportation. (Aremu & Ajayi (2014: p. 176).

By the late 1960s, Ghana's economy had entered into recession as a result of worsening global prices of cocoa (exportation of cocoa accounted for over 70% of the country's foreign earnings) and high level of corruption and mismanagement in the country leading to job losses, astronomical increases in costs of living and significant decreases in standards of living (Aremu &Ajayi, 2014; Olaniyi, 2007). To shift focus from its ineptitude in arresting the economic downturn and to score political points with Ghanaians, the Ghanaian government made foreign nationals, especially Nigerians, the scapegoats for the economic woes of the country and on the 18th of November 1969, the Dr. Kofi Busia-led government in Ghana issued a Quit Order, which was referred to as the 'Aliens Compliance Order' on non-Ghanaians without requisite residence permits to leave the country within fourteen days or face the wrath of the law (Aremu &Ajayi, 2014; Olaniyi, 2007). The Quit Order stated that:

> It has come to the notice of the Government that several aliens, both Africans and non-Africans in Ghana, do not possess the requisite residence permits in conformity with the laws of Ghana. There are others, too, who are engaging in business of all kinds contrary to the term of their visiting permits. The Government has accordingly directed that all aliens in the first category, that is those without residence permits, should leave Ghana within fourteen days that is not later than December 2, 1969. Those in the second category should obey strictly the term of their entry permits, and if these have expired they should leave

> Ghana forthwith. The Ministry of Interior has been directed to comb the country thoroughly for defaulting aliens and aliens arrested for contravening these orders will be dealt with according to the law (Aremu & Ajayi (2014: p. 177).

Aremu and Ajayi (2014: pp. 177-178) reveal that the Ghanaian government promulgated the Quit Order in order to achieve some key objectives which included:

- the generation of employment opportunities for about 600,000 unemployed Ghanaian nationals;
- the reduction of the balance of payment deficit through the removal of remittances sent home by immigrant workers and traders from their earnings;
- the curbing of economic sabotage occasioned by smuggling activities aliens, especially diamond, and;
- the riddance of the country of lawlessness and crime perpetrated largely by aliens.

The above objectives show that the government intended to salvage the economy through a protectionist policy hinged on the criminalisation of foreigners who, as stated earlier, were majorly Nigerians. Indeed, Dr. Kofi Busia, at an international event was quoted to have said that about 90% of Ghana's prison population and known criminals were foreigners and that the expulsion order was essentially carried out to remove these criminals from Ghana (Aremu & Ajayi, 2014; Olaniyi, 2007). The expulsion order was carried out without due regards for the lives of the foreigners leading to the deaths of some Nigerians and the looting of their property by Ghanaians (Aremu &Ajayi, 2014; Olaniyi, 2007). It is also apposite to state that most Nigerians who had valid residential permits and who were not affected by the expulsion order were subjected to discriminations and unfair treatments including the regulations that they could only work as farmers and labourers and not as traders and that their children must not attend schools (Olaniyi, 2007). However, as noted by Aremu and Ajayi (2014), the protectionist policy did not achieve the desired result of rescuing the Ghanaian economy from its predicaments as the Dr. Kofi Busia government was booted out of office by a military coup on the 13th of January, 1974 with his mismanagement of the economy as the chief reason for his sack (Aremu & Ajayi, 2014).

The Ghanaian experience was replayed in Nigeria fourteen years later. The discovery of crude oil in Nigeria and its exportation in the 1970s greatly boosted her economy and made her the destination point of most West African immigrants. Ghanaians in their thousands poured into Nigeria, due to the push factor as a result of the worsening Ghanaian economy and pull factor hinged on the immense prospects of obtaining employment in Africa's most populous country coupled with the oil boom in the country, especially between 1973 and 1981 when oil enjoyed favourable prices in the global market (Aremu, 2013; Gary-Tounkara, 2015). Many were employed into the teaching services all over the country while thousands also found one menial job or the other to do (Aremu, 2013; Gary-Tounkara, 2015).

However, just like the Ghanaian experience when the fall in the global prices of cocoa triggered an economic recession, the fall of crude oil prices in the global market from 1981 coupled with gross corruption and administrative ineptitude negatively affected the Nigerian economy (Aremu, 2013; Gary-Tounkara, 2015). The economic recession led to massive rise in urban unemployment and growing discontent against the government made the civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari adopt the Kofi Busia strategy of making foreigners, especially Ghanaians the scapegoats for the downturn in the economy (Aremu, 2013; Gary-Tounkara, 2015). On the 17 January 1983, the government announced that all unskilled aliens must leave the country on or before 31 January 1983 while the skilled aliens had until 28 February 1983 to quit the country (Aremu, 2013; Gary-Tounkara, 2015). President Shagari justified his actions when he stated that:

> Many such illegal immigrants were tolerated by Nigeria for humanitarian reasons, but it soon became clear that the activities of many of these immigrants ran counter to the national interest of Nigeria. Besides, the fact that many of them were taking up cheap menial jobs, to the detriment of many Nigerians, and also engaging in criminal and anti-social activities detrimental to the interest of the nation. Many were also engaged in smuggling Nigerian food and other goods to their home countries. It was soon discovered that most of the workers in our factories were illegal aliens. The trend was extended into many professions including teaching, to such an extent that within a short period, even the roadside mechanics, tailors and domestics servants were largely illegal aliens. There was public outcry about this alarming development and the government had to do something at once to control the situation (Gary-Tounkara, 2015: p. 26)

Shagari was quoted to have fingered Ghanaians as the perpetrators of most of the crimes, especially armed robberies, in the country (Aremu, 2013). The above statement credited to Alhaji Shagari was almost identical to the justification given by Kofi Busia when he also served the expulsion notice of 1969 on foreigners residing in Ghana. A cursory study of the Nigerian quit order would reveal that it was a protectionist policy aimed at:

- chasing away foreigners in order to create more jobs for Nigerians;
- maintaining law and order through the expulsion of foreigners who were mainly criminals; and
- eradicating smuggling activities of foreigners.

However, as Aremu (2013) and Gary-Tounkara (2015) aver, the real reasons for Shagari's actions could be located in the bid to score political points with the Nigerian citizens in the 1983 presidential elections by diverting their attention away from the incompetence of the Shagari administration in managing the economy and to show it as being decisive in ensuring the welfare and safety of Nigerians without minding whose ox was gored. It is, however, pertinent to state though Alhaji Shagari succeeded in winning the 1983 Presidential election, he was sacked from office in December 1985 by a coup d'état with the new military regime citing Shagari's mismanagement of the economy as a major impetus for the coup d'état.

In August 2019, the Federal Government of Nigeria announced the closure of Nigeria's land borders. Nigeria shares land boundaries with four Africans countries including Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and the Republic of Benin. However, the Nigeria/Republic of Benin border is considered the most important given the high volume of goods and services that move in and out through the border. The Nigeria/Republic of Benin is also commonly referred to as the Seme border (Mobolaji &Alabi, 2017). The Nigeria government adduced many reasons for its decisions to close the border which included the high rate of smuggling activities through the border, drug trafficking, human trafficking, oil bunkering, and armed robberies, small arms and light weapons trafficking and the need to protect the agro production and manufacturing industries (Golub, Mbaye & Golubski, 2019; Mushi; 2019; Olaifa, 2017; Signe & van der Ven, 2019; Unah, 2019). The border closure could thus be seen as a protectionist economic policy.

The closure of Nigeria's land borders has debilitating effects on the economies of other West African countries as Nigeria is the largest market in West Africa (Ademola, 2017; Enehikhire, 2019; Luke & Masila, 2019). The law of reciprocity has also made the businesses of Nigerians living in other West African countries, especially in Ghana, to suffer losses as the governments of these countries clamped down on the businesses of Nigerians for various reasons (Enehikhire, 2019; Luke & Masila, 2019). Krippahi (2020), Mbewa (2020), Morphy (2020), Nasiru (2020), and Wahab (2020) report that Nigerian traders have become the targets of state sponsored intimidation, harassment, embarrassment and molestation in Ghana with over seven hundred Nigerians deported on charges of criminalities, a replay of the 1969 experience when Nigerians were stereotyped as criminals in Ghana. Adepegba (2020) gives good insight into the issue when he reported that:

> This is not the best of times for Nigerian traders in Ghana whose businesses are facing existential threats following the insistence of the authorities in that country that they must have $1m business equity, among other requirements, before they can continue operating their commercial ventures in the former Gold Coast. The authorities premised their demand on the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre 2013, Act 865. According to Section 27(1) of the Act, a person who is not a (Ghanaian) citizen or an enterprise, which is not wholly-owned by a citizen "shall not invest or participate in the sale of goods or provision of services in a market, petty trading or hawking or selling of goods in a stall at any place."… On its face value, the Ghanaian government may be applauded for protecting and preserving the livelihood of the generality of its citizens from being taken over by foreigners as it has happened in Nigeria and other African countries, where the retail business is largely dominated by foreigners. However, the crude manner in which the Ministry of Trade and the Ghana Union of Traders Association have been going about the enforcement of the law gives the impression that it is targeted at Nigerians, who are perceived to have the upper hand in the local market space in Ghana.

For Krippahi (2020) and Mbewa (2020), the treatment being meted out to Nigerians, especially Nigerian traders is a direct consequence of the border closure policy of the President Buhari-led administration in Nigeria. Krippahi (2020) points out that the Foreign Minister of Ghana, Shirley Ayorkor Botchwey, had blamed Nigeria for hurting Ghana's businesses through the border closure policy. In the same vein, Mbewa (2020) avers that Nigeria's border closure policy impacted negatively on businesses in Ghana. The alleged harassments and molestations of Nigerian traders could thus be seen as Ghana's reaction to the Nigeria's border closure policy. It is, however, instructive to note that since 2005, Ghanaian investors and manufacturers have been decrying Nigeria's consistent ban on the importation of about 96 items, including textile and plastics, from Ghana and this ban has created trade tensions between the two countries (Ademola, 2017). It is also noteworthy that general elections will hold in Ghana in December 2020 and the stance taken by the Ghanaian government against Nigerian traders might not be unconnected with the bid to endear itself with Ghanaian voters (Krippahi, 2020).

Implications of Protectionist National Economic Policies on AfCFTA

As shown in the relations between Ghana and Nigeria, protectionist national economic policies are inimical to the ideals of regional integration. The AfCFTA will not be the first initiative to ensure regional integration in Africa and protectionist national economic policies have always been the nemesis of regional integration initiatives. A good example is the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) which was established in 1975 with the chief objective of promoting the economic integration of West African states through the removal of hindrances to free movement of people, goods and services in the sub region. To accelerate the achievement of this objective, in 1979, West African states signed the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of People, Goods and Services (Opanike & Aduloju, 2015). However, as Ademola (2017) notes, the protectionist economic policies of West African States, especially Ghana and Nigeria, have been the major challenge to the aspirations of ECOWAS and if states continue to make and implement such policies, then the success of the AfCFTA initiative becomes doubtful.

It is worthy to note that the success of regional integration initiatives is largely a function of the internal dynamics of the member states of such regions. As Kuhnhardt (2008) and Oyeranmi (2014) observe, the European Union (EU) is widely regarded as the most successful regional integration exercise in the world today. Kuhnhardt (2008) further posits that the EU's success is hinged on the fact that all its member states are fully democratised with their leaders operating on the norms of transparency, accountability and responsibility. True democratic norms across national borders create the necessary environment for regional integration initiatives to flourish. From the study of Ghana and Nigeria, lip services are paid to democratic norms and African leaders often resort to the usage of protectionist national economic policies to divert attention from their ineptitude and mismanagement and to score cheap political points. Thus, the axiom that 'two heads are better than one' only holds true when the two heads are good heads but in a situation where one head is good while the other is bad or where the two heads are bad, failure becomes inevitable. Indeed, “weak states only produce weak integration” (Kuhnhardt, 2008: p. 5).

From the above, if good governance is not ensured in the countries that have endorsed the AfCFTA Agreement, the achievement of its objectives becomes impossible.

Conclusion

There are immense benefits accruable from the implementation of the AfCFTA mandate.

This study, from the examination of Ghana and Nigeria relations, however showed that the main challenge to the successful implementation of AfCFTA is the tendency of African states to make and implement protectionist national economic policies which are inimical to regional integration pursuits.

Governments in Africa also adopt protectionist national economic policies as a political strategy to gain political legitimacy after years of misrule.

Recommendations

To ensure the successful implementation of AfCFTA, there is the need to encourage the establishment, entrenchment and sustenance of democratic values and norms all over the African continent just as it exists in Europe. The building of democratic and strong institutions in African states would guarantee the success of regional integration schemes in Africa just like European experience.

There is also the need to encourage and sponsor researches into the challenges and prospects of AfCFTA. The nexus between scholarship and regional integration programmes would ensure the continual enlightenment of governments and peoples on the gains derivable from such programmes. It would also ensure that challenges are easily identified and solutions recommended proactively.

Governments and leaders in Africa should also develop the political will to implement and achieve the objectives of AfCFTA without considering short and selfish political interests and gains.

The African Union's peer review mechanism should also be given the mandate to review the commitments of African governments to the AfCFTA's objectives and appropriate sanctions be imposed on erring governments.

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GLOBALISATION, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND GREEN ECONOMY IN AFRICA

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Abstract
Contemporary trading activities have changed due to the internationalization of production and distribution of goods and services and increasing flows of capital and investment which strengthen trade across the world. Today, less attention has been on the influence of globalisation on the activities of Multinational Corporations on the human environment in Africa.This study seeks to examine the relationship between globalisation, Multinational Corporations and the green economy in Africa. Besides, data for this study were obtained from secondary sources such as textbooks, journals and internet sources while content analysis was employed to analyse the data collected.This study argues that globalisation of production in contemporary International Economic Relations is promoted by Multinational Corporations whose activities have further led to the increasing levels of environmental pollution in Africa. Also, this study argues that the unregulated trade activities in Africa by MNCs is having damaging consequences on the environment as most African countries will have to reduce their environmental laws to lure Multinational Corporations (MNCs) to invest in their country which has further affected Africa's quest for Green economy. Lastly, African Union should develop new policy frameworks that will ensure that Multinational Corporations activities are environmentally friendly and are in compliance to global best practices as existing environmental laws in most African countries are ineffective to cope with contemporary environmental realities.

Keywords: Globalisation, Multinational Corporations, Green Economy, Trade, Africa

Introduction

Trading activities in recent years has changed by the internationalisation of production and distribution of goods and services and increasing flows of capital and investment which strengthen trade across the world. Between 1945 and 1985, bulk of the trading activities occurred among developed countries of the world. By the 1980s, trading arrangements around the world have changed significantly as some developing countries were in a debt crisis. Thus, these developing countries, especially from Africa, Asia and Latin America, began to liberalise their economies by removing all forms of trade restrictions and promote import substitution to increase the volume of their trade (Tussie &Woods, nd).

Besides, there is a growing concern among state actors that there is no conflicting interest between international trade and environmental regulation. Today, some states are in the dilemma of whether to assess environmental degradation from the perspective of the production process or finished point. According to the environmentalists, the production process is fundamental in deciding the impact on the environment due to increasing trading activities. Thus, environmentalists have been advocating for the inclusion of production process managements (PPMs) into trade agreements. On the contrary, scholars who have argued that discrimination based on the production process would lead to discriminatory tendencies in the international market (Williams, 2001: p. 5).

All over the world, policymakers are faced with two interrelated challenges that focus on how to achieve structural change in a bid to promote higher productivity that is socially all-encompassing and that will link their economic development strategies with the environment. Thus, identifying the need to incorporate both the national objectives and to make industrial policy that is environmentally friendly is considered for engagement. This effort by states set the pace for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN 2015; Altenburg & Rodrik, 2017: p. 8).

What is known as Green Economy emerged in the middle of the global financial crisis when the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) called for a global Green New Deal, that will encourage countries to support the economic transformation to a greener economy. After the Rio+20 conference in 2012, Green Economy has become a concept of discussion in various conferences, seminars and workshops across the world. Today, the idea of a green economy is promoted by donors and governments.

Moreover, studies have shown that Africa's contribution to global emission stood at 2-3 per cent of the world's carbon dioxide emissions from energy and industrial sources when compared to the countries from the global north. But the African continent remains the most vulnerable continent in the world to the impacts of climate change such as the decrease in food production, flooding, drought, loss of biodiversity and changes in natural ecosystems. Today, Africa is experiencing increasing temperature of about 0.7°C with the tendency of the future rise in temperatures (United Nations Climate Change Conference 2006).

The foremost factors that trigger Green Economy in Africa are the availability of high diversity of natural resources such as agriculture, tourism and bio-trade, the immense need for new energy sources and an abundance of natural capital especially from donor financing for Green Economy. Today, a green economy is regarded by states across the globe as a *desideratum* in addressing the increasing challenges of climate change, poverty, pollution, health and any number of goals towards improving the human standard of living and the environment.

Furthermore, questions such as should African countries achieve economic growth and development by first polluting or degrading the environment and later on clean up? Or should African countries leap the pollution and environmental degradation stage in their economic growth and development? Or is it likely for African countries to change the direction of economic growth and development as well as degradation relationship in the continent? (Olusanya & Musa, 2018).

On the whole, countries across the world, especially in Africa, are not left out as they are beginning to show commitment towards transiting to a Green Economy which has formed part of their national policy by adopting "green growth" or "low carbon" economic plans. Some countries that are making progress in this regard include Namibia, South Africa, Ghana, China, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa, Nigeria and Uganda. Hence, this study seeks to examine the relationship between globalisation, Multinational Corporations and the green economy in Africa.

Conceptual Review: Globalisation, Multinational Corporation and Green Economy

The concept of globalisation has been variously defined in the social science literature by scholars and researchers alike. The term "globalisation "has been variously defined in the literature by scholars. Mansbach and Rafferty (2008) assert that globalisation involves those processes that join people universally together, thereby producing worldwide interdependence and featuring the rapid and large-scale movement of persons, things, and ideas across sovereign borders. Again, Mansbach and Rafferty (2008) identified seven key features of globalisation to include:

- the spread of global communication;
- the growing competence of ordinary people and their participation in global politics;
- the emergence of a global market;
- the worldwide diffusion of secular and consumerist culture;
- the emergence of English as the language of globalisation;
- the widening demand for democratic institutions and norms; and
- the networkingof groups to form a nascent global civil society (Mansbach & Rafferty 2008:744).

According to Field, and Field (2009: p. 7) the term globalisation is used to refer to the "perceived changes that are taking place in the world economy, including the rapid growth of trade among nations, privatisation of economic institutions, massive international flows of financial capital, and growth in the number and size of Multinational Corporations".

However, the term "Multinational Corporations" has been a contestable concept in the International Political Economy, when it first gained prominence among scholars in the 1970s. The term "Multinational Corporation (MNCs)" (Spero & Hart 2007) is often used interchangeably with transnational corporations (TNCs), transnational enterprises (TNEs) (O'Brien & Williams, 2007), multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Dunning 1998), international firms and global corporations (Barnett & Muller, 1975)**.** O'Brien & Williams (2007) in their submission assert that most scholars have not made a clear distinction between these terms and have settled for one terminology without any reflecting on the implications of these terms. multinational corporation (MNCs) is also used interchangeably with global corporations which is refers to large scale firms. Richard Barnett was the first scholar to have popularised the concept of "Global Corporations" in the 1970s (Barnett & Muller, 1975)**.** Barnett and Muller (1975) emphasis were on the global outlook of large firms in terms of the impact of their activities.

O'Brien & Williams (2007, p. 178) have argued that the term transnational corporations

(TNCs) reflected the United Nations usage and that scholars who supported the usage of this term "Multinational" give an erroneous impression that they consist of the merger of capital from more than one country, with a few exceptional cases. They further argued that the term transnational corporations (TNCs) or transnational enterprises (TNEs) reflect more precisely that these firms are usually owned and controlled by citizens of more than one country in a bid to engage in direct production activities oversea. Heywood (2007, p. 149) sees TNC as a company that controls economic activity in two or more countries, the parent company usually being incorporated in one state (the 'home'), with subsidiaries in others ('host'). Although, subsidiaries may be separately incorporated affiliates.

Mansbach and Rafferty (2008, p. 744) see transnational corporations (TNCs) as economic enterprises with operations in two or more countries. To O'Brien & Williams (2007), TNCs are firms that own and control production (value-added) facilities in two or more countries. This definition implies that TNCs must not be necessarily large in size, resources, organisational structure and influence. Similarly, Dunning (1992, p. 3) sees MNCs as "an enterprise that engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) and that owns or controls value-added activities in more than one country". Again, in the submission of Dunning (1998), MNEs activity has widened and deepened (market-seeking and natural-seeking FDI to efficiency and strategic-asset-seeking FDI) firms that have to reappraise their locational strategies.

Similarly, Goldstein and Pevehouse (2008, p. 16) see MNCs "as companies that span multiple countries with greater resources, and operate internationally with greater efficiency, than many small states". Notwithstanding, the term, multinational corporation (MNCs) is the commonly used terms in many International Political Economy literature today. For instance, Heywood (2007) buttressed this assertion that TNC is generally preferred as MNC because it reflects the extent to which corporate strategies and processes transcend national frontiers rather than merely crossing them.

On the whole, the concepts 'Green Economy' and 'Green Growth' is still vague in the African milieu as a significant population of Africans are living without access to modern energy which is fundamental in lifting millions of African living in poverty in relative terms. Today, the concepts of 'Green Economy' and 'Green Growth' are deliberated and defined in by different institutions. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) sees Green Economy as one which is "low carbon, resource-efficient and socially inclusive" (UNEP, 2011, p. 16). Bapna and Talberth (2011) define a green economy as "an alternative vision for growth and development; one that can generate growth and improvements in people's lives in ways consistent with sustainable development." They added that "a Green Economy promotes a triple bottom line: sustaining and advancing economic, environmental and social well-being".

Literature Review

There is growing research on globalisation, multinational corporation, and Green economy in the International Political Economy in recent years. Death (2014) in his study of the green economy in South Africa identified four alternatives to the green economy such as Green revolution, Green growth, Green transformation and Green resilience in politics of the Green economy in South Africa. Death study is significant to this study, because of its significant contributions to the existing literature on South African green economy. However, there is a gap in the literature that examines the relationship between globalisation, multinational corporations and the green economy in Africa.

Narayan and Narayan (2010) examined the existence of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) in 43 developing countries between 1980-2004 in which they adopted the short-run and long-run income elasticity. The study revealed that long-run income elasticity is smaller when compared to the short-run income elasticity and there is the presence of EKC or inverted U relationship between carbon emission and economic growth. However, Perman and stern (2003) used the panel co-integration to examine the existence of in 74 countries. The study did not support the presence of the (EKC). Nevertheless, these studies do not examine the relationship between globalisation, multinational corporations and the green economy in Africa.

Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2001) examined the relationship between carbon emissions and per capita GDP for OECD counties from 1960-1990. The study did not discover the presence of EKC. Azomahou, Laisney, and Van (2006) used a non-parametric approach to examine the existence of the EKC hypothesis in 100 countries between 1960-1996. The study revealed that there are EKC in some of the countries studied. However, these studies do not examine the relationship between globalisation, multinational corporations and the green economy in Africa.

Charfeddine and Mrabet (2017) used Pedroni panel co-integration test and Granger causality in panel VECM framework to estimate the EKC hypothesis for 15 Middle East and North African countries between 1975–2007. The study revealed that real GDP per capita shows an inverted U-shaped relationship with EF in oil-exporting countries. Charfeddine and Mrabet (2017) study validates the EKC hypothesis. For the non-oil-exporting countries, the relationship between EF and economic growth is U-shaped, hence EKC is not supported. However, Charfeddine and Mrabet (2017) study does not examine the relationship between globalisation, multinational corporations and the green economy in Africa.

Olubusoye and Dasauki (2018) in their study investigated the presence of an inverted U relationship often referred to as the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) in 20 countries in Africa. The study revealed that in the short run Benin, Burkina-Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia and Mali, GDP has a positive effect on carbon emission but only Benin, Burkina Faso are statistically significant while Liberia Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Senegal have negative consequences on carbon emissions in the short run.

Today, countries in the world are beginning to recognise that improving the human environment is central to human welfare. Besides, the scaling up of the negative impact on globalisation on green economy in recent years has become a source of concern to policymakers. Some studies have demonstrated the relationship between international trade and environmental degradation (O'Brien and Williams, 2007, p. 357). But there nearly absence of research on the relationship between globalisation, MNCs and green economy in Africa. This has further necessitated our interest in this research on ways of improving the human environment. Hence, this study seeks to examine the relationship between globalisation, multinational corporations and the green economy in Africa.

Theoretical Framework

There are various theories and models developed by scholars from International Political Economy, Environmental Economics and Environmental Sciences to the study of globalisation, multinational corporation and green economy. For instance, Momoh (2015) used the business conflict theory to study globalisation and corruption in Africa. Again, Momoh (2016) identified liberal theories such as product cycle theory developed by Raymond Vernon (1966) in his work *International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle,* OLI model developed by John Dunning, Oligopoly theory of Foreign Investment and a radical/Marxist theory developed by Stephen Hymer (1979) in his work titled: “The Multinational Corporation: A Radical Approach” used by scholars and researchers to study the activities of multinational corporations and foreign direct investment.

Thomas and Callan (2007, pp. 13-15) used the circular flow model that shows the monetary flows of economic activity through the factor market and the output market. They also used the Materials Balance Model that positions the circular flow within a larger schematic to show the relationships between economic decision making and the environment in their study of the role of economics in environmental management.

This study uses the Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA). Field and Field (2002) define "Impact" as the effects of any proposed policy (Field and Field, 2002, p.113). Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA) entails the study of the totality of the environmental repercussion emanating from a course of action or policy on the environment.Economic Impact Analysis focuses on how environmental actions (a new law, technological advancement/innovation, etc.) affect an economic system in whole or parts. Besides, cost-effectiveness analysis involves the estimation of various alternatives option to compare the costs of the available options.

Field and Field (2002, p. 115) assert that cost-effectiveness analysis entails taking a given objective and costs out various alternative ways of attaining the objective. Moreover, damage assessment entails the act of public ownership of natural resources in which the citizens can be sued when they are responsible for releasing harmful substances that injurious to the environment. The goal of embarking on damage assessment is to estimate the value or extent of damages done to the environment by the citizens to know the amount can be recovered from the citizens who are liable for this act by the courts. Lastly, benefit-cost analysis focuses on estimating the revenue using market analysis. It compares expected revenue from the environment with anticipated costs (Field and Field, 2002, pp.114-118).

Globalisation, Multinational Corporations and Green Economy in Africa

There is a debate between liberal political economists and environmentalists on the benefits from and the cost of international trade. On one hand, the liberal political economists, have argued that any attempt by the state or non-state actors at ensuring that trade is used to promote environmental standards will distort the existing market system. On the other hand, the environmentalists have argued that the use of trade to promote environmental standards will assist in correcting all the problems associated with market failures due to the inability of the market system to compensate for the damages its has caused the environment due to excessive mineral exploration and exploitation especially by MNCs in the chemical industries (Kegley & Blanton, 2011, pp. 584-585).

Many African countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Namibia and Rwanda have considered green economy investment in recent years as one of the channels through which they can achieve economic growth and development that is sustainable, inclusive, and transformative (Klein, et al 2013).Over the years, African countries namely Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Benin, Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda have developed their national sustainable consumption and production programmes and national green economy strategies with key priority areas of engagement. For instance, Ghana has developed policies on sustainable development and green economy for Ghana to transition to a green economy through the advancement of sustainable consumption and production practices known as "Ghana Goes Green" and Ethiopia has developed a Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) strategy, based on its Growth and Transformation Plan (2011-2015) (AfDB, 2012; (https://_Hlk50619041 www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/news/six-african-countries-switch-green-business-development-sustainable-growth_Hlk50619041).

Studies have shown that globalisation of production led by multinational corporations have led to the increasing levels of environmental pollution globally as global assessment report shows that nearly 60 per cent of the world's ecosystem services were degraded or used unsustainably. Level of income inequality between citizens in the global north and global south have increased between 1990 and 2005 in more than two-thirds of countries across the world. While it is a truism that Africa continent contributes 2-3 per cent of global emission suffer more than the global north countries that produce more carbon dioxide (Co2) emission to the global environment (Bapna & Talberth, 2011).

Also, global statistics have shown that global material extraction has doubled in the last 30 years, from around 36 billion tonnes in 1980 to almost 85 billion tonnes in 2013, with an overall growth of 132 per cent (Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2016). Subsequently, environmental degradation has equally increased. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report 2014 has further shown that global annual Co2 emissions will need tobe reduced 42 to 57 per cent by 2050, relative to 2010, and 73 to 107 per cent by 2100 (IPCC, 2014; Altenburg & Rodrik, 2017, pp. 5-6).

It is pertinent to note that the increasing level of poverty and environmental degradation in recent years has been traced to the failure of succession market and institutional that has made the economic model unable to promote sustainable development goals. There are far less framework that would ensure that polluters (in this context multinational corporations) to pay the full cost of their pollution in Africa. Bapna and Talberth (2011), in their study, show that there are "missing markets" which implies that *"markets do not systematically account for the inherent value of services provided by nature, like water filtration or coastal protection.*"

Besides, "market economy" based on a prevailing international economy that is characterised by various degrees of uncertainty is considered ineffective in providing essential public goods and services that will enhance the human standard of living (Bapna & Talberth, 2011). This is because, in many economies today, economic policies are usually designed by political actors, who are driven by certain interests and in most cases will not represent the interest of the citizens living in poverty. It is against this background that the concept of the green economy is designed to provide therapy to the challenges created by market and institutional failures through various of institutional reforms and protocols, tax reforms, and expenditure-based economic strategies.

Moreover, the pursuit of trade liberalisation by state actors has rather enhanced than lead to environmental degradation while others have argued that the quest for trade liberalisation by state actors have promoted unsustainable pattern of production and consumption (O'Brien and Williams, 2007, p. 357) which is detrimental to the environment. Today, there is a rising concern, especially among radical scholars that the use of trade to promote green economy has arguably been seen as a mechanism or strategy by the global north to hinder Africa's growth and development by obstructing African countries from gaining access to the global north market and keep the African continent perpetually under-developed.

Besides, Scologists have also argued that trading activities especially by MNCs in Africa, over the years, have further worsened the state of environmental degradation in the continent. Besides, it can be said that the continues unregulated and blatant disregard for environmental standards and regulations in many African countries such as Nigeria, Algeria, Gabon, Libya, Algeria and Egypt, just to mention few, by MNCs is having damaging consequences on the ecosystem of Africa. This is because, as MNCs expand their production beyond national frontiers. The home countries to these MNCs (usually the global north countries) whose resources base have depleted or have passed strict environmental laws to protect their environment will have to relocate to places like Africa for their production process, in ways shift the environmental burden from their home countries to their host countries in Africa.

The implication of this is that when these MNCs violate environmental rules and regulations, at the end African natural environment will deplete to the point that it will lead to various health hazards, land, water and air pollution. As it stands today, the activities of MNCs in the chemical industry in Africa is having damaging effects on the environment while home countries of these MNCs natural environment will be conserved while Africa's environment will be suffering from environmental degradation.

Also, unregulated production processes in Africa by MNCs have had affected African natural environment in recent years. This is encouraged by the massive relocation of MNCs from the global north with high environmental standard to the global south especially Africa with low environmental standards. Over the years, many global south countries especially in Africa such as Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Algeria and Libya just to mention a few have lowered their environmental standards to lure multinational corporations (MNCs) to invest in their country. For instance, in Nigeria oil-rich Niger Delta region where there is the high level of oil exploitation and exploration, environmental regulations are often not respected by multinational corporations (MNCs) leading to environmental degradation in the region. These violations of environmental rules and regulations by multinational corporations (MNCs) which engages in oil exploration and exploitation across African countries which have further added to global environmental challenges.

Another implication of this is that African countries such Nigeria, Angola, Libya and Ghana have become the major recipient of pollution while the home country of these oil multinational corporations (MNCs) and other countries enjoy the production benefits at the detriment of the immediate environment of African countries and the global environment at large without suffering any loss emanating from environmental degradation especially on the immediate environment. This study argues that there is a need to develop and amend contemporary policy frameworks by state actors to regulate international trade.

Field and Field (2009, p. 7) in their submission assert that "*the global issues that are thrusting itself into the world`s consciousness is the greenhouse effect, the build-up of heat-trapping gases in the earth`s atmosphere that is producing long-run changes in global climate.*" From the above submission, it can be deduced that there is the urgent need of the international community to address the growing environmental problem facing the world which is a pointer that there are the environmental implications of globalisation.

Today, many citizens around the world have pointed out the potential downside of globalisation, one part of which may be the degradation of natural environments in developing countries. Globalisation has become a dynamic concept, such that sometimes it is hard to cut through the rhetoric and identify the substantive issues that are involved. One aspect of globalisation is the substantive increase that has occurred in the volume of trade among nations. Today, there is a consensus among scholars on the implications of the increases volume of trade on environmental from developed and developing countries. International trade in goods and services has been regarded as an engine of growth for the countries involved. Some people take the view that the long-run environmental implication of this is positive. Many others feed that unrestricted trade will have severe environmental consequences.

Another aspect of globalisation is the growth of MNCs forms and the relocation of industrial firms from developed to developing countries. Environmental regulations are often less stringent in the letter than in the former. The fear is that some developing countries could become pollution havens, places to which forms move to have to spend less on pollution control measures. For instance, South Africa is the home to the highest number of multinational corporations in the African continent (Momoh, 2015).

Consequently, in 2010 South Africa recorded the highest amount of emissions put at 9.2 tons of Co2 emissions (tCo2e) per capita when compared to countries such as India with 1.7 tons of Co2 emissions (tCo2e), Brazil with 2.2 tons of Co2 emissions (tCo2e), China with tons of Co2 emissions (tCo2e) and the UK with 7.9 tons of Co2 emissions (tCo2e). Similarly, South Africa National Development Planning admitted that South Africa has since the 19th century engaged in mineral exploration and exploitation without taking cognisance of the environment (Death, 2014, p. 2). The implication of this is that South Africa contributed in a no small measure to the total amount of global Co2 emissions (tCo2e). Therefore, this call for policy redirection that is geared towards promoting a green economy.

Today, South Africa is rated as one of the leading green economies in the African continent (Dual Citizen, 2012, p. 5). Also, South Africa is regarded as one of the prominent countries in the world that are committed to achieving sustainable development and adopt environmental diplomacy (Death, 2011). Similarly, Namibia a country in the Southern African sub-region has developed a policy framework that will transit its economy into green by managing its natural resources to produce economic, social, and environmental reimbursements. The Namibian government on its part has granted Namibians the rights to use wildlife and other natural resources in a way that will not be detrimental to the entire ecosystem. To sustain this effort the Namibian government is showing commitment by ensuring that Namibians in rural areas especially vulnerable groups such as women are provided with food, and are employed as well as provided with other necessities of life in a bid to reduce the pressure of Namibians on wildlife and other natural resources. One of the benefits of these efforts at promoting a green economy is that it promoting the conservation of the environment as there is an increase in the population of wildlife (Altenburg & Rodrik, 2017).

Conclusion

This study examined the relationship between globalisation, multinational corporations and the green economy in Africa. This study argued that many African countries are looking forward to green economy investment as one of the ways through which they can implement a number of programmes that are geared towards transiting to the green economy but this effort has been impeded by the unregulated production process in Africa by MNCs which is affecting African ecosystem. Besides, Africa's quest for the green economy is further impeded by African states by lowering their environmental standards in a bid to encourage FDI by MNCs in their respective countries which have further affected Africa's quest for green economy. On the whole, this has further resulted in absence of no general rule to achieve a transition to a green economy and the weakening of green economy policies that are in most cases not included within the national developmental framework in many African countries.

Recommendations

- Firstly, the African Union should develop new policy frameworks that will ensure that multinational corporations operating in Africa production processes as well as finished products are environmentally friendly and are in compliance with global best practices.
- Secondly, the African Union should pass a resolution that will be adopted and ratified by its members' states that will provide for similar environmental standard and regulations among African states.
- Thirdly, African countries should individually make a strong commitment towards reducing their GHG emission by getting an increase in fuel conservation and efficiency, switching to low-carbon fuel, and reducing the use and emission of chemicals with high greenhouse impact.

Also, the government at all levels of governance in African states need political commitment for sustainable development, climate change mitigation and adaption as it remains key to achieving a green economy.

Furthermore, for African countries to promote the transition within the framework of sustainable economic development to green economy. They should bring the various government ministries concerned with economic growth and development as well as private sector actors on board.

Lastly, there is a need for African countries to change in both technological by switching to move fuel-efficient equipment and low- carbon fuels and change in driving habits and the adoption of less energy-intensive lifestyles.

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THEME THREE
SOCIAL POLICIES AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES: A PANACEA TO HOUSING RELIEF IN THE TERTIARY INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC BIDA, NIGER STATE, NIGERIA

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Abstract
The paper examined on how cooperative societies operating as a panacea to housing relieve in the tertiary institution in Nigeria. The Federal Polytechnic Bida, Niger State .There are five cooperative societies in the polytechnic .These are: CT&CS society, MASS cooperative society, SENSTAFF cooperative society, G16 cooperative society and Halal cooperative society. Random Sampling technique was adopted in selection of 355 members of cooperative societies. Data collected were analyzed using descriptive analysis, cross tabulation, charts and Pearson's moment correlation. The study reveals that majority of the respondents have benefited from the housing loan which amount to 91.27% while only 8.73% said they do not benefit from the housing loan. This implies that the cooperative societies have major role on housing relieve in the study area. It was found out amongst others that G-16 cooperative society records highest amount of housing loan disbursement between years 2015 and 2019 with ₦234,301,186, ₦196,021,000, ₦211,410,111, and ₦331,018,131. It also reveals that the Pearson's for the correlation between the total annual housing loan disbursements and total annual number of housing loan beneficiaries variables is -0.483 which means that changes in total annual housing loan disbursements have weak negative correlation with changes in total annual number of housing loan beneficiaries of the cooperative societies in the Polytechnic. It therefore recommended amongst others that management interference with cooperative fund recovery should be totally discouraged henceforth, so that enough capital can be made available at the disposal of the cooperative societies for the cooperative members housing loan disbursement. Also there is the need for the cooperative societies in the Polytechnic to look inward to their fund raising portfolio through linkage with other financial institutions. It is also recommended that cooperatives societies should setup a committee of experts who should be proactive in resolving all contending cooperative issues of loan applications by cooperative members in terms of complaints that are generated from time to time.

Keywords: Cooperative society, panacea, Relieve housing, tertiary

Introduction
Housing represents a critical component in the social and economic structures and constitutes one of the basic human needs of all nations (Kabir and Bustani, 2008). Its provision has always been of great necessity to man. As a unit of the environment, housing has profound

influence on the health, efficiency, social behaviour, satisfaction and general welfare of the community. It is a reflection of the cultural, social and economic values of a society and one of the best historical evidences of the civilisation of a country (Adedeji and Olotuah, 2005).

A generally accepted principle, enshrined in international conventions and resolutions is that all citizens, particularly the marginalised have a right to access adequate housing at an affordable cost. Specifically, Article 25 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, points out that housing is a necessary social service for every citizen. In 1976, the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), endorsed by 140 countries, considers housing part of a larger right to an adequate standard of living (Edgar, Doherty and Meert, 2002).

The Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1988, lays considerable emphasis on "enabling" strategies to meet shelter needs. The Strategy recognises that governments are unable to provide shelter for the majority of their populations, but play an important role in providing a framework which enables the private and community sectors to provide housing (UN-Habitat, 2006).

In Nigeria, several housing schemes have evolved over the years; embarked upon by government and private corporations at various levels, in an attempt to provide shelter for its citizens; yet housing problems have become persistent especially for public servants in the country. Housing problem stems from quantitative to qualitative, the effect of which reflects on the social, economic as well as cultural statues of users and leads to pressures for cost reduction rather than value maximisation for the construction industry (Kabir and Bustani, 2008).

Statement of Problem

The provision of decent, affordable and qualitative housing for the teeming population had been a cardinal objective of various governments across the world (UN-Habitat, 2010; Nguluma, 2016, Olayinka, Abiodun, Adebayo, Akunnaya and Ayodeji, 2017). Despite this, housing problem in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions remains almost intractable particularly in developing countries, most especially in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America.

Nigeria's diverse housing problems revolve around over-crowding and slum housing. Many Nigerians cannot afford decent homes. They live in contraptions that can only be called 'Shelter' and not 'Housing'. Government, over time, has intervened in the housing sector by increasing housing stock through the construction of housing estates and through its mortgage institutions which facilitated the disbursement of housing loans. These measures have done little to address the situation. On the other hand, houses provided by the private sector operators are out of the economic reach of even the medium income earner. An effective and realistic strategy for providing decent houses in decent environments at decent prices is, therefore, crucial (Oyewole, 2010).

Odurn and Ibem (2011) noted that fewer studies have been carried out on the processes undertaken by group buyers in the alternative land and housing delivery systems in Nigeria. The study opined further that; group buyers such as cooperative societies can be considered most appropriate organisations that can assist government in meeting the targets set under the 1991

National Housing Policy aimed at ensuring that the disadvantaged people gain access to decent housing. According to Babade (2007), to adequately house the urban population in Nigeria, a conservative figure of 409,227 housing units should have been constructed in 1990. Due to neglect, the figure rose to 783,042 units in 1995; 1,333,176 units in the year 2000; 1,543,318 units in 2003 and 2,171,603 units in 2010.

Based on the above, Oyewole (2010) and Yakub, Salawu and Gimba (2012), proposed the involvement of cooperative societies in housing development as an urgent step needed to be backed by governments, to bring about the much needed transformation in the Nigerian housing sector. Hence, these necessitate this study to critically look into the housing provision through cooperative societies in the Nigeria Tertiary Institution, Federal Polytechnic Bida, Niger State, Nigeria.

Aims and Objectives

The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of Cooperatives Societies on housing relieve among the staffss of Federal Polytechnic, Bida.

Objectives of This Study are to:

- examine the existing cooperative societies and their financial strength;
- identify the type of housing loans facilities provided by the cooperative societies;
- assess the terms/conditions of granting housing loans by the cooperatives; and
- recommend sustainable effective strategies for solving problems of accessibility to cooperative loans.



Figure 1.3: The Study Area Bida Township Map

Source: Niger State Ministry of Lands and Housing, 2019

Literature Rewiew

The global perspective for housing cooperatives has been set out by the memorandum ofunderstanding (MoU) signed by International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) with UN-Habitat in February 2001. The MoU has outlined a series of activities that may be undertaken by ICA and its member cooperatives in housing sector to implement habitat agenda and global plan of action to promote sustainable human development. In a nutshell, it has been recognised at global level that habitat agenda gives a global perspective to find practical solutions to the problems of housing and in materialising this perspective and cooperatives to play a very significant role. In this context, therefore, it would be important to understand habitat agenda (Dawod, 2012).

Cooperatives are considered as one way for the achievement of the two goals of Habitat II Agenda, "adequate shelter for all" and "sustainable human settlement development". A number of paragraphs of the Habitat Agenda describe the role of cooperatives concerning the two goals. A total of 20 paragraphs in the Habitat Agenda make specific reference to a cooperative approach in housing development (UN-Habitat, 2002). Paragraph 82 identifies cooperatives as one means for achieving the goal of adequate shelter for all. It encourages communities to form housing and multi-purpose community development cooperatives for the provision of low-cost housing (UN-Habitat, 1996).

Methodology

Sources and Method of Data Collection

Data needed for this research were collected through primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are based on reconnaissance survey, physical observations, questionnaire administration and conduct of oral interviews with members of cooperative societies. Whereas in secondary sources, information were collected through existing literature and materials. The materials and data were collected through these sources includes written documents by experts and authors.

Sampling Technique

Random Sampling method was adopted in selection of member of the cooperative societies across the entire sample frame in the application of questionnaire. In administered the questionnaires to the co-operative members, these cooperative members have registered as cooperative members of one of the cooperatives in the study area. The total of 355 questionnaires was administered resulting from sum up of number of the cooperatives

Sampling Size

Total population of members of cooperatives societies in the Federal Polytechnic Bida are 4755 (population of the study). The required size from this sample frame will be derived by means of demographic formula usually adopted for determination of sample size Otte (2006).

Data Analysis Techniques and Presentation

The data was coded and cross - tabulated to enable the responses to be statistically analysed. Simple descriptive statistics was adopted for the analysis of the data and information collected. Also, the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS)

Results and Discussion

Socio-economic Characteristics of Respondents

- ***Gender by Marital Status of Respondents***

Respondent's gender by marital status distributions is shown in Table 4.1. The study reveals that 281 (79.15%) of the respondents were males while only 74 (20.85%) were females. For the male respondents, 213 (60.00%) were married while those that were single and separated were 53 (14.93%) and 15 (4.23%) respectively. The study also shows that 54 (15.21%) of the female respondents were married, while 14 (3.94%) and 6 (1.69%) were single and separated, respectively. It can be inferred that the majority of the respondents were married males.

Marital Status	**Single**		**Married**		**Separated**		**Total**	
Gender	**No**	**%**	**No**	**%**	**No**	**%**	**No**	**%**
Male	53	14.93	213	60.00	15	4.23	281	79.15
Female	14	3.94	54	15.21	06	1.69	74	20.81
Total	**67**	**18.67**	**267**	**75.21** 15.21	**21**	**5.92**	**355**	**100**

Source: Author's fieldwork, 2019

- ***Educational Level by Age of Respondents***

The educational level by age of the sample cooperative members is shown in Table 4.2. The study revealed that a majority 125 (35.21%) of the respondents were in the age group of 41 –50 years, and this was followed by 71 (20.2%) who fall in to age group of 21-30 years. The age group of 31-40 years had 87 (24.51%) of respondents and followed by 71 (20.00%) who fall in to age group of 51-60 years. The number of respondents that were in the age group of less than 20 years, 20-30 years and above 60 years were 1 (0.28%), 41 (11.55%) and 30 (8.45%), respectively.

The study revealed that majority of respondents 171 (48.17%) has 1st Degree/HND as their highest level of education, followed by 109 (30.70%) who has M.Sc./M.Tech and above. The respondents that have ND/NCE as their highest level of education are 57 (16.06%), followed by 12 (3.38%) who has O'Level. However, only few 6 (1.69%) of the respondents has primary certificate as their highest level of education. It can be inferred from this that majority of cooperatives members are adults. However, there is high level of education in the study area, as it is an academic environment.

Table 4.2: Educational Level by Age of Respondents

Educational							1st		M.Sc./M.Tech			
M.Sc./M.TechLevel	Primary		O' Level		ND/NCE							
Source: Auchor's Field work, 2019							Degree/HND		& above		Total	
Age	**No**	**%**	**No**	**%**	**No**	**%**	**No**	**%**	**No**	**%**	**No**	**%**
< 20 years	0	0.00	1	0.28	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	**1**	**0.28**
20 – 30 years	0	0.00	4	1.13	15	4.23	19	5.35	3	0.85	**41**	**11.55**
31 – 40 years	3	0.85	4	1.13	21	5.92	41	11.55	18	5.07	**87**	**24.51**
41 – 50 years	2	0.56	1	0.28	9	2.54	62	17.46	51	14.37	**125**	**35.21**
51 – 60 years	1	0.28	1	0.28	8	2.25	32	9.01	29	8.17	**71**	**20.00**
> 60 years	0	0.00	1	0.28	4	1.13	17	4.79	8	2.25	**30**	**8.45**
Total	**6**	**1.69**	**12**	**3.38**	**57**	**16.06**	**171**	**48.17**	**109**	30.70	**355**	**100**

- ***Staff Category of Respondents***

The Polytechnic staff members are of four categories; management staff, senior staff, junior staff and contract staff. The study reveals in Figure 4.1 that majority of the respondents are junior staff with 147 respondents, followed by 118 respondents who are senior staff. For those that are management staff and contract staff are 76 and 14 respondents respectively.



Figure 4.1: Staff Category of Respondents

Sources : Author Field work 2019

- ***Working Experience of Respondents***

The study reveals in Table 4.3 that a majority 189 (53.24%) of respondents worked in the Polytechnic as staff members for the year range of 6-10 years. This is followed by those who worked for year range of 11-15 years with 91 (25.63%) of responses. For those that worked for 16-20 years, 21-25 years, 26-30 years, 0-5 years and 31-35 years were 35 (9.86%), 16 (4.51%), 12 (3.38%), 8 (2.25%) and 4 (1.13%), respective

Years in Range	Responses	Percentage
0 - 5 Years	8	2.25
6 - 10 Years	189	53.24
11 - 15 Years	91	25.63
16 - 20 Years	35	9.86
21 - 25 Years	16	4.51
26 - 30 Years	12	3.38
31 - 35 Years	4	1.13
Total	**355**	**100**

Source: Author's fieldwork, 2019

Existing Cooperative Societies in the Polytechnic

There are five cooperative societies in the polytechnic as presented in Table 4.4. These are: CT & CS society, MASS cooperative society, SENSTAFF cooperative society, G16 cooperative society and Halal cooperative society. The oldest cooperative society in the institution is CT & CS, which is followed by SENSTAFF cooperative society, followed by MASS cooperative society, Halal cooperative society and G16 cooperative society. The first cooperative society (CT & CS) was established in the Polytechnic in the year 1995. This is followed by MASS cooperative in the year 2000, SENSTAFF in the year 2002, G-16 in the year 2009 and lastly Halal cooperative in the year 2014.

Nevertheless, Table 4.4 also revealed that MASS cooperative society has highest number of cooperative members with 1251 members. This is followed by CT & CS with 1209 members, SENSTAFF with 998 members, Halal with 862 members and least is G-16 with 435 members. This implies that Halal cooperative is the fastest growing cooperative in the Polytechnic in terms of membership registration.

Table 4.4: Year of Establishment and Staff Members of Existing Cooperative Societies

Cooperative Societies	Year of Establishment	Members
CT & CS	1995	1209
MASS	2000	1251
SENSTAFF	2002	998
G-16	2009	435
Halal	2016	862
Halal	2014	862

Source: Field survey, 2019

- ***Cooperative Membership of Respondents***

Figure 4.2 reveals that majority of respondents are members of MASS cooperative society with 131 responses, this is followed by SENSTAFF cooperative society with 102 responses. For CT&CS society, Halal cooperative society and G16 cooperative society are 62, 51 and 9, respectively.



Figure 4.2: Cooperative Membership of Respondents

Source: Author's field work, 2019

- ***Number of Beneficiaries from Housing Loan***

The study reveals in Figure 4.3 that majority of the respondents have benefited from the housing loan which amount to 91.27% while only 8.73% said they do not benefit from the housing loan. This implies that the cooperative societies have major impact on staff housing development in the study area.



Figure 4.3: Number of Beneficiaries from Housing Loan

Source: Author's field work, 2019

- ***How Housing Loan was Spent***

Cooperative members spent the housing loan granted on various aspects of housing projects, such as acquiring land, buying building materials and construction of houses. Figure 4.4 reveals that 236 (66.48%) respondents use their housing loan to acquire land. This has a significant number of respondents which implies that the housing loan may not be enough to complete a house. From the result, it also reveals that 61 (17.18%) use their housing loan to buy building materials followed by 47 (13.24%) who use their housing loan for construction of a house, while only 11 (3.10%) respondents use their housing loan for all purposes. Consequently, this result implies housing loan granted to the cooperative members is not enough for them to build a house and this force some of them to start by acquiring a land so that subsequently when they benefit from another round of housing loan or sourced money from other sources their houses could be constructed and possibly reach completion stage.



Figure 4.4: How Beneficiaries Spent Housing Loan

Source: Authors field work, 2019

- ***Housing Type Constructed by Cooperatives Members***

The study reveals in Figure 4.5 that majority of respondents 138 (48.59%) use housing loan to build two bedrooms, this is followed by 69 (24.30%) who build three bedrooms, 46 (16.20%) build four bedrooms while 31 (10.92%) build other types of buildings. This implies that majority of the cooperative members construct small types of building which is an indication of low fund provided by the cooperatives due to poor state and strength of the cooperatives societies and, above all, due to individual cooperative shared capital.



Figure 4.5: Types of Housing Constructed by Cooperatives Members

Source: Authors field work, 2019

- ***Stage of Housing Projects of Cooperative Members***

The study reveals in Figure 4.6 that majority (49.86%) of the respondents are yet to complete their houses. For those that have completed their houses are 21.41%, while about 28.73% still have bare land. Therefore, comparing this with the result in Figure 4.4, it can be infer that cooperative members have other sources of funding their housing projects, because majority of the respondents use housing loan to acquire land while few still have bare land as their housing project.



Figure 4.6: Stage of Housing Projects of Cooperative Members

Source: Authors field work, 2019

- ***Annual Total Loan Disbursements by the Cooperative Societies***

The study reveals in Figure 4.10 that G-16 has higher annual loan disbursement for the year 2015 with ₦343,411,209 followed by SENSTAFF, MASS and CT & CS cooperative societies with ₦193,951,502, ₦82,379,922 and ₦59,103,112. For the year 2016, G-16 record ₦396,131,011 as the highest amount of annual total loan disbursement for the year among the cooperative societies, followed by SENSTAFF, MASS and CT & CS with ₦181,260,010, ₦123,306,941 and ₦100,000,000, respectively. As at 2017, G-16 record ₦273,621,213 as total annual loan disbursement, followed by MASS with ₦203,884,911, SENSTAFF with ₦127,208,935, CT & CS with ₦92,000,000 while Halal cooperative society record lowest with

₦4,211,191. G-16 also records highest total annual loan disbursement for the year 2018 with ₦398,364,201. This is followed by MASS, SENSTAFF, CT & CS and Halal cooperatives with ₦322,381,096, ₦203,259,111, ₦99,101,011 and ₦10,291,000, respectively.

Lastly, as at 2019, G-16 records ₦431,119,600 total annual loan disbursement, this is followed by MASS with ₦381,431,117, SENSTAFF with ₦325,169,358, CT & CS with ₦119,213,115 and Halal with ₦11,539,812, respectively. The result shows that G-16 disburse highest amount of annual total loan for the years under review. This implies that G-16 is the strongest cooperative society in the Polytechnic in terms of financial disbursement. Details of trend for the total annual loan disbursement between year 2015 and 2019 is presented in Appendix III.



Figure 4.7: Annual total savings realized by the cooperative societies 2015 – 2019

Source: Author's field work, 2019

Conclusion and recommendations

Conclusion

Housing cooperative societies are faced by major problems and challenges which include shortage of fund, long bureaucracy, poor response when complaints are lodged, unfavorable terms and conditions and breach of agreement. Also, there are weak negative relationships between total amount of savings and housing loan provision by the cooperative societies in Polytechnic.

Recommendations

Based on the findings, the following recommendations are put forward as policy guidelines toward a sustainable means of housing delivery in the Polytechnic:

- To overcome the challenges of shortage of fund faced by the cooperative societies in the Polytechnic, management interference with cooperative fund recovery should be totally discouraged henceforth, so that enough capital can be made available at the disposal of the cooperative societies for the cooperative members housing loan disbursement.
- There is the need for the cooperative societies in the Polytechnic to look inward to their fund raising portfolio through linkage with other financial institutions such as Federal Mortgage Bank, commercial banks, Federal Housing Authority, Building Societies, Real Estate Investment Trust, Housing Corporations, Central Bank of Nigeria and other international financial institutions with long moratorium.
- Cooperatives should setup a committee of experts who should be proactive in resolving all contending cooperative issues of loan applications by cooperative members in terms of complaints that are generated from time to time, i.e. the committee is to monitor and regularly evaluate the progress and activities of the cooperative managements and cooperatives members from time to time.
- Furthermore, strict and stringent measures and regulations should be put in place by respective cooperatives to check incidences of default and non-compliance with cooperative terms of agreement by cooperative members and cooperative managements in the institution.

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DEVELOPMENT OF EFFECTIVE FACILITY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC BIDA, NIGER STATE

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Abstract
Deplorable conditions of facilities in higher institutions of learning cannot sustain successful teaching and learning process in any nation. Hence, development of effective facility management strategy for any society is key to any meaningful development and the socio-economic prosperity of any institution. Therefore, this study was conducted to investigate the present condition of facilities in Federal Polytechnic Bida Niger State, and to find out how such facilities can be improved. Purposive sampling technique was adopted to select Works and Maintenance Department (WMD), Physical Planning and Development Unit (PPDU), Security Unit (SU) and Information and Communication Technology Centre (ICTC) Staff because only senior technical ones that have requisite knowledge of their professions were considered adequate for the study. While stratified random sampling techniques was used to select academic staff and the students. Total enumeration was adopted for the Heads of Departments (HODs) and Deans of Schools. The data obtained in the interview phase of the study was analyzed through content analysis while the one obtained in the questionnaire used to validate the outcomes of the interview was validated through statistical means of data analysis. The study revealed nine factors that inhibit effective facility management practice in the study institution, the study discovered that negligence or poor attitude of the institution heads and inadequate funds are the main significant factors. Other less significant factors that were also discovered during the study are lack of management interest when it comes to standard, lack of skilled labour, lack of employees training, too many unskilled/semi-skilled labour, poor quality of the available facilities, incessant strike action that often make the facilities to be abandoned for a long time before use and poor record keeping. , strategies such as cost focused/control technique, business value focused technique, workplace focused technique, post occupancy evaluation, multidisciplinary technique, combination of both in-house & outsourcing and performance focused technique are recommended for the case study institution for effective maintenance of their facilities.
Keywords: Development, Facility, Management, Institution, Strateg

1.0 Introduction

Facility Management (FM) has been defined as a management function which integrates people, place and process within the built environment with the purpose of improving the quality of life of people and the productivity of the core business of an organisation (www.i-fm.net, 2020). When related to educational infrastructure, it implies that FM combines the integrated management of building efficiency with work process and support services in order to make the school environment conducive for optimal teaching, learning and research. It is essential to note that the level of facilities provided in educational institutions has a corresponding relationship with the performance of the students (Alimi, Ehinola & Alabi, 2012). This implies that the quantum and quantity of infrastructural facilities provided by academic institutions of higher learning has a significant impact on the quality and value of the students produced over the years (Vidalakis & Papa, 2013).

Study by Hutchinson (2003) shows that deplorable conditions of facilities in higher institutions of learning cannot sustain successful teaching and learning process in any nation. Therefore, the National Board for Technical Education (NBTE, 2014) provided minimum standards of physical and non-physical facilities that polytechnics in Nigeria should provide before they could mount National Diploma (ND) and Higher National Diploma (HND) programmes in the country. Facilities that are required by NBTE in a polytechnic consisted of a campus with a well-designed master plan, which encompasses academic buildings (such as classroom/lecture halls, lecture theaters, laboratories, workshops, studios and libraries). Others includes government/administrative/staff offices, experimental farms, equipment (such as plant, hard and soft furniture items, hand and machine tools), student seats and desks, lecturers' chairs and tables, information and computer technology (ICT) centrer, marker/chalk boards, well fenced campus free from hazards and suitable for learning and research. Also required in addition to the Nigerian standards in some countries are housing (staff quarters and student hostels), recreation and open space infrastructure, transportation (roads for vehicular circulation, pedestrian/ bicycle sidewalks and security services), utility framework (electric power, water and sewerage systems), information and telecommunication technology infrastructure among others (Calatrava, 2009).

In view of the relationship between the infrastructural facilities in higher institutions and the performance of students espoused in the literature, there is need to regularly take inventory of facilities in those institutions and assess their qualities/standard. This has made NBTE to regularly come for inspection of both physical and academic facilities before the approval and accreditation of ND and HND programme in Nigerian polytechnics. It is imperative to note that some tertiary educational institutions in Nigeria adopted the in-house maintenance and property management techniques, which were considered to be ineffective (Adegoke & Adegoke, 2013) and effective (Abdullah et al., 2013). However, some utilised outsourcing, multi-disciplinary and integrated techniques which proved efficient (Riley & Pitt, 2010) and inefficient (Jonah, 2017).

Despite the effort of NBTE for standard facilities in Nigerian polytechnics, the reviewed literature indicates that the state of physical and academic facilities in Nigerian polytechnics has been observed to be appalling (Isa & Yussoff, 2015). Over the years, students have been expressing dissatisfaction with hostel facilities in some of the schools (Sawyerr & Nar., 2013 and Akinpelu, 2015).

Academic facilities such as, information communication technology and library resources and their utilisation in some of them were assessed to be deplorable (Adeoti & Adebayo, 2014; Igbinlola, Ojokuku, & Ohwonigho, 2016). The root cause of the abysmal might be seen as a management tag. Different definitions of the concept have been provided from the divergent stand points of the authors. International Facility Management Association, IFMA (2012) defined it as a profession that encompasses multiple disciplines which ensure functionality of the built environment by integrating people, place, process and technology. This implies that many professionals are involved in FM team if people, place, process and technology are to be integrated and managed for optimal result.

2.2 The Facilities that is required in Nigerian Polytechnics

Availability of facilities in any educational institution should precede the people and the process for them to have impact on the goal of the institution (Vidalakis & Papa, 2013). This implies that facilities are the assets to be managed for the people through a process. The facilities required for polytechnic education as provided by Asiabaka (2008), Calatrava (2009) and the National Board for Technical Education, NBTE (2014) are listed as follows:

- a well-designed campus with master plan;
- physical buildings consisting of classrooms, lecture halls, lecture theatres, etc;
- administrative buildings;
- experimental farms;
- equipment such as plant, vehicles, hand and machine tools etc;
- furniture;
- utility infrastructure such as electric power, water and sewerage system;
- telecommunication technology infrastructure;
- recreation arena for sports, parks and gardens; and
- residential quarters such as staff houses and students' hostels.

All the above mentioned facilities are required to be made available in Nigerian polytechnics including that of the Federal Polytechnic, Bida for the purpose of convenience, comfort and enhancement of learning, teaching and research in the institution.

2.3 Facilities Management Techniques

Several techniques and strategies have been developed for managing institutional facilities. Oladokun (2014) cited by Chitopanich & Lertaryam (2011) highlighted four techniques of managing facilities as follows:

- performance-focused technique, where facilities are operated in a manner that will make their performance satisfactory to the end-users;
- cost-focused technique, which is aimed at making the organization obtain value for its money through cost control and management;
- Workplace-focused technique, which ensures that technology is effectively applied to boost the people's comfort and performance; and
- Business-value-focused technique, which entails that the long term goals of the organization are its main focus.

conditions of the facilities might not be limited to poor funding as some studies on the poor state of public institutions of higher learning in Nigeria have shown. Olatunji (2013) reported that the performance of physical buildings and their elements depended not only on funding but to a large extent on their planned and continuous maintenance. Several other studies to include Adegoke & Adegoke (2013), Oladokun (2014) have also outlined the various challenges militating against effective management of facilities in Nigerian institutions of higher learning. Babadoko & Awe (2017) in their study argued that FM professionals that are required for effective management of the available facility in Nigerian polytechnic are very few. This implies that further studies are needed to investigate the strategies that can be deployed by the limited professionals with limited fund for effective management of the fatalities in the institution.

Therefore, investigating strategies to be deployed in the management of facilities in Federal Polytechnic, Bida for Effective Learning and Research academic performance should not be out-of-place.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

The impact of infrastructure availability in any organisation is an integral part of effective management and development but faced with the issue of lack of maintenance by government at different levels. Infrastructure consists of water supply, electricity, refuse collection, and disposal, fire extinguisher, day and night security services, wall fence, access road, telecom services, parking spaces and security alarm. Also, a lot of works are being carried out on how better facilities in the universities can be effective managed but there is a scarce information on the management of polytechnic facilities. This research work seeks to investigate the infrastructure management facilities of the project area (The Federal Polytechnic Bida.) for effective learning.

1.2 Aim

The aim of this study is to develop effective techniques and strategies for managing facilities in Federal Polytechnic, Bida with a view to provide information that will enhance better performance of the facilities

1.3 Objective(s)

The aim is achieved through the following objectives:

- To find out the present conditions of physical and academic facilities available in Federal Polytechnic, Bida.
- To find out the strategies/policies applied by facilities management professionals in managing the facilities.
- To explore the challenges militating against the strategies/policies in the study area.
- To investigate how the challenges can be overcome for effective management of facilities in the study context.

2.0 Literature Review

2.1 *The Concept of Facilities Management*

Scholars have expressed doubt on the clear and acceptable definition of Facilities Management (FM). Tang (2007) noted that without continuous effort in defining the subject, it

From the description of four techniques and their objectives, it is evident that all of them are useful vehicles for the effective management of institutional facilities in polytechnics. If this is the case, it therefore implies that an integrated technique that incorporates all the attributes of each technique to a particular measure would be necessary.

3.0 Methods of data collection

The following methods were adopted to collect the necessary data for this study:

- Field survey and direct personal observations. This involves identifying, enumerating and capturing pictorials of the physical facilities in the polytechnic.
- Face-to-face interview with semi-structured questions which was used to obtain the primary data from the participants of the study.
- Questionnaire which was used to validate the outcomes of the interview study.

3.1 *Methods of Data Analysis*

The data obtained in the interview phase of the study was analysed through content analysis while the one obtained in the questionnaire used to validate the outcomes of the interview was validated through statistical means of data analysis.

4.0 Data presentation, analysis and discussions

4.1 The Physical Observation Exercise

In the qualitative study conducted, physical observation was first carried out to enable the researcher understand clearly the present condition of the various facilities in the study context.

Plate 4.1: Students' accommodation in Alarming Condition

Plate 4.2: State of the facility and mechanical works

Plate 4.3: Available Drawing studio in the study institution

Plate 4: Present condition of old school library now staff offices in the study institution

4.2 The Interview Exercise

The interview was the next phase after the physical observation exercise in the study, and the outcomes of the exercise are explained in the following sub-heading:

4.2.2 Demographical Information of the Study Participants

In the study conducted, the participants of the interview study comprise of Architects, Builders, Quantity Surveyors, Civil Engineers, Mechanical Engineers, Electrical Engineers and technologist all the participants of the study in the case institution have the required working experience and requisite knowledge to answer all the set interview questions. Details of the information obtained in the interview exercise are explained in the following sub headings:

4.2.3 Conditions of Physical and Academic Facilities Available in the Study Institution

Most of the participants of the interview study agreed that the physical and academic facilities of the polytechnic such as student's lecture theatre/class rooms, hostel accommodations, staff offices, toilet facilities (students/staff), internet facilities, teaching aids and the likes are inadequate while compared to NBTE recommendation. This is consisted with what has earlier been observed during the physical observation exercise in the study. The opinions of the participants of the study also concurred with the findings of Sawyerr et al. (2013), Akinpelu (2015), Isa and Yussoff (2015).

4.2.4 Current Strategies/Policies Applied to Manage the Available Facilities in the Institution

When this question was raised in the interview conducted, participants in all the units emphasised that there was a time that in-house policy was being adopted by the management of the institution. The participants further stated that there were also laid down techniques for proper FM through the in-house policy. Such techniques or methods include cost control and materials management. However, the participants of the interview study also pointed that due to some challenges (which are discussed in the next section) encounter in the management of the institution facilities over the years, presently, there is no proactive method or approach that is being adopted by all the staff in the various units to manage the available facilities. The participants contended that the available facilities are not being inspected regularly. Which implies that unplanned or corrective maintenance (waiting for breakdown before taking action) is being adopted in the case study institution? This might have led to the deplorable conditions of the facilities in the institution. The information obtained from the participants of the interview study is consisted with the findings of Yussoff (2011), Oladokun (2014) cited by Dovey (2008) regarding facilities management practices in Nigerian polytechnics.

4.2.5 Challenges Militating Against the Strategies/Policies in the Study Polytechnic

All the participants of the interview study in the various units emphasised that negligence or poor attitude of the institution heads toward effective FM practice and inadequate funds are the two main challenges of effective facility management practice by the FM staff of the case study.

4.3 *The Questionnaire Strand*

It should be remembered that the essence of this phase is to obtain knowledge on how the identified challenges can be overcome. Therefore, questionnaire was prepared and administered to FM stakeholders in Kaduna Polytechnic, Kaduna State. Details of the outcomes of the questionnaire are explained as follow:

4.3.1 Demographical Information of the Respondents

Table 4.2 shows the demographic information of the respondents of the study. The table also concise the breakdown of the questionnaires that were sent out, and returned.

Table 4.2: Demographical information of the study respondents

Various facility management sub-units in the institution	Questionnaires administered	Questionnaires returned
Electrical	8	8
Mechanical	12	10
Construction	15	10
ICT	10	7
Total	45	35

4.3.2 Challenges of Effective Facility Management in Nigerian Polytechnics

Table 4.3 presents the result of the opinions of the respondents on the challenges of effective facility management in the study context. The respondents ranked the challenges earlier discovered in the literature and interview phases of the study on a Likert Scale of 1 to 5. These factors were ranked according to their severity where 1 indicates strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 neutral, 4 agree and 5 strongly agree. As can be observed in the table, the high Cronbach's α values obtained for all the respondents (0.921: excellent) shows the reliability and acceptability of the data (Agresti and Franklin, 2007). The Kendall's correlation Coefficient of concordance (W) calculated also shows the extent of agreement of all the respondents in the survey exercise. It is essential to note that W ranges from $0 \leqslant 1$, where 0 (H_2) implies that there is no agreement among the respondents, while 1 (H_1) designates that there is complete agreement among the respondents of the validation survey (Siegel and Castellant, 1988). In this study, W ranges from 0.721 to 0.891 at two-tailed significant level of 0.000 ($P \leq 0.05$) which is satisfactory (Siegel and Castellant, 1988). This infers that there was a significant correlation or general agreement on the ranking of the respondents in the validation survey study. Further, the standard deviations (SD) calculated ranges from 0.821 to 1.307 which are also within the acceptable range, as they indicate that there were low variations on the responses among the respondents (Sabine and Braine, 2004).

Table 4.3: the challenges of effective facility management in the study context

Various challenges	MIS	SD		W	Ranking
Negligence of the institution heads	4.27	0.821	0.921	0.749	1st
Poor or inadequate funding	3.07	1.293		0.767	8th
Lack of management interest	4.23	0.921		0.876	2nd
Lack of skilled labour	4.18	0.764		0.732	4th
Lack of employees training,	4.21	0.769		0.721	3rd
Several unskilled/semi -skilled labour in the system	3.58	1.121		0.891	5th
Poor quality of the available facilities	3.21	0.929		0.819	6th
Frequent strike action	3.12	1.307		0.792	7th
poor record keeping	2.17	0.988		0.874	9th

As can be observed in the table, all the respondents of the survey study agreed that factors such as negligence of the institution heads, poor funding, lack of management interest/regular employees' trainings and the likes are the significant challenges of effective facility management in most of the Nigerian polytechnics. This is similar to what has been observed in the physical observation exercise that was first conducted during the study. The opinions of the respondents are also consisted with what views of the participants of the interview exercise in the study.

4.3.3 Strategies for Effective Facility Management in Nigerian Polytechnics

Table 4.4: Strategies for effective facility management in the study institution

Various strategies	*MIS*	*SD*	.	*W*	*Ranking*
Cost focused/control technique	4.41	0.831	0.989	0.741	1st
Business value focused technique	2.07	0.293		0.749	7th
Workplace focused technique	2.23	1.221		0.817	6th
Post occupancy evaluation	4.38	0.741		0.745	2nd
Multidisciplinary technique	3.71	0.782		0.871	4th
Combination of both in-house & outsourcing	4.35	0.891		0.712	3rd
Performance focused technique	3.51	1.314		0.895	5th

Table 4.4 presents the opinions of the respondents on the strategies that can be adopted for effective facility management in the case study institution. The α values obtained for all the respondents (0.989: excellent) also affirms the reliability and acceptability of the data. The W calculated (0.712 to 0.895) also imply the extent of agreement of all the respondents in the validation survey exercise. As can be observed in the table, cost focused/control technique for effective facility management in the study polytechnic came first on the ranking scale. This was followed by post occupancy evaluation, while combination of both in-house/outsourcing came third. This implies that these three factors with MIS above 4.0 are the significant measures that can be adopted by the study institution for effective facility management. This is consistent with view of Tookaloo and Smith (2015), Olatunji (2013) and Abdullah et al. (2013) on the strategies for effective facility management in Nigerian institutions.

4.4 Summary of Findings

- It was observed that facilities such as lecture room/theatre, students' hostel, staff offices, IT center and the likes in Bida Federal Polytechnic were not well managed over the years and is presently under inacceptable condition.
- The study discovered that as at current, there is no pro-active method or approach that is being adopted by the case study institution for effective management of the available facilities. This implies that the available facilities in Federal Polytechnic Bida have not been regularly inspected regularly by any department. Therefore, it can be said that unplanned or corrective maintenance is being adopted in the institution.
- The study revealed nine factors that inhibit effective facility management practice in the study institution. Among these nine factors, the study discovered that negligence or poor

attitude of the institution heads and inadequate funds are the main significant factors. Other less significant factors that were also discovered during the study are lack of management interest when it comes to standard, lack of skilled labour, lack of employees training, too many unskilled/semi-skilled labour, poor quality of the available facilities, incessant strike action that often make the facilities to be abandoned for a long time before use and poor record keeping.

- Not less than seven strategies were discovered by the study for effective facility management in the study context. These strategies are cost focused/control technique, business value focused technique, workplace focused technique, post occupancy evaluation, multidisciplinary technique, combination of both in-house & outsourcing and performance focused technique.

5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusion

Based on the findings, It can be concluded that facilities such as student hostels, staff offices and lecture halls are in deplorable states resulting from non-proactive approach adopted be the management.

Another factor responsible is negligence and poor funding by the institution heads, hence strategies such as cost focus/control technique, combination of both in-house and outsourcing and performance technique etc. observe in the literature can adopted by the management for effective management of the facilities.

5.2 Recommendations

Based on the conclusion, depending on simplicity or complexity of the problems any of the strategies discover in the cost of the studies can be applied to ensuring that the organisation focuses on its core business of teaching, learning and research also the works and maintenance department (WMD) and physical planning and development unit (PPDU) be combined and be renamed as facilities management unit (FMU) to ease access to information and proper record keeping, the said unit beheaded and supported by professional facilities managers, e.g., directors, deputy directors, heads of units etc and also a desk officers in different department/units for effective communication and prompt action. The management of the institution should be more pro- active in attending to issues and manage the little available resources effectively.

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MANAGING DIVERSITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: BUHARI'S ADMINISTRATION IN PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract
Every heterogeneous society is under obligation to devise ways of managing their differences if they must achieve unity and meaningful progress. Our concern is how Nigeria has fared in this task under the watch of Buhari's administration. The paper titled "Managing Diversity and Sustainable Development in Nigeria: Buhari's Administration in perspective" is exploratory attempt to investigate how Nigeria has manage it diversity with such instruments as Quota system, federal character principle and the effect on sustainable development. The paper adopted a discourse approach based on content analysis. The finding is that Nigeria is still long way to joining the leagues of developed nations consequent upon poor management of her diversity through denial which has produced such anti-development phenomena such as agitations, terrorism, banditry and general insecurity, corruption, unproductive economy and such like. We therefore recommend that the state should create initiatives that will uncover and understand differences among the groups and find ways to appeal to a broader set of the citizenry. Again, diversity management should be a practical based policy rather than a tool of manipulation that only serve idiosyncratic and particularistic interest.
Key words: Federal character, Quota system, Diversity, Power sharing, Agitations, National development and Sustainable development.

Introduction

Recently, Nigeria celebrated 60th independent anniversary as a nation in her statehood. Though the federal government, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, celebrated on a low-key, the question in the lips of Nigerians is "what are we really celebrating?" This is occasioned by the fact that for these number of decades, Nigeria is still grappling with the same challenges that necessitated the agitation for self-determination and independence. It is indubitable that Nigeria is a heterogeneous state with diverse ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic and economic differences. A continuing population challenge faced by the country has been the unification of the 200-plus ethnic groups and cultures identified within its borders (Udogu, 2005; Akobo; 2016, Adeosun, 2011). According to Iheanacho (2019) "any country that has several ethnic, cultural and religious groups must devise adequate means to manage such diversities in order to ensure equality, equity and fairness in the political system". It is pertinent to state that, various regimes of government, military and civilian alike at different times diversified the core principles (Freedom, Equality and Justice) and introduced certain policy thrusts aimed at addressing the observed bifurcations inherent in the Nigerian nation with the hope to achieving the desired unity (Cornelius & Sunday, 2015).

Recently, the youth in the country took to the street in a city-wide protest they tagged ***#endsars*** to demonstrate and registered their grievances on police brutality, military high handedness and fatality meted against them. The articulated demands by the youth went far beyond the *prima fascia* end to the tactical police unit known as Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) to incorporate restructuring the country based on the perceived marginalisation against some sections/sectors of the country. They demanded an end to structural, administrative, resources and system (SARS) deformity which has hitherto bred injustices, inequality, agitations, terrorism, banditry and general insecurity, corruption, and unproductive economy in Nigeria among others. Obviously, these are offshoots of diversity management complications in a plural state like Nigeria.

The crux of this paper, therefore, is to pry into how Nigeria has fared in galvanising the diversity inherent in Nigeria for sustainable development under the watch of president Buhari; leveraging on content analysis.

2.0 Empirical Review

Akobo (2016) analysed Nigeria from a socio-cultural, economic and political construct, and evaluates the concept of diversity from an organisational and national perspective to help enhance the practice of diversity management in Nigeria perspective. The work focuses on multinational corporations (MNCs) and hinges on a framework developed to illustrate, as well as prompt further discussions on social related structures in Nigeria that are likely to influence how diversity is managed. This includes dominant social dimensions, state institutions referred to as stakeholders and relevant national development indicators within the discourse of managing diversity. The study majorly examines literature on the historical development of Nigeria in order to provide an in depth understanding of the national context and to unveil structural dynamics in Nigeria that embrace the need to develop diversity management practices in the country.

Onimisi, Khks, Samsu, Ismail, Binti and Wan (2018) conceptualise the Federal Character Principles as a policy measure aimed at ending perceived marginalisation and inequality in the Nigeria. They discovered that one of the major problems confronting Nigeria as a country is the high level of inequality and marginalisation across Nigeria. Therefore, the Federal government of Nigeria established the Federal Character Principle as a policy measure to check the problem of inequality and marginalisation that has led to the lopsidedness in the country. Secondary source of data collection is used for the paper. For the purpose of analyses, the study adopts the content analysis of scholarly input with the decision making theory as it analytical framework. The research discovered that the whole essence of the establishment of the Federal Character Principles as a policy measure for equitable distribution of governmental activities in the Nigeria remains an admirable policy mechanism of the Federal Government of Nigeria but its interpretation and implement is far from it main objectives. Hence, the paper recommends a strict adherence to policy guidelines and massive orientation is needed to draw the intention of the general public to the major objectives of the Federal Character Principles.

Cornelius and Sunday (2015) pried into the implications of separation of powers and Federal Character Principle on public sector in Nigeria. They observed that Nigeria adopted the principle of federal character and doctrine of separation of powers due to inherent problems of disunity and possible altercations arising from the relationship among arms of government. After some decades, those bifurcations that necessitated their (principle of federal character and doctrine of separation of powers) inclusion have not abated. Worst are the notable implications of the principle and doctrine in the output performance of public sectors. The Significance of the work lies in the understanding of why in spite adopting the principle and doctrine, public sectors has not improved. The paper identified some implications of applying the principle and doctrine and made recommendations. Implications identified among others include, corruption, indolence and low productivity, misunderstanding and political crises, politics of bureaucracy, systemic shutdown and so on. It recommended attitudinal change, re-definition of the principle and doctrine, empower the private sector and so on. The paper adopted content analysis of scholarly inputs.

In the same vein, Asaju and Egberi (2015) did a study on federal character and national integration in Nigeria. The unfolding events during and especially after independent in 1960 call to question the idea of a federating unite called Nigeria. This situation, no doubt, impedes efforts at national integration as it applies to the building of a united Nigeria out of the incongruent ethnic, geographic, social, economic and religious elements in the country. This culminates into the establishment of federal character principle, which was entrenched in the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as the best solution to solving this problem. But since its establishment in 1979, it seems the aim of building a virile and united nation as not being achieved. So, the question is why is it that achieving national integration has been difficult?

The main thrust of this paper is to understand the reasons why the struggle to ensure national integration through the instrument of federal character has proved abortive in Nigeria. The paper is a documentary research and data were collated from secondary sources, i.e., journals, books, official publications of the government and other NGOs, internet materials among others. The data was analysed using the content analysis. It has been argued that the principle will make for a more equal federation to which more people will owe loyalty. But unfortunately, findings reveal that the principle while stressing the imperative of ethnic balancing, invariably enthrones ethnicity and deemphasises the nation. In the process, too, it strengthens the parochial, particularistic orientations and individual ethnic attachments of Nigerians. Thus by focusing on regional and ethnic representation, federal character exacerbates differentiation instead of enhancing mutual trust, accommodation and national development. Hence the paper advocates for a reversal of the principle of federal character.

The study by Gberevbie andIbietan (2013) shows that no nation can attain sustainable development for the enhancement of the living standard of the people without a properly organised public service to implement government policies. In this regard, the paper examines the application of the federal character principle in the Nigerian public service for sustainable development. With the adoption and analysis of secondary data, the paper observes that the implementation of the federal character principle in Nigerian public service tends to encourage unethical behaviour amongst public officials and circumscribe merit in the area of manpower procurement and promotion. It, therefore, concludes that for the Nigerian public service to achieve its mandate of facilitating sustainable development there is need for the government to reappraise the implementation of the federal character principle through the enforcement of merit anchored on public service reform initiatives that can galvanise human capacity and governmental institutions for sustainable development.

According to Yakubu (2017) like most states in the developing world, Nigeria was a product of an end to colonial domination, which saw the mashing up of various ethnicities and nationalities without consulting those affected directly. This act of amalgamation arguably birthed the inter-tribal, ethnic or communal conflicts that has plagued Africa's most populous nation and hindered the attainment of an all-inclusive political community and prospects of national development. In response, nation-building elites constitutionally conceived the principle of federal character aimed at amongst other functions, ensue for equitable redistribution of wealth and facilitate for access to resources across the underlying ethnic tribes that make up Nigeria. Decades after it adoption, Nigeria's several attempt at attaining an all-inclusive political community remains largely unresponsive. In lieu, the study having objectively analyse the subject matter of federal character principle, posits ethnicity as a major impediment to national inclusion, integration and development as it also proposes for a review of the federal character principle, terming it as largely inefficient and unable to produce expected outcomes.

2.1 Conceptual and Literature Review

Federal character Principle

Among the power sharing dynamics is policy contrivance technically referred to as Federal Character Principle (FCP). Its introduction into the Nigerian governance lexicon in 1975 by the Murtala administration and its enshrinement in the country's constitution for the first time in 1979 was intended to solve the country's fundamental problem (Adeline, Ikechukwu, Harrison, Johnpaul, Raphael, Kelechi & Ogbulu,| Richard [Reviewing editor] 2019). The Federal Character Principle, no doubt, was introduced in Nigeria to correct the imbalance in terms of employment and appointments to government ministries and agencies among different ethnic groups, regions, states and local government (Akpanabia, 2012, cited in Iheanacho, 2019). The Federal Character Principle is meant to ensure equity and fairness among different groups in Nigeria in order to achieve national unity, integration, loyalty and development. Federal Character Principle is one of the policy alternatives introduced by the Nigerian federation for equitable distribution of national values. National values here include but not limited to employment, appointment, promotion in all government establishment. The whole essence of managing diversity is to rectify the imbalance inherent in a system. Federal principle is an outgrowth of quota system.

Quota System

While the quota system came into being prior to Nigeria's independence in 1960, the Federal Character Principle became officially recognised in the 1979 constitution. Like Federal Character Principle, the quota system is aimed at addressing the issues of ethnic representation in the public sector.

Diversity

Diversity pertains to the host of individual (group) differences that makes all of unique and different from others (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2007). Diversity is about understanding the country's make up. It involves a deliberate, effective and practical ways of reaching a broader range of the country. It entails a significant philosophical shift from a long tradition of minimising differences to amplifying them and thereby seize on the opportunities they present. Managing diversity entails much more than enacting laws and creating policies, rather is a sensitive, potentially volatile and sometimes prickly issue, yet it is the key for sustainable development in any clime. Diversity management is positioned as a means to promote justice and equal opportunities among social groups, as well as improve the livelihoods of minorities identified in society and organisations (Nyambegera, 2002; Akobo, 2016).

Effectively managing diversity requires a state to adopt a new way of thinking about differences among people rather than pitting one group against another, managing diversity entails recognition of the unique contribution every group can makes; making sincere effort at carry every one along and giving the people a level playing ground. Government and its agencies should make accessible the criteria for recruitment, appointment, promotion and sharing of national values and resources.

Sustainable Development

Pearce et al (1992), cited in Nyewusira & Nweke, 2014) defined sustainable development as a development that manages all assets, natural resources, and human resources, as well as financial and physical assets, for increasing long-term wealth and well-being. As a goal, sustainable development rejects policies and practices that support current living standards by depleting the productive base, including natural resources, and that which leaves future generations with poorer prospects and greater risks than our own. According to Jabareen (2008), "some define sustainability as a strategy of development that results in the enhancement of human quality of life and the simultaneous minimisation of negative environmental impacts".

3.0 Theoretical Framework

Whereas regional integration theory seeks to explain the establishment and development of regional international organisations (Schimmeifennig, 2018), national integration theory is predicated on the presumption that there exists a multicultural and multi-ethnic society in which the various groups are defined by their respective languages, or other self-conscious cultural qualities and that their interaction is characterised by the tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal plane (Segun *et al*, 2014). Integration, therefore, is a process of inter-locking linkages where every hitherto dividing boundaries is deliberately dismantled to allow for a more frequent contact, cooperation, consensus and community (Mitchel, Morrison, & Paden, 1989; Ojo, 2009 in Segun *et al*, 2014). Within this context, integration is used to refer to the process of creating a homogeneous progressive reduction of cultural and regional territorial political community (Bamisaiye 2013; Segun *et al*, 2014) in applying the theory of integration to the principle of sharing of power federal quota system and Federal Character Principle, Segun *et al*, (2014) claim that the theory, therefore, brings the understanding of different attempts by the Nigerian government to create an harmonious and cohesive society, culminating in the formulation of quota system and federal character principle with the intention of conjuring nationwide development. This is to address the issue of developmental imbalance, fear of dominance and suspicion between and among various ethnic groups.

3.1 Methodology

The research adopts a discourse approach based on content analysis.

4.0 Discussion

Many scholars, environmentalists and governments agree that sustainability could be achieved through the effective balancing of social, environmental and economic objectives (Berke & Kartez, 1995; Healey & Shaw, 1993; Meadows, Meadows, & Randers, 1992; Robinson & Tinker, 1998; Scruggs, 1993 cited in Jabareen, 2008). However, at the core of social sustainability is the concept of equity. Jabareen (2008) present it thus: “The concept of equity represents the social aspects of Sustainable Development.” Jabareen further opines that “Sustainable Development might be seen as a criterion for environmental justice.” The concept of equity itself encompasses various concepts such as environmental, social and economic justice, social equity, equal rights for development, quality of life, equal economic distribution, freedom, democracy, public participation and empowerment”. Haughton (1999, p. 64, cited in Jabareen, 2008) argues that, "the social dimension is critical since the unjust society is unlikely to be sustainable in environment or economic terms in the long run." To this extent, Agyeman, Bullard and Evans (2002) believe that a truly sustainable society is one in which wider questions of social needs, equity, welfare, and economic opportunity are integrally related to environmental limits imposed by supporting ecosystems (Jabareen, 2008).

Asiedu (2002, 2006), cited in Akobo (2016), highlights corruption as an institutional variable that obstructs development and is a deterrent to foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigerian society. In addition, the government's inability to enforce and monitor contracts issued for development planning and the political instability in the nation stand as variables restricting the growth of FDI in Nigeria. In line with such institutional struggles preventing development, Agundu *et al* (2007), cited in Akobo (2016), argue that development is a sustainable process of good governance and socio-economic progress that 'has the integrity, well-being and security of the individual and society at its core'. According to Jabareen (2008) “some define sustainability as a strategy of development that results in the enhancement of human quality of life and the simultaneous minimisation of negative environmental impacts”. There are two types of equity according to the literature on sustainability: intergenerational and intragenerational. However, intergenerational equity refers to the fairness in allocation of resources between current and future generations while intragenerational equity refers to fairness in allocation of resources between competing interests at the present time (Jabareen, 2008). The most frequently used definition of SD emphasises this type of equity: "Development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED, 1987, p. 43; Jabareen, 2008). Solow (1991), cited in Jabareen (2008) also saw sustainability from the lens of intergenerational equity as he defined sustainability as a matter of distributional equity, about sharing the capacity for well-being between present people and future people. Boyce (1994), in support of intragenerational equity argued that a more equitable distribution of power would contribute to improvement in environmental quality. His definition of a power function is based on a combination of an income inequality index, a literacy variable, political rights and civil liberties, and certain other (mainly geographical) factors (Jabareen, 2008), Boyce, Klemer, Templet, and Willis (1999) in Jabareen (2008), provide empirical support for the hypothesis that greater power inequality leads to greater environmental degradation. Disparities of power appear to affect not only the distribution of the net costs and benefits of environmentally degrading activities, but also the overall magnitude of environmental degradation.

It is instructive to note that the dominant social identities recognised in Nigerian society include gender, ethnicity and religion and often embrace others like class, political affiliation and age. These dominant social identities are socio-cultural characteristics that take precedence in various parts of Nigeria (Ikpe, 2009, in Akobo, 2016). We shall measure the dexterity or otherwise of President Buhari's administration in handling diversity along these dominant social identities of gender, ethnicity, age and religion.

Gender inequality

Elaborating on the socio-cultural values, Akobo (2016) aver that "it includes the expectation on women to perform domestic roles, which sometimes alienates her from opportunities available to men". President Buhari in a state visit to Germany, reacting to the interview during a joint press briefing with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, made this infamous remark "I don't know which party my wife belongs to, but she belongs to my kitchen and my living room and the other room". This is the height of discrimination by a sitting president to his wife and the womenfolk. Linking this to marginalisation of women in Africa, some identified indicators that contribute to this marginalisation include violence and harmful traditional practices, lack of basic human rights, and lack of access to education, health and employment opportunities (World Bank, 2012). Similarly, a number of factors that affect women in Nigeria include poverty, child labour, religious practices that support early marriage, illiteracy and other socio-cultural values that promote gender inequality (Ajala & Alonge, 2013 in Akobo, 2016).

Ethnicity

Right from 2015 when President Buhari was sworn in into office, the members of his kitchen cabinet have been predominantly northerners. The service chiefs were all but one Northerners. This can best be adjudged to be lopsided and gross denial of the differences in Nigeria.

Table 4.1: Buhari's Appointment 2015

S/N	Position	Name of Appointee	State	Region
1	Aide de camp to president	Lt. Col. Abubakar	Kano	North-West
2	Special adviser media, & publicity to the president	Femi Adesina	Osun	South-West
3	Senior Special assistant media, & publicity.	Garba Shehu	Kano	North- West
4	State chief of protocol/special assistance	Lawal Abdullahi Kazaure	gigawa	North-West
5	Accountant general of the federation	Ahmed Idris	Kano	North-West
6	National security Adviser	Babangana Monguno	Borno	North-East
7	Chief of defense staff	Abayomi Olonishakin	Borno	North-East
8	Chief of Army staff	Tukur Buratai	Borno	North-East
9	Chief of naval staff	Ibok-Ete Ekweibas	Cross-River	South-South
10	Chief of Air staff	Sadique abubakar	Bauchi	North-East
11	Chief of defense intelligent	Monday Riku Morgan	Benue	North-Central
12	Director General, state security services SSS	Lawal Daura	katsina	North-West
13	Chairperson, Independent national Electoral Commission	Prof. Mahmood yakubu	Bauchi	North-East
14	Managing Director Nigerian Port Authority	Habibu Abdulahi	Kano	North- west
15	Special Adviser Niger Delta Amnesty office	Paul Boroh	Delta	South-South
16	Acting Director General, Nigerian maritime Administration, Safety and Security Agency, NIMASA	Baba Haruna Jauro	Kano	North-West
17	Executive vice -Chairman/Chief executive Officer, Nigerian communication Commission	Umaru Danbatta	Kano	North-West
18	Executive Chairman Federal Inland Revenue services. FIRS	Babatunde Fowler	Lagos	South-West
19	Director General, Budget office of the Federation	Aliyu Gusau	Zamfara	North-West
20	Secretary to the Government of The Federation	Engr, Babachir David Lawal	Adamawa	North-East
21	Chief of Staff to the President	Alhaji Abba Kyari	Borno	North-East
22	Comptroller-General, Nigerian Custom Service	Col. Hammed Ibrahim Ali (rtd)		North-Central
23	Comptroller-General, Nigerian Immigration Service	Mr. Kuremartin Abeshi	Nasarawa	North-Central
24	SSA to the president on National Assembly matters	Senator Ita S. J Enang	Akwa-Ibom	South-South
25	Group MD NNPC	Emmanuel Kachikwu	Delta	South-South

Source: Abada, Okafor & Udeogu (2018 in Abada, Okafor & Omeh, 2019).

The table showed that Buhari's appointments favoured the Northern parts of Nigeria. The worst aspect of his lopsidedness is that these his appointees are predominantly Muslim even few of the non-Northerners are Muslim faithfuls. This is nothing short of nepotism. Meanwhile

Federal character purports to deal with the privileges and benefits among the primordial component of any state organisation (Eke, 1989; Akpanabia, 2012 cited in Iheanacho, 2019). First and foremost, we should recall that the essence of Federal Character Principle, according to Majekodunmi (2013 in Iheanacho, 2019) "is to allow the composition and conduct of public institutions and affairs reflects the countries diversity. It is premised on the ground that when national institutions and affairs are reflective in composition and conduct of the pluralism of the country, then a sense of belonging is likely to be evoked from the citizenry." Sustainable development can only work where there is relative peace. Peace which represents absence of disturbances, crises and agitations strives in the climate of justice, equity and fairness.

Age

We must give kudos to the present administration for signing "The Not-Too-Young-To-Run" bill into law; a fundamental step for political inclusion for the youth. However, the money politics that characterises the political space in Nigeria is still a major roadblock. Though no-age class is excluded in the injustices and disparity meted against Nigeria under the watch of President Buhari's administration, the youth has been the worst hitin form of police brutality, military high handedness against the youth, political exclusion and many other injustices and inequalities. These injustices have recently fueled a protest by the youth under the slogan ***#ENDSARS***. It is pertinent to note, that in the sixtieth years of Nigerian existence, the spate of youth protest across the major cities of the nation, especially the southern part is unprecedented. What started as protest against abuse of human rights and brutality including fatality of the youths in the hands of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), took another dimension as the youth agitates for restructuring of the structural, administrative and political architecture of the country for progressive and sustainable development. This is one other area the President Buhari has scored below pass mark.

According to The Cable, President during a panel appearance with world leaders at the Commonwealth Business Forum in London criticises the youth as lazy and uneducated (Ogundipe, 2018). Buhari had said "More than 60 percent of the population is below 30, a lot of them haven't been to school and they are claiming that Nigeria is oil-producing country, therefore, they should sit and do nothing and get housing, healthcare, education free." This exposes the philosophy of function of Buhari toward the youth.

5.0 Conclusion

The approach hitherto had been an attempt to eliminate discrimination by deliberately ignoring or denying the difference among this plural citizenry. That account for the failure. Despite several efforts, agitations of ethnic nationalities have not been doused, a phenomenon responsible for recurrent calls for political and economic restructuring of the country (Ikeanyibe, Ori, & Okoye, 2017 in Adeline *et al*, 2019). The major issue may not actually be policy thrust to handle these challenges, but the will to enforce them. The Federal Character Principle and other diversity management mechanism would have reduced the imbalance inherent in the Nigerian system if they are implemented to the later in the spirit of integrity and nation-building. But the opposite is the case. Akobo (2016) commenting on gender inequality buttresses this point thus "it is pertinent to state that the legislative framework encourages gender balance. However, the lack of enforcement of these policies reinforces the reality of discriminatory processes for women's education at the primary, secondary and higher education levels, especially in the Northern part of Nigeria (World Bank, 2012).

6.0 Recommendations

The state should create initiatives that will uncover and understand differences among the groups and find ways to appeal to a broader set of the citizenry (population). It is going to be a comprehensive complex task, nonetheless; it will assuage the needs and reduce the pull on the centripetal of the federation. Again, diversity management should be a practical based policy rather than a tool of manipulation that only serves idiosyncratic and particularistic interest.

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SOCIAL POLICY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: AN APPRAISAL OF NATIONAL SOCIAL INVESTMENT PROGRAMME

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Abstract
Nigeria accounts for 20% of the total population of Sub-Saharan Africa and it is believed that by 2040 it will become the third most populous country in the world with over 400 million inhabitants. The country has more extreme poor population than any other country of the world. It is estimated that by 2030, Nigeria's population living in extreme poverty will have risen from 42.8% (in 2016) to 45.0%. Unemployment, armed conflict as well as climate change are contributing very significantly to high poverty rates in the country. Consequently, a significant population of the country's population has become vulnerable, leading to the erosion of social cohesion. It is against this backdrop that the Nigerian Government rolled out the National Social Investment Programme (NSIP) in 2016. This paper attempts to examine the extent of implementation, challenges and prospects of achieving sustainable development in Nigeria. This paper adopts the quantitative research method, thereby relying on secondary sources of data which include government publications, text books, and online journals. The programme was considered laudable with challenges relating to operational procedures and effective implementation. The top-down policy implementation theory was adopted for analysis. This study reveals that the programme has empowered the vulnerable in Nigeria. Transparency and strengthening of the institutions involved in its implementation was recommended.

Keywords: Social Policy, Development, National Social Investment Programme, Social Investment, Empowerment

Introduction

Social policy is an inclusive discipline that focuses on addressing challenges associated with the needs of social life of a people. Changes in social problems occur base on certain factors (economic and environmental) as well as social structure and state policies of a given society.

According to Albrechm in Esra (2019), social policy refers to all measures and institutions put in place to provide protection to the section of society that requires economic protection in a bid to enhance social security and peace. Social policy does not only mean an attempt to address disputes, imbalances, and conflict of interests between employers and employees and finding solutions to problems in emerging industrial societies but as well, comprehensive practices geared towards addressing not only the challenges confronting members of the working class but also those of the other segments of society. Therefore, it is safe to say that social policy addresses the problems of urbanisation, environment, health, and education and those of all segments of society such as workers, the disabled, the elders, children, and immigrants, health services, social security, struggle against unemployment and poverty, amongst others (Kleinman, 2006).

The aim of social policy is to ensure social peace, social justice, and equality among different groups (Kennet, 2004). Ensuring the welfare of each individual member of the society is the main thrust of the state and other organisations that rollout and implement social policy.

The emergence of social policy is originally attributed to nineteenth-century industrial revolution (economic and social developments). Changes in economic relations, occasioned by the industrial revolution made social changes very necessary. The industrial revolution led to an increase in production which in turn gave rise to the need for more labour. This led to the dominance of capital owners in the labour market, thereby increasing the liberalisation of trade. Consequently, the adoption of liberal market economy approach (Laissez-faire) gave birth to a dominant opinion that government involvement would have dire consequences on the free market (Robinson and Moggridge, 2013). The belief that the creation of a free market would enrich the people later enriched the owners of capital while the owners of labour became poor. Due to the absence of government interventions, poverty increased during this period as well as social problems. This led to the quick development of social policies.

Nigeria's population constitute about 20% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa. It is also projected to be the third most populous nation in the universe by 2040 with over 400 million population. The country is richly endowed with human and material resources. Yet, it hosts more of the world's extreme poor than any other country. It is equally projected that by 2030, the share of Nigeria's population living in extreme poverty will swell from 42.8 percent (in 2016) to 45.0 percent, representing about 120 million people living on less than US$1.90 a day (World Bank, 2019).

Upon assumption of office in 2015, the President Muhammadu Buhari-led government of Nigeria realised the urgency required to turn the tide of poverty and vulnerability in the country and took important measures to set up the foundations of a national social protection policy in support of the pro-poor agenda. A social protection coordinating platform was established in the Office of the Vice President and now transferred to a newly established Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs in 2019 to provide oversight to all social safety-net interventions and a Social Register of poor and vulnerable households across all tiers of government.

The Nigerian government established the National Social Investment Programme (NSIP) in 2016 as a strategy to tackle poverty and hunger across the country, and especially among vulnerable groups. These social programmes were designed to ensure a more equitable distribution of resources to vulnerable populations, including children, youth and women who barely benefit directly from any government policy or programme. These programmes include N-Power, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT), Government Enterprise and Empowerment Programme (GEEP) and The Home Grown School Feeding Programme (HGSF).

In spite of these efforts, major challenges are still visible. The limited amount of social protection programmes being implemented in Nigeria suffer from low coverage, weak targeting, and fragmentation, and are disarticulated - devoid of linkages to productive opportunities for the nation's ever-growing youthful population.

Conceptualisation

Social policy is a concept defined by Walker (1981), as government's programme of action aimed at redistributing resources to marginalised section of the society. He also notes that the character of dominant economic system practised in a particular country determines the nature of social policies laid out by the government. Similarly, Mama (2008) defined social policy as those social arrangements, patterns and mechanisms that are basically related to the distribution of resources in accordance with certain criterion of need.

Social policy in developing countries is considered to mean any government's social welfare action that is designed and supported by a legislation, with the aim of improving the living conditions of people, addressing poverty or material lack, redressing perceived or real economic deprivation in a country or setting agenda for sustainable human development with local or global coverage. Social policy in the developing world is considered to be a by-product of inherent problems of underdevelopment of post-colonial societies.

The European Commission defines social investment as the policy and instrument that enhance investment in human capital and capacity building for participation in social and economic life as well as in the labour market (Bouget et al, 2015). From a different perspective, Wells (2012) sees social investment as the promotion of a "social investment state", with a guideline for investment in human capital wherever possible instead of directly providing economic maintenance. Similarly, Wells emphasises the provision of funding (loans) or some form of social benefits.

The central thrust of this definition is on investment on human capital and enhancement of peoples' capacities, especially the vulnerable sections in society. By and large, the main aim of social investment is to enhance people's capacity to participate in social and economic life and supporting the most vulnerable and disadvantaged through policies and programmes.

The Bruntland Commission Report defines Sustainable Development as development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Schaefer and Crane, 2005). In the opinion of Abubakar (2017), sustainable development provides a mechanism by which society can interact with the environment and at the same time taking measures not to risk damaging the resources for future use. Therefore, sustainable development is both a development paradigm as well as concept that stands for improving living standards without compromising the ecosystem or causing damages to the environment such as deforestation, air and water pollution, among others.

Theoretical Framework

Top-down Policy Implementation Theory

The top-down policy implementation theory states that policy goals can be specified by its makers and that its implementation can be successfully executed through the establishment of some specific goals and mechanisms (Palumbo and Calista, 1990). This perspective emphasises that policymakers must be capable of exercising control over the environment as well as policy implementers. At the heart of this perspective is that the successful implementation of any policy is determined by the linkages between different organisations and departments at the local level (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973).

According to Elmore (1978), it all begins at the top of the process, with the policymaker's goal clearly stated, and goes through a sequence of increasingly more specific measures to define what is expected of implementers along the ladder. At the bottom of the process, the expected satisfactory outcome will be stated with precision. This will be measured in the terms of the original statement of intent.

Proponents of top-down perspective have been criticised for taking policy implementation to be basically an administrative process while paying little or no attention to its political aspects, and in some cases, trying to eliminate them (Berman, 1978). More so, the theory does not recognise political developments in society that is responsible for policies with multiple goals and intertwined implementation structures (May, 2003). Excess attention is given to policy makers as key players while neglecting those delivering the service at the local level who are usually experts with adequate knowledge of social problems.

Overview of Nigeria's National Social Investment Programme (NSIP)

The growing Nigerian unemployed population as well as the number of people leaving in penury has been a thing of concern. This informed the President Buhari administration's determination to roll out what it christened the most ambitious social investment programme to help empower the people and improve their wellbeing. These programmes include N-Power, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT), Government Enterprise and Empowerment Programme (GEEP) and The Home Grown School Feeding Programme (HGSF).

The N-Power

The programme is designed to support young Nigerians between the ages of 18 and 35 to acquire and develop life-long skills for self-sustenance and societal development. They are given a stipend of N30,000 monthly. N-power is addressing the challenges of unemployment especially among graduates. This scheme targets 500,000 graduates. This scheme empowers young Nigerians with the necessary tools to enable them create, develop, build, fix and work on exceptional ideas, projects and enterprises that are capable of providing the required change in local communities, the economy and the nation at large. The programme also focuses on Nigeria's critical needs in education, agriculture, and technological construction, creative and artisanal industries (Social Investment Office, 2018).

The Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)

This programme is designed to give direct support to aged and poor Nigerians through the payment of ₦5,000 each to over one million Nigerians to improve nutrition, increase household consumption and support the development of human capital through cash benefits to various categories of the poor and vulnerable section of the society. So far, N5,000 is paid monthly to households in addition to N5,000 for participants active in human development and sustainability activities. After three (3) years (2015-2018) of implementing this programme, 279,973 Nigerians have benefitted in 20 states. This is in addition to the formation of 5,917 savings groups/cooperatives to ensure sustainability (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2019).

Government Enterprise and Empowerment Programme (GEEP)

It is a micro-lending support targeted at small-scale traders, artisans, enterprising youth, farmers and women in particular. It provides loans between N10,000 and N350,000 at no monthly cost to beneficiaries. So far, 1.7 million petty traders, farmers, artisans have received this support (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2019).

Home Grown School Feeding Programme (HGSF)

It is designed to deliver school-feeding to young children with a specific focus on increasing school enrolment, reducing the incidence of malnutrition, especially among poor Nigerians who cannot afford to eat a meal-a-day. The programme also empowers community women as cooks and support small farmers to help stimulate economic growth. The objective of this scheme is to provide children in primary 1 to 3 across public schools in Nigeria a free nutritionally balanced meal. The goal is to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, improve nutrition and health, promote agricultural development, gender equality and empower women especially in rural communities. So far, 9.5 million pupils are beeing fed in 52,604 schools across 30 states of the federation. This is in addition to the employment of 101,913 cooks (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2019).

To achieve the desired result and ensure an improvement in the wellbeing of Nigerians, the Nigerian government established the National Database with the support of the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC). A National Social Register domiciled with the Federal Ministry of Budget and National Planning has also been established while modalities and operational guide to facilitate the smooth implementation of the N-power programme has been developed and a portal for the unemployed youth, created. Payment to beneficiaries is done through mobile banking to ensure that even those in remote areas receive their stipends (Social Investment Office, 2018).

The overall objective of the programme is to respond to the challenge of poverty, inequality and unemployment in Nigeria through the execution of programmes to help improve the wellbeing of the poor, improve access to health and education, reduce youth unemployment, eradicate child malnutrition, improve financial inclusion through better access to credit for small scale and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and promoting productivity (Social Investment Office, 2018).

By and large, the National Social Investment Programme is no doubt a laudable initiative that attempts to address challenges of inequality of opportunities as well as regional and gender disparities, inadequate access to credit facilities, child malnutrition and unemployment, among others. More so, it stands a chance to become one of the enduring legacies of the Buhari-led administration, especially with the significant progress recorded in the past years of its implementation.

However, there are some issues related to its design, especially when compared to the experiences of other developing countries. For instance, it is a difficult task to ensure that the National Cash Transfer programme (NCTP) practically succeeds in lifting households out of poverty rather than serve as a short-term cash infusion for the beneficiaries. Some of the greatest challenges to this programme include how to extend and expand it to every nook and cranny of the federation; development of the right institutional mechanism required for long term implementation of the programme as well as the development of a sustainable funding plan. More so, the programme risks continuity once the tenure of the current administration ends (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2019).

Poverty, Inequality and Sustainable Development in Nigeria

The rise in Nigeria's extreme poverty is highly disturbing. Even though the country is categorised as a middle-income state, nearly four out of ten Nigerians live below the national poverty line in 2016 with an international measurement of US$ 1.90 per day (World Bank, 2018).The most populous black nation is home to the largest number of extremely poor people, ranking well above India. Over the years, Nigeria has experienced an upward trend in poverty. The country's poverty rate increased from 35.0 to 38.8 percent of the total population from 2011 to 2016. Between 2011 and 2016, the total number of Nigerians living in poverty increased from 57 million to 74 million, this is attributed to increase in poverty incidences as well as rapid population growth rate (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2019).

Top of the Sustainable Development Goals is the global eradication of extreme poverty by 2030. To achieve this feet across the globe, 90 people are expected to be lifted out of poverty every minute. For Africa, 57 people are expected to be lifted out of poverty every minute. In Nigeria, 12 people are expected to be lifted out of poverty every minute. Unfortunately, 9 people in Africa on the average fall into extreme poverty every minute (Ogbu, 2018). It is estimated that 62.6% of Nigeria's total population live below US$1.25 per day (international poverty line) translating to about 100 million Nigerians. Unemployment estimate for Nigeria also increased from 6.4 percent in 2014 to 14.2 percent in 2017. There is also high rate of inequality with regards to income as well as access to basic social services and opportunities (Onah and Olise, 2019).

The recent food, international oil and financial crises induced by the COVID-19 pandemic have worsened the hardship facing the poor and vulnerable in Nigeria. Successive Nigerian governments have, over the years, made efforts to address the challenge of poverty and inequality in Nigeria with very little to show for it. These governments established various programmes to help arrest the situation but in spite of the huge sums of money expended, there is no significant reduction in the poverty and inequality rates in the country. Scholars attribute the causes of poverty and inequality in Nigeria to slow economic growth and social development; unemployment; underutilisation of resources, overreliance on oil; inadequate investment and poor governance (Onah and Olise, 2019).

The poor performance of Nigeria's social sector (health and education) is disturbing. This is especially because the two sectors play significant roles in poverty alleviation. A substantial proportion of the nation's annual national budget has consistently allocated more resources to recurrent expenditure while less than 30 percent of it is allocated to capital expenditure (Onah, 2015). This results to low level of industrialisation and infrastructure development. In spite of the commitment of the present administration to ensure diversification of the Nigerian economy, the country's economy remains largely mono-cultural. Accordingly, the oil and gas industry accounted for approximately 70 percent of government revenue and more than 90 percent of its export earnings in 2017. The nation's economic fortune is made worst by Boko Haram insurgency in the North East, banditry in the North West, herdsmen attack in the North Central and widespread kidnapping across the country (Onah and Olise, 2019).

National Social Investment Programme and Sustainable Development in Nigeria

In his inaugural address for his second term in office on May 29, 2019, President Buhari again promised to improve the livelihood of Nigerians to achieve sustainable development. He specifically promised to lift 100 million Nigerians out of poverty in 10 years and the National Social Investment Programme is to play a critical role in the attainment of this lofty objective.

The Social Investment Programme has led to the commencement of the process of designing a roadmap for institutionalising sustainable delivery towards clearly defined socio-economic and poverty alleviation targets, as well as a comprehensive structure. It is also driving financial inclusion by facilitating identification through the Bank Verification Number (Nigerian Biometric Identification System for Banking). This is also linked to the National Identification Number database by the National Identification Management Commission (NIMC). The programme is identifying and bringing into visibility those who before the NSIPs had never 'existed', making for proper planning. It is also enhancing data collation for National planning, to strategically facilitate the efforts by the State governments and relevant government agencies in addressing the needs of the people within their purview. A database of unemployed graduates seeking employment and as such provides a veritable platform for engaging graduates for the country; private and public sectors alike, with data providing details of qualifications, BVN, age, numbers, interests, etc (Social Investment Office, 2018).

According to Bisong (2019), the N-Power scheme has significantly contributed to employment generation and created positive changes in job creation in Nigeria. This means that the scheme is improving the economic well-being and job enhancement skill among the people.

In the opinion of Eno-Abasi (2020), all is not well with the National Social Investment Programme. This is manifest in the recent condemnation of the programme, as well as spat between the Federal Government and the leadership of the National Assembly over the implementation of the scheme and the desire to achieve the desired result. While the Federal government views the programme as an ambitious one and unprecedented in the history of the nation aimed at giving succour to the poor, the leadership of the National Assembly as well as some socio-political groups, experts and, indeed many Nigerians insist that the programme is failing to achieve set objectives. The First Lady of Nigeria, Mrs Aisha Buhari has also criticised the programme and described it as a failure, especially in the Northern part of the country with specific reference to Kano and Adamawa States. Mrs Buhari queried that despite the ₦500 billion budgetary allocations for the programme, the conditional cash transfer arm of the programme was not reaching the target group. This represents a serious indictment of the implementation of the National Social Investment Programme and its ability to enhance sustainable development in Nigeria.

Mrs Buhari's query gives credence to the perception in some sections of the country that the programme is a mere conduit for the looting of public treasury. Allegations have been rife that it has become a cesspool of corruption. The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic and its spread in 2020 has raised increasing interest in the functioning of the social investment programme. This is another indictment on the current administration and its ability to enhance sustainable development. The operations of the programme over this period in providing palliatives to the people have been seriously indicting on the integrity, competence and fairness of its operators. Some critics have alleged that the distribution mode is questionable. The spread of the distribution is also allegedly skewed in favour of certain sections of the country and hardly could many poor people benefitting from the programme clearly identified. What is seen in the media are stacks of cash on tables and the beneficiaries on queue. More than three years after the commencement of the programme that is supposed to improve the living conditions of the people and achieve sustainable development, crude and archaic methods are still used to reach the people (Guardian Editorial Board, 2020).

The National Social Investment Programme has been implemented since it began in 2016 but there has been little to show for it. The 2019 Poverty and Inequality Report released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) shows that 40.1% of Nigerians are poor. This implies that on average, 4 out of 10 Nigerians are estimated to have real per capita expenditures below ₦137,430 annually. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 2019 Population Statistics reveals that Nigeria has a total of 201 million populations. This, therefore, means that over 80 million Nigerians are considered poor by national standards (World Bank, 2020). This raises concern about the potentials of the programme to achieve sustainable development in Nigerian considering that it has been in operation for over four years.

Achieving sustainable development in Nigeria would remain a mere aspiration if the National Social Investment Programme is not pursued logically with concerted effort to ensure that the living conditions of the majority population is improved by enlarging their choices and expanding their capabilities and opportunities in ways that are sustainable from economic, social, environmental and political perspectives.

Challenges in the Implementation of National Social Investment Programme for Sustainable Development

The National Social Investment Office that used to be in the office of the Vice President before it was transferred into a new ministry, with much of the actual implementation that now rest with relevant agencies and institutions is unlikely to work in the long run. The Centre for Democracy and Development (2019), believes that when political transitions occur at the expiration of the tenure of this administration, different agencies may or may not prioritise the focus of social investment.

The Ministry of Budget and National Planning has already identified some challenges confronting the scheme to include the need to design and adopt a sustainable enrolment and payment system. This has become imperative due to environmental challenges and long distances between communities. The lack of technology and banking infrastructure in many rural areas is making this worse. The Treasury Single Account (TSA) policy has been a disincentive for commercial banks to engage in the programme. Communication gap and overlap of responsibilities and functions, especially among state focal persons and ministries, departments and agencies also constitutes an impediment in its implementation for the good of majority of the nation's poor population (Ndubisi, 2017).

More so, many commentators have criticised the implementation of NSIP on the grounds that there is lack of transparency and accountability. This is made worse by inadequate documentation and dissemination of information on how funds are obtained and expended. Supporting this claim, Onah and Olise (2019), averred that the launch of *trada moni* shortly before the 2019 general elections where government teams went into market places and distributed₦5,000 on the spot without due record of who got what and of what use such monies were to be put to showed lack of transparency. A corollary of this poor documentation is the lack of official document for dependable information on the management of the programme. Hence, there is undue reliance on newspaper and other online sources which validity cannot be assured for data and other information on the programme.

The Centre for Democracy and Development (2019), opined that it is difficult to ensure that the National Cash Transfer Programme actually succeeds in lifting households out of poverty rather than serve as a short-term cash infusion for the beneficiaries. The greatest challenges to this programme, therefore, includes how to extend and expand it across the federation; how to develop the required institutional mechanisms for its long-term implementation; and, how to identify and develop a sustainable funding plan that will outlive any government. As it is currently designed, it is feared that the moment the current present administration is no longer in power, it risk being continued.

Conclusion

The Nigerian Social Investment Programme is no doubt delivering the administration's desired objectives and outcomes. Even though it has only received 31% of its Annual Budgetary allocation of N500 Billion, it has been able to deliver measurable results. The programme has also succeeded beyond political party lines. This is obvious by the adoption of all State governments, including those that are in the opposition party. The design of the programme, therefore, shows a framework for transparency, trust and equitable application across the Federation. However, it is worthy of note that the programme is not enough intervention to lift all poor Nigerians out of poverty and breach inequality gap without a broad-based sustainable growth efforts that runs concurrently with interventions that is focused on creating economic and job opportunities; and social inclusion focused on equal access to health, education, and job opportunities (Aliogo, 2019).

Greater effort is required to enhance sustainable development in Nigeria through social policy. Investment rates are inadequate in many low income countries such as Nigeria and existing investment hardly support sustainable development gains in addition to the financial returns that investors are searching for. It is, therefore, imperative for public institutions in Nigeria to be dedicated to the drive for continual development of a strong, sustainable and effective social investment sector as it is obtainable in developed economies.

Recommendations

The Nigerian government should demonstrate better commitment in the enhancement of sustainable development through the social investment programme by setting up specific strong institutions to sustain the successes already recorded and the continuous development of a sustainable and efficient social investment sector. Developments in this regard should regularly be measured. This will ensure that implementers of the programme remain focused in achieving the desired result.

Component units of the Nigerian Federation (states and local governments) that are closer to the people and are the primary implementers of social policies should be involved in the design and execution of such policies. This will also ensure that the implementation of the policies is properly supervised for the realisation of set objectives.

Collaborative approaches between the public and private sectors on social investment as it relates to youth empowerment, breaching inequality of opportunities, regional and gender disparities, inadequate access to credit for small enterprises, child malnutrition and unemployment should be adopted.

The local population who are the actual beneficiaries of Nigeria's Social Investment Programme should be sufficiently involved in the identification and implementation of projects that affect their lives. This will help to exact the required commitment on their part for the programmes and also re-orientate them to take personal responsibility in the realisation of set objectives for their own good.

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THEME FOUR
COVID -19 PANDEMIC: EXPERIENCES AND RESPONSES

AN APPRAISAL OF SOCIAL POLICY RESPONSE TO COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN NIGERIA

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Abstract
This paper examined the implications of COVID-19 pandemic that has redefined the global dynamics of economy and health care delivery across the globe. Nigeria is not exempted from the socio – economic impacts upon the lockdown, closure of schools, markets, borders and works by the government in attempt to contain its spread and death having been declared by World Health Organization (WHO) as a global emergency on. 19th March,2020. This paper revealed how Nigeria like other countries was badly affected by the pandemic. It assessed effects of the lockdown on the workers who were made to remain indoors both in the formal and informal sectors. The paper argued that it was more severe for the low-income earners, artisans, private school teachers, owners of small scale businesses, students in public institutions and the vulnerable populations such as widows, orphans, persons with disabilities and vulnerable children. The study adopted the descriptive methodology. It relied on a robust approach of systematic literature search, using discourse analysis to analyse social policies put forward by the Nigerian government to cushion the socio – economic effects of the lockdown on the people. The paper outlined the challenges of the government in the provisions of social safety nets for the affected citizens compared to other climes. Thus this has heightened the conditions of the people making them more vulnerable. In drawing the conclusion, the paper solicits for sustained social policies such as Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT), food assistance and other viable economic policies capable of addressing the challenges in the future.

Keywords: Covid–19, Social Policy, Pandemic, Lockdown, Wuhan

Introduction

The outbreak of coronavirus, code-named COVID-19, began in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China by December 2019 and spread across the world to other parts of Asia, Europe and the United States in grave proportions (Johannes & Vivian, 2020). The pandemic has unleashed catastrophic damages on the global economy and healthcare delivery system of many countries across the globe. It was first reported to the World Health Organisation on December 31, 2019 with Chinese investigators linking the disease to the coronavirus family of viruses, which also includes the deadly severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) (WHO, 2020). It has not only claimed many lives, millions are tested positive and still counting across the globe. After being declared a pandemic by the World Health Organisation (WHO) in March 2020, it has spread to many African countries beginning from Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa and subsequently to others. The first confirmed case of the coronavirus disease was reported in Nigeria on 27th February, 2020 while the highest level of public health state of emergency operation was activated in the country by the federal and state governments, led by the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) (Youssoufou, Z, 2020).

In order to contain the spread of the disease different measures were taken by governments of various countries such as closure of the borders, works and so on. In Nigeria, the government ordered closure of schools, works, markets, borders and restriction of movement in areas worst hit by the pandemic such as Ogun State, Lagos State and Federal Capital Territory in order to contain its spread. States governments were not left out as they effected both total and partial lockdowns within their states across the country. Thus, the COVID-19 pandemic affected the socio-economic activities in Nigeria, leading to loss of thousands of jobs with many unable to cater for their family members.

Despite Nigeria being the most populous country in Africa with abundant human and material resources, over 82 million of her citizens live on less than one dollar (USD1) per day according to the country's National Bureau of Statistics (Adams, 2020). Similarly, Nigeria has overtaken India as the poverty capital of the world, with 87 million Nigerians said to be under \$1.90 per day (Zoaka, 2020). Noticeably, the outbreak of the pandemic came when Nigeria was about coming out from the 2016 recession that was a major setback to the country's economy.

Consequent upon this, many developed countries such as America, Britain, China, Brazil and many others have put in place palliatives to cushion its effects on the economy and citizenry. Similarly, the Federal Government of Nigeria embarked on different economic recovery programmes to rescue the nation out of the brim. However, the directives for total lockdown without thought-out palliatives for most of the citizens who were workers in the informal sector and the vulnerable populations brought untold hardship as they were handicapped by its socio-economic effects. Many criticisms were levelled against the government for not doing enough to cushion the harsh effects of COVID-19 on the citizens. While most studies have been focused on the outbreak of the pandemic, its implications on the socio-economic activities of the country and healthcare delivery, nothing much has been done to assess the issue of social policy put in place by the Nigerian government to cushion the multiplier effects of the pandemic on the citizens.

It is on this premise that the paper sets out to appraise the government social policy response and necessity of social policy during the time of emergencies, particularly in responding to the plights of the vulnerable populations in the country. The paper starts with the introduction that forms the background of this work. Section two deals with comprehensive literature on extant works on the origin, development and concept of social policy. Section three gives a critical review of social policy intervention of the Nigerian government during the ravaging COVID-19 pandemic. In a follow up to the above, section four makes a discursive overview of social policy intervention in Nigeria drawing lessons from other climes of developed countries who administered palliatives to addressing the need of different citizens during the time of emergencies. The section five identifies the likely challenges faced by the Nigerian government in an attempt to administer the social policy intervention. While section six suggested solutions and draws conclusion for the work.

Conceptualising social policy

Though scholars and policy makers view social policy from different perspectives, generally, social policy as a concept is used interchangeably with social welfare, social safety nets, social security and social protection.

Perhaps, the understanding of the concept differently by individual country informs such a notion. This is further buttressed by the explanation offered by M. W. Kpessa & D. Beland, (2012) when they affirmed that such resulted from humanitarian and development issues as most scholarship devoted to contemporary African social policy rather than going deep to explain systematic theoretical models and differences between and within countries. Ifeanyi (2018) captures it better when he argued that social protection is broader than others because it embraces persons in the formal and informal sectors as well as those who are unable to work due to certain incapacity such as old age or injury. This means social protection could be assumed to be the common name for all.

However, there is no universally acceptable definition of social policy. According to Marshall (1965), social policy is not a technical term with an exact meaning. The core aspects of his argument of social policy consists of social insurance, public (or national) assistance, the health and welfare services, and housing policy and so on. Vargas-Hernandez et al (2011) consider it as guidelines and interventions for the changing , maintenance or creation of living conditions that are conducive to human welfare. They further state that social policy as part of public policy must cater for education, health, housing, employment and food for all people.

Nevertheless, Mkandawire (2001) emphasises that social policy should encompass or involve overall and prior concerns with social development and as a key instrument that works in tandem with economic policy to ensure equitable and socially sustainable development. Taylor (2019) opines that social policy focuses on human need and what governments and other bodies can do to meet it. It, therefore, means that social policy goes beyond targeting only the poor or vulnerable populations in terms of needs rather it is a social protection policy driven by human rights approach.

This is particularly common in Sub-Saharan Africa where the understanding of social policy is mainly limited to intervention in the informal sector alone. Jacob et al (2010) shed more light on this when they identified two extreme routes to supply social services: direct provisioning by the state (publicly-owned firms) or cash transfers. Furthermore, they examined three high level options to combine various forms of social protection to stimulate local economic development which are employment generation (e.g., Childhood Development (ECD) Centres, Food and nutrition security (e.g., Food gardens or production inputs) and resources poor farmers (e.g., production inputs). This is a demonstration that social protection is a wider concept embedded in the context of social, economic and human welfare. To Hansan, they are wide range of activities and resources designed to enhance or promote the wellbeing of individuals, families and the larger society; and efforts to eliminate or reduce the incidence of social problems (Hansan, 2017).

In a bid to trace the origin of social policy, Aravacik (2018) sees social policy as an instrument that seeks to address the poverty and social imbalance caused by the industrialisation. Tillin & Duckett (2017) argued that there are diverse political factors critical to reason shaping social policies and its effectiveness for mitigating poverty and inequality many countries have introduced or extended initiatives that combine income transfers with initiatives intended to build the wider social and political capabilities of the poor to escape poverty over the long term**.** Even when it is called different names, social protection policies exist in virtually all countries. For example, employment generation (India), food security (Brazil) and agricultural development (India, Mexico and Malawi) are three outstanding major trends, expanded coverage of programmes; concerted investment to amalgamate and consolidate social welfare systems (Jacob et al, 2010).

In the West, proponents of scientific social planning, such as the sociologist August Comte and social researchers, such as Charles Booth, contributed to the emergence of social policy in the first industrialised countries (Vargas-Hernandez et al, 2011). It emerged as a result of the change in economic relations with the industrial revolution of 1700s and early 1800s. Increased production gave rise in Europe to the need for more labours which in turn made the owner of capital to dominate the labour market thus increasing trade liberalisation (Aravacik (2018). The need to support children and women that suffered the 1929 economic recession due to absence of the government's intervention, reduction of workers' wages and poor working conditions and other social problems necessitated the development of social policies.

Social policy is not a new phenomenon in typical traditional African society as its understanding was based on family, religious institutions and rarely on international community either in times of famine or war. Consequently, Social Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa has not been defined by guaranteeing a minimum level of social wellbeing through social insurance, unemployment insurance, state guaranteed old-age pension, or pronatalist social provisioning (Adesina, 2007). In 1950s and 1960s, a good number of African leaders after independence pledged support to development of welfare schemes in United Nations General Assembly. Kazeem (2020) examines social safety-nets across the continent. For instance, South Africa has provision for social welfare infrastructure through which it catered for about 30% of its population who are enjoying cash transfer monthly before pandemic. Also, Nigeria operates social welfare scheme of N-power for the unemployed, conditional cash transfers to the poor household and school feeding for children in primary schools. In Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger, there were food assistance to vulnerable people and utility bill freezes was implemented in Mali and so were Kenya, Tanzania and others. However, the social policy in Nigeria is skeletal and only addresses small numbers of the vulnerable populace.

Review of COVID–19 pandemic and Nigeria social policy intervention

The novel coronavirus emerged in late 2019, affected millions of people around the globe and caused thousands of deaths (Abidemi, 2020). Globally, as of 21 September 2020, there have been 30,949,804 confirmed cases of COVID-19, including 959,116 deaths (WHO, 2020). The first confirmed case of COVID-19 in sub-Saharan Africa was announced in Nigeria on 27 February, 2020 with the arrival of an Italian man through the Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos at 10pm on 24th February 2020. As at 23rd September 2020, the COVID-19 update by NCDC confirmed 57,613 cases, 48,836 discharged and 1,100 deaths (NCDC, 2020).

The spread of the virus heralded the restriction of all movements of people and closure of businesses and offices in Lagos and Abuja, the two main cities, for an initial two weeks as ordered by the NCDC (Olorounbi,2020). Ogun State and some states experienced full and partial lockdown to reduce the spread of the pandemic.

Consequently, the pandemic affected the Nigerian economy that is dependent on import as it disrupted global supply chains, sharp reduction in crude oil prices, turmoil in global stock and financial markets, massive cancellations in sporting activities, entertainment and business events (CBN Report, 2020). In a bid to cushion the socio-economic effects of the pandemic the federal and state governments embarked on several interventions. These interventions are discussed below.

Health Sector Interventions

The first containment efforts of the federal government was to constitute the Presidential Task Force on COVID-19 on March 9, 2020 to coordinate the COVID-19 in Nigeria through a multi-sectoral inter-governmental approach. The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) through the National Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) continued to lead the national public health response in Nigeria under the close supervision of the Federal Ministry of Health, while oversight functions were to be carried out by the Presidential Task Force on COVID-19. In addition, the NCDC is working in tandem with states governments in responding to cases of pandemic at the sub-national levels.

Frontline health workers in Nigerian Federal Teaching Hospitals, Federal Medical Centres (FMCs), and other designated hospitals for COVID-19 treatments fighting against the spread of COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria have continued to receive hazard allowance and inducement allowance of 50% per cent of consolidated Basic salary as hazard pay across board from the federal government (Vanguard, 2020).

The Minister of Health Osagie Ehanire gave a detailed explanation of the payment as 40% of Consolidated Basic Salary as Special COVID-19 Hazard and Inducement Allowance to healthcare workers at Special non-public Hospitals and Clinics in the Federal ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) for the same three months period. While 20 percent of the Consolidated Basic Salary were to be paid as Special Risk Allowance additionally on the Special COVID-19 Hazard and Inducement Allowance to all health workers directly managing COVID-19 at the infectious Diseases Hospitals, Isolation and Treatment Centres (Vanguard, 2020). In addition, the CBN gave credit support of ₦100 billion to the health sector in a bid to ameliorate the effects of the COVID-19 in Nigeria. This is with a view to strengthening the sector's capacity to meet potential increase in demand for healthcare products and services (CBN, 2020).

Economic Sector Interventions

There were several interventions of the government to cushion the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the citizenry. Some of them are as follow:

Central Bank of Nigeria Stimulus Package

The official intervention of the Central Bank of Nigeria to cushion the effects of the pandemic could be seen from six policy responses: Extension of moratorium on loans; reduction of interest rates from 9% to 5%; creation of a ₦50bn (€130m, which was later increased to N100 billion) fund to support the economy; credit support for the healthcare sector; regulatory forbearance and strengthening of the loans-to-deposit rate policy (Adeshokan, 2020). The CBN developed a fiscal stimulus package, including a ₦50 billion ($138.89 million) credit facility to households and small and medium enterprises most affected by the pandemic.

The Nigeria Incentive-based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending(NIRSAL) Microfinance Bank was established to empower small businesses across Nigeria and drive financial inclusion; a ₦100 billion ($277.78 million) loan to the health sector, and ₦1 trillion ($2.78 billion) to the manufacturing sector.

Moreover, the interest rates on all CBN interventions have been revised downwards from 9 to 5 percent, and a one-year moratorium on CBN intervention facilities has been introduced , effective March 1,2020 (Onyekwena & Ekeruche, 2020). President Muhammadu Buhari directed that a three-month moratorium on loans to all Trada moni, Market moni and Farmer moni beneficiaries and a similar moratorium to all federal government funded loans be issued by the Bank of Industry, Bank of Agriculture and the Nigeria Export Import Bank as relief efforts to tackle COVID-19 pandemic (Sanni, 2020) .

Nigeria Economic Sustainability Plan (NESP)

The Nigeria Economic Sustainability Plan (NESP) was approved by the Federal Executive Council (FEC) on June 24, 2020. It was aimed at developing appropriate responses to the challenges posed by the COVID -19 pandemic. The NESPhas been developed in consultation with Cabinet Ministers, Heads of Federal Agencies, the Presidential Economic Council (PEAC), State Governors and National Assembly. It has been developed as a 12-month, ₦2.3 Trillion Transit' plan between the Economic Recovery and Growth plan (ERGP) and the successor plan to the EGRP. It was to be funded as follows; ₦500 billion from the Federal Government; ₦1.11 trillion from the CBN in form of structured lending; ₦334 billion from external bilateral/ multilateral sources and ₦302.9 billion from other funding sources (Ogala, 2020). Some of the areas of interventions includes mass agricultural programme of cultivation between 20,000 and 100,000 hectares of new farmland in every state, infrastructure through extensive public works and road construction programme that would employ a minimum of 1000 young Nigerians per local government amounting to 774,000, mass housing programme of up to 300,00 homes every year, installation of Solar Home Systems targeting 5 million households, serving about 25 million individual Nigerians who are currently not connected to the national Grid and others.

Economic Stimulus Bill 2020

Also, Emergency Economic Stimulus Bill, 2020 was approved by the House of Representatives in its plenary session held on Tuesday, 24 March 2020 to provide support to businesses and individual citizens of Nigeria (Dixit et al, 2020). The proposed law aimed at providing 50% tax rebates to companies that do not lay off their employees from March 1 to 31 December, 2020 being the actual amount due or paid as PAYE taxes under the personal Income Tax Act, 2004 (as amended). It also provided for deferment of residential mortgage payments by individual contributors to the National Housing Scheme for a period of 180 days and a waiver of import duties on medical goods (Adegite & Abu, 2020).

Other Social Responses

Apart from the above, there were other social responses of the government in form of Cash Transfers and food assistance as palliatives to the most vulnerable populations.

- Conditional Cash Transfers

Similarly, the Federal government announced the category of Nigerians qualified to benefit from its conditional cash transfers during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Disaster Management, and Social Development, Sadiya Umar Farouq was to anchor the cash transfer to the most vulnerable populations. On 1 April 2020, the ministry began paying N20,000 (US$52) to families registered in the National Social Register(NSR) of poor and vulnerable households which was set up in 2016 to combat poverty.

President Buhari in his broadcast announced an expansion of the initial number of households for the conditional Cash Transfer by one million, which was to be focused on the most vulnerable. Consequently, the Ministry continued in the distribution of the fund started from Abuja as beneficiaries are entitled to N5,000 every month; however, the payment of N20,000 would cover period of four months according to the Minister. 190 beneficiaries in Kwali Area Councils as the total beneficiaries in Abuja according to the ministry were 5000 households. Other States received theirs though at different days.

- Food Assistance

After the lockdown, the Honourable Minister, Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development in line with the Presidential Directive and Governor's forum on school-feeding during lockdown, it was agreed that Home Rations remained the alternative means of feeding children during lockdown which was to start with the FCT, Lagos and Ogun States as pilot cases (Abdullateef, 2020). The school feeding programme is a component of the social investment that has become a conduit pipe of corruption.

Similarly, there was Presidential directive for the Custom boss on 7 April, 2020 to release confiscated rice to the Ministry in charge of palliative to distribute to Nigerians as relief items to cushion the effect of the lockdown. To this end, about 46,000 metric tonnes (158 trailers) of rice were released and shared to Nigerian through the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs (The

Guardian, 2020). For example, 70,000 were said to have got over 3500 metric tonnes of assorted grains comprising of maize, millet and sorghum of the Federal government in Bauchi (Leadership, 2020). The rice was distributed across states though rejected by some states such as Oyo, Benue, etc., on health ground that the rice had expired.

Apart from these, some states government also took measures to cushion the pandemic effects in their states.

Nigeria's Social Policy in the COVID-19 Era: Lessons from other Countries

Nigerian governments' directives on lockdown both at the federal and state levels just like other countries across the globe was greeted with daunting challenges due to absence of commensurate policy responses to the socio-economic problems that were expected to follow. The provision of cash transfer of N5000 to cover periods of 4 months amounting to ₦20,000 to the vulnerable households of 3.5 million considered the poorest populations was a good step by the government. However, these could only achieve a little in a country where above 80 million citizens live below $1 dollar per day.

In other countries, governments paid rents and utility bills, emergency cash grants and stimulus packages to their citizens and suspended the payment of taxes. For example, as at the end of April 2020, over 30 million Americans had filed for unemployment benefits since Coronavirus Disease 2019 hit the United States (Iyatse 2020). Taking a cue from developed countries, Rahul (2020) noted how Hong Kong gave HK $10,000 to each resident to combat outbreak while in the United State the U.S. Senate passed a $2trillion (€1.7 trillion) coronavirus aid bill for economic relief of direct payments of $1,200 to most American adults who earn $75,000 or less and aid to help small businesses pay workers (BBC News, 2020).

Besides, additional $500 was given to each child and there was expansion of unemployment aid to include payments for the first time to those who are self-employed and so on. Thus, unemployed workers were given additional $600 per week by the temporary federal pandemic legislation called the Coronavirus Aid Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act passed in March 2020 over and above the states grants (Liana, 2020). America gave their citizens $2,500 to stay at home while there is food bank in London (The Guardian, 2020).

There was an introduction of the Canada Emergency Response Benefits (CERB) in March 2020 by Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, to replace system for paying jobless benefits with a simpler payout across the board of C $500 per week for four month. It was to cover Canadians who lost jobs, got sick, quarantined, or had care for children out of school at $2,000 (Canadian; US $1,470) per four week period (Liana, 2020).

In the United Kingdom, those working in the private sector and pay tax through the pay-as-you- earn (PAYE) system were placed on furlough (i.e., temporarily lay-off) by their employers in order to apply for a government grant to pay 80% of gross salary up to a limit of €2,500 per month while the typical full-time worker receive €585 a week amounting to about €2,340 a month subjected to decision of the employer to pay their staff either as full or temporary staff. More so, there is an arrangement for self-employed that had a loss of income, receive a taxable grant of 80% of average monthly profits over the past three years – up to a capital of €2,500 per month. Also, there is coronavirus self-employment income support scheme as sick pay called universal credit or contribution base employment and support allowance (ESA) (BBC News, 2020).

In the UK, there are evidence of credible vouchers issued to the beneficiaries and there are effective institutional checks and balances to ensure that beneficiaries are fed with nutritious foods in commensurate with the payments made transparently by the British government (Onwubiko, 2020). It would be recalled the stimulated doubts and suspicion that greeted the Ministry of Humanitarian Disaster Management and Social Development claimed that school feeding through Home Rations were given to the children who were at home after the closure of school gulping humongous amounts without vouchers and details of the benefiting pupils like the operation of school feeding in the UK.

Nigeria's Social Policy in the Era of COVID-19: Challenges

The Nigerian government has taken several emergency interventions to cushion the effects of the COVID-19 on the citizenry and the country at large. However, there are some challenges that kept reverberating in a way that left the social policy of the government overwhelmed and handicapped. Some of them are discussed below:

Corruption

Prior to covid -19 outbreaks, corruption is an endemic problem in Nigeria. Managing the health crises opened ways for corruption to fester the more. Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Disaster Management and Social Development Affairs under Hajiya Sadiya Umar Farouk recently claimed to have distributed COVID-19 palliatives to Nigerians and given out-home rations to school children who were at home in continuation of the school feeding of the federal government. These have stimulated controversies with masses calling for details of the beneficiaries. Besides, the food assistance meant to assist the vulnerable populations could not provide food for majority of those who need it as the distribution system is marred by corruption and opaque accountability (Dixit et al, 2020). The case of the NDDC that claimed to have spent ₦1.32 billion (about $200 million) as COVID-19 relief as confirmed by the Acting Managing Director of Niger Development Commission while undergoing a probe of the Commission's activities by the National Assembly (The Guardian, 2020), readily comes to mind. Therefore, the system encourages corruption and given its pace, social policy would be difficult to achieve its targets.

Economy

The Nigerian economy was just coming out of the 2016 recession when the COVID-19 broke out. The economy of the country is weak and vulnerable as the oil exports accounting for about 90% of Nigeria's exports declined to nearly $30 per barrel in the wake of the pandemic thus adversely affecting the volume and value of net exports (Onyekwena et al, 2020). The directive of lockdowns came with hardship as 65% of Nigeria's GDP comes from the informal sector and employment of 90% workforce thus portends grave economic instability. The stimulus packages of the Central Bank of Nigeria that offers a credit of ₦3 million to poor families affected by the pandemic, the Economic Stimulus Bill 2020 and other interventions targeted to promote small scale and medium enterprises could not achieve much as many poor households do not only lack the required collateral but are also not aware of the economic packages of the government. Besides, many of the enterprises are not registered and would find it difficult to access the loans or credits. The Human Rights Watch (2020) noted that Conditional Cash Transfer payment could only reach a fraction as by March 31,2020 the National Social Register included 11,045,537 people from 2,644,493 households far fewer than the over 90 million Nigerians projected to live in extreme poverty, on less than $1.90 a day.

Healthcare Delivery

The manpower shortage and facilities in the hospitals and laboratories prior to COVID-19 outbreak were in a state of disarray. For example, Nigeria had just built 350 intensive care units (ICU) infrastructure at 71 locations, with each having between one to 20 beds for its entire population of 200 million before the outbreak (Ogundipe, 2020). After several months, Nigeria got to the point where 35 states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory could boast of isolation and treatment centres, with the number of laboratories increased to a level where the country could test 15,000 samples per day and so far over 400,000 tests conducted (Thisday, 2020). This is a good move but relatively low in a country with a population of 200 million which actually planned to combat COVID-19. More so, the incessant strikes by medical personnel even during pandemic remains the most unfortunate thing that could befall a nation in the period of pandemic.

Lack of Reliable Data

Nigeria does not have a verifiable data to truly determine its population and the beneficiaries of the cash transfers so far. Therefore, to talk about social policy in support of the vulnerable populations without traceable data is tragic. It is absolutely difficult to manage social policies effectively in a country like Nigeria where only about 40 percent population are having bank accounts (Dixit et al, 2020). Yet, there were claims that reasonable number of the citizens enjoyed the government Conditional Cash Transfer. The suspicion has informed the need for the demand of details of the beneficiary of both the Conditional Cash Transfer and the government palliatives so far.

Unemployment

According to the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS), unemployment rate in Nigeria stood at about 23.1 percent in the third quarter of 2018 but as at the second quarter of 2020 it has moved to 27.1 percent. The unemployment rate in the country has exposed the youths to criminality, robbery and insecurity. The FG's National Social Investment Programme (NSIP) under which Tradermoni and N-power are implemented appeared to be as ludicrous as the bigger economic policies. This is because the 500 batch A and B of N-power beneficiaries were relieved going back to the streets without adequate preparation for them even during the pandemic period.

How many homes of the unemployed would N10,000 Tradermoni feed? (Iyatse, 2020). There were no direct provisions for the unemployed during the pandemic let alone students whose institutions were closed down.

Politics

The outbreak of the pandemic necessitated the need for the government to roll out palliative measures. However, Informal political processes, party affiliations, religious inclination and ethnic clientages which the country is known for marred the distribution processes in the face of inefficient formal institutions and careful implementation mechanisms. It has been inevitably politicised, but not necessarily adversely. Consequently, undefined parameters made the distribution worst and such attracted criticisms from the populace who alleged that the process was politicised. For example, in Edo State, most of the residents claimed they were not aware if there was any distribution of palliatives in their localities (Eranga, 2020). Thus far, findings revealed that actually most of the palliatives distributed across the states were actually distributed along party lines rather than genuinely given them to the targeted populace.

Technical Know-how

There is a significant challenge in the area of mechanisms that could reach out to households that are worst hit by the pandemic. Social needs and policy response could only be effective and achievable when there is undergirded integrated technology response spanning several sectors including health, education, trade, businesses and others. This is needed to address structural issues, corruption and diversion that make the country resilient to shocks and limit range of policy responses in terms of emergencies like the pandemic thus calling for investment in technology.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Recommendations

The paper calls for continuous investments in the health sector and advocates for a special budgetary allocation, independent research, pharmaceutical reforms and provision of the health need of the poor. Apart from the healthcare delivery, the paper advocates for the following to administer social policy protection effectively and efficiently:

- There is urgent need to build and reconstitute the state in its social policy delivery to the citizens in periods of distresses both at the formal and informal sectors and defining the parameters and comprehensive data for the beneficiaries seamlessly.
- For social policy to reach all the targeted beneficiaries, awareness must be created through local channels and ensuring a synergy among the community leaders, the frontline ministries and agencies of the government in charge of palliative.

- Government should consider granting small-interest –free-loans or small grants to smaller enterprises and poor households via the community based microfinance using community leaders as guarantors to reduce incidence of collateral and registration.
- Direct Cash Transfer options should adopt prepaid debit cards for the poor either at the community or family level leveraging on the complimentary efforts of the civil society organisations for due diligence and accountability.
- Food assistance as palliative should be organised at the community level, identifying venues, sets eligibility, parameters and technology deployment to track down diversions and corruptions.
- There is need for inclusion of prominent citizens such as traditional or religious leaders and members of the civil society in the Federal and State Government Task Force Committees on implementation of the emergency palliative programmes across the country.
- There is need for urgent and sincere diversification of the country's economy to accommodate more revenues especially from the agric sector and other sectors than depending on oil exports.
- There is need for development of a verifiable data to ensure accurate precision and specific needs in terms of health, education and economic relief aids to the most disadvantaged citizens of the country in the period of distress such as this.
- Government should strengthen and expand the targeted vulnerable population through a robust and effective coordinating framework that would encourage a seamless implementation.
- Investment in a digital technology to facilitate learning activities across all levels of education, galvanise economic activities, revenues, and health delivery in the period of pandemic. For example, the closure of educational facilities from primary to the tertiary levels by the government could be avoided if there have been massive investments in technological know-how for online learning without necessarily disrupting the school calendar and regular payment of the teachers.

Conclusion

Having analysed emergency interventions of the government in the wake of COVID-19 pandemic,it can be asserted that both the federal and state governments have not done much to mitigate the sufferings of the people. Arising from this, the poverty level of the country may increase with such haphazard approach to mitigating the effects of the pandemic on the citizens who had suffered the order of closure of businesses, works and restriction on movements. While the pandemic has heightened the existing fragilities, compounded the challenges in the economy and the health sector, its potential future implications may come with devastating consequences if better approaches are not explored. The social policies such as food assistance and cash transfer executed by the government are inefficient, inadequate and corruption ridden. Besides, it's skeletal and that could hardly match the severity of the problems confronting the populace. For social policy in Nigeria to be effective, it must be well funded to fathom the economic conditions and poverty levels of the country into consideration. Hence, there is need for policy interventions that would make direct impacts on the life of the common man on the streets, children out of school, utilities bills and workers at both the formal and informal sectors.

There is urgent need to adopt functional strategies to bring Nigeria out of the economic doldrums the pandemic may bring otherwise; it could heighten the condition and fragilities of the country in a way entirely inimical for development of the country and its citizenry.

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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC CRISIS IN NIGERIA: A DESK REVIEW OF EVENTS IN KANO STATE

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Abstract

The novel human coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2 or COVID-19) originated from China's city of Wuhan in 2019 and since its outbreak, it has spread to many countries around the world. This is the worst kind of disease that have hit the world in recent time and the continent of Africa recorded its first case in Egypt on 14th February, 2020 and in Nigeria on 27th February, 2020. The pandemic has overwhelmed the health systems of both developed and developing nations and has affected the political, social, economic, educational and human security of nations. Thus, this paper assesses the socio-economic impacts of COVID-19 pandemic crisis in Nigeria with focus on Kano State. This is a desk research and employs analytical methods and gathers data from various sources including official sources and media reports. The paper contends that the various strategies adopted by the government to curtail the spread of the disease have serious consequences on the life of the people and suggests a well- packaged palliatives measures for all irrespective of religion, ethnic groups and party affiliations, this will help to reduce the economic hardship faced by the people.

Keywords: COVID-19, pandemic, socio-economic, Kano, Nigeria

Introduction

Coronavirus seems to be the worst of its kind that have hit the world in the recent times. It started in the Hubei province of China in 2019 and has spread to all continents, affecting more than two hundred countries by September 30, 2020. The virus was identified as a novel beta-coronavirus and the genetic sequence was shared on 12 January 2020 and the infection is officially called COVID-19 and the virus SARS-CoV-2. The outbreak was declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 30 January and a Pandemic on 11 March, 2020 by World Health Organisation (*Tabish, 2020). COVID-19* is a respiratory illness caused by a virus called Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and its symptoms include fever, cough, and shortness of breath. COVID-19 can be transmitted through direct contact with respiratory droplets of an infected person (generated through coughing and sneezing). Individuals can also be infected from touching surfaces contaminated by the virus and touching their face, e.g., eyes, nose and mouth (Eranga, 2020).

As at 1 October, 2020 at 6.32 GMT, the confirmed cases globally stood at thirty-four million, one hundred and sixty-six thousand, six hundred and thirty-two (34,166,632), while deaths recorded during the same period hit one million and eighteen thousand, eight hundred and seventy-one (1,018,871) and those that recovered from the pandemic stood at twenty-five million, four hundred and thirty-seven thousand and forty-one (25,437,041). Africa ranks second among the continents with lowest cases of this pandemic (1,489,711 confirmed cases), Asia, (10,638,277 confirmed cases), North America (8,898,913 confirmed cases), Europe (5,027,512 confirmed cases), South America (8,080,109 confirmed cases) and Oceania (31,388 confirmed cases) (Worldometer, 2020). Nigeria recorded her first case of COVID-19 on 27 February, 2020 when an Italian national tested positive to the virus (SARS-CoV-2) in Lagos and on 9 March, 2020 the second case was reported in Ewekoro, Ogun State. This was from the Italian index case (a Nigerian who had contact with the Italian national) of 27 February, 2020 (Ojo, 2020). Since then, there have been an upsurge in the number of confirmed cases and new cases have been confirmed in more states in the country.

As at 6.42 am on 1 October, 2020 the confirmed cases in Nigeria stood at fifty-eight thousand, eight hundred and forty-eight (58,848), the deaths hit one thousand, one hundred and twelve (1,112) those recovered were fifty thousand, three hundred and fifty-eight (50,358) (NCDC, 2020). The epicentres of the pandemic are: Lagos and Abuja.

The pandemic has affected the political, social and economic lives of the people. With the imposition of lockdown, many factories and business were closed, millions of people lost their jobs and businesses were crippled. It has caused global social disruption by reducing global social relations. Moreover, it has degobalised the world in terms of human migration with airports closed and social events postponed (Amzat, Aminu, Kolo, Akinyele, Ogundairo, & Danjibo, 2020).

It is against this background that this paper assesses the socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria with a focus on Kano State. The paper is structured into five parts of which this introduction is a part. The second segment examines the Federal Government of Nigeria responses to effort at curtailing the spread of the disease while the third part takes a cursory look at COVID-19 in Kano and the state's government effort to curb the spread of the virus. The fourth section is the analysis of the socio-economic impact of the virus in Kano state and the last part is the conclusion and recommendations.

Nigeria's Federal Government Response to COVID-19 Pandemic

As earlier indicated in the introductory segment of this paper, Nigeria recorded her firstsss case of COVID-19 on 27 February, 2020 and since then the number of confirmed cases have increased and virtually all the states in the federation have confirmed cases of the deadly virus.

The Federal government's COVID-19 response plan is based on ten pillars namely: the scaling up of surveillance centres, contact tracing, establishment of isolation centres, case management of critically sick COVID-19 patients, closure of places of worship, entertainment and sporting centres, closure of land border, airport closure for both domestic and international flights and the suspension of burial and wedding ceremonies (Odah, 2020).

Prior to the first case, the government constituted the Preparedness Group on January

31, 2020 and the Group comprised representatives from Federal Ministry of Health, Office of the National Security Adviser, World Health Organisation, United States Centre for Disease Control, Pro-Health International, Public Health England and others. The Group was saddled with assessing and managing the risk of importation of COVID-19 to Nigeria and also making preparation for early detection and response (NCDC, 2020).

At early stages of the pandemic, precautionary measures took by the Federal Government of Nigeria to curtail the spread of the disease included:

- closure of the national borders and airspace, schools, worship centres and other public places,
- cancelling of mass gathering events and imposition of total lock down on the Federal Capital Territory, Lagos and Ogun States for an initial period of fourteen days; and
- imposition of dawn to dusk curfews in these territories (Olapegba, Ayandele, Kolawole, Oguntayo, Gandi, Dangiwa, Ottu &. Iorfa, 2020).

During the lockdown, only food stores and essential service providers such as medical personnel, law enforcement agencies were allowed to operate. Besides, civil servants were asked to stay at home and performed their administrative functions (Abodunrin, Oloye & Adesola, 2020). However, due to the rise in the number of COVID-19 confirmed cases, the government extended the lockdown to include the rest of the country on April 27, 2020. On 4 May 2020, the government announced plans to ease restrictions in the country by allowing offices, markets, businesses, and stores to resume operation with limited hours and staff capacity, but with compulsory wearing of face masks in public and checking of body temperatures (Iboi, Sharomi, Ngonghala & Gumel, 2020).

On 29 June 2020, the Federal government extended the second phase of eased lockdown by four weeks and approved inter-state movement outside the curfew hours with effects from 1 July, 2020. Moreover, on 27 July, 2020, the government extended the second phase of eased lockdown by one week. On 6 August, 2020, the government through the chairman of the Presidential Task Force on COVID-19, who is also the Secretary to Government of the federation, Boss Mustapha, announced the extension of the second phase of the eased lockdown by another four weeks (Oyekanmi, 2020).

As a way of reducing the suffering of the people due to the lockdown, the Federal Government of Nigeria turned out the following palliative measures for targeted groups:

- three months interest holidays for those holding *Marketmoni* (an interest-free loans to market women and traders, artisans, youth and farmers);
- *Farmermoni* (designed to help petty traders expand their trade through the provision of collateral free loans); and
- *Tradermoni* (a loan programme of the Federal government, created specifically for petty traders and artisans across Nigeria), loans issued by the Bank of Industry, Bank of Agriculture, and the Nigeria Export and Import Bank.

Furthermore, the President Mohammad Buhari announced an expansion of the initial number of households that would benefit from the direct distribution of food and cash from 2.6 million households to 3.6 million households, whom he described as most vulnerable in the society (Eranga, 2020).

COVID-19 in Kano and the State Government Response to the Pandemic

Kano State, one of the most populous state in Nigeria and economic nerve centre of Northern Nigeria was created on 27 May, 1967 and had its first confirmed case of COVID-19 on 11 April, 2020. The geometric increase in the number of confirmed cases at the early period of the pandemic in the state saw it leapfrog the Federal Capital Territory to the second position on the log of states with the highest number of cases (Oloyede, Ngbokai & Giginyu, 2020).

Prior to the first case of COVID-19 in the state, on 20 March, 2020 the state governor inaugurated the state's COVID-19 task force chaired by the deputy governor, Drnasiru Yusuf Gawuna, and co-chaired by Prof. Abdul-Razaq Garba Habib, Head of the Infectious Diseases Unit, Aminu Kano Teaching Hospital, Kano. The task force was charged with the responsibilities of assessing the situation and coordinating the state's response to the threat posed by the pandemic, through multi-disciplinary approach and inter-sectoral collaboration; and to also advise the government on necessary steps and decisions to combat the threat.On 23 March, 2020, the government suspended all social gatherings, closed event centres and urged traditional and religious institutions to regulate places of worship.

On 29 March, 2020, the governor, Abdullahi Ganduje set-up a 40-man fund raising committee headed by Prof. Muhammad Yahuza Bello and the Committee was mandated to seek for donations from organisations and individuals, identify the needy to whom the donations would be distributed and to design the mode of the distribution exercise.

To curtail the spread of the deadly virus, the Kano State government adopted the following measures: closure of educational institutions from pre-primary to tertiary institutions across the state, stay at home directives, including suspension of economic activities, closure of state border contact tracing, social distancing and other diseases preventive measures such as quarantine, self-isolation and fumigation and essential palliatives (Odah, 2020). The Dateline of COVID-19 in Kano between April and September 2020 is reflected in Appendix.

From the appendix, for five days (September 26-30), Kano did not record any new cases of COVID-19 and the active cases have continued to reduce and as at 30 September, 2020, the number stood at 15. The turn-around in COVID-19 cases in Kano State has been attributed to a number of factors and prominent among which wasthe activation of more testing centres. In June 2020, the state government activated two more laboratories to expand the testing capacity in the state and more were donated by stakeholders and corporate organisations to the state. The total number of testing centres in the state is five (Ayeni, 2020). The giant stride made by the state had been commended by Dr. Chikwe Ihekweazu, Director-General, Nigeria Centre for Disease

Control, who commended the state for rising to the initial challenges by investing millions of naira and testing more than any other states in the federation. In his words, "Kano State rose to the challenges and invested millions of naira. Today, Kano is testing more than any state in Nigeria and they are not finding as many cases anymore. We are confident of their response" (Cited in Oloyede, Ngbokai&Giginyu, 2020).

However, experts have contended that the decline in positive cases was because of low level sampling and testing, while others accused the state government of underreporting cases (Alqali, 2020). Besides, people were unaware of the existence of testing campaign and the venue for the test, thereby making it difficult for them to subject themselves to testing or sample taking process.

Assessment of the Socioeconomic Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic Crisis in Kano State

Religious activities were affected by COVID-19 pandemic. Mosques and Churches were under lock-and-key for the first time in the history of the state, the Friday congregational prayers were not observed. During the Ramadan the usual tafsirs and other religious activities associated with the period were not observed too. However, towards the tail end of the Ramadan period and the relaxation of the lockdown by the state government, religious activities resumed and people went about their activities without obeying the COVID-19 protocols. It is important to note that most religious houses provided sanitizer, washing handbasins, soap and water for the use of their members during religious gathering but majority of the members declined to make use of them.

The public and social gathering were also affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The lockdown strategy by the state government to curtail the spread of the disease led to the reduction in public and social gathering. The affected activities were burial ceremonies, workshops, marriage and conferences. Flamboyant marriages and burial ceremonies were either postponed or celebrated in a low key fashion due to social distancing and were aired on the social media for people who cannot be present physically at the ceremonies. Besides, the pandemic has resulted in people developing mental and physical fatigue due to lesser activities and this may cause ill health (Abulude & Abulude, 2020).

The pandemic has also affected sporting activities in the state. The people of the state are sport loving and they always support the state representative Kano Pillars (Sai Masu Gida) in the elite league in Nigeria but the suspension of the league by the League Management Committee due to the pandemic prevented the fans to watch their darling team. The state's preparation for the National Sport Festival tagged Edo 2020 was also affected due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the viewing centres were sport enthusiasts watched live matches of their favourite clubs recorded low patronage.

The pandemic exposed the poor state of public healthcare system in the state, just as is the case in other states of the federation. The state was confronted with a situation where the available health facilities were being over-stretched to address emergency (Tarauni, 2020). At the early stage of the pandemic in the state, there was no standard laboratory equipped to test blood samples of such magnitude and the state's only testing centre then was shut down for five days due to fear of contamination. Different explanations were adduced for the closure of the testing centre. For instance, the head of the COVID-19 testing centre in Kano, Nasiru Magaji, said it was closed for routine fumigations. A member of Kano Task Force on COVID-19, Isa Abubakar, attributed it to a shortage of testing kits. While Osagie Ehanire, Minister of Health, ascribed it to some staff being infected with COVID19 as well as a shortage of testing kits (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2020).

The pandemic also led to increase in prices of foodstuff, vegetables, palm oil, detergents, sugar and beverages. The increase in prices was attributed to increase in transportation cost due to limited transportation of food items from the farm and the closure of market. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the average price of some selected food items in the country increased in April. The results of the survey conducted by it showed that the average price of one kilogram of rice (imported high quality) increased by 7.56 per cent to ₦471.84 in April from N438.66 in March; the price of 1kg of tomato also increased by 8.49 per cent to ₦277.00 in the same month as against ₦255.33 in March. The average prices of one dozen 'agric' medium-sized eggs increased by 3.38 percent to ₦476.72 monthly, from ₦461.15, in March. By the same token, the average price of 1kg of yam tubers increased by 11.63 per cent to ₦230.09 in April from ₦206.12 in March. Similarly, the average price of one kilogram of rice (imported high quality) increased by 7.56 per cent to ₦471.84 in April from ₦438.66 in March. The price of 1kg of tomato also increased by 8.49 per cent to ₦277.00 in the same month as against ₦255.33 in March (Mojeed, 2020).

More so, the pandemic contributed to loss of jobs and pay-cut in the state. Many small and medium-scale enterprises layed-off of their employees due to the measures taken by the state to curtail the spread of the disease and others that did not lay-off their staff reduced their salary. The revenue of the state has been drastically affected by the pandemic. There was a substantial drop in the monthly allocation from the federation account to the state and this was due to fall in the price of oil in the international market. Oil is the major sources of revenue for Nigeria and as the country's experienced sharp decline in crude oil price which dropped from $60 per barrel to as low as $30 per barrel in March resulted in fall in projected revenue. Moreover, the state has to grapple with dwindling internally-generated revenue due to the imposition of the lockdown in the state and the state government has to settle a monthly wage bill of ₦10 billion (Yakasai, 2020).

Lastly, according to UNESCO (2020), 1,379,344,914 students or 80 percent of the world's learners were affected by the closure of educational institutions globally (Mondol & Mohiuddin, 2020). In Nigeria, close to 46 million students were affected by the closure of educational institutions in the country (Nigeria Education in Emergencies Working Group, 2020). School closure not only affected students, teachers and family but have far-reaching economic and social implications (Owusu-Fordjour, Koomson& Hanson, 2020). For instance, there has been increased in violence activities as well as crime rates due to the closure of educational institutions in the state. It has also brought to the fore widening gap between children of the rich and the poor in terms of access to online classes during the lockdown. Besides, COVID-19 has resulted in a paradigm-shift in educational sector in the state and many schools especially the private ones conducted classes online in order to engage their students during the lockdown.

On the positive side, COVID-19 has led to a paradigm shift in educational system in Kano State. Most schools in the state especially the private's ones conducted their lessons online, thereby engaging their students and ensuring syllabus coverage during the lockdown.

The pandemic also contributed to the closeness of the people to their creator. Majority of the people of the state perceived the pandemic as God punishment for their wrongdoings and believed that seeking His forgiveness is the solution to the pandemic. Accordingly, majority of the people seek the face of the Lord.

The COVID-19 pandemic also led to Nigerians looking inward for their essentials needs due to closure of border and airport. Besides, it brought about ingenuity in our people.

Conclusion and Recommendations

As long as there is no approved preventive vaccine, all hands must be on deck to ensure that we curtail the spread of the virus. The pandemic remains a huge public health emergency and can only be surmounted with everyone adhering strictly to the NCDC guideline as well as complying with safety and preventive measures.

There is no doubt that COVID-19 is real and there is no approved preventive vaccine to cure the virus for now. So, all hands must be on deck to ensure that we curtail the spread of the virus. From the study, we have seen that COVID-19 has impacted both positively and negatively on the socio-economic life of the people of Kano State. Therefore, government should provide incentives in form of financial support and tax holiday to small and medium scale enterprises in order for them to retain their staffs. In addition, government should provide unemployment benefits and social assistance to our teeming youths in order for them to keep and soul together.

There is need for improvement in the health sector. Most of the hospitals lack personnel and equipment for handling of COVID-19-related cases and the isolation centres were inadequate and not well equipped. Hence, government should provide more resources to the health sector as well as monitoring the disbursement of such resources in order to ensure that the resources are well utilised.

The organised private sector should be praised for their response to COVID-19. Some of them donated money and equipment. However, more need to be done, as there are lot of the people that did not get the palliatives donated by some of these organisations. The organisations should involve grassroots civil society groups and traditional institutions in the distribution of the palliatives. The traditional rulers and civil society groups are close to the people and they know those who are actually in need of the palliatives.

Furthermore, the Federal Ministry of Health and the Presidential Task Force on COVID-

19 should ensure that more laboratories are provided for easy access and quality laboratory diagnosis for all Nigerians. Besides, more medical and professional workers should be recruited and incentives such as insurance policy and good payment package should be provided for them.

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Appendix: Dateline of COVID-19 in Kano State, April-September, 2020

		CONFIRMED CASES		DISCHARGED CASES		DEATHS		TOTAL ACTIVECASE
S/NO	DATE	TOTAL	NEW	TOTAL	NEW	TOTAL	NEW	
1	11 April, 2020	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
2	12 April, 2020	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
3	13 April, 2020	3	2	0	0	0	0	3
4	14 April, 2020	4	1	0	0	0	0	4
5	15 April, 2020	16	12	0	0	0	0	16
6	16 April, 2020	21	5	0	0	1	1	20
7	17 April, 2020	27	6	0	0	1	0	26
8	18 April, 2020	37	10	0	0	1	0	36
9	19 April, 2020	36	0	0	0	1	0	35
10	20 April, 2020	59	23	0	0	1	0	58
11	21 April, 2020	73	14	0	0	1	0	72
12	22 April, 2020	73	0	0	0	1	0	72
13	23 April, 2020	73	0	0	0	1	0	72
14	24 April, 2020	73	0	0	0	1	0	72
15	25 April, 2020	77	4	0	0	1	0	76
16	26 April, 2020	77	0	0	0	1	0	76
17	27 April, 2020	77	0	0	0	1	0	76
18	28 April, 2020	115	38	0	0	1	0	114
19	29 April, 2020	139	24	0	0	3	2	136

22	30 April, 2020	219	80	0	0	3	0	216
23	1 May, 2020	311	92	0	0	3	0	308
24	2 May, 2020	313	2	7	7	6	3	300
25	3 May, 2020	342	29	7	0	6	0	329
26	4 May, 2020	365	23	0	0	8	2	357
27	5 May, 2020	397	32	3	3	11	3	383
28	6 May, 2020	427	30	6	3	13	2	408
29	7 May, 2020	482	55	19	13	13	0	450
30	8 May, 2020	547	65	20	1	18	5	509
31	9 May, 2020	576	29	30	10	18	0	528
32	10 May, 2020	602	26	48	18	26	8	528
33	11 May, 2020	666	64	61	13	32	6	573
34	12 May, 2020	693	27	74	13	33	1	586
35	13 May, 2020	707	14	79	5	33	0	595
36	14 May, 2020	753	46	87	8	33	0	633
37	15 May, 2020	761	8	90	3	33	0	638
38	16 May, 2020	761	0	93	3	35	2	633
39	17 May, 2020	825	64	11	18	36	1	678
40	18 May, 2020	842	17	111	0	36	0	695
41	19 May, 2020	842	0	119	8	36	0	687
42	20 May, 2020	847	5	121	2	36	0	690
43	21 May, 2020	875	28	123	2	36	0	716
44	22 May, 2020	883	8	133	10	36	0	714
45	23 May, 2020	883	0	133	0	36	0	714
46	24 May, 2020	896	13	133	0	36	0	727
47	25 May, 2020	919	23	134	1	38	2	747

48	26 May, 2020	923	4	134	0	38	0	751
49	27 May, 2020	936	13	135	1	41	3	760
50	28 May, 2020	939	3	139	4	41	0	759
51	29 May, 2020	942	3	192	53	41	0	709
52	30 May, 2020	951	9	200	8	43	2	708
53	31 May, 2020	954	3	240	40	45	2	669
54	1 June, 2020	958	4	240	0	45	0	673
55	2 June, 2020	970	12	286	46	45	0	639
56	3 June, 2020	970	0	318	32	45	0	607
57	4 June, 2020	980	10	359	41	46	1	575
58	5 June, 2020	985	5	382	23	46	0	557
59	6 June, 2020	997	12	415	33	48	2	534
60	7 June, 2020	999	2	450	35	48	0	501
61	8 June, 2020	1,004	5	477	27	49	1	478
62	9 June, 2020	1,020	16	497	20	50	1	473
63	10 June, 2020	1,025	5	522	25	50	0	453
64	11 June, 2020	1,048	23	556	34	50	0	442
65	12 June, 2020	1,049	1	577	21	50	0	422
66	13 June, 2020	1,091	42	599	22	50	0	442
67	14 June, 2020	1,137	46	626	27	50	0	461
68	15 June, 2020	1,158	21	626	0	50	0	482
69	16 June, 2020	1,158	0	663	37	50	0	445
70	17 June, 2020	1,160	2	696	33	50	0	414
71	18 June, 2020	1,170	10	706	10	50	0	414
72	19 June, 2020	1,182	12	707	1	50	0	425
73	20 June, 2020	1,184	2	712	5	50	0	422

74	21 June, 2020	1,190	6	712	0	50	0	428
75	22 June, 2020	1,190	0	718	6	51	1	421
76	23 June, 2020	1,190	0	744	26	51	0	395
77	24 June, 2020	1,191	1	774	30	51	0	366
78	25 June, 2020	1,191	0	793	19	51	0	347
79	26 June, 2020	1,191	0	818	25	51	0	322
80	27 June, 2020	1,195	4	835	17	51	0	309
81	28 June, 2020	1,200	5	866	31	51	0	283
82	29 June, 2020	1,211	11	904	38	51	0	256
83	30 June, 2020	1216	5	931	27	52	1	233
84	1 July, 2020	1,257	41	958	27	52	0	247
85	2 July, 2020	1,257	0	977	19	52	0	228
86	3 July, 2020	1,262	5	1003	26	52	0	207
87	4 July, 2020	1,264	2	1,024	21	52	0	188
88	5 July, 2020	1,268	4	1,029	5	52	0	187
89	7 July, 2020	1,271	3	1029	0	52	0	190
90	8 July, 2020	1,291	20	1,029	0	52	0	210
91	9 July, 2020	1,302	11	1,030	1	52	0	220
92	10 July, 2020	1,303	1	1,030	0	52	0	221
93	11 July, 2020	1,303	0	1,030	0	52	0	221
94	12 July, 2020	1,309	6	1,030	0	52	0	227
95	13 July, 2020	1,314	5	1,032	2	52	0	230
96	14 July, 2020	1,314	0	1,035	3	52	0	227
97	15 July, 2020	1,318	4	1,035	0	52	0	231
98	16 July, 2020	1,331	13	1,035	0	53	1	243
99	17 July, 2020	1,386	55	1,071	36	53	0	262
100	18 July, 2020	1,395	9	1,100	29	53	0	242

101	19 July, 2020	1,400	5	1,125	25	53	0	222
102	20 July, 2020	1,416	16	1,125	0	53	0	238
103	21 July, 2020	1,430	14	1,125	0	53	0	252
104	22 July, 2020	1,447	17	1,152	27	53	0	242
105	23 July, 2020	1,452	5	1,165	13	53	0	234
106	24 July, 2020	1,452	0	1,190	25	53	0	209
107	25 July, 2020	1,455	3	1,190	0	53	0	212
108	26 July, 2020	1,520	65	1,205	15	53	0	262
109	27 July, 2020	1,529	9	1,235	30	53	0	241
110	28 July, 2020	1,566	37	1,258	23	53	0	255
111	29 July, 2020	1,584	18	1,258	0	53	0	273
112	30 July, 2020	1,591	7	1,258	0	53	0	280
113	31 July, 2020	1,597	6	1,258	0	53	0	286
114	1 August, 2020	1,597	0	1,258	0	53	0	286
115	2 August, 2020	1,597	0	1,258	0	53	0	286
116	3 August, 2020	1,597	0	1,270	12	53	0	274
117	4 August, 2020	1,598	1	`1,270	0	53	0	275
118	5 August, 2020	1,599	1	1,275	5	53	0	271
119	6 August, 2020	1,608	9	1,291	16	53	0	264
120	7 August, 2020	1,609	1	1,303	12	54	1	252
121	8 August, 2020	1,622	13	1,303	0	54	0	265
122	9 August, 2020	1,626	4	1,308	5	54	0	264
123	10 August, 2020	1,634	8	1,308	0	54	0	272
124	11 August, 2020	1,643	9	1,313	5	54	0	276
125	12 August, 2020	1,644	1	1,313	0	54	0	277
126	13 August, 2020	1,661	17	1,320	7	54	0	287
127	14 August, 2020	1,677	16	1,334	14	54	0	289

128	15 August, 2020	1,678	1	1,366	32	54	0	258
129	16 August, 2020	1,679	1	1,366	0	54	0	259
130	17 August, 2020	1,680	1	1,373	7	54	0	253
131	18 August, 2020	1,680	0	1,373	0	54	0	253
132	19 August, 2020	1,683	3	1,373	0	54	0	256
133	20 August, 2020	1,692	9	1,373	0	54	0	265
134	21 August, 2020	1,692	0	1,418	45	54	0	220
135	22 August, 2020	1,704	12	1,418	0	54	0	232
136	23 August, 2020	1,708	4	1,463	45	54	0	191
137	24 August, 2020	1,711	3	1,463	0	54	0	194
138	25 August, 2020	1,721	10	1,507	44	54	0	160
139	26 August, 2020	1,722	1	1,507	0	54	0	161
140	27 August, 2020	1,722	0	1,507	0	54	0	161
141	28 August, 2020	1,725	3	1,527	20	54	0	144
142	29 August, 2020	1,725	0	1,537	10	54	0	134
143	30 August, 2020	1,725	0	1,537	0	54	0	134
144	31 August, 2020	1,727	2	1,537	0	54	0	136
145	1 September, 2020	1,727	0	1,581	44	54	0	92
146	2 September, 2020	1,727	0	1,581	0	54	0	92
147	3 September, 2020	1,727	0	1,591	10	54	0	82
148	4 September, 2020	1,727	0	1,601	10	54	0	72
149	5 September, 2020	1,727	0	1,601	0	54	0	72
150	6 September, 2020	1,727	0	1,604	3	54	0	69
151	7 September, 2020	1,728	1	1,604	0	54	0	70
152	8 September, 2020	1,728	0	1,604	0	54	0	70
153	9 September, 2020	1,728	0	1,604	0	54	0	70

154	10 September, 2020	1,728	0	1,626	22	54	0	48
155	11 September, 2020	1,728	0	1,626	0	54	0	48
156	12 September, 2020	1,728	0	1,626	0	54	0	48
157	13 September, 2020	1,732	4	1,626	0	54	0	52
158	14 September, 2020	1,732	0	1,626	0	54	0	52
159	15 September, 2020	1,732	0	1,626	0	54	0	52
160	16 September, 2020	1,733	1	1,653	27	54	0	26
161	17 September, 2020	1,733	0	1,653	0	54	0	26
162	18 September, 2020	1,734	1	1,655	2	54	0	25
163	19 September, 2020	1,734	0	1,655	0	54	0	25
164	20 September, 2020	1,734	0	1,655	0	54	0	25
165	21 September, 2020	1,734	0	1,656	1	54	0	24
166	22 September, 2020	1,734	0	1,656	0	54	0	24
167	23 September, 2020	1,734	0	1,656	0	54	0	24
168	24 September, 2020	1,734	0	1,661	5	54	0	19
169	25 September, 2020	1,737	3	1,661	0	54	0	22
170	26 September, 2020	1,737	0	1,661	0	54	0	22
171	27 September, 2020	1,737	0	1,661	0	54	0	22
172	28 September, 2020	1,737	0	1,661	0	54	0	22
173	29 September, 2020	1,737	0	1,663	0	54	0	20
174	30 September, 2020	1,737	0	1,668	0	54	0	15

***Source:* Compiled by the Author from Nigeria Centre for Disease Control's daily COVID-19 Situation Report.**

DEVELOPMENT IN PANDEMICS: A CASE STUDY OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECT OF COVID-19 ON NIGERIA

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Abstract

Social and economic patterns and conditions of societies have been argued as the cause of asymmetry between countries and the politics of catch-up that generate tensions and conflicts. Coronavirus epidemic from Wuhan in China spread into global pandemic to over 215 countries, territories and conveyances and, without discrimination, wrought socio-economic disruptions to all countries, irrespective of their strategic preparedness and response plan. COVID-19 lockdowns, social distancing, quarantine, stigmatisation, economic contractions, as well as price and supply shocks respect no borders, ethnicities, gender, age, religion, or disabilities. Yet, the 'antigenic', 'super-spreading' and ''lethal' characteristics make COVID-19 much more dangerous than other waves of pandemic since the 430 B.C. and thus a critical challenge for global public health, medical communities and research. This research has two-horned objectives: the broad and specific objectives. The broad objective is to examine the implication of pandemic on development. The specific objective is to underscore the social and economic impact of COVID-19 on Nigeria's development in order to provide evidence-based response plan for sustainable future. The research adopts *ex-post facto* design and observation method, drawn from secondary sources of data which are analysed qualitatively. Relying on Schumpeter's 'creative destruction' explanation of modernisation theory, we conclude that Nigeria can build resilient and real-time infrastructures against pandemics and concomitant socio-economic disruptions, through a paradigm shift from the pervasive one-size-fits-all Western development orthodoxy, towards sustainable growth and development.

Keywords: COVID-19, development, epidemic, pandemic, response plan

Introduction

In January 2020, global mankind faced a super-spreading coronavirus pandemic, caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). The super-spreading global pandemic started as an epidemic in Wuhan, Hubei Province in China, with the first COVID-19 case noticed on 17 November 2019. The World Health Organisation (WHO) defined the virus – coronavirus disease 2019 (simply, COVID-19) - as "an outbreak of new pathogen that spreads easily from person to person across the globe". In March 2020, the United Nations declared the pandemic a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) requiring collective control measures. COVID-19 occurred in 100 years (1918-2019) remembrance of the 1918 deadliest 'Spanish Flu' pandemic in human history which caused an estimated 50-100 million extra-ordinary mortality across the globe (Morens and Taubenberger, 2018).

COVID-19 took man by the storm: a health pandemic with devastating socio-economic disruptions on human security. People lost their freedom from fear and freedom from want in a state of psychological depression for fear of immediate death under scarcity. Historically, pandemics cause economic and social crises, shocks, emergency and/or disruptions through market failure (Stiglitz, 2008; Chauffour and Farole, 2009; Petrakos, 2014), external trade and price shocks (Francois and Woerz, 2009), political instability (Aisen and Veiga, 2013; Lagravinese, 2015; Pepinsky, 2012), global governance (Hall, 2010) and civil unrest through protests and work stoppages (Eke and Ezeibe, 2009; Bermeo and Bartels, 2014; Guigni and Grasso, 2016; Grasso and Guigni, 2016; Benbury, 2016), etc. COVID-19 began as health pandemic and implicated economic factors.

Thus, our two-horned objectives are broad and specific objectives. The broad objective is to explore the relationship between pandemic and development. The specific objective is to scrutinise the effect of COVID-19 and Nigeria's preparedness and response strategies for social and economic development. This paper has seven sections to address contending issues: 1) Introduction; 2) Background to Socio-Economic Pandemics; 3) Theoretical Framework; 4) Socio-Economic Implications of COVID-19 in Nigeria; 5) Nigeria's Policy Responses to COVID-19 Pandemic; 6) Findings and Way Forward; and 7) Concluding Remarks.

Background to Social and Economic Pandemics

Global mankind is bedeviled by historic socio-economic pandemics, spanning political crisis, financial crisis and health crisis, from ages. For example, global political crisis took place in World War I (1914-1918) and World War II (1939-1945), the global economic crisis (1929-1939) (Pepinsky, 2012) and one-of-a-lifetime global financial crisis (2007-2009) (Mosley and Singer, 2009) and global health pandemic.

Global health pandemic began since 430 B.C (Ibe and Eke, 2020). The timeline of global historic health pandemics is presented in table 1.

S/ No.	Period	Pandemic	Symptom	Effect	Origin
1.	430 B.C.	Malaria, tuberculosis, influenza, leprosy, etc.	Fever, thirst, bloody throat and tongue.	Communicable diseases in the agrarian days of hunter -gatherers which crept in from Libya, Ethiopia and Egypt into Athens and killed about two-thirds of the population of Athens.	Libya, Ethiopia and Egypt.
2.	165 A.D.	Antonine Plague	Fever, sore throat, diarrhea and pus -filled sores.	Early appearance of smallpox began with the Huns and inf ected the Germans and then to Roman troops who carried it into Roman Empire, lasted till 180 AD and killed Emperor Marcus Aurelius.	Huns.
3.	250 A.D.	Cyprian Plague	Diarrhea, fever, fatigue, throat ulcers, vomiting, and gangrene	Named after Christian Bishop of Carthage , the first victim, spread from Ethiopia through North Africa to Rome, Egypt and northward ad lasted over three centuries, affecting Britain in 444 A.D.	Rome
4.	541 A.D.	Justinian Plague	Enlargement of lymphatic gland.	Named after Emperor Justinian of Rome, the first bubonic plague, caused by ra ts, spread by fleas from Egypt to Palestine, the Byzantine Empire and to the Mediterranean ad killed over 50 million in two centuries.	China, Egypt.
5.	11th C Lep-rosy	Leprosy	coloured skin patches, numbness and weakness of hands and feet.	Leprosy (Hansen's disease), had existed since Ages. It was reported as early as 600 B.C. in India, China, and Egypt and grew into pandemic in Europe in the Middle Ages. Army commander of Syria Army Commander Naaman was a leper and Jesus Christ healed 10 lepers. Leprosy is more endemic in Africa, Asia and Latin America	Syria..
6.	1350 A.D.	The Black Death	As symptoms of bubonic plague	Black death marked the second wave of bubonic plague which first emerged from China and through Sicily in 1347 A.D. and through sufferers who landed the port of Messina, it spread throughout Europe from where it killed one-thirds of world population.	China/ Sicily
7.	1492 A.D.	The Columbian Exchange	Fever, cough, runny nose, sore throat, skin rash	Attended the arrival of the Spanish in the Caribbean which spread smallpox, measles and bubonic plague to the native population thus killed as much as 90% throughout the north and south continents.	Spain.
8.	1665 A.D.	The Great Plague of London	As with bubonic plague	The Plague was a resurgence of the bubonic plague. It killed 20% of the population of London.	London.
9.	1817 A.D.	First Cholera Pandemic	Diarrhea, dehydration, abdominal pain vomiting, nausea	Pandemic originated from Russia and was the first of seven cholera pandemics over the next 150 years. The sickness was. transmitted through faeces-infected water and food. From Russia, it passed to British soldiers, on to India, then to Spain, Africa, Indonesia, China, Japan, Ital y, Germany and America. It killed scores of millions, particularly in Russia, Britain and India. Cure-vaccine was created in 1885	Russia.
10.	1855 A.D.	The Third Plague Pandemic	Abdominal pain, diarrhea, fever and chills, shock, etc.	Pandemic was occasioned by a return of the bubonic plague in Yunnan, China and moved to India and Hong Kong. It claimed 15 million victims.	China
11.	1875 A.D.	Fiji Measles Pandemic	Fever, runny nose, sneezing, cough, etc.	Pandemic killed 40,000 people whose corpses were scavenged by wild animals as entire villages died and were burnt down .	
12.	1889 A.D.	Russian Flu	Fever, runny nose, sneezing, cough, etc.	Pandemic was first observed in Siberia and Kazakhstan, later passed to Moscow, Finland and afterwards to Poland and to the rest of Europe and the next year to North America and Africa. it killed 360,000 by the end of 1890	Russia
13.	1918	Spanish Flu	Fever and chills, cough, diarrhea, fatigue, body aches, etc.	Pandemic began in Madrid, capital of Spain as first of avian -borne flu in Europe, the United States and parts of Asia, before it spread to other parts of the world. It claimed 50 million victims, globally.	Spain
14.	1957	Asian Flu	As in 13	Pandemic started in Hong Kong and spread to China, U.S. and was widespread in England. It claimed 1.1 million victims, globally.	
15.	1981	HIV/AIDS	Fever, headache, enlarged lymph nodes	Pandemic was first identified in America gay communities, although believed to have developed from Chimpanzee. HIV/AIDS is transmitted through blood and genital fluid,, which destroys t -cells. It killed 35 million victims worldwide.	America
16.	2003	SARS	Respiratory challen ges, dry cough, fever, head and body aches	Pandemic started in China and spreads through respiratory droplets from coughs and sneezes. It was believed to have started from bats, spread to cats and then to humans. It infected 8,096 people and killed 774 others.	China.

Sources: Authors compilation from several publications.

COVID-19 pandemic, like any other health pandemics that have "recurred at irregular intervals since at least the ninth century AD" with signs and symptoms of fever, muscle aches, respiratory complaints, have remained unchanged over centuries (Morens and Taubenberger, 2018). According to terror management theory espoused by Greenberg et al (1986) and Greenberg et al (1990), COVID-19 predisposes people to one of the three proximal reactions: denial, suppression or immediate actions to reduce the threat.

Nevertheless, pandemics create new social divisions between officials and opinion-based groups over public health actions, most often based on some conspiracy theories and other myths and fictions, for example, the role of "superfast 5G wireless network" in the DNA/RNA micro-chip plug-and-play remote connectivity in humans (Ibe and Eke, 2020, p. 36) which, in Jorge Noguera's description of the COVID-19 health pandemic, allows a future world of the "internet of things" (Noguera, 27 April 2020). Government's measures against pandemics, such as lockdown restrictions, quarantine, social distancing, wearing of masks and washing of hands, if not collectivised for inclusive intensions to engage in hygiene-related group behaviours, often degenerate into moral issues that generate exclusionary sentiment with attendant protests.

In a world risk society characterised by vulnerability (Smith, 2013) accentuated by gaps in social, political, environmental, economic and technological process (Robbins, 2013), development is not a natural given. COVID-19 is one of the great lessons of nature to humanity that man is not infallible and countries and communities are vulnerable as they need preparedness for effective and efficient response against the dramatic socio-economic dislocations of pandemics in every sphere of life (Kevany, 29 September 2020).

Despite the findings by the U.S. CDC that, of every 4 new emerging infectious diseases in people, 3 come from animals (Wiebers and Feigin, 4 June 2020) and the long history of pandemics, the high-level simulation exercise for pandemic preparedness - "Event 201" conducted, on 18 October 2019, before the discovery of the first COVID-19 case in Wuhan, by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation in conjunction with Johns Hopkins Centre for Health World Economic Forum (WEF) showed that humanity was woefully unprepared against emerging pandemics (Kanshal, 14 April 2020). According to Director-General of WHO, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the super-spreading "COVID-19 is taking so much from us, but it's also giving us something special, the opportunity to come together as one humanity to work together, to learn together and to grow together" (Ghebreyesus, 20 March 2020) to reverse humanity's gloom to bloom.

From the background to the study of pandemics, a critical take-home lesson is that by their mutational change, it is more worrying that there are no ready tools to prevent future occurrences despite man's better understanding of the standard public health approaches in preventing, mitigating and controlling as well as the fiscal and monetary policies for recovery.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

This section is devoted to operational definition of key concepts as well as explanation and application of the analytical theory.

First, brief contextualisation of the following key concepts – 'development', 'epidemic', 'pandemic', and 'response plan' is germane to better understand keywords used to address the critical issues in the paper.

Development is a social condition in which the basic needs of the national population are satisfied by the application of endogenous technology, to assure rational and sustainable use of natural resources and systems, in which the social groups have access to organisations, basic services such as education, housing, health services, nutrition, employment and, above all, ensure their cultures and traditions are respected with government legitimacy within the social framework of the particular country (Pico, 1995, Razeto, 1995; Reyes, 2001).

Epidemic is a temporary but rapid spread or occurrence of a disease, which affects many persons at the same time, and spreads from person to person in a defined locality, community or region (Kelly, n.d.)

Pandemic is an epidemic that crosses international boundaries, occurring worldwide or over a very wide geographical location or area, and affecting a large number of people (Last, 2001).

Response Plan encompasses wide areas of counter or combative plans or actions, from, personal, group, community, national, regional, global to mobilisation of resources for humanitarian response purposes. In this paper, response plan involves empiric and adaptive responses for the prevention, mitigation and containment of COVID-19 pandemic.

The explanation of the contextual meanings of the key concepts is to enhance understanding of the onion-core issues interrogated.

Second, theoretically, we explored the Rostow-Schumpeter exogenous-endogenous dichotomous assumptions of the modernisation theory to rely on Joseph Schumpeter's 'creative destruction' model. Modernisation, in a classical sense, is seen as:

i) a systematic process;
ii) a transformative process; and
iii) an imminent process.

As a systematic process, modernisation theory involves phased, continuous and time-honoured homogenous process for convergence among societies. As a transformative process, using Rostow's characterisation model, modernisation passes through 5 stages. As an imminent process, modernisation is a necessity, particularly in LDCs with the problem of lack of productive investments.

However, Walter Rostow social economic paradigm (1960) of 'modernisation' theory of 5-phased development argues that "to adapt and survive, societies require the ability to acquire the cultural attributes and structures of 'modern' societies, including, for example, a class system, democracy, bureaucracy and modern science and technology (Robbins, 2013). Western apologists to Rostow assume that modernisation follows European or American process and nations that show attitudes of complacency to the process will have "unmatched economic prosperity and democratic stability" (Tipps, 1976, p. 14). Again, Dean C. Tipps, relied on these Western assumptions that modernisation is one-off irreversible process which once begun cannot be stopped and argued that once LDCs come into contact with the West – the purveyors of modernisation - they will be infected and unable to resist the spillover effect of modernisation.

Bloch (1948) and Quintanilla (2012) critiqued Rostow's thesis as reductionism and proffered that bureaucracy and democratic institutions are exogenous parameters or historical constants that are subjective and alien in growth and development plans; "no society dispenses of its cultural environment which can be variously uneasy with, inconsistent with, or simply putting the achievements of science and technology at stake." For instance, Pierre Benoit Joly, Pierre Lamard and Pierre Yves Lequin and Saliha Hadna, respectively cited in Jean-Claude Ruano-Borbalan paper, argued persuasively that: 'democratisation of innovation' or 'technical democracy' is high-stake, hard-to-achieve in the new "moral economics" which do not necessarily allow the LDCs address their societal challenges because while technical democracy show the importance of societal and democratic imperatives as embarrassing with huge consequences for individual and collective choices, "Economic and political logics strongly limit the production and transfer of knowledge, in order to be part of the processes of 'technical democracy" (Ruano-Borbalan, 2017, pp. 6 and 7). The world is characterised by pluralist histories and roots of science and technology since both are a result of cumulative cultural evolution and for anyone to assume singularity of science is fatal (Pickstone, pp. 113-132).

Joseph Schumpeter's "creative destruction" approach, after industrial mutation from turmoil, espouses endogenous, inclusive and practical model for less-developed countries (LDCs) like Nigeria, to attain sustainable socio-economic development in the post-COVID future. Illustratively, Alvin So's three-fold examples – the rise of the U.S. as a superpower after World War II, the spread of world communist movement, and the disintegration of European communist empires (So, 1991) – created a new socio-economic focus in which countries from the illustrative examples sought to promote their economies and to enhance their political independence (Chirot, 1993). As a corollary, COVID-19 pandemic shows that Western policy makers quickly abandoned their one-size-fits-all development orthodoxy, administered 'indiscriminate largesse' and made radical changes to stem the super-spreading virus.

Drawing from Schumpeterian "creative destruction" explanation of modernisation theory is that people and societies learn new knowledge, attitude and behaviour under anxiety and pain to challenge orthodoxy with hope and resolve to rebuild for their stable socio-economic future. Thus, Schumpeter's thesis serves a clarion call for Nigeria to adapt to thinking outside the Box for a home-grown sustainable development.

Socio-Economic Effect of COVID-19 on Nigeria

Nigeria had its index case of COVID-19 on 27 February of a 67-year-old man who returned to Nigeria on 25 February from a medical vacation in Milan. Since then, oil posed the main COVID-19 transmission channel to Nigerians (World Bank Group, 2020, p. 99). Nigeria, on 30 March, announced the adoption of the international containment measures, including at first, lockdowns in FCT Abuja, Lagos and Ogun States. Thereafter, other States across Nigeria took the cue. However, the lockdowns did not apply to essential services, such as food and groceries distributed and retailed in stalls and malls, for a limited 4-hour in every 48-hour period.

Due to Nigeria's deficit health infrastructure, the healthcare facilities were stretched beyond capacity, some frontline medical workers resorted to protests, resignations, and search for greener pastures abroad, for instance, in UK's National Health Service (NHS) and U.S.'s National Institutes of Health (NIH) thus causing brain-drain in Nigeria's health sector. The personnel gap-filling action by the government was to call for assistance of Chinese medical personnel to contain the virus and its antigenic characteristics. The call unveiled moral question about propriety of the Chinese in spite of the alleged conspiracy theory surrounding the virus as part of Chinese geopolitical power-game. having raised concerns and botched the recruitment of the Chinese by Nigeria's medical professionals, Nigerian government resorted to expansion of the frontline workers by immediate training and deployment of community health workers (CHWs) for contact tracing and testing.

However, from a global 36.43 million persons infected, there were 1.06 million deaths in 214 countries, territories and 2 internal conveyances as at 8 October 2020 (Worldometer, 8 October 2020). Africa's 54-country record was 685,155 persons infected and 17,248 deaths. Nigeria's statistics was 59,738 persons infected and 1,113 deaths. Thus, Nigeria alone had 20% infection and 28% of Africa's total share of infection and mortality rate, respectively. The social psychology of danger of immediate death affected culture and traditions of the people, for example, people of all religious faiths in Nigeria were forced, particularly by the lockdown and social distancing measures, to watch and listen to their religious activities and celebrations, for example, the Palm Sunday and Easter Sunday, from computers, laptops, televisions, telephones, radios, etc.

A sequel to the social effect of the lockdown was the brutality and extortion perpetrated by the security agents – police, army, civil defence corps, vigilante groups, etc. - who enforced government lockdowns against the fundamental rights of the citizens by restricting movements of goods and services within approved curfew-free hours. Many drivers and commuters, who feared and avoided the unruly spectre of the security agent, inadvertently obstructed the supply chain of essential goods and materials thus created supply shock including food insecurity in Nigeria.

Economically, the effect of lockdown: closure of borders and businesses occasioned major negative impact on the Nigerian economy and the people, particularly the most vulnerable group, which includes:

(i) reduced oil production from 2.1 mbpd to 1.7mbpd as part of OPEC production cut;

(ii) reduced oil price benchmark from $57 to $13 for Bonny light, and $28 from Brent, with millions of barrels of oil unsold;

(iii) devaluation of official foreign exchange (FOREX) rate from N360 to N380 per dollar;

(iv) grant of moratorium on public debts to States in line with suspension of debt service obligations of countries by multilateral and bilateral creditors;

(v) budget shrinkage by 15% of $35 billion;

(vi) forced 6.1% economic contraction. The economic contraction, the Bank maintained, occasioned extreme poverty and will erase at least five-year effort on poverty alleviation (Daily Tracker, 9 October, 2020).

(vii) the youth, due to staff rationalisations and 6.1% contraction in the economy, lost their jobs and moaned under unemployment which rose by 27.1% in August 2019 from 23.1% in the third-quarter 2018 (Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, 2020). Those who retained their jobs were underemployed, for example, among the banks that were temporarily restricted by the Central Bank of Nigeria from laying off their staff, Access Bank resorted to restructuring of salaries of their staff to break even under the effect of COVID-19, loss of jobs and money and thus lost confidence and hope on the leadership to drive a brighter future;

(viii) the women, following the overall negative effect of COVID-19 on the small and medium-

sized enterprises (SMEs) which accounts for 96% of businesses and 84% of jobs in Nigeria, lost their daily earning from businesses such as local street trading, food vendor business, etc., for their family livelihood;

(ix) out-of-school children, among the vulnerable group, suffered psychological distress from lockdowns, closure of schools and denial of learning and healthcare services. Many of the children, mostly, girl-child, children living in extreme poverty, and children living in rural areas, were subjected to denial of digital access and abuse as the girl-child was forced into child marriage and parenthood as well as sexual abuses, child labour, more ostensibly in the farms or street-hawking (Human Right Watch, 5 May 2020);

(x) old people and children suffered loss of 'kindness pandemic" from care-givers; and

(xi) people with disability suffered increased inequality and, particularly, in the digital divide.

Cumulatively, 27% of Nigerian labour force – more than 21 million, mostly the vulnerable youth and women, became unemployed. Worse of the matter, Nigeria was ranked the poverty capital of the world with 89.1 million of its population of 196 million people, below the poverty line. The socio-economic hardship orchestrated on the Nigerian citizens caused psychological distress (15% insomnia, 23% moderate-severe depression, 25% severe post-traumatic stress, and 18% clinical post-traumatic stress) (Olaseni et al, 2020).

Nigeria's Policy Responses to COVID-19 Pandemic

Nigeria engaged the tool or instrument of economic stimulus package encompassing fiscal and expansionary monetary policy responses to encourage private sector economic activities against deficiency of aggregate demand, create multiplier effects, stimulate the floundering economy and return it to growth after COVID-19 disruptions.

Nigeria's fiscal stimulus included policy measures such as increased government spending and tax reduction in form of tax-holidays as well as debt-obligation moratorium. On the other hand, monetary stimulus refers to monetary policy decisions and actions of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to lower interest rates or procure securities for cheaper and easier borrowing and investment by firms. Nigeria's response plan was coordinated from three levels – Nigerian government's responses, Nigeria-International cooperation, and Nigeria-private sector collaboration.

Nigerian Government's Responses

Though Nigeria's policy responses spanned the Federal government, international and non-governmental in scope, the first policy response by the Nigerian government was to inaugurate a 12-member Presidential Task Force (PTF) on Control of COVID-19, on 9 March 2020. Detail of the members of the PTF on COVID-19 is as represented on table 2:

Table 2: Members of Nigeria Presidential Task Force on Control of COVID-19

S/No.	Name	Office	Position
1.	Mr. Boss Mustapha	Secretary to the Government of the Federation	Chairman
2.	Dr. Sani Aliyu	Director-General, National Agency for the Control of Aids (NACA)	National Coordinator
3.	Dr. Osagie Ehanire	Honourable Minister of Health	Member
4.	Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola	Honourable Minister of Interior	Member
5.	Senator Sirika Hadi	Honourable Minister of Aviation	Member
6.	Hajia Sadiya Umar	Honourable Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Services	Member
7.	Malam Adamu Adamu	Honourable Minister of Education	Member
8.	Alhaji Lai Mohammed	Honourable Minister of Information and Culture	Member
9.	Dr. Mohammad M. Abubakar	Honourable Minister of Environment	Member
10.	Alhaji Yusuf Magaji Bichi	Director-General, State Services	Member
11.	Dr. Chikwe Ihekweazu	Nigeria Centre for Disease Control	Secretary
12.	Dr. Fiona Braka	WHO Acting Country Representative	Honourary Member

Source: https://statehouse.gov.ng/cvid19/members/

The major activities of the PTF was to coordinate and oversee Nigeria's multi-cultural inter-governmental efforts, provide information on COVID-19 protocol and policy planning on the empirics regarding mass gatherings, transmission, deaths, prevention, mitigation and control of the deadly virus. In broad terms, Federal Government of Nigeria's fiscal and monetary stimulus package included:

(I) announcement of aggregate $112 billion (₦4.5 trillion) stimulus package, representing 3.1% of Nigeria's gross domestic product (GDP);

(ii) release of Contingent funds of N984 million (US$2.7 million) to the NCDC for periodic data on the epidemiology, strategies for the prevention, mitigation and control, the method and number of transmission, deaths and recoveries as well as to achieve policy coherence at the national level in line with the COVID-19 protocols;

(iii) release of additional ₦5.6 million (US$18 million) to the NCDC for purchase of protective gears;

(iv) announcement, in April 2020, of plans to create ₦500 billion ($1.39 billion) COVID-Fund to strengthen the national healthcare infrastructure against the virus and opening of

isolation centres and training of medical personnel, including absorption of community health workers (CHWs);

(v) publication by National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement (NESRA) on protocols for handling chemicals used as disinfectants, infections and medical wastes;

(vi) release of grant of ₦10 billion (US$28 million) to Lagos State with the first index case and support of the states and FCT, Abuja through the Presidential Task Force;

(vii) reduction of price of petroleum pump price from ₦143 to ₦121.50 per litre in May 2020 and later, in September, a triple-barrel increase of: *i)* petroleum pump price from ₦121.50 to ₦162 per litre (32.51%); *ii)* electricity tariff from ₦30.23 to ₦62.33 (93.62%) per kilowatt of unit of energy/hr; and *iii)* value-added tax (VAT) from 5% to 7.2% (44%);

(viii) enforcement, by the federal and States governments, of compulsory use of personal protective equipment (PPE), e.g., face and nose masks and observance of sanitary protocols including periodic washing of hands and use of sanitisers;

(ix) introduction of Economic Sustainability Plan through investment in the health infrastructure;

(x) promulgation of Infectious Diseases Emergency Prevention Regulation in Lagos State, from where the index case was noticed;

(xi) implementation, by federal and State governments, of border closure, lockdown, curfew, closure of schools and restricted international as well as inter-State movements;

(xii) triggering, by the federal government, of ₦2.3 trillion automatic stabiliser for job-intensive projects in agriculture, road, and housing sectors;

(xiii) creation, by the federal government, of ₦50 billion credit facility and injection of liquidity of ₦3.6 billion (2.4% of GDP) into the country's banking system;

(xiv) roll out, by the CBN, of ₦100 billion credit support for the health sector;

(xv) adjustment, by the CBN of the official exchange (FOREX) rate by 15%; and

(xvi) coordination, by the CBN, of a private-sector special intervention initiative under the Dangote-led Coalition against COVID-19 (CACOVID-19) (Nigerian economic Summit Group, 2020; Offong, 20 August 2020; IMF, 24 July 2020; Ibe and Eke, 2020).

Nigeria-International Cooperation

Nigeria benefitted from international organisations' collaboration. The World Bank of Directors approved a total sum of $114.28 million, made up of

(I) $100 million credit from International Development Association (IDA) and

(ii) $14.28 from the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility.

The COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Project (CoPREP) package was to enable Nigeria give grants to 36 states and the FCT, Abuja to contain COVID-19 by breaking the chain of local transmission (Daily Tracker, 7 August, 2020).

Also, the European Union announced a contribution of €50 million (₦21 billion) to Nigeria for the implementation of COVID-19 coordinated response through optimum care for the confirmed cases and protecting the gains of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Nigeria sought loans from multilateral international lenders, including $3.4 billion from International Monetary Fund (IMF), $2.5 billion from World Bank, $1 billion from African Development Bank (AfDB), and unspecified amount from Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), all in the region of $7 billion (Ibe and Eke, 2020, p. 71). Yet, Nigeria enjoyed negotiated two-year moratorium on debt obligations, with multilateral institutions.

Further, Germany gave ₦2.5 billion and ₦2.2 to the federal government and Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) States, respectively. Many groups from China, including Chinese automaker Guangzhou Automobile (GAC) donated $51,000, the Consulate-General of China with the Overseas Chinese Association in Nigeria donated about $91,000 and medical supplies (*China Daily,* 23 April 2020), including 1,500 pieces of *N*95 respirator masks, 13,000 pieces of surgical masks, 4,750 pieces of disposable gowns, 850 pieces of infra-red thermometer, 4,750 pairs of medical goggles, 9,750 pairs of shoe covers (Saliu, 23 April 2020).

Nigeria-Private Sector Collaboration

The CBN-initiated 'kindness pandemic' was led by Aliko Dangote-driven Private Sector CACOVID. Nigeria Breweries (NB) contributed ₦100 million to the FGN and another ₦150 million special donations to 7 States in Nigeria in corporate social responsibility.

In spite of the coordinated multiple-response, Nigeria experienced many challenges in the implementation of the COVID-19 response plan. Though Nigeria is a resource-rich country and lower-middle income country in Africa (World Bank Group, 2020, p. 119; World Bank, 2019), she owes $1.34 billion of Africa's $35.80 billion total debt obligation as at 2018 (World Bank Group, 2020, p. 97), which the World Bank Lead Economist for Nigeria, Khwima Nthara described as “out of sync with the country's revenue profile” (*Punch,* 30 September, 2016, p. 3). More so, Nigeria's 2019 annual health budget was $1.09 billion, representing meagre 4.14% of the national budget. The stimulus package was also a paltry1.6% of Nigeria's GDP, which could go N20,000 ($52) to only 11 million of the country's estimated population of 190 million people.

Economic experts blame Nigeria's COVID-induced economic crisis on the commodity-pricing structure of the country's economy, lack of job-creating commodity base such as “agriculture, tourism and creative industries” as well as overdependence on crude oil for about 85.2% aggregate financial revenue when, of course, the world is turning to environmentally-friendly energy sources. As it were, the OPEC production cut, fall in global oil price and poor revenue-generation from non-oil sectors, caused a minus $122 from $144 p/b break-even price in Brent Crude and revenue required by Nigeria to balance the national budget (Paraskova, 24 April 2020; Onuoha, 3 March 2020).

Although, the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development promised to distribute about 77,000 metric tons of food rations to vulnerable households, the palliatives which were locally sourced from the Nigerian markets occasioned supply shock with attendant rise in substitute commodities. Notwithstanding the backlash, the commodities were long-warehoused, mostly expired and undistributed to the hungry Nigerian masses. The challenges of food insecurity merged with the triple-barrel increase in prices of petroleum pump price, electricity tariff and amped VAT regime, caused horrendous socio-economic hardship on Nigerians.

The socio-economic hardship that followed the implementation of Nigeria's COVID-19 response plan, particularly regarding breach of fundamental human rights, supply shocks and food insecurity, created social divisions, suspicion, anger, frustration and aggression that fuelled the protests and looting of undistributed COVID-19 palliatives by angry and vulnerable group – Nigeria's hidden and neglected youths – under #ENDSARS in October which was checkmated by government terrorism on the citizens. Situating the indirect cost of human and material loss side-by-side with direct effect of COVID-19, points to the complex network of socio-economic challenges orchestrated on the Nigerians, mostly the vulnerable youth, old, women and people with disabilities.

Findings and Way Forward for Nigeria's Post-COVID Socio-Economic Development

Our findings from the study of the socio-economic effect of COVID-19 on Nigeria are that COVID-19 pandemic:

(i) reveals the reality that there is no economy in the world that is hyper-immune to shocks or emergencies and that no governments, external or domestic, that are omnipotent and sole-providers of all individuals' social and economic needs in society;

(ii) reveals that COVID-19 is a complex humanitarian emergency of socio-economic nature requiring both national stimulus package and international collaborative effort;

(iii) recreates the danger of commodity rentier oil-economy of Nigeria for immediate and urgent economic diversification at a time fossil fuels is seen as propellant of the COVID-19 virus and being replaced with environmentally-friendly energy sources;

(iv) exposes scarcity and deprivation from social protection system as causes of social tension and crisis as well as build consciousness to protect democracy, rule of law and civil rights, for instance, the #EndSARS movement in Nigeria, which is a result of denial of rights to fundamental freedoms to food, shelter and basic necessities for vulnerable unemployed, under-employed and people losing jobs and income;

(v) reverses inattention to personal hygiene by adaptation of sanitary protocol, learned through social media;

(vi) intensifies collective spirit and cooperation through online virtual existence for commerce, work, learning, for example, Nigerian government blamed of the #EndSARS movement on Twitter and Facebook;

(vii) increases the awareness to protect national borders as neo-isolationism to prevent the spread of epidemics and ensure health security; and

(viii) causes psychological distress and brain-drain, most Nigerian medical workers opted for higher pay abroad, e.g. in the British NHS and U.S. NIH.

It must, however, be underscored that the implementation of Nigeria's stimulus package ended on politics and paper. Most Nigerians were not affected by the COVID-19 palliatives thus the resultant socio-economic hard times imposed by COVID-19 disruptions, unemployment, under-employment, wage cuts, high bills, low exchange rate of the naira, etc., exposed people to new social learning for survival and development policy orthodoxy gave way. Development, therefore, requires science and research for Nigerians to improve their cultural environment by building resilient institutions through skilled manpower which can turn available raw materials into quality production and gain higher market for increased revenue.

Thus far, Nigerian state, using Schumpeter's "creative destruction" modernisation thesis, should be as rich as the value-additions her citizens make to transform available raw materials into quality and competitive goods able to conquer the market for increased revenue. Nigeria has comparative advantage in agriculture as the "mother of entrepreneurship and start-up of cottage industries for growth and development" (Ibe and Eke, 2020, p. 147) as much as in tourism, mining and high productive-youth (54% male and 51% female) population of under-20 years old to complement the more labour-intensive productive advantage to contribute to the national GDP (Abdul Azad cited in Okafor, 13 July 2020). The truism is that survival is a function of interaction between natural and creative endowments. Thus, COVID-19 pandemic provides challenges and opportunities for Nigeria's development.

Concluding Remarks

Notwithstanding the differences in impacts on countries across the globe, based on differentiated institutional resilience, the socio-economic challenges of the less-discriminatory COVID-19 are increasingly impacting far more long-term destruction on the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These challenges force man to make diverse and dramatic changes in every sphere of life through home-grown sustainable development response plan. COVID-19 has illuminated the fact that research and innovation for development can be spontaneous and no society is particularly immune to historical and cultural heritage for technology to drive development from an interaction between resilient institution and production, based on economic advantage. It is, therefore, incumbent on Nigerian government, as a way of thinking outside the Box, to improve research and evolve resilient national policies, institutions, appropriate skill sets and behavioural patterns to overcome the present and future pandemics for sustainable growth and development.

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ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF FUEL SUBSIDY REMOVAL IN NIGERIA ON THE POOR IN THE COVID-19 ERA

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Abstract

The Nigerian oil wealth has not translated to an improved standard of living for its people most of who are living in abject poverty. This is just because the resources are not being efficiently and effectively utilized to achieve its developmental goals. Consequently, a poor health system and an economy solely dependent on crude oil export for its government revenue has posed serious challenges to the economy amidst the coronavirus pandemic causing untold hardship to the citizens. In the midst of this, the Buhari led government announced the full deregulation of the downstream oil sector in the country and full removal of subsidy on petroleum products. This paper, therefore, is an examination of the effect of the fuel subsidy removal on the Nigerian poor and its overall benefit to the Nigeria economy using descriptive research design method. The paper noted that while the poor will suffer more in the form of higher transport fare and increased price of food items and other commodities, subsidy removal is in the overall interest of the whole economy as funds will be channeled to improving infrastructural amenities especially in the health care, education and transport sectors. The paper then recommends transparent honesty on the part of government in expending the funds saved from fuel subsidy removal to improve infrastructures and create social welfare programs that will ameliorate the effect of the fuel subsidy removal on the poor.

Keywords: Deregulation, Subsidy, Coronavirus, Covid-19, Pandemic, Infrastructure, Development.

Introduction

That Nigeria is blessed with a huge abundance of natural resources is no news. It is as obvious as telling a blind man that the dead snake in his hand is like a rope. Unfortunately, the abundant wealth has not translated to the wealth of its citizens. It is ironical that Nigeria, the most populous black nation and Africa's biggest economy, is a rich nation with poor citizens. Nigeria has the second largest proven oil reserve in Africa at 37.2 billion barrels, second only to Libya and it is the continent's largest producer of oil (Siddig, Minor et al, 2020) producing about 1.78 million barrels per day in March, 2020 (Olisah, 2020).

Despite the abundant natural resource endowment in Nigeria and its vast arable land, the Nigerian economy is a monolithic economy (Umeji, 2019) depending on crude oil export for its major source of government revenue and budgetary expenditure. According to Olisah (2020) crude oil sales contribute about 90% of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings, 60% of its revenue and 8% of gross domestic product (GDP). Besides, fuel is a very significant factor in production in every aspect of the Nigerian economy, its importance in the economy cannot be undermined. As stated by Ogubode, Ilesanmi and Olusankinse in Okwanga, Ogbu and Pristine (2015) the Nigerian economy to a large extent depends on petroleum motor spirit (PMS) either for transportation of goods or for service provision. To Agu, Ekwutosi and Augustine (2018) petroleum motor spirit is an important source of energy in Nigeria, the economy depends on it to drive economic activities.

According to Okwanga et al (2015), petroleum motor spirit may not be used in the actual production of goods but it is used for their distribution; adding to their final cost of production. Hence, Nigeria is a high consumer of energy fuel. Unfortunately, with four government-owned refineries with an installed capacity of 445,000 barrels per day, more than enough to cover its domestic requirements, Nigeria is still a net importer of refined petroleum products (Onyeizugbe & Onwuka, 2012) making it the only member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) still importing refined fuel (Adekoya, 2020).

Successive Nigerian administrations, despite huge earnings from oil export, have failed in the provision of social amenities needed by its people and in poverty reduction, hence, the introduction of fuel subsidy in the mid-1980s (Agu, Ekwutosi & Augustine, 2018) to ameliorate the suffering of the people due to the high cost of pump price of fuel. Subsidy exists when government helps the consumers of a particular product to pay a price lower than the prevailing market price of that commodity (Kadiri, &Lawal, 2016; Agu, Ekwutosi & Augustine, 2018). Some authors like Agu, Ekwutosi and Augustine (2018) see it as a kind of market manipulation whereby government fixes the price of the commodity below its actual market price and pay the difference to the retailers. In this case, the government fixes the pump price of fuel below the actual market price and the difference is paid to the importers and marketers by the government.

Scholars and international organisations, like the International Monetary Funds (IMF) have canvassed for the removal of subsidy from petroleum products due to its distortions to the actual market price resulting to its failure to reflect the actual market cost (Okwanya, Ogbu, & Pristine, 2015). They also went further to argue that because of subsidy, the subsidised product is consumed recklessly (Sanders & Schneider, 2000 cited in Okwanya, Ogbu, & Pristine, 2015). This paper, therefore, assesses the impact of the fuel subsidy removal on the poor in Nigeria in a pandemic era.

Statement of Problem

Scholars and international organisations are clamouring for the removal of fuel subsidy due to the resulting distortions to the market. In 2012 the Goodluck Ebele Jonathan-led administration started a partial deregulation of the Nigerian downstream oil sector or partial removal of the fuel subsidy in Nigeria. Recently, the Buhari government announced full deregulation of the downstream oil sector or full subsidy removal from fuel in the country.

The fuel subsidy removal cannot be unconnected with the dwindling revenue to the government due to the recent recession in the country as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the moment, the Nigeria government is not only struggling with leveling the curve of the COVID-19 but also the fall of its revenue at this critical time that it requires funds to curb the spread of the coronavirus in the country. The dwindling government revenue is as a result of the collapse of crude oil prices in the international market a consequent of the measures taken by various countries to curtail the global spread of the coronavirus.

As it is, the Nigerian government can no longer sustain the payment of subsidy on fuel because the cost of subsidising fuel in the country keeps increasing just as population is increasing causing an increase in the demand for fuel. In 2011, the government spent $8 billion on subsidy (Moyo & Songwe, 2012); in 2019 it spent N462 billion while it is projected to spend N417 billion in 2020 (Onwuamaeze & Ekeghe, 2020). This means that according to Moyo and Songwe (2012) 30% of Nigerian government expenditure is on fuel subsidy crowding out other development spending.

In the words of Lipton (2013) energy subsidy is growing too large to bear. It is actually growing too large to bear especially at this time that Nigeria is experiencing a rapid rise in unemployment, an aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic induced recession as the Nigerian economy contracted by 6.1% year on year in the second quarter of 2020, its steepest in the last 10 years (Kazeem, 2020). Hence, this paper is to examine the implication of fuel subsidy removal on the Nigerian poor and its overall benefit to the Nigerian economy.

Objectives of the Study

This paper is aimed at:

- assessing how the fuel subsidy removal affects the poor household in Nigeria; and
- examining the benefits of fuel subsidy removal to the Nigerian economy.

Conceptualisation of Subsidy and Deregulation

The World Bank and IEA in Okwanya, Ogbu and Prstine (2015) described subsidy as any policy by the government that is aimed at reducing the price of a commodity or service consumed by citizens relative to what the price would have been in the absence of such policy. According to Kadiri and Lawal (2016), they defined subsidy as a reduction in the market price of goods and services by the government such that individuals whose purchasing power are not able to acquire such goods and services are able to pay for them. Subsidy occurs when the government helps the consumers to pay a price which is below the market price for consumer goods (Kadiri & Lawal, 2016; Agu; Ekwutosi & Augustine, 2018).

According to Agu; Ekwutosi and Augustine (2018) it is a kind of market manipulation whereby prices of consumer goods are fixed by the government and the difference between the actual market price and the fixed price is paid by the government to the retailer. To Onyeizugbe and Onwuka (2012) subsidies are government measures that keep prices below market prices for consumers or above market prices for producers; these could be in the form of grants, tax reductions and exemptions or price controls.

Thus, subsidies are government policies aimed at making consumer goods and services available and accessible to the poor in the society. It is also aimed at encouraging the participation of the poor in economic activities especially in developing countries (Okwanya, Ogbu & Pristine, 2015). Unfortunately, subsidy is never an efficient policy measure despite its good intensions as it could lead to an inefficient resource allocation especially if the price is fixed below the marginal cost of production (Agu; Ekwutosi and Augustine, 2018).

Deregulation, on the other hand, is putting an end to government monopoly. It is opening up of a particular sector of the economy for private sector participation. According to Kadiri and Lawal (2016), the deregulation of the Nigerian downstream oil sector is about the removal of government control on the prices of the petroleum products and removal of restrictions on the establishment and operations of jetties and depots while allowing the private sector to import and distribute petroleum products at market determined prices.

Deregulation involves removal of controls by government in certain sectors of the economy to enable private sector participation in such sectors thereby stimulating competition and efficiency since prices are determined by the market forces. According to Fasua (2020), the irony of deregulation is that there must be regulation for deregulation to work. Deregulation is a sound economic policy as it enhances economic growth and development; foreign investment is attracted to the sector and employment; eventually everyone benefits. However, it has been argued that deregulation is beneficial to firms with a strong financial footing while disadvantaged to firms with weak financial position (Farlex Financial Dictionary, 2012).

Methodology

The researchers adopted descriptive research design approach to evaluate the effect of fuel subsidy removal on the poor in Nigeria and its overall effect on the Nigerian economy.

The Effect of Fuel Subsidy Removal on the Poor in Nigeria

Fuel subsidy is targeted at the poor in the society, unfortunately, the poor does not have cars to fuel neither do they have generators to power, they only benefit from fuel subsidy indirectly while the benefits of fuel subsidy goes directly to the rich. Nonetheless, fuel subsidy removal at this time of COVID-19 pandemic will only add to the hardship being currently experienced by the majority of Nigerians who are living below the poverty line. It will have severe negative implications for the poor in Nigeria.

Removal of subsidy will lead to a further increase in transportation cost which was recently increased by transporters due to social distancing as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, prices of food and other related products will skyrocket while household income remains the same for some households while some other households there have been no meaningful source of income since the pandemic induced lockdown. This will result in a fall in the real income of the poor households, increasing the poverty level in the country thereby compounding the already unbearable economic hardship in the society and worsening the poor standard of living of the citizenry.

An increase in the pump price of fuel in the country will also cause an increase in the cost of production as the Nigerian production and manufacturing sector is driven by fuel, either for production or for distribution. Industries overhead cost will increase leading to closure of businesses and their relocation to neighbouring countries like in the recent past (Eme, 2011 cited in Majekodunmi, 2013; Anyadike, 2013); the aftermath of this will be loss of jobs and worsening the already high unemployment level. This is coming at the time many household income earners are still on forced leave without pay due to the coronavirus pandemic, the effect will be catastrophic.

More so, apart from increased cost of production being transferred to the consumers in the form of high prices, the cost of every other thing ranging from school fees, house rent to food items will increase. This will worsen the hardship in the society as many household are yet to come to terms with the already existing hardship induced by the global public health crisis.

The subsidy removal at this time will lead to astronomical increase in the price of commodities, hence, a season of pains and hardship in the country especially for the poor.

Overall Benefits of Fuel Subsidy Removal in Nigeria

Azel de Granado, Coady and Gillinghon (2012) argue that subsidy is more beneficial to the rich than the poor as it is consumption based making the rich richer and the poor poorer, thereby increasing inequality in the society. Subsidy, no matter its good intentions, is hardly an efficient developmental policy tool especially if the government fixed price is below the marginal cost of production. Therefore, the whole society will be better off if such subsidy is removed.

Fuel subsidy removal will be beneficial to Nigerians as it will stimulate economic development. The huge fund which is hitherto used to pay for subsidy will become available to the government for the development of the much needed infrastructure in the country, especially in the health care, education and transport sectors. If this is done, every citizen of the country will benefit.

Deregulation of the downstream oil sector will attract private sector investments, more especially foreign direct investments, to the sector. Before now investors are not attracted to the sector as they fear they may not be able to recoup their investment at government controlled prices. Foreign direct investment in the sector will create employment opportunities for the large number of unemployed Nigerians and also generate revenue to the government in the form of taxation and levies.

Availability of foreign exchange with the Central Bank of Nigeria will be another result of fuel subsidy removal. A steady flow of foreign exchange to the Central bank will lead to a single foreign exchange rate regime in the country thereby stabilising the foreign exchange market and eliminating the black market. Foreign exchange will become easily accessible for importation of goods and machineries.

Removal of fuel subsidy will also help to remove the distortions in the market. It will bring an end to smuggling of petroleum products to neighbouring countries. Due to higher price of petroleum products in the neighbouring countries, fuel that are meant for domestic use in Nigeria are smuggled across border to be sold at higher prices causing scarcity in the country.

The erstwhile Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria and the former Emir of Kano. Sanusi Lamido Sanusi in listing the benefits of fuel subsidy removal (Onwuamaeze & Ekeghe, 2020) said that Nigeria is the only oil exporting country that does not ripe the benefits of crude oil price rise in the international market because it fixes the price of refined products that it does not produce. So, whatever it gains in high price of crude oil it losses to high price of refined products that it imports. This is so because as price of crude oil goes up the price of refined products will go up also. Therefore, removal of fuel subsidy will eliminate such revenue losses to the Nigerian government.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In spite of the negative effects of fuel subsidy removal on the poor in Nigeria, the overall benefit to the economy of fuel subsidy removal outweighs its effect on the poor. Therefore, fuel subsidy should be removed in Nigeria to free funds for government developmental and pro-poor spending, especially in this era of COVID-19 pandemic that the government requires funds to curtail the spread of the coronavirus.

However, it will be a meaningless venture to remove fuel subsidy without improvement in the poorly developed transport system in Nigeria through which the poor indirectly benefits from the fuel subsidy.

The study therefore recommends that the government must ensure that the funds saved from the subsidy removal is expended with transparent honesty to effectively improve infrastructures and create social welfare programs that will help ameliorate the effect of the subsidy removal on the poor, improve the standard of living of the citizens and help the nation achieve its developmental goals. It should also put measures in place aimed at the reduction of the cost of public transport in the country.

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COVID-19 PANDEMIC: RE-EXAMINING POLITICAL BOUNDARIES AND CITIZENSHIP IN AFRICA

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Abstract
This paper examines the implications of the current COVID 19 pandemic for sovereignty and citizenship in globalized world most importantly Africa that this paper will concentrate on. The world is currently interconnected in a quest to find solution to a global pandemic, the novel corona virus, COVID 19. Arguably, no state seems to be self-sufficient in finding solutions to the pandemic. But, while the pandemic has united members of the international community – leaders and citizens – it, at the same time, calls attention again to the theories of globalization and state sovereignty. For instance, while the pandemic has reinforced the notion of 'global citizenship' by uniting humanity irrespective of nationality in a fight against the scourge threatening their existence, similarly, the plague has tended to reignite the sovereign power of states as many states have resulted to international boundary closure and restriction of internal movement of people to curtail either the importation or spread of the virus. That is, the plague has created a political paradox – it creates global citizens (humanity) and promotes nationalism (sovereignty) at the same time. Thus, this paper is an effort at contributing to political theory– globalization and citizenship - by seeking answer to the question: in what ways do the outbreak of COVID 19 and the fight against it increase affect citizenship and the power of state?This paper adopts qualitative research method. Purposive interview through the use of thematic study will be employed to sample opinions. Students and researchers in the field of globalization and citizenship will benefit from the outcome of this study. It will also benefits governments across the world and most importantly Africa, bureaucrats and international organizations such as United Nations Organization and World Health Organization.

Keywords: Africa, Citizenship, COVID-19 Pandemic, Global Citizenship, Globalization, State, Sovereignty

Introduction

The emergence of COVID-19 pandemic and the need for a collective result has called for a global solution other than seeking way out through individual state approach. This urgent need to salvage the entire world from being wiped away by the scourge of COVID-19 pandemic and finding a lasting solution to this monster has united the entire world more than ever before. Several nations of the world have pulled resources (both human and economic) together to support the World Health Organisation in combating coronavirus. However, the collective efforts made by the global communities does not devoid individual state from exercising their sovereignty by protecting their citizens and territories from the spread of COVID-19 since it is the primary responsibility of a state to secure lives and properties of its citizens. This right by individual state to exercise its sovereign power through measures such as border closure and internal restriction of movement to curtail the spread of COVID-19 is, however, conflicting with the theories of globalisation and rights of the citizens. It was noticed by Zimmermann et al (2020, p. 1484) that human movement between and within countries from all over the world was put on temporary halt as early as April 2020 as a proactive measure to curtail the inter-state spread of coronavirus. They are of the opinion that globalisation which allows for the mobility of people across borders for the purpose of international tourism, international students, international trade, migration and transportation has a great potential of facilitating the spread of COVID-19 pandemic across the borders. The concern raised by Zimmermann et al (2020) has led to the assumption that accuses globalisation as a cause of this pandemic.

This study, therefore, seeks to contribute to political theory– globalisation and citizenship - by answering the question: how has the COVID 19 pandemic and the fight against it increase affect citizenship and the power of state? This answer will be gotten as the researchers re-examine political boundaries and citizenship in this era of coronavirus.

Conceptual Clarifications

COVID-19 Pandemic

Coronaviruses belong to the family of sub-order Cornidovirineae, Coronaviridae and Nidovirales with a total of 39 species under the realm of Ribovviria (Gorbalenya et al., 2020). According to Schoeman and Fielding (2019), the entire SAR-CoV fall under the species of severe acute respiratory syndrome related coronavirus and genus Beta-coronavirus. They further stated that most of the species in this category are enzootic and merely few of these species can infect human beings. There are seven human CoVs (HCVs) already confirmed. Human coronaviruses are mostly associated with upper respiratory tract diseases ranging from minor to modest including common cold. Most people are usually infected with either one or more of these viruses at different stages of their lives (Killerby et al, 2018).

Despite the fact that virology started in 1892, the isolation of the first case of coronavirus, avian infections bronchitis virus was carried out by Fred Beaudette in 1937. This event was followed by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-VoV) in 2002 and also respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in the Middle East during 2012. The beta CoVs which consists of SARS-CoV-1 was isolated from bats in 1992. Coronavirus which was reported by World Health Organisation (WHO) to have originated from Wuhan, Hubei Province in China was linked to Wuhan Seafood live animal market is now present in six out of seven continents of the world (Hui et al, 2020; Coronavirus Situation Report, 2020).

The cause of coronavirus disease 2019 with acronym COVID-19 is traceable to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2). This sudden disease was accompanied by worldwide fear and universal health anxiety since December 2019 when it was first reported. The World Health Organisation has reported that as of 26th July, 2020, 15,785,641 cases of coronavirus was already confirmed while 640, 016 death was recorded (WHO, 2020*a*). The quest to battle against this deadly virus made WHO to strategise measures such as social distancing, isolation of confirmed patients during the early stage, identification and reduction of transmission from animal source, communication of adequate and correct information to the members of the public, reduction of the economic and social impact and sponsors of researches that focuses on finding lasting solution to the pandemic. Consequently, the need to collectively find a lasting transnational solution to COVID-19 pandemic with the aid of global citizenship andwithout tampering on the sovereign status of states make this study imperative.

Citizenship

Song (2012) opined that citizenship is and should be bounded by the territorial boundaries of the state. Hence, Oladeji (2015) asserted that there appears to be a strong relationship between citizenship and the modern state. According to him, it is seemingly impossible for a state to exist without citizens, who in their associational capacity have established or submitted themselves to the power of a sovereign government for the promotion of their general welfare and the protection of their individual and collective rights (Oladeji, 2016). Consequently, citizenship produces the state and as well the state produces citizenship. Therefore, citizens are the rightful member of a confined political community.

Further more, Kostakopoulou (2008) confirmed the definition of citizenship as mentioned by Oladeji when he stated that citizenship entails an association among right-bearing members and the state. It is a contract of right and duties between the state and its members. That is to say, citizenship offers a person certain rights such as freedom of movement within the state, right to vote and be voted for, right to reside in any part of the country, unhindered access to public goods and services and diplomatic security outside the country (Manby, 2016). Abe and Oladeji (2016) balanced Manby's position on citizens' rights by offering duties and obligations of citizens to the state which include but not limited to payment of tax, obedience to law, defence of state sovereignty, active participation during election, respect the rights of other citizens, etc. This study, therefore, seeks to approach the challenges that COVID-19 pandemic has posed on the world survival through the instrumentality of global citizen which transcend state patriotism.

Global Citizenship

The incessant movement of people, businesses, and capital compelled by globalisation has ensued in novel business requirements and rights. The internationalisation of social and economic matters which calls for global solution has brought the concept of global citizenship to a limelight. The concept of global citizenship is recognised by a large and different group of actors both governmental, non-governmental organisations and political theorists. Falk (1994) and carter (2001) both argued that democracy has been perceived to have ties with citizenship and that global citizenship would in many areas be tied to global democracy.

Recently, the idea of global citizenship has been used widely and this usage emanates from several sources. The explanation of global citizenship transpires from the background that the traditional nation-state is less autonomous in the international system that is infiltrated by numbers of multinational forces. The weak state in this new arrangement according to Holsti (2002) demonstrate less autonomy and more social disintegration. A contradiction brought by globalisation has been the increasing international agreement that favour democracy, respect for human rights, pluralism accompanied by increased economic discriminations, environmental intimidations and what some scholars presented as "unprecedented human suffering" (de Oliveira & Tandon, c1995).

Several explanations of global citizenship stress the individual dimension. This made McIntosh (2005) to define it as the ability to see oneself and the world around them. He further explained it as the ability to compare and contrast, the ability to recognise that both reality and language come in many forms, the ability to notice power relations and comprehend them scientifically and the ability to stabilise the consciousness of one's certain ties with the certainties of entities outside the perceived self. Ladson-Billings (2005) added to the above list the demonstration of concern for the rights and welfare of others. Arneil (2006) argues that global citizenship can be theorised as the custodian of shared providence. The benefit of seeing global citizenship as the sharing of the same destiny is that it shifts concentration away from the conceptions of both charity and formal agreements among nations, and toward the question of universal sharing of resources, rights, and responsibilities. One of such responsibilities of a global citizen at this trying period is the need to seek antidote to the novel coronavirus COVID-19 that is ravaging the world at the moment.

Globalisation

Globalisation was perceived by Appelbaum and Robinson (2005) as redesigning the way we have conventionally gone about understanding the social global and human culture and a field of globalisation studies now evolving across the subjects. The need for the study of globalisation has been conditioned to numbers of phenomena that got the scholars' attention since 1970s:

- first of these conditions was the development of a globalised economy that requires a new production procedures, finance and consumption and a global economic integration.
- second, the new universal cultural arrangements, practices and flows, and the knowledge of global cultures;
- third, the world political practises, the increase of new globalised institutions, and alongside, the spread of world authority and structures of diverse categories;
- fourth, the unparalleled multidimensional movement of people around the globe which entails new forms of international movement, identities and communities; and

- fifth and the last phenomenon for the study of globalisation according to Appelbaum and Robinson (2005) was the new social hierarchies, methods of disparity, and relations of supremacy across the globe and in the world system as a whole.

The intellectual works on the above phenomena has multiplied, as have precise studies of the effectsof globalisation on certain states and regions and on sex and culture. Research plans carried out recently have fragmented out into a vast numbers of topics ranging from international sexualities to world tourism, transformations in state, work restructuring, global welfare, crime and globalisation,the transnational media, etc. This outburst of research is a pointer to the importance of the impacts of globalisation. It appears that virtually all the subjects in the academic have been connected to the studies of globalisation ranging from the studies of ethnicity to women studies, literature, art, language and cultural studies, the social sciences, business administration, history and the natural and applied sciences.

Despite much disagreement on the conceptualisation of globalisation and the best theoretical tools for the understanding of the concept, among scholars, there are still numbers of points that scholars agree upon. Firstly, the speed of social transformation globally appears to have accelerated during the latter years of the twentieth century, with consequences for several dimensions of social life and human culture. Secondly, this social transformation is associated with increasing connectivity between people and states globally, an objective dimension, together with an improved global consciousness of these relationship, a subjective dimension. Most scholars will also agree that the impact of globalisation on economic, social, political, cultural and ideological procedures to which globalisation would allegedly refer are universal and that various aspects of globalisation is multi-faceted.

According to Giddens (2009), the concept of globalisation was not popular three decades ago, however it is the most popular word in mouth of everyone today. He further stated that the term globalisation means that all citizens progressively live in one world, such that individuals, groups and states become perpetually interdependent. Barnett and Cavanagh (1994) perceived globalisation as been often used as an economic concept that mean the acceleration of the relationship in the world economy in the last few decades, and the associated occurrences on the increase of both fairly open transnational financial markets and worldwide organisations. Friedman (1999) explained that the motivating force driving globalisation is free market and capitalism. Thus, this paper examines the implications of globalisation on the internationalisation of COVID-19 pandemic and its effects on state sovereignty and citizenship in a globalised world.

State Sovereignty

The emergent of international law and other factors such as COVID-19 pandemic that will be discussed later in this paper has made the concept of absolute sovereignty to become outdated. Globalisation especially has encouraged the increase in states interdependence and cooperation. This has led to the limited sovereignty of states as a result of internationalisation and universalisation of human rights. Even though sovereignty of state is the basic standard of international law, the exact definition of the concept of sovereignty is not well defined. The following definitions of sovereignty will do justice to our discussion in this paper.

Sovereignty as defined by Arshid and Jamsheed (2017) is an important component of the state system. It originated from the Latin word "superanus" which connote supreme. Sovereignty, therefore, means supreme power of the state. According to them, the contemporary idea of the state system became perfected with the introduction of the concept of sovereignty. Bodley (1993) offered the definition of sovereignty as full and undisputable supremacy over a piece of territory and the entire citizens from time to time. Fassbender (2003) observed that the idea of sovereignty has proven to be very flexible. He further explained that sovereignty is a shared or umbrella concept that designates the rights and duties that is accorded to a state by international law at a particular time. From the foregoing, despite the submissions of scholars above on their notion of state sovereignty to mean the power of state, the re-examining of state boundary and citizenship by researchers in this era of COVID-19 pandemic has created a political paradox – it creates global citizens (humanity) and promotes nationalism (sovereignty) at the same time.

Objectives of the study

The main objective of this study is to re-examine political boundary and citizenship in the era of COVID-19. Others are as follows:

- to find out the effects that the outbreak of COVID-19 and its containment on citizenship;
- to examine the way the outbreak of COVID-19 and the fight against it increase affects the power of state' and
- to analyse how COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced the notion of 'global citizenship' by uniting humanity irrespective of nationality in a fight against the scourge threatening the global existence.

Research questions

- What are the effects that the outbreak of COVID-19 and its containment has on citizenship?
- In what ways has the outbreak of COVID-19 and the fight against it increase affects the power of state?
- How COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced the notion of 'global citizenship' by uniting humanity irrespective of nationality in a fight against the scourge threatening the global existence?

Research methodology

Research method

The findings of this study are based on survey questionnaires. Several statistical tools were employed in analysing, presenting and interpreting data collected. Descriptive and inferential statistics was used to interpret the data. Tables and graphs were utilised to demonstrate the characteristics of collected data from the participants. The reliability of different instruments that were used in this study was tested by Cronbach alpha coefficients and also computed to determine the validity of Question.

Population

A population according to Flick (2009) consists of the explanation of the study cluster that will be utilised for inquiry and these descriptions explain the characteristics that fit to the intended group and the ones that will be excluded. In line with this, the study investigates the re-examination of political boundaries and citizenship during COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, this study made use of the population of the entire Africa which is estimated to be 1,365,998,896 people as of 19 April 2021 among which the sample size of 385 was drawn through simple random sampling method and Raosoft calculator.

Sampling Size and Procedure

Cohen, Manion & Morrison (2007) argued that as a result of barrier of expenses and limited period it is impossible to collect data from the whole population and to this extent a sample has to be selected except in a case where the population is less than 30. A sample according to Churchill and Brown (2007) is a sub-group of fundamentals out of the population. The major reason for sampling is that by choosing some fundamentals of a population the investigator can present conclusions about the whole and definite group of elements which is the target population (Wellington, 2008). This study established a symbolic sample of the focused population by means of probability sampling. Probability sampling grants all elements in the population the same possibility of being integrated in the study. A sampling frame consists of the entire world population from age 18 and above. The sample size according to the Raosoft calculator is 385. This is arrived at by 5% margin of error, 95% level of confidence, 1,365,998,896population sizes and 50% distribution response. These samples were asked questions on the re-examining political boundaries and citizenship during COVID-19 pandemic in Africa.

Data Gathering Instruments

Data was gathered through the following instruments:

- *Secondary Data:* These were sourced through the use of journals, newspapers, official documents, government reports that promotes COVID-19 pandemic, political boundaries and global citizenship.
- *Survey Questionnaire:* A total sample size of 387 respondents was surveyed. Both structured/unstructured questionnaires measure the re-examining political boundaries and citizenship during COVID-19 pandemic.

Data Analysis, Presentation and Discussion

This research work was mainly carried out to examine the implications of the current COVID-19 pandemic on sovereignty and citizenship in globalised world. The findings of this study are based on questionnaires. Several statistical tools were employed in analysing, presenting and interpreting data collected. Descriptive and inferential statistics was used to interpret the data. Tables and graphs were utilised to demonstrate the characteristics of collected data from the participants. The reliability of different instruments that were used in this study was tested by Cronbach alpha coefficients and also computed to determine the validity of Question. The first section of this work shows the summary of case processing and reliability statistics. The second section of this study is the exploratory data analysis (EDA) in which we conduct a general summary of the respondents' information and responses as recorded in the questionnaire. Each sections of the questionnaire were carefully summarised and reported. This is aimed at fulfilling and proffering answers to the research questions raised in this paper. The third section considers the appropriate statistical test in order to proffer answer to the related research question(s). At the end, reports of the statistical test were presented and inferences were made where necessary.

The Reliability Test

The Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the items is 0.627, suggesting that the items have relatively high internal consistency in each of the items. Essentially, this means that respondents who tends to select high scores for one scale item also tends to select high scores for the others scale items; similarly, respondents who selected a low scores for one item tend to select low scores for the other scale items. Thus, knowing the score for one scale item would enable one to predict with some accuracy the possible scores for the other two scale items. Had alpha been low,

Table 1: Reliability Statistics for all Items in the Questionnaire

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Item
.627	38

Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA)

Demographic Information of the Respondent

Table 1 and figure 1 below presents the respondent according to their country of origin, according to the statistics, 93.10 percent are Nigerians, 2.3 percent are from Puerto Rico, 2.3 percent are from South Africa and 2.3 percent are Tanzanian by origin. However, it was observed that majority of the population are Nigerian. See table 1 and figure 1 below for more details.

Table 2. Country of Origin

	Frequency	Percent
Nigeria	127	32.82
Kenya	72	18.60
South Africa	104	26.87
Tanzania	84	21.71
Total	387	100.0



Figure 1. Pie chart of Country of Origin.

Country of Residence

Table 2 and figure 2below shows the respondents according to their Country of Residence, majority 74.7 percent) of the respondents resides in Nigeria, 4.4 percent resides in Canada, 16.3 percent resides in South Africa.

Figure 3. Country of Residence

	Frequency	Percent
Canada	67	17.31
Nigeria	119	30.75
Kenya	35	9.04
South Africa	75	18.86
United Kingdom	91	23.51
Total	387	100.0



Figure 2. Bar chart of Country of Residence

Economic Status

Table 3 and figure 3 below explains the respondents according to their economic status, it shows that 1.8 percent are extremely poor, 2.3 percent of them are very wealthy, and 58.1 percent of the total respondents are neither wealthy nor poor. Therefore, most of the respondents are the middle class. See figure 3 below for more information.

Table 4. Economic Status

	Frequency	Percent
Moderately poor	7	1.8
Moderately wealthy	32	8.3
Neither wealthy nor poor	225	58.1
Poor	14	3.6
Very poor	7	1.8
Very wealthy	9	2.3
Wealthy	93	24
Total	387	100.0

Figure 3. Bar Chart of Economic Status

Educational Status

Table 4 examines the respondents according to their educational status. Majority (63 percent) of the respondents attained Postgraduate level of education, 28.4 percent are Bsc holders. Apart from this, few (2.6 percent) are undergraduates, 5.9 percent are OND/HND holders. However, the statistics depicts that majority of the respondents attained PGD level of education. This is due to the fact that most of the respondent that partake in the survey attained PGD level. See figure 4 below for detail.

Table 5. Educational Status

	Frequency	Percent
Post-graduate	244	63
Post-secondary qualifications,	23	5.9
Undergraduate	10	2.6
University completed	110	28.4
Total	387	100.0



Figure 4. Educational Status

Table 5 presents the distribution of respondents according to their gender. According to the statistics, 65.60 percent are male and 31.80 percent are female. However, it was observed that there are more male responses in the survey than of the female. This might also imply that more male respondents were being accessed for this research work compare to the females. See the Figure 5 below for more details.

Table 6. Sex

	Frequency	Percent
Female	123	31.8
Male	254	65.6
Prefer not to say	10	2.6
Total	387	100.0



Figure 5. Pie Chart of Sex

Table 6 and figure 6 presents the respondents according to their age distribution, according to the responses,10.9 percent of the respondents falls within the age of 18-29 years, 34.6 percent of them are within 30-39 years of age, 30 percent of them are within 40-49 years of age, 15.5% of the respondents are within age 50-59, 4.1% captures age 60 and above while 4.9% of the respondents prefer not to mention their age. However, it was observed from the statistics below that lager percent of the respondents are young adults (30-39 years).

Table 7. Age Category

	Frequency	Percent
18 but below 30 years	42	10.9
30 but below 40 years	134	34.6
40 but below 50 years	116	30
50 but below 60 years	60	15.5
60 and above	16	4.1
Prefer not to say	19	4.9
Total	387	100.0



Figure 6. Bar Chart of Age Category

Table 8. Data Presentation

The table below presents responses madeby the participants to the research questions on COVID-19 pandemic: re-examining political boundaries and citizenship in Africa. These results shall be discussed later and findings will be made by the researchers.

S/N		No		Not Sure		Yes	
		F	%	F	%	F	%
1	Are there cases of COVID -19 in your country?	0	0	18	4.7	369	95.3
2	Would you agree that the government of your country should use whatever means to stop the spread of COVID-19?	318	82.2	7	1.8	62	16
3	Do you subscribe to restriction of movements (curfew/total lock down) as a way of stopping the spread of COVID-19?	77	19.9	86	22.2	224	57.9
4	Would you say the government in your country has given enough palliative to ensure people stay at home?	318	82.2	7	1.8	62	16
5	Do you think lockdown has increased the poverty and crime rate in your community?	74	19.1	43	11.1	270	69.8
6	Do you think other measures (social distancing, disinfecting public places, personal hygiene, facemask etc.) are better alternatives to lockdown in the fight against COVID 19?	110	28.4	56	14.5	221	57.1
7	Do you see restriction of movement to curtail the spread of COVID -19 as violation of your fundamental human right?	316	81.7	9	2.3	62	16
8	Would you say that the fight against COVID-19 has unduly increased government control over citizens' rights in your country?	136	35.1	34	8.8	208	53.7
9	Would you agree that the COVID -19 pandemic has increased tension/division among states?	76	19.6	34	8.8	277	71.6
10	Would you agree that COVID -19 pandemic is a war situation, and people's rights may be deprived by the state to combat the pandemic effectively?	63	16.3	09	2.3	315	81.4

11	Would you agree with the government of your country not to allow foreign nationals into the country as a way of curbing the spread of COVID-19?	98	25.3	18	4.7	271	70
12	Would yo u agree to the immediate deportation of any foreigner who tested positive to COVID-19 in your country?	337	87.1	0	0	50	12.9
13	Would you agree that the citizens of your country be barred from returning to the country after the end of COVID-19?	356	92	7	1.8	24	6.2
14	Do you think the global rich (countries and individuals) are doing enough to assist the poor (countries and individuals) in their fight against COVID-19 pandemic?	110	28.4	104	26.9	173	44.7
15	Do you think international institutions (WHO, IMF , World Bank, etc.) have responded well towards curtailing the pandemic?	114	29.5	102	26.4	171	44.2
16	Would you agree that the COVID - 19 pandemic has increased social bond among people irrespective of race, colour, nationality, gender, etc. in your countr y and across the world?	73	18.9	114	29.5	200	51.7
17	Would you support your government to reduce/cut its funding of World Health Organisation (WHO) because you think the organisation is biased against your country?	252	65.1	64	16.5	71	18.3
18	What is the level of the spread of COVID 19 in your country?						

		Frequency	Percent
	High	77	19.9
	I don't know	17	4.4
	Moderate	144	37.2
	Moderately high	42	10.9

	Moderately low	45	11.6
	Very high	46	11.9
	Very low	16	4.1
	Total	387	100
19	What are the measures being applied by the government to curb the spread of COVID-19 in your country of residence? You may select more than one option.		
		Frequency	Percent
	Aggressive testing; Isolation and treat me	96	24.8
	**Encourage personal hygiene	9	2.3
	Encourage returnee travellers to self-is	10	2.6
	Total	387	100
20	How effective are the measures taken by the government against the spread of the virus in your country?		
		Frequency	Percent
	Effective	128	33.1
	Ineffective	33	8.5
	Moderately effective	111	28.7
	Moderately ineffective	50	12.9
	Very effective	16	4.1
	Very ineffective	49	12.7
	Total	387	100
21	How likely are you willing to assist others in the fight against the pandemic?		
		Frequency	Percent
	Likely	62	16
	Moderately likely	59	15.2
	Moderately unlikely	8	2.1
	Very likely	249	64.3
	Very unlikely	9	2.3
	Total	387	100

Discussion and findings

The findings of this research is set to answer three major questions that has been raised in this paper. However, these three research questions will be answered through other sub-research questions.

What are the effects that the outbreak of COVID-19 and its containment has on citizenship?

The interest of the researchers in raising the above research question was to find out how the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic and measures to contain it has affected citizenship. The sub-questions below is, therefore, set to finding adequate answer to this research question.
Are there cases of COVID-19 in your country?

The above question was raised in order to ascertain the presence or otherwise of COVID-19 pandemic in the participant country. We found out that virtually all participant agreed that there are cases of COVID-19 in their country. From their responses 369 respondents which represents 95.3% of the participants agreed that there are cases of COVID-19 in their country while 18 participants with 4.7% were undecided in their response. Majority of responses confirmed the pandemic nature of COVID-19.

Would you agree that the government of your country should use whatever means to stop the spread of COVID-19?

The question above was raised to address the statement that whether citizens of various countries that participated in this research will agree with their government to use whatever means to stop the spread of COVID-19 in their states. Responses gathered reveals that majority of the participants with 270 responses and 69.8% agreed to the need for the government of their various countries to use whatever means to stop the spread of COVID-19 pandemic, 99 participants with aggregate of 25.6% disagreed and 18 participants with 4.7% neither agreed nor disagree.
Do you subscribe to restriction of movements (curfew/total lockdown) as a way of stopping the spread of COVID-19?
The researchers raised the above question in order to find out what the responses of the participants will be on the restriction of citizens' movement through curfew or total lockdown as a way of stopping the spread of COVID-19 in their various states. The responses shows that 224 participants with 57.9% agreed to curfew and total lockdown as a mean of containing the spread of COVID 19 in their countries. This shows that majority of participants did not mind losing their freedom of movement as much as they will be preserved from destruction of COVID-19. 77 respondents with 19.9% disagreed as they could not fathom the negative impacts that restriction can have on their freedom of movement. 86 with 22.2% participants were confused with this decision. They don't know either to say yes or no.

Would you say the government in your country has given enough palliative to ensure people stay at home?

The researchers wanted to know from the responses of the participants if the government in their various states made provisions for enough palliatives to support citizens during the total lockdown and curfew in order to encourage them to abide by government restrictions during COVID-19 pandemic. From their responses, 318 participant with 82.2% stated that their government did not offer enough palliative to support their staying at home during COVID-19 pandemic. The result of this was that citizens in some African countries broke government directives by not keeping to curfew and lockdown directives. Most citizens took to the street by daring government's rules on COVID-19 and their tendency of contacting the deadly virus to seeking means of livelihood for themselves and their family members. 62 respondents with 16% agreed that their government made adequate provisions to support stay at home policies while only 7 participants with 1.8% were undecided. Above responses shows that Africancitizens became vulnerable to contacting coronavirus (COVID 19) due to the failure of government to provide the needed support to their citizens.

Do you think other measures (social distancing, disinfecting public places, personal hygiene, face mask, etc.) are better alternatives to lockdown in the fight against COVID-19?

This question aimed at finding out from the participants if there could be better alternatives to total lockdown and curfew which had so much impact on the citizens. 221 respondents with 57.1% agreed that social distancing, disinfecting public places, personal hygiene, face mask etc.) are better alternatives to lockdown in the fight against COVID-19. 110 participants with 28.4% disagreed with this view while 56 respondents with 14.5% responses neither said yes or no. We can conclude from the result above that measures like (social distancing, disinfecting public places, personal hygiene, facemask, etc.) are better alternatives to lockdown in the fight against COVID-19 as revealed by the majority.

Would you say that the fight against COVID-19 has unduly increased government control over citizens' rights in your country?

This research question was raised to gather responses from participant on how the fight against COVID-19 has unduly increased government control over their rights as citizens in their various countries. 208 participants that represents 53.7% of the responses agreed that the fight against COVID-19 has unduly increased government control over their rights as citizens in their various countries. 136 participants with 35.1% responses disagreed while 34 participants with just 8.8% responses were undecided. From the above responses, we can conclude that the fight against COVID-19 indeed has unduly increased government control over the rights of the participants as citizens in their various countries.

In what ways has the outbreak of COVID 19 and the fight against it increase affects the power of state?

This second research question was master minded by the researchers to find out the ways through which COVID-19 outbreak and the fight against its spread has affected the power of state. The sub-research questions discussed below will find answer to this question:

Would you agree that COVID-19 pandemic is a war situation, and people's rights may be deprived by the state to combat the pandemic effectively?

The above question is meant to find out the reactions of states to COVID-19 pandemic as a war situation and how people's rights may be deprived by the states in order to combat the pandemic effectively.The result gathered from this question shows that majority of the respondents with the aggregate of 81.4% agreed to the assertion that COVID-19 pandemic is a war situation, and people's rights may be deprived by the state in order to combat the pandemic effectively in the selected countries. Many immigrants were denied visa to enter foreign countries during the lockdown era. Some that have already gotten visa ahead of COVID-19 pandemic were revoked. The researcher concluded that COVID-19 pandemic is regarded as war situation and that any sovereign country has the right to utilise her sovereign power to contain the spread of COVID-19 pandemic in their various states even if it will mean deprivation of global citizens' rights in order to protect their own citizens.

Would you agree with the government of your country not to allow foreign nationals into the country as a way of curbing the spread of COVID-19?

The above question is a follow up to the immediate one. The researches engage this question find out the effects of COVID-19 pandemic on states' power. Findings shows that many countries used their sovereign power to deny the nationals of other states access to their country as a mean of containing the spread of COVID-19 pandemic through globalisation. From the responses gathered, 271 participants with 70% responses agreed that their state government should use their sovereignty to deny foreigners entry into their countries as a mean of curbing the spread of COVID-19. 98 participants with 25.3 responses disagreed while 18 respondents with 4.7% responses neither said yes or no. From these responses, the researchers draw inferences and conclude that many countries disallowed foreign nationals into their countries during the lockdown and border closure in order to curb the spread of COVID-19 in their countries.

How COVID 19 pandemic has reinforced the notion of 'global citizenship' by uniting humanity irrespective of nationality in a fight against the scourge threatening the global existence?

In this third research question, the researchers wish to find out how the idea of global citizenship has united citizenship irrespective of their nationality and other differences in their fight against COVID-19 pandemic. These questions are discussed below one after the other:

Do you think the global rich (countries and individuals) are doing enough to assist the poor (countries and individuals) in their fight against COVID-19 pandemic?

The above question aimed at answering the research question on how COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced the notion of 'global citizenship' by uniting humanity irrespective of nationality in a fight against the scourge threatening the global existence. From the responses gathered, majority of the participants with173 respondents with 44.7% confirmed that the global rich (countries and individuals) are doing enough to assist the poor (countries and individuals) in their fight against COVID-19 pandemic, 110 participants with 28.4% responses did not agree while 104 participants with 26.9 responses were undecided. The researchers therefore concluded from the above responses that the global rich countries and individuals did assisted poor countries in their fight against COVID-19 pandemic.

Do you think international institutions (WHO, IMF, World Bank, etc.) have responded well towards curtailing the pandemic?

This question tried to assess the commitment of international organisations/institutions such as World Health Organisation (WHO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and regional organisations such as European Union (EU), African Union (AU) etc. to the fight against the spread of COVID-19 pandemic. 171 participants with aggregate of 44.2% responses agreed that international organisations/institutions responded well towards curtailing COVID-19 pandemic, 114 participants with 29.5% responses disagreed while 102 participants did not know whether international institutions responded well towards stopping the spread of COVID-19 pandemic or not. The researchers therefore concluded that international organisations most importantly World Health Organisation (WHO) were committed to containing the spread of COVID-19.

Would you agree that the COVID-19 pandemic has increased social bond among people irrespective of race, colour, nationality, gender, etc. in your country and across the world?

This question is a follow up to the above question. It is aimed at finding out how COVID-19 pandemic has increased social bond among people irrespective of race, colour, nationality, gender, etc. in your country and across the world. Majority of the responses with 51.7% responses actually confirmed the assertion that COVID-19 pandemic has increased unity among global citizens with no recourse to their differences. 18.9 respondents refuse to agree with this assertion while 29.5 respondents were not sure of their decision. The conclusion is therefore drawn by the researchers that nations of the world have become more united in the era of COVID-19 pandemic to finding lasting solution to this monster irrespective of their differences.

How likely are you willing to assist other states in the fight against the pandemic?

The responses gathered shows that majority of the respondents with 370 participants out of 387 showed interest in assisting other countries to fight against the spread of COVID-19 pandemic while only 17 participants did not showed interest in assisting other states in their fight against the spread of COVID-19 pandemic. The researcher inferred from the responses above that global citizens are willing to assist other states in their fight against the spread of coronavirus.

Conclusion

The researchers conclude that COVID-19 pandemic as earlier mentioned in this paper has created a political paradox – it creates global citizens (humanity) and promotes nationalism (sovereignty) at the same time. In as much as larger percentage of the participants that took part in this research showed interest in assisting to finding solution to the spread of COVID-19 pandemic within the globe, many of them also showed their senses of patriotism and devotion to their individual country by agreeing to the assertion that foreigners should not be allowed to enter into their countries as a mean of curbing the spread of coronavirus in their various states. Thus, this paper made a frantic effort at contributing to political theory – globalisation and citizenship - by seeking answer to the research questions such as: What are the effects that the outbreak of COVID-19 and its containment has on citizenship? In what ways has the outbreak of COVID-19 and the fight against it increase affects the power of state? and how COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced the notion of 'global citizenship' by uniting humanity irrespective of nationality in a fight against the scourge threatening the global existence? The researchers therefore conclude by saying that the research questions raised in this study has been justified by adequate responses and submissions made by the participants.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made in line with the research findings of this study:

- It is recommended that the government of various countries should use whatever means to stop the spread of COVID-19 pandemic.
- Curfew and total lockdown is recommended as a mean of containing the spread of COVID-19 in various countries.
- The study shows that many African countries as stated by the participants did not offer enough palliative to support their staying at home during the total lockdown. It is therefore recommended that Government should make adequate palliative for their citizens whenever they want to consider total lockdown as a choice to contain the spread of COVID-19 or any other pandemic in the future.
- The study recommend that social distancing, disinfecting public places, personal hygiene, face mask, etc. are better alternatives to lockdown in the fight against COVID-19 or any pandemic.
- It is recommended that government should minimise their excessive control over citizens' rights during pandemic or any state of emergency in order to receive the cooperation of their citizens.
- The outcome of this study shows that COVID-19 pandemic is a war situation. It is therefore recommended that any pandemic should be treated as war government should do everything possible to secure the lives of their citizens in such a war-like situation.
- The study shows that the restrictions placed by some countries on foreigners from traveling into their country during the pandemic assisted in the spread of COVID-19. It is therefore recommended that such a traveling ban should be considered by all nations of the world during the future pandemic in order to save the world from being wiped off. This may be against the theory of globalization, but the world should be careful in saving the global citizens in the time of pandemic while every other thing becomes secondary.
- The study shows that several wealthy nations of the world and wealthy individuals aided

poor countries during the pandemic. It is therefore recommended that such a good gesture should be upheld for future purposes.

- The study recommends that the social bond built among the global citizens irrespective of race, colour, nationality, gender, etc., should be maintained.

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COVID-19 PANDEMIC: ACCESS TO FOOD AND COPING MECHANISMS IN PORT HARCOURT, RIVERS STATE

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Abstract
Access to food and other basic needs during the peak of covid-19 pandemic was quite difficult for most people in Nigeria, especially during the associated lock down periods. In Port Harcourt and its environment, this problem was very observable. This is the problematic this paper interrogates. The objectives of the study are to identify challenges faced in accessing food and examine the measures adopted by affected families in coping with this difficulty. Data for this paper were generated through semi-informal interviews with 50 individuals on household basis, accidentally selected in Port Harcourt and Obio/Akpor local government areas of Rivers State. Findings point to the fact that accessing food and other essentials was very difficult, particularly for the daily income earners and those who got no form of palliatives. The commonest coping measures adopted by the low income earners are; begging and doing menial jobs in exchange for food items and rationing of food among others. The affluent families coped by compromising security personnel who were supposed to ensure compliance to lock down orders, and travelled out to make purchase of food items and other necessities. Based on the findings, it is concluded that covid-19 pandemic made access to food and other daily essentials difficult. Therefore, government, organizations and individuals should come up with more proactive measures to carter for food and other essential daily needs, especially for the vulnerable families during pandemic periods when movement is restricted.

Keywords*:* COVID-19, lockdown, food, coping measures, palliative

Introduction

The COVID-19, otherwise known as the coronavirus ravaged the entire globe, starting from China in the Asiatic continent. COVID-19 is a transmissible health malady caused by a strand of virus known as coronavirus which came to international focus in December 2019 (Cennimo, 2020). Cennimo further explains that the World Health Organisation declared it a global health emergency on 30 January 2020 and a global pandemic on 11 March, 2020. He also defines it as "illness caused by a novel coronavirus now called severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-COV-2)…" There are so many polemics surrounding its origin, but this is out of purview of this paper. However, it is worthy of note that its impact and spread cut across national boundaries. Beyond the health implications associated with it, there are other serious fallouts from this rampaging health challenge of the 21st century. Some of these include; food insecurity and hunger crisis; lack of access to sufficient food; restrictions that have impacted on agriculture; exacerbated poverty and economic downturns that make the attainment of sustainable development goals difficult. The SDGs 1-5 make it imperative that extreme hunger, poverty and deadly diseases must be reduced greatly; and good health and wellbeing be optimised within the stipulated time frame. This vision may remain unaccomplished in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic and associated difficulties in accessing food. Adequate and sufficient food is central in achieving these goals.

According to the United Nation (UN) in Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the estimated number of persons expected to face food challenges as fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic by end of 2020 stands at 265 million, globally. Before the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, many individuals and households no doubt, have experienced food insecurity to some extent. The reasons for their previous experience are:

- acute food shortages due to changing climatic conditions;
- poor agricultural yield;
- violent conflicts that threaten food production and supply chain;
- increased food prices; and
- high unemployment and poor wages that limit purchasing power at the disposal of individuals and households.

These limitations which are common in Nigeria, coupled with the invasion of COVID-19 have further worsened the food crisis.

Nigeria has been identified as one of the nations that found it difficult to ensure that her citizens had access to food and other basic needs during the COVID-19 pandemic. Ewang (2020) in Human Rights Watch (HRW), observed that; "millions of Nigerians observing COVID-19 lockdown lack the food and income that their families need to survive." This observation aptly captures the prevailing situation in Nigeria, especially during the peak of the pandemic and the associated lockdown.

Statement of problem

Like other nations of the world, Nigeria adopted the lockdown measure which necessitated restriction of movement, as a check to the spread of the virus. This single measure ensured strict prohibition of movement of people outside their immediate home environment and froze people from going about their legitimate activities. Such activities that were affected include; production and supply of food and other necessary essentials of daily needs; and provision of relevant services.

Akiwumi in United Nation Conference for Trade and Develoment (UNCTAD) (August 11, 2020) stated that:

> Administrative restrictions imposed by governments, such as lockdowns, travel restrictions and physical distancing measures have also worsened the risk of food insecurity. These restrictions are being felt particularly strongly by low income households and those working in the informal economy, due to their loss of livelihoods and inability to access markets.

However, the levels of restriction varied from state to state and even within the states. In Rivers State, following the adoption of prohibited movement, the period of total lockdown was extensive and open markets were shut down. State-government-imposed curfew was also added to the lockdown and only people offering essential services were allowed to operate during this period. Food shops were allowed to open on a regimented basis when the lockdown was relaxed intermittently.

However, Obio/Akpor and Port Harcourt Local Government Areas were worse hit by the strict and extended periods of the lockdown and state government imposed curfews. There was increase in the prices of staple food such as garri, which cost about N6000.00 to N7000.00, in comparison of its pre-COVID-19 price of N3000.00 to N3500.00. Every other consumable followed the same pattern. Farming and fishing activities were greatly reduced, thereby making associated produce scarce and exorbitant. This state of affairs made it Herculean for most households to access food (items including water that provide bodily nourishments for physical growth and energy) and other necessities (such as toiletries) during the worse scenarios of the pandemic in the state.

This was particularly so for daily income-earners and other low income-earners who hard barest savings, if at all. This created suffering, misery and tension in the polity as observed by the researcher. It is not in doubt that households without access to food and other necessities of daily living are bound to suffer more than other categories of households. This has necessitated the need to investigate not only the difficulties encountered in the search for food, but also the coping measures adopted by residents of the two named local government areas in Rivers State. These two LGAs are the major commercial centres and the largest of the 23 LGAs in the state.

Coping measures are mechanisms adopted or initiatives by individuals to manage difficulties or unusual situations that arise during periods of stress that may threaten the continual survival of individuals. It comes in various forms; it may be person specific and varies over space and time, even when the prevailing condition is the same.

Palliatives are a form of coping measure adopted by government (national and state), organisations, religious institutions and philanthropic individuals in form of food supplies and financial assistance during lockdown (a period people are strictly confined to very limited space within their very immediate vicinity) in Nigeria.

Objectives of the study

Three key objectives guided the study and they are:

- To identify the difficulties associated with accessing food and other basic needs during the peak of covid-19 pandemic;
- To highlight the measures adopted in coping with the difficulties in accessing food and other basic needs; and
- To investigate the social categories that were worst hit in accessing food and basic needs during the lockdown.

Research questions

- What are the difficulties experienced in accessing food and other essentials during the peak of covid-19 pandemic?
- What measures were adopted to cope with the difficulties in getting food and other essentials during the peak of covid-19?
- Which social categories were most affected during the lockdown in accessing food and other essentials?

Theoretical Framework

Theories abound in the field of coping mechanisms to explain how individuals cope with stressful periods of life. Amidst all these, the macro-analytical state-oriented theory is considered most appropriate to the study. The state-oriented theories place emphasis on the actual coping methods adopted by an individual and the outcome of such adopted strategies.

The proponents of this strand of coping theory are Richard Lazarus and Susan Folkman, according to Chowdhury (2020). They interrogated how individuals react to stressful situations. In their analysis, they came up with the notion that there are several alternatives of how people deal with stress. For instance, some make plans to overcome the situation, whereas others avoid confronting the situations. Chowdhury defines coping as "the conscious and unconscious efforts we put in to solve problems and reduce stress." Furthermore, she defines coping skills or strategies as; "a set of adaptive tools that we proactively administer to avoid burnout". Such tools are dependent on our personality types and may include our thoughts, emotions and actions.

Lazarus and Folkman in Chowdhury (2020) state that successful coping mechanisms depend on the emotional functions related to the problem and classified eight of such functions that are relevant to active coping thus:

- *Self control* – where individuals try to control their emotions in response to stress;
- *Confrontation* – where we face the pressure and retaliate to change the situation and bring it back to our favour;
- *Social support* – which involves talking to others and looking for social connections to help us survive a difficult time;
- *Emotional distancing* – where we stay indifferent to what is going on around and prevent the stress from controlling our actions;
- *Escape and avoidance* – where we deny the existence of stress as a coping response;
- *Radical acceptance* – where one resorts to unconditional self-acceptance for adapting to adversity;
- *Positive reappraisal* – where we seek to find the answer in the struggle or grow from it and;
- *Strategic problem-solving* – where we implement specific solution-focused strategies to get through the tough time and redirect our actions accordingly.

Going by the listed emotional functions (or principles) that are considered prerequisites to active coping with stressful situations, this theory captures how individual households managed to pull through the traumatic lockdown period, following the outbreak of COVID-19 in Rivers State. The coping measures adopted in the study areas incorporated elements of the emotional functions such as: social support, radical acceptance, positive reappraisal and strategic problem-solving strategies.

Research Methodology

The cross-sectional research design was adopted for the study and the research is descriptive in nature. The technique of garnering data is semi-formal interviews held with respondents with strict observation of COVID-19 safety protocols. The sampling population consists of all heads of households in Port Harcourt City and Obio/Akpor Local Government Areas both in Rivers state, Nigeria. The sampling techniques adopted for the study are purposive and accidental, while the sample size is 50. Data analysis is purely qualitative under thematic headings.

Presentation and Discussion of Findings

a) Difficulties identified in sourcing food and other daily essentials during the COVID-19 pandemic

From the interviews held the following listed factors were mentioned very often as the difficulties identified in getting food and other essentials include:

- Prolonged lockdown and strict restriction of movements;
- Closure of markets;
- Non-availability of some food items and other essentials;
- Exorbitant costs of food items; and
- Border closures that prevented supply of food items from outside the state;
- Limited or no savings that prevented people stocking food and other essentials;
- Poor power supply limited stocking of perishable food items;
- Difficulties in getting palliatives (rowdiness, discrimination in who gets or not, distance to points of sharing, hoarding of items, etc.);
- Disallowing people from engaging in their legitimate economic activities from which they earned daily;
- Unpreparedness for the extended strict lockdown periods; and
- Not being able to access money in the banks easily.

Measures frequently mentioned as coping strategies to the difficulties encountered in getting food and other necessities are:

- Strict rationing of available food and monotonous meals;
- Begging from and doing menial jobs for privileged neighbours in exchange for food items;

- Borrowing money from others to restock;
- Depending on family support network;
- Adults going hungry in preference to feeding their younger children and the very aged;
- Using water, paper or condemned pieces of cloth to clean up in place of toilet roll;
- Patronizing illegal night markets (were available) with the risk of being robbed or arrested by security officials; and
- Compromising some security personnel to cross borders where restriction in movement was not strict to shop for food and other essentials not easily reachable in neighbourhoods.

Social categories that were mostly affected by the difficulties in accessing food and other essentials are:

- Daily income earners whose pay are very low;
- Low income earners especially those with marginal or no savings;
- Salary earners whose salaries were withheld during the COVID-19 lockdown with minimal savings;
- Unemployed household heads that depend on the good will of other family members for their upkeep before the pandemic;

Discussion of Findings

Most of the difficulties experienced by respondents during the peak period of the COVID-19 pandemic are interlinked. For example, the prolonged lockdown periods, strict restriction of movements and closure of markets brought about limited supply of food which was majorly smuggled and thus inflated the prices of such. Also, accessing money from the banks within the study area was very difficult during the extreme lockdown period. All these made it impossible for people to sufficiently restock or buy food items when the lockdowns were intermittently eased. Moreover, free vehicular movement and limited number of persons to be conveyed at a time, made it hard for people to shop for food and other necessities when they had the window to do so.

There was panic buying which implied that the limited available food items and other essentials were quickly mopped up by few households who could conveniently afford their high cost. This was to the detriment of low income earners and poor households who could barely afford a day's meal. The closure of shops and markets impacted more on households who depended on daily hustling activities to earn a living. This category could not sufficiently heed to the call to stock food and other essentials that could carry them on for a reasonable period of time.

Iriekpen and Chinwe (May 14, 2020) of *ThisDay* newspaper reported that even the governor of the state, Barrister Nyesom Wike acknowledged the sufferings of residents of the two LGAs in accessing money from banks to purchase food, especially during a two day window period to restock food. This finding is in corroboration of the comment by United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs that the global pandemic of COVID-19 is more than a health crisis which is “killing people, spreading human suffering and upending people's lives.”

Difficulties in accessing food and other essentials during the peak of COVID-19 imply that good feeding practices that ensure nutritious meals are compromised. Indulging in meals that are monotonous and lacking in necessary nutrients just to quench the hunger pangs is not the best or standard practice. This situation has obvious consequences, particularly for specific population categories, the young, aged and ones with dietary specifics. Poorly fed young children stand the risk of having their growth rate and immunity impaired and are at a greater risk to contact infectious diseases such as COVID-19, Abrams and Szefler (May 18, 2020).

For the aged category, especially those that have underlying health challenges like diabetes and require regimented diet the period was not friendly to them. With reduced immunity and not keeping to a strict health diet, their health status nose dived most likely. In addition, most elderly persons depend on others for support and have been said to be "less capable of supporting themselves" according to the UN Secretary General. This means that the lockdown period and associated prohibition of free movement meant they were cut off from some of their social network links like their children and close relatives who could not easily reach out to them. Their misery at this time is better imagined than experienced. Even the adults that sacrificed their meals for the benefit of young children and the aged in their households also jeopardised their wellbeing. All human beings require sufficient and adequate meals to function optimally. A hungry man is an angry man, a popular saying goes. Although complaints were high among the residents of the two LGAs on what they passed through, they did not take laws into their hands till the lockdown was eased.

The Human Rights Watch opined that those who lost job and income during the pandemic experienced more difficulties in accessing food, especially as Nigeria's social protection systems and risks hardly accommodated the country's poorest and vulnerable groups. With lack of good planning at both national and state levels, it becomes glaring that Nigeria is one of the least prepared countries to effectively handle the welfare concerns of her citizens in the pandemic era. Government intervention in the pandemic period like provision of material and financial palliatives were insufficient and poorly managed in terms of distribution and accountability. The 'Nigeria factor' also played out in the implementation of the interventions of government to reduce the stress accompanying the lockdown on the citizens. Yet, Abrahams and Hunter (September 8, 2020) observed that "across the world, over 200 countries have expanded or introduced new social protection measures to help their citizens face the shocks of the pandemic."

The other difficulties encountered by different households for example, lack of or marginal savings to have enabled them prepare adequately for and restock during the lockdown is related to low income and unemployment issues. This brings to fore, the existing disparities that characterise inequality in the Nigerian State where the income gap keeps widening between the political class and the others. An average public servant can barely meet up with the upkeep demands of their families before the COVID-19 pandemic.

It is needless to emphasise that the pandemic brought more untold and unpleasant experiences their way. It will not be out of place to state that other social forces or determinants helped to exacerbate the difficulties in accessing food and other essentials. For example, preexisting poverty, discrimination based on indigene factor and rowdiness of environments where palliatives were distributed. Also, loss of livelihoods or jobs, seizing of salaries of some categories of workers and lack of safety-net initiatives on the part of government made it absolutely difficult to access food and other essentials of living.

Some of the adopted coping measures like use of alternatives to toiletries were also unfortunate, considering that most households had long upgraded to modern ones, but had to revert to traditional or earlier ways of cleaning up after using the toilet. There is a risk involvement here because hygiene is compromised and infections can be contacted. A household reported using detergent as the only available cleaning item to bath its children during the lockdown, because it was not possible to get bathing soap for his household then. This is poignant. Could this not have a health implication on those children who their tender skins were applied the detergent? This can be termed reversal of development and can definitely not lead to the attainment of the relevant SDGs.

The identification of social categories that were extremely impacted by the difficulties in accessing food and other essentials of daily need show that the vulnerable households were more impacted than the well to do ones. However, all households did not find it easy accessing food during the peak of the pandemic in Rivers State. The UN is of the opinion that "COVID-19 outbreak affects all segments of the population and is particularly detrimental to members of those groups in the most vulnerable situations…" It suggests further that the social crisis resulting from COVID-19 pandemic may also intensify "inequality, exclusion, discrimination and global unemployment in the medium and long run." This realisation made the UN Secretary-General during the launch of COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan on 23 March, 2020 to make this remark:

> We must come to the aid of the ultra-vulnerable millions upon millions of people who are least able to protect themselves. This is a matter of basic human solidarity. It is crucial for combating the virus.

This point to the need to come up with rapid response initiatives that can help ameliorate the sufferings and difficulties associated with accessing food and other vital requirements for the wellbeing of households during the emergency periods, like COVID-19.

Conclusion

The difficulties encountered during the lockdown as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic are real and many. Many households were impacted and several coping mechanisms were adopted to ensure survival during the bleak period. However, these coping mechanisms were anchored on individual household basis and, therefore, were not sufficient to cushion sufficiently the difficulties of the time. There is need to have a broad-based programme of action that will accommodate all types of household and still give special attention to the most vulnerable.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are made;

- National and state governments should have reliable safety nets, especially during emergency periods such as COVID-19 for her citizens in order to provide them with food and other basic needs which they may find it difficult to access. More of public resources should be set aside for this purpose.

- Governments should ensure that sufficient palliatives are provided and distributed to citizens without any form of bias. This could be achieved by forming partnerships with NGOs, CSOs and CBOs that can not only contribute items and finance, but act as support groups in the distribution of the palliatives.
- Lockdowns should not only be backed up with government interventions to cushion their effects, especially on the vulnerable groups, but the plans, programmes and who is eligible should be sufficiently publicised. This will likely reduce discriminations that people experience while trying to benefit from such interventions.
- Saving culture and regimented spending and use of resources should be encouraged among households and individuals. With good planning, this can serve as an immediate safety net for households and could make adverse situations such as the lockdown period less burdensome.
- The value of being your brother's keeper should be encouraged further, especially in difficult times. The socialization process at any level can be relied upon to achieve this.
- Marketers should avoid hiking prices of food and other daily essentials during periods of scarcity and emergency. Government intervention is needed to attain this feat. Places with close monitoring can be created to oversee the buying and selling of food and other essentials with controlled pricing during lockdown.
- Government can ensure that the food supply chain is not completely broken during lockdowns so that people will not suffer hunger by allowing food carrying trucks to cross state boundaries. This may involve inter-state arrangements between governors with agreed checks and balances to ensure that the arrangements are not hijacked by unscrupulous individuals.
- CSOs, NGOs, CBOs, religious organisations and wealthy individuals should make more contributions towards providing food and other necessities during emergency periods. This definitely will boost reserves that will help citizens pull through the difficult phase of COVID-19 pandemic and finally;
- Government must be empathetic to her citizens in speech and conduct during pandemic periods when people's emotions are heightened.

If most of these measures are tried out, the extent of difficulties, suffering and misery encountered in sourcing for food and other essentials of daily living during the lockdown of COVID-19 pandemic will greatly be reduced. This way, people's mental and physical wellbeing will be maintained or restored. We should not forget that there is fear of further breakout of COVID-19. A timely preparation will save not only Rivers state, but the entire nation from what may be considered catastrophic!

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COVID–19 PANDEMIC IN NIGERIA: BETWEEN THE SUFFERING CITIZENS AND REALITIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE BY THE STATE APPARATUS DURING THE LOCKDOWN

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Abstract
Coronavirus is undoubtedly ravaging the world and changing the socio-economic and political pattern of people's means of livelihood. This challenge has added to many problems encountered by Nigerian citizens due to human rights abuse from the state security agents. Existing literature on the enforcement of COVID-19 safety guidelines says little about the experiences of these individuals. This paper unravels the horrifying and inflicting nature of human rights abuse from the citizens during the lockdown. Data was generated through an In-depth Interviews (IDIs) with eighteen (18) individuals who undergone or witnessed human rights abuse within the period. The data was analyzed using content analysis and was presented as narratives in ethnographic format.

Keywords: Corona virus, human rights abuse, lockdown, pandemic, state security agencies

Introduction
The changes in the socio-economic dynamics of Nigeria have created unassuming challenges to her citizens. This challenge emanates from the country's weak structure to absorptive capacity (Alhassan and Kilishi, 2016; World Bank, 1997) resulting from mono-culture economy (Akpan, 2012; *Kida, Liberty, Alhassan, & Alade, 2019), increase in its external debts (Nwangwu, & Okoye, 2014) and government distractions from the insurgent operations in the north as well as security challenges in the south (*Nnodim and Ochogba, 2018***).** This could account for the 2016 economic recession and other economic crisis that had been witnessed in the country. For instance, in Nigeria, about US$14 billion was lost to crisis in 2016 (Ogundipe & Oluwole, 2016; Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2016). Being the most populous nation in Africa and considering the mineral deposits in the country, it is expected that her leaders will rise above these challenges.

However, poverty rate continues to rise as many citizens live below US$1 a day and the standard of living continues to be on decline. The World Bank defines poverty as "an inability to achieve a minimum standard of living" (World Bank, 2018). Consistent with this fact, more people around the world are losing the various dimensions for a minimum standard of living (Buheji, Cunha, Beka, Mavrić, Carmo de Souza, Costa Silva, Hanafi, &Yein, 2020). To be specific, in Nigeria, the unemployment rate has risen from 4.3% in 2015 to 8.1% in 2019 while the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita has fallen from 2,744 in 2015 to 2,363 in 2019 (NBS, 2019; World Bank, 2016).

Despite all these challenges in Nigeria, the outbreak of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) exacerbates the problem, as it opened waves for structural disparities (Kihato & Landau, 2020). Khan and Sarker (2020) described this virus as belonging to a subunit of Orthocoronavirinae, drawn from Coronaviridae, and Nidovirales family. It spreads easily through a contact with the infected persons when the infectious droplets gets into their sense organs like mouth, nose, or eyes. The outbreak of this virus emanated from Wuhan, a part of China in December, 2019 but, has spread rapidly to other countries and regions in the world. Accordingly, Mohamed, Katiane da, Godfred, Bartola, Yuri, Simone, Mohammed, Tulika, (2020) note the exclusive attribute of COVID-19 in relation to the hardship its outbreak inflicted on the globe at the same time with less recourse to the improved technological innovation attained within the last century. While the number of confirmed cases continued to increase in many countries, (WHO, 2020) advised for non pharmaceutical measures to contain its viral spread as slow reach of vaccination is likely to occur. Given this advice, Nigeria and many other African states that had poor healthcare system adopted these measures. The adopted measures include:

- Washing of hands regularly with soap;
- Physical distancing (at least 2 meters away);
- Border closures;
- Lockdown;
- Avoiding of crowds;
- Avoiding of handshakes;
- Wearing of face masks;
- The use of alcohol based sanitizers;

Although, these measures are seen to be effective and efficient, however, they contradict different norms, values and folklores established in the country. Therefore, many people feel nostalgia and lacklustre observing them. These made the national and sub-national government to enforce these measures through the State apparatus (Presidential Task Force-COVID-19, 2020a). The enforcement of this curfew has unfortunately been marked by deadly repression and other violations of human rights.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) defines Human rights as “rights which all human beings have by virtue of their humanity, such as the right to life, dignity of human person, personal liberty, fair hearing and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. They provide a common standard of behaviour among the international community”. Though the common narratives of the historical trajectory of Nigeria as country shows that human rights abuse dates back to the colonial era (Onwuazombe, 2017), shreds of evidence show mounting human rights abuses in the pre-contact African/Nigerian societies. An era in which the colonialists feel that it is the only way of making the citizens comply with rules and order. This has taken a toll of more deaths, denying or violating people's rights with little or no effort to obtain court order.

Accordingly, human rights, as noted by Moskowitz (1974) are not just a set of prescribed rule, but also forceful political, socio- economic, juridical, as well as ethical conduct, cultural and theoretical circumstances that characterise the inherent value of man in the society. Given this scenario, a report by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), notes the security forces have used "excessive or disproportionate" force resulting in "8 documented incidents of extra-judicial killing leading to 18 deaths" between 30 March and 13 April in Kaduna, Abia, Delta, Niger, Ebonyi and Katsina States (NHRC, 2020).

Nigerian security situation report has been that of brutalising citizens at will, maltreating civilians to extort money, and often beat, inflict injury, and torment activists, criminal suspects, detainees and convicted prisoners (Initiative for Equal Rights, 2019). For instance, the military, police at different times have let loose horror and chaos in the oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria which have led to arrests, imprisonment, torture of the residents and their leaders. The action of these security personnels had been in disagreement with the Constitution under its social objectives which provides that, "the State shall direct its policy towards ensuring that, there are adequate medical and health care facilities for all persons," (1999 federal constitution of Nigeria).

In this paper, attempt was made to investigate the level of challenges associated with famine, hunger and starvation which was caused by the outbreak of coronavirus and the perceived realities of humiliation, torture and other forms of human rights abuse on citizens by the state security agents towards enforcement of stay at home during the lockdown.

Deployment of State Security Agents and Violation of Human Rights

The concept of security tends to show decisive concerned efforts of government with responsibility of safeguarding lives, properties and welfare of its citizens against internal and external aggressions. This accounts for the establishment of armed forces, police, security agencies, and other para-military forces in different countries legal framework is meant to tackle security related challenges in those countries. The dynamics of crisis (farmer/herder), violent crimes (kidnapping and hostage taking) and insecurity challenges/problems associated with insurgence operations of Boko Haram group in Nigeria justified the need for state security apparatus.

Generally, security has a direct link to human beings (human security), implying that even at the national level (national security) which supposedly meant to protect the state from external aggression is invariably protecting the citizens. Although, much emphasis was placed on national security because human beings can hardly live outside the state. Recently, there has been a swift shift from national security to human security because of the premium attached to the later over the former. It has equally been observed that different states hardly witness threats from external influences due to technological advancement and establishment of nuclear weapons capable of handling it (Jolly & Ray, 2006; Debiel & Werthes, 2006).

The view of human security therefore, is channeled to human lives, human freedom and its fulfillment (UN Commission on Human Security, 2003). Accordingly, UNDP (1994) and Oche (2002) highlighted some fundamental elements of human security. Thus,

- It must be built from general concerns of individuals or groups in the society resulting from different security challenges peculiar to them;

- Issues that constitute human security are mutually dependent as challenges to this required a concerted effort;
- Challenges arising from human security can easily be identified using early control measures; and
- Human security is an overall architecture meant for people in the society.

More emphasis on the security of human lives was aptly captured by ul Haq in his work *"Reflections on Human Development"*. It states thus:

> …the world is entering a new era in which the very concept of security will change – and change dramatically. Security will be interpreted as: security of people, not just territory. Security of individuals, not just nations. Security through development, not through arms. Security of all the people everywhere – in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, in their environment" (Ul Haq, 1995, as cited in John, 2014, p. 1).

Little wonder, the report by UNDP on the foundational basis of human security recognised seven aspects that include:

- economic security;
- food security;
- health security;
- environmental security;
- personal security;
- communal security; and
- political security (UNDP, 1994, p. 25-33).

Of course, while the report notes that, denial of human security results from government non attendant to the above seven foundational basis of human security aspects will inadvertently lead to physical violence which in its conclusion noted that challenges emanating from this could be found in the formation of societies that incite conflict. Similarly, (Mahmud et al, 2008) note the need to understand that physical violence is not the only aspect of security challenges rather, formation of societies which in our understanding is more likely to instigate physical violence.

Given this perspectives, the role of every government or state is to protect its citizens from attack, crisis and violence. It is no wonder Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) hardly hesitates to deploy its state apparatus to areas where threat to human lives is foreseen. This strategy is not only employed by government to save the territorial boundaries of the state rather to save her citizens. Governments equally do extend her tentacles to other neighboring countries whose security apparatus may not be strong enough to face security threats within their country.

To be specific, it could be recalled that Nigeria armed forces with particular reference to military have shown dexterity since independence in terms of professionalism, discipline and successful operations. The army's performance in peace keeping operations in countries like

Congo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Liberia, among others, is quite commendable. However, the much respected security personnels which till now considered the best in West Africa and in peace keeping operations cannot guarantee the security of its people and the integrity of its territory (Nwangwu et al, 2016; Robert, 2012).

An increasing number of researches seek to understand the role of 'state security forces' deployed in an area to quell crisis, violence, insurgence and how it has degenerated to violation of human rights. The report by Center for Civilians in Conflict entitled "*when we can't see the enemy, civilians become the enemy*" show sufficient events/occasions where armed security agents who were deployed to solve problem of insurgence operations of Boko Haram group in the North East ended up becoming the problem.

The report noted among other things that, the structural and operational challenges of these security forces in Nigeria allow for violation of human rights of its citizens. To this effect, it highlighted these challenges as:

- unprofessionalism and unaccountability;
- unclear policies to protect citizens;
- difficulty in differentiating between citizens and militants;
- normalisation of violence;
- poor intelligence and information gathering;
- inadequate training and equipment;
- outright neglect to procedures and unlawful detention;
- corruption and mistrust of security forces;
- asymmetric warfare, growing vigilantism;
- external factors and State of emergency;
- poor civil and military relations;
- lack of complaint mechanism; and
- shortfall in the number of deployed troops.

This has not only affected Nigerian citizens but has a way of informing the masses that the country's security architecture is bad which would require concerted efforts of both the citizens and the government to tackle.

Reviewing deployment of state security forces by FGN in internal security control, it was observed that such was carried out with impunity, care-free attitude with little or no regard to citizens' rights. To be sure, in Nigeria, notable areas that deployment of security agents had led to human rights violations are Odi in Bayelsa State, Zaki-Biam in Benue State, Baga, in Borno State, Jos in Plateau State which took different forms of extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrest, torture, rape, etc. (*Human Rights Watch*, 2001; Audu, 2013; Idowu, 2014; Ibikunle, 2016).

In recounting the state of insecurity and human rights violations in Nigeria, Naankiel and Ayokhai (2016) note that it has deteriorated to the extent that Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is either a willing accomplice or, a helpless by-stander. Following this incidence, Ibrahim (2013) notes how this challenge is possible in Nigeria due largely from a colonial security apparatus that was instituted by colonialists to manage, control, extort from the people rather, than defend them.

Nigeria is not alone on this as many other African states that had contacts with the Europeans are having similar challenges regarding/relating to state security forces and non attendant to citizens protections. To be specific, the deployment of military and paramilitary forces by the Kenyatta government to quell the Shifta war from 1964 to 1967 was in a manner that killed about 4000 Somalis before the insurgency was controlled (Branch, 2014).

In another work entitled, *Killing a Mosquito with a Hammer: Al-Shabaab Violence and State Security Responses in Kenya*, written by Lind et al (2017), it shows human rights abuse by the armed state forces deployed by Kenyan government to control the Al-Shabaab violent attack. Human rights abuse observed among the Kenya security operatives set up to control the crisis include but not limited to police brutality, extortion, extra-judicial killing of suspects, torture, maiming, assassinations, killings and forced disappearances of activists, clerics, Muslims and traders (*Human Rights Watch*, 2016; *Open Society Foundations*, 2013). For instance, Human Rights Watch highlighted about 34 incidences of forceful disappearances of people from 2014 to 2016 in the State capital as well as north-eastern part of the country, declaring the participation of the Anti-Terrorism Policing Unit (ATPU) and Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in this action. What was adjudged to be the reasons necessitated these human rights abuse by the armed state security personnel are weak structure of the investigative ability, unaccountability, mistrust and tension between the Muslims and the security agencies deployed to the area. In this same vein, the state response to this incidence was intense, awful and severe leading to denial of unjustified excesses of these armed security agencies and more brutal killings to cover up these activities (Lind et al, 2017).

While we provided evidence of how the deployment of security forces has led to the violation of human rights in Nigeria and Kenya, it is instructive to note that such acts are obtainable in most African countries. For instance, the outbreak of coronavirus disease with its imminent spread made many African states to adopt non pharmaceutical measures like total lockdown to contain it. During the enforcement of lockdown protocols, it was observed that its security apparatus involved in human rights violations. Gukurume (2020) captured it well by stating, in African continent, the outright use of force and violence has also been reported in Uganda, Nigeria, Rwanda and Kenya, where the state security agents enforcing COVID-19 lockdown curfews have killed civilians. Similarly, Onyishi, et al (2020) note that, this was caused by unfriendly policies, together with obvious harassment and extortion from informal workers and seizure or destruction of products of small scale businesses accused of breaking the COVID-19 safety rule in Nigerian suburbs.

Material and Methods

The study was necessitated by the urgent need to underscore and address different challenges orchestrated by the Corona virus disease outbreak of 2019 (COVID-19) in Nigeria. The heuristic nature of this paper made the researchers to adopt a qualitative research technique both in collecting and analyzing data (Abanihe, 2002; Heyat, 2002). Given this perspective, the approach employed was phenomenological which made the research design to be cross-sectional in nature. Invariably, this means that they are meant to explain rather than describe the phenomenon. In-depth Interviews (IDIs) was used across the 18 individuals/respondents who in one way or the other had been participated (State Security Personnels) or subjected (vulnerable citizens) to any form of human rights abuse during the lockdown. Interviews were conducted with some perpetrators of the act, individual witnesses as well as some victims in an attempt to strike a balance by having a fair judgments and analysis on the problematic. Three different cases of non-probability sampling method were used for the study. The need for this sampling technique is to provide the researchers with the necessary data or information (Asika, 2010) that would be required in the study.

Results

Fear of viral spread of COVID-19 instigated stringent measures to contain it

Results revealed a number of challenges that could emanate from an outbreak of virus especially one which has not had a cure/vaccine. Most countries had faced these challenges squarely since COVID-19 pandemic which culminated into finding out measures that would assist in curtailing its widespread. Common measures adopted by these countries are: social/physical distancing, frequent washing of hands, physical distancing, avoidance of crowds, lockdown, bans on things like social gathering, inter-state travels, church activities, and closure of schools. Different governments saw these measures as restrictions required to contain the spread of the virus especially in Africa where poor healthcare system is common. Of all these measures adopted by different countries in the world, Nigerian government see lockdown (restriction of movements) as the most effective and efficient (Presidential Task Force-COVID-19, 2020b).

Some of the respondents had similar opinion with the government that, some level of restrictions on citizens is required towards curtailing the spread of the disease. According to them, this approach can be achieved by using State apparatus in checkmating the level of compliance on citizens. It is instructive to note that the outbreak of the COVID-19 and how it spreads across the world (NCDC, 2020b) raises concern that (WHO, 2020) advised all governments around the globe to stir up an action towards controlling its viral spread. For instance, the first reported case of the virus was in China, a part of Wuhan in late December, 2019 (Odigbo, Eze & Odigbo 2020) and by 03 September, 2020 it has spread to over 215 countries in the world with about 26,441,490 confirmed cases, and 872,164 death tolls recorded (Worldometer, 2020). Given the above incident, it became a matter of serious concern for countries to act in accordance with the World Health Organisation (WHO) directives for the following reasons:

- to minimise further spread of the virus in their country;
- because no country is safe under this threatening virus; and
- because it is a social responsibility of any government to prevent, manage endemic and epidemic diseases in their respective country (International Commission of Jurist, 1985).

The nature, type and how the novel virus spread made different national and sub-regional governments to adopt stringent measures. Of course, the measures introduced by these governments to curtail its spread are good but the attitude of the state security operatives deployed to implement it takes another toll. On one hand, some of these security personnel saw torture, beatings, as the only effective and efficient process of making citizens to stay at home. On the other hand, government at different levels within the period could not monitor excesses of these security personnel because of the fear that its spread could overwhelm their medical practitioners.

Therefore, the objective analysis of these had led to different forms of human rights abuse. Interviews show that governments hardly expose or allow citizens to understand the true nature of human rights abuse of these individuals. They tried to undercover a lot of it due to inherent challenges bedeviling the judicial system in Nigeria (Onwuazombe, 2017). For instance, different interviews carried out indicate/show that some of the security operatives always regard themselves as demy gods operating under the auspices of the national or sub-regional government. Sometimes, authoritarian regimes and government uses them to oppress their rival groups, opposition parties, activists and journalists. To be specific, in African continent, the outright use of force and violence has also been reported in Uganda, Nigeria, Rwanda and Kenya, where the state security agents enforcing COVID-19 lockdown curfews have killed civilians (Gukurume, 2020). While reviewing 2019 human rights violation report, we noticed that an average Nigerian citizen is subjected with the problem of meeting up with the political, economic and infrastructural conditions which has been rated as bad, awful, dreadful and corrupt in the world (Initiative for Equal Rights, 2019, p. 9).

Although, there is need to curtail the excesses of these security officials in our society but we should not ignore the general opinion of people that many of these security operatives are imbued with ill mannered attitudes like arrogance and pride. By virtue of their office/work, they are egoistic and enjoy governmental backings/protections. The tendency is to also explain the security agents' character in Nigeria as unprofessionalism, in which case the rule or ethics of the profession may not have been properly laid or inserted. To some other participants, whether a security officer understands the rule or ethics guiding its profession should never define his character in an issue. This is because understanding the rule is one thing and acting in line with the understood rule is another thing. Ordinarily, rule is meant to be a guide within which peace, order and decorum is maintained in the society. That is why situations where everybody in the society understands what is to be done, when and how it will be done, then, the problem is however, reduced.

There is an evident in the case of a cousin who was physically assaulted and tortured on his way to attend to a patient in his working place by the officers enforcing the lockdown rules. According to him, they (security agents) don't want to listen to any explanation. These happen despite the exemption of all essential workers in the country. To be sure, this incessant harassment of health workers made Nigerian Medical Association (NMA) in Lagos to embark on sit at home strike waiting for the time when the State government and the Commissioner of Police will operationalise the restriction of movement instructions as regards to the essential service providers in the State (Emorinken, 2020). As remarked by a respondent:

> Nigerian Government and its security forces as well as cronies are too focused on reducing the viral spread of COVID-19, but this narrow-minded view has led to serious violation of human rights of citizens and incidental civilian harm while the number of confirmed cases continued to rise.

Respondents maintain that they (governments and its security apparatus) pretend to the citizens and international community to the extent that many do not understand the true nature of human rights abuse by these security agents in the country. This pretense underscores the level of condemnation of human rights abuse by the international community. As argued by a respondent during an interview:

> ... while freedom is not meant to be absolute, people should be accorded the dignity of 'human person' as highlighted in the 1999 constitution of Nigeria under the human rights act. When this is properly considered, it would reduce the anguish terror being unleashed by the police and military officers who were deployed to enforce lockdown rules in the country. After all, if these citizens feel victimized by security forces, they are likely to obstruct their operations.

To this end, the systemic injustice, violence and discrimination in Nigeria questions the relevance of the 1999 constitution which should have stand aloof and provide citizens with the basic fundamental human rights. Having looked at the different human rights abuse encountered by the citizens during the lockdown, effort will be made to see the effects of these stringent measures on citizens.

Effects of these stringent measures on individual citizens across the country

In the Nigerian context, it has been noted that the sanctity and sacredness of human life have lost its meaning (Onwuazombe, 2017). Occasionally, violation of human rights enthrones conflicts in the society either between the citizens and the security agents or between and among security personnels and the law enforcement agents. These conflicts are sometimes led to violence and destruction of properties. For instance, it was noted that human rights abuse witnessed in Abia, and Anambra States within the period of lockdown led to mass protest which had resulted into burning down of police stations in those states.

This attitude of these security personnels have been in disagreement with the United Nations (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which in its Article 1 recognises the freedom, equality, dignity and rights of all human beings. Similarly, Article 5 of the convention seeks to protect and safeguard citizens against torture, cruelty, inhumanity, dehumanising treatments or punishments. Since there is no social security that can take care of the vulnerable in Nigeria, citizens tend to suffer more especially in hardship. The worries were that COVID-19 mitigation measures had led to further deprivation of minimal survival and life necessities needs. This deficiency might expand from deprivation due to insufficient income, to lack of income (Buheji, 2019).

Many Third World countries with particular emphasis on African continent will likely experience a long term consequences of hardship resulting from the outbreak of coronavirus (World Bank, 2020). In a country where people depend more on their day to day earnings/income, it will be difficult to enforce "sit-at-home" order especially with the government that does not have a way of cushioning the effect of the hunger through palliatives on her citizens. Acciari (2020) points out the difficulty for the poor in acquiring essential Personal Protection Products (PPP) such as gloves, masks and alcohol gel, let alone applying social distancing measures. Ahmed et al, (2020) highlights the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic since the poor are more prone to mortality due to their precarious conditions of subsistence. Olajide (2020) was able to situate these economic challenges in Nigeria where a greater number of individuals that live in the cities are not just poor but are housed in slum with poor living conditions and inadequate social amenities.

Although these schemes are not reaching every household, so in order to get their daily commodities they have to go out and face the beatings of the local police, as the police were instructed to follow strict rules during the lockdown. The effect of these has been that many citizens see the state and its repressive apparatus as an immediate and serious threat to their lives and livelihoods. A Nigeria police officer had this to say during an interview with the researchers:

> Nigeria as a country is neither prepared nor positioned to face this dreadful disease, therefore, the only best way to follow it is to introduce stringent measures capable of reducing its viral spread while certain effort is being made to find its vaccine across the world. For instance, the Nigeria Centre for Disease and Control (NCDC) have few quarantine centers and testing kits, implying that serious effort should be channeled towards exploring other measures to contain the virus. This has been the reason government deployed its security agents to assist in enforcing the lockdown order in the country.

Arguably, it is unnecessary to undermine the need to employ the state security agents especially when it involves threat to life of citizens. It has been noted in the literature that health is one of the social responsibilities of the government towards controlling a widespread pandemic in their country (International Commission of Jurist, 1985). This could account for why UNHRC allow that some degree of limitations should be attached to the human rights act especially during a national health challenges. While government efforts to curtail the rate of infections in a country are encouraged, it is necessary to note that it should not be done outside the operational guide of health related issues. If not, people might begin to doubt the sincerity of purpose between the intent and its outcome. To be specific, the first two weeks of implementation of lockdown rules in Nigeria, the security agents on duty killed 18 persons while 12 persons lost their lives to the dreadful virus (coronavirus) (*Human Rights Watch*, 2020; Khalid, 2020; Nigeriarights, 2020; Idris, 2020; Kola, 2020; BBC, 2020). This follows an argument by a participant during an interview by the researcher that Nigerian governments at different levels do not understand properly their social responsibilities:

> If the government understands her social responsibilities, works to ensure that her citizens are protected, and create a secure environment, the cycle of any dreadful virus can be broken. In the process, the government will gain the trust and support of these citizens.

Consequently, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) noted that any limitations on human rights arising from national health challenges or epidemic have to be carried out in a considerable manner (ICCPR, 1976) as to see that such disease could be nipped in the bud rather than instigating more problems. For example, the report presented by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) show that 11 persons were killed extra-judicial in Nigeria between April 13 and May 4 by security agencies enforcing the COVID-19 lockdown, as well as other non-state actors (NHRC, 2020). In their report, the commission noted that seven of the deaths were caused by the police, while the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), "Non-State Actors and the Abia State Task Force on COVID-19 were responsible for 1 death each" (Oluwole, 2020). Consequently, the report documented 11 incidents of extra-judicial killings in Nigeria; four of them were recorded in Abia State alone. "Delta State recorded 2 deaths, while Niger, Jigawa, Lagos, Anambra and Rivers States recorded 1 death each," (Oluwole, 2020). The commission equally noted that they received 104 complaints/incidents of human rights violations across the country within the period. 49 were received/documented within the first week of the extended lockdown period (i.e., 13-20 April); while 33 complaints were received in the second week (i.e., 20-27 April). During the third week (i.e., 27 April–4 May), 23 complaints/incidents were received/documented by the Commission (NHRC, 2020).

It is quite funny that state security operatives could act in a manner that does not really show their professionalism. In Nigeria, despite the abundance of human and natural resources, many citizens still live below poverty line. The standard of living of an average individual in Nigeria is still very low. Therefore, it is not the outbreak of COVID-19 that brought the suffering of these citizens rather it exacerbates it. An issue relating to killing and maiming of citizens in Nigeria by the security operatives is imminent. Although, some of these may be through accidental discharge but it has a way of informing people of unprofessionalism among some security personnel.

S/N	Date of Incidence	Location	Case type
1.	27/03/2020	Rivers State	The Director of State owned newspaper corporation (Mr. Vincent Ake) was sacked because one newspaper in the corporation reported about the first COVID -19 case in the State.
2.	03/04/2020	Adamawa State	The arbitrary use of firearms by the police officers at Damilu Mosque to disperse worshippers injured 20 persons.
3.	05/04/2020	Akwa Ibom State	A police sergeant (Edidiong Alexander) assaulted a medical practitioner (Dr. Daniel Edet) who works with University of Uyo Teaching Hospital on his way to work on that fateful Friday 3/4/2020.
4.	11/04/2020	Lagos State	A police officer (Mr. Taloju Martins) was caught on camera extorting the sum of forty thousand naira (N40,000) from a motorist in the State.
5.	14/04/2020	Anambra State	The killing of two persons in Nkpor by poli ce officers while enforcing the lockdown order in the State.
6.	15/04/2020	Abia State	The death of a commercial driver (Mr. Amobi Igwe) for refusing to bribe an NSCDC officer on duty.
7.	15/04/2020	Rivers State	A tricycle (Keke) driver lost his life arou nd Estate police station in the State.
8.	16/04/2020	Abia State	The killing of Mr. Ifeanyi Arunsi by drunken police officers who were not on duty on COVID-19 preventive assignment.
9.	17/04/2020	Delta State	The extortion of about one hundred and twenty thousand naira (N120,000) from Mrs Nwabuabo Obiajulu and her son for flouting the lockdown directives by the police officers.
10.	18/04/2020	Osun State	A woman was assaulted by two police officers while enforcing COVID-19 protocols in Iwo area of Osun State.
11.	23/04/2020	Rivers State	A female police officer was shot dead by a colleague who was attached to State Taskforce on decongestion and the destroying of goods, wares and properties of citizens in the state.
12.	10/05/2020	Niger Delta Region	Extortion of truck drivers at Mbiama, a border town that links the State to Bayelsa -Rivers-Abia States respectively the sum of fifty thousand naira (₦50,000) to eighty thousand naira (₦80,000).
13.	13/05/2020	Niger State	The extortion of passengers that did not have identification cards (ID) by the Nigeria Immigration Officers on duty in the Niger State.
14.	02/08/2020	Ogun State	Amidst the economic challenges in the country, Ogun State government imposed twenty five thousand naira (₦25, 000) COVID-19 test fee on her students across the State.

Compiled by the researchers.

Discussion

The state security agents who are the perpetrators of this act hardly see their action, inaction and reactions as a crime against those individual citizens, rather, an attempt to carry out an assigned instruction from the government. To them, that could be the only better way to enhance and achieve relatively low number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the country. But the unfortunate thing is that they (security operatives) hardly observe social distancing neither do they cover themselves with face mask during the operations. The worst of it all is that they employ all forms of violence in a disorderly manner as many of them act under the influence of alcohol. The actions of these security agents are at the pointed end to a debate over the stability between individual liberty and human rights on the one hand, and the call for protection of the society as a whole from coronavirus on the other hand.

Different forms of human rights abuse took more dimension as public restrictions caused by the COVID-19 disaster took grasp in the world. Violators of the COVID-19 lockdown protocols have suffered under the heavy-handed enforcement by the state security agents. Many assert enforcement efforts have been unreasonably aggressive, hostile and intended to intimidate, bully and oppress individuals rather than the acclaimed public health protection. Although, the lockdowns, curfews, and other crowd control measures are aimed at saving lives, but overzealous enforcement pattern has cost lives. The human rights report released after the lockdown found that the police accounted for 59.6 per cent of the total cases of violations; followed by non-state actors (i.e., mostly private individuals in sexual and gender-based violence-related cases) which accounted for 18.3 per cent of the total cases. It also pointed out that the various task forces on enforcement of COVID-19 regulations across the country accounted for 10.5 per cent of the cases; while the Nigeria Army and NSCDC accounted for 7.7 per cent and 1.9 per cent respectively (Oluwole, 2020).

Among the states noted in the report to have the highest number of incidents of human rights violations include: Lagos, Enugu, Imo, Akwa Ibom, Nasarawa, Delta, Abia, Abuja, Benue, Niger, Zamfara, and Rivers States. Nonetheless, maintaining law and order may be a Herculean task especially when it involves complex situations. Such situations could be scary for any law enforcement agents that it may require courage to articulate what is expected of him. Though, it has been noted in the literature that a well trained, professional and disciplined force understands what is needed to quell conflict or crisis without resorting to the use of force or threats to lives. In light of this perspective, it may be difficult for the police or security forces that are ill-equipped for such a task and more difficult for the armed forces, whose duty prepares them to deal with the enemies directly. Thus, they (army) are usually not trained for crowd-control (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2011).

The committee in charge of Human Rights implementation noted in Chapter 5, article 2(3)(a) that ICCPR requires the States to follow or adopt necessary steps to investigate carefully abuse of human rights on time through autonomous and neutral bodies (ICCPR, 2020). Arguably, many of the investigations carried out in relation to human rights violation by the state security forces on citizens will either yield no meaningful result or remain pending. Being aware of the implication of this act, no government would be willing to expose its security agents. That could account for why (Lind et al, 2017) note that state response concerning the incidence of human rights abuse by Kenya state security forces is intense, awful and severe which led to excesses in human rights violations as well as more killings to cover its activities. Sometimes, authoritarian regimes and government uses them to oppress their rival groups, opposition parties, activists and journalists.

Conclusion

Human rights violation has become a major problem facing different countries in the world. Some of these countries under report the rate of the human rights abuse found in their respective states. Consequent upon this, this study has attempted to analyse different human rights abuse experienced by the Nigerian citizens during the lockdown. However, some of these abuses, tortures, humiliation, anguish and suffering on these citizens are hardly known by the international community. This is because of the condemnation and sanction this could attract to the country involve. Such under reported cases of human rights abuse have exacerbated it that many security agents do see themselves as demy gods who could act beyond limits. While government efforts have been to see that none of the security personnels under them are subjected to this humiliation, citizens of the country hardly protest against these injustices due to fear of being maltreated.

Concurrently, there are corresponding agreements among the respondents that many security operatives in Nigeria are unprofessional, in which case the rule or ethics of the profession may not have been properly laid. The national and sub-national governments have not tried to rise above the board to see that some of them (security men) that required training are trained and some others who should be cautioned for breaching the human rights act are brought to book.

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COVID-19: THE PRIORITY BETWEEN PEOPLE'S HEALTH AND SAFETY AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATION IN NIGERIA

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Abstract
The emergence of a killer virus towards the end of the year 2019 in Wuhan China has claimed over 100, 000 lives worldwide and still counting. The virus known as Coronavirus or formally referred to as 2019 novel coronavirus or simply '2019-nCoV' is linked to the same family of viruses as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome or SARS that was first reported in China in 2002 and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome or MERS which was first reported in Saudi Arabia in 2012. The virus has spread to about 210 countries and territories across the globe. In Nigeria, the virus killed many people and adversely affects the economy.The aftermath of the emergence of the disease has left many countries counting their economic loses as many prominent cities and epicentres of businesses were forced to close down and the cities completely lockdown. The objective of this study is to identify where government placed more priority between the economy and people's health and safety in Nigeria's effort to contain the virus. The study used content analysis. Findings of the study revealed that government has taken some health and economic measures in the fight against the pandemic. The outbreak of the disease also caused oil price shocks in the international market which negatively affected the Nigeria's mono economy and substantial number of businesses will be adversely affected. Though the lockdown was meant to safeguard the health and safety of the people as most governments around the world have placed much emphasis on people's health, it was viewed by many as a financial burden on millions of Nigerians who depends on their daily earnings to survive. The study therefore recommends for proper compensation by government in addition to giving some palliative measures to put back some businesses after the pandemic. Nigeria should also look for the possibility of diversifying the economy so as to reduce over reliance on oil as a major source of income.

Keywords: COVID-19, People's health and safety, Economic consideration and Nigeria

Introduction
On 31 December, 2019, there was an outbreak of pneumonia cases from unknown virus in Wuhan, China. Based on the initial laboratory findings, the disease named coronavirus (COVID-19) was described as an infectious disease that is caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome. The virus has since spread to about 210 countries and territories across the globe. While there are ongoing efforts to contain the spread of coronavirus, latest statistics revealed that COVID-19 has infected over 3.7 million people and killed at least 263,000 people worldwide as

at early May, 2020 (Johns Hopkins University, 2020). United States of America (USA) is now the most affected country in the world with more than 73,000 deaths. Countries all over the world are struggling to curtail the spread of the deadly virus by testing and treating patients, carrying out contact tracing, limiting travel, cancelling large gathering such as sporting, events, schools and even religious activities. Many World's greatest cities are now deserted as people stay at home, either by choice or by government order. Shops, theatres, restaurants, and bars are closing. To add, on daily basis people are losing jobs and income, with uncertainty of when normalcy will return.

Richard (2020) reported that the world envisages a slowdown in the global economy to under two percent for this year (2020), and that will probably cost in the order of US$1 trillion, compared with what people were forecasting back in September. He, therefore, warned that few countries were likely to be left unscathed by the outbreak's financial ramifications. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that 25 million jobs could be lost. Developing countries could lose at least US$ 220 billion in income which translates into lost of jobs, closed factories, and stretched governments in some of the world's poorest and most vulnerable countries.

Similarly, the outbreak of the disease has resulted into crude oil price crisis as the demand of crude oil in the international market drastically reduced. Presently, the price of crude oil per barrel fluctuates between US$20 and US$29 (Ezebuike, 2020). This no doubt, affects the oil exporting countries like Nigeria that largely depends on crude oil as the major source of revenue and foreign earnings. In fact, even the national budget is benchmarked on the oil price assumptions which make the budget vulnerable to oil price shocks. Noting that Nigeria's 2020 budget was pegged on the presumption of oil selling at US$57 per barrel, this plunge drags the 2020 budget in to large deficit.

The above discussions indicate that COVID-19 has both health and economic implications. According to Alaje, (2020), the perspective to which COVID-19 should be viewed is beyond the death of a human, but also the death of the world economy (Nigeria inclusive), thus the fight against the virus is not just for the health agencies, but the economic agencies and policy makers. Honestly speaking, the reality of COVID-19 is beyond health implications, economic implications abound. In line with this view, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has also made a call to action to international community to think beyond the immediate impact of COVID-19. It emphasised the need for three priority actions:

- resources to help stop the spread of the virus;
- support to respond during the outbreak itself; and
- resources to prevent the economic collapse of the developing countries.

Thus, the objective of this paper is to determine the Nigerian government's priority between people's health and safety and economic considerations in Nigeria.

Concept Clarifications

Coronavirus (COVID-19)

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is defined as illness caused by a novel coronavirus now called severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2; formerly called 2019-nCoV), which was first identified amid an outbreak of respiratory illness cases in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China. It was initially reported to the World Health Organisation (WHO) on 31 December 2019. On 30 January 2020, the WHO declared the COVID-19 outbreak a global health emergency. On 11 March 2020, the WHO declared COVID-19 a global pandemic, its first such designation since declaring H1N1 influenza a pandemic in 2009.

Illness caused by SARS-CoV-2 was recently termed COVID-19 by the WHO, the new acronym derived from coronavirus disease 2019. The name was chosen to avoid stigmatising the virus's origins in terms of populations, geography, or animal associations.

The most common symptoms of coronavirus are fever, cough, shortness of breath, and breathing difficulties. In more severe cases infection can cause pneumonia, severe acute respiratory syndrome, and even death. The period within which the symptoms would appear is 2-14 days. Meanwhile, there is no specific treatment for disease caused by a novel coronavirus. However, many of the symptoms can be treated and therefore treatment based on the patient's clinical condition.

Nigeria's Response to COVID-19

President Muhammadu Buhari in March, 2020 signed the COVID-19 Regulations 2020 to declare COVID-19 as a "dangerous infectious disease." The president had signed the regulations "in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Quarantine Act (CAP Q2 LFN 2004), and all other powers enabling him in that behalf." The regulations, effective 30 March 2020, also gave legal backing to the various measures outlined in the President's National Broadcast on 29 March 2020, such as Restriction/Cessation of Movement in Lagos, Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, Ogun State and others toward containing the spread of the pandemic in the country." The Quarantine Act empowered the president to restrict movement when a "dangerous disease" breaks out.

According to lockdown rules, Nigerians can still perform online transactions and use ATMs during these restrictions, exemption is also granted to financial system and money markets to allow very skeletal operations in order to keep the system in light operations during the pendency of the regulations.

Nigerian President's First COVID-19 Address

On 29 March 2020, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari has given his first coronavirus address to the nation touching on a myriad of issues from containment efforts, social and economic intervention and the way forward. A major take away was the imposition of a lockdown on two impacted states, Lagos and Ogun and also in the Federal Capital territory, FCT. The president said "Based on the advice of the Federal Ministry of Health and the National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), "I am directing the cessation of all movements in Lagos and the FCT for an initial period of 14 days with effect from 11pm on Monday, 30th March 2020".

The restriction extends to Ogun State due to its close proximity to Lagos and the high traffic between the two States. All citizens in these areas were asked to stay in their homes. Travel to or from other states should be postponed. All businesses and offices within these locations should be fully closed during this period. The containment period is to be used to identify, trace and isolate all individuals that have come into contact with confirmed cases. We will ensure the treatment of confirmed cases while restricting further spread to other States. However, the order does not apply to hospitals and all related medical establishments as well as organisations in health care related manufacturing and distribution. The respective state governments also imposed varying degrees of restrictions on movement of persons and goods, including public gatherings and markets within their states (https://www.orientenergyreview.com).

Policy Responses by Federal Government of Nigeria

The effect of the various restrictions and lockdown on the businesses and economy at large prompted the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to introduce fiscal and economic stimulatory measures to ameliorate the impact on businesses and save the economy from collapse (KPMG, 2020).

The fiscal measures announced by the FGN and some of its relevant agencies like the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN); and proposals by the House of Representatives (HOR) in the Emergency Economic Stimulus Bill, 2020 (the "Bill") to help businesses cope include:

Moratorium by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN)

In paragraph 5(3) & (4) of the Regulation, the FGN directed the implementation of:

- a three-month repayment moratorium for all *TraderMoni*, *MarketMoni,* and *FarmerMoni* loans; and
- a similar moratorium for all FGN funded loans issued by the Bank of Industry, Bank of Agriculture and the Nigeria Export Import Bank.

The FGN also directed Nigeria's development financial institutions to engage international and multilateral development partners to negotiate concessions to ease the pains of borrowers under on-lending facilities using capital from the development partners.

Direct Food/Cash Distribution by FGN

In paragraph 5(1) of the Regulation, the FGN directed the implementation of direct food/cash distribution to 2.6 million households comprising the most vulnerable. This vulnerable group comprise those who are resident around the satellite and commuter towns and communities in Lagos and Abuja and earn daily wages for their sustenance, such as artisans and petty traders.

Economic Measures by the CBN

On its part, the CBN introduced the following incentives:

- extension of moratorium on all principal repayments of its intervention facilities for one year, effective from 1 March 2020 (for those whose contractual moratorium is still effective as of date, the additional one-year moratorium will take effect for them from the end of the contractual moratorium);
- reduction of interest rates on all CBN intervention facilities from 9% to 5% per annum for one-year effective 1 March 2020;
- creation of a ₦50 billion targeted credit scheme for households and small- and medium-sized enterprises that have been particularly hard hit, including but not limited to hoteliers, airline service providers, healthcare merchants, etc.;
- provision of N100 billion credit support for the healthcare industry particularly pharmaceutical companies, hospitals and health practitioners, that want to start new or expand existing drug manufacturing or healthcare facilities;
- regulatory forbearance in form of leave granted to Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) to consider temporary and time-bound restructuring of the tenor and loan terms for businesses and households adversely impacted;
- strengthening of the CBN Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR) policy by supporting industry funding levels to maintain DMBs' capacity to direct credit to individuals, households and businesses and by indicating readiness to consider additional incentives to encourage extension of longer tenured credit facilities; and
- provision of ₦1trillion in loans to boost local manufacturing and production across critical sectors.

Tax Measures by the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS)

The FIRS introduced the following measures:

- extension of timeline for filing of value added tax and withholding tax from the 21st day to the last working day of the month following the month of deduction;
- extension of the due date for filing of companies' income tax returns by one month ("revised due date of filing");
- filing of tax returns by taxpayers without audited financial statements (provided that the financial statements would be submitted within 2 months of the revised due date of filing);
- use of electronic platforms for payment of taxes and processing of tax clearance certificates;

- proposed creation of a portal where documents required for desk reviews and tax audits will be uploaded by taxpayers for online access by the tax authority; and
- facility for submission of tax returns online by taxpayers via efiling.firs.gov.ng or by designated e-mail accounts published by the FIRS.

Some state tax authorities have also introduced similar measures for tax payers in the states. In a public notice issued by the Federal Capital Territory Inland Revenue Authority (FCT-IRS), the deadline for the filing of personal income tax returns has been extended by 3 months from 31st of March to 30th of June 2020. The Lagos State Internal Revenue Service (LIRS) on the other hand announced the extension of the deadline for filing personal income tax returns by 2 months from 31st of March to 31st of May 2020.

Proposed measures by the House of Representatives

On 24 March 2020, the House of Representatives passed the Emergency Economic Stimulus Bill 2020 (the "Bill"). The Bill primarily seeks to:

- protect employees from loss of their jobs by granting income tax relief to the value of 50% income tax rebate on the total actual amount due or paid as pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) under the Personal Income Tax Act, 2004 (as amended) to companies, which maintain their payroll cost as of 1 March 2020 till 31 December 2020. A company will not be excluded from benefiting from this relief if there is a reduction in number of employees due to death arising from natural causes, voluntary disengagement, or disengagement by virtue of a breach of the Labour Act Cap L1 LFN 2004. Companies that are partly or wholly under the Petroleum Profit Tax (PPTA) Act are not eligible for this relief. However, the Bill is not explicit on the manner of implementing this incentive either by way of a refund of the PAYE tax paid to the State Inland Revenue Service (SIRS) or a corporate income tax refund by FIRS using PAYE as the basis for the computation. The basis for the exclusion of companies under the PPTA is also unclear as there is a threat to the job security of their staff as well given the fall in crude oil price;
- suspend import duties on medical equipment, medicines and personal protective gears required for the treatment and management of COVID-19 for 3 months ending in June 2020; and
- defer mortgage obligations on residential mortgages obtained by individual contributors to the National Housing Fund for 3 months in the first instance.

The law-making process in Nigeria requires the Bill to be passed by the Nigerian Senate and assented to by the Nigerian President before it will become law. The Bill is presently at the Senate.

It is expected that the government and its agencies will continue to monitor COVID-19 developments and introduce additional measures to sustain Nigerian businesses and citizens in these hard times. We expect more coordination amongst government ministries and agencies to ensure a holistic response to COVID-19 that will take into consideration the interest of stakeholders.

Responses by Various State Governments

State governments are taking action to stop the spread of the virus in most parts of the country. The actions taken notably include lockdown and encouragement of social distancing as well as restrictions of movement especially interstate travels. In some states, the action has aggravated the citizens over the continued lockdown which affects their businesses. In addition to all these, some states issued directives on civil servants to stay at home except for essential services. While some states relaxed the lockdown order from time to time, others completely lockdown the state for quite a long time. In Kano state for instance, the lockdown order was relaxed twice a week, while in Katsina state, the lockdown in some local governments was extended for almost four weeks without any respite.

State governments also extended the lockdown even to the religious places, banning gatherings for all forms of worships. Markets were also not sphered as almost all the markets were banned from any form of transactions. Some states went as far as quarantining the major areas where there is high concentration of people. Isolation centres were provided by the state governments where all suspected cases of COVID-19 are treated and taken care of.

In addition to the above measures, some state governments provided some palliative measures to their citizens to cushion the effect of the lockdown and restriction of movements. This was in addition to the measures taken by the federal government. All these was done to curb the spread of the virus. However, there were some lapses recorded in many states of the federation regarding the lockdown order. In many states, people are seen moving freely and gathering in places of worship and business premises without adhering to the social distancing order. This has greatly affected the measures taken and increases the risk of spreading the virus. In some states, the governors refused to even cooperate with the officials of the National Centre for Disease Control. In Kogi State for instance, the governor sent away the members of the NCDC from the state and refused to allow the people of the state to be tested. This was a threat to the success of the eradication of the virus in the country and increase the risk of more contacts.

The general observation with regards to the state government's responses was that, the people were cooperating but there are complaints of lack of assistance from the states with regards to the supply of relevant test materials in many states. More so some states provided very poor isolation centres which increase the risk of more disease.

Despite all the measures taken by the states and federal government in Nigeria, the virus is every day on the increase and more deaths are daily being recorded. The reason for such increase could be attributed to the lack of adherence to the guidelines issued by the NCDC and some people feel that the virus is just a scam.

Methodology

The study used documentary method in collecting the data for analysis. Content analysis was also used in an attempt to determine the Nigerian government's priority between people's health and safety and economic considerations in respect of COVID-19.

Discussions of Major Findings

The lockdown rules introduced by government in order to contain the spread of the COVID-19 in an attempt to save the life of Nigerians caused a lot of harm to both individual and national economy. Government offices, Banks, and other businesses were shutdown. The effect of the lockdown led to the following:

- introduction of moratorium on CBN intervention facilities; and
- introduction of import waivers for pharmaceutical companies.

In response to COVID-19, the federal government directed the implementation of direct food/cash distribution to 2.6 million households comprising the most vulnerable. This is done so as to reduce the effect of lockdown on the peoples' welfare. However, there have been a lot of complaints on whether the palliatives reached the target population.

The CBN revised downward the interest rates on all intervention facilities from 9% to 5% per annum for one year effective from 1st March, 2020. The CBN also has arranged a fiscal stimulus package including a 50-billion-naira credit facility to households and small and medium enterprises most affected by the pandemic, a N100 billion loan to the health sector and N1 trillion to the manufacturing sector.

The outbreak of the COVID-19 resulted in crude oil price shock which has direct effect on Nigeria's mono economy. As a result of that Nigeria reviewed national budget downward and cut the oil price benchmark from the initial US$57 per barrel to US$20 per barrel.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Based on the findings the study concludes that in fighting against the coronavirus, governments in Nigeria give more priority to people's health and safety than economic consideration. Government also introduced some palliative measures to cushion the effect of the pandemic though there was outcry in many quotas of the population on the process of the distribution of the palliatives. The lockdown orders in many states was implemented to show government's readiness to contain the spread of the virus but reports of serious violations were, however, reported in many states.

It is pertinent to note that, though the virus appears to be deadly, people in Nigeria are taking things for granted by viewing the orders of the state governments as derogatory. Religious leaders in many parts of the country have taken the action of government as a deliberate attempt to prevent them from performing their religious obligations. There were also reports of riots and protests in many parts of the country on the continuous lockdown by government and lack of any support. Some people affected by the pandemic also complained about lack of proper medical care in the isolation centres which sparked speculation of the actual readiness of the government to contain the virus and ensure the safety of its citizens.

In many parts of the country, many people depend for their livelihood on daily earning. In view of that, locking them down for a period of two weeks or more will expose them to a greater risk of hunger. Though the government announced a palliative measure to cushion the effect of the lockdown especially on those daily earners, such measures were virtually non-existent in majority of the areas said to have benefitted. For example, the continuous lockdown in Jos city of

Plateau state has led to a mass protest by the citizens calling on the government to ease the lockdown order and allow them to look for food. Some state governments like Kaduna and Kano have, based on the experiences of other states, device a way to ease down the lockdown order by giving free days where people can go out and re-stock their food store.

Based on the findings, the study made the following recommendations:

- The government health and economic agencies should work together in fighting against the coronavirus so as to address both health and economic challenges of the virus.
- Nigerian government should diversify her economy to alternative sectors like agriculture, solid and mineral resources. This will go a long way in reducing over reliance on oil.
- Government should provide more palliatives to the people in order to reduce the hardships caused by the coronavirus pandemic. The traditional and religious bodies should be involved in selecting the poorest households who are to be the beneficiaries.
- Government should be proactive in the fight against the virus and provide more testing centres in the country looking at the rate at which the disease is fast spreading.
- Government should also sanction erring defaulters of the lockdown order so as to be able to identify, trace and isolate those affected by the virus.
- There should be a synergy between the executive and legislative arm of government on policy actions towards the containment of the virus so that there would be no delay in ensuring health and safety of the people.
- State governments and NCDC should work together to ensure the continuous support of the containment process so as to avoid rift between the two agencies.

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FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE OF NIGERIAN OIL AND GAS SECTOR IN POST COVID-19 ERA

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Abstract
This study examines financial risk in relation to strategic performance of oil and gas companies (OGCs) in Nigeria. The essence is to investigate how OGCs can manage their financial risks to ensure effective and significant contribution to sustainable development of the nation in the aftermath of covid-19 pandemic. This is because Nigeria depends heavily on the oil and gas sector and the key players in the sector must be strong enough to support the economy of the country. Financial risk was represented by credit risk while performance of OGCs was represented by returns on asset (ROA). Secondary data was collected from audited financial statements of seven OGCs over a period of 19 years (2000-2018) and analyzed using multiple regression statistics. Results show that financial (credit) risk has a significant negative effect on ROA of OGCs in Nigeria. To reduce the effect of covid-19 and sustain performance, OGCs should know that their financial operations as it regards credit is antithetical to their performance and they should prioritize it and address it using established or proven financial risk management strategy like risk avoidance.

Keywords: Financial risk, strategic performance, return on asset, sustainable development, credit risk, Covid-19, oil and gas sector

Introduction

Following the occurrence of COVID-19 pandemic crisis are efforts by efforts by organisations in many economies towards strategic response to cushion the effect of this least envisaged ravaging event to sustain their economies. Economies driven by oil and gas like Nigeria is have renewed their interest risk management (RM) as one of the many strategic response to handled the disaster ushered in by this pandemic on the operations of businesses. According to Milan (2017), RM have top the strategic agenda for executives of many corporations in the years following the global financial crisis, and this is much to be so following COVID-19 as even the worst risk to world economy compared to the financial crisis. Consequently, Oils and Gas Executives have formalised and standardised policies and processes for managing different types of risks resulting from COVID-19 pandemic in order to sustain their enterprise economy in particular and national economy at large. One of the risks that has grown in intensity and gained inroads into Oil and Gas Industry (OGI) is financial risk.

Financial risk is associated with the method, an investors or a firm adopt in financing a project or its operations. It refers to the risk that a geared or levered company or investors (company or investors with debt in its capital structure) may not make sufficient profit after paying interest on debt to finance the priority demand of its creditors. It can also be refers to the variability of income to the equity capital due to debt capital (Ajao, 2009)**.** Financial risk is associated with different types of market risks affecting the activity of organisations (mainly exchange rate risk, interest rate risk and commodity risks) as well as credit risks, counter-party risk, and liquidity risks. Donwa, Mgbame and Okuonghae (2015) suggest that this risk domain also includes structural risks which are understood as the risks that are derived from a company's statement of financial position or balance sheet structure.

Dragon Oil (2018) states that financial risks that mainly face oil and gas firms includes prolonged or sharp decline in crude oil price; failure to replace, acquire and develop additional reserves; gas development projects in the country of operation and security of cash balances of the oil and gas firm. These categorisations fall within the ambience of credit risk. Therefore, in this paper, the researcher will focus on credit risk as a proxy for financial risk and are used interchangeably in this paper. Reason for the choice that it is less examined in the context of OGI and data were said to be readily available for the companies selected for study and for the period covered in the study.

Credit risk (CR) arises as a result of the risk of losses in on- and off-balance sheet positions arising from movements in market prices (Joel, 2009). Milan (2017) attributed surging interest in CR to economic turbulence such as the one brought by COVID-19. The author opined that many organisations are making significant investments to reinforce their CR management (CRM) capabilities and infrastructure. Evidently, inefficient CRM was the major cause of the financial crisis of 2008 as many businesses involved in superlative activities and high debt concentration (Njanike, 2009). CR is an income-generating activity if well managed. It is critically important to firm performance and success over time (Al-shakrchy, 2017). But at this point, whether CRM can lead to improved performance of firms of all sizes in OGI has not been well ascertained empirically.

Interestingly and most importantly too, other authors (Milan, 2017; Boger, 2005) have acknowledge that, little work has been done in this important area of CRM which is "data and analytics". This would include empirical analysis of the effect of CRM on performance of OG companies (OGCs) as literature is scarce. This is more so as literatures on CRM concentrates on banks (Lalon, 2015; Mwaurah, Muturi, & Waititu, 2017; Ogbulu, & Eze, 2016; Al-shakrchy, 2017; Harcourt, 2017; Iftikhar, 2016; Mutual, 2016; Kibui & Moronge, 2014; Awoke, 2014; Richard et al., 2008; Freeman, & Wright, 2006; Varotto, 2006).

As Awoke (2014) claimed CR to be a serious threat to the performance of Banks and that various researchers have examined the impact of credit risk on Banks in varying dimensions, This paper argues that CR can also be a serious threat to performance of OGCs and there is need for researchers to examined the impact of CR on performance OGCs. Therefore, the overall objective of this paper is to examine the effect of financial (or credit) risk on performance of OGCs in Nigeria. The remaining part of the paper is organised into literature review, methodology, results and finally concluding remarks.

Literature review

CR generally refers to a situation where a firm is exposed to loss if another party fails to perform its financial obligations or the company is unable to meet its debt obligations as at when due. From this stand point, CR is said to occur when the value of a firm's assets falls below its liabilities (Kannan, 2005). CRM is the act of managing CR to possibly reduce if not to forestall the occurrence of such loss. CRM means any step taken to either stop the occurrence of CR or to reduce the effect of CR. Technically, within OGCs, the concept of CRM refers to two things that can be classified in the broadest context under items "off the balance sheet" and items "on the balance sheet". The former constitute those items that cannot easily be quantified such as the underlying factors that cause default and impact on the credit-worthiness of all counterparties of a particular type, description or geographical location (IAIS, 2003); including the practice of extending credit to 'own or affiliated business' or credit granting without sufficient assessment of credit-worthiness (Bekhet & Eletter, 2014)

The arguments for the connection between credit risk and performance of OGCs in Nigeria is based on the predictions and explanations of the optimal capital structure theory (OCST). Explicitly, the OCST states that there exists an optimal, finite debt to equity ratio due to a trade-off between the expected value of bankruptcy costs and the tax savings associated with the deductibility of interest payments (Kim, 1976). Bankruptcy occurs when a firm is unable to meet its fixed obligations to its creditors. Bankruptcy costs can be direct or indirect. Direction costs are legal, accounting and trustee fees, possible denial of income tax carryovers and carry-backs. Indirect costs have to do with the opportunity costs from disrupted firm-supplier relationships that are associated with the transfer of ownership or control (Barker, 1976). Warner (1977) and Weiss (1990) gave evidence of financial distress and state the importance of bankruptcy costs to a business.

There have been phantom of empirical researches on credit risk management in many industries, especially the financial sector institutions. Kargi (2011) studied the effect of CR on the profitability of Nigerian Banks using financial ratios as measures of bank performance and credit risk from the annual reports and accounts of sampled banks from 2004-2008 and analysed the data using descriptive, correlation and regression techniques. The author found that CRM significantly reduced the profitability of banks by the levels of loans and advances, non-performing loans and deposits thereby exposing them to great risk of illiquidity and distress. Epure and Lafuente (2012) investigated bank performance in the presence of risk for Costa-Rican banking industry during 1998-2007. The results showed that performance improvements were caused by regulatory changes and that risk explains differences in banks.

However, most of the past studies mentioned above largely focused on banking sector and, on average, credit risk and performance of banks are inversely related. This means that more credit risk led to more losses in bank performance. Apart from the fact that these studies were carried out in banks, and that the measures of credit risk (non-performing loans, the amount of credit, etc) are different in the context of OGCs, past studies in oil and gas sector is rare, hence the need for an investigation with the hypothesis that: "there is no significant relationship between credit risk and the performance of oil and gas companies in Nigeria."

Methodology

The research design adopted for this study was ex-post facto research design. This design implies that data for the study is already in existence and connote secondary or desk research approach. Data were drawn from audited annual report of seven OGCs in Nigeria whose data were available for the period of the study (2000 – 2018). These companies are Oando Plc, Total Upstream Nigeria, Chevron Nigeria, Eni Oil, Exxon, Forte Oil Plc, Mobil Oil Nigeria Plc. The study adopted a multiple linear regression models estimated using ordinary least square regression technique which examined the relationship between credit risk management and performance of oil and gas companies in Nigeria:

ROA = f (CRR, SIZ, LEV)..…………..……………….…..(3.1)

ROA = $\alpha_0 + \alpha_1$CRR + α_2SIZt + α_3LEV +?i ……………..(3.2)

Where: α_0 = Autonomous constant or intercept of the explained variable; α_1- α_6 = Coefficient or gradient of each of the explanatory or independent variables; $?_i$ = Error term or residuals.

Results and Discussions

The result of the relationship between credit risk and return on asset of OGCs in Nigeria as presented in Table 4.1 is returned by random effect model (REM). To solve the autocorrelation problem, a REM corrected was estimated as the final regression model upon which the interpretation is based. The REM (Robust) implies that differences between OGCs do not influence the relationship between the variables considered in the model.

Table 4.1: CRR and ROA Regression Results of OGCs in Nigeria

```
. xtreg roa lncrr siz lev, re

Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       130
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =         7

R-sq:  within  = 0.2624                         Obs per group: min =        16
       between = 0.2303                                        avg =      18.6
       overall = 0.2203                                        max =        19

                                                Wald chi2(3)       =     42.18
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
         roa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       lncrr |  -.0120672     .00237    -5.09   0.000    -.0167124   -.0074221
         siz |   -.031167   .0083513    -3.73   0.000    -.0475352   -.0147988
         lev |   .0011626    .002876     0.40   0.686    -.0044743    .0067995
       _cons |   .2925005   .0590089     4.96   0.000     .1768452    .4081558
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |   .0356398
     sigma_e |  .04234985
         rho |  .41459451   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. xttest3
last estimates not xtreg, fe
r(301);

. xtserial roa lncrr siz lev

Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
```

```
H0: no first order autocorrelation
    F(  1,       6) =     20.523
           Prob > F =      0.0040

. xtpcse roa lncrr siz lev, correlation (ar1)

Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)

Group variable:   code                       Number of obs      =       130
Time variable:    year                       Number of groups   =         7
Panels:           correlated (unbalanced)    Obs per group: min =        16
Autocorrelation:  common AR(1)                              avg =  18.57143
Sigma computed by casewise selection                        max =        19
Estimated covariances      =        28       R-squared          =    0.1878
Estimated autocorrelations =         1       Wald chi2(3)       =     22.32
Estimated coefficients     =         4       Prob > chi2        =    0.0001
```

roa	Panel-corrected Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
lncrr	-.0055242	.0030708	-1.80	0.072	-.0115429	.0004945
siz	-.0348646	.0074948	-4.65	0.000	-.0495541	-.0201751
lev	.0011191	.0027372	0.41	0.683	-.0042458	.0064839
_cons	.3031062	.0536416	5.65	0.000	.1979707	.4082418
rho	.7087873					

```
. outreg2 using ib2.doc
ib2.doc
dir : seeout
```

***Source**:* Stata output of the regression result computed by the Researcher

The result presented above shows an average of about N30.3 billion return on asset of OGCs in Nigeria if all the explanatory variables in the model are held constant. This indicates that at zero level of credit risk consideration, size and leverage, the performance of OGCs in terms of ROA will appreciate by an average of more than N30 billion. Furthermore, the coefficient of -0.00552 for credit risk relates to ROA negatively and significantly at 10% level.

This means that credit risk has a significant negative effect on ROA of OGCs in Nigeria. Thus, the corresponding hypothesis (H_{O3}) that "there there is no significant relationship between credit risk and the performance of oil and gas companies in Nigeria is rejected. Practically, this may be interpreted that a unit increase in credit risk will lower ROA of OGCs in Nigeria by about ₦0.00552 billion.

From the model, differences in firms have no marked influence on the relationship between credit risk and ROA. Therefore, the negative coefficient (-0.0349) for size, though statistically significant at 1% level, has a negligible influence on the relationship. Interestingly, the insignificant coefficient (0.00112) for leverage has confirmed the non relevance of this firm-specific difference in explaining the relationship between credit risk and ROA of OGCs in Nigeria. The negative relationship found between credit risk and ROA is consistent with past studies by Annamalah, Raman, Marthandan and Logeswaan (2018), Kishk and Ukaga, (2008), and Hammoudeh and Li, (2004). Thus, it may be instructive that in anticipating improved ROA, OGCs in Nigeria could exercise care in the management of their account receivable and revenue generated on daily basis to track down possible avenues of leakage from the income flow into the covers of the companies. Being so, their performance could be strategic and could ultimately lead to sustainable development by returning huge revenue to the government for use in developmental projects.

The explanatory power (R^2, 0.188) of the model means that with the controlled variables, credit risk explains only 18.8% variations in ROA while the remaining 81.2% variations are explained by other variables not included in the model. The F-test statistics value of 22.32 is statistically significant at 1% level and this indicates that the model is good and correctly specified. At this level, it could be explained that, with RE model, the behaviour of OGCs in terms of account receivables in relation to revenues made every year are generally the same regardless of whether such firms is large or small, highly or less levered.

Conclusion, Implications and Recommendations

In this paper, the authors have discussed financial risk effect on strategic performance of Nigerian oil and gas sector in post CVOID-19 era. The paper tries to draw the attentions of stakeholders and policy makers to the role of risk management n enhancing sustainable development in the aftermath of COVID-19 pandemic. It has discussed the concept of financial risk management focusing on credit risk and the performance of OGCs in terms of returns on assets.

From the analysis performed, it is concluded that financial (credit) risks has a negative effect on performance of OGCs in Nigeria. This implies that, if not given due consideration in the scheme of things to drive the economy forward in the post-COVID-19 – the worst ever global pandemic era in recent history, financial (credit) risk could weakens any such developmental strides by marring the role of the oil and gas sector which play host to the development and sustenance of the Nigerian economy.

From the above, it is safer to assert that, in planning post-COVID-19 economic renascence and sustainability, issues that concerns oil and gas sector development, should consider how best to tackle financial (credit) risk which has affected the companies in this sector negatively. One of the ways which has been proven effective at handling credit risk is risk avoidance. Such strategy could make the difference between the success or failure of the sector and the economy at large in this "next normal."

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COVID-19 LOCKDOWN: MOVING NIGERIA'S SMES FROM REACTIVE HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY TO PROACTIVE STRATEGY

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Abstract
This study investigated reactive strategy to Human Capital Development (HCD), as COVID-19 Lockdown generated waves in Nigeria. Regardless of the massive availability of literate Nigerians, especially gainfully employed ones. Availability of a pool of employees with laudable mastery of virtual platforms in execution of daily tasks, has remained elusive. There has been no study on COVID-19 and HCD reactive strategies or proactive strategies; that was a gap.This study seeks to plug the identified gap. Qualitative approach was used for the study, data were harnessed from secondary sources. Findings of the study showed that COVID-19 lockdown forced Nigerian organizations to embrace execution of daily tasks through virtual interface. Also discovered was that, practically all SMEs in Nigeria were taken unaware by COVID-19 Lockdown. At the wake of COVID-19 lockdown, organizations' emergency development of staff members to handle and executes tasks online occurred as reactive strategy. The findings of this study filled the gap of paucity of literature on the subject matter, and constituted a piece of literature to be digested and cited by future researchers. The study concludes that Human Capital Development strategy at the wake of COVID-19 lockdown in Nigeria is a reactive strategy. The researcher recommends that SMEs in Nigeria should move from reactive Human Capital Development strategy to proactive Human Capital Development strategy. Proactive Human Capital Development strategy would serve as a succor whenever external environment poses threats, as witnessed in COVID-19 lockdown.
Keywords: COVID-19; SMEs; Human Capital Development; ReactiveStrategy; Proactive Strategy

Introduction
Worries have been expressed about human capital development, Ewing et al (2012) express concern on a range of issues relating to human capital in Africa,which include low digital literacy;low technological knowledge; and poor ability in operations of virtual platforms. UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2018) ranks Nigeria among countries whose income could not be optimised, because digital competency of human capital remains elusive. World Bank Group (2019) identifies Nigeria as having issues such as digital illiteracy; difficulties in internet connectivity; poor electricity supply; debilitating broadband infrastructure; rural areas seclusion, gender and economic digital gap, poverty and economic inequalities.

Ndubuisi (2019) affirms World Bank Group's call on Nigeria for reforms; Ndubuisi, was agitated on his discovery that Nigerian businesses only utilise 4% of internet capacity as reported by World Bank Group. More so, Nigeria SMEs were noted as lacking digitally inclined workforce. Out of 139 nations ranked, Nigeria was occupying 121 position in the report of Global Competitiveness Assessment. Similarly, Chimezie (2020) worries that, in most recent Network Readiness Index (NRI) report from World Economic Forum, out of 121 nations evaluated worldwide in 2019, Nigeria ranked 111. Other African countries that left Nigeria behind include South Africa, ranked 72; Rwanda, ranked 89; Kenya, ranked 93; and Ghana, ranked 95. NRI configuration measures impact of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) onadvancement of nations, the cited author identifies NRI as leading universal index for use of technology for improved technology, growth and competitiveness.

In the light of the foregoing, while existing authors agree that there were issues in the area of human capital development and survival of organisations in Nigeria. Extant submissions do not consider roles of reactive human capital development and proactive human capital development strategies for SMEs navigation through threats, as COVID-19 pandemic affect economy of Nigeria. This was identified as a gap. Intention to plug this gap, triggers researcher to carry out this study titled “COVID-19 lockdown: moving Nigeria's SMEs from reactive human capital development strategy to proactive strategy”. Objective of the study is to offer illumination and add to existing body of conceptual knowledge on COVID-19 pandemic, Nigerian SMEs, Human Capital Development, Reactive Human Capital Development Strategy,and Proactive Human Capital Development Strategy.

Literature Review

COVID-19

Farfán-Cano (2019) argues, COVID-19 is an acronym, which is being employed to represent coronavirus which was discovered in 2019, the acknowledged writer, contends further, coronavirus was traced to a term SARS-CoV-2, discovered in the respiratory specimen taken from patients in a location in China called Wuhan. The named author, holds the view that COVID-19 spread from China to Ecuador, then physician began to pay close attention to pathogen and its characteristics. Nadeem (2020) refers to COVID-19, as an elusive adversary being confronted by human race. The quoted researcher agrees with earlier studies that suggest Wuhan in China as the place of origin of coronavirus. The mentioned writer was disturbed with speed at which the epidemic was circulating across borders. Said author, encourages researchers to keep coming up with new studies on COVID-19 pandemic, until a lasting solution is obtained.

Ozili (2020) agrees with other authors that COVID-19 could be traced to China in Wuhan, Hubei Province. The acknowledged author, equally concurs with studies which state, coronavirus was initially termed “SARS-CoV-2” but later renamed coronavirus disease 2019, currently being abbreviated as COVID-19. However, cited researcher adds, a live animal and large seafood market was the precise venue where novel case was recorded. The forgoing indicates, mode of coronavirus transmission may have been from animals consumed by human being in the said market, China's index case in Wuhan was witnessed on 1 December, 2019. The mentioned author, presents global statistics on COVID-19 as at 31 March, 2020 thus: US

180,723 confirmed cases and 3,578 deaths; Italy 105,792 confirmed cases and 12,428 deaths; China 81,518 confirmed cases and 3,305 deaths; Iran 44,605 confirmed cases and 2,898 deaths; Spain 94,417 confirmed cases and 8,269 deaths; Germany 68,180 confirmed cases and 682 deaths; UK 25,150 confirmed cases and 1,789; Egypt 710 confirmed cases and 46 deaths; Nigeria 135 confirmed cases and 2 deaths; Ghana 161 confirmed cases and 5 deaths; South Africa 1,135 confirmed cases and 3 deaths; Zimbabwe 8 confirmed cases and 1death. The said author, believes, there were several unconfirmed cases.

According to Shereen, Khan, Kazmi, Bashir, and Siddique (2020), COVID-19 is a much dreaded viral communicable infection. Submissions of Shereen et al. (2020), correspond with those from other researcher. However, said authors, suggest, therapeutic combinations and vaccines need to be developed if COVID-19 must be mitigated. COVID-19 is the acronym assigned to coronavirus disease discovered in year 2019 by World Health Organisation (WHO). The disease that metamorphosed to coronavirus was initially observed in China (Ebenso & Otu, 2020). According to Anjorin (2020), World Health Organisation delayed proclamation of the said coronavirus disease as pandemic, but, when coronavirus has spread to a total of one hundred and fourteen countries and still counting, then, World Health Organisation declared COVID-19 as pandemic. Ebenso and Otu (2020) categorises COVID-19 as transmissible through human respiratory drops, sneezing, aerosols, and coughing. Furthermore, Anjorin (2020) confirms, an Italian who flew into Lagos in February, 2020, was the carrier of COVID-19 to Nigeria. Hence, first case of COVID-19 in Nigeria was documented in Lagos, on 27th of February, 2020. Thereafter, government has been implementing phases of lockdown in Nigeria, in an attempt to limit the spread of COVID-19 in the country (Etukudoh et al, 2020).

Human Capital Development

Human capital development is one of the responsibilities of organisation to its employees (Obisi, 2011). Whereby, workers are made to attend skill acquisition programmes while the organisation bear the cost. Obisi, recognises two ways by which employees can be developed while working for an organisation. Acquisition of skills could come through on the job training or off the job. The author clarifies, skills gained through learning curve within organisation is referred to as on the job, but any skill acquisition which requires employee to vacate job in the organisation for period of time is referred to as off the job training. He was displeased with practice of managers diverting money meant for human capital development into other areas of need.

Adedeji (2013) maintains conviction that human capital development is dependent on laudable roles being played by higher institutions of education in Nigeria. The author argues further that education might trigger desirable economic acceleration only, if mass development of human capital become realisable through provision of access to all and sundry that possess entry qualification. More so, content of education programme ought to be in tandem with labour market demand. Adedeji contends further, by underscoring the necessity of technology and innovation as the propeller of knowledge based economy, therefore, down-playing higher education was deemed as synonymous with abandoning interest in developing human capital.

Human capital development is the ability of employer to consciously eliminate factors that make work less challenging and less demanding to profiled staff (Salau et al, 2014). Authors posit that task significance, skill variety, autonomy and task identity do count, when it comes to human capital development. Audu and Gungul (2014) recognise human capital development **as** being instrumental to high productivity and overcoming socioeconomic challenges. Human capital development refers to in-service training and workforce development on execution of assigned responsibilities and tasks in organisation (Fejoh & Faniran, 2016). The authors argue, optimal job productivity will be elusive, except in-service training and employee development become priority. Furthermore, said authors, affirm human capital development as needful for boosting workers morale, and updating of workforce skill toward handling changes in technological environment.

Small and Medium Scale Enterprises

According to Nigeria's Vision 2020 Strategic Plan (2009), SMEs was defined as sector that serves as driving force for employment generation, income generation through export, poverty alleviation and income redistribution. The said Vision 2020 Strategic Plan, has eight specific objectives and diverse goals. Going by Nigeria Vision 2020 programme developed in year 2009, eight specific Nigerian government objectives and goals on SMEs ought to be attained by year 2020. More so, the main trust of Vision 2020 developed in 2009, is that Nigeria should rank among top 20 most industrialised nations by year 2020. Three of out of the eight objectives and goals are relevant for analysis in this study.

The Vision 2020 objectives in question were situated as number one, number three, and number five in the published Nigeria's Vision 2020. For instance, Vision 2020 objective number one seeks to develop SMEs that could drive national economic growth and development; while corresponding goal pursues increase in entrepreneurship and increase employment generation from SMEs in Nigeria to 60% by 2015 & 80% by 2020; to contribute 50% of GDP by 2015 and 75% by 2020. Objective number three seeks to grow and upsurge entrepreneurial skills and proficiencies of extant and possible entrepreneurs; while corresponding goal pursues enhancement in investment on human capital by 20% annually up to 2015 & 15% in 2020, and increase productivity at all micro, small and medium enterprise levels by 20%. Objective number five seeks improvement in technology for production of goods and services; while corresponding goal pursues intensification of skills and technical know-how on industrial production and management by 30% annual up-till 2020.

According to Abdullahi et al (2015), SMEs stand for private inventions that can be relied upon to play notable roles in economic growth and sustained development of Nigeria. SMEs function as main employer of labour and constitute roughly 95% of private enterprises, stated percentage indicates that expected contribution of SMEs to improvement of economy could not be ignored. Said authors, suggest, entrepreneurs piloting SMEs might overcome financial challenges by restategising. Ikon and Chukwu (2018) agree with earlier writers, SMEs signify accelerator of economic growth.

Mentioned authors, argue, inadequate workers training and infrastructural limitations in Nigeria affect proficient attainment of pre-determined goals and objectives of small and medium scale enterprises; consequently, industrial growth and development of Nigeria remain doubtful. Said authors, advocate additional government involvement on access to concessional funds to SMEs, so as to activate SMEs sustainable growth and as well lubricate Nigeria's pathway toward much desired industrial growth. According to Edet and Okon (2018), SMEs refer to indispensable constituent for provision of reliable foundation for nation's economic development.

Quoted authors, argue, SMEs in Nigeria require repositioning in order to facilitate desirable performance (ability to generate employment; offer needs satisfying affordable products to intermediate and end users). Poor policy implementation, poor location, multiple taxation, insufficient training, poor management practice, financial misappropriation, and information gap constitute challenges that weigh down operations of SMEs in Nigeria (Edet & Okon, 2018).

Cited authors, recommend, government policies for promoting SMEs should be implemented religiously; financial institutions support for SMEs should be mandated by government; consumption of home made goods and services should be promoted; Nigeria's industrial policy should be targeted at making SMEs instrumental for aspired growth and development of Nigeria's economy. According to Oyedokun and Micah (2019), SMEs are privately run organisations, but, expected to contribute to economic growth and development of Nigeria; hence, worry sets in when reverse becomes the reality.

Said writers contend, SMEs contributions to Nigerian economy in terms of output, sales turnover and upswing in gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate are insignificant. SMEs in Nigeria should increase their production capacity in order to have sizeable output; intensify staff development, implement market penetration strategies in order to witness increase in sales turnover and thereby re-write existing undesirable trend (Oyedokun & Micah, 2019)

Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2020) defines SMEs as private businesses recording turnovers that fall below ? 100 million in a year or businesses whose workforce is not up to 300 personnel. Cited author, notes "nearly 96% of Nigerian businesses are SMEs, juxtaposed with 65% in Europe and 53% in the United States of America." Named writer contends further, "Nigerian SMEs denote about 90% of industrial sector in terms of number of enterprises, Nigerian SMEs contribute roughly 1% of GDP compared to 40% in Asian countries and 50% in the US or Europe." Difficulties confronting SMEs in Nigeria range from enormous gaps in infrastructure, poor financial sustenance, high levels of untrained personnel, and weak investment commitment to transform experimental plants to profitable business (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2020).

Theoretical Framework

This study was anchored with human capital theory. The foundational idea of the theory may be traceable to Adam Smith. However, the theory was brought to limelight and became acceptable globally through an Economist called Gary Becker in the year 1964. The basic assumptions of human capital theory centered on boosting resources in workers which in return build competitive strength for organisation to secure good standing within a specific industry it operates. To buttress on preceding statement, to arrive at human capital, individuals must have received formal trainings and acquired skills in institutions of higher learning. On securing employment, such individual receive both on job and off job trainings to improve on and optimise fundamental skills acquired while in school. As a result of acquisition of essential and up to date skills, individuals become assets in their own right capable of facilitating realisation of pre-determined goals and objective in the most efficient way possible. Part of the assumption is that, the more highly developed the human capital, the more the associated reward.

If above assumptions ride on without opposition, it would have been a misnomer. Because, there has never been a theory without divergent views on it. Human capital theory has attracted confrontation from some authors. One of the attacks on human capital theory came from Fix (2018) whoopines that, human capital theory lacks evidence, untestable and unscientific in its approach. The theory also, received confrontation from Marginson (2017) who feels human capital theory should have been loaded with complex mathematical models, beyond comprehension of individuals, who are not quantitatively inclined. Obviously, quoted author, was disappointed, seeing persons without calculus background; digesting human capital theory without paying consultancy charges to analysts.

However, the submissions of oppositions were rendered insignificant by robust submissions projected by advocates of human capital theory. Proponents of human capital theory include Adedeji, and Campbell (2013) who align with assumptions of human capital theory by insisting that higher institutions of learning in Nigeria should trigger, nurture and foster enduring skills in learners. Similarly, Ongo et al (2014) argue that developing human capital leads to economic growth. Argument of named authors, was informed by the outcome of a panel data analysis carried out by them. Likewise, Mubarik et al (2017) contend that human capital development precedes break-through in small and medium manufacturing enterprises. Human capital theory is considered for anchoring this study because, on one hand, human capital constitute strength in the internal environment. Because, human capital is internal to SMEs, it is subject to control of organisation. On the other hand, human capital is flexible and could be deployed to downplay threat from external environment (in this case COVID-19 lockdown). More so, having identified human capital as strength, SMEs can deploy the strength to utilise opportunities from business external environment optimally.

Methodology

The study utilised qualitative research design. The data used were tracked from secondary sources. The currency of the literature and the secondary data used for the study were not compromised. Currency in this regard, simply means, the researcher is not making use of obsolete literature. One of the interpretations of currency in Webster dictionary is "the quality or state of being current." Specifically, the researcher is of the view that any literature whose date of publication is from 2008 and below might not be good enough for a study like this. In corroboration of the forgoing, Nigeria Vision 2020 was developed in year 2009, and the data therein are needed for comparative purposes up till year 2020.

Analysis

The analysis for this study takes the form of comparing performances with standard. To this end, the standard are contained in the published Vision 2020 Strategic Plan for SMEs in Nigeria. While performances are the evidences from studies conducted by extant researchers and international institutions, such as World Bank Group, IMF and the likes. Both the standard and performances were collected from publications reviewed for this study. Objectives number one, three and five of published Vision 2020 Strategic Plan for SMEs in Nigeria were adopted as the standard.

Though Vision 2020 objective number one seeks to develop SMEs that could drive national economic growth and development. Several authors such as Abdullahi et al (2015), Dabor and Oserogho (2017), Abehi (2017), Ikon and Chukwu (2018), Edet and Okon (2018), Oyedokun and Micah (2019), and Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2020), based on the evidences from their respective studies, assertively contend that economic growth and development had eluded Nigeria because amongst other things, human capital development in SMEs has suffered repeated neglect. Vision 2020 goals that correspond to objective, pursue surge in entrepreneurship and increase in employment generation from SMEs in Nigeria to 60% by 2015 and 80% by 2020; more so, to contribute 50% of GDP by 2015 and 75% by 2020. However, Abdullahi et al (2015) in the outcome of their investigation, argue that employment generation still ranks among issues in SMEs. According to Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2020), Nigerian SMEs contribute approximately 1% of GDP compared to 40% in Asian countries and 50% in the U.S. or Europe."

In as much as objective number three of Vision 2020, seeks to grow and secure appreciation in entrepreneurial skills on one hand, and on the other hand ensure proficiencies of extant and possible entrepreneurs, extant researchers (Abdullahi et al, 2015; Dabor & Oserogho, 2017; Abehi, 2017; Ikon & Chukwu, 2018; Edet & Okon, 2018; Oyedokun & Micah, 2019) due to discoveries from their isolated investigations, lament that entrepreneurial skills and competencies remain unpluggaps in SMEs.

Likewise, corresponding goals to the third objective of Vision 2020, whose purpose is enhancement of investment on human capital by 20% annually up to 2015 & 15% in 2020, and increase productivity at all micro, small and medium enterprise levels by 20% was knocked Ndubuisi (2019) who upholds World Bank Group's call on Nigeria for an holistic retouch on human capital; said author, lays it bare, Nigerian businesses merelyexploit 4% of internet capacity as reported by World Bank Group; furthermore, Nigeria SMEs were noticeable as deficientin raising digitally inclined personnel, out of 139 countries classified, Nigeria fell on 121 position in the report of Global Competitiveness Assessment.

Apparently, objective number five in the published Vision 2020 Strategic Plan for SMEs in Nigeria, seeks improvement in technology for production of goods and services. However, UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2018) ranks Nigeria along with countries whose technology and digital competencies of human capital are too evasive to elicit maximisation in production of goods and services. In addition, World Bank Group (2019) identifies Nigeria, as having issues such as digital illiteracy; difficulties in internet connectivity; poor electricity supply; debilitating broadband infrastructure; rural areas seclusion, gender and economic digital gap, poverty and economic inequalities. The goals corresponding to fifth objective of Vision 2020 Strategic Plan for SMEs in Nigeria, pursue intensification of skills and technical know-how on industrial production and management by 30% annual up-till 2020.

Nevertheless, available record proved that SMEs in Nigeria are not ready for the said skills and technical know-how,Chimezie (2020) exposes latest Network Readiness Index (NRI) report from World Economic Forum, in which out of 121 countries appraised worldwide in 2019, Nigeria ranked 111; while South Africa, Rwanda, Kenya,and Ghana were ranked 72; 89; 93; and 95, respectively. Gumel (2017) comments that alarming number of SMEs never survived in business beyond five years; and states that, most acidic challenges to SMEs come from external business environment factors. Dabor and Oserogho (2017) contend that SMEs in Nigeria have been dwarfed by epileptic power supply, unjustifiable double taxation, and blockage of access to fund.

Discussion of Findings

Vision 2020 Strategic Plan for SMEs in Nigeria was developed in year 2009. The difference in years between 2009 and 2020 is in excess of ten years. Therefore, at least ten years were available to implement the Strategic Plan. However, Abdullahi et al (2015), Dabor and Oserogho (2017), Abehi (2017), Ikon and Chukwu (2018), Edet and Okon (2018), Oyedokun and Micah (2019), and Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2020) in their separate studies raised concern over inadequate development of human capital which could constitute internal strength in the SMEs in Nigeria.

Similarly, Vision 2020 objective number one, which seeks to develop SMEs that could drive national economic growth and development, has failed the test of time, considering varied submissions of erudite scholars like Abdullahi et al (2015), Dabor and Oserogho (2017), Abehi (2017), Ikon and Chukwu (2018), Edet and Okon (2018), Oyedokun and Micah (2019), and Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2020) which respectively contend that economic growth and development remain elusive in Nigeria. Cited authors also affirm regrettable neglect of human capital development in in Nigeria's SMEs. Vision 2020 goals, matched with objective one of Vision 2020, which was to ensure rise in entrepreneurship and increase in employment generation from SMEs in Nigeria to 60% by 2015 and 80% by 2020; and contribute 50% of GDP by 2015 and 75% by 2020; have alike failed. Based on reports from isolated studies by Abdullahi et al (2015), acknowledged researchers argue, low employment generation continue to top the list of grievances against SMEs in Nigeria. More so, contribution of SMEs to GDP in Nigeria is nothing to write home about. Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2020) reports, Nigerian SMEs contribute approximately 1% of GDP compared to 40% in Asian countries and 50% in the US or Europe.

Likewise, this research discovers, third objective of Vision 2020 Strategic Plan has equally proved abortive, there has been neither desirable growth, appreciation in entrepreneurial skills nor development in proficiencies of extant and possible entrepreneurs, researchers like (Abubakar et al, 2015; Dabor & Oserogho, 2017; Abehi, 2017; Ikon & Chukwu, 2018; Edet & Okon, 2018; Oyedokun & Micah, 2019) have nailed the said third objective with their separate reports. The named writers, argue, there are unplug gaps as far as entrepreneurial skills and development for SMEs is concerned. Similarly, goals to which third objective of Vision 2020 is linked were not realised, investment on human capital never occurred as stated (20% annually up to 2015 & 15% in 2020), also there was no corresponding increase in productivity at all micro, small and medium enterprise levels by 20%. Ndubuisi (2019) agrees with World Bank Group, Nigerian SMEs merely exploit 4% of available internet capacity. Nigeria SMEs were confirmed as deficient in raising digitally inclined personnel, since out of 139 countries considered, Nigeria ranked 121 in the report of Global Competitiveness Assessment.

More so, the fifth objective of Vision 2020 Strategic Plan for SMEs in Nigeria, which targets improvement in technology for production of goods and services, has failed. UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2018) affirms Nigeria as being technologically and digitally incompetent. Similarly, World Bank Group (2019) categorises Nigeria workforce, as being digitally illiterate. World Bank Group argues, difficulties in internet connectivity; poor electricity supply; debilitating broadband infrastructure; rural areas seclusion, gender and economic digital gap, poverty and economic inequalities have continue to frustrate SMEs in Nigeria. The goals of ensuring increase of skills and technical know-how on industrial production and management by 30% annual up-till 2020, ends up as mere abstract. Chimezie (2020) exposes latest Network Readiness Index (NRI) report from World Economic Forum, in which out of 121 countries appraised worldwide in 2019, Nigeria ranked 111; while South Africa, Rwanda, Kenya, and Ghana were ranked 72; 89; 93; and 95 respectively. Foregoing constitute evidence that Nigerian SMEs are not set for realisation the written goals. Just as the foregoing are not within control of SMEs, similarly, COVID-19 lockdownis not subject to control of SMEs in Nigeria.

Furthermore, this study discerns, SMEs have failed to develop human capital before incidence of COVID-19 in Nigeria. According to Etuk et al (2014), SMEs could not play significant role in economic development; due to inadequate development of human capital. It is, therefore, established that during Pre-COVID-19 period in Nigeria, things were not at ease for small- and sedium-scale enterprises (SMEs), because of failure in the area of human capital development. More so, in as much as SMEs have problem with human capital development before COVID-19 incidence, it means, pool of strength in term of human capital was evasive in Nigeria SMEs prior to COVID-19. Before incidence of COVID-19 lockdown, Nigeria's SMEs were raising alarm over rising running costs. COVID-19 lockdown is here, SMEs have no strength (pool of human capital with digital and networking formidability) to avoid threats and exploit opportunities optimally from COVID-19 lockdown in Nigeria.

Conclusion

This study concludes that,COVID-19 lockdown is an external factor to SMEs in Nigeria. Businesses do not bear control on external environment, but on internal environment, so SMEs in Nigeria have no control over COVID-19 Pandemic. From findings discussed, SMEs in Nigeria have at least ten years history of neglecting human capital development. The trust of Vision 2020 Strategic Plan for Nigerian SMEs suggests that by year 2020, exceptional growth of SMEs in Nigerian would have ranked Nigeria among the first twenty most industrialised countries in the world. Apparently, Vision 2020 Strategic Plan for SMEs in Nigeria has failed. In the light of the forgoing, SMEs in Nigeria can only maintain reactive status, since internal strength in term of technological and digitally fortified workforce remain elusive. SMEs in Nigeria need to abandon reactive HCD strategy and go for proactive HCD strategy.

Recommendation

This study recommends that SMEs in Nigeria should move from reactive human capital development strategy to proactive human capital development strategy. Proactive human capital development strategy would serve as a succor whenever external environment poses threats, as witnessed in COVID-19 lockdown.

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THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON ECONOMIC AND PRODUCTION OF WOMEN IN KARU LGA OF NASARAWA STATE NIGERIA

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Abstract
The impact of COVID-19 pandemic across the global economy will be profound. The socio-economic impacts of COVID-19 on Markets and supply chain has disrupted businesses and has close or scale back operations, million have or will lose their jobs and livelihoods. Emerging evidence on the impact of COVID-19 suggests that women's economic and productive lives will be affected disproportionately and differently. Hence, the paper will examine the economic and productive dimension of the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on women in Karu local government area of Nasarawa state. Therefore, this study will employ survey research design which will make use of questionnaires to determine the opinion, perception and attitude of women by sampling 100 respondents out of the totalof 150 questionnaires distributed to selected women living in Karu LGA of Nasarawa state. Thus, it is assumed that COVID-19 pandemic will hurt women's economic and productive lives in Karu LGA of Nasarawa Nigeria. The state government might wish to see the need to support women economically by providing palliatives as well as balancing the prices of goods and services within the state.

Keywords: Covid-19, Pandemic, Economy, Productivity, Karu LGA

Introduction

The outbreak of the deadly Coronavirus has put the operational activity in several states to a stand-still. Several people have lost their job as industries remain out of operation for a significant period of time. The impact is heavier in the developing nations where the opportunity for development is low. Nigeria was among the first states in Africa that had identified the COVID-19 virus and the spread of the virus was quite rapid as well (Adepoju, 2020). The most important factor to be considered in this stage is the financial condition of the country. It has been speculated that about 4 out of 10 Nigerian people belong to below-the-poverty line and the outbreak of the virus will even further increase the number of people belonging to that group (Akwagyiram, 2020). Moreover, it had a negative impact on Nigerian women as well because they are primarily in the firing line of losing their job as businesses are looking to reduce their employee strength in order to maintain profitability. Economic productivity is low because people with low income does not have the financial superpower to buy house or take loans from the banks or invest on certain products. Therefore, money flow in the economy is low and it restricted the economic development and Government has less finance to invest outside as well. There are no specific government rules to restrict women from losing their job. There have been increased cases of domestic violence as the country experiences a rising unemployment rate among women. This research is going to understand the factors that have led to rising unemployment among women than men and its consequences in the domestic field.

Research Objective

- The main objective of this research is to identify the current condition of women and the problems that they are facing due to outbreak of COVID-19 virus.
- To provide suitable recommendation to improve condition of the state of the government regarding women employment.

Research Question

Do women facing domestic violence only due to present COVID-19 scenario or it occurs frequently?

Literature Review

Concept of COVID-19

The spread of the virus has a deep impact on women in Nigeria and it can be seen that it is more of a socio-economic problem rather than a health issue. An increase in sexual abuse cases is rising at a rapid rate and the psychological distress due to loss of work is clearly visible. There has been a total of 717 molestation cases that were reported from Nigeria (Barrons, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic is said to have a deep impact on the inequalities that persist in the operation process. Women who live close to the poverty line are the main sufferers in this case as they were the first ones who lost their job. So, there has been an increase in the responsibilities on women as they had to take care of the household as well as perform in the professional sphere (Science Wire, 2020). Children spend most of their time at home while older people need a lot of care in order to keep them protected from the virus. So, economic and social stress on women, in general, has been extremely high.

Concept of Economic Productivity

The pandemic had caused a lot of problems in the locality and it can be seen that women suffered a lot economically as well. Workers from South Sudan had to pause their business and, therefore, they were having problems to meet daily requirements (Bhalla, 2020). Women is losing more money compared to men as they experience a drop in their income level and loss of a job. It seems that women are the first ones to lose their job before men and it shows the gender discrimination in the workplace. Most women who are actually poor have the highest risk of transmitting the disease because 70% of the health-workers are women (WHO, 2019). They are coming in direct contact with the patients and thus they have an increased chance of getting contaminated with the disease. A disproportionate increase in women's unemployment can be seen all across the world in comparison with men. In developing continents like Asia and Africa women were financially the hardest hit due to the pandemic. 25% of the self-employed women had lost their job in comparison with 21% of men and it is expected that the trend will continue to rise further (Financial Express, 2020). Surveys suggest that 40% of the women working in private and other sectors had lost their job and it is important for the economy to look after them as they had an enormous amount of responsibilities on their shoulders (Deccan Herald, 2020).

Impact of COVID-19 on Karu LGA of Nasarawa State

The state of Karu LGA in Nasarawa State is even worse after the start of the pandemic. It is already one of the poorer states in Nigeria and the advent of Covid-19 had a deeply negative impact on the residents of Karu region (Abu, 2020). Although the government is working hard to protect the disease from spreading but it is affecting the daily life of the common people. It can be seen that the operational activity of most women is getting hampered as they are mainly based on handicraft manufacturing and selling it in urban regions. Now that they cannot travel to the urban regions, and most importantly because people are not willing to spend on handicrafts now, these people are suffering financially. The government will have to look after their financial prospect to make sure that they receive adequate support during this pandemic (Muhammad, 2020). Most single mothers are facing a really difficult time in dealing with the current scenario as they are finding it difficult to manage the household spending from their savings. Therefore, the Government needs to provide financial support to those people who are currently unemployed.

Method

The research had been conducted by gathering primary data from the questionnaire survey. The data is then stored in excel by taking values in the Likert Scale and then the quantitative analysis is to be conducted. A total of 150 considered for this research of which 100 chosen personnel are taken for this research. Descriptive Statistics and regression analysis had been conducted in this research to demonstrate the impact of the chosen variable and to draw a relationship between the financial position of the women and its impact on the mental health of the society. The research is taking an indicative approach where the results of the quantitative analysis are interpreted into its own terms and are related to the current position of the society. It can be seen that the operational activity of the organisation is thoroughly dependent on the financial status of the Government and the condition of the Government is also being analysed in this report which will demonstrate the state of the common people as well. The following regression equation is being followed which will help in the demonstration of the current condition of the state of Karu LGA of Nasarawa State.

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IMPLICATION OF DAILY PROJECTION OF COVID-19 NEW CASES ON WELLBEING AS AT 27TH FEBRUARY TO 28TH MAY, 2020: A SAMPLE OF EBONYI STATE ADULT POPULATION

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Abstract
The continuous projection of daily new cases and figures of infected persons was dramatically exerting potential problem on wellbeing of many adult population across the aforementioned state. The projection of daily spiking figures of infected person seems to be unhealthily managed, and has taken some individual to the deadly part of ill health. Researching on the implication of daily projection of COVID-19 pandemic cases will probe into the neglected parts that posed more threat to individual's wellbeing in collaboration with the pandemic itself. Fourty eight adult population systematically selected in the state metropolis participated in this study. Group of questions related to demographic characteristics and wellbeing were used to obtain participants' profile and their current state of optimal human functioning. Descriptive and ANOVA statistics were used for data analysis. The result revealed that the daily pronouncement of COVID-19 new cases lead to social phobia, lack of motivation and depression among adult population. It was concluded that continuous projection of spiking figures should be considered as necessary factor in psychosocial interventions so to enhance health management strategy.

Keywords: Daily projection, COVID-19 new cases, well-being, adult population.

Introduction

The gradual shock emanating from daily projection of spiking figures of infected person obviously becomes an albatross suspected to threaten individual's optimal health functioning. Wellbeing of a person may often be disrupted by stressful situation originated from within or outside ones' environment, which may include the need to adjust and adapt to social pressure, media projection of pandemic, and social problem. Well-being is a positive psychological construct, and it can seriously be minimised by negative coping strategies (Ukeh & Hassan, 2018). Personal wellbeing consists of positive emotions and absence of negative emotions such as depression, lack of motivation, lack of confidence and anxiety; and positive functioning (Oniyangi, Jamiu, Igben, Alaro, Babangida, & Danlami, 2019).

Coronavirus disease (COVID-19), a novel pandemic and a respiratory - borne virus which transmit from one person to another through a microscopic respiratory secretion seems to obviously exerts great threat to health management and well being (World Health Organisation, 2020). Its outbreak dramatically affected every aspect of human functioning.

Conversely, during the aforementioned period, health, lives, and social activities were in danger. Hence, the spiking figures as projected from Nigerian Center for Disease Control (NCDC) dashboard become a problem to personal adjustment and adaptation to the pandemic. Standing on below projected result of COVID-19 cases in tracking dashboard of Nigeria as at 28th May, 2020: Affected states - 36; Total sample tested = 48,544; Total cases = 8,733; Active cases = 5,978; Discharged cases = 2,501; Deaths = 254. Demographics - Male = 1145 (66%), Female = 583 (34%); most affected age group = 31-40 (23%). Travel history = 210 (12%), contacts = 444 (26%), (NCDC, 2020).

Coupled with the shut down that challenged activities in which one meet and spend time with other people, cultural protection, unpleasant economic shocks and unexpected political tensions, stopping developing project, and limiting the freedom of religion congregational meetings, (ICAP, May, 2020). It will not be surprised to say that, individual's wellbeing could be also at risk. This lead to one research question that prompted the need to embark on this study and was stated as:

What are the consequential health implications of daily projection of COVID-19 new cases on Wellbeing?

Using the viral modernity theory by Michael (2020) which based on the role of information and forms of bio-information in the social world. It explained how information on infectious disease can exert serious consequential effect on health and well being of the safe ones (Ogbonna, 2020). The manner and pattern through which these information are conveyed to people lack effective health management strategy. Thus, it's implication on well being seems to be far less curtailed than the novel pandemic. Just as Peters, Jandris, and McLaren, (2020) opined that, media professionals as information relay on social media are capable of inducing extreme fear and stigma related to a pandemic to the audience. This lead to one propelling research hypothesis stated as:

- There would be a statistical significant effect of daily projection of COVID-19 new cases on Wellbeing.

The Resent Study

The purpose of this study is to assess the implication of daily projection of COVID-19 cases on well being of adult population in Ebonyi State. While, the problem of the study is lack of health management strategy used in conveying information and its implication on optimal human functioning.

Method

Using descriptive survey design, the researchers sampled 48 adult (20 females, 28 males) population in Ebonyi State Metropolis. Their age ranges from 28 and 52 with the mean age of 40.00 years. Data was collected using group of questions related to the variables under investigation. The researcher assigned numerical values and their weightily point to different scaling item. The responses were collected and was analysed using frequency distribution mean (X). A mean of 2.5 was used as the decision rule.

Procedure

Due to the restriction on movement, and social distancing protocols, the study used social media such as email and whatsapp as convenient sources for questions distribution and data collection. Secondary source of data from television, radio, and news paper report, and updates from NCDC were also used to effectively gather relevant information.

Instrument

The questionnaire used include group of questions related to demographic characteristics, and consequential health problems likely to be observed by the participants. The sets of this questionnaire was administered through mails and whatsapp. Questions on the consequential health as observed were gathered and classified based on the alternative offered to the respondents (i.e., social phobia, lack of motivation, anxiety, depression, and lack of confidence).

Dependent Variable (DV)

The study considered the consequential state of health observed by the participants due to continuous projection of new cases (i.e., social phobia, lack of motivation, anxiety, depression, and lack of confidence) as the subject under study.

Independent variables (IV)

The study considered daily projection of COVID-19 new cases as the predictor variables of the consequential health as observed.

Data Analysis

The study adopted descriptive statistics, and Anova to determine the statistical strength and level of significance of IV on the DV, and also the influencing strength of IV on DV. The table below explained more of that.

Result

Table 1: Research question (1): What are the observable consequential health implication of daily projection of COVID-19 new cases on you?

S/N	ITEMS	SD (1)	D (2)	A (3)	SA (4)	TOTAL	X
1	Social Phobia	4	7	16	21	48	3.13
2	Lack of Motivation	4	6	19	19	48	3.10
3	Anxiety	5	10	10	23	48	3.06
4	Depression	12	24	12	0	48	2.0
5	Lack of Confidence	4	14	16	14	48	2.83

SD = (strongly disagree), D = (disagree), A = (agree), SA = (strongly agree). X = (mean score of all participants against each factor).

Table 1 shows that the mean score of people's responses on the consequential health implication of daily projection of COVID-19 new cases against each factor are (3.13), (3.10), (3.06), and (2.83) which is remarkably above 2.5, and is considered to represent populate opinion. Only one factor among others is below 2.5 and is considered unpopular. Thus, the research question provided answer to number 1, 2, 3, and 5 factors, indicating the implication of daily projection of COVID-19 new cases on Wellbeing with regard to those factors considered.

Table 2: Mean and standard deviation of Gender against each factors considered as observed consequential health implication of daily projection of COVID-19 new cases.

Variable		Mean	SD
Lack of Motiva:	Male	5.0000	1.41421
	Female	19.000	.00000
Social Phobia:	Male	5.5000	2.12132
	Female	18.5000	3.53553
Anxiety:	Male	7.5000	3.85141
	Female	16.5000	9.1923
Depression:	Male	18.000	3.00000
	Female	6.000	8.48528
Lack of confi:	Male	9.000	5.000
	Female	15.000	1.000

The table shows that the mean score of male participants (5.0000) is lower than that of female (19.000) on lack of motivation. It also shows that the mean score of male participants (5.5000) is lower than that of female (18.5000) on social phobia. Also, the mean score of male participants (7.5000) is lower than that of female (16.5000) on anxiety. However, on depression, it shows that the mean score of male participants (18.000) is higher than that of female (6.000). Thus, on lack of confidence, it shows that the mean score of male participants (9.000) is lower than that of female (15.000). ANOVA statistics was performed to determine if the observed differences among gender were significant (see Table 3)

Table 3: ANOVA summary showing the statistical strength and level of significance of IV on the DVs among gender.

Source of variance	Sum of square	df	Mean square	F	Sig
Social phobia	169.000	1	169.000	19.882	**
Lack of motivation	196.000	1	196.000	17.001	**
Anxiety	81.000	1	81.000	1.670	**
Depression	144.000	1	1.44.000	2.000	**
Lack of confidence	36.000	1	36.000	1.385	**

Key: ** = Significant, p<.05
ns = not significant

The results indicate that the five factors considered as the dependent variables had much significant effect among gender as a result of daily projection of new COVID-19 cases. Thus, the research hypothesis were confirmed.

Findings

The findings were quiet reveling, the responses in the questionnaire were used to test the research question. This is, in order to ensure valid and reliable data. Table 1 shows that the mean score of people's responses on the consequential health implication of daily projection of COVID-19 new cases against each factor are (3.13), (3.10), (3.06), and (2.83) which is remarkably above 2.5, and is considered to represent populate opinion. Only one factor among others is below 2.5 and is considered unpopular. However, in other to test the propelling hypothesis, anova statistic were adopted. Thus, the result confirmed the hypothesis which stated that: there would be a statistical significant effect of daily projection of COVID-19 new cases on wellbeing. The consequential factors of wellbeing (i.e., social phobia, lack of motivation, anxiety, depression, and lack of confidence) were significantly found to have much influence from the proposed independent variable.

This result were in line with the proposed theory of the viral modernity by Michael (2020) which based on the role of information and forms of bio-information in communicating to the social world. Moreover, it explained how the manner and pattern through which information on infectious disease can exert serious consequential effect on health and wellbeing of the safe ones. Hence, the result of this study confirmed it.

Discussion

The finding showed how COVID-19 pandemic predicted social phobia as a result of its threatening nature (3.13); lack of motivation due to induced lock down (3.10); Anxiety as a result of daily increment on cases (3.06); Lack of confidence due to disagreeableness of the self-concerning inadequate curtailing strategies by the government towards the pandemic (2.83). The anova statistic which were used to test the hypothesis also revealed the significant strength of daily projection of COVID-19 new cases on consequential factors of wellbeing (i.e., social phobia, lack of motivation, anxiety, depression, and lack of confidence).

Implication of the finding

The result of this study clearly revealed the implication of daily projection of COVID-19 new cases on well being of adult population in Ebonyi State. As can be observed from table 1, the mean responses clearly indicates the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on optimal human functioning. The result showed that the mean score of the respondents in number (1), (2), (3), and (5) against each factor were above (2.5). This indicated that those who reported negative health functioning due to daily projection of COVID-19 cases were considered as representing populate opinion.

It should, however, be noted that the success of any governmental strategies depend to a large extent on reports from its community. The results of this study proved the fact that the community are weighed down out of the daily increment of new cases as projected through NCDC report on media.

Limitation of the Study

The sample size used could not be said to have been truly representative of adult population of Ebonyi state who have consequential health problem as a result of daily projection COVID-19 new cases with regard to wellbeing. The study covered only one state indicating that generalisation should be made with caution. Thus, further studies should be made across state. An attempt by this research to discover the interactive differences among gender variable has been relatively unsuccessful. This could be as a result of unequal sample on that variable. In future investigation, studies should take into consideration the equitable size of gender and other socio-economic variables that could say much on the implication of daily projection of COVID-19 new cases on Wellbeing

Summary/Conclusion

COVID-19 pandemic through this research study has lead to: "Social phobia" as a result of its threatening nature; "lack of motivation" due to induced lock down; "Anxiety" as a result of daily increment on cases; "Lack of confidence" due to disagreeableness of the self concerning curtailing strategies. Majority of Ebonyi youth are now engaging in smoking behaviour, and standing on roadside both in day time and at night.

The community therefore looked unto the government on their effectiveness to proffer reliable remedies as concern to lack of effective health management strategy toward projection of daily spiking figures of infected person.

The researcher suggested that daily researching on curative vaccine for the virus should be of the most important instead of continuous projection of daily spiking figure.

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INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A POST-COVID-19 PROGNOSIS

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Abstract
This paper examines industrial relations and their key concepts, assesses some historical trends in industrial relations, and makes a prognosis on the embedded relationships between employers and employees in the post-Covid-19 dispensation. The problem of the study essentially borders on what happens to industrial relations, post-Covid-19 pandemic. Covid-19 universally stands for coronavirus disease of 2019. The study's design entails and examination of the key concepts of industrial relations and an assessment of the evolutionary trends in the associated employer-employee relations. These lead to the prognosis in which the paper forecasts the outcome of industrial relations in the post-covid-19 period. Because employer-employee matters are not plain theoretical issues, it became operationally basic to focus the work on a national economy. The Nigerian national economy was chosen purposively in these regards. The paper envisions some increasingly disorderly industrial relations in the post-covid-19 period, and recommends thoughtfulness and tolerance as attributes required of the employers and employees, under the emerging dispensation, pending national economic recoveries in many locations.

Keywords: Industrial Relations, Employer-Employee Relations, Covid-19 Pandemic, Post-Covid-19 Dispensation

Introduction
Industrial relations are usually predicated on the prospects of the existing economic and employment systems. Challenging economic and employment scenarios therefore beget the possibilities of daunting industrial relations. COVID-19 which universally stands for the coronavirus disease of 2019 is much more than a health crisis, and possesses the potential to create devastating political, social and economic scenarios that would leave deep scars on all national systems (UNDP, 2020). The pandemic exposed the fragility of world economies (Ryder, 2020). The post-COVID-19 industrial setting is accordingly forecasted to be full of operational difficulties. It is against the background of these concerns that this paper interrogates the topic of industrial relations, examining its key concepts, making historical assessments of its trajectories and a post-covid-19 prognosis of what becomes of industrial relations in the emerging

dispensation. Focusing on definite theoretical expositions and empirical tangibility, under purposive sampling methodology, the work makes a concentration on the Nigerian national economy.

The middle income West African country (Nigeria) indeed typifies a location where covid-19 dislocations are likely to be more pronounced, even as the entire emerging era presents a generic portrait of scary scenarios. Minister of Finance in Nigeria, Zainab Ahmed, acknowledged in May 2020 that the country was in very difficult and challenging times, facing very significant economic downturn, the type that has never been seen in the history of the nation (Sahara Reporters, 2020). The central research question of this contribution accordingly borders on what becomes of industrial relations in the emergent period. The rest of the paper is organised around the following principal themes and subthemes: The concept of industrial relations, trade unions: their governance and structure, central labour organisations and international affiliations, the international labour organisation (ILO), union solidarity and check-off systems, industrial conflicts, conflict resolution and collective bargaining, the post-COVID-19 prognosis, and a conclusion.

The concept of industrial relations

Industrial relations are about relationships between employers and employees. We can also say it is about relationships between employees and management, or between labour and management. At the center of this relationship are issues bordering on supervision, direction, planning, and coordination of organisational activities (Das, 2015). Employees are fundamentally, usually interested in their welfare and safety, while employers (management) are more or less usually interested in productivity and profitability. But how can productivity and profitability become guaranteed when the safety and welfare of employees are not assured? The manager and the managed must agree and work together. The employers and the employees would need to engage in compromises. These engagements and compromises are achieved within the premises of industrial relations.

However, before the Industrial Revolution, this relationship was easier, personal and direct. The Industrial Revolution refers to the transition to new manufacturing processes in Europe and the United States, which occurred from about 1760 to 1820 and 1840 (Kaufman, 2004). The pre-Industrial Revolution era was marked by a simple process of manufacturing, small scale investments, incidence of localised markets and limited number of employees. There was close proximity between the employers and employees, manager and the managed. There were personal and direct relationships between the employer and employee. This made it easier for the employers to secure the cooperation of employees. Grievances and misunderstandings on the part of either party were promptly resolved. Additionally, the state did not then interfere in the economic activities of the people (Das, 2015)

But the Industrial Revolution necessitated complexities. It witnessed the development of machine tools and commencement of the mechanised factory system. Size of businesses increased, and enormous financial and human resources were deployed in running the industrial organisations, and above all, there was the substitution of mechanical devices for human skills (Landes, 1969). People in organisations were then likened to machines. Subsequently, there emerged a new class of professional managers. Labour also became more sophisticated, knowledgeable in their rights and capable in bargaining powers. Ownership and management became separated. Relationship between ownership and management was no longer as amicable as it was in the pre-Industrial Revolution period. It now became an era of complex, impersonal and indirect industrial relations (Das, 2015).

Maintaining the requisite smooth relationship between owners and workers, labour and management was no longer an easy task. But Management and labour must continue to work together, for organisational growth and inclusive prosperity. The fine-tuning of the attendant processes continued within the ambit of industrial relations. Currently, therefore, people in organizations are no longer considered as parts of a machine. They are considered as a resource to the organisation, with the potentials to take the organisation to greater heights. It became realised that in the long run, the effectiveness of the organisation depended upon people, and managing these people properly was critical to the survival of the organisation. How management relates with her people, particularly the workers unions, and how employers relate with employees are, therefore, at the heart of industrial relations.

There are essentially, three main parties directly involved in industrial relations: employers, employees and government (as regulators and umpires). It has to be noted however, that governments also get engaged in industrial relations as employers, giving them a duality of roles in such instances. Therefore, according to Singh (1967) industrial relations is an integral aspect of social relations arising out of employer-employee interaction in modern industries, which are regulated by the state in varying degrees, in conjunction with organised social forces and influenced by prevailing institutions. It accordingly involves a study of the state and the legal systems, workers' and employers' organisations at the institutional level, and the patterns of industrial organisation (management, capital structure, technology), and the compensation of the labour force (Singh, 1967).

Kumar (1961) on his own part submits that industrial relations are broadly concerned with bargaining between employees and trade unions on wages and other terms of employment, adding that the day-to-day relations within a plant also constitute one of the important elements that impinge on the broader aspects of industrial relations. Essentially, the core subjects of the field of industrial relations as researched by most scholars are: trade unionism, collective bargaining, labour-management relations, and the national labour policy and labour laws within which these issues are embedded (Kaufman, 2008).

Trade Unions' Governance and Structure

We earlier identified employers, employees and government (as regulators and umpires) as the three main parties directly involved in industrial relations. Trade unions are employees' organisations. They are organisations of wage and salary earners formed for the purpose of maintaining and improving the employment conditions of their members (Fashoyin, 1992, p. 30).

Trade unions (also called labour unions) have also been described as organisations, consisting predominantly of employees, the principal activities of which include the negotiation of rates of pay and conditions of employment for its members (ABS, 2018). The issue of trade unions consisting predominantly of employees is underscored in this definition. In other words, there may be non-employee members of a trade union. One of the ways through which such a situation may arise is when some workers have been disengaged by the employers but they are still members of the union.

Webb & Webb (1920) is the locus classicus on the origin of trade unions. According to Webb & Webb, trade unions originated from 18th century Britain, where the speedy expansion of the nascent industrial society, in large numbers, drew women, children, rural workers and immigrants into the work force in new roles. The unions actually encountered immense hostility in their early existence from employers and government agencies. Unions and unionists were at the time, frequently prosecuted under various restraint of trade and conspiracy laws. This pool of unskilled and semi-skilled labour spontaneously organised in fits and starts at the beginnings but subsequently became the important arena for the development of trade unions.

In Nigeria, prior to the coming of the colonial masters, organisations of people engaged in craft or trade were in existence. These organizations which included the ones for hunters, blacksmiths, carvers and weavers, regulated trade practices, offered mutual aid and fixed prices (wages) for their services and could be referred to as trade unions (Olusoji, Owoyemi & Onokala, 2012). However, organised trade unions officially started in Nigeria on Monday 19 August 1912 when workers in the colonial civil service organized themselves into trade unions as obtainable in Sierra Leone. A certain Mr Henry Libert (a Sierra Leonean) summoned a meeting of about thirty-three indigenous workers, and by the fifth meeting on 15 November 1912 after receiving guidance from Sierra Leone, the aim of the union was decided, which was to promote the welfare and interests of the indigenous workers of the Nigerian Civil Service. The union was known then as the Civil Service British Workers Union but later changed to the Nigerian Civil Service Union shortly before the country's independence in 1960 (Olusoji, Owoyemi & Onokala, 2012).

From these earliest times, trade unionism in Nigeria remained in evolution and today the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) is arguably the most notable trade union in the country. Trade union governance (the management of trade unions) in the challenging environment in which they have to operate today requires skills which were previously considered unnecessary for trade unionists. These are skills basically required to run modern organisations effectively: financial management, accountability to members, negotiating skills, capacity for research and development, organisational and planning skills for the future of the organisation. These are some of the governance approaches which successful trade unions use (Reguera, 2002).

But there are still certain basic patterns of trade union organisation/structure. Most trade unions have a central and an affiliate or branch system, and a delegates' conference. Then in some countries, a congress of trade unions provides the ultimate layer of trade union organisation. Geographical diversity can also impact on trade union organisation in different national spaces, necessitating varying regional and other arrangements (Morris, 2002). The central control for many trade unions takes the form of an Executive Committee or Council, Executive Board or some such similar designations. This Committee or Board is usually elected at a delegates' conference and executes the policies determined by the conference. In some situations where the system relates to affiliates of unions to confederations, the central body is elected by the various affiliates. The central control is generally responsible for employment of staff where the organisation needs to have full-time staff (Morris, 2002).

The governance and administration of a trade union is generally the responsibility of the central authority, and the full-time staff, as guided by the delegates' conference. The union's administrative system is similar in many ways to that of other business systems requiring an executive authority that is finally responsible to a representative authority but which has the task of ensuring that the organisation functions effectively and efficiently. On the other hand, the representative system ensures that the executives reflect the wishes of the rank-and-file membership. The Executive of a trade union represents the elected leaders (council, committee, board, etc.) and have the responsibility of planning, staffing, organising, directing and controlling the business of the union (Morris, 2002).

Central Labour Organisations and International Affiliations

A central labour organisation in any national economy is usually made up of many trade unions (as many trade unions as possible). It is not always practicable to get all the trade unions in a national system to come together under a specific central labour organisation. At a point in Nigeria, the existing central labour organisations included the Nigeria Trade Union Congress (NTUC), the United Labour Congress (ULC), the Nigerian Workers' Council (NWC), and the Labour Unity Front (LUF). These four groups further united into an umbrella body then called the United Committee of Central Labour Organisations (UCCLO). Following an already existing historical pattern in the country, this attempted fusion of the unions into UCCLO in 1970 was also short-lived (Cohen, 1971).

The foremost central labour organisation in Nigeria is the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), founded in 1978 following a merger of the four different unions already mentioned in the preceding paragraph: Nigeria Trade Union Congress (NTUC), Labour Unity Front (LUF), United Labour Congress (ULC) and Nigeria Workers Council (NWC). The NLC consists of 29 affiliated unions and about 4 million members, making it one of the largest trade union bodies in Africa (Owoseye & Adedibu, 2017). But there is also the Trade Union Congress (TUC). Essentially, the NLC is for the junior staff in the various organisations where the workers earn a living while the TUC is for the senior staff members. The TUC was registered in August, 2005. Prior to that date, TUC had gone through various transformations starting in 1980, first as Federation of Senior Staff Associations of Nigeria (FESSAN), then as Senior Staff Consultative Association of Nigeria (SESCAN) and, finally, TUC (TUC, 2020).

The NLC and TUC are distinctively central labour organisations. But there are also other powerful trade unions (professional associations) in the country, which either in affiliation to the two distinctive central labour organizations or standing on their own, wield immense influence in industrial relations in Nigeria. These bodies include:

around the world to meet the extraordinary challenges of a changing world of work. The recommendations included a universal labour guarantee, social protection from birth to old age and an entitlement to lifelong learning. The ILO has also developed a system of international labour standards aimed at promoting opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and productive work, in conditions of freedom, equity, security and dignity. This is in the belief that in today's globalised economy; international labour standards are an essential component of the international framework for ensuring that the growth of the global economy provides benefits to all (ILO, 2020a, b, c, d).

Union Solidarity

The solidarity principle in industrial relations ordinarily refers to the role of collective solidarity among workers (Eurofound, 2007). It would therefore seem to simply imply camaraderie, cohesion, commonality, harmony and esprit de corps among unionists in particular and workers in general. But union solidarity also has a more technical meaning. This is when the concept is inversely regarded as solidarity unionism and it refers to a model of labour organising in which two or more workers at one workplace come together and act in concert and fight together for better wages, benefits, and more control on the work process itself. It does not require a union contract or even majority support to act together when using the solidarity unionism model at the workplace. We simply act together because we work together, we care about each other, and we all belong to the same class. We do this because we have a moral right and obligation to stand up with and for our fellow workers regardless if others choose to do so (Conatz, 2012).

According to Conatz (2012):

> This strategy of unionism was practiced by most working class organizations in this country (the United States) up until the 1940s and it 'got the goods'. That is why we in the IWW (Industrial Workers of the World) hold dear this philosophy of unionism. Our working class ancestors successfully practiced this model. However, today the traditional labor movement has lost its strength and vitality ever since they stopped abiding by this principle.

Solidarity unionism as a concept essentially refers to the idea of putting the organisational powers of unions directly into the hands of the workers. Beyond all the semantics, the important thing is 'getting the goods'. Solidarity unionism may deliver such goods and union solidarity as more commonly known can also get such goods delivered.

Check-Off Systems

The check-off system in employer-labour relations refers to the practice whereby the employer regularly deducts from the wages/salaries of the employees for the benefit of the unions. Union dues are major sources of fund for the workers' unions and the employer is the principal collector of these dues on behalf of labour. All things being equal, this source of funds is

- NUPENG: National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers;
- PENGASSAN – Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria;
- NMA: Nigeria Medical Association;
- ASUU: Academic Staff Union of Universities;
- NUT: Nigeria Union of Teachers;
- NASU: Non-Academic Staff Union of Universities;
- ASUP: Academic Staff Union of Polytechnics; and
- NARD: National Association of Medical Doctors (Owoseye & Adedibu, 2017).

International Affiliations

The Nigeria Labour Congress (NUC) and the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUC) are affiliates of the International Trade Unions Confederation (ITUC). The ITUC was founded in Vienna, Austria, in November, 2006. It groups together the former affiliates of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the World Confederation of Labour (WCL), along with trade union organisations which had no global affiliation. The ICFTU and the WCL dissolved themselves on 31st of October, 2006 to pave way for the creation of the ITUC. The ITUC regional organisations are the Asia-Pacific Regional Organisation (ITUC-AP), the African Regional Organisation (ITUC-AF) and the American Regional Organisation (TUCA). The International Trade Unions Confederation (ITUC) is the main international trade union organisation, representing the interests of working people worldwide. The ITUC's primary mission is the promotion and defence of workers' rights and interests, through international cooperation, between trade unions, and global campaigning and advocacy, within the major global institutions. It is the world's largest trade union federation, representing 207 million workers through its 331 affiliated organisations, within 163 countries and territories (TUC, 2020; ITUC, 2020; ITUC Africa, 2020).

The International Labour Organisation, Union Solidarity and Check-Off Systems

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is a United Nations agency with the mandate to advance social justice and promote decent work in the world, by setting international labour standards. The ILO was the first specialised agency of the United Nations and has 187 member states, made up of 186 of the 193 UN member states and the Cook Islands. The UN agency operates under a unique tripartite structure where representatives from the government, employers and employees, openly debate and create labour standards. The International Labour Office is the permanent secretariat of the ILO and is the focal point for the organisation's overall activities, under the scrutiny of the Governing Body and the leadership of the Director-General.

The ILO employs about 2,700 officials from over 150 nations at its headquarters in Geneva, and maintains around 40 field offices in the world. To mark the centenary of its founding in the wake of the First World War in 1919, the ILO convened a Global Commission on the Future of Work, whose report, published in January 2019, made ten recommendations for governments guaranteed for the unions. However, in situations of precarious economic conditions, where the workers are even owed arrears of salaries by the employers, the check-off system also becomes an unsteady source of union funding. Even under such scenarios, the unions still rely on the employers for the operation of the check of system as direct collection by the unions in good and bad times would remain cumbersome. The check-off system is an internationally applied practice.

Industrial Conflicts, Conflict Resolution and Collective Bargaining

Industrial conflicts occur when workers express their dissatisfaction with management over the existing state of the employer-employee or management-employee relations. Causes of such conflicts are usually matters related to regular wage payment or wage increase, and the employer or management, reneging on remunerations according to the terms of the employment. Employees may express their dissatisfaction in formal or informal ways. The formal methods are organised and planned in advance, while informal ones are spontaneous and unorganised, usually taking management by surprise. Formal and informal industrial conflicts may take the form of any of the following: strike, work-to-rule, absenteeism or sabotage (Smith, 2017).

In the viewpoints of Akume & Abdullahi (2013, p. 202) the traditional approach of viewing conflict is that it is dysfunctional, it is a consequence of poor communication, a lack of openness between people, and the failure of managers to be responsive to the needs and aspirations of their employees. But conflict, they argue, could foster the building of better and stronger social ties among groups in society, where the process of resolution and reconstruction is open, fair, truly accommodating and integrative that it allows for group viability, self-criticism and creativity. Interactionism as theoretical perspective in conflict studies, therefore, sees conflict as a normal process of interaction, especially in a plural society (Akume & Abdullahi, 2013). Industrial conflicts are accordingly to be expected in employer-employee or management-employee relations, and when they occur the situation calls for conflict resolution.

Industrial Conflict Resolution

Benjamin (2013) identifies the following six steps to conflict resolution in the workplace (industrial conflict resolution) as to:

- clarify what the disagreement is;
- establish a common goal for both parties;
- discuss ways to meet the common goal;
- determine the barriers to the common goal;
- agree on the best way to resolve the conflict; and
- acknowledge the agreed upon solution and determine the responsibilities each party has in the resolution.

Solaja (2015) found that the causes of conflict in manufacturing companies in Lagos State, Nigeria, include poor means of communicating grievances to top managers, unfavorable economic and industrial policies, poor employee compensation and welfare among others. His study concluded that managers should combine strategies such as (collective) bargaining, collaboration and avoidance, when dealing with industrial conflicts, to maintain cordial and productive labour-management relationship. This takes us to the concept of collective bargaining as mechanism of productive labour-management relationship.

Collective Bargaining

The concept of collective bargaining in industrial relations refers to the process of negotiations between employers and employees (management and employees) aimed at reaching agreements on acceptable salaries and wages, working conditions, sundry benefits, and other aspects of workers' compensation/expectations, and rights of workers. The interests of the employees are commonly presented at the bargaining sessions by leaders of the trade union to which the employees belong. Collective agreements are reached at the end of the negotiations usually spelling out wage scales, working hours, training benefits and entitlements, health and safety imperatives, overtime agreements, grievance channeling mechanisms, and the rights of workers to participate in workplace or company affairs (BLS, 2008).

The terminology of 'collective bargaining' was first used by Beatrice Martha Webb in 1891. Webb was among the founders of the London School of Economics; she played a crucial role in founding the Fabian Society and was a cofounder of the field of industrial relations in Britain (Wilkinson et al, 2014). According to ILO (2020e) collective bargaining is a fundamental right, rooted in the ILO Constitution and reaffirmed as such in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. It is a key means through which employers and their organisations and trade unions, can establish fair wages and working conditions. It also provides the basis for sound labour relations. Typical issues on the bargaining agenda, ILO (2020e) posits include wages, working time, training, occupational health and safety and equal treatment. The objective of these negotiations therefore is to arrive at a collective agreement that regulates terms and conditions of employment. Collective agreements may also address the rights and responsibilities of the parties, thus ensuring harmonious and productive industries and workplaces. Enhancing the inclusiveness of collective bargaining and collective agreements is consequently a key means for reducing inequality and extending labour protection (ILO, 2020e).

The Post-COVID-19 Prognosis

COVID-19 is the worldwide alias for the novel coronavirus disease (nCoV), first reported in Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei Province, China, in December 2019 (WHO, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic is the greatest worldwide (health) crisis of contemporary times, and the biggest global challenge the world has faced since the Second World War (UNDP, 2020). Nearly all aspects of human endevours on the planet have been affected by COVID-19, with the impacts having immediate and multiplier trajectories. Human endevours frequently beget employer-employee relations otherwise denotable as industrial relations. International borders were closed, and within national domestic territories, nonessential movements were prohibited. Aviation and other transportation businesses were globally stopped by the operators voluntarily.

Factories closed shops, schools ceased to exist, manufacturers stopped work, construction sites went dead, politicians ran away and only operated through the virtual media, as employers and employees also ran for cover, while the deadly pathogens carrying the fatal disease hovered over the world. In other words, businesses collapsed, and national economies encountered trauma, as the global economy spontaneously shrank in size. The Post-COVID-19 period is when normalcy would seemingly return on all these fronts. What becomes of industrial relations in the immediate Post-COVID-19 period and thereafter?

The emergent period indeed portends immense disfigurations even in industrial relations. Employers of labour who sustained monumental losses in the wake of the contagion would be in a determined struggle to reposition their businesses. It will not be the suitable time for the employees' welfare concerns to be given the usual attention. Invariably, the workers will be in very weak moral positions while demanding for improvements in their service conditions. Private sector employees are likely to be worse off than their public sector counterparts, under these configurations. Even in the public sector, the fortunes of national governments have been impaired by the COVID-19 cataclysm, as their revenue sources generally dwindled. Consequently, governments resorted to the depletion of their reserves, or domestic and international credit arrangements, to accommodate the impacts of the highly decreased income sources. It would accordingly appear insensitive on the part of public sector employees to embark on spirited struggles for presumed adequate compensation. Robust industrial relations will be in danger. Employer-employee relations are not known to be conducted on mutually indeterminate foundations. Collective bargaining could turn to collective stillness, as employees balk at the possibilities of admissible disengagements against the backdrop of a labour market, already saturated with a COVID-19-induced joblessness.

It is strongly believed that the impact of COVID-19 could lead to hundreds of millions of people being left without work. And as at May 2020, the G7 countries' jobless totals varied from 30 million in the United States to 1.76 million in Japan, with claims for unemployment benefits soaring in some of the countries, particularly the USA (Kretchmer, 2020). In April 2020, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) predicted that 1.6 billion workers in the informal economy of the world, translating to nearly half of the global workforce, stood in immediate risk of having their livelihoods destroyed, and in the second quarter of 2020, the ILO warned that the COVID-19 conundrum might cost globally the equivalent of 305 million full-time jobs (ILO, 2020f; Kretchmer, 2020). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) predicts that in Africa (beyond the health risks) the COVID-19 pandemic may precipitate a social and economic emergency in the following ways:

- lower trade and investment from China in the immediate term
- a demand slump associated with the lockdowns in the European Union and OECD countries; and
- a continental supply shock affecting domestic and intra-African trade. And it is shaking commodity-driven growth models that had largely failed to create more and better jobs or improve well-being (OECD, 2020).

COVID-19 is accordingly anticipated to worsen Nigeria's unemployment crises (Onehi, 2020). From a pre-COVID-19 position of 23.1 per cent in 2019, Nigeria's unemployment rate was expected to reach 33.5 per cent by 2020 (Nseyen, 2019). All of this presents scary scenarios for industrial relations. How would industrial conflict resolution thrive in such circumstances?

Trade unions' strengths will be whittled down by the likely disengagement of many of their members. International affiliations by the national central labour organisations will become weakened by frail financial inflows occasioned by impaired check-offs and remittances. Union solidarity at the domestic and international angles will become feeble because of the global nature of the COVID-19 challenges. In Nigeria, different trade unions and professional associations have at different times been at the vanguard of vibrancy in industrial relations in the country. Some of these bodies have been identified in the section of this article dealing with central labour organisations and international affiliations. A major aspect of this paper's prognosis is that the heat in the industrial relations affairs of Nigeria, post-COVID-19, will continue to come from one of these unions in particular. The generic central labour organisations, the NLC and TUC are likely to be caught up by the fathomable COVID-19 stillness. The allusion to probable source of energy is to ASUU: Academic Staff Union of Universities in the country.

Pre-COVID-19 and amid the upheaval, ASUU and the federal government of Nigeria had remained hostile to each other. The federal government as employer of the ASUU members remain the chief protagonist at that federal angle, as state governments in the country wait in the wings being that ASUU membership consists of academics in the federally and states' owned universities in the country.

Historically, ASUU accuses governments in Nigeria of insensitivity, arguing that the incessant ASUU strikes in the country have been recurring due to the inconsiderateness of those in positions of authority in the country (Anyanwu, 2018). Will government(s) in the country, now become sympathetic to ASUU's demands, post COVID-19? Even in the face of obviously dwindling financial resources, ASUU is one union with the research tentacles to unearth how the different levels of governments in the country utilise the increasingly scanty financial inflows, particularly the COVID-19 related credits and other funds.

The World Bank announced a ₦31.2 billion ($82 million) support for Nigeria's fight against the COVID-19 pandemic (Ujah, 2020). Nigeria's component states are getting $1.5bn from the World Bank's total package, translating to a likely average of ₦150 billion to ₦200 billion for each of the 36 states in the country (Sahara Reporters, 2020). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also disbursed $3.4bn to Nigeria for the same purposes (Akinmurele, 2020). There were other specific health's issues-related local and international organisational interventions availed the Nigerian nation. The European Union (EU) for instance boosted the country's COVID-19 efforts with ₦21 billion (EU, 2020). According to Carsten (2020) who cited Zainab Ahmed, the country's Minister of Finance, Budget and National Planning, Nigeria was seeking $6.9 billion from multilateral lenders to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, made up of $2.5 billion from the World Bank, $3.4 billion from the International Monetary Fund, and $1 billion from the African Development Bank (AfDB). How these accounts are managed will have bearing with industrial relations in the country, as public sector workers become more sensitive to government's expenditure postures in the challenging post-Covid-19 dispensation. It will certainly not be business as usual for sleazy government officials; while the other employees of government are either being disengaged or being paid discounted monthly wages. The Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) is not likely to be cowed into tameness in industrial relations in the emerging post-Covid-19 dispensation.

Conclusion

We have demonstrated in this paper that industrial relations have historically come a long way. Invariably, employer-employee relationships are not expected to fizzle out (soon) from the overall socioeconomic contexts of human associations. All notable historical epochs since the emergence of industrial relations beget their own brands of the process. In the pre-industrial revolution period, employer-employee relationships were easier, personal and direct. Following the industrial revolution, industrial relations became more complex and subsequently internationalised. The character of industrial relations in Nigeria has also exhibited these historical particularities, as earlier repressive military regimes in the country usually precipitated strident labour tendencies. This contribution prognosticates that post-COVID-19 industrial relations will be increasingly disorienting, as robust industrial relations remain in jeopardy. Employer-employee relations are not known to be conducted on mutually indeterminate foundations, which potentially characterises the post-covid-19 period. The paper recommends thoughtfulness and tolerance as the attributes required of the employers and employees in the embedded turbulent times, pending national and international economic and industrial recoveries.

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SURVIVING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERACTION OF SOCIAL ANXIETY, FAMILY FUNCTIONING AND INTERNET ADDICTION

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Abstract
We demonstrated that survival of the Covid-19 pandemic is a function of reduced social anxiety and bolstering family functioning which inversely is an effective strategy to lessen the internet/online addiction vulnerabilities. A total of 1800 adolescents comprising 909(50.5%) males and 891(49.5%) females (age range 11-17 years, *M* = 15.30 years, *SD* = 1.99) conveniently sampled from six co-educational secondary schools in three States of South-East Nigeria were administered: Social Phobia Inventory, Family APGAR Index, and Problematic Internet Use Questionnaire. Results of Hayes regression-based PROCESS macro revealed that Social anxiety positively predicted internet/online addiction during the pandemic. Family functioning negatively predicted internet/online addiction. Family functioning did not moderate the relationship between social anxiety, and internet/online addiction Findings support various clarion calls for social tranquility amidst Covid-19 myths, more family understanding and synergy as panacea for internet/online vulnerabilities.

Keywords: Adolescents, family functioning, internet addiction, social anxiety.

Introduction

Surviving COVID-19 pandemic saw the whole world strictly observing some perhaps unpleasant measures. One of such unproductively uncomfortable measures included the lockdown. COVID-19 pandemic shot almost the entire world into the confinement of the room. One thing that is very important even right inside the room was survival. The internet becomes the available surviving option or tool especially at the peak of the pandemic as most of the life-supporting activities were online. Hence, most people clung to internet optimising extensively its services in the areas of information assessment (Sinclair, 2014; e.g., about the pandemic, excitement (Young, 2009) to relief depression and boredom created by the pandemic and maintaining, creating as well as re-creating social connectivity/network (Long & Chen, 2007) which the pandemic severed. Consequently, people resorted to the internet use as the viable means of survival and this invariably resulted to unavoidable addiction to the internet.

Nonetheless, the lockdown measures was necessitated by fear and social anxiety surrounding the community spread or transmission (Mansdorf, 2020; Leung, 2020) of the virus;

occurrences of mass sudden death mostly and particularly fuelled by people's underlying illnesses (Kazeem, 2020) most people already lived with; economic hardship (Elusoji, 2020; Unah, 2020) and unpredictability of the future of humanity. In the midst of all these uncertainties, effective family functioning becomes germane and paramount to survival at homes. It is the period that family agreements, cohesion, adaptableness, organisation, communication and interaction (Alderfer et al, 2008) must be synergised to cushion the effect of the panic and pandemonium created out there in the society by the pandemic. In other words, how families internally run their everyday itinerary, meet up with their obligations, responsibilities, roles, interact and emotionally bond together (Rhee, 2008). It is, therefore, effective family functioning involving lucid interactions, well laid down roles, unity, and good emotion regulation as against ineffective family functioning characterised by high levels of disagreement, anxiety, disorganisation, and poor emotional and behavioral control (Alderfer, et al., 2008) that can ensure adequate survival during the COVID-19 lockdown. We, therefore, sought to investigate to understand how social anxiety, family functioning and internet addiction interact to ensure that people survived during the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, our study aimed at understanding whether social anxiety created by COVID-19 pandemic and the corresponding family functioning led to internet addiction in an attempt to survive the pandemic. Hence, we hypothesised that social anxiety and family functioning during the COVID-19 pandemic significantly associated with internet addiction.

This study is relevant both to the extant literatures as well as other practical aspects of human existence and survival especially at the period the entire world is in dear need for survival. First, extant literatures may have documented numbers of studies (Gao, Yu, & Ng, 2013; Ray, 2018; Yuan, et al., 2013; Yujia, Jiao, & Liqiong, 2017) with our variables but none seems to have considered the same variables with respect to surviving the COVID-19 pandemic. Again, most studies on COVID-19 pandemic had rather concentrated more on safety protocols like face masks, social/physical distancing, washing of hands, use of hand sanitisers, etc, (Luscombe, 2020; Wu et al, 2020), COVID-19 vaccine (Noko, 2020, Bird, 2020), death tolls (Nigerian Center for Disease Control, NCDC 28/5/2020; WHO, 2020), lockdown measures (Lee, 2020; Ayado et al, 2020), palliatives (Howley, 2020; Bologna, 2020), etc. Very few or no studies had gone beyond the environment to examine how most people managed to survive within the family. This is an epic aspect our study is uncommon and uniquely contributes to literature.

Internet addiction refers to a situation where an individual has lost control over the internet use and keeps using internet excessively to the point where he/she experiences problematic outcomes that negatively affects his/her life (Young, 1998). Ordinarily, being addicted to a thing involves using that particular thing to the point that the user's existence becomes hinged on it. The lockdown measures orchestrated by COVID-19 pandemic made the internet become the only surviving options at homes as food were bought online; online social interaction boomed, most online businesses gained relevance and other new ones sprang up; and every other contact related transactions were almost stopped and prohibited. Thus, almost everyone were forced into internet use. It should equally be noted that even before the COVID-19 lockdown measures, internet addiction has already been a nagging societal concern (Ciarrochi et al., 2016; Karacic & Oreskovic, 2017) scholars have been investigating on. Therefore, the advent of Covid-19 lockdown measures 'formalises' the addiction to internet use basically to bridge the gap of social and business isolation (Douglas, et.al, 2008). It was again mostly to help people survive through adequate coping with anxiety, frustration, or for excitement (King et al., 2018).

However, the social-emotional theory was used to further explain internet addiction as it posits that people are addicted to internet to cope with their emotional problems (Savci & Aysan, 2017**).** In other words, daily life stress and negative affection brought about by COVID-19 pandemic led people to virtual environments and the time spent on virtual environments cause internet addiction. There are empirical evidences supporting that social emotion, like anxiety, is strongly correlated with internet addiction (Yuan, et al., 2013; Yujia, Jiao, & Liqiong, 2017; Obeid et al, 2019).

Social anxiety could be understood as fear of being judged or evaluated negatively in a social or performance situation; and it has two categories: a specific social anxiety or a more generalised social anxiety (Morrison & Heimberg, 2013). A specific social anxiety is the fear of (e.g., speaking) in front of groups (only), whereas people with generalised social anxiety are anxious, nervous, and uncomfortable in almost all social situations. Taber-Thomas et al (2016) observed social anxiety as a source of negative affection that cause the individual to feel a certain fear or anxiety in one or more social environments where he or she can be judged by others such as while having a conversation, coming across someone unfamiliar. Social anxiety perhaps may have heightened the fear of COVID-19 pandemic.

A socially anxious individual fears social environments. And this usually leads to stress reactions and negative affections in the individual (Caplan, 2006). An excessive feeling of this affection affects the person's functioning; pushes him or her to avoid social environments and situations, thereby turning to the virtual world to obtain relaxation and satisfaction. Thus, virtual environment as presented by the internet offers individuals the opportunity to hide their identities, have fun in isolation, isolate themselves completely from physical/personal problems and conflicts. Hence, internets and virtual platforms are perceived as shelters for escaping from daily life stress and negative affection; whose excessive use could invariably lead to addiction. Lockdown measures of COVID-19 offer the opportunity for most families to be run through internets. To this end, it becomes germane to consider family functioning relation to internet addiction.

The manner with which family internally runs their everyday itinerary, meet up with their obligations, responsibilities, roles, interact and emotionally bond together (Rhee, 2008) during the pandemic could associate with internet addiction as survival during the pandemic was basically hinged on the internet. For example, online shopping, socio-media entertainments, interactions and games, were aspects internet was deployed at homes. Specifically, during the lockdown, the socio-media was used to bridge the interpersonal physical gap of interaction enforced by the COVID-19 safety protocol.

Therefore, for family to effectively function for survival during the pandemic, internet was deployed to run the everyday itinerary of the family, meeting up with family obligations, responsibilities, roles, interact and emotionally bond together. This singularly predisposes family members to internet addiction as they were constantly online. In fact, one would not be too wrong to assume that the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown measures forced people into internet addiction just to be able to survive. No doubt the fact that considerable research efforts have been focused on family functioning; but in relation to surviving the COVID-19 pandemic, research endeavours are very rare. For instance, most studies on family functioning had focused more on other variables like parent-adolescent relationships (e.g., Laursen et al, 1998; Schneider et al, 2001), developmental and mal/adjustment in children (Masten & Shaffer, 2006), parent-children relationship (Zhang et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2013; Zhu et al. 2015; Huang et al, 2019; Deng et al. 2013; Yen et al. 2007), family functioning and problem of gaming (Schneider et al, 2017). This is an epic aspect our study uniquely contributes to literature as it examined family functioning from another perspective.

Method

Participants and Procedure

This cross-sectional survey used an anonymous online questionnaire to collect data from respondents. The online survey ran during the second week of the lockdown in Nigeria (7th to 18th April, 2020) and involved a total of I, 800 participants comprising males (n = 909, 50.5%) and females (n = 891, 49.5%) who were selected from three Universities in South East, Nigeria (i.e., one University each was randomly picked from Anambra, Enugu, and Imo). Online nature of our study informed our choice of the use of University as the email contacts of the participants were supplied and accessed through the Personnel Services Department of each University. Of all the contacts supplied and online survey sent, only 729 respondents who were from University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 595 respondents from Nnamdi Azikiwe University (UNIZIK) and 476 from Imo State University (IMSU) successfully completed the survey. The questionnaires were completed through online survey platform hosted on Google. Ethical approval was obtained from the Department of Psychology Ethical Review Board, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Participation was completely voluntary, consensual, anonymous; and informed consent was obtained from all the participants.

Measures

Social Phobia Inventory

Adolescents' social anxiety was assessed using the Social Phobia Inventory (SPI)(Connor et alm 2000). The Social Phobia Inventory consists of questions which evaluate fear (of people in authority, of parties and social events, of being criticised, of talking to strangers, of doing things when people are watching, and of being embarrassed), avoidance (of talking to strangers, of speaking to people for fear of embarrassment, of going to parties, of being the center of attention, of making speeches of being criticised, of speaking to authority), and physiological discomfort (blushing, sweating, palpitation, or shaking and trembling in front of other people). It has 17 items; and each of the 17 item is rated on a scale from 0 to 4 as follows: 0 (not all), 1(a little bit), 2 (somewhat), 3 (very much) and 4 (extremely); with higher scores corresponding to greater distress. However, the full scale score ranges from 0 to 68, and a score of 19 and above suggest social anxiety. Sample items includes: “I am afraid of people in authority”, “Being criticised scares me” and “I avoid speaking to anyone in authority”. The developers reported alpha reliability coefficient of .85. We obtained an alpha coefficient of .85 in the current study; and all the items loaded on a single dimension.

Problematic Internet Use Questionnaire

The PIUQ is an 18-item self-report measure designed by Demetrovis et al (2008) to measure the extent of problems caused by the 'misuse' of the internet. The questions in the scale reflect typical addictive behaviour. Sample items include: 'How often do you fantasise about the Internet, or think about what it would be like to be online when you are not on the Internet'?, 'How often do you neglect household chores to spend more time online'?, 'How often do you feel tense, irritated or stressed if you cannot use the Internet for as long as you want to'?, 'How often do you choose the Internet rather than being with your partner'?, and 'How often do you try to conceal the amount of time spent online'?. It has three (3) sub-scales such that items, 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, and 16 measure obsession; items 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, and 17 measure neglect; and items 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18 measure control disorder. The scale is scored on a five-point likert scale with the response format of: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Often, and Always. The level of addiction was rated on this scale ranging from 20 to 49 normal, 50-59 moderate addiction, and 80-100 serious addiction. Answer to each resulted in a score 1 to 5 points. Never = 1, Rarely = 2, Sometimes = 3, Often = 4, and Always = 5. Demetrovics, et al. (2008), reported a Cronbach's alpha of PIUQ as .87. Cronbach alpha of the subscales are .85, .74, and .76 respectively. We obtained an alpha coefficient of .93 in the current study; and all the items loaded on a single dimension.

Family APGAR Index

Family functioning was assessed using the Family APGAR Index developed by Smilkstein (1978). It consists of 5 parameters of family functioning which includes: Adaptability, Partnership, Growth, Affection and Resolve. The acronym APGAR comprised of the first letter of each parameter. The scale contains five items designed to measure a person's satisfaction with social support from the family. Thus measuring family member's perception of their family function. Sample items include: “I am satisfied with the support I receive from my family when something concerns me”, “I am satisfied with how my family discusses issues of common interest and shares the problem solution with me”, “My family accepts my desire to promote new activities or make changes in my lifestyle”, and “I am satisfied with how my family expresses affection and responds to my feeling of love and sadness”. The items were developed on the premise that a family member's perception of family functioning could be assessed by reported satisfaction with the five parameters of family functioning listed above (Smilkstein, 1978).

In other words, the statements focus on the emotional, communicative, and social interactive relationships between the respondent and his or her family. The response options describe the frequency of feeling with each parameter on a 3-point likert scale ranging from (hardly ever) which is scored '0' to (almost always) which is scored 2. The total score ranged from 0 to 10; where the scores for each subject was calculated by summing the scores of the five items on the scale with higher score, representing higher perceived functionality of the family.

Results

Age range of the participants was 11 – 17 years (M = 36.05 years, SD = 14.18), indicating that majority of the students were in middle to late adolescence. Mean scores on the other variables were as follows: family functioning (M = 7.90, SD = 2.25), social anxiety (M = 27.13, SD = 14.01) and internet addiction (M = 24.55, SD = 15.83).

Table 1: Correlations of demographic variables, family functioning, social, anxiety, and internet addiction

Variables	1	2	3	4	10
1 Gender	-				
2 Age	$.06^{*}$	-			
3 Class	$-.09^{**}$	$.61^{**}$	-		
4 Family functioning	-.03	.00	.03	-	
5 Social anxiety	$-.07^{**}$	.05	$.07^{**}$	$.09^{**}$	-
6 Internet addiction	$.09^{**}$	$.13^{***}$	$.07^{**}$	-.04	$.33^{***}$
5 Social anxiety	$-.07^{**}$	.05	$.07^{**}$	$.09^{**}$	-
6 Internet addiction	$.09^{**}$	$.13^{***}$	$.07^{**}$	-.04	$.33^{***}$

Note. $^{***}p<.001$; $^{**}p<.01$; $^{*}p<.05$; **Gender (0 = boys; 1 = girls)**

In Table 1, it was found that female gender was associated with being older in age, being in lower class, and more internet addiction. Older students were also found to be in higher classes in school, and more internet addiction. Those who were in higher class reported more social anxiety and more internet addiction. Family functioning correlated positively with social anxiety.

Table 2: Hierarchical multiple regression predicting internet addiction by social anxiety and family functioning as moderator variable, controlling for gender, age and class

Variables	***B***	***SE***	***t***	***p***	**95%*CI***
Social anxiety (SA)	.39	.03	13.43	.000	[.33, .45]
Family Functioning (FF)	-.57	.17	-3.31	.001	[-.91, -.23]
SA x FF	-.02	.01	-1.69	.092	[-.04, .00]
Gender	3.10	.71	4.40	.000	[1.72, 4.49]
Age	.85	.24	3.55	.000	[.38, 1.31]
Class	-.14	.35	-.40	.692	[-.83, .55]

$R^2 = .14$; $F(6, 1774) = 11.48$, $p<.001$; Gender (coded 0 = male, 1 = female)

In Table 2, it was found that social anxiety was positively associated with internet addiction (*B* = .40), indicating that for each one unit rise in social anxiety, internet addiction increases by .40 units. Family functioning was negatively associated with internet addiction (*B* = -.57), indicating that for each one unit rise in family functioning, internet addiction decreases by -.57 units. The interaction of social anxiety and family functioning was not significant (*B* = -.02, *p* = .092), indicating that family functioning did not moderate the relationship between social anxiety and internet addiction. The R^2 (.14) for the model indicated that 14% of the variance in internet addiction was explained on account of the entire variables in the model.

Discussion

The results of the descriptive analysis revealed that during the pandemic, females were more addicted to the internet than males. This could be because most of the family roles, functions, itineraries that made the family function effectively during the pandemic were basically and more performed by females than males. Aside maintaining the family function, a number other studies (e.g, Beranuy et al, 2009; Duke & Montag 2017; Montag et al, 2015) had supported the fact that more females remain online more in an attempt to make, establish, and maintain social ties, transact business of all sorts. So, utilising their internet prowess to enhance family functioning is not out of place. It could therefore be deduced that during the pandemic, women were more supportive to the survival and family functioning using more of their internet knowledge. This our conclusion does not automatically rule out the efforts of most males towards the family functioning neither did it outrightly indicates that some few males are less knowledgeable about the utility of the internet to make, establish, and maintain social ties, transact business (Baloglu et al, 2018).

The first hypothesis (H_1) which stated that social anxiety would be associated with internet addiction during COVID-19 lockdown was tested and the result revealed that social anxiety predicted internet addiction during the pandemic, indicating that the more restrictions were imposed on people's physical contacts due to the pandemic, the more they got addicted to the internet facility as a means of bridging the gap created by the restrictions. Ordinarily without the pandemic, literatures (Yuan, et al., 2013; Yujia et al, 2017; Baloglu et al, 2018) had established a significant link social anxiety and internet addiction. One plausible explanation for the significant positive association is that people perceive a low likelihood of obtaining satisfactory evaluations from others during the pandemic. Amidst social interaction, a perceived inability to successfully ascertain who actually is infected during the pandemic precipitates social anxiety. So, people rather than optimistically facing the evaluation from others, they rather run to the virtual environment to take solace. This also supports the proposed idea of social emotional model of internet addiction (Savci & Aysan, 2017) that daily life stress and negative affection directs the individual to virtual environments and the time spent on virtual environments cause internet addiction.

The second hypothesis (H_2) which stated that family functioning would be associated with internet addiction during COVID-19 lockdown was tested and the result revealed that family functioning has a significant negative association with internet addiction; indicating that effective or positive family functioning will less likely lead internet addiction. This result, though unexpected, shows implies that family members who were forced to stay together at home during the pandemic enjoyed more of family interactions more that they that of the internet. It could be because of hard economy/recession imposed by the lockdown, there was no enough flowing cash to remain online. Thus, family members had to manage to survive only with the meagre available cash. Of course, remaining online at the period of COVID-19 pandemic, was very cost effective and people were even only yelling for food to eat for survival not to talk of remaining online. Therefore, this could account why our result shows less internet addiction with more effective family functioning. Literatures (e.g, Liau et al 2015; Schneider et al, 2017; Deng et al. 2013; Liu et al, Zhang et al. 2011; Zhu et al. 2015) considering family functioning with other variables had shown positive family functioning association with decreased internet addiction while ineffective family functioning such as conflicts and the likes increase the chances of internet addiction (Deng et al. 2013; Yen et al. 2007). So, the online interactions become a substitute for the succour that effective family functioning would have provided which in turn, increases the internet addiction formation level. Thus, with enhancement of unhealthy family functioning, more people during the pandemic sought for possible survival ways as internet addiction could not guarantee their survival. This was also very evident in massive violation of COVID-19 lock down measures as people could not survive the hardship together with the little restricted family functioning.

The findings of this study is important as it has extended the quest of scientific enquires of COVID-19 pandemic beyond the level of development of vaccine, palliatives, safety protocols, etc., towards understanding the interplay of some rare socio-psychological variables like social anxiety and family functions. Moreover, internet addiction is one of the variables that COVID-19 scholars hardly thought of as could be scientifically juxtaposed with COVID-19; which this study has successfully shown that there exists an association. To this end, we suggest for future studies the scientific correlates of more unusual/common variables of interest with COVID-19 as the results may baffling. Besides, most addiction studies (Gorman-Smith et al, 2000; Gao et al, 2013; and Pace et al, 2014) have dominated the domains of adolescents and moving away from that scope to consider family (basically parents) is another way our study is unique and thus add to literature.

Our study, like many other online studies was faced with limitation. We met with huge resistance in accessing the online contacts of the participants and this was both due to the lockdown measures and some ethical reasons. Most of the participants on their side could not respond to the scales sent to them. Only a number of them who were enlightened did after due follow up of reminders. Of course, such attitude does not encourage scientific enterprise. Funding was yet another big challenge at the period of the Covid-19 pandemic when the whole was in recession.

Conclusion

COVID-19 pandemic threatened and frightened people's social interaction to the point that physical contacts were limited and confined within the family circumference. This rather heightened social anxiety as people resorted to internet as a safe interactive medium. This heightened social anxiety combined with effective family functioning reduced addiction to internet as more physical family interactions were enhanced, Thus, surviving the COVID-19 pandemic requires the understanding that though the pandemic comes with heightened social anxiety, effective family functioning through active family interaction and participation drops down addiction to internet.

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THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN NIGERIA: IMPLICATIONS ON ECONOMIC LIVELIHOODS, SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH

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Abstract
The paper examines the implication of Coronavirus (COVID-19) on the economy, security and public health in Nigeria with a view to underscoring government efforts to mitigating its effect. The novel coronavirus have change the narrative globally and have occasioned monumental hardships to even acclaim strong economies, with some still struggling hard to contain the virus from spreading. The paper underline government strategies of nose mask wearing, personal hygiene (hand washing and use on hand sanitizers), social distancing, quarantine, isolation as well as lockdown with their implication on the economy, security andthe citizenry. The study concluded that though corona virus have greatly impacted the globe but with strong fiscal and monetary policies implementation, the effect of the pandemic can be ameliorated alongside sincere overhaul and increase budgetary allocation to the health and security architectures for future eventualities.

Keywords: COVID-19, Public Health, Economy, Security, Nigeria

Introduction

According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) (2020), the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is an infectious disease caused by a new strain of the coronavirus. It is a severe and acute respiratory disease which has since become the greatest pandemic in the past decade. On 30 January 2020, World Health Organisation officially declared the COVID-19 epidemic as a public health emergency of international concern.

COVID-19, or as termed SARS-COV2 in the medical circle, first appeared in the Wuhan city of Hubei province in China in December, 2019. Retrospective investigations by Chinese authorities have identified human cases with onset of symptoms in early December 2019. While some of the earliest known cases had a link to a wholesale food market in Wuhan, some did not. Many of the initial patients were either stall owners, market employees, or regular visitors to this market. Environmental samples taken from this market in December 2019 tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, further suggesting that the market in Wuhan City was the source of this outbreak or played a role in the initial amplification of the outbreak. The market was closed on 1 January 2020.

Since its discovery, COVID-19 has spread worldwide and has claimed millions of lives. As at 1st September 2020, WHO (2020) confirms 25,509,135 coronavirus cases worldwide with 850,902 confirmed deaths across 216 countries worldwide. The worst hit continent has been the north and South America with 469,897 deaths. The United States of America specifically has recorded the highest mortality with 183,598 deaths closely followed by Brazil with 121,381, Mexico 64,414, Peru 28,944 and Colombia 19, 663 deaths (ECDC, 2020). These figures, however, are subject to change every passing second.

The COVID-19 pandemic In Nigeria is part of the worldwide coronavirus pandemic. The index case was an Itaian citizen who tested positive in Lagos on 27 February 2020. A second case of the virus was reported in Ewekoro, Ogun State on 9 March 2020, and a Nigerian citizen who had contact with the Italian citizen. While early figures showed its slow spread, over the past months community transmission of the virus and increase test capacity of the government has revealed that the virus is in every state of the country. Latest figures published by the National Center for Disease Control (NCDC) as at 1st September, 2020 showed that 405,914 tests had been completed leading to 54,247 confirmed cases, 42,010 discharged cases, 11,214 active cases and 1.023 deaths (NCDC, 2020). Again, this statistics are very fluid and changes with every passing day.

COVID-19 is as much a health issue as it is a socio-economic problem. Since its emergence, it has changed every facet of human life. The negative impact of COVID-19 span the social and economic milieu and poses very drastic negative impact on societies. The pandemic has led to job loses, deaths of businesses and decline in revenue. This has left millions of people jobless and on the brink of hunger and also led to shrinkages in the economy. It is also instructive to note that, the pandemic have also brought unprecedented profits to pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer inter alia in the production of Hydro-chloroquine, Vitamin C, "Agbo" and other trial drug used in the treatment of the novel coronavirus as well as exposed the health capacity of our health infrastructures and as well as readiness of the health professional globally. This paper will attempt to present some of the implications of COVID-19 in the areas of public health, security and economic livelihoods, nature and character on responses respectively. The paper will also recommend harmonisation of government policies that will breathe life into the economy, and restore job losses through sincerely implementation of the health budget and related polices to managing the pandemic.

Situation Report Globally and Nigeria as at 1st September, 2020

Specifically the NCDC on 1st September, 2020 confirmed 239 cases across14 states and the FCT with 10 deaths recorded. The statistical breakdown shows that Plateau 15, 116 in FCT, 33 in Lagos, 19 Ekiti, 12 Kaduna, 11 Ogun, 11 Ebony 8 Benue, 7 Abia, 5 Delta, 5 Ondo, 4 Edo 3 Imo, 2 Osun and 1 Bauchi respectively bringing the total number to 54,247 confirmed cases.

Cumulatively, the state by state as at this day 1st September, 2020 indicates that Lagos the epicenter in Nigeria still top the chart with 18,157 confirmed and 2,724 active cases, FCT 5,202 confirmed and 3,590 actives cases. Others include:

State	**Confirmed**	**Active cases**
Oyo	3,118	1,127
Plateau	2,649	1,116
Edo	2,587	151
Kaduna	2,152	122
Rivers	2,141	99
Delta	1,749	161
Kano	1,727	92
Ogun	1,659	110
Ondo	1,543	132
Enugu	1,162	234
Ebonyi	1,001	43
Kwara	966	157
Katsina	796	315
Osun	784	30
Abia	776	71
Borno	741	34
Gombe	723	64
Bauchi	668	21
Imo	529	313
Benue	668	160
Nasarawa	434	124
Bayelsa	391	22
Jigawa	322	3
AkwaIbom	278	38
Ekiti	274	67
Niger	243	15
Adamawa	228	33
Anambra	216	30
Sokoto	159	3
Kebbi	93	3
Cross River	82	1
Zamfara	78	0
Yobe	67	0
Kogi	5	0

Source; NCDC, 2020

On a global scale, the WHO and European Centre for Diseases Prevention and Control (ECDC), EU official website maintained that since 31st December, 2019 to 1st September, 2020, 25,509,135 reported cases with 850,902 deaths.

On continental bases in the order of 5 highest fatality

Continent	**Confirmed**	**Deaths**
Africa	**1,253,066**	**29,811**
South Africa	627,041	14,149
Egypt	98,939	5,421
Morocco	62,590	1,141
Algeria		1,510
Nigeria	54,247	1,023
Ethiopia	52,131	
Asia	**7,040,471**	**141,169**
India	3,691,166	65,228
Iran	375,212	21,571
Indonesis		7,417
Iraq		7,042
Turkey		6,370
Saudi Arabia	315,772	
Bangladesh	312,996	
Pakinstan	296,149	
N/S America	**13,508,242**	**469,897**
United State	6,031,013	183,598
Brazil	3,908,272	121,381
Peru	652,037	28,944
Colombia	615,168	19,663
Mexico	599,560	64,414
Europe	**3,677,025**	**209,325**
Russia	995,319	17,176
Spain	462,858	29,094
United Kingdom	335,873	41,501
France	281,025	30,635
Italy	269,214	35,483
Oceania	**29,635**	**693**
Australia	25,746	652
New Zealand	1.401	22
Guam	1,395	10
French Polynesia	527	
Papua New Guinea	459	5
Fiji		2
Others (Int`l Conv. Japan)	696	7

Source: ECDC (EU Official website)

The United States remain the worst-hit country in the world and North America by extension simplicita.

Global cum Nigeria's Response to the Covid-19 pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic erupted quite abruptly and left very little time for countries across the world to ramp up medical preparedness in order to tackle the emerging challenges. When the World Health organisation(WHO) declared the corona virus as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) in January 20, 2020, countries had already began making efforts to ready themselves for any possible outbreak within their domains (WHO, 2020). Nigeria was no such exception as the National Center for Disease control (NCDC) took the lead in the training of the rapid response teams across the 36 states in Nigeria. This training was concluded in December, 2019. On 28 January 2020, the NCDC further revealed that a Coronavirus Group had been set up to activate its incident system to respond to any emergency. Additionally, the NCDC worked with 22 states in Nigeria to activate their emergency operations centers to manage and link up with the national incidence coordination centers (Ihekweazu, 2020).

Despite this proactive measures by the government, Nigeria recorded her index case of the corona virus in February, 27 when an Italian national arriving the country through the Murtala Mohammed International Airport, Lagos tested positive for the corona virus. Upon the detection of the index case, the NCDC activated a multi-sectorial National Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) to oversee the national response to COVID-19 as well as commenced contact tracing. Subsequently, the Presidential Task Force (PTF) for coronavirus control was inaugurated on March 9, 2020. The PTF announced that travelers from 13 COVID-19 high-risk countries had been restricted from entering the country. The earliest cases of the covid-19 as recorded by the NCDC were mainly from returning travelers. This was the earliest trend of the COVID-19. (NCDC, 2020)

The number of confirmed cases of the covid-19 pandemic has been on the increase since it was detected in February, 2020. NCDC (2020) confirmed that community transmission of the virus has since set in as more cases continue to be confirmed across the country. Movement restrictions or lockdowns was a popular strategy aimed at stifling the spread of the coronavirus across the country. In the first three months of the pandemic, nations across the world went into lockdown as millions of citizens were restricted to their homes.

In Nigeria this was also the case as states governments first took the initiative to shut land and air borders into their state. According to Amzat, Aminu, Kolo, Akinyele, Ogundairo&Danjibo (2020), lockdowns were a vital response in controlling community level transmission of the virus. Movement restriction was later adopted nationwide as a strategy to slow the level of community transmission. There was a lockdown in two states (Lagos and Ogun) and the FCT for four weeks effective from March 30, 2020, with restrictions on inter-state travels throughout the country (Muanya et al. 2020).

The lockdown affected every sector of the country. In the aviation sector, there was a ban on local and international passenger flight. In the education sector, schools including private and public and universities were shut indefinitely. The banking sector was also affected as their hours of opening were cut down and customers were advised to use their online channels for cash transactions. The civil servants were initially asked to stay away from work and only after a while did they resume partially and only for workers from grade level 14 and above cadre. The lockdown also extended to the religious sector as there was an enforced ban on religious gatherings, sporting facilities, restaurants and bars, eateries, reduction of passengers in commercial buses to half capacity, with major food markets also closed in some states while others operated in line with NCDC guidelines on specific days and hours.

Furthermore, face mask was made part of our dressing first in Cross River state in Nigeria when the State Governor Professor Ben. Ayade through the Head task force on COVID-19 and commissioner of health Mrs Betty Edu made it mandatory for all in public places with the assertion that it had the capacity to prevent the spread of Coronavirus (*Premium Times,* Friday, 21 August, 2020). Other measures adopted to contained the spread on the virus include the wearing of Personal Protective Equipment's (PPE), restriction of movement generally except for necessaries including interstate, the closures of all air ports, payment of palliatives assuage the hardship occasion by the lockdown, massive public education on self-hygiene, washing of hand for at least one minute in running water, used of hand sanitizers, social cum physical distancing inter alia.

Implications of the Covid-19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has had profound impact on the economy of countries across the world. According to a UNDP (2020) report, 'What began as a health crisis - with grave impact on populations - will within days become an economic and fiscal crisis with a high risk of negative social implications'. The impact of the COVID-19 on global economy has been well documented. According to Ozili (2020), the COVID-19 pandemic affected the global economy in two significant ways:

- firstly, the spread of the virus encouraged social distancing which led to the shutdown of financial markets, corporate offices, businesses and events; and
- secondly, the rate at which the virus was spreading, and the heightened uncertainty about how bad the situation could get, led to flight to safety in consumption and investment among consumers and investors (Ozili and Arun, 2020).

Nigeria is not immune from the global economic shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a fact, the Nigerian economy which was just beginning to recover from the 2016 recession was badly hit by the ripple effect of the pandemic.

On the economy, the slump in crude oil prices was the major economic shock suffered by Nigeria during the pandemic. The decline in oil prices by 55 percent between the end of 2019 to March 2020, is one of the most serious economic shocks that Nigeria has faced in its memory, especially as the oil sector contributes 65 percent and 90 percent to government and total export revenues, respectively.

Ozili (2020) presented a more coherent analysis of the impact of the pandemic on the Nigerian economy. There are five main ways through which the COVID-19 pandemic spilled over into Nigeria:

- one, the COVID-19 pandemic affected borrowers' capacity to service loans, which gave rise to NPLs that depressed banks' earnings and eventually impaired bank soundness and stability. Subsequently, banks were reluctant to lend as more and more borrowers struggled to repay the loans granted to them before the COVID-19 outbreak;
- two, there were oil demand shocks which was reflected in the sharp decline in oil price. The most visible and immediate spillover was the drop in the price of crude oil, which dropped from nearly US$60 per barrel to as low as US$30 per barrel in March. During the pandemic, people were no longer travelling and this led to a sustained fall in the demand for aviation fuel and automobile fuel which affected Nigeria's net oil revenue, and eventually affected Nigeria's foreign reserve;
- three, there were supply shocks in the global supply chain as many importers shut down their factories and closed their borders particularly China. Nigeria was severely affected because Nigeria is an import-dependent country and as a result Nigeria witnessed shortage of crucial supplies like pharmaceutical supplies, spare parts, and finished goods from China;
- four, the national budget was also affected. The budget was initially planned with an oil price of US$57 per barrel projection. The fall in oil price to US$30 per barrel meant that the budget became obsolete and a new budget had to be formed that was repriced with the low oil price; and
- five and finally, the COVID-19 pandemic affected the Nigerian stock market. Major market indices in the stock market plunged when investors pulled out their investments into so-called safe havens like U.S. Treasury bonds. Stock market investors lost over NGN2.3 trillion (US$5.9bn) barely three weeks after the first case of coronavirus was confirmed and announced in Nigeria on 28 January, 2020.

As the outbreak intensifies, Nigeria's services, trade and financial sectors would suffer significant disruptions. Together, the three sectors contribute over 30% to GDP. Contraction in these sectors could result in significant job losses both in the formal and informal job markets. This could be a severe blow and could be a threat to instability as youth unemployment/underemployment is already high at 55%. The impact is already partially felt in the exchange rate which has depreciated by 1.0% since mid-February 2020 but the informal market indicates an expectation of a larger depreciation of the Naira. Amidst the pressure, on March 20th, the Central Bank adjusted the currency to ? 380 per dollar. A week before the announcement, informal sources indicated that the Naira was trading at ? 380 per dollar in the parallel/black market. The impact of the outbreak in the advanced economies on jobs and financial transactions could have further negative impact on remittances, which in 2018 represented 80 percent of the Federal budget, affecting the livelihood and spending patterns, which in turn could have a negative impact on the economy and wellbeing of the people.

Similarly the second quarter of the 2020 in Nigeria is 27.1% indicating about 21,764,614 (27.1 million) while underemployment rate stood at 28.6% which amount to 55.7% when combined as contained in the 17th June Report of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Furthermore, living standard in consequentially high with its attendant consequent of life expectancy, resulting from low income which leads to low saving and low investment. F(In+Sa+Inv).

On impact of coronavirus on security, the pandemics have a bearing on the social fabric of society - stress initiated by economic losses often result in visible cracks where incidences of once socially unacceptable norms become more frequent. Evidence suggests that health related pandemics have the potential to increase the risks of:

- domestic violence – with police reports in China and Nigeria showing that domestic violence tripled during the epidemic;
- violence against health workers due to serious stress levels that the pandemic places on patients; and
- abuse and exploitation of women and girls – especially care givers evident in the wanton cases of rape and molestation in Nigeria never in our political dictionary.

Furthermore, frustrations resulting from economic loss and wastage of our common wealth could also play into existing regional fault lines within Nigeria as the call for restructuring is reechoing.This is not unconnected to the lope sider intervention of the federal government in the distribution of palliatives, associated fraud in the cash transfer scheme, claims of prosecuting the school feeding programmed under lockdown with N85 billion by the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and related interventions with no appreciable impact to some section of the country.

Restrictive non-pharmaceutical measures, for example isolation, social distancing and quarantine implemented in contexts already characterised by fragility – in conflict and humanitarian situations will remain a key policy challenge. In such contexts, social connectedness is the currency that nurtures the much-needed resilience for communities to persevere in the face of crisis. As such, social networks and systems which provide support and regulate well-being are often weakened through restrictive non-pharmaceutical measures. Implementing isolation measures without taking regard of the local context can further exacerbate the situation, lead to stress disorders, mental health and in some cases protracted violence.

On the pandemic impact on public health, it has to place immense and unprecedented pressure on the country's underinvested and mismanaged healthcare system. Estimates indicate that around 20 percent of COVID-19 cases require hospitalisation and another 7.5 percent require intensive care. Not until the pandemic, most was no known about the NCDC and its laboratories if not its activity and existence.

In total, there are 330 ICU facilities in the country, including 30 in Lagos. Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) currently has five testing centres and treatment centres designated for COVID-19. An isolation facility in Lagos is equipped with 100 beds but the capacity outside Lagos is very limited. Based on the recent assessment of eight treatment centres by WHO, a majority are not well-equipped and the capacity to respond is particularly weak in the North. The Aminu Kano Teaching Hospital, designated as a treatment centre, is still under construction currently with 2 makeshift beds although with some improvements. The spread of the virus, as patients are transferred to treatment centres, such as the one in Abuja, could be intensified putting more pressure on the already weakened healthcare infrastructure.

It is not just the sheer number of cases that will need medical care over the course of the pandemic, vast amounts of cases will get sick at the same time which will rattle the healthcare system. It is unclear how many treatment centres there are in the country but based on the above projections, within 3-5 days, critical bed care capacity in the WHO assessed designated treatment centres could be exceeded. This could be compounded by lack of supportive medical equipment such as surgical masks, gloves (PPEs) and ventilators in adequate quantities. While the impact on the older population has been the greatest, especially in Italy where the average age in the fatal cases is 79, infection and hospitalisation rates among the younger population are not trivial. Between Feb 12th to March 16th, the United States Centre for Disease Control reported that 20-44 years old accounted for 29 percent, 20 percent and 12 percent of confirmed cases, hospitalised and ICU admissions, respectively. Based on these proportions, as much as 2600 young Nigerians could require hospitalisation/intensive care.

Government Fiscal Measures for the Post-COVID-19 Era

In response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the monetary authority, the Central bank, said it would provide support to affected households, businesses, regulated financial institutions and other stakeholders to reduce the adverse economic impact of the COVID-19 outbreak. The Central Bank provided support in six ways:

- one, it granted extension of loan moratorium on principal repayments from March 1, 2020. This meant that any intervention loan currently under moratorium would be extended by one year; two, it offered interest rate reduction on all intervention loan facilities from 9% to 5% beginning from March 1, 2020;
- three, it offered a NGN50bn (US$131.6m) targeted credit facility to hotels, airline service providers, healthcare merchants, among others;
- four, it provided credit support to the healthcare industry to meet the increasing demand for healthcare services during the outbreak. The loan was available only to pharmaceutical companies and hospitals;
- five, it provided regulatory forbearance to banks which allowed banks to temporarily restructure the tenor of existing loan within a specific time period particularly loans to the oil and gas, agricultural and manufacturing sectors; and

- six, it strengthened the loan to deposit ratio (LDR) policy which allowed banks to extend more credit to the economy.

On the other hand, the fiscal authorities had to review and revise the 2020 national budget of N10.59 trillion (US$28 billion). The government announced that the budget was reduced by N1.5 trillion ($4.90 billion) as part of the measures to respond to the impact of coronavirus on the economy and in response to the oil price crash. The new budget was benchmarked at US$30 per barrel from US$57 per barrel in the previous budget.

Conclusion and Recommendations

It's a truism that the effect of COVID-19 on the global economy, healthcare and security is monumental and catastrophic globally and Nigeria in particular.This is not unconnected with the politicisation of corona virus daily cases announcement by NCDC and its agents and the politics of discharged cases on the weak of no known vaccine. It's also safe to conclude that coronavirus infectious rate globally and Nigeria in particular have attain its zenith but its effect hardly felt by Nigerian in all sectors of our fragile economy, healthcare as well as security and shall continue for a while.

Based on the forgoing we recommend attracting the implantation of fiscal and monetary measures coughed by the CBN and affected agencies to contain the effect of post COVID-19 economy, distribution of palliatives should also be done incognisances of the Federal Character principle, rate of infection, proactive measures by states to contain community spread of the virus and not against party lines. The Presidential Task force on COVID-19 need be fair in the implementation of its guidelines as against the selective application and interventions by CACOVID, take utmost care in the lifting of band/lockdown as well as expedite actions to providing enabling environment to the safe reopening of schools. It's also safe to advocate the change in the security architectures and their managers as it appears, the current managers of the various security outfits are short of ideas due to the pandemic.

Finally, it is important for government to remain proactive in addressing the domestic effects of the pandemic by sincerely making cash transfers to citizenry using BVN, expand the NSIP progrmmes to accommodate more Nigerians and sincere overhaul of the health and security sectors of the to make viable with capacity to handle global emergencies by increasing budgetary allocation and strict implementation.

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THEME FIVE
PUBLIC HEALTH, QUALITY OF LIFE AND WELLBEING

ENSURING QUALITY LIFE: COMBATING POVERTY, CORRUPTION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

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Abstract
The quest for development in Africa preoccupy's every African's mind. It is a quest for liberation from economic, social, educational and psychological quagmire. Development is measured by the quality of life of citizens (level of income earning via access to feeding, housing, clothing, education, etc). Poverty remains a persistent disease prominent in Africa and has been imputed to colonialism and other encroachments which may have directly or indirectly impeded development in Africa yet, most African countries gained independence for more than three decades ago. Attempts by local and foreign aids to assist in curbing this economic meltdown appear failures. The paper argues that lack of wise decisions during policy execution appears to be a strong factor behind these anomalies. Although good policies may be made, the execution, which is often piloted by corrupt personnel, is the major cause of under-development in Africa. The struggle to retain power by maintaining the *status quo* in various leadership positions is a fertiliser which nourishes and retains corruption, low quality of life via underdevelopment in Africa. The paper intends to extract some propositions of previous theorists as a theoretical guide, while utilising documentary method of data gathering. Its analytical rigour is anchored on quantitative and qualitative descriptive analysis. It concludes with some recommendations as a possible way forward for Africa.

Keywords: African-development; national-corruption; poverty; underdevelopment; African-economy

Introduction

Corruption reduces the quality of anything it comes in contact with. It is a debasement, a reduction and a disfiguration of an obligatory standard. The Governance and Public Administration Division (2011-2016) reveals that corruption is a great challenge to good governance, sustainable economic growth, peace, stability and development in Africa. It further posits that Africa is regarded as the most corrupt and underdeveloped continent in the world. This stipulation is further supported by the reports of Transparency International over the years. There is no significant improvement that has been recorded so far indicating a moderate level of development across African continent. Even the success recorded for Nigeria, one of the African States, in Human Development Index (HDI) showcased in 2019 was revealed to be falsely measured and treacherously inflated (Briefing note for countries on the Human Development Report, 2019). It is pertinent to state that few rich persons do not make a developed nation, and countries that are oil-rich could still be classified among underdeveloped nations. Joseph Ugaz, the Chairperson of Transparency International, noted that corrupt individuals could be enjoying a lavish life while millions of Africans are denied basic amenities like food, shelter, health, education, etc (Transparency International, 2015).

Poverty is a familiar phenomenon to every African. The origin and causes of poverty has been the preoccupation of many theorists within and beyond Africa. Poverty has been, among others, attributed to corruption. Corruption in Africa is an irrefutable reoccurrence which is often regarded by many Africans as a normal situation to be lived with. Across Africa, profound huge amount that can stabilise every sector in African states descends into private pockets (Ojo, 2016).

The aftermaths are crippled economy, unmitigated poverty and low quality life. Corruption is regarded as the greatest impediment to realising sustainable development (Atuobi, 2007; Awojobi, 2014; African Newspage, 2018; Nnorom, 2019). It hinders every attempt to fight poverty, procure basic amenities, roads, health facilities, and attempts to fight itself (corruption), thereby posing grievous challenge to the development of any nation. Agbiboa (2012), in this regard, opines that underdevelopment results when funds for enabling development are embezzled. This makes the fight for corruption, poverty and underdevelopment a paramount task if the quality life of citizens of Africa via development is to be realised.

Further researches reveal that Africa's poverty, insecurity and underdevelopment resulted from neoliberal economic reforms and framework which rendered political leaders incapable of proving the basic means for citizens' survival, and which have generated terror organisations, pirate groups, ethnic based militias, and armed robbers, who exploit the platform to vent their anger on the state (Okolie, 2007; Okolie, 2017). Several studies censure the government for the law quality life eminent in African countries.

This paper aims to fill an intellectual gap by spotting out the ways development can be sustained at individual level, in order to rejuvenate Africans standard of living. The focus is on how the quality life of Africans that has been demeaned can be restored. It examined some past theoretical propositions and documentaries, and made some recommendations that can improve the current situation of Africa.

However, a descriptive, historical and evaluative approach was adopted to analyse the state of poverty, corruption and underdevelopment in Africa. The article made use of secondary data to provide a quantitative and qualitative understanding of the issues under examination. The study is divided into four sections: section one explored some previous theories on corruption, poverty and underdevelopment; section two discussed the wheels of corruption and how they breed poverty and underdevelopment in Africa; section three made some recommendations for the amelioration of Africa's low quality life; and section four listed the tables used for further illustration of details discussed.

Theoretical Perspectives

There exists a growing consensus on the view about corruption. While its activities cripple efficiency, it has a distributional effect in the sense that it drastically devalues the poor (Ndikumana, 2006). Corruption is the root cause of poverty and underdevelopment. Simultaneously, the fight against corruption is the fight against poverty and underdevelopment.

Corruption embraces a broad spectrum of activities which range from fraud, embezzlement to bribery (Igwe, 2010). Corruption is a failure of institutions to control bureaucrats or a failure of the legal systems to checkmate the behaviour of those who perpetrate crimes (Igwe, 2010; African Governance Report *iv*, 2016; Bojang, 2017; Nnorom, 2019) but, the retention of corruption dwells in the capitalisation on corruption, at federal, state and grassroots levels to execute unjust activities. Andvig (2008), in this light, posits that corruption is high and common in African countries because it is easier for the perpetrators to get away with it. Nduku and Tenamwenye (2014), identified the causes of corruption in Africa as:

> the negative colonial legacy, poor leadership, politics of the belly, omnipotent state, greed and selfishness, clientelism, and patronage nepotism, absence of popular participation of the public in governance, weak institutions of governance, lack of accountability and transparency, lack of political will, weak ethical values, centralist nature of the state and concentration of state power, weak judicial system and constant insecurity and conflicts.

Asogwa (2008) identified poverty, government policy, poor remuneration, and bad governance as the causes of corruption but, a closer scrutiny of these factors will affirm that corruption is the cause of these factors. This is because; it uses these factors to reinstate itself so that fighting it becomes almost impossible. Maintenance of *status quo*, in this regard, makes corruption indelible. Osagwu and Ejiri (2013) affirmed this view when they noted that the legacies of the era of coups d'état continues to exert pressure on the new democratic dispensation. The military lootings were so glaring that the citizenry came to believe that the essence of leadership is to amass as much wealth as possible. This makes any opportunity gained by African citizen a means to upgrade oneself and ones immediate family, and any attempt to censor such act is faced with discontent. This mindset is not exclusive to our political leaders but permeates through, to grassroots level. Having stayed in power for some time, and having reaped some dividends, leaders try all possible means to remain or die in power (Momoh, 2015). The will to acquire resources more than others makes the distribution of resources unevenly, impoverishes others and spread underdevelopment.

Poverty, in Africa, makes many citizens seek quick measures to satisfy their needs. Despite the high level of inflation in most African countries, salaries of workers are usually constant. Having huge responsibilities and obligations, which are to be met with the salaries that never grow, make citizens who were once honest knock on corruption doors. Poverty as the effect of corruption is usually maximised by greedy politicians to their advantage. Politicians capitalize on citizens' poverty to buy their votes (Gabriel, 2018). Poverty instigates a person to execute an unjust action which one will ordinarily not do. It is alienation against a person by himself in the society (Chukwuma, 2009). When there are no socially motivated objectives in a country, the country suffers underdevelopment.

Underdevelopment is another effect of corruption, and is marked by high death rates, low life expectancy (Igwe 2010), low level of technological acquisition, low industrialisation, etc. A country is developed when there are opportunities for citizens to be economically independent (Eboh, 2005). The World Poverty Clock rated Africa as the continent with the number of extremely poor people in the world (Ndujihe, 2018). In Nigeria, for instance, "…59.5% of Nigerians suffer from at least one severe health deprivation, with only 24% expressing satisfaction with healthcare quality. The number of people that die as a result of non-communicable disease is 909 per 100,000 people (Agbo, Nzeadibe and Ajaero, 2012)." Sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest scoring region on the Corruption Perception Index and has failed over the years to make any significant progress. The reason for the low scores is attributed to misallocation of funds on politics. Delia Ferreira Rubio, the chairperson of Transparency International states "Governments must urgently address the corrupting role of big money in political party financing and the undue influence it exerts on our political systems" (Transparency international, 2019). Patricia Moreira, the Managing Director of Transparency International supported this view. She states "To end corruption and improve people's lives the relationship between politics and big money must be tackled" (Transparency International, 2019).

Recent finding revealed that African leaders are the highest paid in the world despite the continent's underdevelopment challenge. Table one, two and three below reveal the salaries of some African presidents, the most recent two-year report of corruption perception in some African countries, and the view of households in some African countries in regards to the institutions perceived as corrupt.

Poverty is not persistent in Africa because there are no assets to alleviate it rather; it thrives because corruption operates from the state with the connivance of political leaders, to officials in their interaction with ordinary citizens who wish to access basic goods and service (Ojo, 2016). While corruption is considered as the reward of bad governance (Agu, 2005; Morgan, 2013; Alliyu, Kalejaiye and Ogunola, 2014; Ojo, 2016; and African Governance Report iv, 2016), its wheels comes in different forms and move beyond our political leaders who are usually blamed nationally and international. Until public officials utilise their given allocations effectively while individuals at grassroots level display a corrupt free attitude, fighting corruption will be a pale vision. Table 4 describes eaters of corrupt proceeds and their mode of eating them. The wheels of corruption incorporate fraud, embezzlements, bribery, Discretion of government spending, the tax system, nepotism, etc. The wheels of corruption will be briefly discussed to relate how poverty and underdevelopment emanate from them.

Wheels of Corruption

Fraud

At individual level, some persons steal from fellow individuals through deception like the cyber crimes ravaging African nations. Top public official, at public level, sell lies to citizens while usurping their collective resources. In Nigeria and Angola, findings reveal that the oil and gas sector which is the major resource of these countries is shrouded in unaccountability (Ndikumana, 2006, and Lloyd, 2018). A continent where citizens are deprived their resources remains poor and underdeveloped.

Embezzlement

This is somehow connected to fraud but, unlike the deception attached to fraud, it is a theft of public funds that is self evident, due to poor regulatory system or inability to voice it out. The fat finance attached to politics tells it all. The unaccountable funds channeled to different development projects that were never accomplished ring the bell of embezzlement. The looting of external debt and aid by government leaders are forms of corruption. The disappearance of funds for facilities resuscitation in education, economic, and other sectors are forms of embezzlement. A report has revealed that illicit financial flows are import elements of international corruption affecting the African continent. Such flows originate from commercial activities which includes wealth hiding, criminal ones which include money laundering, stock market manipulation and outright forgery (African Governance Report IV, 2016). When development projects are subverted, underdevelopment which appears in the form of poverty and low quality life engrosses African citizens.

Bribery

The collection of bribe most times influences right decision making. Bribes sell lies and fake commodities, dethrone professionalism and enthrone mediocrity. Ndikumana (2006) reveals that bureaucratic corruption creates delays in service delivery and shortages of services as a way of generating opportunities for bribes and embezzlement. The poor masses unable to pay bribes are excluded from obtaining the services, and are further marginalised while their poverty level deepens.

Discretion of Government Spending

This nature of corruption is often piloting by policy makers who determines the geographical location of projects and service delivery points. This is due to the government discretion on capital expenditures. The officials in charge can manipulate expenditures on road construction projects to extract kickbacks while allocating it to the highest kickback bidder. Roads mapped for construction, sometimes are not based on its economic mobility necessities rather, on regions of influential political figures (Ndikumana, 2006). Such decisions create inefficiencies and inequality in resource distribution; huge sums leave government purse without returns because they have been misallocated. Those who promise kickbacks are granted monopoly in commerce and industries while they provide financial support to regimes that they benefit from hence, maintenance of status quo and non-supervision on whether they delivered or not. This attitude nourishes and retains corruption, poverty and underdevelopment.

The Tax System

The payment of taxes and duties for commodities, establishments and other properties are ways to generate revenue in countries. The irregularities surrounding the tax system make the government to lose valuable resources. This occurs when the tax collectors receive bribes and reduce or alleviate the usual tax burden on the private actors. Attempts to improve efficiency is most times infringed by the fiscal authorities who has the right to exercise discretion on whose tax should be paid, reduced or exempted. Corruption most times cause uneven distribution of tax burdens. Prominent individuals and politicians exercise their influence to reduce tax burden on them. They acquire large properties that are suppose to attract huge tax payment but, minimise tax burden while the poor and disenfranchise taxpayers bear the full tax incidence. While the government loses revenue, the masses that pay full tax make little for survival.

Nepotism

This involves the favoring of friends, family or anybody close or trusted (Lloyd, 2018), based on relationship rather than abilities. A nation can depreciate as a result of nepotism. Africans are known for communal life system but this virtue can be subverted to enthrone dysfunctionality. Nepotism can make the wrong persons to be installed in handling sensitive positions. Such installment can lead to the mal functioning of the position the mediocre occupies as well the institution and the country at large.

Recommendations and Conclusions

It should be reaffirmed that Quality life of Africans does not solely depend on political leaders. The citizens' resolutions are essential ingredience to realising it. The ability to make wise decisions during the execution of policies, tasks and projects is a strong factor. Hence the following recommendations will improve Africa's current state:

- Fat salaries in politics must be cut: This will enable citizens to know the candidates willing to serve the masses and those aspiring for the purpose of filling their bank accounts.
- Answering of "what do we want" question: The determination to change the status quo even in the midst of poverty should be the concern of public officials and grassroots individuals. This will disengage the politicians from capitalising on the masses poverty or helplessness. One may not force politicians to stop corrupt activities but one can refuse to accept stipends from them, or become a puppet for carry out illegalities. We can shun corruption identified in our various door steps.
- Support for aspirants with bright vision and dethrone of nepotism: Qualified individuals should be elected, employed and supported to handle available positions in order for growth and development to materialise. Citizens must remove apathy and show a great determination to alleviate corruption, poverty and underdevelopment.
- Human Reform as a propellant for development: The sustenance of development is made possible through human policies made available by the state and its apparatus but, at the centre of development and the policies to be made by state apparatus is the human person who is the controller with different dispositions at different times. There is need for human reform in order to end greed and other vices associated with it.
- Adequate recording and supervision of any capital project financed: Every fund released

for project execution should be appropriately monitored, and the project should be supervised and its execution ensured. Foreign aids should also be monitored. This will drastically reduce fraud and embezzlement of public funds.

- Voicing of inefficiencies and irregularities in public sectors without fear or favour: As citizens with rights, the masses should summon courage to pinpoint irregularities. They should engage in peaceful demonstrations to voice out the irregularities noticed in public sectors if need be. This will enable their voices to be heard at local and international level, and immediate measures to be taken for rectification.
- Regarding the political leaders' attitude as a facticity of life. Citizens should live beyond what political leaders can offer. Since their attitudes have refused to change over these years, there is need for citizens to look inward and create a change from within so that development will move from individual to societal level. Constant blame on politicians will not save the day but, a little turn around on citizens' part will initiate development. When citizens first get theirs' right, the political leaders' corruption will have no place to hide; citizen's complaints and demonstration will, to a get extent, be considered.

Names	**Countries**	**Amount paid (per annum)**
Paul Biya	Cameroon	$610, 000
Mohammed VI	Morocco	$460, 000
Jacob Zuma	South Africa	$272, 000
Abdelaziz Boufika	Algeria	$168, 000
Uhuru Kenyatta	Kenya	$132, 000
Azali Assoumani	Comoros	$115, 000
Hage Geingoba	Namibia	$110, 000
Danis Nguesso	Republic of Congo	$110, 000
Ali Zeidan	Libya	$105, 000
Alassane Dramane Ouattara	Ivory Coast	$100, 000
Ellen Johnson	Liberia	$90, 000
Paul Kagame	Rwanda	$85, 000

Source: Compiled by the author from African-facts.org (Africa-facts.org/the-highest-paid-african-presidents/#)

Table Two: Some African countries scores and ranks in TI's Corruption Perception Index

Countries	**Scores**		**Ranks**	
	2018	2019	2018	2019
Cote d'ivoire	35	35	105	106
Zambia	35	34	105	113
Ethiopia	34	37	114	96

Niger	34	32	114	120
Liberia	32	28	120	137
Malawi	32	31	120	123
Mali	32	29	120	130
Djibouti	31	30	124	126
Gabon	31	31	124	123
Sierra Leone	30	33	129	119
Togo	30	29	129	130
Guinea	28	29	138	130
Comoros	27	25	144	153
Kenya	27	28	144	137
Mauritania	27	28	144	137
Nigeria	27	26	144	146
Central African Republic	26	25	149	153
Uganda	26	28	149	137
Cameroon	25	25	152	153
Madagascar	25	24	152	158
Eritrea	24	23	157	160
Mozambique	23	26	158	146
Zimbabwe	22	24	160	158
Democratic Republic of the Congo	20	18	161	168
Angola	19	26	165	146
Chad	19	20	165	162
Congo	19	19	165	165
Burundi	17	19	170	165
Equatorial Guinea	16	16	172	173
Guinea Bissau	16	18	172	168
Sudan	16	16	172	173
South Sudan	13	12	178	179
Somalia	10	9	180	180

Source: Compiled by the author from Transparency International 2018 and 2019

Table Three: The households view of some institutions corrupt in some African countries

Countries	President	Member of parliament	Local Politicians	National officials	Local Officials	Police	Tax Officials	Judges
Benin	43 %	43 %	39 %	50 %	41 %	58 %	72 %	58 %
Botswana	15 %	20 %	17 %	29 %	27 %	30 %	20 %	14 %
Cape Verde	9 %	8 %	9 %	7 %	8 %	7 %	7 %	5 %
Ghana	16 %	16 %	19 %	26 %	26 %	52 %	34 %	36 %
Kenya	26 %	40 %	38 %	33 %	37 %	64 %	35 %	28 %
Lesotho	6 %	11 %	8 %	19 %	5 %	35 %	14 %	11 %
Madagascar	11 %	15 %	12 %	11 %	13 %	31 %	20 %	25 %
Malawi	19 %	22 %	15 %	25 %	23 %	28 %	23 %	20 %
Mali	25 %	31 %	35 %	35 %	36 %	50 %	58 %	56 %
Mozambique	10 %	11 %	11 %	19 %	18 %	31 %	20 %	16 %
Namibia	22 %	27 %	29 %	35 %	34 %	44 %	37 %	32 %
Nigeria	54 %	59 %	57 %	59 %	58 %	75 %	56 %	40 %
Senegal	19 %	20 %	22 %	22 %	19 %	27 %	30 %	22 %
South Africa	22 %	26 %	44 %	36 %	45 %	48 %	22 %	22 %
Tanzania	5 %	8 %	10 %	9 %	11 %	34 %	20 %	25 %
Uganda	25 %	25 %	34 %	36 %	38 %	67 %	60 %	35 %
Zambia	31 %	38 %	35 %	36 %	40 %	70 %	50 %	31 %
Zimbabwe	42 %	40 %	49 %	49 %	49 %	62 %	44 %	25 %
Average	22 %	25 %	27 %	30 %	29 %	45 %	35 %	28 %

Source: Andvig (2008: 21)

Table 4: Eaters of corrupt proceeds and their mode of eating them

S/N	The Eaters	Plate/mode of eating
1.	Traditional Institutions	Traditional titles to federal/state/local government officials
2.	Religious Institutions	Prayer Mercantilism, Thanks Giving and Spiritual Blessings
3.	Legal Institutions	Judicial manipulations and outright judgments purchase
4.	Educational Institutions	Awards carefully wrapped in public lectures, Grants and Funds for projects not utilised.
5.	Family Institutions	Birthdays, Festivals and Ceremonies
6.	Civil societies	Public appearance, lectures and rallies
7.	Unions/associations	Courtesy visits, rallies, lectures
8.	Professional bodies	Courtesy visits and subtle demands of the impossible from their excellencies.
9.	Media	Business patronage , e.g., advertisements, media meetings with their excellencies, media awards of excellence.
10.	Ethnic nationalities	Threats and acts of public disturbance; amnesty
11.	Security Agencies	Security Meetings with their excellencies, securing the communities, people, life and property.
12.	Political institutions	Inflated contracts, political conflicts/gathering/meetings.
13.	International collaborators	Buyers of stolen crude, artifacts, and other items from African countries.

Source: extracted from Alliyu, Kalejaiye, and Ogunola (2014, p. 110).

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POST-DEFECATION PRACTICES AND HEALTH STATUS OF CHILDREN IN NIGERIA

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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to examine the association between post-defecation practices and health status of children less than five years old in Africa. Cross-sectional survey design is used to elicit data from 900 respondents. Three binary logistic regression model was fitted. We adjusted for significant sociodemographic variables. Statistical test was conducted at $p<0.05$ level of significant, with 95% Confidence Interval (CI). Result show there is a positive significant association between post-defecation practices such as anal cleansing with unhygienic materials (χ^2=4.274, $p<0.05$), disposing faeces around household environments (χ^2=10.542, $p<0.05$), and poor health status among children less than five years. The odds was higher among children whose mothers had no formal education (AOR=1.560; CI=0.908-2.434), separated parents (AOR=18.569; CI=5.379-64.102), economically deprived poor (AOR=2.102; CI=1.109-2.178), and those that practice unhygienic post-defecation behaviour (AOR=7.806; CI=3.539-75.021). The research concludes that poverty and unhygienic post-defecation practices influence the health status of children less than five years old. Thus, there is need to increase awareness and hygienic post-defecation consciousness necessary for improve health status of children in the slums.

Keywords: Africa, childhood health status, faeces disposal, post-defecation, slums, unhygienic practices.

Introduction

Post-defecation practices varies across socioeconomic, demographic, and geographical space globally. For instance, unhygienic cleansing of the perianal region has health implications, especially, for socially exclusive populations that lives in urban slums in less industrialised countries. The situation is precarious in Africa where data on childhood post-defecation practices and incidence of morbidity in the slums are important for planning to reduce the prevalence of mortality. However, there is paucity of information on childhood post-defecation practices in the slums of Africa. Report shows that over 220 million people still practice open defecation in sub-Saharan Africa (World Health Organisation, 2017), resulting in severe health challenges for children less than five years old.

In Nigeria, open defecation is widely practice which increase the risk of water-borne diseases such as diarrhea, dysentery, cholera, and death among under-five children at 132 per 1000 live births (Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey, 2018). Yet, little attention has been given to post-defecation practices in Nigeria and Africa, where achieving the sustainable development goals remain a challenge. Studies on defecation practices have largely focused on adult (Owolabi, 2012; Uwizeye, Sokomi, and Kabiru, 2014). There is a paucity of information on the health implications of childhood post-defecation in the slums. This gap in the literature has effects on the human development index, typified by high under-five mortality in Africa using Nigeria as a case study. Therefore, this study was designed to examine the association between environmental and cultural determinants of post-defecation practices such as anal cleansing, and faeces disposal practices on the health of children less than five years in the slums of Nigeria in order to make context-specific recommendations. These findings might shed light on the pathways to child morbidity and mortality in Africa. This is essential to develop contexts interventions' to improve children's health and reduce the prevalence of mortality among socially exclusive population.

Current study

In this study, we examined the effect of post-defecation practices on children's health in Africa, using Nigeria as a case study. We anticipated the effect of maternal education on children's health. This is essential because health risk varies from one community to another. Previous studies have associated maternal socioeconomic status such as income, place of residence and education to children's health (Case, Lubotsky, and Paxson, 2002; Ezeh, et al., 2017). These studies support the claim that children from poor households were likely to fall ill easily and their recovery rate is slow (Case, Lubotsky, and Paxson, 2002; Ezeh, et al., 2017). As a result, we anticipated that children from socioeconomic deprived households might suffer health inequality and social exclusion, which makes them susceptible to poor health status.

In Nigeria, public policies are not implemented at the household level. Therefore, environmental context of where children lives are often neglected. We also examined the post-defecation practices of under-five children in the slums of Nigeria. We focused on children anal cleansing practices, children defecation site, and places where faeces was disposed. We adopted the World Health Organisation (WHO) Joint Monitoring Programme standards for classifying unhygienic practices as unimproved and proper practices as improved. The WHO recognise that the safest way to dispose children faeces was to dispose it to the toilet (WHO and UNICEF Joint monitoring programme, 2017). This knowledge is necessary because, in many countries such as Nigeria, defecation programmes often neglect the disposal processes of children faeces (Bawankule, Singh, Kumar, and Pedgaonkar, 2017). In addition, dumping of faeces along major roads is a common practice urban slum in Africa (Muindi, Egondi, Kimani-murage, et al., 2014). Thus, environmental contexts where children lives are often neglected. This study, therefore, is designed to examine the implications of post-defecation practices on the health of children less than five years in Nigeria.

Methods

This is a descriptive cross-sectional survey design conducted between February to July 2017. The study was conducted among 900 respondents in the slums of Ibadan situated in Oyo

State, South-west Nigeria. Ibadan is historically acknowledged as the largest traditional city in sub-Saharan Africa with a modest population of 3,552,000 and it is projected to increase to 5.03 million inhabitant by the year 2025 (UNDESA, 2012; World Population Review, 2020). Ibadan slums are congested and it is characterised by unhygienic environmental conditions. Inhabitants in the slums dump refuse into the drainage and open defecation is a common site. Ibadan has one of the highest densely populated slums in Southwest Nigeria that accommodates people from all ethnic groups including foreigners. The city has grown in size and population to the extent that, environments that were purely rural 10 years ago are now peri-urban, and peri-urban communities have developed to full urban environment. In the same vein, slum communities geographically located at the outskirt of the city are now major site for daily business activities.

Participant and sample size

This study utilised 900 respondents using the expanded programme of Immunisation (30 by 30) cluster-sampling technique for sample size determination (Yoon, et al., 1997). Scholars have recommended the use of expanded programme of Immunisation (EPI) cluster sampling techniques for studies in the slums in order to minimize error when reporting the experience of only inhabitants of the slum communities (Yoon, et al., 1997). The World Health Organisation began using the EPI cluster sampling technique in 1974 and it has been adapted in epidemiological survey involving children (Milligan, Njie, and Bennett, 2004). Therefore, in this study, the EPI cluster sampling technique was adapted by systematic selection of 900 respondents in the study location.

Before launching to the field, the researchers recruited three female research assistants who had been living in the study location for more than 10 years. These research assistants were postgraduate students, mothers with experience in caring for children, and were further trained for 2 weeks on the rudiments of data collection. The research assistants fluently speaks English and Yoruba language. The choice of female research assistants was to make female respondents more relax when reporting defecation and post-defecation practices of their children. The questionnaire was translated to Yoruba language, because, Yoruba ethnic group (one of the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria) mostly occupies Southwest Nigeria. This enable respondents to select questionnaire written in language option of their choice. A pilot study was earlier conducted in two slum communities for internal consistency of the instrument, followed by a retest for reliability of the instrument with the same participants. After which the questionnaire was modified and adapted. Data from the pilot study was analysed and a Crombach alpha standard score of 0.8 was obtained with correction made were necessary.

Measures

A segment of the World Health Organisation (WHO) Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) instrument that focused on childhood defecation was adapted for this study (WHO and UNCEF Joint monitoring programme, 2017). The module had been tested and certified in various countries in the world. The questionnaire collected socio-demographic data of mothers such as age, education, ethnic group, and marital status. The questions modified and adapted after a pilot study were; what kind of toilet facility do children in your household usually use? (If "flush" or "pour flush", probe for where does it flush to?), has your pit latrine or septic tank ever been emptied? The last time it was emptied, where were the contents emptied to? did a service provider empty it? can you please show me the facility where children in your household defecate? do your child share this facility with other children in your household? how are children faeces disposed of? are there materials for anal cleansing? what materials do you use for cleaning your children buttocks after they defecate? How do you source for these materials that you use for anal cleansing? Do you regularly wash your hands with soap after caring for your children when they defecate? Do you wash the hands of your children after they defecate?

Ethical Consideration

Oral and written informed consent was obtained from mothers of under-five children before administering the questionnaire. Ethical approval was sought from University of Ibadan Social Sciences and Humanities Research Ethics Committee, University of Ibadan, Nigeria with assigned number UI/SSHEC/2017/0025. In addition, the international standard ethical issues bordering on respondent's confidentiality, beneficence to participants, non-maleficence and justice as it affects the study was considered and respected.

Data Collection and Analyses

The dependent variable was childhood diaorrhea. This was measured by asking mothers whether their under-five children had experienced diarrhea in the last four weeks before the survey. A binary response ('Yes' or 'No') was elicited from mothers. The independent variables were the location/site where under-five children defecate, materials used for cleaning children's buttocks after defecating, and faeces disposal site. The classification of variables aligned with the WHO/UNICEF joint monitoring programme for toilet practices (WHO and UNICEF Joint monitoring programmes, 2017). The data were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Chi-square was used to test the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. A logistic regression model was used to examine the influence of post-defecation practices on health of children less than five years old that lives in slum communities in Nigeria. Decision rules for the test of hypotheses were set at 5% level of significance. A p-value greater than 0.05 were rejected.

Results

The average age of participants was 32.0±5.03 years. Most participants (70.3%) were married, had basic education (50.2%), were within 25-34 years, and lived below the minimum

Table 1: Selected Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Mothers Age	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
15-24years	145	16%
25-34years	495	55%
35years & above	260	29%
Mothers education		
No education	103	11.4%
Primary school	255	28.3%
Secondary school	452	50.2%
Tertiary	90	10.0%
Marital status		
Single	80	8.9%
Married	633	70.3%
Separated	105	11.7%
Divorce	38	4.2%
Widow	44	4.9%
Income		
Below average	520	58%
Average & above	380	42%

Table 2 presents the association between post-defecation practices and health status of children less than five years old. Under-five children that defecate using unimproved toilet facilities were more susceptible to poor health status. There is a positive significant association between using unhygienic toilet facilities and poor health outcome among children less than five years old (χ^2 = 42.167, P<0.05).

Table 2: Association Between Post-Defecation Practices and Health Status of Under-Five Children

Defecation behaviour	**Health status**			**Asymp. Sig.**
	Good	**Poor**	**$\chi 2$**	**(2-sided)**
Defecation site				
Unimproved	85%	97%		
Improve	15%	3%	42.167	0.000
Buttocks cleansing				
Unimproved	95%	90%		
Improve	5%	10%	4.274	0.039
Faeces disposal				
Unimproved	85%	74%		
Improve	15%	26%	10.542	0.001

Significant at p<0.05

Almost all respondents (97%) with poor health status had in the last four weeks, utilized unimproved toilet facilities. In addition, the risk of childhood illnesses (χ^2=10.542, P<0.05) was high when faeces were disposed around household environments. The children from 74% of respondents that disposed faeces around household environments had been ill within the last 4 weeks before the survey. Further, there is a significant association between using unimproved toilet materials for cleaning buttocks after defecating and poor health status of children in the slums (χ^2=4.274, P<0.05). This shows that post-defecation practices influence the health status of children less than five years old.

Table 3: Association Between Mothers' Socio-Demographics and Post-Defecation Practices of Under-Five Children in The Slums

Characteristics	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	(Odds ratio)	(Odds ratio)	(Odds ratio)
Mother's age group (in Years			
15-24	8.040*(3.841-16.841)* ***		18.569*(5.379-64.102)****
25-34	2.288*(1.280-3.921)**		2.411*(0.974-5.970)*
35> (RC)	1.000		1.000

Note: P-Value less than 0.05 is significant and asterisked (***) beside Exp (B) column, while those that were not asterisk was not significant (P>0.05).

Table 3 shows the association between mothers' socio-demographics and post-defecation practices of children less than five years that live in urban slums of Nigeria. There is a significant positive relationship between mothers age and childhood post-defecation (χ^2 = 29.822, P<0.05) practices. Children whose mothers were younger (15-24 years) were more likely to defecate with improved toilet facilities. However, this category of children practice unhealthy post-defecation behavior as unimproved materials were used for anal cleansing, and faeces were disposed around household environment. These practices constitute health risk to children and it retard earlier positive efforts made to defecate with improve toilet facilities.

In addition, mothers' education influences the health outcome of children less than five years old. This is because educated mothers were likely to maintain higher hygiene level than others. Children whose mothers had no education were more likely to practice unhygienic post-defecation behaviour. This has negative health outcome as it exposes them to diseases and morbidity. Further, there is a significant positive relationship between mothers' marital status and under-five children's defecation practices (defecation site χ^2 = 16.956, P<0.05; buttocks cleaning χ^2 = 36.727, P<0.05; faeces disposal site χ^2 = 77.629, P<0.05). Children that lives with both parents had better chances of practicing improve hygiene behavior. This is because improved financial support from parents increase children's health status and development.

Household income influences defecation and post-defecation practices in Nigeria. This is because households with sufficient resources could afford the necessary materials needed for hygiene defecation practices. While poor households may struggle to acquire all the needed facilities needed for hygiene post-defecation practices. These findings emphasised that household income was the major determinant of children's post-defecation practices and health status in Nigeria.

Mother's education			
No education	4.414*(1.922-10.139)****		1.560*(0.908-2.434)****
Primary	3.301*(1.626-6.705)****		0.255*(0.125-0.521)****
Secondary and above (RC)	1.000		1.000
Marital status			
Divorce/separated/widow	9.020*(2.911-27.951)****		18.569*(5.379-64.102)****
Single	2.203*(0.908-5.340)*		2.411*(0.974-5.970)*
Married (RC)	1.000		1.000
Type of marriage			
Polygamy	1.260*(0.72-2.01)*		1.029*(0.560-0.101)**
Monogamy(RC)	1.000***		8.209
Wealth Index			
Poor	3.293*(1.83-5.93)****		2.102*(1.109-2.178)****
Rich(RC)	1.000		1.000
Defecation site			
Unimproved		7.964*(3.702-13.102)****	7.806*(3.539-15.021)****
Improve (RC)		1.000	1.000
Buttocks cleansing			
Unimproved		1.511*(1.249-2.049)*	0.211*(0.086-0.470)****
Improve (RC)		1.000	1.000
Disposal of faeces			
Unimprove		1.398*(0.249-1.636)****	0.304*(0.172-0.522)****
Improve (RC)		1.000	1.000

*p values <0.001., ***p values <0.05., (C.I in parenthesis)

Table 4 shows the relationship between household environments and health status of children less than five years old in Nigeria. The unadjusted model on table 4 shows that the odds of practicing unimproved post-defecation with poor health status was high among under-five children whose mothers' were older than 24 years, without informal education, financially incapacitated and without husband (single or widow). The odds of poor health status was higher among children whose mothers had limited financial support for proper care of children. Furthermore, children from poor households were more at risk of experiencing poor health than others.

The adjusted odd ratio shows that, the places where children defecates influence their health status. Indiscriminate disposal of faeces around household environments increases the risk of morbidity and mortality, which leads to poor health status among children in Nigeria. Model 2 shows that the odds of experiencing poor health status was high among children that defecate using unimproved toilet facilities (OR = 6.964; $P<0.05$). In summary, poor health status due to unhygienic post-defecation practices was high among children whose mothers were advanced in age, without formal education, widow, and financially incapacitated.

Discussion of Findings

In this study, we examined the post-defecation practices that makes children susceptible to poor health status in the slums of Nigeria. We found that socioeconomic deprived households were vulnerable to unhygienic practices. Children from poor households experience severe health inequality. They practice unhygienic post-defecation behaviour which endangers the health of children less than five years old. In addition, disposal of refuse and faeces around household environments constitute health risk to children less than five years old. Our analyses further shows that all children living in the slums were expose to poor health status, irrespective, of the financial status of their parents. We establish the role played by unhygienic post-defecation practices on children's health status, especially those living in slum communities.

Contrary to expectation that children of younger mothers were more at risk of poor health due to inexperience (Bora, Sable, Wolfson, Boro, et al., 2014), our result suggest otherwise. This may be attributed to support derived from grandparents who has more experience in childcare. Previous studies have documented that in Africa, and Nigeria in particular, grandparents has passion for child rearing and thus, were most often involved in caring for grandchildren at a tender age (Chukwudeh and Ojo, 2018). This is connected to the dynamics of modern industrial society, which requires mothers to work outside the homes, thus, given room for grandmothers to assist biological mothers in caring for children. This was reiterated by (Connelly and Ikpaahindi, 2017) that, described grandparents as alternative childcare. Such description shows the importance of children in each households, which propel grandparents to support younger mothers in caring for children.

In addition, our analyses provide evidence that maternal education influence behavioural factors that determines childhood post-defecation practices. This is in consonance with other studies that describe the influence of mothers education on children's health (Currie and Stabile, 2003; Muindi, Egondi, Kimani-murage et al., 2014). Health disparity in resource constrained societies is widen by lack of basic education and poor health literacy. In Kenya, for instance, death among under-five children due to diarrhea is high at household level when mothers do not have formal education (Mosley, 1984). Education is not compulsory in Nigeria where 35% female population are illiterate (NDHS, 2018). Female illiteracy or lack of education in resource-constrained community is responsible for high prevalence of morbidity and mortality in a country. This study captured this by reiterating that there is greater risk of poor health status among children less than five years old where mothers have little or no formal education.

The risk of poor health among children is higher in the slums than at any other environment due to lack of basic sanitation infrastructures such as clean toilet facilities. Previous studies in Nigeria supports this finding that unavailability of clean toilet facilities increase the risk of diseases (Yaya, et al., 2017; Yaya, et al., 2018). Despite the knowledge that disposing faeces around living environment constitutes health risk to children less than five years old, about 85% of the households in Nigeria slums, persistently dispose children faeces within household environments. This practice is a major cause of poor health status among children in the slums. Slums are disproportionately characterised by unhygienic practices. Findings in this study are in tandem with the reports by (Fiona, Corey, et al., 2019). In addition, Gill, Lanata, Kleinau, and Penny, 2004) noted that unhygienic disposal of children faeces increase disease burden by 23%. The International Monitoring Organisation on Health defines safe disposal of children faeces as the process of depositing children's faeces into the toilet (WHO, 2017).

Poor health status among children in the slums is associated to the practice of unhygienic post-defecation behaviour. According to (Mahrukh, Teresa, and Vanessa, 2019), open defecation was responsible for the spread of diseases, especially among under-five children in slum communities. It is, therefore, understandable that sanitation (toilet practices) was the central focus of the Sustainable Development Goal 6 (United Nation, 2017). In fact, some scholars have regarded open defecation as a security threat to women and children (Gabriella, 2012), and a violation of human right Bora, Sable, Wolfson, Boro, et al., 2014; Corburn and Hildebrand, 2015). Nigeria efforts to eliminate open defecation especially among under-five children has claw back due to poverty and unhygienic slum practices.

In this study, childhood post-defecation practices has negative implications on the health indicators in Nigeria. Such hazard was responsible for over 16% of under-five death due to poor sanitation practices in Nigeria (World Bank, 2015). In addition, the findings of this study shows that the risk associated with poor childcare increased with mothers that has no formal education. This is in tandem with (UNDP, 2018) reports, that slow decline of under-five mortality in Nigeria is associated to the high rate of female illiteracy in the country. A few study have reported that children faeces were not harmful (Aluko, Afolabi, Olaoye, et al., 2017; Gill, Lanata, Kleinau, and Penny, 2004), while other studies have associated indiscriminate contact of children faeces to health risk (Dairo, Ibrahim, and Salawu, 2017). Adane, Mengistie, Kloos, Medhin, and Mulat, 2017) associated the disposal of faeces on the floor within household environment to diarrhea due to the presence of flies. Further, findings from this study aligned with the reports of an earlier study conducted in Ondo State, Nigeria, by (Owolabi, 2012) who linked unsanitary disposal of faeces around residential homes to poor health status among children.

Strength and Limitation of the Study

This is a cross-sectional research survey design; a longitudinal survey may yield a different outcome. In addition, the data were self-reported and the authenticity of the results depends on the respondents. More so, recall bias cannot be excluded from the report. Furthermore, a larger population group is likely to stir further interest or yield a different outcome. However, this study provide an insight on the role played by post-defecation practices to determine the health status of children less than five years old in the slums of Nigeria. This is essential in order to direct health intervention programmes towards children's sanitary practices in the slums. Furthermore, this study utilised the World Health Organisation expanded programme of immunisation sampling technique to ensure that only slum inhabitant were selected for the study.

Conclusion

Childhood post-defecation practices remains a major health challenge, especially, in the slums characterised by lack of basic infrastructures. This situation increases the prevalence of morbidity and mortality among children less than five. Poverty, which leads to social exclusion have been implicated for the persistent practice of unhygienic post-defecation behaviour and children from poor households were more susceptible to poor health status. Therefore, to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal 6 by 2030, there is need to increase consciousness towards hygienic post-defecation practices in the slums, especially, among children less than five years old.

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PUBLIC HEALTH AND QUALITY OF LIFE IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

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Abstract

The study is focused on public health and quality of life in developing economies. Public health improves the quality of life of people through prevention and treatment of diseases. The paper examines the health aids in developing countries; and ascertained the sustainable development goals on public health. It also examines public health programmes in a developing country; and assesses public health code of ethics. The paper reviews previous work on public health in a developing economy and obtained public health situation for developing economies. The study relies on secondary source of information and, therefore, focuses on conceptual exploration, and critical analyses of previous studies. This study affirms that public health practitioners and organisations have an ethical responsibility to promote public health and wellbeing. The study proposes that public health organisations should strive to conduct and disseminate health assessment focused on population health status and issues facing the community.

Keywords: Public health, Health aids, Developing economies, Quality of life, Disease control, Health Ethics

Introduction

Public health refers to the art of prolonging life by preventing disease and improving quality of life through informed choices of society, organisations: public and private, individuals and communities by organised efforts. Public health is the science that protects and improve the health of people and their communities. Thus, public health is achieved through research on diseases, promoting healthy lifestyles, injury prevention, and preventing, detecting, and responding to infectious diseases. Public health focuses on protecting the health of an entire population which could be a neighbourhood, a country or a particular region of the world. Professionals in public health try to prevent problems from happening or recurring through conducting research, administering services, recommending policies and implementing educational programmes (www.cdcfoundation.org).

The basis for public health is to examine the determinants of health of a population and the threat it faces. The concept of health covers the physical, psychological and social wellbeing of a population or society. Public health is an interdisciplinary field which involves epidemiology, social sciences, biostatistics and management of health services. The sub-fields of public health include community health, health economics, environmental health, public policy, health education, occupational safety, gender issues in health, sexual and reproductive health, and disability (Perdiguero, 2001).

The aim of public health is to improve the quality of life of people in a community through prevention and treatment of diseases. This is conducted through surveillance of cases and promotion of healthy behaviours. The public health approaches include promotion of breastfeeding, hand washing, suicide prevention, obesity education, smoking cessation, delivery of vaccinations, increasing healthcare accessibility, distribution of condoms to control the spread of sexually transmitted disease (WHO). In developing countries' access to healthcare and public health initiatives are difficult challenges. Public health infrastructures are yet to be established.

Consequently, public health plays an essential role in disease prevention in both the developing and developed countries through local health facilities and non-governmental organisations. Most countries establish their own governmental public health agency which is known as the ministry of health and it is responsible for domestic health issues. The World Health Organisation (WHO) is the international agency that responds on global public health issues.

Conceptual Review

Health Aids in Developing Countries

A great disparity in access to healthcare and public health initiatives exists between developed countries and developing countries as well as within developing countries. Public health infrastructures are still forming in developing countries. They lack trained health workers, monetary resources, sufficient knowledge to provide even a basic level of medical care and disease prevention (Chem, et al, 2006; Jamison & Mosley, 1991).

Consequently, diseases and mortality rate increase in developing countries which results to extreme poverty. Some parts of the world are plagued by largely preventable or treatable infectious diseases. Similarly, many developing countries are experiencing more of the effects of chronic diseases; with, the poorer communities being heavily affected by both chronic and infectious diseases (Jamison & Mosley, 1991). Consequently, another public health concern in the developing countries is poor maternal and child health, exacerbated by malnutrition and poverty. The WHO reports that a lack of exclusive breast-feeding during the first six months of life contributes largely to avoidable child deaths each year. Irregular preventive therapy for treating and preventing malaria episodes among young children and pregnant women is one public health measure in endemic countries.

Addressing determinants of health across a population is the concern of modern public health. It has been recognised that health is affected by factors which is knowned as social determinants of health, environment, genetics, income, educational status and social relationships. The upstream drivers such as environment, education, employment, income, food security, housing, social inclusion, etc., affect the distribution of health between and within populations and are often shaped by policy (WHO, 2010). Concerning the spread of diseasesdue to globalisation and the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa; there has been a significant increase in health aid to developing countries after World War II (Twumasi, 1981; Asim& Bruno, 2013). From 1990 – 2010, total health aid from developed countries to developing countries increased from 5.5 billion to 26.87 billion. Some wealthy countries have continuously donating billions of dollars every year, with the goal of improving population health (Asim & Bruno, 2013).

However, between 2000 and 2010, HIV receivedover $6 billion which was more than the increase that was seen in any other sector during those years (Eran & Jay, 2014). Health aid has increased through multiple channels including private philanthropy, bilateral donors, non-governmental organisations, private foundations such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and multilateral donors such as the World Bank or (Asim& Bruno, 2013). Recently, health aid was channeled towards initiatives such as financing antiretroviral medication, insecticide-treated mosquito nets, and new vaccines. The positive outcomes of these initiatives can be seen in the eradication of smallpox and polio.

Public Health Programmes in Developing Countries

Thus, public health programmes provide vaccinations which have helped to promote health, including the eradication of smallpox, polio, etc. The following key functions of public health programmes were identified bythe World Health Organisation (WHO).

Engaging in partnerships where joint action is needed for health issues and providing leadership on matters critical to health. Translation and dissemination of valuable knowledge to promote health by conducting research agenda and stimulating the generation of facts and information. Establishing norms and standards and monitoring and promoting their implementation. Find out health trends and monitor the health situation. Promote health policy that is ethical and evidence-based.

The surveillance programmes of public health can also send signal on impending public health emergencies, monitor the epidemiology of health problems, record the impact of an intervention, or track progress towards specified goals;allow priorities to be set, and inform health policy and strategies for necessary action; and investigate, diagnose, and monitor the community's health problems and hazards.Public health surveillance can also identify and prioritise many public health issues facing the world today, which includes tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, zoonotic diseases, diabetes, waterborne diseases, and antibiotic resistancebetween 2000 and 2010

Sustainable Development Goals and Public Health

The United Nations have developed the Sustainable Development Goals to address current and future challenges in tackling health issues in the world, Also, set the Millennium Development Goals of 2000 which should be completed by 2030. These goals cover the entire spectrum of development across nations. The Goals primarily address health issues in developing countries. These goals address key issues in global public health: Poverty, Hunger and food security, Health, Education, Gender equality and women's empowerment, and water and sanitation(United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda, 2015).These goals can be used by Public health officials to set their own plan for smaller scale initiatives for their organisations.

The burden of disease and inequality faced by developing countries are hoped to be reduced by these goals and thus, lead to a healthier future. The sustainable development goals developed by the United Nations in 2017 include the following:

- Stop all kinds of poverty everywhere
- Promote nutrition,achieve food security,Stop hunger, and promote sustainable agriculture.
- Achieve healthy lives and well – being for all people.
- Achieve lifelong learning opportunities and equitable quality education for all people.
- Educates all women and girls, and achieve gender equality
- Ensure effective management of water and sanitation for everyone.
- Provide reliable, sustainable modern energy for all.
- Ensure productive employment and decent work for all for sustainable economic growth.
- Achieve sustainable industrialization, build resilient infrastructure, and foster innovation.
- Reduce inequalitywithin countries and among countries.
- Ensure human settlements and cities are resilient, safe, and sustainable.
- Ensure efficientproduction and consumption patterns.
- Take effective action to combat climate change and its impacts.
- Promote sustainable use ofmarine resources and oceans and seas.
- Protect and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems,combact desertification, sustainably manage forests, halt biodiversity loss and halt and reverse land degradation.
- Provide opportunity of justice for all,Promote peaceful societies for sustainable development, and set up effective and accountable institutions at all levels.
- Promote the global partnership for sustainable development and Strengthen the means of implementation.

Review of Public Health Programmes in a Developing Economy

Poverty Alleviation Programme

Inspite of various strategies toward poverty alleviation, malnourishment, hunger, illiteracy and lack of basic amenities continue to be a common feature in developing economies that included some parts of India. Though the policy towards poverty alleviation has beenfor overfive decades, it has not undergone any useful transformation. Government policies have also failed to address the health issues of majority of people who are living on or just above the poverty line. Butsch [2008] affirmedthat the governmental health care services, which should provide free or subsidised treatment to the poorest are not able to reach the target group. Lack of knowledge of available services, proximity to available services, or having special needs, have been significant barriers to health care service access.

Nutrition Programmes

Despite substantial improvement in health and wellbeing, under-nutrition still remains a silent emergency in India [Braun, Ruel&Gulati, 2008].Every year,many children die in India.

Consequently, more than half of these deaths could be prevented if children were well-nourished. Concerted efforts have been made to provide supplementary nutrition to children, so as to improve their nutritional status. However, no programme can be expected to reach all those in need. The Mid-day Meal (MDM) Programme provides for school children of five years and above suffers operational problems of food not sufficient to meet the needs of the child, or being adulterated. The Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) Scheme for 0-6 year old children was provided but its reach and coverage is limited.

Programmes on Communicable Diseases

India records progress on communicable disease control. Communicable diseases contribute to 24.4% of overall disease threat. Diseases like Polio, Yaws and Neonatal Tetanus have been eliminated. Although a significant reduction in leprosywas seen but there are new infective cases and disabilities being reported. In AIDS control, progress has been made with a decline from a 0.41% prevalence rate in 2001 to 0.27% in 2011- but still there are some persons living with HIV and still new cases are reported [Draft National Policy, 2015].There has been a significant decline in malaria but there are also threats of resistant strains developing. The tuberculosis burden, there exist multi-drug resistanttuberculosis.

Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) rises globally and have reached epidemic proportions according to World Health Organisation, 2014. Overall mortality due to NCDs was 60%. The disease specific share was as follows: Cancers-7%, Diabetes-2%, Cardiovascular Diseases-26%, COPD-13%, Other NCDs-12%. With large number of diabetic patients in India, there is also a mounting problem of Impaired Glucose Tolerance(IGT). Around 35% of IGT sufferers go on to develop type-2 diabetes [Verma, Khanna&Bharti, 2014].

Immunisation, being one of the cost effective interventions for disease prevention; however, the success of the Universal Immunisation Programme is constrained by implementational issues like poor cold chain management and injection safety, non-uniform coverage,high dropouts, poor monitoring and surveillance. Health education focuses on only knowledge-based interventions,neglecting felt needs and ground reality and does not reach the remote corners and vulnerable sections in India. Quality of training is doubtful, training of health educators is not regularly done. The involvement of the NGO s as a public-private-partnership provides hands-on technical support to the field staff is a commendable strategy but if without the supervision - vision of medical college teachers, could result in poor training: performance mostly proving counter-productive [Mohapatra, Mohapatra & Mohapatra, 2016].

Family planning programmein developing countries: some women lack access to contraceptives:thus, many women have unmet need of contraception due to inability to get contraceptives and family planning services or information. Few women in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia use modern contraceptives. [www.gatesfoundation.org]. Social norms, illiteracy, traditional social attitudes, and patriarchal structure of society constitute main hindrance to the successful implementation of the family planning programme in the developing world, where women are not allowed to take decisions on family planning. Some governments who lack the initiative have failed to provide basic infrastructure to tackle the hindrances or to facilitate public-private partnership to run family planning programmes. The reasons for the unmet need for family planning are fear of side effects, opposition of family planning by family members,limited knowledge about methods, poor involvement of males, reliance on breast feeding and poor health system delivery [Mohapatra, Mohapatra & Mohapatra, 2016].

Public Health Code of Ethics

The following Factors should be considered in any setting where public health interventions and policies are planned.

Permissibility

Public health ethical practice should be set within the parameters of the law at any given time and within established procedures for changing the law over time. A professional in ethics should try to work within the law so as to serve the needs, rights, and well-being of individuals and society at large. More so, organisations and individual professionals can ethically strive to change the law through the democratic and judicial process.

Respect

This supports human dignity within transactions, exchanges, and relationships.

Reciprocity

This refers to the notion that social life should reflect mutual exchanges and cooperation rather than unilateral imposition. Reciprocity ensures us to relieve as much as is reasonable, the burdens of adhering to public health policy. Whenever a public authority requires individuals and communities to participate in an important communal undertaking, it is required on that authority to provide the means necessary to see that such contributions are not unreasonably burdensome. The ethical ideal of reciprocity attests to the notion that social life should reflect mutual exchanges and cooperation. Effectiveness: If the goals of a proposed public health action are determined to be morally permissible, it is then necessary to assess how well those goals will be met. A proposed public health action or decision should be able to achieve its intended public health goals, if the best information is presently available,

Responsible Use of Scarce Resources

Every public health action, in particular which requires difficult ethical judgments, involves the use of scarce resources such as human skill, talent, and time; medical equipment and supplies, other infrastructure; natural resources and funds. Ethical decision making requires consideration of whether a given action merits expenditure of resources in relation to other needs or health goals that require attention now or in the foreseeable future.

Proportionality

Proportionality refers to assessment of the relative effects, positive and negative, of an action or a decision. A proportionate action refers to one in which the means used to attain a public health goal are reasonable when the benefits they bring and the costs they impose are compared, provided that those benefits and costs are distributed equitably and in a fair and nondiscriminatory way. However, a disproportionate action refers to one that involves a very small chance of significant benefit to a few and the cost of widespread deprivation or harm to many.

Accountability and Transparency

Public health practice relies on the support and voluntary cooperation of individuals and communities, both of which require trust. Trust is built on ongoing transparency and accountability. This involves describing actions and motives even when no critical questions are being asked. By giving an account of the reasoning and evidence behind a programme, public health practitioners demonstrate respect for the affected communities and stakeholders. Accountability helps the public to know the difficulty and seriousness of purpose involved in public health decision making, even if they disagree with the specific decision or outcome in question.

Public Participation

Public participation refers to the meaningful involvement of members of the public in public health research, decision making, planning, policy, and practice. Thus, public participation shows that participants and decision makers are mutually informed and engaged in dialogue and exchange (Thomas et al, 2002).

Previous Work

Mohapatra & Sengupta (2016) conducted a research on health programmes in developing country – why do we fail? The objective was to ascertain why the health programmes in India failed. The public health initiatives have contributed to the improvement of several indicators over the years but morbidity and mortality levels are still unacceptably high. The gaps in health outcomes continue to widen, notwithstanding that India possesses as never before, a sophisticated interventions, knowledge and technologies needed for providing health care to her people. Thus, the power of the existing interventions does not match the power of health systems, to deliver the needy, adequately and comprehensively.Access to public health services areinadequate; and benefits from the public health system have been inadequate between the rich and the poor.

The researchers made a line list of all the National Health Programmes in the country and carried out a SWOT (Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats) analysis to examine the reasons for the failure of National Health Programmes in India. They summarised the gaps in the implementation of theprogrammes and discussed the reasons of poor programme performance.

Findings indicate that the coordination between policy makers and programme implementers is far from what is desired for effective rolling out of health programmes. Policy and programmes are formed with inadequate knowledge of existing bottlenecks at the field level. Thus, the history of health programmes dates back to 1951, when India became the first country to adopt National Family Welfare Scheme (Lenka & Kar, 2012). India invests very small amountof public fund in healthcare: the total expenditure for health is only 1.62% of the whole budget out of which the National Health Mission's share is less than one percent. The government deviates from the core strategies of the National Health Mission-the allocation for the health sector has not increased. Poor communication and inefficiencies disrupt the continuity of health care.

Also, there are poor use of healthcare informatics, insufficient management training, a lack of an organisational structure and financial resources that limits collaboration with other healthcare organisations. In India, due to rural impoverishment, urbanisation and rapid industrialisation, migration of rural communities to urban areas is on increase. The primary health care system is not structured and organised in urban areas. However, the manpower and infrastructure are not sufficient to meet the needs of the growing urban population, especially the migrant influx. There is less number of health facilities (clinics), their facilities, functioning, and attitude of staff definitely influence the utilisation by the people. Issues of affordability in terms of treatment costs and costs of drugs, etc., were also major obstacles. One-fourth of the urban population of India, approximately, 80 million people live below poverty line. Poverty and insufficient health services leave a considerable percentage of this population with little or no access to basic healthcare facilities. The researchers affirmed that an understanding of migration and healthcare utilisation has the potential to influence health policy and provision of health services through an appreciation of differential needs of urban communities. Organisational capability that refers to management, strategies, and decision making are invaluable in helping researchers, clinicians, and programme directors in developing countries assemble teams,use resources effectively, network, and form partnerships.

Conclusion

The health of a population depends on poverty mitigation, healthcare financing, reduction of inequalities, health education and communication, and life style changes. Additionally, health of populations depends on efficient healthcare delivery systems in public and private sectors, and reducing mortality and morbidity.Health and safety are important aspect of human existence. Public health practitioners and organisations have an ethical responsibility to minimise, prevent, protect and promote public health and wellbeing.

Recommendations

Public health decision makers need to be transparent and honest about disclosing conflicting influences and interests.

- Public health practitioners and organisations should strive to conduct and disseminate health assessments focused on population health status and issues facing the community.
- Medical colleges should be actively involved in training of health practitioners and also perform operational research to evaluate health programmes and find solution to health programmes failure.

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ENFORCEMENT OF THE COVID-19 PROTOCOLS AND THE EMERGING HUMAN SECURITY CRISES IN NIGERIA

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Abstract
The discovery of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan City of China in late December 2019 and its subsequent pronouncement as a global public health pandemic by the World Health Organisation in early 2020 is heightening tensions, disrupting socio-economic activities and impacting daily living across the globe. The index case was first reported in Nigeria on 27 February, 2020. Nigeria's principal COVID-19 mitigation and containment strategy includes presidential declaration of total lockdowns and imposition of curfews in major cities of the federation. Security personnel were effectively deployed to enforce the COVID-19 regulations including sit-at-home and compulsory use of personal protective equipment (PPE). In enforcing the lockdown regulations, clashes between the security operatives and citizens were rife. This study investigates how excessive use of force in enforcing COVID-19 protocols undermined certain aspects of human security in Nigeria. Using the Marxist theory of the post-colonial state, this study argues that the application of excessive force in managing emergency situations is intrinsically linked to the authoritarian character of the Nigeria state which ignores the needs and priorities of the citizens. Brutalisation of citizens and restriction of movements undermined livelihoods and exposed people to assaults, diseases, deaths, hunger, wants, and psychological trauma. The study believes that overhauling the Nigerian state in line with the demands of human security will strengthen the country's capacity to manage emergency situations.

Keywords: COVID-19, Nigeria, protocols, human security, enforcement, emergency situation

Introduction

The discovery of the novel coronavirus the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) in Wuhan City of China in late December 2019 and its subsequent declaration as a global health pandemic by the World Health Organisation (WHO) on 11 March, 2020, is heightening tensions, disrupting socio-economic activities and impacting daily lives. As of 23 October, 2020, COVID-19 daily epidemiological report indicates that a total of 41,570,883 confirmed cases and 1,134,840 deaths have been recorded across the globe (WHO, 2020). Nigeria's index case of COVID-19 was recorded on February 27, 2020, following the arrival of an Italian national at the Lagos International Airport two days earlier on a flight from northern Italy. The Italian citizen had subsequently travelled from Lagos to Ogun State, sub-national entity in the south west province of Nigeria, on a business trip from where he displayed symptoms related to COVID-19, was tested, confirmed and promptly isolated (Ebenso & Otu, 2020). As of 21 October, 2020, Nigeria reported a total 61,558 confirmed cases and 1125 deaths (NCDC, 2020).

Initially, the Nigerian government had through the National Centre for Disease and Control (NCDC) activated a multi-sectoral National Emergency Operations Centre to lead a national response to COVID-19 (Amzat*et al*, 2020). Similarly, a Presidential Task Force on COVID-19 was inaugurated to provide guidelines and coordinate intergovernmental efforts to control the spread and mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria (State House, 2020). In line with the advisory roles of these interim coordinating mechanisms, World Health Organisation COVID-19 emergence response strategies included total or partial lockdown, compulsory use of facemask, maintenance of social/physical distancing were adopted as Nigeria's containment measures to check the spread of the virus. These interim measures were urgently prioritised given Nigeria's increasing risk to community transmission of the COVID-19. World Health Organisation had in its interim report, classified Nigeria as one of the 13 high-risk African countries with regard to the spread of COVID-19 (Amzat et al, 2020). This report is largely due to the poor condition of the health sector which limits citizen's access to quality healthcare services. It is therefore projected that Nigeria may bear the final burden of the COVID-19 pandemic if the country fails to coordinate effective measures to combat the virus.

To avert the impending danger, law enforcement agencies made up of the military, the Nigerian Police Force, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, the Nigerian Immigration, the Nigerian Custom and other non-state actors, were mobilised to maintain law and order, protect lives and property, and implement the COVID-19 protocols across the thirty-six states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory. However, a review of the activities of the security operatives deployed to support the enforcement of the COVID-19 regulations shows that the wellbeing and livelihood of the citizens were negated in the process. For instance, several cases of security killings and brutality were reported in Kaduna, Jigawa, Katsina, Rivers, Abia and Anambra states. In fact, it was reported that Nigeria recorded more fatalities linked to security killings more than COVID-19 casualties. Job losses due to lockdown were rife in most urban cities, lockdown limited peoples' access to healthcare services, destruction of traders' wares were widespread, extortion of people defying COVID-19 protocols were rampant, physical assault, detention and torture of people moving in search of means of sustenance were reported while compulsory use of face mask recorded human casualties.

Although the COVID-19 control measures of the Federal Government are necessary in containing further spread of the virus, however, they are having negative implication on human security. For the purpose of this study, human security is an approach which prioritises safety of people from such chronic threats as hunger, repression, and disease and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily life (UNDP, 1994). It addresses the unending questions of survival, livelihood and dignity of people in response to present and emerging threats – threats that are extensive and cut across seven specific areas, including: food, health, community, political, economic, environmental, and personal.

In this study, we analysed how the repressive character of the security agencies generated human security concerns in Nigeria during the COVID-19. We specifically interrogated how various aspects of the COVID-19 protocols undermined the key issues of human security. This paper argues that the way and manner security agents enforced the COVID-19 protocols infringed and endangeredthe economic, health, political, food and personal security of Nigerians.

Theoretical Perspective

This work adopts the Marxist theory of the post-colonial state theory, which is rooted in the Marxist conception that the state is a product and manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonism (Lenin, 1984). The theory assumes that the post-colonial state is a creation of imperialism, which made it tofollow a development strategy dictated by the interests of imperialism and its local allies, not by those of the majority of the indigenous population. According to Ekekwe (1986), the post-colonial state rests on the foundation of the colonial state, whose main goal was to create conditions under which accumulation of capital by the foreign bourgeoisie would take place through the exploitation of the local'shuman and natural resources most often by the help of the security agents who are often poorly trained and under paid making them more susceptible to corruption and abuse. (Campbell, 2020).

The colonial state was authoritarian, anti-people, anti-development and a protector of the interest of the foreign bourgeoisies; it was on the basis of this that the post-colonial state emerged and is maintained. Thus, unlike the state in the West; where the banding of individuals in a civil society makes demands on the state and their demands are articulated and processed. In a post-colonial state; there is no link with their civil societies and they do not take citizens demand seriously, rather what matters is the interest of foreign Bourgeoisies and the feathered Nest of the petty-bourgeoisies.

Therefore, using the Marxist theory of the post-colonial state, this study argues that the application of force in managing emergency situations is intrinsically linked to the authoritarian character of the Nigeria state which ignores the needs and priorities of the citizens. Brutalisation of citizens whileon restriction of movements undermined livelihoods and exposed people to assaults, diseases, deaths, hunger, wants, and psychological trauma. The study believes that overhauling the Nigerian state in line with the demands of human security will strengthen the country's capacity to manage emergency situations.

This paper relied on documentary method of data collection**,** which is a way of collecting data by reviewing existing documents derived from books, journals, newspapers, etc. It is most suitable for the paper because the data required for the study are already in the public domain. The paper also used content analysis, rooted on systematic logical deductions, which is a technique of making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages (Holsti, 1969).

Shutdown of Workplace and Economic Insecurity

Economic insecurity describes the risk of economic loss faced by workers and households as they encounter unpredictable events of social life (Western et al, 2012). A lockdown is an emergency measure that applies restrictions on movement, which means you must stay where you are and not exit or enter a building or a given area. This scenario usually allows for essential supplies. All non-essential activities remain shut for the entire period (Business Standard, 2020), which is a hard blow on Nigeria due to her poverty rate. Nigeria, in 2018, was announced by the World Poverty Clock as the poverty capital of the world, with over 40% of its citizens living below the poverty line (Kalu, 2020).

The COVID-19 pandemic affected the global economy in different ways more especially developing countries like Nigeria:

- encouraged social distancing which led to the lockdown of financial markets, corporate offices, businesses and events; and
- travel restriction imposed on the movement of people in many countries led to massive closure for businesses and industries-aviation, entertainment, hospitality sports and others.

The combined loss globally was estimated to be over $4 trillion (Ozili, 2020). The lockdown prevented many Nigerians working in the informal sectors from going to work or conducting their businesses. Local food vendors and traders have expressed fears over their ability to feed their families during the lockdown, with their daily earnings, the only source of their sustenance disrupted. An increase in food prices as a result of the lockdown also means that many cannot stock up necessities. According to Felix Morka, executive director of the Social Economic Rights Action Centre, a Lagos-based nongovernmental organisation (NGO). "The vast majority of people outside of the formal system are hit devastatingly by the lockdown, and any disruption to their daily livelihood has a huge and significant impact on their ability to meet their most basic needs" (Human Right Watch, 2020, p. 4).

Indeed, more than 80 percent of Nigerians work in the informal sector: street traders, taxi drivers, tradesmen, and artisans to food vendors and hairdressers; these activities involve face-to-face contact and are the means of livelihood greatly threatened by the lockdown. According to a Lagos based NGO, 65 percent of an estimated 25 million people work in the informal sector; who have lower incomes, often do not have savings, health insurance, or pensions that provide a basic social safety net, and 72 percent are poor (Human Right Watch, 2020).

Again, the spiral spread of the virus and the heightened uncertainty about how bad the situation could get, led to flight in consumption and investment safety among consumers and investors (Ozili and Arun, 2020). Also, the effect of the pandemic across the world implies that global supply chains have also been materially disrupted with huge consequences on the Nigerian economy. The lockdowns of several other western and emerging market also imply that import-dependent supply chains in Nigeria has also be severely interrupted; because Nigeria global linkages show that Nigeria is increasingly aligned with trends and risks outside its shores. Thus, sectors in Nigeria that depend significantly on foreign input will be negatively impacted. Overall, these supply chain disruptions will alter production and manufacturing, and general trade and commerce and other import dependent industries in the country (Augusto, 2020).

Supporting this claim, top economists such as Gita Gopinath and Kristalina Georgieva have come to a consensus that the coronavirus pandemic would plunge the world into a global recession (Financial Times, 2020). Also, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, in his nationwide broadcast to announce the partial lifting of the lockdown, admitted the economic difficulties that the measure had caused, acknowledging that many citizens had lost their livelihoods. According to him, many businesses have also shut down and "no country can afford the full impact of a sustained lockdown while awaiting the production of vaccines or cures for the virus" (APA, 2020, p. 5).

In response to the worldwide COVID-19 outbreak, most African countries adopted the same strategy as high income countries and have implemented strict lockdown measures to contain the spread of the virus. The impact of these measures aimed at reducing the spread of the virus has hit the economy. In Nigeria, Africa's largest economy, a 38% drop in GDP during the five-week lockdown was estimated, from late March to the end of April. South Africa appears to be experiencing a similar-sized shock. Impacts are even larger in Rwanda, where GDP has almost halved during that country's strict six-week lockdown (Africa Report, 2020).

Meanwhile, speaking recently on the effect of COVID-19 on the Nigerian economy, the Minister of Finance, Budget and National Planning, Zainab Ahmed, said that prior to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, the Nigerian economy was already fragile and vulnerable; according to her, the global economic crisis due to the coronavirus pandemic has resulted in unprecedented disruptions to the global supply chains, and a sharp drop in the global crude oil prices due to the slowdown in the global economy and lockdown in several countries, such as Italy, Spain and most Eurozone economies and beyond; coupled with theturmoil in global stock and financial markets. However, prior to the pandemic, the Nigerian government had been grappling with weak recovery from the 2014 oil price shock, with GDP growth tapering around 2.3 percent in 2019.

In February, the IMF revised the 2020 GDP growth rate from 2.5 percent to 2 percent, as a result of relatively low oil prices and limited fiscal space; the country's debt profile has also been a source of concern for policymakers and development practitioners as the most recent estimate puts the debt service-to-revenue ratio at 60 percent, which is likely to worsen amid the steep decline in revenue associated with falling oil prices. These constraining factors will aggravate the economic impact of the COVID-19 outbreak and make it more difficult for the government to weather the crisis (Onyekwena & Ekereuche, 2020). For the fact that Nigeria is still dependent on oil, the current crash in oil prices is adding to the COVID-19 lockdown effects. The Nigerian government is projecting revenue flow from oil to decline from N5.5 trillion in 2020 to N1.1 trillion, so we have a sudden fiscal crisis in Nigeria presenting some pretty immense economic challenges (CDC, 2020).

Practically, many companies (mostly industrial and services firms) have announced layoffs and /or salary cuts during the lockdown. Local airlines like Air Peace, Arik Air, and Dana Air, whose operations have been completely grounded due to travel restrictions, have all announced varying degrees of staff lay-offs and salary cuts (as high as 80%) in the past month. The Tech space is also trying to operate leaner, with Renmoney (local fintech lender) laying off 390 sales agents (Tellimer, 2020). However, the CBN issued a directive preventing any bank from laying off staff within this period; this was done immediately after Access Bank PLC announced downsizing due to higher operating expenses (Tellimer, 2020).

In order to cushion the effect of the pandemic on the citizens, the federal government announced a number of responses: N500 billion COVID-19 Crisis Intervention Fund, 50 billion Naira CBN intervention fund for households and MSMEs, N20,000 four-month conditional cash transfer to the country's poorest, reduction in price of fertilisers as subsidy to farmers etc. Also, in response to the economy slash, approvals were granted by the National Assembly and the International Monetary Fund for Nigerian government to borrow N850 billion domestically and \$3.4 billion respectively to help finance the 2020 budget and reduce the impact of the severe economic shock the COVID-19 pandemic is having on the Nigerian economy. Experts believe the palliative measures introduced so far by the government are not enough considering Nigeria's estimated 200 million population (CODE, 2020). However, the problems were not only that it was not enough, there were widespread disenchantments that the process was riddled with corruption, highjack by the political elite and did not reach the supposed beneficial. Therefore, the intended alleviation of the economic despondency of the citizenry was not achieved, which further aggravated the adverse effects of the pandemic and the lockdown

Lockdown and Food Insecurity

The COVID-19 pandemic is undermining nutrition across the world, most especially in low and middle-income countries (UN, 2020). The lockdown triggered by COVID-19 have led to disruption in health, nutrition, food aid, school feeding, it also resulted in limited access to food and its supply chains leading to scarcity in the availability of and access to sufficient/diverse nutritious food and supplements provided through the health care facilities (Relief Web, 2020). Malnutrition and other co-morbidities such as tuberculosis, HIV, diabetes are considered a risk factor for complications in people with COVID-19, due to a compromised immune system. Children are mostly the worst hit in cases of malnutrition. UNICEF reports from the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic suggest a 30% reduction in the coverage of essential nutrition services in LMICs and declines of 75–100% under lockdown contexts (UNICEF, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic is also expected to increase other forms of child malnutrition: stunting, micronutrient deficiencies, and overweight. The global community's failure to act now will have devastating long-term consequences for children, human capital, and national economies (Fore, Dongyu, Beasley &Ghebreyesus, 2020).

Although the lockdown policy was a grand measure to curb the spread of the virus, the measures are impacting on food systems; disrupting production, transportation, sale of nutritious, fresh, affordable foods andthe spiking food price rise; forcing millions of families to rely on nutrient-poor alternatives (Guardian, 2020). Strained health systems and interruptions in humanitarian response are also eroding access to essential and often life-saving nutrition services (Roberton, Carter, Chou et al, 2020). The national lockdown is having an economic effect that has led to tightening of credit access to farmers, limited access to inputs for farmers, limited access to transport services to transport food; also border closures limiting food imports. Though the lockdown does not apply to those providing essential services, such as food distributors and retailers, including market stalls selling food and groceries, which the government has said can operate for four hours every 48 hours (Human Right Watch, 2020); but movement restrictions, the opaque way security agents extort and abuse their enforcement, as well as uncertainty in the lockdown rules by the federal government have led to food supply chain problemswith a lot of farmers on the receiving end.

Indeed, Kobo360 co-founder, Ife Oyedele affirmed that food truck drivers who were exempted from lockdown restrictions, were afraid for their own safety, or fear they will be fined or arrested by overzealous police, who have improvised ways and means to circumvent the lockdown rules on what can move around or what is essential; as a result its fleet across Nigeriawas not operating because truck bosses were scared to go have their drivers on the road. Several farmers said crops were rotting in their fields or at the depots waiting for trucks that never arrive. And millers cannot get their milled rice to buyers (George, 2020). On the same note, small scale farmers have been unable to access supplies and even their markets, leading to business losses; like eggs rotting away because farmers cannot move to sell them.

Meanwhile, as the coronavirus crisis unfolds; disruptions in domestic food supply chains, with shocks affecting food production, loss of incomes and remittances; these are creating strong tensions and food security risks in many countries, including Nigeria. The United Nations World Food Programme has warned that an estimated 265 million people could face acute food insecurity by the end of 2020 (World Bank, 2020). Therefore, since local production in the sector cannot meet the demands of the 200 million people in Nigeria, augmenting with imported food has become a necessity. It is estimated that only about 100,000 tonnes of wheat are produced locally against an annual demand of over 3 million tonnes. The production of rice and fish which is highly consumed amongst Nigeria still falls below the quantity demanded. According to the NBS, between 2006 and the first half of 2019, Nigeria spent 38.24 billion Naira on agricultural goods import to augment domestic production. These goods include rice, sugar, wheat flour, fish, poultry, beef, milk, etc. Despite the increase in rice production from an annual average of 7.1 million tons in 2013 and 2017 to 8.9 million tons in 2018, imported rice still finds its way to the country to feed the ever-growing population (Obadofin, 2020).

Indeed, with the closure of borders and no viable alternatives, it is expected that the food supply from imported food will drop, which has adversely effected livestock farmers, feed has skyrocketed making it more difficult for Nigerian farmers, food availability and human security.

Lockdown Policy and Threats to Personal and Political Security

The lockdown of countries entails complete restriction of movement as the virus is transmitted through direct contact with infected persons or surfaces. Some of these measures as well as their enforcement , have implications on the right to freedom of movement, the right to freedom of association and the right to freedom of assembly. While typical restriction of movement of people would fall under a human rights violation, there is an exception for threats to a nation that pandemics fall under.

Nonetheless this exception does not cover the human rights violations in the enforcement of quarantine measures which have been brought to light around the globe (NLR, 2020). Meanwhile, while quarantines/lockdowns may violate these rights the U.N. stated that in response to serious public health threats to the "life of a nation," human rights law allows for restrictions on some rights, but this must be done in a lawful manner; must be justified on a legal basis as 'strictly necessary': be based on scientific evidence that is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory; be set for a determinant amount of time; maintain respect for human dignity; be subject to review; and be proportionate to the objective sought to achieve (NLR, 2020:6). Indeed, lockdown measures in place from the worldwide medical communities' recommendations to stop the spread of a global pandemic seems to be exactly the type of situation, but the abuses is the bone of contention.

Meanwhile, Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights maintained that, "no one shall be subject to torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment." Article 5 cannot be suspended where "strictly necessary" for "the life of a nation," is concerned, and Article 9 of the Convention is also meant to protect the citizens of the world against arbitrary arrests, detentions or punitive banishments from one's country (NLR, 2020, p. 2); and Nigeria is subscribed to these conventions. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet *highlighted that police and other security forces are using excessive and sometimes deadly force to enforce lockdowns and curfews*; in neglect to the United Nation Human Rights that emergency declarations based on the COVID-19 outbreak should not be used as a basis to target particular groups, minorities, or individuals. It should not function as a cover for repressive action under the guise of protecting health (UNHR, 2020).

In Nigeria, ever since the colonial period, governments have used the army for domestic purposes. But, soldiers are often poorly trained and with their salaries in arrears, making them more susceptible to corruption and abuse. The members of the Nigeria police force are even less trained and more poorly paid than the soldiers (Campbell, 2020); they have always been known for the crude ways they treat civilians; neglecting the constitution. So, it's not surprising that the COVID-19 enforcement measure has been taken by some unpatriotic officers and men of the Nigeria security agencies to perpetuate severe human rights abuses on some Nigerians. These abuses include killing, physical assault, torture, illegal seizure, extortions and incidences of sexual and gender-based violence. Furthermore, there have been cases of outright destruction of property by security agents (Action aid Nigeria, 2020), thereby inflicting hardship and pains on the vulnerable citizens adding to the economic insecurity brought about by shutting business activities, especially women and youths. There have been reports as regards the violation of human rights during the COVID-19 lockdown of which the report shows that a total of 105 complaints were monitored/received from twenty-four States (24) out of the 36 States of the federation including the FCT, namely: Abia, Adamawa; AkwaIbom; Bayelsa, Benue; Cross Rivers; FCT, Ebonyi State; Edo; Enugu State; Ekiti State; Delta State; Gombe State; Imo State; Kaduna; Katsina; Kogi; Kwara State; Lagos; Nasarawa; Niger State; Ogun; Osun; Plateau and Rivers States (Ojukwu, 2020).

Indeed, Olaruwaju (2020, p. 1) noted that the head of the Nigerian Human Rights Commission, Anthony Ojukwu said that it received 105 petitions from families of deceased Nigerians through their lawyers and carried out investigations and reported that "security operatives killed about 18 persons following the enforcement of covid-19 lockdown" and that "civilians' complaints of brutality and killing by security operatives were received from 24 states out of Nigeria's 36 states between March 30 and April 13". *In just two weeks after the imposition of lockdown, security forces enforcing it killed 18 Nigerians, while COVID-19 killed 12 persons within the same period.* Similarly, the report also noted that other types of violations recorded within the period include 33 incidents of torture, inhumane and degrading treatment, 27 incidents of violation of the right to freedom of movement, unlawful arrest, and detention, 19 incidents of seizure/confiscation of properties and 13 incidents of extortion (Africa News, 2020; Aljazeera, 2020). The report finds that the Nigeria Police Force accounted for about 90% of the total cases of violations followed by the Nigeria Army and Nigeria Correctional Service and other non-state actors and only 31 incidents of violations representing about 29% of the complaints were resolved (Ojukwu, 2020).

The Effect of COVID-19 Protocols Enforcement on Human Security in Nigeria

Indeed, pandemics always have devastating consequences, Francis Fukuyama stated "countries which are dysfunctional state, have polarised societies, or poor leadership have done badly, leaving their citizens exposed and vulnerable", (2020, p. 26); Nigeria being a post-colonial state where civil societies and citizens' demand and rights do not matter or count in policy outcomes, rather citizens are suppressed, repressed or even killed. The ongoing *#EndSars*protest is an example; where young Nigerians banded together to demand the disbandment of SARS which the government had previously said it disbanded trice: in 2016, 2017 and 2018; because of citizens' continuous outrage against its atrocities, especially to young Nigerians; three times, they were not implemented.

Consequently, when government acquiesced to their demand to disbanded SARS; nobody believed it and they continued the protest, further demanding that the president address the nation; the Senate joined the call for the president to address the nation to no avail. Rather than the resolution of this impasse; on Tuesday, 20 October, 2020 around 6 45pm Nigerian time, young and defenceless Nigerians, singing the National Anthem and flagging Nigeria Flag were massacred at Lekki Lagos by the Nigerian Army, which had earlier said that they are loyal to the president.

Meanwhile, when the former United States (U.S.) Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton condemned the killing and pledged her support to the Nigerian people; and in quick succession came the condemnation of the killing and support for the Nigerian people by the US Democratic Party 2020 Presidential Candidate, Joe Biden. The president quickly addressed the nation on 22 October, 2020 (7pm Nigerian time); a statement of note made by him is that the prompt response to youth's demands was seen as weakness (Thisdaylive, 22/10/20). A post-colonial state acquiescing to demands of her citizens is seen as weakness?

Therefore, after systematic andobjective logical deductions of information in this paper; we can safely say that the way and manner Nigeria security agents enforced the covid-19 lockdown, which killed, denied, infringed, violated and abused Nigeria citizens' rights and circumvented the means of their pursuit of livelihood, in an economy that was already in a comatose. This made it very difficult for Nigerians to find the equilibrium between life (health) and livelihood in the midst of a pandemic. Boxed in this corner, *human security*, which the 1994 *Human Development Report* defines as "safety from chronic threats and protection from sudden hurtful disruptions of the patterns of daily life" (Dorn, 2020, p. 1); of Nigerians has been adversely affected by the activities of Nigeria security agents.

Conclusion and Recommendation

This paperusing the post-colonial state theory, argued and established that the way and manner the Nigerian security operatives enforced the covid-19 lockdown protocols, adversely affected Nigerians human security: food, economic, physical, health, community and political security; Indeed the accumulated acrimony and pent-up anger of Nigerian seem to have erupted in the guise of the *#EndSars*protest, which now threatens national security.

The paper recommend that given the degeneration of the *#End SARS* protest to numerous other hash tags: *#Lekki toll gate massacre; #Secure North; #New Nigeria; #End Bad Government in Nigeria* and others hash tags; a study is recommend in two areas:

- Whether the *#End SARS* protest will lead to the resolution of Nigeria post-colonial state contradiction; which will enable the Nigeria state provide human security to the citizenry.
- Given the various purported breaches of the Cyberspace security of Nigeria national asserts (CBN, Nigeria Army, and Banks, etc.) by *#anonymous twitter handle*. How secure then is Nigeria's digital platforms?

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THEME SIX
GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT

PHYSICAL SPOUSAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR WELLBEING IN OWERRI METROPOLIS IN IMO STATE, NIGERIA

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Abstract

This study is to examine physical spousal violence against women and their wellbeing in Nigeria. The incessant scourge of physical spousal violence against women in Nigeria such as biting, shoving, throwing, grabbing, choking and use of weapons, among others, has increased drastically, constituting great challenges to women's wellbeing despite a plethora of legal and regulatory mechanism proscribing all kinds of violence in Nigeria. It is from the forgoing that the objectives of the study are drawn. Specifically, the study will ascertain the extent physical spousal violence against women has worsened their wellbeing in Owerri metropolis in Imo state, Nigeria. The study adopts a survey research. A multi-stage sampling technique is used to select 108 women from the three local government areas in Owerri metropolis. The instrument used to generate primary data is a self-administered questionnaire while the secondary data are largely adopted from journals, textbooks, newspapers, web pages and government publications. Four point Likert scale, mean scores and percentages of the responses are employed. Feminist theory provides the theoretical umbrella for this discourse. The findings show that, physical spousal violence against women, to a very high extent, has significantly worsened their wellbeing on healthcare, feeding, risk of training their children, homelessness, childcare, deprivation of liberty, safety of lives, lost work, and self esteem among others. The study recommends for housing and welfare policies for violated women, empowerment of women through microfinance and skill training, childcare support services via social security, among others.

Keywords: physical, spouse, violence, women and wellbeing

Introduction

Physical spousal violence against women has been a persistent epidemic in Nigeria that violates women's basic rights and affects the physical wellbeing of concerned women, their families, and broader communities. It connotes any behaviour or intentional use of physical force within an intimate relationship with the potential for causing death, disability, injury or harm to those in the relationship. It could be perpetrated by a husband, wife, boyfriend or ex-partner *via* physical assault such as scratching, pushing, shoving, throwing, grabbing, biting, choking, shaking, slapping, punching, burning, use of a weapon and use of restraints or ones' body size, or strength against another person among others, (*Owoaje & OlaOlorun, 2012).* This could result to harm, suffering or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

Remarkably, as spousal abuse cuts across men and women, women are predominantly the worst heat in Owerri metropolis because several men still beat their wives and perpetrate other kinds of physical abuse on them instead of extending a hand of love and protection to them, (Akande et al, 2002). Some of the reasons attributed to the abuse were if a wife disobeys or challenges her husband or does not play her gendered role, habitual immoral life, the rejection of a spouse's sexual advances and as a form of discipline on her, etc., in order to maintain the husband's power and control, (Omorogiuwa, *2017*). Hence, women became miserable because some were homeless without care for themselves and their children. Others experienced poor feeding as a result of lack of income and joblessness. In the same vein, they lack the basic necessities of life (such as food, shelter, clothing, sanitation, education and healthcare among others) necessary for a minimum standard of living, ("Basic needs", n.d).

Worthy of note is that, these women in Owerri rarely report the violence inflicted on them for fear of being stigmatised by the society and lack of positive response from the society. In the light of that, women resigned themselves to the culture of silence as a result of ignorance of what constitutes their rights generally (Okeke, 2018). Furthermore, the violence continues to be extremely harsh causing very big problems to women's well-being despite a plethora of legal and regulatory mechanism proscribing all kinds of violence against women, (*Haaga et al, 2015)*. Thus, the need for the study was raised.

Statement of the Problem

The contention was always premised on unimproved wellbeing. The experience of physical spousal violence made some women homeless, unable to take care of their health, children, education and family (Omorogiuwa, *2017*). Other challenges were having fewer opportunities to choose how to live their lives, females faced epidemic level of violence and harassment, gender stereotypes, low self-esteem and aspirations (Browne & Millington, 2015). Furthermore, women experienced poorer health, more emotional distress, more suicidal thoughts, attempts and unable to participate in issues concerning them and their homes, (Benebo et al, 2018). That led to the curiosity to provide answers to the following question:

Research Question

- To what extent does physical spousal violence against women worsen their well-being in Owerri metropolis Imo state, Nigeria?

Objective of the Study

The general objective was to examine physical spousal violence against women and their wellbeing in Owerri metropolis Imo state, Nigeria. Specifically, the study was to:

- Ascertain the extent physical spousal violence against women has worsened their well-being in Owerri metropolis Imo state, Nigeria.

Review of Related Literature

Conceptual Clarifications

Physical violence

It means a planned deliberate use of physical force or power, vulnerable or real against oneself, another person, group, community, that either give rise to or has a probability of causing injury, psychological harm, death, mal-development or deprivation (Rutherford et al, 2007). Furthermore, World Health Organisation in 2005 defined physical violence as any woman who is being slapped or thrown something at, hit with a fist or something else that can hurt her, kicked, dragged or beaten up, choked or burnt on purpose, threatened with or actually used a gun, knife or other weapons against her, (Bakare et al, *2010)*. It usually occurs in the home, to display power and control perpetrated by one spouse against another.

Spouse

The concept spouse entails "husband" and "wife" as any individual lawfully married to another individual, and "husband and wife" as any two individuals lawfully married to each other, regardless of the individuals' sex (Tate & Makuch, 2016). Again, it connotes a person who is married to another person, and both of them are living together or with another person in marriage-like relationship devoid of any time frame (Joanne, 2017). It suffices to say that, a spouse describes a husband or wife in a marriage relationship who are living together in a home.

Woman

It is a Latin word "femina" meaning woman. Femina became changed in the 14th century in order to associate the word female with the male. Interestingly, woman is traceable to the English word "wife" which is also related to man. Given the influence of Christianity, it became "this is the bone of my bone and the flesh of my flesh, she shall be called a woman, for she was taken out of the rib of a man". For that, it's a compound of "wife" and "man", (Panchuk & Jones, 2019). Usually, it is reserved for an adult, sometimes used to identify a female human regardless of age as in phrases like, "women's right". They are capable of giving birth, though older women who have gone through menopause and some inter-sex women cannot, ("Women" 2020) and a Nigerian woman is seen as a divine being with a noble role of motherhood (Azeez, 2016).

Wellbeing

It is the level of wealth, comfort, material goods and necessities available to women as nurtured by quality and affordable food, housing, healthcare, education, economic and political stability, adequate infrastructures, safety of lives and property (Nwude, 2012). Again, it is the quality of life most often associated with health, education, food, nutrition, housing, household goods and services, childcare (Steger, 2018). To guarantee a woman's wellbeing, she has to be protected from violence, fear of want of food and healthcare, (United Nations, 2009). Everybody every time should have physical and economic access to adequate amounts of nutritious, safe and appropriate food to maintain a healthy and active life, (Akinyele, 2009). It suffices to say that, a reasonable living should revolve around the above mentioned variables.

Empirical Review

The empirical review showcased that the paper titled: violence against Women: An exploration of the physical and mental health trends among immigrant and refugee women in Canada was authored by Gurugeet al (2012). It assessed the history of violence and the impairment of physical and mental health among 60 women participants from the Iranian and Sri Lankan, Tamil communities in Toronto, Canada. It was a pilot study and a cross sectional research. A convenience sampling technique was used.

Findings revealed that the participants experienced various types of violence throughout their lifespan, with a recurring incidence of psychological abuse within twelve month. They also had physical and mental health impairment. The title of the paper was very long and clumsy. Significant results were arrived at but the shortfall is that the study did not show the remedies to those challenges the findings revealed. Thus, generalisation of the findings was difficult. The previous study was foreign, it used convenience sampling technique while the present study will be local and will use multi stage sampling method. In the same light, Osisiogu (2016) authored a work on physical abuse of women in the home: A Nigerian perspective. It examined the nature of physical abuse of women in the home by exploring the concept(s), research (Nigerian and international), theoretical explanations, and social responses in Abuja and Keffi, Nigeria. It was a qualitative research. Primary and secondary data were used. Findings revealed that societal responses to domestic violence in Nigeria continue to be influenced by the culture of patriarchy, religion, and indifference in the attitude of the criminal justice system. It recommended that criminal justice system should be more efficient in handling matters of physical and sexual abuse of women in the home and community. Adopting a 'zero tolerance' approach should also be employed. The study did not point out the total population and sample size used. As such, the sampling technique was not revealed. .

Similarly, another study was aimed at strengthening the research on gender based violence with emphasis on physical violence among men and women in intimate relationships. It also reported the prevalence and factors associated with physical violence taking into account the hierarchical nature of the data. It was a descriptive cross sectional study. Multi-stage cluster sampling technique was employed. The sample size was 1000. Mean, standard deviations, proportions and percentages were used to summarise variables. Findings revealed an increased need and importance of accounting for hierarchical structure of data. Most of the significant associations in bivariate analysis disappeared in the multilevel regression analysis. The study r3ecommended application of multilevel models methods, (Yusuf et al, 2011). Both the previous and present studies adopted multistage sampling technique. The study lacked details which make it difficult for readers and beneficiaries to know the way forward.

Future research in related area will address the challenge. In Ibadan, Azeez (2016) carried out a study on gender-based violence experiences and reactions in Ibadan metropolis Nigeria. The goal was to assess the respondents' responses to gender-based violence as a way-out of gender-based violence in Oyo State. Specifically, the study made enquiries about the level of awareness, effects and eventual victims' of responses to non-physical gender-based violence. The study used multi-stage sampling techniques and 327 respondents were sampled. Data were coded and analyzed using Statistical Packages for Social Scientist (SPSS). Findings revealed that 68.5% respondents left redress for God; 7.3% took legal action and 9.7% fought the perpetrators. In effect, 83% of the perpetrators are likely to continue gender-based violence. The study recommended legal redress through media and local initiatives. Both the previous and present studies adopted multi stage sampling method.

Consequently, Kamimura et al (2014) conducted a study on intimate partner violence, physical and mental health among women utilising community health services in Gujarat, India. The motive was to describe the lifetime prevalence of intimate partner violence and examine the association between intimate partner violence, health and wellbeing among women utilising community health services to the economically disadvantaged in India. Sample size was 219 women utilising community health services. Standardised instruments were used. Findings revealed that those with a lifetime history of violence reported poorer physical, mental, sexual, and emotional health compared to those without it. The study recommendations were not clearly stated. The previous study was foreign while the present study will be local.

Gap in Literature

In the light of the reviewed literature, researchers have investigated the broad physical spousal violence against women but few focused on Owerri metropolis Imo state, Nigeria. However, the inadequacies, incompleteness and incommensurability the current literature has not addressed, created the yawning knowledge gap this study will fill.

Hypothesis

- There is no significant relationship between the extent of physical spousal violence against women and their well-being in Owerri metropolis Imo state, Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework

The study was anchored on feminist theory. The major proponents are Mary Wollstonecraft (1794), Laura Cereta 15th century, Sojourner Truth (1851) who submits that women have limited rights due to men's flawed perception of women (Brunell & Burkett, 2020). Feminist theory gives a voice to women and highlights ways they can better their lives and if both sexes have the power of reason then liberty should apply to women, (Matthew-Richard, 2017).

Tenets of the Theory to the Study:

Feminist Theory has the following tenets:

- It analyses gender;
- It recognises and reflects on the emotional live of women;
- Explored the production of knowledge from a woman's perspective;
- To liberate a woman's perspective from the discourse of a man's ideologies; and
- Our language is so masculine in nature and does not reflect women's experiences.

Application of the Theory to the Study

Feminist theory is relevant to the study because it has been lauded as the most influential in the study of gender issues. It analyses the status of women and men in society aimed at using that knowledge to better women's lives (Eme, 2015). Men's pervasive oppression and exploitation was displayed in Owerri metropolis *via* the use of physical violence such as scratching, pushing, shoving, throwing, grabbing, biting, choking, shaking, slapping, punching, burning and use of weapons against their wives contrary to the provisions of the United Nations General Assembly to combat all types of violence against women, (*Haaga et al, 2015)*.

Thus, the knowledge of feminist theory was used to safeguard women by protecting their gender rights against violence from men at homes in order to ensure that their rights are not impinged upon. To pull out of these challenges, spouses should be treated equally without violation. The affected women, who lost access to their healthcare, home, education, feeding, childcare, liberty, work, and self-esteem, should be a priority for housing and welfare policies, childcare support services, empowerment of women, safety, employment, boosting of their self esteem etc. (Osisiogu, 2016**)**.

Methodology

A survey study was conducted in Owerri metropolis with an estimated population of about 403,425, (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). A multi-stage sampling technique was adopted. Three local governments were purposively selected as Owerri West, Owerri North and Owerri Municipal as the sampling frame. Secondly, 6 communities were randomly selected from Owerri West and Owerri North respectively: Obinze, Ihiagwa, Nekede, Uratta, Emekuku and Naze. Regarding Owerri Municipal, no community was selected because their settlements are not known as communities but villages and residential areas. It comprises of 5 villages as follows: Umuororonjo, Amawom, Umuonyeche, Umuodu and Umuoyima and residential areas such as Ikenegbu, Aladimma, World Bank Housing Estate, etc. Thirdly, random sampling was used to select 12 villages from the communities in Owerri West, Owerri North respectively. They are Umueje, Umuanunu, Umuelem, Nakaramoche, Umudibia, Umualum, Ezeogba, Ezedibia, Akwakuma, Amakohia, Umuakali and Umuezuo while 5 villages and 1 residential area were selected from Owerri Municipal. Finally, 6 women were randomly selected from each of the villages which summed up to a total number of 108 respondents. A self-administered questionnaire was used in collecting primary data to compliment the secondary data largely adopted from journals, textbooks, newspapers, web pages and government publications. A four point Likert scale was used. Data was analysed using mean item and percentages.

Data Presentation, Findings and Discussion

Data was presented bearing in mind the objective and hypothesis of the study.

Table 1: Percentage, Decision, Mean Scores and Ranking of Respondents on the Extent to which Physical Spousal Violence against Women has worsened their Well-being on the following:

S/N	Questionnaire Items	Very High Extent 4	High Extent 3	Moderate Extent 2	Low Extent 1	Mean	Decision	Ranking
1.	Healthcare	106(98%)	-(0%)	2(2%)	-(0%)	**3.96**	Accepted	1st
2.	Feeding	75(69%)	30(28%)	3(3%)	-(0%)	**3.66**	Accepted	6th
3.	Risk of training their children	55(50%)	45(41%)	4(4%)	4(4%)	**3.39**	Accepted	9th
4.	Homelessness	88(81%)	15(14%)	4(4%)	1(1%)	**3.75**	Accepted	4th
5.	Childcare	90(83%)	11(10%)	3(3%)	4(4%)	**3.73**	Accepted	5th
6.	Deprivation of Liberty	99(92%)	2(2%)	1(1%)	6(5%)	**3.79**	Accepted	3rd
7.	Safety of lives & property	20(18%)	80(74%)	5(5%)	3(3%)	**3.08**	Accepted	10th
8.	Lost work	68(63%)	32(30%)	-0(%)	8(7%)	**3.48**	Accepted	8th
9.	Low self esteem	103(95%)	4(4%)	-(0%)	1(1%)	**3.93**	Accepted	2nd
10.	Longevity	81(75%)	19(18%)	6(5%)	2(2%)	**3.65**	Accepted	7th
Total		785	238	28	29	**36.42**		
Grand Mean						**3.64**	Accepted	

Source: Nwobi, U. A. **(2020) Authors Field Work.**

Mean (X) = $\frac{\sum fx}{N}$

Data on Table 1: showed that all the items ranging from 1 to 10 had mean scores above the criterion mean of **2.5**. That indicated acceptance. The grand mean of **(3.64)** was above the criterion mean. The result of the study confirmed that there was a significant relationship between the extent of physical spousal violence against women and their worsened well-being. On that premise, the following findings were deciphered:

- The healthcare of most physically violated women was worsened to a very high extent.
- Women feeding and nutritional value declined to a high extent because of lost of resources.
- Paucity of fund subjected women to risk of inability of training themselves and children.
- Majority of the women became homeless since they were denied access to family resources.
- In the same vein, women were unable to take care of their children's needs.

- Women's liberty was deprived because of their being isolated from the society.
- They lost their properties because of displacement from their homes in search of shelter.
- A significant numbers of them lost their jobs because they were indisposed to work.
- It lowered the self esteem of women and made them to be withdrawn from the society.
- A significant number of them lost their lives in the course of experiencing physical violence.

Discussion

Evidently, the statistics on table 1 item 1 in the study showed that majority of the respondents confirmed that, physical spousal violence against women worsened their healthcare to a very high extent as follows; (mean score (x) = 3.96 > 2.5). It came first (1st) in ranking. In that direction, women and their families were burdened by hospital bills, inability to receive medical attention and hospitalization because of increased hospital bills when survivors required medical care for physical injuries like bruises, broken bones, head injuries, poor sleep, hypertension, lacerations and internal bleeding without sufficient attention. Pregnant women also experienced greater risk of miscarriage, pre-term labour and injury to or death of the fetus, (Oluremi, 2015). Similarly, Tara & Licoze (2019) submit that men's coercive and controlling behaviour limited women's decision about their healthcare, family planning and large household purchases. Thus, women opportunity to access maternal healthcare services, family planning, large household purchases and health facilities for child bearing became reduced. More of the care they received was from family members, traditional healers and traditional birth attendants.

In the same manner, the opinion of respondents on table 1 item 1 indicate that feeding was identified by (mean score (x) = 3.66 > 2.5). In terms of ranking, it took sixth position. That demonstrated that physical spousal violence worsened the risk of poor nutritional outcomes because of withdrawal of food by abusive family members. As a result of that, women did not have access to food which translated to their inability to make decisions for themselves and their family including the choice of brands and quantities of food prepared in an attempt to care for themselves and their children. Besides, the feeding of the children was more closely controlled by their mothers through the will of their husbands who curtailed the ability of violated women to make decisions (Ackerson & Subramanian, 2008). Those that suffered depression were untreated and had little energy to take their children to the clinic. Some breast feeding mothers could not eat for days and it resulted to body weakness and loss of energy (Chai, 2016).

Furthermore, the study showcased that on risk of training children; (mean score (x) = 3.39 > 2.5) and it attained the ninth (9^{th}) position. That was in consonance with the fact that women undergoing physical violence suffered high risk of training their children and they pass through disruption, (Dryden-Edward & Stopper, 2019). Again, the economic loss to households has the potential to result in vulnerability such as re-direction of funds away from long-term planning like children's education, (Merino et al, 2019).

Regarding homelessness the respondents' opinion on table 1 item 4 revealed that, (mean score (x) = 3.75 > 2.5) and ranked number four in position. It demonstrated that several women were forced to vacate their homes to find safety elsewhere in the course of trying to escape physical spousal violence. As these women vacated their houses, it led to disruption of children in their schooling, friendship, link to community, cultural activities and violated their sense of safety and belonging at homes, children poorer academic outcomes, low school attendance, learning difficulties and when violence became chronic and sustained, it gave rise to trauma that distorted survivors sense of identity and concept of others resulting to social isolation and inability to relate with others, ("Children exposure to domestic and family violence: Key issues and responses", 2015). In the same context, Michele (2018) attested to the fact that, women and children were obliged to live with their friends and relatives far away from school. Thus, were unable to participate socially and academically because they suffered lack of space at home to study, had limited access to computer for homework, increased anxiety, stress, meant to live in a noisy environment, overcrowded accommodation that affected their sleep. Children who lived in the refugee camps were vulnerable to being teased and bullied at school because of the stigma associated with refugee accommodation.

In a similar context, the respondents' perceptions on childcare as indicated in table 1: item 5, revealed the following: (mean score (x) = 3.73 > 2.5) and took 5th position in ranking. Laying credence to the findings, children whose mothers experienced abuse had increased risk of their mother's having a significant reduction on control of resources and ability to take part in decision making of the family. As a result of that, the capacity to direct family resources by these women to childcare was significantly reduced which led to anxiety, depression and violence against their peers. Children also sustained injuries in an attempt to shield their mothers from being beaten, Islahi & Ahmad (2015). In addition, Kachiputu & Mwale (2016) concurred that violence withheld child's financial support, school fees; uniforms were not provided, some had their textbooks and exercise books burnt. Those whose parents fought or insulted themselves were hurt because of the frequent beating and tongue lashing of their mother.

Obviously, the result of the findings was indicative of the fact that liberty of violated women was significantly worsened as the respondents uncovered in table 1 item 6 above; (mean score (x) = 3.79 > 2.5) with third (3rd) position. In that direction, women often lacked freedom to move from home to access medical facility hence, their wellbeing was impeded. Again, most of the abused women did not have fund to access health facility. Amidst that, family members opted for women to remain in their homes rather than risk moving about. In the light of this, camps for internally displaced persons and refugees sometimes become sites of confinement for women, which limited their access to resources as they could not leave the premises. Furthermore, women's financial dependence on their spouses and other family members increased their vulnerability to paucity of fund and decreased their voice and bargaining power within the household, (United Nation, 2019).

The respondents opinion on safety of lives and property of women worsened as revealed in table 1 item 7; (mean score (x) = 3.08 > 2.5) with a 10th position. In the same vein, witnessing violence between parents disrupted a child's sense of safety and security. Overtime, the children internalised bad relationships, employed controlling and manipulative behavior themselves and perceived violence as normal within marriage which made them prone to replicating such behavior at adulthood, ("Domestic violence and abusive relationship", n.d.). Beyond that, husbands that flogged their wives in the presence of their children were likely to have their kids grow up at home to witness violence, become abusers themselves, may struggle to form a relationship in adult life, likely to use violence when they perceive threat in school and community, enveloped in insecurity, anger and withdrawn from the society for fear of being abused by their mates and those who are aware of their predicaments. Besides, they will become afraid of intimate relationship when is appropriate for them to marry. Above all, they may deviate from being vulnerable to being used for criminal activities and gangs, ("Foundation for partnership initiative in the Niger Delta", 2018).

It was distinct from table 1 item 8 in the study that, (mean score (x) = 3.48 > 2.5) and ranked eight (8th) in position. That means that women loss of job worsened because of violence.

Flowing from that direction, "Family violence and workplace" (n.d.) explained that the performance of women at workplace was affected by violence because of their recurring absence. That reduced productivity and cost of running the organisation causing disruption and threat to women's safety and their co-workers as well. It also interfered with the women ability to work which gave rise to loss of job as confirmed by, ("What are some other effects" 2019). This is in consonance with Fisher (n.d.) who said that, about 50% of women that experienced spousal violence either quit or were forced to leave their jobs which translated to a total income loss for the women and their family at large. Even poorer strata of the population where the women often need to generate income for their family subsistence had their participation and productivity in the market also affected.

On the frontier of low self esteem as indicated in table 1 item 9 **above:** (mean score (x) = 3.93 > 2.5) and was the second (2nd) in ranking meaning that from respondents opinion, violence worsened women self esteem. Similarly, Okemini & Adekola (2012) agreed that women who suffered physical spousal violence have low participation in community development, very low self esteem, inferiority complex and incapable of taking part in societal affairs due to poor health. In the same context, they felt valueless, unable to please their partner, incapable, helpless, have the tendency of destroying themselves and never wanted to disclose it to others. As the abusive words of their abusers continue, their self-esteem became very low. That led to suicide attempts, some stopped work because of loss of trust on their spouse and went into isolation on account of anger, ("violence against women and its consequences", 2014).

The result of the finding on longevity as seen on table 1 item 10 indicates that, (mean score (x) = 3.65 > 2.5). This variable ranked 7th position. This established that most women who experienced physical spousal violence to a high extent short-lived. Merino et al (2019) concurred that it reduced the life span of several women because of their inability to care for themselves, their children, death or long-term injury and lack of peace of mind that intensified fear in women. In consonance to that, United Nations Women (2019) revealed that out of 87,000 women that were globally killed purposely in 2017, 50,000 (approximately 58%) died because of physical spousal relationship. Besides, an estimated 137 women were killed across the world by their family member daily and more than 30,000 (1/3) women killed purposely were put to death by their spouse.

Concluding Remarks

The primary conclusion to draw from this study is that, it provided convincing evidence that the incessant scourge of physical spousal violence against women in Nigeria increased drastically and constituted great challenges to women's well-being despite a plethora of legal and regulatory mechanism proscribing all kinds of violence in Nigeria. Hence, this study was aimed at examining the extent physical spousal violence against women has worsened their well-being in Owerri metropolis Imo state, Nigeria. Findings from the study revealed that, physical spousal violence against women to a very high extent has significantly worsened their well-being on healthcare, feeding, risk of training their children, homelessness, childcare, deprivation of liberty, safety of lives, lost work, and self-esteem, etc. To address the challenges the recommendations below should be employed. In conclusion, the above findings have established that physical violence worsened the wellbeing of women.

Recommendations

The study recommends the following:

- Healthcare sectors should help to identify early the abused women, refer to appropriate care and give them necessary treatment and support to feel safe, respected and not stigmatised.
- There should be housing and welfare policies. To achieve this, the government should provide outreach support, financial assistance and incentives to women who are victims of homelessness and welfare challenges as a result of physical spousal violence.
- Government should provide social security for childcare through earmarking of fund by the government for the abused to meet their needs in line with international best practices.
- A law to amputate the finger of abusers should be made and enforced by the government. This will reduce the threat on safety of lives and untimely death of the abused.
- To eliminate loss of job, there should be empowerment of women through microfinance and skill training. To achieve this, there has to be community mobilisation and group based participatory education that will encompass the women to generate critical reflections on the skills needed to generate income themselves and unequal relationships.
- Effort should be made to provide effective community based support services and opportunities, provided through public health experts networking with non-governmental organisations and voluntary organisations to create social support network.

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FEMINISATION OF POVERTY AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SELECTED COMMUNITIES IN BEKWARRA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, CROSS RIVER STATE – NIGERIA

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Abstract

The phenomenon of violence against women has remained a major public health concern, particularly as its cumulative impact on morbidity and mortality rates as well as its social and economic costs, has serious implications for the sustainability of societies across the globe and especially Africa. Violence against women is today considered a worldwide problem with devastating effects on the physical, mental and social health of women. Unfortunately, significant numbers of women in Nigeria, especially those living in rural areas, experience daily diverse forms of gender-based violence. As noted by various studies, factors such as the challenge of gender inequality, power imbalances and the economic status of women are highlighted as root causes of violence against women in Nigeria. This study thus investigates the factors responsible for the poverty of women in Bekwarra L.G.A and how they contribute to the prevalence of violence against women. The study, relying on the cross-sectional survey research design involving 300 respondents purposively selected from households in 5 selected towns in Bekwarra L.G.A and descriptive statistics, reveals that gender biases in access to public privileges, wage gap, low levels of education, unpaid care work and women's limited property rights contribute to feminisation of poverty and violence against women in Bekwarra L.G.A. This confirms the postulations of the ecological model of gender-based violence which argues that no single factor can explain why women are at higher risk of interpersonal violence; rather, violence against women is the outcome of a number of individual, relational, community and societal factors. Thus, the study recommends that government at all levels should address social norms that perpetuate violence against women and also ensure women's economic autonomy and security as a way to achieve sustainable development in Nigeria and Africa as a whole.

Keywords: feminisation of poverty, gender-based violence, wage-gap, poverty, violence against Women

1. Introduction

The phenomenon of poverty remains one of the most disturbing concerns of state governments and civil society groups across the world. This is mainly because poverty is a dehumanising socio-economic condition denoted by a persistent lack of the resources to satisfy ones basic life needs. Poverty denies one of full humanness and subjects the poor to a miserable life of inability to pursue decent living conditions. The poor are those who do not have the means and resources to live healthy, and thus endure starvation, ill health, homelessness, unsafe environments and increased mortality. Poverty is also strongly associated with low levels of education, lack of requisite skills for productivity, an inability to work, unemployment, and low need for achievement. While these attributes have often been found to exist with poverty, their inclusion in the definition of poverty tend to obscure the relation between them and the actual inability to provide for one's basic needs as occasioned by lack, deprivation and social inequality. However, whatever definition one uses, scholars and laypersons alike commonly agree that the outcomes of poverty are detrimental to both individuals and society.

The United Nation's 1995 World Summit for Social Development, in Copenhagen, noted that poverty is characterised by nine key conditions, namely: a lack of income and productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to education and other basic services; increased morbidity and mortality from illnesses, homelessness and inadequate housing, unsafe environments, social discrimination; and exclusion from decision-making in civil, social and cultural life. It is on this basis that the poor is considered the wretched of the earth. It is also acknowledged that poverty affects people in different depths and levels, at different times and at different phases of existence. As argued by Social Watch (2010) and the World Summit for Social Development (1995), women, especially in developing countries, are more likely to be poor than men. Women, owing to their comparatively limited access to material resources; more limited social and cultural assets in the society, cannot partake in society on equal terms with men, and are thus excluded from social and civic life. Poverty affects greatly the standard of life of women, their consumption patterns and leisure activities, and exposes them to different kinds of risks and harm.

Among many other challenges faced by women as a result of their disadvantaged status in the society, violence against women stands out as a significant risk factor for women's ill health, with far-reaching consequences for their physical, mental and social health. For Krantz and Garcia-Moreno (2005), violence against women encompasses a multitude of abuses directed at women and girls over their life span. It includes all practices and behaviours that expose women and girls to risk and harm, and are meted on them mainly because they are females. Violence against women make it difficult for women and girls to participate in social and economic activities that will improve their status in the society as they are either socially, physically and psychologically deprived or restricted to do so. Furthermore, studies by scholars, such as Umana (2018), Oluremi (2015), Nussbaum (2004), and Jewkes (2002), have also suggested that the challenge of violence against women is not unconnected to the phenomenon of poverty and the deprivation of women in the society.

It is against this backdrop that this study sets out to investigate the factors responsible for the poverty of women and how this contributes to the phenomenon of violence against women in Bekwarra Local Government Area of Cross River State. The research questions arising from the objective of this study include: What factors contribute to the poverty of women in Bekwarra L.G.A of Cross River State? In what ways does the socio-economic status of women contribute to the violence against in women in Bekwarra L.G.A of Cross River State? In what ways has poverty and violence against women affected women in Bekwarra L.G.A of Cross River State? What are the strategies employed by women to cope with poverty and violence against women in Bekwarra L.G.A of Cross River State?

2. Meaning and Definitions of Feminisation of Poverty

The social, economic and political barriers that restrict females from accessing opportunities and wealth in relation to males in the society, creates a condition of impoverishment where women represent the most miserable gender in the world. Whereas men have an extensive range of privileges in the society, women are largely segregated, deprived, and have limited access to education, wealth, decision-making power, and opportunities. Some women are forbidden to do jobs with decent wages, while many others are restricted to lesser tasks or menial jobs with very poor pay. As noted by Chant (2018), McCarthy (2018) and Fukuda-Parr (1999), women in the society are often denied access to critical resources that facilitate prosperity, such as credit, land and inheritance. Their health care and nutritional needs are often not given priority, and above all, they lack sufficient access to education, well paying jobs and support services, while their participation in politics and decision-making at home and in the community remain minimal. As a result, millions of women are caught in the web of poverty, socio-economic disability and hunger. This recognisable trend is what is deemed the 'feminization of poverty', which according to various studies is not only a growing problem in Nigeria, but in several other countries around the world.

The concept of feminisation of poverty explains the fact that women represent disproportionate percentages of the world's poor, especially in developing countries. As noted by *Chen et al (2005), the* United Nations Development Fund for Women (1995), describes it as the burden of poverty borne by women owing to their disadvantaged conditions in the society. Feminisation of poverty captures the increasing tendency for those to be in poverty to be primarily women and girls. Diana *Pearce, first used the term 'feminisation of poverty', in her thesis titled 'the feminisation of poverty: women, work, and welfare' (1978), to explain the experiences of women in the society and how the poverty of women is disproportionately higher than that of men.* For instance, a United Nations report of 2015 noted that women are 4% more likely than men to live in extreme poverty around the world. Again, 70% of all the people in the world living in poverty are women.

Also, women are more likely to be food insecure than men in two-thirds of countries across the globe, while women are 2.6 times more likely to do unpaid work than men. Furthermore, 15 million girls, compared to 10 million boys, will never get a chance to learn to read or write in primary school (Gor, 2018; UNDP, 2015). The implication of these is enormous, and extends to the feminisation of poverty. For *Chant (2006) and Fukuda-Parr (1999), the feminisation of poverty* is not entirely a consequence of income disparity or lack of one, but is also the consequences of systemic deprivation of capabilities and gender biases present in societies. Medeiros and Costa (2006) equally emphasised that women's increasing share of poverty is related to a number of social issues that limit women in the society, while the feminisation of poverty is a process enabled by the poverty of choices and opportunities women encounter as females.

Whereas there is no singular explanation for the phenomenon of feminization of poverty, UNIFEM (1995) has identified four key “dimensions” that enable the heightened rate of poverty of women across societies (See Figure 1). According to UNIFEM (2005), as cited in Abbate (2010), there is the *temporal dimension* where women engage in household tasks for which they receive no pay for, alongside so many other responsibilities as wives, mothers or females in the household. As a result, women have less time to devote to paid employment, and consequently earn a smaller income, even though they are effectively doing more work than their male counterparts. *There is also the spatial dimension* where are women are restricted to pursue gainful engagements outside the home owing to their responsibilities as housekeepers and caretakers. For instance, a married woman with children will often times find it difficult to pursue a job that takes her far from her family and away from the task of caring for the family. The repercussion of this is that she is restricted to the location where she can work and take care of the home front at the same time, which in most cases poses limited options and opportunities.



Figure 1: Dimensions of Feminisation of poverty. Source: Author's illustration

The employment segmentation dimension on the other hand explains how women are impoverished by the systemic distribution of the types of jobs women should do. In most societies for instance, women have been corralled into specific lines of work, such as teaching, catering, caring for children and the elderly, tailoring, sales, and domestic servitude. The challenge is that most of these kinds of jobs lack stability, security and a higher income, thus leave the woman at the risk of unemployment, underemployment and poverty. While the *valuation dimension underscores the inability of women to earn from the various laborious household chores that they do; including taking care of all members of the family, largely because it is* considered of far less value, at least economically, than other paid employments that require expertise or training. It is important to note, as pointed out by Abbate (2010), that the feminisation of poverty not only forces women into a role where they must earn less, it also encompasses far more than just matters of income or individual suffering; when allowed to perpetuate feminised poverty ensnares generations of women and girls in a vicious cycle of poverty and hopelessness, threatening the socio-economic conditions, health, and well-being of women and their families.

2.1 Poverty and Violence against Women

The phenomenon of violence against women is not new; however, its growing dimensions and deepening implications for women, girls and society as a whole reiterates the need to urgently eradicate its occurrence. Violence against women captures the entirety of risk and harm; including the subjugation, suppression, and abuse women face in the society simply for being females. As rightly stated by Gillum (2019) and Chant (2018), violence against women is a major public health concern that has profound impacts on women across the globe. Many women who have suffered violence because of their gender have been found to endure serious mental, physical and many other social and economic challenges.

In Nigeria for instance, violence against women takes many forms and manifests in practices such as domestic violence, child marriage, female genital mutilation, trafficking for sex or slavery, sexual abuse and rape, virginity tests, acid bathing, and ritual killing of women and girls. Furthermore, global estimates published by WHO in 2015 revealed that about 1 in 3 (35%) of women worldwide have experienced either physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence or non-partner sexual violence in their lifetime. Again, globally, majority of victims of domestic violence-related murders are women; while as many as 38% of murders of women are committed by a male intimate partner.

Whereas many assume that violence against women is caused by things like substance use, stress, abusive behaviour, prejudice and negative masculinity; however, studies have shown that income levels of women in the society and the phenomenon of feminised poverty plays a major role in violence against women. As suggested by Nwakanma and Abu (2020), Niess-May (2019) and Gor (2018), often times violence against women is caused by the choice of the perpetrator to abuse persons who are economically unequal to him, and in this case women. Adams et al (2012) have also argued that although gender-based violence cuts across socioeconomic status, age, geography, tribe and sexual orientation, low-income women are more vulnerable to abuse, exploitation and suppression; and those who experience domestic or intimate partner violence have fewer options to leave violent relationships, due to their lack of income and resources.

It has also been argued by Niess-May (2019) that the intersection of poverty and violence against women can be understood in the ways poverty exacerbates the impact of the abuse, cause an exceptional loss of resources for the survivor, and lessen positive outcomes for women and girls. For instance, poverty and its associated challenges can make men (who in most societies double as bread-winners and head of family), feel inadequate, frustrated and angry; thus, creating the tendency for them to vent their anger on their wives and children. In some other cases where the women are the bread-winner, violence and abuse can come from the feelings of shame, envy and uselessness. Also, women who live in poor households are sometimes unable to escape an abusive relationship, or seek redress in a court of law owing to lack of resources to pursue such**.**

1.2 Theoretical framework

Efforts by different scholars over the years to understand and explain violence against women as well as poverty; why it happens and how to eradicate it, has generated a plethora of theories such as the feminist theory, the patriarchal system theory, etc. However, the most compelling, for this study, is the '*Ecological model*' of gender-based violence. This theory argues that violence against women results from the interaction of a number of factors at different levels of the social environment. Scholars of this school of thought opine that no singular factor alone causes violence and abuse; rather, violence against women is the outcome of different factors at four levels of the social environment, namely: the individual level, the relationship level, the community level, and the level of the society. Heise (1998) in a work on '*Violence against women: an integrated, ecological framework*, created a flowchart showing how these factors collectively increase the likelihood of violence against women and girls. As shown in Figure 2, the model can best be visualized as four interconnected concentric circles representing different



Figure 2.1 : Ecological model of gender-based violence. Source: Heise (1998)

At the *individual level*, personal experiences and biological factors are believed to influence how men treat women in the society, and increase their likelihood of becoming a perpetrator of violence. Contributing factors, as noted by Heise (1998), include witnessing marital violence or separation as a child, being a victim of child maltreatment, alcohol and substance abuse, and growing up with an absent or rejecting parent. At the second concentric circle, *personal relationships,* such as family, intimate partners and peers, have been identified as key predictors of gender-based violence. It is argued that gender-based violence can be 'borrowed' or 'imbibed' from relationships. For example, associations with violent friends or a previous relationship with a violent partner can influence the tendency of a young person to engage in violence and abuse of women and children.

In the context of *community*, factors such as beliefs about women and gender roles, communal responses to crisis, tradition and practices, population density, poverty rates, etc, can increase the occurrence of violence against women. The last concentric circle explains how ***societal** factors*, such as the state institutions and the judicial system, culture and socialisation, education system, religion, and state policies, determine whether violence against women is encouraged or inhibited (WHO, 2020).

Another important perspective to this theory is that the violence women endure at these four levels of the social environment further perpetuates the poor socio-economic conditions of women and the feminisation of poverty. Women who suffer gender-based violence caused by any of the factors highlighted usually suffer chronic mental and physical health problems, injuries, isolation, inability to work, loss of wages, lack of participation in regular activities and limited ability to care for themselves and their children, all of which contributes to their socio-economic condition. Malgesini et al (2019) also revealed in a recent study that gender-based violence is not only recorded among low-income women; however, many women, as a result of violence, lose their previous economic stability and get into severe material deprivation and poverty. The simple explanation is that while a number of factors at the different levels of the social environment contribute to violence against women, these same factors determine the extent and varied dimensions of feminisation of poverty.

1. Methodology

3.1 Background Information on the Selected Local Government Area

Bekwarra Local Government Area is one of the 18 local government areas in Cross River State. Asides being one of the largest L.G.As in Cross River State, Bekwarra is also a major indigenous language in the State alongside Efik and Ejagham. Bekwarra LGA shares borders with the Ogoja, Obudu, and Yada L.G.A's as well as with Benue State. With an expansive population of 141, 000 people and a geographical area of 340km^2, Bekwarra is home to a number of tribes with members of the Bekwarra ethnic sub-division being the most populous in the area (Birkhoff, 2019; National Population Commission, 2006). Common towns and villages in Bekwarra L.G.A, include Gakem, Ukpah, Afrike, Ibiaragidi, Beten, Ugboro, Ijibor, Anyikang, Ebegang, Utukpuru, Inyanya and Ebewo, while the administrative headquarters is located in

Abuochiche. The L.G.A also has a substantial quantity of crude oil reserves with the activities of oil mining firms contributing the most to the economy of the area.

The striking feature of the Bekwarra people is that they are a very industrious, creative and peace-loving people. Their skills in craft and commerce are famous, with majority of population engaging in banana plantation, groundnut, yam and palm oil agriculture, palm wine tapping, fishing, and metal welding. However, the L.G.A, in spite of the huge resources available to her, regrettably has a high youth unemployment level and increasing poverty rates. The female population in poverty has also been noted to be high; while incidences of domestic violence, child and forceful marriage, femicide, and many other forms of violence against women have also been recorded in recent past. These characteristics make the LGA a suitable area for a study of this nature.

3.2 Sampling Technique and Sample Size

The population of this study is made up of the entire women residing in Bekwarra LGA as at the time of this study. The National Population Commission (2006) and Birkhoff (2019) put the population of females in Bekwarra LGA at 52,583, with most of them within the ages of 15 and 48 years. The study employed a multi-stage sampling process which allowed the researcher to select 300 respondents from households in the 13 towns in Bekwarra Local government area.

Table 3.1: Sample size selected for the study

S/N	Towns	Sample	Retrieved	Percent (%)
	Abuochiche	60	60	20.0
	Afrike	60	60	20.0
	Beten	60	60	20.0
	Gakem	60	60	20.0
	Ukpah	60	60	20.0
	Total	**300**	**300**	**100.0**

NB: Percentage may not total 100.0 owing to approximation

Source: Field Survey, 2020

As shown in Table 3.1, five (5) towns were selected using a simple random sampling technique, while 60 respondents were purposively selected from different households in each of the towns. The purposive sampling technique employed is the homogeneous purposive sampling technique, and is informed by the need to concentrate on people with particular characteristics relating to the research interest. In this case, age, marital status, occupation, income level, size of household and educational level was considered as criteria for inclusion.

3.3 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis

The research design employed in this study is the cross-sectional survey design; thus, primary data was collected using a semi-structured questionnaire designed to be completed by the respondents. Furthermore, percentages analysis, charts, and frequency tables, were used to present and analyse data collected for the study.

4 Results

This section presents the socio-demographic information of the respondents and an analysis of data collected in response to the research questions. Table 4.1 reveals that most of the respondents, 36.7%, are within the age bracket of 28-37 years; another 22.0% of the respondents were 48 years and above as at the time of the survey. Furthermore, 51.3% of the respondents indicated that they are married, while 20.0% of the respondents indicated that they are separated.

4.1 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Variables	Distribution	Abuochiche	Afrike	Beten	Gakem	Ukpah	Total	%
Age	18 – 27	10	11	16	10	12	59	19.7
	28 – 37	27	20	19	23	21	110	36.7
	38 – 47	11	18	9	15	12	65	21.7
	48 – Above	12	11	16	12	15	66	22.0
Marital Status	Married	30	31	29	38	26	154	51.3
	Separated	12	12	14	7	15	60	20.0
	Divorced	11	10	11	6	10	48	16.0
	Widowed	7	7	6	9	9	38	12.7
Education	Secondary	19	20	19	17	28	103	34.3
	OND/NCE	24	17	19	19	17	96	32.0
	B.Sc/HND	12	17	14	12	9	64	21.3
	Post Grad.	5	6	8	12	6	37	12.3
Occupation	Unemployed	14	14	19	12	11	70	23.3
	Self employed	15	12	10	17	26	80	26.7
	Private Sector	9	10	10	9	11	49	16.3
	Civil Servant	13	15	11	10	8	57	19.0
	Farming	9	9	10	12	4	44	14.7

NB: Percentage may not total 100.0 owing to approximation

Source: Field Survey, 2020

Some of the respondents also indicated that they are divorced (48 or 16.0%); while the remaining 12.7% indicated that they are widowed. The survey also included respondents who have secondary education (34.3%), OND and NCE (32.0%), B.Sc. or its HND equivalent (21.3%) and Post Graduate degrees (12.3%). Most of the respondents, 70 or 23.3%, were unemployed at the time of the study, another 26.7% of the respondents are self-employed, and

16.3% work in the private sector, while 19.0% are civil servants. Only 14.7% of the respondents were into farming and other agricultural business as at the time of the survey. It is important to note that these characteristics make the sample population most suitable for this survey, particularly as the study considers women who are married or have been married and educated at least at the secondary level as appropriate to provide comprehensive data needed on the subject of interest.



Figure 4.1: Income levels of respondents.
Source: Field Survey, 2020

The study, as shown in Figure 4.1, also investigated the income levels of the respondents which revealed that only 1.7% or 5 of the respondents earn ₦150,000 and above per month, while majority of the respondents, that is 42.7%, earn between ₦10,000 and ₦30,000 per month, alongside another 23.0% of that earn less that N10,000 per month. When placed side by side the household size of the respondents, one can deduce the socio-economic conditions of the respondents.

Table 4.2: Household size of the respondents

Variable	Categories	Frequency	Percent
Size of Household	Less than 3	40	13.3
	03 – 06	77	25.7
	07 – 10	133	44.3
	10 – 14	24	8.0
	15 – 19	15	5.0
	20 and Above	11	3.7
Total		300	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2020

As shown in Table 4.2 below, only 13.3% of the respondents have a household below three persons. Other respondents indicated that they have a household of 3-6 persons (25.7%), 7-10 persons (44.3%), 10-14 persons (8.0%) and 15-19 persons (5.0%). Only 11 or 3.7% of the respondents indicated that they have a household of 20 persons and above. This, as mentioned earlier, provides a background to understand the socio-economic conditions of the respondents. Kufenko et al (2018) and Brown and Brown (2014), have argued that whereas the relationship between household size and socio-economic status may not be clear; household size remains a key factor in assessing the socio-economic status of individuals and families, especially as the size of household is seen to have implications for family budget and expenditure, saving behaviour and access to quality of life.

4.2 Analysis of Data and Findings

- *What factors contribute to the poverty of women in Bekwarra L.G.A of Cross River State?*

Table 4.3: Causes of poverty of women in the selected communities

Research Question	Variables	Very large extent	%	Moderate extent	%	Small Extent	%	No extent	%	Total
Cause of poverty	Lack of education and illiteracy	249	83.0	29	9.7	17	5.7	5	1.7	300
	Discriminatory wages	271	90.3	16	5.3	6	2.0	7	2.3	300
	Unpaid house chores	253	84.3	41	13.7	2	0.7	4	1.3	300
	Lack of assets or Inheritance rights	282	94.0	9	3.0	8	2.7	1	0.3	300
	Male marital rights over women	276	92.0	16	5.3	7	2.3	1	0.3	300
	Low need for achievement	277	92.3	21	7.0	2	0.7	0	0.0	300
	Death of partner and breadwinner	256	85.3	36	12.0	7	2.3	1	0.3	300

Source: Field Survey, 2020

One of the objectives of the study is to find out the common factors that contribute to the poverty of women in Bekwarra L.G.A. Reactions from the respondents indicated that there are both systemic and cultural sources of poverty. For instance, 83.0% of the respondents noted that lack of education and illiteracy among women and girls play a key role feminisation of poverty. Also, 90.3% of the respondents agreed that discriminatory wages to a very large extent contributes to poverty of women and girls in the community. Other factor identified by the respondents include: unpaid domestic services that deprive women of the time resources to pursue paid employments, gendered division of assets and inheritance as specified by culture, male marital rights over the assets of women, limited need for achievement occasioned by faulty gender socialization, and at times, the death of a partner who is in most cases the breadwinner of the household.

4.2.1 In what ways does the socio-economic status of women contribute to the violence against women in Bekwarra L.G.A of Cross River State?

The study also investigated the various ways the socio-economic conditions of women contribute to violence against women in Bekwarra L.G.A. As shown in Figure 4.2, 40.0% of the respondents indicated that owing to poverty and deprivation, many women depend on men for almost all their material needs which in turn enable some men to exploit and violate women. Another 23.7% of the respondents noted that another way the socio-economic conditions of women in the LGA contribute to violence against women is that it denies many women the resources to seek redress in a court of law when violated by men.



Figure 4.2: Socioeconomic conditions of women and VAW. Source: Field Survey, 2020

Furthermore, 14.3% of the respondents also revealed that the poor socio-economic conditions of women in the L.G.A make it difficult for many women to make quality reproductive health choices. For instance, some women, as a result of their inability to access contraceptives, get pregnant regularly even when their partners have no plans for an additional child; and as agreed by some of the respondents, situations like this can generate stress, anger and domestic violence. In the same vein, 13.0% indicated that due to their poor socio-economic conditions, many women begin to feel apprehensive of losing their partners to other women who appear more appealing. It is also noted that women in this category at times resort to nagging and frequent quarrels, while others may indulge in various risky behaviours including infidelity and drug use, all of which sometimes degenerate into domestic neglect, deprivation and violence.

4.2.1 In what ways has poverty and violence against women affected women in Bekwarra L.G.A of Cross River State?

On the ways poverty and violence impact on women in Bekwarra L.G.A, 20.3% of the respondents indicated that these two conditions or phenomena prevalent among women in the study area has contributed to the increase in baby traders in the State; another 19.3% noted that it has led to the exclusion of women from many social activities and privileges, including decision-making processes, education, etc, since females are seen as less valuable and incapable. Others, 17.3% noted that it has encouraged many women to go into early marriages, 16.0% indicated that has made many women take poor productive health choices such as multiple pregnancies and giving birth to so many children, 13.7% agreed that it contributed to the increase in rape and other sexual violence, while the remaining 7.0% noted that poverty and violence against women endorses killing of women for ritual purposes.



Figure 4.3: Impact of Poverty and VAW on Women. Source: Field Survey, 2020

4.2.1 What are the strategies employed by women to cope with poverty and violence against women in Bekwarra L.G.A of Cross River State?

Furthermore, the survey, on the various strategies employed by women to cope with poverty and violence against women in Bekwarra, revealed that most women engage in petty trade as a way to cope with their poverty. While others, as shown in Table 4.4, indicated that they engage in all manner of casual jobs (such as washing clothes for people, cleaning compounds, helping traders with their loads and weeding people's farmlands); 5.7% of the respondents indicated that they do housemaid services, 14.7% indicated that they do subsistence farming to cope with poverty, 19.3% indicated that they have associations they do savings and contributions, and 4.7% indicated that they sometimes beg to survive and feed their family, while the remaining 4.0% revealed that one of the ways they cope with their poor socio-economic conditions is to keep multiple relationships that help them meet their material needs.

Table: 4.4: How do women in Bekwarra LGA cope with poverty?

S/N	How Women and Girl's cope with poverty	**Frequency**	**Per (%)**
1	Petty trade	92	30.7
2	Casual work	43	14.3
4	House maid	17	5.7
5	Multiple jobs	20	6.7
6	Thrift/Contribution	58	19.3
7	Multiple partners	12	4.0
8	Farming	44	14.7
9	Begging	14	4.7
	Total	300	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2020

The survey also shows that women employ different strategies to cope with situations of violence and abuse. The study, as shown in Figure 4.4, categorises these strategies under two themes: *passive measures*, which explains the indirect, self-harming and negative strategies employed by women and girls to cope with violence and abuse instead of seeking real solutions to their circumstances, and *active measures*, which captures the positive ways some victims approach abuse by seeking real solutions. In Figure 4.4, some of the respondents, 37.0% or 111, indicated that women sometimes try to come to terms with their circumstances and employ silence as a way of reducing the frequency of the abuse; others, 29.7% or 89, stated that women sometimes retaliate by engaging their abusive partner physically; 12.3% or 37 noted that many women have resorted to prayers hoping that God will intervene; 6.3% or 19 of the respondents indicated that as a result of violence and abuse, some women indulge in infidelity as a way to pay back the abusive partner or find succour, and the remaining 14.7% or 44 stated that women sometimes considered harming themselves in order to end the whole suffering and torture that they endure in their relationships.



Figure 4.4: Coping strategies of women in Bekwarra. Source: Field Survey, 2020

The respondents also noted that there are some positive ways women employ to cope with abuse and violence (See Figure 4.4). For instance, 30.3% of the respondents stated that some women seek counsel and therapy from faith-based organisations, counselling centres, and other non-governmental organisations. Also, 44.0% noted that women also cope with an abusive marriage by engaging in petty business that keeps them away from home and help them meet some of their material needs; another 5.7% noted that some women also go back to school so as to improve their social standing and chances of getting higher paying jobs, 16.3% indicated that another positive way of dealing with violence and abuse is separation, while the remaining 3.7% noted that they would rather divorce than remain in an abusive relationship.

1. Summary and Conclusion

The study has identified two key sources of poverty among women in Bekwarra Local Government Area. As indicated by most of the respondents, whereas there are cultural factors (such as the marital rights men have over their wife's income and property, gender roles and domestic chores of women which deprives them of the time to pursue paid employments, and gendered division of assets and inheritance) that impede women from accessing wealth, there are also systemic factors that limit women in the society. For instance, the limited access women have to education contributes to the feminization of poverty, discriminatory wages, occupational glass ceilings, work conditions that repress women (such as pregnancy and marital status discrimination), and limited property rights, all expose women and girls to higher risks of poverty.

The study also found that resource-constrained women are vulnerable to sexual abuse and domestic violence in the society. For instance, majority of the respondents indicated that poverty and deprivation make many women depend on men for almost all their material needs which in turn enables the men to exploit and violate them. Furthermore, poverty denies women and girls the resources to pursue legal options when violated by men, poor socio-economic conditions make it difficult for many women to benefit from making quality reproductive health choices, including controlling the rate at which they conceive, or ensure that they are free from sexually transmitted diseases and infections. These findings corroborate the arguments of scholars, such as *Abdourahman (2017) and* Jewkes and Garcia-Moreno (2002), that poverty increases people's vulnerabilities to sexual exploitation and abuse in the family, at the workplace, in the schools, and in the community as a whole. For these scholars, the increasing rates of rape, forced labour, domestic violence, trafficking in women and girls, sexual harassment, and the killing of women for ritual purposes as found in our society today is connected to the problem of feminised poverty.

In Bekwarra L.G.A, it has also been noted that some of the outcomes of poverty among women, include: poor health care for women and girls, multiparity and other risky reproductive health behaviour, exclusion from social activities, objectification of women and sexual exploitation, exposure to HIV/AIDs and other STI's, increased trafficking of women and girls, and exposure of women and girls to ritual killings. Furthermore, the coping mechanism for poverty and violence against women as identified by the respondents reveals a potential for some victims of violence and abuse to harm themselves or commit suicide. This further heightens the urgent need to begin to fashion out ways to lift more women out of poverty and reduce the occurrences of violence against women in our society.

Recommendations

Drawing from the findings of the survey, the study thus recommends the following as measures to eliminate poverty among women, and also reduce the phenomenon of violence against women in Bekwarra L.G.A, as well as in Cross River State and by extension Nigeria as a whole:

- There is the urgent need to create and support public policies that address the root causes of poverty among women in the society, including ensuring the compulsory education of women and girls in the study area, creation of effective social support for women and girls, and proscribing cultures that limit women's access to wealth, inheritance, fair wages, and assets.
- It is also important to create or fortify existing public policies, which ensures that perpetrators of violence against women are penalized with the purpose of creating actual and imagined deterrent for others.
- There is also the need to increase and monitor the efficiency of institutions established to rehabilitate survivors of violence against women, or provide legal services for victims.

- It will also be key if the state, at all levels, establishes effective crisis intervention centres and shelter for women and girls who suffer violence in any level of the social environment.

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GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT: THE PLACE OF WOMEN IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE NIGERIA EXPERIENCE

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Abstract
The place of women in any endeavour cannot be overemphasised. Given their enormous contributions to socio-economic development, there can be no meaningful advancement where women are excluded. In Nigeria, like every other country, women have faced challenges and discrimination for reasons of their sex and the wrongful perception that women belong to a lesser class than their male counterparts which is strengthened by traditional and cultural practices. However, Nigeria is a perfect example of a plural society, characterised by divergent socio-cultural groups. Interestingly, divergent groups also imply divergent interests. As a result, conflict has featured prominently in the country, as each group struggles to project its own interests. Hence, this study seeks to investigate the contributions of "women in Nigeria" to national development. The organisation has effectively mobilised the Nigerian women towards social, economic and political empowerment. The paper draws on the liberal feminist perspective in analysing issues. The study adopts both primary and secondary sources of data using the simple random sampling technique. 20 interviews were conducted. The results of the study reveal that women have in various ways contributed to national development. Therefore, taking cognisance of women's peculiar roles in society, the paper suggests the need to harness their capacities in such roles via education, to facilitate the achievement unity within the entity called Nigeria. Also, it recommends that concerted efforts should be made at enhancing cooperation and continuity between NGOs so as to achieve the goals of development.

Keywords: women, nation, development, national unity and women education

Introduction

Optimal development requires the harnessing of a country's asserts, its capital, human and material resources to meet demand from the population as comprehensively as possible. However, it is evidenced from recent activities of government and non-governmental organisation toward girl-child education that leaders of world have realised that to create a developed and balanced national economy, women who are the majority of population needed to be effectively involved through formal education. Thus, women education within every society could be argued that gaining more and more acceptability in many nations of the world. Also in the same vein, Usman (2019) opines that, there seems to be a global understanding among teaming populace on the fact that women education is not only a necessity but the only way to make women relevant in the society and national development.

In the recent time, there is more to intensify efforts buttressing the need and importance of women education, especially in the economy developing countries such as Nigeria where special considerations and emphases are ongoing to ensure that large quantity of children are yet to be enrolled into formal education be absorbed into education system (Adetunde, 2015 cited in Usman, 2019). Interestingly, some state governments in Nigeria have started showing interest in reabsorbing the out of the school children from their various streets into formal education system in all, there is global dedication toward women's education.

Women empowerment in order to bring about nation building involves the transformation of economic, social, psychological, political and legal circumstances of women. However, women are seen to be largely ignored in planning, design and implementations of development programmes or policies which affect them directly (Yakubu, 2019). In the same vein, Adepoju (n.d, p. 2) stated that in Nigeria, women are worst affected by poverty. Also, Fos (1997) cited in Yakubu (2019) reports that, statistics on poverty in Nigeria indicates that 70 % of poor Nigerians are women. The impact of poverty on women shows not only on material shortages but also lack of opportunities for self-actualisation in areas like education, health, cultural, political and social rights. As noted by Oluwasola (1998, p. 59), a number of factors have been responsible for the inadequate recognition and undervalue of women's roles in promoting economic and social change. These factors include:

- the male dominated culture in Nigeria like in most developing nations which give women an inferior position in the society; and
- custom, taboos and the sexual division of labour which keeps women performed by women in the home front, and their family farms (Arum, 2010, p. 1).

Similarly, interest in the participation of women in the process of nation-building had been kindled to a large extent by the actions of women in developed countries. Staging a diligent campaign for political and economic recognition of their own position. Western women have also provoked greater concern for women in developing countries. The United Nation declared 1975 through 1985 “Decade for Women” four world conferences on women were held in Mexico City (1975), Copenhagen (1950), Nairobi (1985) and Beijing Conference (1995). These conferences directed the searchlight on a variety of issues among which include violence against women, women's right, women's reproductive health, etc. It was only till then that, the women's question entered the political agenda in Nigeria.

Statement of Problem

The role of women as a collaborative effort towards national development and ensuring a peaceful society is worthy to note that, it is the woman who lays the foundation of a virtuous and peaceful society in her role as a mother. She has the huge responsibility for moulding the character of the young ones. It is true that, the condition of a society or nation is the true reflection of the nature of their homes and women in Nigeria have paid a heavy price because of insecurity challenges in the country especially in the last two decades just to promote national unity.

Conceptual Clarification

Woman

The word "Woman" connotes a being whose biological anatomy is different from that of a man. Conceptually, the African woman is perceived as a human being, a counterpart of the man at all levels of social and economic order; a daughter, the counterpart of a son, with roles and a presence which only a daughter can fill, a mother, where the mother is seen as the seat of life, the key factor in the nurturing sustenance and stabilisation of life within the family and community in general; a wife, spouse to a man and a partner in the business of making a home, a community and the society at large (African Leadership Forum, 1993, p. 4 cited in Yakubu, 2019).

Nation

A nation is a large community of people associated with a particular territory usually having a political character or political aspiration. It is distinguished from a community as being larger, in that it contains various groups of community, more diffused and pluralistic in its components; more specific in its goals as a central motive of its component parts. However, a nation constitute in a hierarchical and ascending order, individual citizens, families, clans, villages, towns, wards, local governments and states as a whole. It also constitutes both those who govern and the governed (African Leadership Forum, 1993, p. 5).

Development

Development is the advancement in the management and use of natural resources to satisfy human needs and thereby improve the quality of human life. According to Omari (1976) sees development as an induced, planned and deliberate change which aims at improving the life conditions of the masses in particular areas and situations so as to achieve a set of defined goals. Todaro (1977) opines that development is the process of improving the quality of all lives involving; raising peoples living levels i.e. their income and consumption levels of food, medical services, education and so forth, through relevant economic growth processes, creating conditions conducive to the growth of people's self-esteem through the establishment of social, political and economic systems and institutions which promote human dignity and respect; and increasing people's freedom to choose by enlarging the range of their choice variables e.g. increasing varieties of consumer goods and services.

National Unity

National unity means the existence of harmony, oneness and peaceful coexistence among the components of a nation. In the Nigerian context, it also connotes the peaceful and harmonious coexistence of the various groups that make up the Nigerian nation (Etuk & Bassey, 2019). Nigeria is highly plural society, to the extent that there is multiplicity of ethnic, language, religious and political groups. Consequently, national unity simply means the ability of all the groups to exist harmoniously with one another, under the same umbrella as a nation. However, this can only be possible if each of the groups accepts decision with which they disagree, tolerate views different from theirs and be prepared to comprise and ultimately agree on common procedures and actions.

Women Education

Considering that education is the process of acquisition of skills and values for better social functioning, women education can be implied to mean the entire process of acquisition of skills and values by women, to facilitate their ability to function effectively in the society.

However, it is the entire process by which women undergo planned programmes of instruction for the purpose of acquiring necessary experiences that would liberate them from ignorance and improve their social worth. Like most developing countries, Nigeria has at different times placed emphasis on the education of the girl-child in successive policies. This became pertinent because as noted by the United Nation's platform for Action and Beijing Declaration of 1996, education is a liberating force that will among other things ensure women's upward mobility, as well as facilitate their participation in decision making in society (Etuk & Bassey, 2020).

Theoretical Framework

This paper draws on the feminist perspective. The use of the feminist theory is because it attempts to describe women oppression. Explain its causes and consequences from its different points of view and similarly provide strategies for women's liberation. Feminist theory forms the basis of analysis of universal women's experience of oppression, repression and suppression.

However, feminism is all about the advocacy of the claims and rights of women. Like any social movement, it arose out of the growing discontent with women's condition and the rising awareness of consciousness of their condition and the need therefore to improve their lot. The political ideas of enlightenment developed not simply by the enlightenment philosophers but more practically in the events of the French and particularly the American revolutions also represent an important aspect of the feminist ideas and aspirations because in Britain and America, pressure for women to be granted equal rights, educational and political rights grew during the 18th and 19th centuries.

Structural changes in society have also been noted as important reasons for the rise of feminism, which importantly forced middle class women in particular to attempt to redefine their role in society. Consequently, variations in demographic patterns have also been seen as important causes of feminism and certainly the surplus of women in 19th century Britain was one of the reasons both for pressure for the improved education for girls and for expanding employment opportunities for women. On the other hand, according to some accounts, also it is the shortage of women that produced the advance in women's suffrage in the American West (Yakubu, 2019, p. 6).

Thus, there are various strands of feminism, they include: Liberal feminism, radical feminism, Marxist, socialist feminism. For proper analysis, this study adopts the liberal feminism in explaining the role women play in national development in Nigeria. Liberal feminism has its roots in the social contract theories of the 16th and 17th centuries, with the idea of liberty and equality based on man's rationality. As well as the distinction between public and private spheres of life. They see women as rational beings who should have their own right. Liberal feminism contributes women's unequal status and social position to their exclusion from the public sphere, largely due to the sexual division of labour. It seeks to ensure women get greater access to a wide range of occupations within the positions of decision-making power (Young, 1993, p. 129).

Conclusively, liberal feminism aims at achieving equal political and social rights for women. It is a form of feminism that argues that equality for women can be achieved through legal means and social reforms and that man as a group needs to be challenged. Feminist writers associated with this tradition are amongst others, Mary Wallstones, John Stuart Mill and Betly Frieden. Liberal feminism seeks no special privileges for women and simply demand that everyone receive equal consideration without discrimination on the basis of gender.

Women and Development

Young (1993) provides a solid base for evaluation of the place of women in development. Their various contributions in the different sectors and how more development will be attained if women are being integrated into planning and implementation of policies. Also, Young (1993) started off her study in “Planning development with women”, by stating that women were noticeably absent from the discussion of development theory and practice during the first United Nations development decade (1960-1970). Despite the fact that the successes of community development schemes often largely depended upon women's commitment, no particular effort were made to identify women's needs. At this time, most development practitioners considered that women's need were taken care by “the family” conceived of as a corporate unit headed by the male household head, who exercised benevolent authority and control over its members and resources (Young, 1993, p. 18). She pointed out that, any benefits directed at the family head automatically benefits all its members through a modified trickle-down effect. As a result, project managers and designers saw little wrong with meeting local organisation or groups which were male only in position to disseminate information, inputs and equipments. However, at this time, question whether women undertook economic activities which could usefully be supported never appears to have addressed. When women were specifically considered, it was virtually always as mothers and child bearers.

According to Rahila (2019) who said, during the second United Nations Development Decade (1971-1980), women's issues and development came to be conceptually linked for the first time. A combination of factors led to this. Early confidence that economic growth could be achieved by judicious manipulations of macro-economic levers was shattered. Development planner shifted from looking at only economic growth to issue of equity of distributional patterns, targeting the poor, building on local capacity and cultural autonomy. With this type of approach, the contributions of these women to the family economy and the family welfare came to be appreciated. More attention to agriculture and food crop production led to greater appreciation of women's work within it, women constitute a large proportion of the poorest, it was also realised that it is these women, particularly in the poor strata who provide almost all their families basic needs.

Young (1993) pointed out that, it is the growing strength of the women's movement in all parts of the world that led to women within the United Nations system and within national and agencies beginning to make specific demands for women's voices to be heard in development decision-making. Here, she perceived two different things happening to women. First, that women were being excluded from the development process because planners and policy makers ignored woman's important economic activities. Consequently, due to this, there was a need to integrate women into development. This perspective led to the argument that women were a neglected resource for development. The other view was that women were already integrated into the development process, but assumptions about women's specific activities led planners to neglect women's real needs and to over exploit their labour. As a result of this, women were loosing out to men in the development process. The assumption here is that women were not a neglected resource but were overburdened and undervalued. That there was need to re-evaluate women's already considerable contributions to the development process and a redistribution of the benefits and burdens of development between men and women.

However, the third United Nations Development Decade (1981-1990) opened with the second United Nations Women's Conference held in Copenhagen. With the theme "Conventionally employment, health and education" the conference aimed at reviewing the progress made and obstacles encounted at the national level in implementing the 1975 world plan of action. The conference reviewed that despite some progress in certain areas and particularly in the increased attention to women in economic, social and political life, there was little cause for rejoicing because stagnation and deterioration describe women's condition in national life in most countries since 1975. Despite increases in overall labour force participation rates, women were primarily working in the lowest paid and most sex differentiated occupations, particularly in the service sector. Women's non-market and home based productive activity were ignored. The conference was unanimous about the need for improvement in the lives of women issues such as equality of wages, redefinition of the term "worker", the need for improved health, education, development issues like the decline in agricultural production, women's labour input and the inadequacy of their economic and social rewards were made for the first time.

Consequently, the 1980s opened up a period of global recession and a deteriorating economic situation in the industrialised market economies and increasing indebtedness in the developing world. Though, certain factors led to this recession. Firstly, sharp rise in oil prices in 1973 and 1979 caused by the balance of payments problems for oil-importing countries, while oil exporters accumulated large financial reserve and anxiously sought suitable investment opportunities. Secondly, in their attempt to industrialise and modernise, developing countries had always had to borrow money from governments, aid agencies and private banks. Thirdly, falling commodity prices and increasing protectionism in the Western industrialised countries led to a sharp drop in many developing countries income.

Sequence to this, stabilisation and structural adjustment policies were designed to bring sick economies back to health. These policies had various effects on women. Structural adjustment affects women in a number of ways: Through the impact of changes in income and prices, in the level and composition of public expenditure, or in working conditions. The change in income affected prices of most basic purchases such as food, kerosene, clothing, etc. because subsidies were removed. This affected women much more than men because of their involvement in child care and domestic work, they were more dependent on public sector service such as water, electricity health facilities, public transport, etc. Young (1993) therefore was of the view that involving women at all levels of development thinking, planning and implementation will make a world of difference not merely to women but to the society to be able to carry out planned social changes in the way societies conceive of relations, between the genders and the dismantling of centuries-old structures of thought and practices. Women are a tremendous social resource which no society can afford any longer to under-value and under-use. As such, planners have a great responsibility both to listen to women and also to build their vision into planning strategies in order to facilitate and achieve meaningful national development.

Expected Roles of Women in Facilitating National Development

Value Sustainers and Economic timulators

The initial role of women in the national development is value sustainer. Women over the long history of humanity have been the custodians of norms and values; the engrossment of men in the economic activities and power has denied them the ability to sustain the values. Seeking for meaningful national building is to ensure that our values and norms are not being eroded by foreign values. Thus, women who are the best teachers of various household need to uphold the national values wherever position they assume or activities they engage in maintaining this social trends implies that women will be forever remain relevant and positive to the societal development at all times. This also tells us that our system of education that favour male students need to be readjusted to include norms, values and national integrity. Asogwa and Anah (2017) argued that, most community based economy and traditionally endowed business are still surviving due to women involvement in spite of their low level of education. This is further evident when observed our traditionally-based economic trends across the six geopolitical regions of Nigeria especially the three major languages.

Consequently, women all over the world play important role in the socio-economic life of both developed and developing nations. It has been evidently shown that women entrepreneurs in stimulating the economy, create new jobs and stabilised social interaction. Entrepreneurship literatures have increasingly acknowledged the desire by women to be economically independent, their roles and contributions in shaping labour market is continuously increasing (Adepelumi, 2011; Aduku et al, 2016; Ahmed, 2019 cited in Usman, 2019).

Adepelumi (2011) accounts that, women in the south-east, south-west and Northern parts of Nigeria are massively involve in various cultural practices such as dancing, artistic works, clothe dying, production of local recipes, trade-medicines, farming and agro-allied works, post-harvesting processing among others. The overall economic turnover of the impact of these women could be better, if only they are majority literate and fully aware of their responsibility as nation builders. Regrettably, men in their wisdom of over-conquering denied them the access to education but left them with important pillar of our society by making them the heritage sustainers and cultural developer.

Nevertheless, the initial role of women is to still sustain these heritages even with higher standard of educational attainment, especially now that the Nigeria government and its national economic plan is trying to look inward for diversification of economy. If well implemented, the nature is ready to smile at women but education is needed to amass the opportunity provided for latest technologies for better commercial activities and national economic growth.

Agent for Peace and Security

The second role require of women in national development through education is peace and security agent. No gender can strike a balance like women; they have been serving as backbone for many households and contribute globally as agent of peace for years immemorial. According to Lauren (2017) argued that educating women is a positive plan for the attainment of national peace and unity. Again, women have been succor for many uprisings in various regions despite always being the victims of crises. Women are also able to play the supporting roles for their families and husbands for years immemorial but less appreciated. Educating women will make them to be effective in tackling today's challenges, our social unrest reach its peak because most of our mothers are not able to monitor what goes on under their roof. How can a mother that cannot operate computer or simple mobile device discover the involvement of her children in online scam and crime? However, men are known to be good in keeping secrecy even when not at easy but women seeks solution through network of other womanhood when noticed strange things (Paul & Ripsman, 2018 cited in Usman, 2019).

Consequently, when women are educated, their silence sufferness could be over, their access to the information world will be high and ability to speak their minds will be restored. However, in order to maintain peace and security in our nation, women have to be supported, encouraged and promoted to play active roles in nation-building. They have been the frontiers of many peace brokers, women have served time without number as solution seekers, their silence today is not because they have lost their voice and sights but because they are denied the education that can make their voice to be heard and make their sight noticed.

Active Participation in various National Institutions

Women should also be encouraged to actively participate in various institutions at strong positions and ranks. The only way to make women education to count in respect to national development is for women to be engaged meaningfully especially the educated ones amongst women. As enrolment for girl-child is increasing the opportunity given to women to serve the nation at various bodies should be increasing. The earlier identified bottlenecks such as religion misconception that lead to denial of women some rights (Oniye, 2010; Shuaibu & Mohammed, 2013), the cultural theory that enforces women to remain indoor (Usman, 2007), societal under appreciation of women efforts (Wolfgang, 2016) among many other opined prejudices should be effectively get rid of. The only way to encourage the recently enrolled female students to give it all to their education is to ensure that those who have graduated are well positioned in our society in terms of job, security and society acceptance. This could form model for others currently in various tertiary institution to aspire and put more effort to channel their commitment to academic activities that is targeted at promoting national development.

Representative in Policy-Making

Also, women should be nominated and dully represented in various planning committee or commissions. The era of planning some important policies for women without their representation should by now come to an end. With huge numbers of educated and elite women in our society, every gathering and policies that has to do with women should by the women for the women. Even in our local communities, women should be supported to plan for themselves, concordances with Tyoakaa, Amaka and Apine (2014) and Ufuophu (2015) have shown that, women do better side by side men in business, cooperative, social responsibility, association among others. Many major markets in South-Western part of Nigeria are effectively managed by women. In most of these markets, the cases of inter-trade or intra-trade issues are amicably resolved with minimal men intervention. It should be brought to our notice that majority of these market leaders are less educated but their leadership passion and management robustness are noteworthy. Thus, our national development plan can look into aspect of making women part of every committee, every policy maker and policy executor. The gender gaps could not be filled if men are still being made to sit for women as it mostly happen in many occasions.

Peace and National Development

Peace connotes progress, achieved not just through the development and equitable distribution of wealth but also trough alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (i.e., dialogue, mediation, persuasion, logic, social justice, social inclusion, etc.). The evolution of Nigeria, now set in the context of current challenges of poverty and hunger, makes aggression the first choice during dispute. A hungry man is an angry man! Policy-makers appear to overlook anger and population management as a casual factor in displacement.

However, development empowers citizens to maximise their potentials to meet daily needs (Nwanegbo & Odigbo, 2013). The modern definition of development deviates from traditional economic indicators of GDP and high volumes of trade to the psychological and material factors, important in the process of actualisation by humans (Chandler, 2007, p. 367 cited in Nwanegbo & Odigbo, 2013). Development plans, whether domestic, national or international, try to achieve one major goal; a better life for citizens and sustainable development is never achieved in conflict, crises or war. Nigeria cannot be an exception.

Since independence, perhaps realising the importance of development to the citizenry, successive government in Nigeria prepared lofty National Development Plans; Colonial Development Plan; National Rolling Plans; Structural Adjustment Programmes; National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy; Strategy for Attaining Development Goals, 7 Point Agenda, Vision 20:2020, etc. (Wikipedia, 2019). These were propositions that would have allowed citizens to achieve high standards of living but were largely unimplementable due to lack of funding and political will, policy somersaults and week institutional capacities.

Women – The Victims in all Conflicts

Historically, the greatest number of casualties in all known conflicts in the world are women and children. Women are the gender group at the receiving end of bad governance, bad leadership, communal conflicts, mismanagement of resources, aggression, etc. They are left hopeless, helpless and hapless i.e. very unlucky in conflicts caused by government officials, unemployed and angry youths, the majority of whom are men, who in the first instance prosecute war out of ego rather than on the basic logic.

In order to create sustainable peace in the many conflict areas in the world, the United Nations through the Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 1325) addressed the unique impact of armed conflicts on women, recognising the undervalued and under-utilised contributions of women in conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping and peace-building (3Ps) and the importance of women's equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security. The women, peace and security agenda promotes the view that effective incorporation of gender perspective and women's rights have a positive impact on the lives of everyone in conflict areas.

Materials and Methods

The Research design adopted is case study. The study was carried out in the Calabar Branch of WIN comprising of the activities of both the Cross River and Akwa Ibom chapter of the organisation. The population of the study comprised of members of WIN whose views or responses give insight on the subject under study. The study adopted and made use of both primary and secondary sources of data. Using the simple random sampling technique, 10 WIN members and 10 non-WIN members were selected for face to face interviews. The interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewees and later transcribed and used for the analysis.

The highest policy making body of WIN is the Annual General Meeting (AGM). This is composed of all Executive Committee (NEC). The AGM elects the NEC which is responsible for implementing all decisions. Between the AGM and NEC is the coordinating council.

WIN Calabar branch is one of the largest branches in the federation. It has two main fold, Calabar (Cross River State) and Uyo (Akwa Ibom) chapter with projects located at other areas like Ogoja. It comprises also of both male and female members, this is because it believes that the problems of society, class, gender exploitation and oppression are better addressed through a collective struggle of both sexes.

WIN Calabar branch has been very active in initiating and supporting a number of programmes and activities that have contributed immensely to nation-building in Nigeria.

Conclusion

The achievement of national unity and development is a function of number of practicable strategies. However, the unilateral initial cradle for women education that intend to better position the women in our society is no longer valid, as it has just been realised by every stakeholder that education of women goes a long way in stabilising our national integrity and development. It is also known, the initial misconception that women will take over men work is never true; as educating women will make them vibrant in various occupations they are currently engaged at minima level. Thus, all those mental jobs that yielded little income could be reposition to a well-paid through education and contribute to national development.

Also, government should set up its efforts at ensuring massive education for women. Explicitly, government should modify the content of the National Policy on Education – to create an enabling environment for Nigerian women to be massively and adequately educated. When this is achieved, then the stage would have been set to take Nigeria to the next positive level in the direction of making national unity and development an absolute reality in Nigeria.

Recommendations

- There should be proper representation of women in various national institutions to ensure fairness and gender balances, in particular in politics and political appointment.
- Women should be supported through standard education for them to continuously support our national values and integrity.
- Education for women should be inclusive of skills on peace and security that can make

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GENDER DISPARITY IN THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING AND MATHEMATICS (STEM) FIELDS: AN ASSESSMENT OF WOMEN'S CONTRIBUTION

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Abstract
The suppression of gender disparity is key to development of nations. Male and female differences that gender connotes, must be appreciated, especially because women are generally seen and treated by the society as less capable and inferior to men. Substantially, this paper assesses the contributions of women in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) fields. In an attempt to assess the present situation, it was revealed that some factors associated with gender disparity tend to hinder women's contributions in STEM fields. This research is motivated by the question 'what are the contributions of women's in the STEM field'? The study adopts the System Theory for its theoretical framework analysis. The paper is complemented with archival review of existing literature and empirical analysis on gender disparity in STEM. In the paper, the author recommends interplays for plausible engagement of all capable and qualified women in STEM policy development and promotions as well as a clarion call on the mass media to showcase the achievements of women in the STEM fields.

Keywords: Gender Disparity, Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics, Development

Introduction

STEM is an acronym for Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics. As a basis for the different emerging technologies, the place of STEM is crucial to the development of the global economy. This explains why groups and individuals continue to reiterate that unless STEM is given the deserved attention, development of the contemporary society will not happen at the desired pace and depth. As this call for action gathers steam, greater attention must be paid to STEM fields, focusing on gender perspective in which women's participation remains germane. This is because in the final analysis, the capacity to drive the development is predicated on women achieving their full potentials (Innovation Nigeria News Magazine, 2018, p.12).

The United Nations conventions such as the 1995 World Conference on Women held in Beijing and the World Conference on Science held in Budapest in 1999, called for the collection of gender data reflecting women's economic, science and technology contributions (UNESCO, 2014). Similarly, the United Nations has recognisded the role of women in the development of any country as well as the importance of understanding the gender differentiated efforts in development plans. To this end, the Platform for Action of the 4th United Nations World Conference on women (1995) noted that women's empowerment and full participation are prerequisites for the achievement of equality, development and peace. In the same vein, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in its 2016 Report, stated that STEM fields are crucial for sustainable development because they help in finding solutions to threats posed by global challenges such as climate change, epidemics and increased income inequality. By implication, STEM contributes significantly to the socio-economic and environmental development of a country which ultimately, leads to sustainable development.

Macathy (2003) noted that although women are underrepresented in almost every sphere of recognised scientific fields, there is an increasing participation in the 21st century. Paradoxically, Fegbasan (2010) points out that there is a relationship between gender role, orientations and gender stereotype with related variables, which has raised global consciousness regarding the impact of gender in all fields of human endevours, including STEM. Thus, this paper assesses the contributions of women in STEM fields. The paper is motivated by the research question 'what are the contributions of women's in the STEM fields'? The study adopted the System theory for its theoretical frameworkanalysis. The paper is complemented with archival review of existing literature and empirical analysis on gender disparity in STEM fields. The research work ends up with some recommendations.

Theoretical Framework

For this research paper, the Systems Theory was adopted to guide the theoretical framework analysis, based on its relevance for analysing multicultural phenomena. Systems Theory was developed by a biologist,Von Bertalanffy in 1936 out of his desire to build laws and principles to guide research in several disciplines. In his words:

> There exist models, principles, and laws that apply to generalised systems or their sub-classes, irrespective of their particular kind, the nature of their component elements, and the relation or 'forces' between them. It seems legitimate to ask for a theory, not of systems of a more or less special kind, but of universal principles applying to systems in general (Bertalanffy, 1968).

In his analysis of the general system theory, Bertalanffy emphasised that the same concepts and principles (system environment boundary, input, output and process) underlie the different disciplines, providing a basis for their unification. He argues that real systems are open toand interact with their environments, which can acquire qualitatively, new properties through emergence, resulting in continual evolution. Rather than reducing an entity to the properties of its parts or elements, the Systems Theory focuses on the arrangement of and relations between the units which connect them into a whole (Heylighen and Joslyn, 1992).

Frank and Gills (1993, p.17), argue the case for applying the System Theory across disciplines because it provides a “human-centric alternative to the systematic distortions of Eurocentrism” which could help us see 'a common river and unity of history in a single world system that is multicultural in origin and expression." In this view, researchers in the field of social sciences and others have shown the applicability of this theory to the study of gender, political geography, developmental studies, ethnic and race relations as well as international relations and political economy. Thus, Covington (1998, p. 4) argues that the Systems Theory is all-purpose in that, it considers numerous systems that interact with other systems which help a researcher to focus attention on important components that might otherwise go unnoticed. He argues further that the Systems Theory gains a holistic view of an area of human activity, taking the environment in which a phenomenon is observed as part of this holistic consideration.

Following this view, the Systems Theory is seen as useful in providing a framework for the study of complex variables influencing one another. Newman (1972, p. 496) also reiterates the growing popularity of the Systems Theory over the years because of its suitability to serve as a universal conceptual paradigm of social and behavioral phenomena. Sharing this observation, Covington (1998, p. 5) submits that the Systems Theory has survived the test of time, having faced its critics and remains a viable theory used by a cross section of academia and other fields. The strengths of the Systems Theory for conjectural and analytical framework have informed its adoption for this research.

The adoption of the Systems Theory as the theoretical framework for this research paper would enhance understanding of women as a subsystem of the society supra-system whose contributions in the STEM fields are to be seen as equally important as other sectors of the society. Furthermore, the study of gender disparity in STEM fields in assessing women's contributions using the Systems Theory is an open system, open to the influence of some factors embedded in its environment (the society). Thus, women's contributions in STEM fields are a function of certain factors in the environment which include socio-economic variables such as the status of parent, parental occupation, standard of living measured by per capita income, Gross Domestic Product, access to quality education and availability of resources. Other factors include the cultural norms and customary practices, which most often, guide the behavioural patterns in a society.

In addition, innate ability, sex, attitude and teaching approach constitute environmental factors which influence the attitude of female students, whom it is believed, view science to be more important to boys than girls. More so, the historical legacies and religious factorssurrounding the role of women in the society constitute environmental factors affecting women's contributions in STEM fields. Also, of immense significance are the institutional design factors such as educational policy, women enrolment, science education, job opportunities and professional career placements. Put together, these enumerated factors are significant factors within the environment that greatly impact on women's contributions in the STEM fields.

Women and Effects of Gender Disparity in STEM Fields

UNESCO, in 2014, defined gender-gap as a degree of imbalance between males and females regarding access and participation in STEM fields or the differences between gross enrolment of males and gross enrolment of females in science and technology courses. Cromie (1995) posits that gender discrimination is a critical factor facing females' effective contributions in every field of science. The discrimination results from combination of built-in biases that make them less likely to participate in mathematical, critical and technical professions.

However, the wide gender gap between males and females over the years has led to deliberate efforts made by United Nations to address it. The efforts made include declaration of a decade for women which culminated in the Beijing Conference of 1995, Education for All and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) now Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN, 2000; Oldham, 2000; UNDP, 2001).

Similarly, several other national and international documents and human rights mechanisms have been put in place to encourage women's contributions in all endevours of life. One of such as pointed out by Kukah (2003:163); Akinboye, (2004:13), is the 1979 International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), that elaborates the nature of women's civil, social, economic, political and development rights and steps required to promote greater equality between women and men. Also, the relevance of Beijing Platform for Action, that initiated the renowned principal international action plan on women's rights, that contains an elaborate section on safeguarding women in power and decision-making, and women development which states, for instance, that the empowerment and autonomy of women and the improvement of women's social, economic, political, cultural and others status is essential for the achievement of both transparent and accountable government and administration as well as sustainable development in all areas of the society.

To this end, Awe (1992), Waylen (1996), Nwankwo (1996), Unumeri (2003), Abdu (2003) and Johnson (2003),have all observed that throughout the world, the power relations that shape social, political, economic, science and cultural life prevent women from contributing fully in all areas of their lives, whether it's in the home, or in the public arena. Keller(1985) observed that, in the past, a dominant assumption about gender disparities in STEM concerned women's lack of ability due to biological, innate, and/or immutable differences. Furthermore, Fegbasan (2010) asserted that there is a relationship between gender role, orientations and gender stereotype with related variables. Tessa and Mahzarin (2019,p.11),allude that the presumed causes of gender disparities in science today and the debates surrounding the causes of gender disparities in STEM often settle around three interrelated hypotheses. According to them, gender disparities may arise from innate and/or socially determined gender differences in STEM ability as well as preferences/lifestyle choices and explicit/implicit biases of both men and women in perceptions of men and women's work.

In the same vein, Ceci et al., (2014), were of the view that over time, a more complex possibility was added. For instance, gender differences may not be exclusively shaped by innate or immutable abilities but may also be influenced by socio-cultural factors. Along a different dimension, it was previously assumed that the social barriers to women's entrance and advancement in STEM were exclusively from the prejudices held by men about women. Over time, this assumption has also been revised: both men and women evaluators can be involved in gender discrimination (Moss-Racusin et al, 2012). Thus, the presumed effects of gender disparities in STEM have shifted over time as new evidence and interpretations emerge.

Factors Hindering Women's Contributions in STEM Fields

This section focuses on Women's contributions in STEM fields globally and factors that tend to be of challenge to them. This will be done from archival review of existing literature and empirical analysis by exploring the research findings. However, these following five factors are considered to be particularly important:

- Institutional design factors;
- Socio-economic development;
- Cultural norms and customary practices factor;
- Innate ability, sex, attitude and teaching approach ; and
- Historical legacies religious belief system (Ndinechi and Okafor, 2016; Diekman et al, 2010; Lawal and Muhammed, 2014; Viadero, 2006; Spear, 1985; Omotola, 2007, p. 38; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

The Institutional Design Factor

This view holds that a country's institutional characteristics either enable or constrain women's contributions in STEM fields. Three aspects of the challenges find support in this literature are: the educational curriculum policy, women enrolment in school and science courses offers, and job and professional career placement. On the issue of educational curriculum policy Gonzalez and Kuenzi (2012); Fioriello (2010); Ezeudu, Ofoegbu, and Anyaegbunnam (2013, pp. 27–32) submit that STEM education system and STEM acquired skills are propellers of technological advancement. There are also perceived notions that the educational curriculum is wanting in creativity, including the personal ideas of the lead author and group opinions of the authors, particularly as it relates to developing countries. Thus, Udeani (2012), argues that school factors like instructional materials, illustration, examples and applications presented in resources materials are more familiar in general to the experiences and interest of males than to those of females.

However, there have been global calls for a paradigm shift from the disciplinary approach to teaching and learning the educational curriculum policy of STEM to interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approach of integrating the four disciplines into one cohesive discipline called STEM education. This is to show the interconnectedness among the various disciplines and how the skills acquired could be used in the real world (Peter and, Adewale, 2016, pp.111-117).

Another institutional design factor that is most prominent among factors considered is the influence of Women Enrolment in School and Science courses offers. Ndinechi and Okafor (2016) describe STEM education as a global concept that encompasses the process of critical thinking, analysis and collaboration in which students integrate the process and concept in the real world. Low enrollment numbers among women in the field of STEM can be attributed to several factors. The field of STEM has been traditionally viewed as more a track for men as opposed to women. Other studies appear to be supportive of this position. The study by Billings (2003) on the same problems discovered in the United States of America, that despite efforts over the last 20 years to redress female under-representation, the percentage of women studying computing and related subjects has continued to fall between 1985 and 1990.

Accordingly, this status quo was maintained in the United Kingdom with females making up only 18% of computer science and 11% of software and engineering. Not only are enrolments low and declining, but proportionately, more women than men drop out, fail STEM related courses or choose to major in another subject other than sciences (Selby, 1997). The deleterious trend was repeated in New Zealand with women accounting for a mere 20% of undergraduates in information technology and the sciences (Brook et al, 2000).

Similarly, Croxford (2002), in a study on "participation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics" in Scotland following the introduction of a new programme titled "Science Strategy for Scotland," observed the following:

- after taking account of attainment and science qualifications, females were less likely than males to study mathematics, informatics and engineering;
- one quarter of students with two or more sciences at higher grade were studying medicines and dentistry or subjects allied to medicine. The proportion for science-qualified females was 34%; and
- in the final years of compulsory education (S3-S4), all pupils studied at least one science subject and over half studied at least one technology subject. He concludes that gender and attainment were the main factors that influenced differences in choice of sciences, technology, engineering and mathematical courses.

On job and professional career placement factors, Orji (2000) contends that some professions like carpentry, engineering, woodwork, mental work and automobile engineering technology are still regarded in some quarters as a "no-go" area for females while nursing and catering professions are seen as exclusive for women. STEM fields areespecially important for both men and women alike because theyaccelerate the pace of change and development globally. According to him, STEM provides the foundation for wealth and development, bringing immense improvement to the quality of life and people's ability to interpret the world.

In addition, Diekman et al, (2010) argue that while the focus was previously on the biases of other people evaluating the work of women, a more complex thesis looks at possible bias within both women and men themselves, including their own preferences, biology, and social experiences that may encourage opting in (or out) of certain careers. For Crawford and Cribb (2013), both contend that the exclusion of women from participation and high achievement in STEM means limited access to jobs in these fields, which are among the fastest growing and highest paying endeavors. To them, a student's performance in science and mathematics is a strong indicator of later earnings.

The Socio-Economic Development

Lawal and Muhammed (2014) found out that the socio-economic status of parents and parental occupation are among the factors that cause gender gap in STEM. In relations to gender equality, this approach holds that economic development is central to increasing the pool of women eligible for positions of social, economic, and power (Alexander & Welzel, 2007). Thus, we must admit that a country's level of socio-economic development correlates with women's participation in STEM fields.

Indeed, these scholars establish that increased economic development associates with a more broad-based distribution of economic and occupational resources. Greater access to economic and occupational resources increases women's chances of professional development, creating a larger pool of women eligible for contributions in STEM. Others note that higher levels of economic development bring more social and science services to societies. These developmental measures such as increase in per capita income, Gross Domestic Product, women in the work force and women literacy positively influence the percentage of women's engagement and contributions in STEM fields.

The Innate Ability, Sex, Attitude and Teaching Approach

Viadero (2006) pointed out that differences in brain structure, hormone production or maturation rates may account for differential performance in school-related tasks. Furthermore, the parts of the brain responsible for processing verbal information and control of impulse mature earlier in males. Thus, Acker and Oathy (1993) reports that females are indifferent in science because they lack analytical and visual spatial skills needed for abstract reasoning to science. According to Johnson (2007), males are more variable on most quantitative and visuospatial ability, which necessarily results in more male at both high and low ability extremes and achievement to communicate and comprehend abstract ideas effectively. Thus, better performance by males than females contributed from interest, specific brain and cognitive systems.

Iwu and Azoro (2017, pp. 832-838) noted that, few females than males have innate ability to succeed in academic disciplines that require advanced mathematical abilities, hence the scarcity of females with exceptional mathematical talents, which explains the disparity in female and male ratio in STEM education. Contrarily, to the above argument Campbell et al, (2002) and Erinosho (2008) contend that this has been proved wrong with the emerging evidence which shows that ability is not a determining factor in performance because girls and boys are found to perform equally well if instructional context is fair and conducive. In STEM subjects for example, many cognitive and non-cognitive skills necessary for individual, such as higher intelligent thinking and problem-solving skills can be learned and improvedupon.

Spear (1985) posits that sex, attitude and teaching approach of teachers influences the attitude of female students, whom they believe view science to be more important to boys than girls. In support, Sadker and Sadker (1986) stated that confidence of females is low such that their ability to study science subjects like mathematics is practically unconnected with their actual ability. Furthermore, Lioyd (2014) found that mathematics and physics seemed irrelevant and are male courses. However, Hassan (2011), in his study, found that 82.7 per cent of the sample population agreed that it was not important for girls to study industrial and technical education courses and women were mostly enrolled in courses such as art, business, education, law and home economics.

The Cultural Norms and Customary Practices Factor

Cultural norms and customary practices have great influence on women's STEM contributions. Babatunde (2003) defines culture as a socially created phenomenon that is influenced by the history, social experiences and material circumstances of the people. Among the cultural ideological factors that affect women's contributions in STEM is the patriarchy system (Bari, 2005). Patriarchy is characterised by male kinship, permanent marriage and paternal authority (Appadorai, 1974, p. 35). Fayomi and Igbelina-Igbokwe (2006) note the influence of patriarchy cultural structure on the social status of the female gender. Cain et al (1979, p. 406) define patriarchy as a set of social relations with a material base that enables men to dominate women. In other words, patriarchy describes a distribution of power and resources within the family in a manner that men maintain power and control of resources, and women are powerless and dependent on men (Oyekanmi, 2004, p. 42). To this end, the family plays a vital role in selection of profession, for females while career in science requires scientists to devote most of their time to researches striving to solve problems and bringing about new innovations.

Invariably, men dominate the STEM fields and set the standards for evaluation. MacDonald (1985) asserts that talented girls are discouraged from advanced science and mathematics courses by guidance counselors who try to convince them that the subjects are difficult and unnecessary for them. Limnus and Steveson (1990) and Baker (1983) independently opined that parents discourage their female from sciences because they believe that males perform better in mathematics from elementary school and throughout their academic process. Davis (2008) in his study found that, the level of parented education, fear of science by girls and see science as difficult, lack of science self-confidence and interest are what causegender gap in science education. Cromie (1995) posits that gender discrimination is a critical factor facing females' effective contributions in every field of science. The discrimination results from combination of built-in biases that make them less likely to participate in mathematical, critical and technical profession.

The Historical Legacies and Religious Belief System

Researchers have presented historical legacies potentially capable of affecting women's social, economic, political and scientific status (Omotola, 2007, p. 38). For instance, some studies have also stressed the salience of the epoch character of colonialism particularly in African countries. They have argued that colonialism in Africa was male dominated and did nothing to deviate from the preclusion of women from the public sphere, education and their limitation in the economic sphere (Omotola, 2007, p. 38). Scholars argue that the impact of religious beliefs on women's empowerment through measures of publics' levels of secularisation is negative (Inglehart & Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). This corroborates Coombs' assertion cited in Aguele and Uhumuavbi, (2003), that female contributions and interest in STEM diminishes as they move up in the educational ladder towards the university level due to a variety of factors that are primarily rooted in their religious beliefs surrounding the role of women in the society.

From the foregoing, much of the research findings confirm the barrier to women's full social inclusion, which adversely continues to restrict and hinder women's contributions in STEM fields. Moreover, taking the five factors as a whole, and the various institutional design factors (the educational curriculum policy, women enrolment in school and science courses offers job and professional career opportunities), socio-economic development, cultural norms and customary practices factors, together with historical legacies and religious belief systems, as well as innate ability, sex, attitude and teaching approach are likely correlating factors hindering women's participation in STEM fields.

Perspectives on Nigeria's Women in STEM Fields

STEM is of critical importance for all countries because failure to do so means the loss of vast human resources that could be harnessed towards contributing to national development and further entrenchment of gender equality in the society. A country's ability to create, apply and diffuse scientific and technological knowledge is now a major determinant of its socioeconomic development and national competitiveness. This potential cannot be fully realised without optimally engaging the the entire population of a nation including girls and women (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2010).However, they remain substantially under-represented in STEM fields for the fact that they are generally seen and treated by society as being less capable and inferiorto men.

According to Garder (1984) and Ocho (1985), in Nigeria culture female children are reared differently from males. Girls are protected and discouraged from explorative and risky activities while males are encouraged to be assertive and challenge their mental powers. Thus, socialisation leads to certain personality characteristics regarded as masculine or feminine independent qualities such as initiative and assertiveness for boys; dependency, submissiveness and complacency for girls towards science as they believe that they are inferior to boys physically and mentally. Schools specifically play important role in females' access to science by the manner the school curriculum is implemented in Nigeria.

Nevertheless, UNICEF (2005) found that many children do not attend schools in Nigeria because their labour is needed to either help at home or to bring additional income into the family. Many parents cannot afford sending their children to school due to high cost of tuition, uniforms, textbooks and other requirements. For others, the distance to the nearest school is also a major hindrance. Regarding cultural bias, many parents do not send their children especially girls to school and prefer to send them to Qur'an school rather than formal schools. Even when children enroll to school do not finish primary cycle. (Najib **and Ahmed 2019, p. 11)** The reason for this low completion rate includes child labour, economic hardship and early marriage for girls. Moreover, Hassan (2011) survey the gender inequality in industrial and technical sectors in Nigeria; parents' perspective in 21st century, the study found that traditional beliefs, parental educational background, culture, religion, early marriage, is what course gender gap in science and technology courses in Nigeria.

Francisca (2019) asserts that in a country like Nigeria, many complex challenges impair the contributions of women and girls in the development of STEM. To her, where scientific research is hampered by several factors, principal among which are infrastructural development, dearth of funding as well as that of facilities, a situation which remains quite pathetic and calls for greater attention by relevant authorities. Their exclusion from the generation and application of scientific knowledge represents a tremendous waste of human potentials. Some dedicated and committed women lack confidence in themselves, due to lack of encouragement of young women and girls to develop interests in STEM. Opening new doors requires a range of shifts in both mindset and, in some cases, culture. It is disheartening to note that STEM policy makers do not involve women in developing STEM policies. Therefore, there is the need to address the striking fact that lack of fund and facilities needed for innovative research work is very far out of reach from women and girls. Scholarships for women and sponsorship for female scientists is extremely rare, suggesting that more should be instituted (Francisca, 2019).

Contributions of Women in the STEM Fields

In the words of Noris et al (2003), alluding to the rising gender-egalitarian attitudes that gives rise to an emancipative worldview, reflected in self-expression values that emphasise autonomy of women. On the other hand, since the post-World War II era, there has been a global explosion of women's activism on behalf of equality, liberation, and better living conditions. They have gained visibility and influence in a wide array of social, political, economic and scientific arenas in the society. This change seems to allow many women to go further; by building up their own careers and support bases, consequently becoming actively involved in human endeavours (Henderson, 2006). Indeed, women's dedicated efforts to challenge the status quo have allowed more women to reach high positions in recent years. (Omotola, 2007; Ajayi, 2007; The Nigeria CEDAW NGO Coalition Shadow Report, 2008; Genevieve, 1999). Thus, women's increasing contributions in STEM fields is both a source and a signal of social change.

For instance, between 2011 and 2013, there was an increase in the percentage of women researchers in South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Cameroon and Ethiopia **(**Oluwafunmilayo**,** Para-Mallam and Dorothycited in The Conversation Africa, 2020). Barbara, et al (2020) observed that women account for 53% of the world's bachelor's and master's degree graduates and 43% of Ph.D graduates. Women scientists have a vital part to play in scientific leadership and in contributing to global development and transformation. As part of building skills and mentoring the next generation of African scientists, the African Union declared 2015 as the Year of Women's Empowerment and Development towards Africa Agenda 2063. It also adopted the Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa till 2024, which examines among other things, the role women can play in accelerating Africa's transition to an innovation-led, knowledge-based economy which meets modern society's needs (Oluwafunmilayo, Para-Mallam and Dorothycited in The Conversation Africa, 2020). Hosek et al, (2005) this no longer appears to be the case among many U.S. funding agencies. Across the National Science Foundation (NSF), United States Department of Agriculture, and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the percentage of female applicants receiving grants is now approximately equivalent to the percentage of male applicants receiving grants.

Women have a distinct way of seeing and interpreting the world. This is not to say that all women have the same consciousness or share the same thoughts. It is to say that women of each particular culture or group have a consciousness, a way of seeing, which is common to themselves as women in that it is distinct from the way the men of their culture or group sees things. Of paramount importance is the inclusion of women's voices, experiences, and perspectives in a technological world to strengthen organisational life, research and the future of humanity as observed by (Aptheker cited in Billings, 2003, p. 6; Lawrence and Uche (2007).

Conclusion

Overcoming gender inequality in the STEM fields is not just a matter of access to professional training programs, whether in vocational secondary or higher education. As Awe, (1992); Waylen, (1996); Nwankwo, (1996), Unumeri, (2003), Abdu, (2003), Johnson, (2003), have all cautioned that throughout the world, the power relations that shape social, political, economic, science and cultural life prevent women from contributing fully in all areas of their lives, whether it is in the home, or in the public arena. The facts entail actions towards equal participation for women in all contexts of social, economic and political life, including the development in STEM fields.

The logic is that leaders and experts need to address this aspect and contribute to rigorous thinking on the opportunities and challenges of women in STEM as well as other crucial areas of gender equality, poverty reduction and emancipation of women at all fronts. With the inclusion of women's voices, experiences, and perspectives in a technological world to strengthen organisational life, research and the future of humanity is of paramount. However, it is not enough to continually brand the dominant assumption about gender disparities in STEM that portray women's lack of ability is due to biological, innate, and/or immutable differences (Keller, 1985).Moving forward, there is a clarion call to substantially change the narrative regarding women's underrepresentation in STEM fields in Nigeria, for the fact that they are generally seen and treated by society as being less capable and inferior to men. It could, therefore, be concluded that unless the government addresses issues of gender disparity, especially in its quest for development strive, the utilisation of women's intelligential prowess in STEM fields towards concrete development may elude the country.

Recommendatios

The author recommends as follows:

- Federal Government of Nigeria should sponsor programmes that would engender higher participation of women in STEM fields.
- Federal Government of Nigeria should give gender mainstreamingand gender contributions higher priorities in its developmental programmes.
- Federal Government of Nigeria should ensure equal participation of males and females in national affairs.
- Federal Government of Nigeria shouldprovide dedicated funds for development of women in STEM fields.
- Federal Government of Nigeria should ensure that the media continually showcase the achievements and excellence of women in the STEM fields.

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WOMEN EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT AND EXPOSURE TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Women education is a key measure to promoting gender equality while reduced gender-based violence (GBV) against women is one of the indicators of gender equality realisation. Whereas evidence has consistently shown female education to positively impact child's health, women's fertility, and women's participation in civic life and paid job across contexts, evidence on the relationship between female education (and economic empowerment) and GBV against women is not clearly established. Mapping this relationship is important for informing gender policies and practices. Hence, given increasing violence against women in Nigeria, this study used Nigeria demographic and health survey data of 2008, 2013, and 2018 to investigate the direction of the relationship between female education/economic empowerment and women's exposure to intimate partner or domestic gender-based violence. Findings show that women education and economic empowerment do not reduce women's GBV victimisation as GBV against women is consistently higher among educated and wealthier women. The implication of findings for gender education intervention programmes for men and women is discussed.

Keywords: Gender education, gender-based violence, feminism, patriarchy, sociocultural factors

Introduction

Gender-based violence (GBV), especially violence against womenis a public health and human rights issue that is gender motivated. It can be institutional (perpetrated by government institutions, security agencies, laws and schools) or non-institutional (perpetrated by individuals in both domestic and non-domestic realms) and can happen to any gender, but women are the most common victims. Common GBV against women studied in literature includephysical, emotional, and sexual violence.The commonest severe forms of violence against women include domestic violence, intimate partner violence, sexual abuse, trafficking, forced prostitution, exploitation of labour, and rape in war (Watts & Zimmerman, 2002). Results have consistently shown GBV to be high across contexts (WHO, 2005; Garcia et al., 2013) with the worst scenarios in Southeast Asia and Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa (WHO, 2005; Garcia et al, 2013; Kanga et al, 2017; Orpin et al, 2020).

Factors such as culture and laws that promote and condone male domination of women, male alcoholism, conceptions of 'insubordinate' female partners, perceptions justifying of partner's violence, all-female children among others have been linked to increasing GBV in sub-

Saharan Africa (Obi & Ozumba, 2007; Nwabunike &Tenkorang, 2017) while protective factors against GBV in sub-Saharan Africa are identified as having male offspring, female education and women economic empowerment (Obi & Ozumba, 2007; Aguocha et al, 2017).

To address GBV many intervention programmes are adopted towards reducing gender inequality that undergirds GBV.These efforts include increasing girl-child enrolment in school, 'skill-building and economic empowerment programming, community mobilisation, and participation group education efforts aiming to change attitudes and norms that support violence against women and girls' (Ellsberg et al, 2015). Girl-child education is, however, the most popularly advocated measure for combating gender inequality and GBV, especially domestic violence. Following the increased implementation of the girl-child education agenda, gender literature has mapped the relationship between women's education and other factors such as infant health, participation in labour and exposure to GBV. While there is robust evidence supporting a positive relationship between girl-child education and fertility, infant health (Curries & Moretti, 2002; Pratley, 2016), women's participation in a paid job (see Klasen & Lamanna, 2009; Bianchi, 2000) and the creation of human capital of the next generation (e.g., Klasen & Lamanna, 2009; Hill & Kings, 1995), findings on the relationship between girl-child education and gender-based violence are inconsistent (Aguocha et al., 2017; Ellsberg et al, 2015; Chisamya et al, 2012; Obi & Ozumba, 2007). The study of Obi and Ozumba (2007) and Aguocha et al (2017), for example, show that women's education did not protect them from domestic violence. Chimsanya et al (2012) show that girl education in Bangladesh and Malawi did not correspond with their experience of gender relations. Other studies have shown women attainment of higher education reduced their exposure to GBV (Garcia et al, 2013; Aguocha et al, 2017).

There is, therefore, a need for further research on the relationship between women education and gender-based violence. This study covers this needby drawing on 2008, 2013, and 2018 Nigeria demographic and health surveys (National Population Commission (NPC), 2009, 2014, 2019) to investigate the relationship between women education or economic empowerment and women's exposure to gender-based violence, particularly intimate partner or domestic gender-based violence – simply defined as violence (sexual, economic verbal, physical or emotional) inflicted or perpetrated by someone against his or her intimate partner within or outside a household. The finding of this study is explained from patriarchal, socio-cultural, religious, media, and curriculum perspectives.

Method

The design of the study is descriptive drawing from quantitative survey secondary datawhich were used to source information on the level of women education (and economic empowerment) and level of women's exposure to GBV, intimate partner (married or unmarried) violence to be specific. Specifically, the secondary data used for the study was sourced and derived from 2008, 2013, and 2018 Nigeria demographic and health surveys (National Population Commission, 2009, 2014, 2019). The survey collects data from ever-married and never-married women on violence committed by their spouses, boyfriends or other men on them since age 15 or in the last 12 months. Participants of the survey include women age 15-49 years. The total national sample for 2008 is 21,468 while 2013 includes 27,634, and 2018 includes 10,678 (NPC, 2009, 2014, 2019). Intimate partner physical and sexual violence percentage scores were already provided in the surveys' reports. To get the total score intimate partner or domestic GBV exposure of women, the author summed and averaged the physical and sexual violence percentage scores for each reported year. The education and wealth level of ever-married women (and their spouses) exposed to violence against women were mainly considered for this study. The data considered was used for plotting the bar charts used for this study.

Finding

How dowomen education and economic empowerment relate towomen's exposure to gender-based violence?

This section presents answers to the above question drawing on the analysed collected secondary data.



The chart in Figure 3 shows wealthier women consistently experience greater intimate partner physical violence across all measured years than other women: that is, the wealthier a woman becomes the more likely she is to experience intimate partner physical violence. Women with the least wealth experienced the least intimate partner physical violence. This finding violates the progressive order of development and hence, is disturbing and possible explanations for it are offered in the subsequent section.

Discussion

The evidence in the presented charts suggests that girl-child education and economic empowerment do not reduce the level of women's exposure to intimate partner or domestic GBV in Nigeria but exacerbate it. More clearly, the result shows a negative and dissatisfactory relationship between women's education and economic empowerment and women's exposure to intimate partner or domestic gender-based violence. This section compares this finding with findings of the previous literature and further discusses the finding from patriarchal, socio-cultural, media, hidden curriculum, and religious perspectives.

The study's finding compares with the findings of other studies that women with higher education reported higher exposure to intimate partner violence in southeast Nigeria (Aguocha et al., 2017; Obi & Ozumba, 2007). This finding is also similar to Chisamya et al. (2012) findings in Bangladesh and Malawi contexts that the girl being educated did not correspond with girl experience of transformation of the inequitable gender relations they faced in society as gender-based violence is still high in these contexts despite that parity is reached or closely reached in these contexts.

In sum, the finding of this study shows that in the Nigerian context the increase in girl-child education is associated with greater exposure to intimate partner or domestic gender-based violence. Jewkes et al (2008) findings that exposure of men and women to intervention programmes like training on gender equality and hegemonic masculinity topics did not reduce women's victimisation of intimate partner violence but reduced men's perpetration of intimate partner violence lends credence to this finding that girl-child education does not without more reduce GBV. The perspectives from which this finding is explained are individually discussed below.

Patriarchy and sociocultural factors as explanatory factors for GBV in Nigeria

From a patriarchal perspective, the finding of higher gender-based violence against women with higher education and higher income could be associated with patriarchal beliefs and the fragile hegemonic identity of men that are threatened by women's enlightenment and empowerment in Nigeria. Of course, hegemonic masculinity stifles the agency and autonomy of women as educated women engaged in agency are discriminated against and meted with hostility (Rudman & Glick, 2001). Patriarchy—an ideology and practice that assumes and treat men as superior to women – dictates roles and expectations for both men and women with the affairs of women subordinated and largely examined and controlled.

In a patriarchal system, people associate women with characteristics such as the emotional, irrational, subject of desire and passion, and unable to apply standards of justice while men are associated with rationality, ability to apply dispassionate reason and standards of justice (Lister, 1997). And young men have been found to believe that it is not woman to have further education and men's role include asserting authority over women (Matt York, 2014). Obi and Ozumba's (2007) further noted that high class educated Nigerian wives would want to assert their rights in the family and this assertion of her rights brings the 'traditional authority and dominance' of the man into question leading to his frustration and use of violence to satisfy societal expectations of his dominance. These patriarchal dictates and beliefs documented in previous studies explain the finding of this study that wealthier and more educated women experience greater intimate partner or domestic violence in Nigeria.

Sociocultural factors contribute to the dissatisfactory and negative relationship between female education and their exposure to GBV. As assumed by sociocultural theory propounded by Lev Vygotsky (1978), an individual's behaviour and perceptions are influenced by contextual culture, institutions and history. Higher gender-based violence reported by wealthier and more educated women in Nigeria can be explained by the socio-cultural ascription of subordinate and carer roles to women; these roles and expectations (especially the subordinate role and expectation) are, sometimes, disrupted by women's access to higher education and wealth.

Religion as a factor behind increasing GBV

Religious teaching, albeit biased teaching, is another factor promoting hegemonic masculinity and gender-based violence, especially domestic violence, against women in Nigeria. Male headship is central to Christian and Muslim teachings especially among Pentecostal Christians in the global south (van Klinken, 2011; Christian Aid, Vioce4Change, & Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2015). In Nigeria, women and girls develop gendered identity about their roles, expectations, and worth through religious indoctrination and, sometimes, they understand their roles to include enduring domestic violence (Para-Mallam, 2006). Although there are instances where male headship has been approached from liberal and agency perspectives whereby men are encouraged to be responsible in their family life and avoid extramarital affairs (van Klinken, 2011; Christian Aid, Vioce4Change, & Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2015), hegemonic masculinity is mostly promoted by popular Pentecostal churches in Nigeria.

Currently, there is the emergence of radicalisation of Nigerian young men into hostility against educated and successful women by religious organisations that preach hegemonic masculinity. For example, among numerous other pastors, two popular Pentecostal pastors with largest followership shares in Nigeria (Pastor Chris Oyakhilome and Pastor Enoch Adeboye) share teachings of the husband as the wife's master and present contemporary educated women in bad light and women behaviours as the reason for men's misbehaviours (see Aworinde & Alagbe, 2019; Akinkuotu, 2020). This is in contrast with the Pentecostal pastor analysed in van Klinken study (2011) who held men responsible and accountable for their irresponsibility and misbehaviours. The consequence of this Pentecostal preaching in Nigeria is the rise in intimate partner violence against women, especially the educated and successful ones. This is also evidenced in a study conducted by Aguocha et al (2017) which shows that Pentecostal educated Christian women reported greater experience of intimate partner violence than their orthodox Christian counterparts.

Hidden curriculum promoting gender stereotype as a factor behind increasing GBV

'The hidden curriculum in sexual politics is more powerful than the explicit curriculum' (Connell, 1989, p. 300). Women domination practised in society is reinforced in Nigerian schools. Even though topics such as gender discrimination and inequality and traditional harmful practices like widowhood practices and female genital mutilations are introduced in primary and junior secondary social studies education curriculum (Obiagu & Nwaubani, 2020) as well as higher institution curriculums, it is has been shown that recommended textbooks used in Nigeria largely discriminate against women by associating women mainly with subordinate and gender stereotypical roles like home-making while associating men with economically well-paid works (Mustapha, 2012). Teacher education programmes in Nigeria give little attention to gender (Action Aid, 2013) and no attention to school-related gender-based violence (British Council & IOE, 2014).

Moreover, teaching in Nigeria is dominated by teacher-centred methods, repetition and explanation that are devoid of challenging the status quo (Obiagu, 2019), and Nigerian teachers hold gender stereotypical views and reflect them in their teaching practices (Ifegbesan, 2010). These impede the realisation of the aims, including the elimination of GBV, behind the introduction of gender-based topics in Nigerian schools, though the introduced gender-related topics are insufficient to address the bifurcation of public and private spheres of lives along gender lines or the gendered ideology of space that enable GBV. This limited inclusion, presentation and implementation of gender-related topics in Nigerian schools further explains the situation whereby educated Nigerians condone GBV and educated men still perpetrate intimate partner gender-based violence against their women.

Media and ignorance as contributory factors in increasing GBV

The media is another major source promoting gender-based violence against educated and successful women in Nigeria. Aside general contribution of the media in normalising, banalising, reinforcing, and reproducing sexual assaults, rape and other forms of gender violence and inequalities through various means including commodification of women's bodies in media contents (Montiel, 2014), educated and successful career women are often represented as disloyal to their husbands and as non-carers in Nigerian movies (Adewoye et al, 2014). This leads some men and women to foreclose themselves from learning about feminism and gender equality assumptions and goals while putting pressure on educated women to prove their innocence to the people and society. As shown by Connell (1989), men who engage in counter-sexist politics and adopt some feminist principles have almost all read feminist books while mass media is seemingly the main source of information about feminism among men who have not moved towards feminism. A recent study found men in southeast Nigeria as ignorant of what constitutes gender-based violence but understood physical violence against women as a correctional measure (Agbawodikeizu et al., 2019). With increased ignorance and misinformation about feminism and women empowerment, affected men become apprehensive of educated women and hence, develop the tendency to assert control and perpetrate violence on educated women to prevent, from occurring in their homes, the scenarios sold by the media. As argued elsewhere 'female liberation is widely perceived by some as western cultural imperialism' (Para-Mallam, 2006, p. 409) and GBV against women is a subtle way of resisting women liberation and empowerment in Nigeria.

Conclusion: What gender education intervention programme for men and women?

Gender equality educational policies and practices should consider the adoption and application of the following suggestions.

There is aneed for a gender education intervention programme that will tackle the fragile ego of men who are threatened by women's success and prevent the development of such fragile ego in growing boys. The gender education intervention programme for GBV reduction through education should focus more on training the boys and men to viewgirls and women as peoplewho, though with unique biological features, haveequal rights and opportunities as them and not as their subordinate. Beyond changing men's view of women as their subordinate, gender education intervention programme for men should help men unlearn inferiorising femininity and learn to appreciate, as worthy and sophisticated,the traditional values of women. This approach is reliable given the findings of Matt York (2017) and Jewkes et al (2008), in the South African context, that gender-education intervention programmes targeted at exposing men to training about masculinity, gender inequality, gender violence and HIV/AIDS changed their hegemonic masculinity worldviews, promoted their positive perception of women as independent beings,and reduced their perpetration of GBV.

More proactively, gender-related, citizenship and human rights contents introduced into school subjects in Nigeria will be more effective at reducing gender-based violence if approached from a critical feminist stance that challenge patriarchy and sociocultural factors that subjugate women or oppress women or men.For example, citizenship lessons addressed from a feminist perspective would normally recognise the traditional bifurcation of the private and public spheres along gendered lines and further incorporate discussions that challenge this bifurcation in order to empower both men and women to unlearn systemic gender discrimination and encourage more women's representation and participation in the civic and public arena and agency.

There is significant hope in approaching these contents from a feminist perspective since a study by Connell (1989) showed men who read feminists books (not media contents on feminism) to be more respecting of women.Notably, the growing miseducation about gender equality and feminism sold through the media, especially social media, sometimes, by socio-emotionally damaged individuals who need mental help – that increases mistrust and hostility of one gender against the opposite gender in Nigeria calls for the adoption of an additional feminist approach to civic, human rights and gender-related topics in Nigeria. This approach is important if the mis-education received through the media about gender equality and feminism, which contributes to growing gender-based violence, is to be tackled in Nigeria. In this digital age, failure to teach about feminism and gender equality in schools is dangerous; if we fail to teach them about it in schools, they draw contents about it from the wrong persons and wrong media in societies.

It is not enough to empower women with educational qualifications or economic skills that increase their employment opportunities and economic wellbeing; more should be done to intentionally empower them to challenge andescape gender-based violence (especially domestic violence) and systemic discrimination against women. Since being educated and wealthy failed to shield women from gender-based violence as shown in this study just as exposure of women to training on gender-based violenceis shown to be ineffective in reducing their victimisation (see Jewkes et al, 2008), gender scholars need to begin exploring better approaches to empower women to be free from gender-based violence. A suggestion would be to adopt a gender-education intervention programme for women that target catching the girls young and equipping them with a worldview that disrupts their traditional perceptions (influenced by their sociocultural backgrounds) of self as men's subordinate and promote their perception of self as men's cooperative equals or equal partners. This worldview is more likely to position them for both socioeconomic and mental independence as well as to deter hegemonic men with fragile ego out from their spaces. Their early development of independence and critical feminist worldview will reduce their tendency of bowing to social pressures that promote patriarchal dictates and hostility towards men or chances of partnering with men who violate their rights or perpetrate or perpetuate gender-based violence against them.

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'…Waiting for her police…..': Intimate partner violence during COVID-19 lockdown in Nigeria

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Abstract

This paper focuses on intimate partner violence in Nigeria during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) lockdown in Nigeria. Data was obtained from media reports, specifically on cases of intimate partner violence which happened between 29th March 2020, when the COVID-19 lockdown was imposed and 4th May 2020, when the lockdown was relaxed with gradual easing measures. This study found out that there were cases of maiming, battering, sexual predation, humiliation and killing of women by their intimate partners during the lockdown as a result of factors including but not limited to crippling of economic activities which led to financial pressures, aggression and, in some cases, substance abuse. The paper concludes on the note that the lockdown heightened the prevalence of gender-based violence against women. To address this, the need for government to provide adequate shelters, mental healthcare, justice and security services as well as the allocation of substantial financial resources to run them, in order to tackle gender-based violence are recommended, among others.

Introduction

Gender-based violence (GBV) has been a long-standing problematic issue that has primarily affected women. GBV has been defined as "any act that results or is likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of acts such as coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life"(United Nations General Assembly, 1993, p. 3). Women are primarily affected because of their vulnerability to violence, which is reinforced by existing gender inequalities. Available estimates reveal that 30 percent of women have been victims of at least a form of GBV in their lifetime, since the age of 15 (Garcia-Moreno & Pallitto, 2013). Globally, 1 in 3 women have experienced either physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence or non-partner sexual violence; and intimate partner has been the most prevalent (World Health Organisation (WHO), 2017). GBV is a pandemic that has had adverse effects on the well being of women. More worrisome is the exacerbation of acts of violence perpetrated against women during crisis or natural disasters. Reports have shown that during crisis and natural disasters, the statistics of GBV escalate as a result of tension, financial strain, breakdown of a stable environment, inability to access the usual support networks, disrupted public services, weakening of legal protection systems, among others (Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2020; Smith, 2020). With the outbreak of the coronavirus Disease 2019

(COVID-19) in December 2019 which led to several deaths, the pandemic became a worrisome issue globally. The alarming rate at which the virus was spreading necessitated the need for measures to be imposed to curb its spread. Along with other measures, countries imposed varying degrees of lockdowns with enforced time and movement restrictions. The adoption of lockdowns as a measure for curbing the spread of COVID-19 has had an adverse effect on the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and rights of some women. This is as a result of the existing challenges of the gendered dimension of accessing the essentials further exacerbated by the global pandemic; leading to the trapping of women at home with abusive partners with restricted opportunities for support services, in situations where they exist (Jang & Farise, 2020). Cases of violence against women have skyrocketed as a result of the confined living conditions accentuated by the lockdown. A noticeable increase has been recorded in countries including the United Kingdom, United States, Singapore, China and Sweden (Young & Aref-Adib, 2020; Umukoro, 2020a).

In This paper, media reports of GBV were pooled and focus is especially on cases of IPV in Nigeria from March 29 2020, when the COVID-19 lockdown was imposed and 4 May, 2020 when the lockdown was relaxed with gradual easing measures. Several acts of violence perpetrated against women in Nigeria by their intimate partners included battering, sexual assault, inflicting pain, maiming, emotional abuse and even death. The reasons for the escalating figures of IPV are identified and the paper is concluded on the note that greater gender inclusiveness in society is needed to take action against GBV. This paper will serve as evidence for policy response to redress violence against women, not only during the COVID-19 pandemic but beyond it. Additionally, it will serve as a stimulant for further research on intimate partner violence in countries of the global south, during pandemics.

Brief Literature Review

Intimate partner violence is perpetrated within a heterosexual or homosexual relationship by a current or former partner. It is the most prevalent type of violence experienced by women and studies have identified it to include acts inflicted by an intimate partner to cause physical, sexual, emotional and psychological harm (Stewart & Vigod, 2017; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000). Violence perpetrated against women by their current or past intimate partners are often carried out for control and dominance. Physical harm can be inflicted when an intimate partner engages in acts including but not limited to kicking, slapping, battering, punching, hitting, pushing, biting, using a weapon and exerting strength upon the victim to cause injury, disability or death.

Sexual violence includes acts compelling the victim to engage in sexual activity against their will using threat or physical force. Emotional and psychological harm can be caused by acts or threats of acts by an intimate partner that cause or are likely to cause trauma, shame and humiliation to the victim. In countries like the United States, Australia, Israel, South Africa and Canada, it has been reported that about 40 to 70 per cent of female victims of murder were put to death by their partners (United Nations, 2009). Several factors have been identified in literature as causes of IPV. These include factors such as economic hardship, cultural normalisation of abuse, suspicion of infidelity, a history of family violence, alcohol and other substance abuse, personality disorders, low social and economic status of women, (Lucero et al, 2016; Sabri et al, 2018; Ogundipe et al, 2018; Mbadugha, 2016). When violence is perpetrated against women, it has implications on the victims, their families and society at large. Evidence from studies show that IPV leads to homicide, sexually transmitted infections, physical disability, low self esteem, poor academic or job performance of victims, mental disorder, emotional instability of children, post traumatic stress disorder, homelessness, absenteeism from work due to injury, reproductive health problems and draining of public resources (Messing, 2019; Mbadugha, 2016; Wong & Mellor, 2014). Although IPV is widespread, scholars have pointed out that it is rife in some places than in others. Using the ecological framework, they explain that interactions at the individual, family, community and societal levels impact on how violence against women manifests (Jewkes, Levin & Penn-Kekana, 2002).

At the individual level, Ellsberg and Heise (2005) assert that the male that was a victim of marital violence as a child will likely perpetrate violence; at the family level, marital conflict is fuelled when wealth control and decision making lies with the male; at the community level, lack of social support for women while legitimising violence from men upholds it; and at the societal level, the prevalence of gender norms and culture that enforce male dominance propels violence against women. In contrast, in societies where interactions in the social environment are not synonymous with the explanation above, the likelihood of violence against women will be minimal. The varying levels of interaction probably explains why global estimates indicate that "among low- and middle-income regions, Africa has the highest proportion of women reporting either physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence or non-partner sexual violence, at 45.6 per cent, South-East Asia- 40.2%, Eastern Mediterranean- 36.4%, the Americas-36.1%, Western Pacific -27.9% and Europe -27.2% (WHO, 2013).

Despite the prevalence of IPV and its negative effects on the lives of victims, many of the abused women refuse to leave such relationships. Various reasons have been identified as to why abused women stay in violent relationships and these include the absence of support from family and friends, uncertainty about the future, fear of societal stigmatisation that comes with separation or divorce, optimism that there will be a positive change in the attitude of the perpetrator of violence, absence of shelter facilities from government for women who decide to leave abusive relationships; absence of an alternative means of livelihood and economic support, fear of retaliation and the consideration of the effect on children (Heise, Ellsberg & Gottemoeller, 1999). No matter the form of violence, it makes women more vulnerable in society, hence it is important that anti-gender based legislations are made and adequate mechanisms for their implementation and enforcement are put in place to address its prevalence.

Intimate Partner Violence in Nigeria during the COVID-19 Lockdown

The COVID-19 lockdown has increased the vulnerability of women and girls in Nigeria to violence, as experienced in several other countries. Particularly alarming is the rate of violence against women, recorded in states where the federal government of Nigeria imposed full lockdown. The rate of violence against women was more pronounced in Abuja, Kano, Lagos and Ogun states where there was imposition of full lockdown.

Available reports show that between March and April 2020, the figures of reported GBV cases increased from 60 to 238, a 297 percent surge, while in states like Benue, Ebonyi and Cross River with partial lockdown, there was only a 53 percent increase in cases within the same time frame (Young & Aref-Adib, 2020). Since the lockdown started in March 2020, the Domestic and Gender Violence Response Team in Lagos state has had an average of 13 reported cases daily and a 60 percent increase in domestic violence (Umukoro, 2020b). Irrespective of the magnitude of the lockdown, partial or full; several cases of IPV including sexual predation, verbal, physical and psychological assault have been recorded across states in Nigeria.

A case which was widely condemned as a result of the wide publicity it gained was that of Sulaiman Maiyegun, who in Lagos in early May 2020, beat his wife and posted the pictures of the battered woman on his timeline on Facebook. Sharing the photos of the woman, he wrote: "*I beat my wife and am waiting for her police because I talk to a woman"* (Ojo, 2020). By this, he meant that it was a justifiable act on his part to have battered his wife because of her reaction to his talking to another woman. The picture he posted of his battered wife on his Facebook timeline went viral and generated a lot of comments condemning his actions. Afterwards, he was arrested by security agents and the case taken to court.

Cases of physical assault also occurred in other cities in Nigeria during the lockdown. In Abuja, during a media interview with officials of the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and other related offences, cases were mentioned of several forms of sexual and domestic abuses experienced by women and girls during the lockdown between April and May 2020. From the interview, Aluko (2020) reported 2 cases of IPV; the first was of a man that assaulted his wife, removed her tooth in the process and inflicted injuries on her; and the other of a woman who was rescued from her husband after he attempted to burn her alive. Apart from these, there was a reported case in Yobe state in May 2020 of Ba'ari Abacha, a husband who cut off the right hand of his wife, Halima Bulama for attending a marriage contrary to his instructions (Umukoro, 2020b).

These clearly are cases of physical abuse which must have been preceded by verbal assault on the victims. These incidences left the women in these marriages battered, maimed, psychologically traumatised and in need of medical attention. Psychological abuse is as harmful as other forms of abuse; though physical pain may not be inflicted, it causes trauma, shame and humiliation to the victim. The lockdown made many women to experience psychological abuse and one of the reports that got into the news happened in Delta state. The case was reported during the lockdown, of Mr. Godspower locking his pregnant wife, Sharon, outside for hours as punishment for being loquacious, not preparing his meals on time and allowing her mother's interference in their marriage (Umukoro, 2020a). Although the report did not indicate any form of physical abuse, being locked out during pregnancy is humiliating and traumatising.

There were also instances of sexual predation and assault during the lockdown. In Lagos for instance, in April 2020, a video went viral of a man who was harassing his wife for sex despite the woman taking to the streets and screaming that she has had enough of his sexual molestation; he forcefully took her back into the house to continue with his sexual predation (Okoro, 2020). Another was the case of Alasan Audu who killed his wife, Hansau while forcefully having sex with her in April 2020, few days after their wedding in Jigawa State (Adeniyi, 2020). Hansau was said to have rejected sexual advances from her new husband who then decided to forcefully have his way, leading to her death.

Although, some of the victims of physical, verbal, psychological and sexual abuse were lucky to escape with their lives as a result of intimate partner violence during the lockdown, there were exceptions. Some were not so lucky because they lost their lives in the process. A clear example of this was a case that was said to have occurred in Ondo state in April 2020. It was reported that in Idanre local government area of Ondo State, a man, Eric Olowokande allegedly quarreled with his wife Mojere, punched her to death and fled afterwards (Gbolagunte, 2020). He was reported to have left her corpse in their home where he allegedly punched her to death but after some days the stench attracted neighbours who alerted the police. Eric was later apprehended by security operatives and detained.

Reasons given for the prevalence of IPV especially during the lockdown in Nigeria included the trapping of women at home with abusive partners, poverty, transferred aggression, limited access to support services, poor behavioural tendencies of men who cannot cope with staying home, financial dependence of women on men and distorted perceptions leading to substance abuse (Kaigama, 2020; Hassan, 2020). Before the lockdown, women in abusive relationships and marriages could escape for safety from their intimate partners during assault but the restriction on movement made them trapped. In addition to this, many economic activities were crippled; hence, financial resources were limited, leaving many victims at the mercy of their abusers. Limited financial resources triggered aggression and distorted perceptions which made some men to resort to substance abuse, leading to them abusing their partners. The movement restrictions also made access to support services limited, leaving many victims helpless. The movement restriction made it difficult for abused women who needed help to get access to support services like security operatives, non-governmental organisations advocating for the protection of the rights of women, legal aid and justice.

IPV has many effects on the lives of women. Homelessness, health complications and difficulty in getting access to justice are some of the effects of GBV on women during lockdowns (Jang & Farise, 2020). The risk of getting accommodation as a result of the high costs of housing pose a serious challenge to victims fleeing from abusive partners. Health complications could also arise due to sexual predation, physical and psychological abuse; leading to sexually transmitted infections, post-traumatic stress disorder and gynecological problems. The difficulty of victims getting access to justice is also heightened as a result of the restricted movement and shutting down of government offices including courts. Restrictions on movement make it difficult for victims to get to security agencies like the police or get access to courts to protect themselves from further abuse.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Despite the growing campaign and advocacy against GBV, the lockdown imposed by government in Nigeria as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic has heightened its prevalence. Beyond the available reports, many women living with abusive partners but who relied on their jobs, educational, social, religious or economic activities as routes of escape were trapped with their abusers for weeks. Many women have been maimed, traumatised, shamed, humiliated and even lost their lives without their stories getting reported by media, reported to civil society organisations, or getting support from non-governmental organisations because they happened discreetly. Particularly vulnerable are women whose sources of livelihood have been suspended due to the lockdown, those financially dependent on their abusive partners, women living with disabilities or those who are pregnant.

Although, Nigeria is the first country in the West African sub region to pass the Violence Against Persons (VAPP) Act at the national level and in 11 states, it is believed by advocates of women's rights that the anti-gender based legislations are not being properly implemented given the absence of some statutory bodies as well as non-responsiveness of government (Umukoro, 2020a). Legislations, no doubt, are important. However, they cannot be effective if they are not well implemented. The implementation of the VAPP Act is as important as its enactment and a significant way to determine if it is effective is if there is a change in the attitude of people towards violence against women (Okedele & Yacob-Haliso, 2017). From the foregoing discussion, lockdown or not, this paper is concluded on the note that to take action against GBV in Nigeria, there is a need for greater gender inclusiveness.

This paper, therefore, recommends that public awareness should be increased on human rights and on the criminal nature of GBV in different local languages using the mass and social media. NGOs that advocate for the rights of women should work in harmony with governments at the national, states and local government levels to sensitive women about the existence of anti-GBV legislations where they exist, and the means of seeking redress using them. For victims to get assistance easily help lines should be put in place and public campaigns on their availability should be embarked upon. Through the public enlightenment on the availability of help lines, victims or people that notice any form of abuse on persons around them can reach out to those lines and get help. This paper also recognises the importance of government putting in place adequate financial resources and services to tackle all forms of GBV during and after periods of unrest or pandemics. Going by this, it is recommended that adequate financial resources should be committed by government in Nigeria to services such as adequate shelter or safe homes for fleeing victims of GBV, mental healthcare and security services. Adequate trainings should also be organised for security agencies in Nigeria so that they can be responsive to victims of GBV in a professional manner. Additionally, access to justice should be tagged as an essential service during pandemics; hence, it is recommended that courts in Nigeria be kept open for emergency protection orders. Apart from this, government should ensure that the social security of women is improved. The dependence of women on the men in their lives for financial resources has been a major reason for IPV; therefore, government should increase women's access to economic opportunities. Lastly, this paper recommends that women parliamentarians in Nigeria should form a formidable force to ensure that policies made are gender-inclusive as doing this will be instrumental to the taking of action against GBV in society.

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THEME SEVEN
URBANISATION AND SUSTAINABLE CITIES

IMPACTS OF KOGI STATE UNIVERSITY ON HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY OF ANYIGBA, KOGI STATE, NIGERIA

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Abstract

Liberalisation of the establishment of tertiary institutions across Nigeria in recent times has created new growth poles as places or settlements where the institutions are located have benefitted from several associated social and economic opportunities. However, the establishment of several of these new tertiary institutions has not been accompanied with the required investment in the building of on-campus student housing or hostel accommodation. This study, therefore, seeks to analyse the effects of the establishment of Kogi State University (KSU), Anyigba on housing development and environmental quality of the town. Amongst others the study examines the pattern of housing development and level of adherence to physical development regulations in the study area and the characteristics of neighbourhoods around the KSU campus where most of the off-campus student hostels are situated. As part of the study a total of 364 questionnaires were administered on heads of households and landlords of the houses where students reside using a systematic random sampling approach. The focus of the questionnaires is to determine factors that influence housing development in neighbourhoods around the campus of KSU and the level of adherence to extant physical planning regulations in the development of these housing, particularly off-campus student hostels. Personal observation was also used to obtain data on the visual quality of the study area. Descriptive and inferential analytical techniques are adopted for the analysis of data obtained with the aid of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Among others, the study reveals that 68% of housing used for off-campus student hostels did not observe the required plot ratio and setbacks, while 26% of the houses did not have toilets and other required conveniences such as kitchens and bathrooms. The study further establishes that toilets are inadequate in 61.6% of the houses that had such facility. Amongst others, the study recommends a more rigorous physical development control in the area to stem the ugly scenario of unwholesome housing development and poor environmental quality.

Keywords: Environmental quality, Housing development, Impacts, Kogi State University, Off-campus students housing

1.0 Introduction

In recent years, the Federal government of Nigeria has demonstrated enormous enthusiasm to the growth of tertiary education sector thereby establishing more institutions, especially universities and the liberalisation of their ownership. While liberalising the ownership of higher institutions, adequate attention has not been accorded to the provision of commensurate students housing accommodation in the institutions so established to cater for the teeming student populations. In view of this inadequacy in complimenting on-campus housing accommodation, substantial percentages of the students take succour in sourcing for off-campus alternative accommodation. In addition, many housing developers have also considered such inadequacy of on-campus housing as a veritable investment opportunity to be harnessed. However, it has been observed that a plethora of problems are associated with off-campus student housing in many parts of the country.

The establishment of Kogi State University (KSU) Anyigba in 1999 has exacerbated the rate of immigration of people into Anyigba in recent times (Ifatimehin and Ufuah, 2006). It has equally engendered an unprecedented rate of land-use change in the entire University's host community through massive residential and rental housing development and renovation of existing housing stock to attract demand. The situation has also led to the proliferation of unapproved and haphazard housing development.

2.0 The Study Context

This study intends to explore the housing development trend alongside the assessment of physical environmental quality as it affects the growth of Anyigba. It also seeks to identify pattern of housing development and suggest how housing development can be made more sustainable and a more conducive environmental quality can be achieved within Anyigba with a view to relieving the housing stress of the residents of the town, especially the students. The aim of this study is to assess the effects of the location of Kogi State University (KSU) on housing development and the environmental quality of Anyigba town. This is with a view to assessing emerging physical development challenges in the area. Pursuant to this aim, the evolved objectives of the study are to examine the relationship between the establishment of KSU and housing development in the study area; determine the influence of off-campus student housing development on the environmental quality of Anyigba; and identify emerging physical development challenges arising from the pattern of housing development for off-campus students' accommodation in Anyigba town.

Anyigba town is located on latitude 7° 15'N and longitude 7° 32'E (Ifatimehin and Ufuah, 2006). It has an average altitude of 420m above mean sea level (MSL). The estimated population of Anyigba is 18,907 persons as at 2002 based on a growth rate 3.25% (UNDP, 2002). Using the exponential growth formulae, the population of the town is projected to reach 34,494 in 2019. According to Ifatimehin and Ufuah (2006), the presence of KSU in Anyigba has engendered the growth of the town on the one hand, and significant socio-economic transformation and improved literacy level of the residents on the other. Furthermore, Ifatimehin *et al.* (2009) stated that Anyigba is located in the tropical region with both wet and dry climate; in terms of vegetation, it is located in the guinea savannah region, with average annual temperature of 25°C and 1600mm precipitation. It is located on sedimentary configuration of the Anambra basin, the predominant soil type is lateritic in nature with combination of hydromorphic and loamy soils. The sitting of Kogi State University in the town is apparently affecting housing development and environmental quality of the town. The location of Anyigba in Nigeria is presented in Figure 1.



Figure 1**:** Location of the study area.
Source: Bureau of Lands and Urban Development, Lokoja, Kogi State (2019).

3.0 Review of Related Literature

Housing is a basic necessity for the survival of man, ranking second on the hierarchy of human needs after food. The definition of what constitute housing has been subject to several debates. It has been noted that contrary to popular opinion, house and housing are not synonymous terms (David, *et al.*, 2012). A house denotes just the building consisting of walls and roof that protects the inhabitants from harsh elements of weather (Sulyman, 2015). As a result, Agbola and Alabi (2000) noted that a house is a symbol of physical protection, security, respect, psychological wellbeing and economic value to the family or individual. In other words, a house is a mere shelter. On the other hand, housing transcends mere shelter (Jinadu, 2007; David *et al.*, 2012).

Agbola and Kassim (2007), Ndubueze (2009) and Ademiluyi (2010) argue that the concept of housing incorporates the environment, safety and the wellbeing of the residents. It is a major component of a household's consumption (Chatterjee, 1981); as such, it is regarded as a bundle of goods and services (Bourne, 1984). It has further been argued by Henilane (2016) that housing is the most important component of human life and survival.

A more holistic definition of housing is the one offered by FRN (2012). It defines housing as the process that entails the provision of secure, comfortable, beautiful, serviceable, inexpensive and exclusive habitation in a serene location or environment in a neighbourhood, sustained by constant protection of the built environment for the day-to-day activities of individuals and households within the neighbourhood, while showing their socioeconomic and cultural desires and preference.

Housing is now seen as a fundamental need and an inalienable human right (Amole, 2009b; David *et al.,* 2012). For example the UN Declaration of human rights in the 1940s recognised housing as a right. Similarly, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and consequently, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recognises the right to decent and affordable housing. Again, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) stated unequivocally that the major responsibility of the government is to provide welfare services (including decent and affordable or subsidised housing) to its citizens. Section 16(1) (d) of 1999 constitution under the Fundamental Objectives of State Policy mandates the government "to provide suitable and adequate shelter for all citizens". However, the right to housing is a 'non-justiciable' right, meaning that claims cannot be laid on them in the law courts. Notwithstanding, Ebie (2009) still contends that housing is the first and most essential of all human rights.

Globally, the issue of student housing has attracted concerted concerns from academics, policy makers and non-governmental organisations (Jiboye, 2011). This is so because majority of the higher institutions of learning, particularly in developing countries, do not have enough on-campus accommodation for its students (Amole, 2009b; Mohit *et al.,* 2010). The problem becomes more worrisome in sub-Saharan Africa where majority of the higher institutions only has hostel accommodation for a minute proportion of their students (Jiboye, 2011). In Nigeria, students' hostel accommodations in higher institutions are grossly inadequate; thereby increasing the rate of hostel squatting and consequently, overcrowding of hostel rooms. Therefore, students have devised alternative means of meeting their housing needs through off-campus housing.

Mohit *et al.* (2010) have demonstrated that off-campus student housing is a significant contributor to the housing market globally. Similar opinion was offered by Jiboye (2011) who argued that in Nigeria, rental housing development around tertiary institutions is a widespread practice. In fact, Jiboye (2009), Amole (2009a) and Mohit *et al.* (2010) have established a link between students seeking accommodation off-campus and housing development in neighbourhoods where higher institutions are located.

It has been noted that housing development is associated with a plethora of ecological impacts (Jaafar *et al.*, 2014). Similarly, Junnila and Horvath (2003) argued that housing development contributes to more than 50% of global human energy consumption. Furthermore, Dong *et al.* (2005) contended that the only way to minimise or mitigate the environmental impacts of housing is through the adoption of the philosophy of sustainable housing development. In other words, environmental sustainability forms a core issue in modern housing development.

WCED (1987) argued that while environment is where humans live, development is whatever human beings do in order to change, alter or improve the environment in which humans live. They argued further that environment and development are two interlocking and interdependent concepts. For example, in attempting to supply sufficient and decent housing for humanity, the environment is usually altered.

Duruzoechi (2015) noted that the process of housing development involves tempering with the natural environment through cutting down of trees, clearing the bushes, excavation of the soil and superimposition of buildings in places that were initially vacant and occupied by flora and fauna. The effect of the aforementioned activities that are related to housing development is an undeniable loss of biodiversity. However, biodiversity losses have been linked to a reduction of the earth's bio-capacity.

WHO (2009, 2012) submitted that more than 7% of global carbon emission result from the construction or development of housing. Similarly, Sulyman *et al.* (2017) in their investigation of the ecological footprint of housing in Minna reported that housing has a significant level of ecological footprint. In fact, they stressed that buildings have the highest ecological footprint. They concluded that all the materials used in housing development (including timbers, sand and water) has significant amount of ecological footprint.

Furthermore, although cities occupy only about 4% of the earth surface, they house over 50% of global population, consume more than 33% of ecological resources and generate more than 35% of global pollution. As Olatubara (2008) observed, housing is one of the foremost elements of cities. Therefore, the relationship between housing and environmental quality cannot be overemphasised.

4.0 Research Methodology

This study obtained the required data from primary and secondary sources. The primary data were obtained with the aid of structured questionnaire and observational rating. The questionnaire was used to obtain the socio-economic and demographic data of the residents of Anyigba; while the observational rating method was used by the researcher to rate the physical conditions of the housing units in the study area and the sanitary condition of their surrounding environments. 364 respondents were chosen as the sample size for this study using Dillman, 2007 technique of determining sample size from a given population. The systematic random sampling approach was adopted for the administration of questionnaires to the respondents. However, only 323 (that is, 88.74%) questionnaires were duly completed and successfully retrieved for analysis in this study. The secondary data utilised in this study were obtained from Bureau of Lands and Urban Development, Lokoja, and scholarly publications. All secondary sources have been duly acknowledged in the reference section of this paper. Qualitative and quantitative techniques of data analysis were adopted to analyse the socio-economic, demographic, sanitation and housing data collected for the study since the research is exploratory and descriptive in nature. The research hypothesis was tested using the Pearson Correlation analysis technique. Data analysis was conducted with the aid of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

5.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

5.1 Socio-Eeconomic Characteristics of the Households

The analysis of the socio-economic attributes of the respondents presented in Table 1 revealed that both gender are fairly represented in the study (57.3% male and 42.7% females). On the aggregate, about 81.4% of the respondents were above 18 years old, while 36.8% reported that they were between 28-37years old. In terms of marital status, about 36.8% of the respondents reported that they were single, while only 15.5% affirmed that they were married. Others were divorced (24.8%) and widowed (22.9%). The dominance of respondents who were single may not be unconnected to the massive students' population in the study area. Surprisingly, only about 29.4% of the respondents reported that they earned below the minimum wage of Nigeria (N30,000:00). This indicates that the study area is economically viable.

Table 1: Socioeconomic characteristics of the households

Attribute	Frequency	Percentage
GENDER		
Male	185	57.3
Female	138	42.7
AGE		
Less than 18years old	60	18.6
18-27years old	92	28.5
28-37years old	119	36.8
38-47years old	52	16.1
48-57years old	0	0
58years old and above	0	0
MARITAL STATUS		
Single	119	36.8
Married	50	15.5
Divorced	80	24.8
Separated	74	22.9
Widowed	0	0
MONTHLY INCOME		
Less than ₦30,000	95	29.4
₦30,000-₦45,000	38	11.8
₦46,000-₦60,000	80	24.8
₦61,000-₦75,000	110	34.1
> ₦75,000	0	0

5.2 *Household Size*

A probe into the household size of the respondents (Table 2) indicates that majority (63.2%) of the respondents had more than 7 members, while 36.8% of the respondents' households were occupied by 5-6 residents. The implication of this is that majority of the households in the study area have exceeded the average household size of Nigeria which is 5 persons per household. Therefore, the residents of Anyigba experiences high occupancy status, which is an indication of overcrowded housing condition in the study area. This may expose the residents to negative health outcomes.

	Frequency	*Percent*
1-2 persons	0	0
3-4 persons	0	0
5-6 persons	119	36.8
7 persons and above	204	63.2
Total	323	100.0

5.3 *Housing Ownership Status*

The housing ownership status of the respondents is presented in Table 3. As the result indicates, 49.2% of the respondents were renter-occupiers. However, 38.4% were owner-occupiers; while 12.4% resided in family houses. The dominance of renter-occupiers in Anyigba may be linked to the high student population in the study area. The students were mostly non-indigenes whose residence in the community is temporary (that is, only for the period of their academic pursuit).

Table 3: Housing Ownership Status

	Frequency	*Percent*
Owner-occupied	124	38.4
Renter-occupied	159	49.2
Family house	40	12.4
Total	**323**	**100.0**

Source: Authors' Field Survey (2020)

5.4 Determinants of Housing Choice

Table 4 indicates that the major determinant of housing choice of the residents of Anyigba was affordability (57.0%). This was followed by the proximity (24.8%). The weakest determinant of housing choice of the residents of the study area was neighbourhood quality (18.3%). None of the respondents reported the aesthetic feature of the community as a determinant of their housing choice.

Table 4: Determinants of Housing Choice

	Frequency	Percent
Affordability	184	57.0
Aesthetics	0	0
Neighbourhood quality	59	18.3
Proximity	80	24.8
Total	323	100.0

Source: Authors' Field Survey (2020)

5.5 *Condition of the Surrounding Housing Environment*

The physical conditions of the housing environments in the study area were also rated on the scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represented very bad score and 5 represented very good score. As shown in Table 5, the landscape conditions of 53.9% of the residential environments were just fair. More so, 12.7% the landscape condition of their residential environment were rated as very good, 25.7% were rated as just good, while only 7.7% were rated as just bad. Interestingly, none of the housing units scored a very bad rating. The implication of this is that majority of the residences has a satisfactory landscape condition.

Table 5: Condition of the Surrounding Housing Environment

	Frequency	*Percent*
Very good	41	12.7
Good	83	25.7
Fair	174	53.9
Bad	25	7.7
Very bad	0	0
Total	323	100.0

Source: Authors' Field Survey (2020).

5.6 *Proportion of Plot Built or Occupied by Housing Structure*

The proportion of the plots occupied by the housing structures in the study area was measured by the researcher. It was discovered that majority (68.4%) of the households do not have adequate plot ratio. Only about 31.6% of the households maintained adequate plot ratio (Table 6). The implication is that majority of the houses in Anyigba do not have enough floor and air spaces. Consequently, this may expose the residents to negative health challenges.

Table 6: Proportion of Plot Occupied by Housing Structure

	Frequency	*Percent*
Adequate	102	31.6
Inadequate	221	68.4
Total	323	100.0

Source: Authors' Field Survey (2020).

5.7 *Sanitary Condition of the Study Area*

Table 7 presents the sanitary condition of Anyigba. Although toilets were available in 74% of the houses, toilets in up to 61.6% of the households were inadequate. More so, 63.2% of the households in the study area depended on pit latrines. Furthermore, the toilets in about 59.7% of the households were in bad and deplorable condition. This shows that residents of Anyigba experience sanitation problem. In terms of the wastewater drainages, 81.4% of the households surveyed had sewage system. However, on the aggregate, only about 42.4% of the households had good and functional sewage system. Again, this is a pointer to sanitary problem in Anyigba – an indicator of poor environmental quality.

Table 7: Sanitary Condition of the Study Area

Attribute	*Frequency*	*Percentage*
Availability of Toilet		
Available	239	74.0
Not Available	84	26.0
Adequacy of Toilet		
Adequate	124	38.4
Inadequate	199	61.6
Type of Toilet		
Pit latrine	204	63.2
Water closet 35	10.8	
Aqua privy	35	10.8
Open defecation	49	15.2

Condition of Toilet

Very Good	40	12.4
Good	50	15.5
Fair	40	12.4
Bad	168	52.0
Very bad	25	7.7
Availability of Sewage System		
Available	263	81.4
Not available	60	18.6
Condition of Sewage System		
Very good	52	16.1
Good	85	26.3
Fair	87	26.9
Bad	35	10.8
Very bad	64	19.8

Source: Authors' Field Survey (2020).

5.8 ***Nexus between Housing Ownership and Condition of the Housing Environment***

Analysis of the relationship between housing ownership status and the landscape condition of the housing environment is presented in Table 8. Pearson's correlation analysis revealed that there is a strong and positive correlation between housing ownership status and the landscape quality of the housing environment of Anyigba ($r = .742$, $N = 323$, $p = <.0005$). This means that home-ownership is a statistically significant determinant of residential landscape quality in the study area.

Table 8: Correlations Analysis of the Relationship between Housing Ownership and Condition of the Housing Environment

		Housing ownership status	*Landscape Condition of the Housing Environment*
Housing ownership status	Pearson Correlation	1	**.742****
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	323	323
Landscape Condition of the Housing Environment	Pearson Correlation	**.742****	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	323	323

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Authors' Field Survey (2020).

6.0 Conclusion and Recommendation

Housing is a basic necessity for human survival. It is a necessary factor for the realisation of social, economic, spiritual and psychological satisfaction and wellbeing. Student housing is one of the most important housing typology in areas where tertiary educational institutions are located. The inability of most tertiary educational institutions to provide the required housing units in terms of quantity and quality has engendered the development and growth of off-campus housing. However, in the process of developing student off-campus housing, the private developers do not pay adequate attention to ensuring the minimum environmental quality that is required for healthy living.

This study has shown that residents of Anyigba are exposed to health hazards owing to the poor sanitary conditions of their residential environments. Furthermore, the study indicated that the developers do not maintain adequate plot ratio in the study area. More so, the incidence of high occupancy ratio and consequent over-crowding of households is widespread in Anyigba. In terms of landscape quality, the study revealed that homeownership is a significant determinant of landscape quality in the study area.

Drawing from the aforementioned findings, this study suggests the need to improve the sanitary condition of Anyigba by providing better [public] toilets in the study area on the one hand, and constructing quality drainage systems on the other hand. It is also recommended that measures should be put in place by Kogi State Town Planning and Development Board (KSTPDB) to ensure that developers maintain standard plot ratio. The National Orientation Agency (NOA) should also ensure that the residents of Anyigba are educated on the dangers of living in overcrowded housing conditions. Finally, Kogi State Government should endeavour to implement subsidised Site and Services Housing Scheme in Anyigba in order to ensure that higher homeownership rate and better landscape quality are attained.

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DETERMINANTS OF RESIDENTIAL SATISFACTION AMONG PUBLIC HOUSING ESTATES IN OWERRI, IMO STATE

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Abstract
Housing is a basic requirement for the realisation of better quality of life and standard of living. Adequate and decent housing determines the psychosocial, physical and spiritual satisfaction of the residents on the one hand, and predicts their socio-economic and emotional status, privacy and security on the other. This study is aimed at investigating the determinants of residential satisfaction among the residents of public housing estates in Owerri; and the objectives of the study are to evaluate the physical attributes of the public housing estates as well as appraise the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the residents of public housing estates in Owerri. A systematic random sampling technique is adopted to administer 324 questionnaires to residents of the public housing estates in Owerri Imo State, Nigeria. Data analysis is done with the aid of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The study reveals that there is a very strong and positive relationship between socio-economic/demographic characteristics of the residents and the level of housing satisfaction in the study area (N = 324, p = .05, r = .989). However, further indepth analysis of individual indicators indicates that the relationship between gender and housing satisfaction is very strong (r = .993), as women tend to express higher housing satisfaction than men. The study also reveals that although occupation is a very weak determinant of housing satisfaction (r = -.165), relationship between income and residential satisfaction in the study area is strong (r = .581), indicating that the higher the income of the residents, the higher their level of housing satisfaction. Age and marital status are having fair and positive relationship with housing satisfaction (r = .492 and r = .472 respectively), indicating that older residents tend to be more satisfied with their dwelling units than the younger residents; while married occupants experience higher residential satisfaction in the estates. However, the study shows that household size (r = .065) have weak and negative relationship with housing satisfaction among public housing residents in Owerri, indicating that larger household size does not necessarily lead to residential dissatisfaction among residents of public housing estates in Owerri. The study, therefore, suggests the need to encourage women and youth participation in public housing estates development in the study area. The need to also evolve and implement financial empowerment programmes on the residents of the estates in the study area is also recommended. Owing to the scope of this study, the relationship between weather conditions, housing design and proximity to places of work and the level of residents' satisfaction in the study area are not explored. Further studies are recommended to appraise these important factors.

Keywords: Determinants, Residential, Satisfaction, Housing, Public, Estates

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Residential housing is a necessity for human survival; it is an essential need (Agbola & Alabi, 2000, and a means of accommodation for human habitation (Jinadu, 2007). It has been argued by Federal Republic of Nigeria (2012) that in all ramifications, residential housing exceeds an average shelter, because it captures the entirety of the social services and happenings which improves the liveability of the community. It is in respect of this multidimensional nature of housing that Agbola and Alabi (2000) opined that for an individual or households, the residence is referred to as a refuge and of ample safety together with passionate identity, financial worth and a basis for individual respect.

The housing condition in Nigeria is characterised by some irregularities, which are qualitative and quantitative in nature (NHP, 1991; Oladapo, 2006). The quantitative housing problem could be solved by accumulatively increasing the number of obtainable housing stock while the qualitative shortages are massive and complex in nature. In fact, Ozdemir (2002) cited Oladapo (2006) considered the qualitative problem as the major challenge facing urban housing in Nigeria. If the housing sector is to improve and increase the quality of the residential structures it produces in meeting these desires and prospects, it then needs a proactive approach to understanding what is being produced. This can be done efficiently through assessing the users' satisfaction on the performance of quality dwellings. In the actual desired gap approach, the concept of residential satisfaction rests on the conceptual framework Diogun (2000).

Federal Republic of Nigeria, (2006) highlighted that housing is the process of ensuring the obtainability of well-organised shelter in a suitable location within a neighbourhood, as well as the sustainability in the conservation of the built environment which concerns all the various activities carried out by individuals and the society at large. This idea of housing is all encompassing, since it relates to the aspects of safety, comfort, aesthetics and functionality. The main idea behind mass housing programme in Nigeria has been the delivery of suitable, acceptable and satisfactory shelter that meets administratively agreed specifications and the basic prospects of the end users. Satisfaction of residents is observed as an extent at which current residential situation of end users meets and accomplishes their desired prospect and aspirations (Salleh, 2008). The occupants' right to residential housing is essential in terms safety, privacy, community and collective relationship status, neighbourhood amenities and infrastructure and management of the environment.

Most buildings especially the pubic residential estates are erected with the general desire to satisfy the housing demands of the public. In Owerri, majority of the public housing estates provides accommodation for diverse groups of persons who have divergent reactions, perceptions and notions regarding the level and quality of housing satisfaction derived from the units of houses they occupied. Most often, residents do modify and construct additional functions in the already designed houses which indicate that they are possibly not satisfied with the present condition of the residential structures alongside the facilities and utilities in the housing units they occupy. It is against this premise that this research seeks to bring to limelight the determinants of resiadential satisfaction in some of the selected public housing estates in Owerri, and to suggest possible ways to improve the condition of the residential dwelling units to make it more habitable for the people to occupy.

1.1 Aim and Objectives

This study is aimed at investigating the determinants of residential satisfaction among the residents of public housing estates in Owerri. To achieve the aim, the following objectives were set for the study, vis-á-vis, to:

- assess the socioeconomic characteristics of the residents;
- evaluate the level of housing satisfaction among residents of the public housing estates in the study area; and
- examine the relationship between socio-demographic attributes of the residents in the study area and their level of satisfaction with the public housing estates.

1.2 The Study Area

The study focuses on Owerri which is the administrative centre of Imo State, Nigeria, located at the middle of Igbo land. It is the major city in the state, follow by Orluand bOkigwe respectively. Owerri comprises of Owerri West, Owerri North and Owerri Municipal Local Government Areas. Owerri has an estimated population of about 1,401,873 as at 2016 (NPC, 2006). Owerri is bounded by Otamiri River and the Nworie River to the eastern and southern part. Owerri is located on Latitude 5.476310 and Longitude 7.025853 and it is situated at 73 metres above sea level. The location of Owerri in Nigeria is shown in Figure 1.

The slogan is Heartland and at present it can be considered as the activity centre of Nigeria as a result of its elevated concentration of large and exotic hotels, high assembly of musical studios and quality recreational areas for leisure. Owerri is among the three most active capital of defunct Biafra republic since 1969 till date. Presently, Owerri holds some statuary which reflects some of the activities that took place during the world war, predominantly in the areas that suffered intense bombing, although several war relics and historical events are situated in the museum at Umuahia, Abia State. Owerri has an average temperature is 26.4 °C.



Figure 1**:** Location of the study area.
Source: Bureau of Lands and Urban Development, Lokoja, Kogi State (2019).

3.0 Review of Related Literature

Housing is a basic necessity for the survival of man, ranking second on the hierarchy of human needs after food. The definition of what constitute housing has been subject to several debates. It has been noted that contrary to popular opinion, house and housing are not synonymous terms (David, *et al.*, 2012). A house denotes just the building consisting of walls and roof that protects the inhabitants from harsh elements of weather (Sulyman, 2015). As a result, Agbola and Alabi (2000) noted that a house is a symbol of physical protection, security, respect, psychological wellbeing and economic value to the family or individual. In other words, a house is a mere shelter. On the other hand, housing transcends mere shelter (Jinadu, 2007; David *et al.*, 2012).

Agbola and Kassim (2007), Ndubueze (2009) and Ademiluyi (2010) argue that the concept of housing incorporates the environment, safety and the wellbeing of the residents. It is a major component of a household's consumption (Chatterjee, 1981); as such, it is regarded as a bundle of goods and services (Bourne, 1984). It has further been argued by Henilane (2016) that housing is the most important component of human life and survival.

A more holistic definition of housing is the one offered by FRN (2012). It defines housing as the process that entails the provision of secure, comfortable, beautiful, serviceable, inexpensive and exclusive habitation in a serene location or environment in a neighbourhood, sustained by constant protection of the built environment for the day-to-day activities of individuals and households within the neighbourhood, while showing their socioeconomic and cultural desires and preference.

Housing is now seen as a fundamental need and an inalienable human right (Amole, 2009b; David *et al.,* 2012). For example the UN Declaration of human rights in the 1940s recognised housing as a right. Similarly, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and consequently, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recognises the right to decent and affordable housing. Again, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) stated unequivocally that the major responsibility of the government is to provide welfare services (including decent and affordable or subsidised housing) to its citizens. Section 16(1) (d) of 1999 constitution under the Fundamental Objectives of State Policy mandates the government "to provide suitable and adequate shelter for all citizens". However, the right to housing is a 'non-justiciable' right, meaning that claims cannot be laid on them in the law courts. Notwithstanding, Ebie (2009) still contends that housing is the first and most essential of all human rights.

Globally, the issue of student housing has attracted concerted concerns from academics, policy makers and non-governmental organisations (Jiboye, 2011). This is so because majority of the higher institutions of learning, particularly in developing countries, do not have enough on-campus accommodation for its students (Amole, 2009b; Mohit *et al.,* 2010). The problem becomes more worrisome in sub-Saharan Africa where majority of the higher institutions only has hostel accommodation for a minute proportion of their students (Jiboye, 2011). In Nigeria, students' hostel accommodations in higher institutions are grossly inadequate; thereby increasing the rate of hostel squatting and consequently, overcrowding of hostel rooms. Therefore, students have devised alternative means of meeting their housing needs through off-campus housing.

Mohit *et al.* (2010) have demonstrated that off-campus student housing is a significant contributor to the housing market globally. Similar opinion was offered by Jiboye (2011) who argued that in Nigeria, rental housing development around tertiary institutions is a widespread practice. In fact, Jiboye (2009), Amole (2009a) and Mohit *et al.* (2010) have established a link between students seeking accommodation off-campus and housing development in neighbourhoods where higher institutions are located.

It has been noted that housing development is associated with a plethora of ecological impacts (Jaafar *et al.*, 2014). Similarly, Junnila and Horvath (2003) argued that housing development contributes to more than 50% of global human energy consumption. Furthermore, Dong *et al.* (2005) contended that the only way to minimise or mitigate the environmental impacts of housing is through the adoption of the philosophy of sustainable housing development. In other words, environmental sustainability forms a core issue in modern housing development.

WCED (1987) argued that while environment is where humans live, development is whatever human beings do in order to change, alter or improve the environment in which humans live. They argued further that environment and development are two interlocking and interdependent concepts. For example, in attempting to supply sufficient and decent housing for humanity, the environment is usually altered.

Duruzoechi (2015) noted that the process of housing development involves tempering with the natural environment through cutting down of trees, clearing the bushes, excavation of the soil and superimposition of buildings in places that were initially vacant and occupied by flora and fauna. The effect of the aforementioned activities that are related to housing development is an undeniable loss of biodiversity. However, biodiversity losses have been linked to a reduction of the earth's bio-capacity.

WHO (2009, 2012) submitted that more than 7% of global carbon emission result from the construction or development of housing. Similarly, Sulyman *et al.* (2017) in their investigation of the ecological footprint of housing in Minna reported that housing has a significant level of ecological footprint. In fact, they stressed that buildings have the highest ecological footprint. They concluded that all the materials used in housing development (including timbers, sand and water) has significant amount of ecological footprint.

Furthermore, although cities occupy only about 4% of the earth surface, they house over 50% of global population, consume more than 33% of ecological resources and generate more than 35% of global pollution. As Olatubara (2008) observed, housing is one of the foremost elements of cities. Therefore, the relationship between housing and environmental quality cannot be overemphasised.

4.0 Research Methodology

This study obtained the required data from primary and secondary sources. The primary data were obtained with the aid of structured questionnaire and observational rating. The questionnaire was used to obtain the socio-economic and demographic data of the residents of Anyigba; while the observational rating method was used by the researcher to rate the physical conditions of the housing units in the study area and the sanitary condition of their surrounding environments. 364 respondents were chosen as the sample size for this study using Dillman, 2007 technique of determining sample size from a given population. The systematic random sampling approach was adopted for the administration of questionnaires to the respondents. However, only 323 (that is, 88.74%) questionnaires were duly completed and successfully retrieved for analysis in this study. The secondary data utilised in this study were obtained from Bureau of Lands and Urban Development, Lokoja, and scholarly publications. All secondary sources have been duly acknowledged in the reference section of this paper. Qualitative and quantitative techniques of data analysis were adopted to analyse the socio-economic, demographic, sanitation and housing data collected for the study since the research is exploratory and descriptive in nature. The research hypothesis was tested using the Pearson Correlation analysis technique. Data analysis was conducted with the aid of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS)

5.0 Results and Discussions

5.1 Socio-Eeconomic Characteristics of the Households

The analysis of the socio-economic attributes of the respondents presented in Table 1 revealed that both gender are fairly represented in the study (57.3% male and 42.7% females). On the aggregate, about 81.4% of the respondents were above 18 years old, while 36.8% reported that they were between 28-37years old. In terms of marital status, about 36.8% of the respondents reported that they were single, while only 15.5% affirmed that they were married. Others were divorced (24.8%) and widowed (22.9%). The dominance of respondents who were single may not be unconnected to the massive students' population in the study area. Surprisingly, only about 29.4% of the respondents reported that they earned below the minimum wage of Nigeria (N30,000:00). This indicates that the study area is economically viable.

Table 1: Socioeconomic characteristics of the households

Attribute	Frequency	Percentage
GENDER		
Male	185	57.3
Female	138	42.7
AGE		
Less than 18years old	60	18.6
18-27years old	92	28.5
28-37years old	119	36.8
38-47years old	52	16.1
48-57years old	0	0
58years old and above	0	0
MARITAL STATUS		
Single	119	36.8
Married	50	15.5
Divorced	80	24.8
Separated	74	22.9
Widowed	0	0
MONTHLY INCOME		
Less than ₦30,000	95	29.4
₦30,000-₦45,000	38	11.8
₦46,000-₦60,000	80	24.8
₦61,000-₦75,000	110	34.1
> ₦75,000	0	0

Source: **Authors' Field Survey (2020).**

5.2 ***Household Size***

A probe into the household size of the respondents (Table 2) indicates that majority (63.2%) of the respondents had more than 7 members, while 36.8% of the respondents' households were occupied by 5-6 residents. The implication of this is that majority of the households in the study area have exceeded the average household size of Nigeria which is 5 persons per household. Therefore, the residents of Anyigba experiences high occupancy status, which is an indication of overcrowded housing condition in the study area. This may expose the residents to negative health outcomes.

Table 2: Household size of the respondents

	Frequency	*Percent*
1-2 persons	0	0
3-4 persons	0	0
5-6 persons	119	36.8
7 persons and above	204	63.2
Total	323	100.0

Source: Authors' Field Survey (2020).

5.3 ***Housing Ownership Status***

The housing ownership status of the respondents is presented in Table 3. As the result indicates, 49.2% of the respondents were renter-occupiers. However, 38.4% were owner-occupiers; while 12.4% resided in family houses. The dominance of renter-occupiers in Anyigba may be linked to the high student population in the study area. The students were mostly non-indigenes whose residence in the community is temporary (that is, only for the period of their academic pursuit).

Table 3: Housing Ownership Status

	Frequency	*Percent*
Owner-occupied	124	38.4
Renter-occupied	159	49.2
Family house	40	12.4
Total	**323**	**100.0**

Source: Authors' Field Survey (2020)

5.4 Determinants of Housing Choice

Table 4 indicates that the major determinant of housing choice of the residents of Anyigba was affordability (57.0%). This was followed by the proximity (24.8%). The weakest determinant of housing choice of the residents of the study area was neighbourhood quality (18.3%). None of the respondents reported the aesthetic feature of the community as a determinant of their housing choice.

Table 4: Determinants of Housing Choice

	Frequency	Percent
Affordability	184	57.0
Aesthetics	0	0
Neighbourhood quality	59	18.3
Proximity	80	24.8
Total	323	100.0

Source: Authors' Field Survey (2020)

5.5 ***Condition of the Surrounding Housing Environment***

The physical conditions of the housing environments in the study area were also rated on the scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represented very bad score and 5 represented very good score. As shown in Table 5, the landscape conditions of 53.9% of the residential environments were just fair. More so, 12.7% the landscape condition of their residential environment were rated as very good, 25.7% were rated as just good, while only 7.7% were rated as just bad. Interestingly, none of the housing units scored a very bad rating. The implication of this is that majority of the residences has a satisfactory landscape condition.

Table 5: Condition of the Surrounding Housing Environment

	Frequency	*Percent*
Very good	41	12.7
Good	83	25.7
Fair	174	53.9
Bad	25	7.7
Very bad	0	0
Total	323	100.0

Source: Authors' Field Survey (2020).

5.6 *Proportion of Plot Built or Occupied by Housing Structure*

The proportion of the plots occupied by the housing structures in the study area was measured by the researcher. It was discovered that majority (68.4%) of the households do not have adequate plot ratio. Only about 31.6% of the households maintained adequate plot ratio (Table 6). The implication is that majority of the houses in Anyigba do not have enough floor and air spaces. Consequently, this may expose the residents to negative health challenges.

	Frequency	*Percent*
Adequate	102	31.6
Inadequate	221	68.4
Total	323	100.0

Source: Authors' Field Survey (2020).

5.7 *Sanitary Condition of the Study Area*

Table 7 presents the sanitary condition of Anyigba. Although toilets were available in 74% of the houses, toilets in up to 61.6% of the households were inadequate. More so, 63.2% of the households in the study area depended on pit latrines. Furthermore, the toilets in about 59.7% of the households were in bad and deplorable condition. This shows that residents of Anyigba experience sanitation problem. In terms of the wastewater drainages, 81.4% of the households surveyed had sewage system. However, on the aggregate, only about 42.4% of the households had good and functional sewage system. Again, this is a pointer to sanitary problem in Anyigba – an indicator of poor environmental quality.

Table 7: Sanitary Condition of the Study Area

Attribute	*Frequency*	*Percentage*
Availability of Toilet		
Available	239	74.0
Not Available	84	26.0
Adequacy of Toilet		
Adequate	124	38.4
Inadequate	199	61.6
Type of Toilet		
Pit latrine	204	63.2
Water closet	35	10.8
Aqua privy	35	10.8
Open defecation	49	15.2

Condition of Toilet		
Very Good	40	12.4
Good	50	15.5
Fair	40	12.4
Bad	168	52.0
Very bad	25	7.7
Availability of Sewage System		
Available	263	81.4
Not available	60	18.6
Condition of Sewage System		
Very good	52	16.1
Good	85	26.3
Fair	87	26.9
Bad	35	10.8
Very bad	64	19.8

Source: Authors' Field Survey (2020).

5.8 *Nexus between Housing Ownership and Condition of the Housing Environment*

Analysis of the relationship between housing ownership status and the landscape condition of the housing environment is presented in Table 8. Pearson's correlation analysis revealed that there is a strong and positive correlation between housing ownership status and the landscape quality of the housing environment of Anyigba (r = .742, N = 323, p = <.0005). This means that home-ownership is a statistically significant determinant of residential landscape quality in the study area.

Table 8: Correlations Analysis of the Relationship between Housing Ownership and Condition of the Housing Environment

		Housing ownership status	*Landscape Condition of the Housing Environment*
Housing ownership status	Pearson Correlation	1	**.742****
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	323	323
Landscape Condition of the Housing Environment	Pearson Correlation	**.742****	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	323	323

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Authors' Field Survey (2020).

6.0 Conclusion and Recommendation

Housing is a basic necessity for human survival. It is a necessary factor for the realisation of social, economic, spiritual and psychological satisfaction and wellbeing. Student housing is one of the most important housing typology in areas where tertiary educational institutions are located. The inability of most tertiary educational institutions to provide the required housing units in terms of quantity and quality has engendered the development and growth of off-campus housing. However, in the process of developing student off-campus housing, the private developers do not pay adequate attention to ensuring the minimum environmental quality that is required for healthy living.

This study has shown that residents of Anyigba are exposed to health hazards owing to the poor sanitary conditions of their residential environments. Furthermore, the study indicated that the developers do not maintain adequate plot ratio in the study area. More so, the incidence of high occupancy ratio and consequent over-crowding of households is widespread in Anyigba. In terms of landscape quality, the study revealed that homeownership is a significant determinant of landscape quality in the study area.

Drawing from the aforementioned findings, this study suggests the need to improve the sanitary condition of Anyigba by providing better [public] toilets in the study area on the one hand, and constructing quality drainage systems on the other hand. It is also recommended that measures should be put in place by Kogi State Town Planning and Development Board (KSTPDB) to ensure that developers maintain standard plot ratio. The National Orientation Agency (NOA) should also ensure that the residents of Anyigba are educated on the dangers of living in overcrowded housing conditions. Finally, Kogi State Government should endeavour to implement subsidised Site and Services Housing Scheme in Anyigba in order to ensure that higher homeownership rate and better landscape quality are attained.

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DETERMINANTS OF RESIDENTIAL SATISFACTION AMONG PUBLIC HOUSING ESTATES IN OWERRI, IMO STATE

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Abstract

Housing is a basic requirement for the realisation of better quality of life and standard of living. Adequate and decent housing determines the psychosocial, physical and spiritual satisfaction of the residents on the one hand, and predicts their socio-economic and emotional status, privacy and security on the other. This study is aimed at investigating the determinants of residential satisfaction among the residents of public housing estates in Owerri; and the objectives of the study are to evaluate the physical attributes of the public housing estates as well as appraise the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the residents of public housing estates in Owerri. A systematic random sampling technique is adopted to administer 324 questionnaires to residents of the public housing estates in Owerri Imo State, Nigeria. Data analysis is done with the aid of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The study reveals that there is a very strong and positive relationship between socio-economic/demographic characteristics of the residents and the level of housing satisfaction in the study area ($N = 324$, $p = .05$, $r = .989$). However, further indepth analysis of individual indicators indicates that the relationship between gender and housing satisfaction is very strong ($r = .993$), as women tend to express higher housing satisfaction than men. The study also reveals that although occupation is a very weak determinant of housing satisfaction ($r = -.165$), relationship between income and residential satisfaction in the study area is strong ($r = .581$), indicating that the higher the income of the residents, the higher their level of housing satisfaction. Age and marital status are having fair and positive relationship with housing satisfaction ($r = .492$ and $r = .472$ respectively), indicating that older residents tend to be more satisfied with their dwelling units than the younger residents; while married occupants experience higher residential satisfaction in the estates. However, the study shows that household size ($r = .065$) have weak and negative relationship with housing satisfaction among public housing residents in Owerri, indicating that larger household size does not necessarily lead to residential dissatisfaction among residents of public housing estates in Owerri. The study, therefore, suggests the need to encourage women and youth participation in public housing estates development in the study area. The need to also evolve and implement financial empowerment programmes on the residents of the estates in the study area is also recommended. Owing to the scope of this study, the relationship between weather conditions, housing design and proximity to places of work and the level of residents' satisfaction in the study area are not explored. Further studies are recommended to appraise these important factors.

Keywords: Determinants, Residential, Satisfaction, Housing, Public, Estates

1.0 Introduction

Residential housing is a necessity for human survival; it is an essential need (Agbola & Alabi, 2000, and a means of accommodation for human habitation (Jinadu, 2007). It has been argued by Federal Republic of Nigeria (2012) that in all ramifications, residential housing exceeds an average shelter, because it captures the entirety of the social services and happenings which improves the liveability of the community. It is in respect of this multidimensional nature of housing that Agbola and Alabi (2000) opined that for an individual or households, the residence is referred to as a refuge and of ample safety together with passionate identity, financial worth and a basis for individual respect.

The housing condition in Nigeria is characterised by some irregularities, which are qualitative and quantitative in nature (NHP, 1991; Oladapo, 2006). The quantitative housing problem could be solved by accumulatively increasing the number of obtainable housing stock while the qualitative shortages are massive and complex in nature. In fact, Ozdemir (2002) cited Oladapo (2006) considered the qualitative problem as the major challenge facing urban housing in Nigeria. If the housing sector is to improve and increase the quality of the residential structures it produces in meeting these desires and prospects, it then needs a proactive approach to understanding what is being produced. This can be done efficiently through assessing the users' satisfaction on the performance of quality dwellings. In the actual desired gap approach, the concept of residential satisfaction rests on the conceptual framework Diogun (2000).

Federal Republic of Nigeria, (2006) highlighted that housing is the process of ensuring the obtainability of well-organised shelter in a suitable location within a neighbourhood, as well as the sustainability in the conservation of the built environment which concerns all the various activities carried out by individuals and the society at large. This idea of housing is all encompassing, since it relates to the aspects of safety, comfort, aesthetics and functionality. The main idea behind mass housing programme in Nigeria has been the delivery of suitable, acceptable and satisfactory shelter that meets administratively agreed specifications and the basic prospects of the end users. Satisfaction of residents is observed as an extent at which current residential situation of end users meets and accomplishes their desired prospect and aspirations (Salleh, 2008). The occupants' right to residential housing is essential in terms safety, privacy, community and collective relationship status, neighbourhood amenities and infrastructure and management of the environment.

Most buildings especially the pubic residential estates are erected with the general desire to satisfy the housing demands of the public. In Owerri, majority of the public housing estates provides accommodation for diverse groups of persons who have divergent reactions, perceptions and notions regarding the level and quality of housing satisfaction derived from the units of houses they occupied. Most often, residents do modify and construct additional functions in the already designed houses which indicate that they are possibly not satisfied with the present condition of the residential structures alongside the facilities and utilities in the housing units they occupy. It is against this premise that this research seeks to bring to limelight the determinants of residential satisfaction in some of the selected public housing estates in Owerri, and to suggest possible ways to improve the condition of the residential dwelling units to make it more habitable for the people to occupy.

1.1 Aim and Objectives

This study is aimed at investigating the determinants of residential satisfaction among the residents of public housing estates in Owerri. To achieve the aim, the following objectives were set for the study, vis-á-vis, to:

- assess the socioeconomic characteristics of the residents;
- evaluate the level of housing satisfaction among residents of the public housing estates in the study area; and
- examine the relationship between socio-demographic attributes of the residents in the study area and their level of satisfaction with the public housing estates.

1.2 The Study Area

The study focuses on Owerri which is the administrative centre of Imo State, Nigeria, located at the middle of Igbo land. It is the major city in the state, follow by Orluand bOkigwe respectively. Owerri comprises of Owerri West, Owerri North and Owerri Municipal Local Government Areas. Owerri has an estimated population of about 1,401,873 as at 2016 (NPC, 2006). Owerri is bounded by Otamiri River and the Nworie River to the eastern and southern part. Owerri is located on Latitude 5.476310 and Longitude 7.025853 and it is situated at 73 metres above sea level. The location of Owerri in Nigeria is shown in Figure 1.

The slogan is Heartland and at present it can be considered as the activity centre of Nigeria as a result of its elevated concentration of large and exotic hotels, high assembly of musical studios and quality recreational areas for leisure. Owerri is among the three most active capital of defunct Biafra republic since 1969 till date. Presently, Owerri holds some statuary which reflects some of the activities that took place during the world war, predominantly in the areas that suffered intense bombing, although several war relics and historical events are situated in the museum at Umuahia, Abia State. Owerri has an average temperature is 26.4 °C.



***Fig. 1*: Location of Owerri in Nigeria.
Source: Digitised by the Author (2020).

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 *Determinants of Residential Satisfaction*

Several researches have been conducted in both developed and developing countries of the world, and these have highlighted some factors considered as determinants of residential satisfaction. According to Mohit *et al.,* (2010) dwelling size, integrity of building structure and neighbourhood cleanliness (Liu, 1999) social interaction and culture (Rapaport, 2000) are perceived as significant determinants of residential satisfaction, Others include family size as opined by (Theodori, 2001), socio-economic status such as income level and employment (Varady *et al.,* 2001), satisfaction with the physical condition of the housing and management services (Varady and Corozza, 2000), past living conditions as well as residential mobility and future intention to move (Varadi & Corrozza, 2000). Dekker *et al* (2011) also discovered that housing tenure ship and education status as determinants have strong influence on housing satisfaction as house owners have a higher level of satisfaction compared to tenants.

Adams (1992) observe that marriage and education status determines the level of housing satisfaction, However, there is no consensus about the direction of these determinants on residential satisfaction, but in some cases it is associated with greater dissatisfaction (Lu, 1999).

The income level of households also serves as a determinant in residential satisfaction of inhabitants (Mustapha *et al.,* 1995; Mohit*et al.,* 2010), thus, Individuals with different income levels may display different housing satisfaction on similar housing environments. There is a substantial proof which indicates that housing satisfaction is determined by a wide array of subjectively and objectively alleged circumstances (Theodori, 2001).

Ibem and Amole (2012) and Lu (2002) consider age distribution as an important determinant of occupants' satisfaction. In fact, Lu (2002) opined that people of much younger age bracket are most likely not to be satisfied with the condition of their residential housing units they occupy than the elderly. Salleh et al (2012) highlighted that this might be because the younger ones have advanced prospect and ambition than the elderly ones.

Home-ownership of property has been seen as a profound indicator on residential satisfaction (Barcus, 2004; Elsinga and Hoekstra, 2005, because home-ownership gives home-owners a greater sense of control over their housing units (Kaitilla, 1993; Lu, 2002). Home-ownership also provides a feeling of security and personal achievement, and therefore, higher self-esteem (Rohe and Stegman, 1994; Rohe, Van Zandt and McCarthy, 2001).

The degree of residents' satisfaction occupying residential houses is determined by the availability and functionality of all the components of the environment. The condition of suitable dwelling units, specifically for the urban poor in the society, therefore, constitutes a main problem to housing growth in most of the developing countries (Jiboye & Ogunshakin, 2010).

Gbakeji (2014) opined that to effectively give pleasure to the residents, a comfortable housing environment have to represent pleasing aspects of the wider society, since residential areas are recognised and depends on the available living space one occupy if it meets up with the social needs while showing the status of an individual in the society. Virtually everybody tries in achieving an environment that is well satisfactory as possible, which is focus on the problems of class, level and life cycle. Within the confines of earnings and life cycle of individuals, though, many other factors are responsible for persuading the satisfaction level of the residents' which is most especially concentrated towards the entire neighbourhood (Ajanlekoko, 2001; Nwaka, 2005; Akinmoladun and Oluwoye, 2007).

The level of income has been recognised as having positive impact in determining the degree of residents' satisfaction. The research by Lu (1999) and Vera-Toscano and Aceta-Amestoy (2008) indicate that persons of high income status are presumed to be comfortable with the condition of their dwelling units than the lower income group in the society because the rich has a strong economic base to acquire affordable houses.

The pressure of staying in a place for a longer period and the household size has also been regarded as determinants of housing satisfaction. More so, Elsinga and Hockstra (2005) in their research discovered that in Europe, housing satisfaction is advanced among title-holder compare to the ones renting, while Salleh *et al.* (2012) indicated that the capacity to pay for house rent frequently is an indicator that determines level of satisfaction amongst the renters in mass housing estates particularly in Malaysia.

The indices that are out of the housing sector, height of social incorporation among the inhabitants (Hashim, 2003) and entrance to restricted amenities and the different housing scheme (Tech-Hong, 2011) also emerge a considerable weight on occupants' satisfaction. However, Tech-Hong (2011) has opined that the people of both middle and high cost estates in Greater Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, were contented when certain chances are granted to them in acquiring new homes using a specific method in the buying system.

3.0 Methodology

The data for this study were collected from primary and secondary sources. The secondary sources include data obtained from books, journals, conference proceedings and reports while the primary data on the other hand, were collected directly from the field through a well-structured questionnaire. The primary data collected for the study covers socio-economic and demographic data on age, income status, educational level, occupation, employment, gender, marital status, ownership status, household size and occupancy ratio of the residents in the study area. Systematic random sampling technique was used to sample 324 questionnaires to residents of the public housing estates in Owerri Imo State, Nigeria which were drawn from the sample frame of 3800 housing units in the study area. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used to analyse the data obtained from the questionnaire survey and the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyse the data collected for the study. The results were presented in the form of tables, charts and graphs. Relative Residential Satisfaction Index (RRSI) was used to measure the level of housing satisfaction among the respondents. RRSI is given as:

$$RRSI = 5n_5 + 4n_4 + 3n_3 + 2n_2 + 1n_1/5N$$

Where:

n_1 = number of respondents that are strongly dissatisfied n_2 = number of respondents that are dissatisfied n_3 = number of respondents that are neutral responses n_4 = number of respondents that are satisfied n_5 = number of respondents that are strongly satisfied

N = total number of respondents

In the RRSI, the value ranges from 0-1, with 0 representing extreme/strong dissatisfaction; while 1 represent extreme/strong satisfaction.

4.0 Data Analysis and Presentation

Table 1 presents the data on the socioeconomic and demographic attributes of residents of public housing estates in Owerri. The gender distribution of the respondents indicated a dominance of Men (65.10%) against Women (34.90%). This may be an indicator of the role of Men as household heads in the study area. With regard to the age of the respondents, more than 7.10% and 29.30% were between the age of 18-27years and 38-47 years old respectively. However, 22.20% of them were above 58years old.

It was also discovered that 69.80% of the respondents are married, 8.30% are widowed and 21.90% are separated. Majority of the residents (that is, 63.90%) have a household size of 4-6 persons. This is an indication that there is much compliance with the acceptable and recommended household size of 5 persons as stipulated in the National Housing Policy ([NHP] 1991).

However, the fact that 36.10% of the residents reported a household size of 7-9 persons indicates that a significant proportion of the households are above the national threshold, which indicates that the affected residents experience overcrowded housing conditions. The residents in the study area are more of civil servants with 47.20%, traders occupy the second slot with 22.20 while farmers constitute 15.40% of the residents, and this is an indication that Owerri is an administrative centre where most of the inhabitants are civil servants.

Less than 1% of the residents are extremely low income earners who earn below N30,000 monthly, this was followed by 56.80% of the residents who earn between N31,000-N40,000 monthly, then 27.50% earn between N41,000- N50,000 and on a general note, only 15.40% of the residents earned above N50,000 monthly. On the aggregate, more than 90% of the households interviewed earned more than N30,000 monthly which is the acceptable minimum wage in Nigeria.

Attributes	*Frequency*	*Percentage*
GENDER		
Male	211	65.10
Female	113	34.90
Total	324	100.00
AGE		
18-27years	23	7.10
28-37years	20	6.20
38-47years	95	29.30
48-57years	114	35.20
58years and above	72	22.20
Total	324	100.00

MARITAL STATUS		
Married	226	69.80
Separated	71	21.90
Widowed	27	8.30
Total	324	100.00
HOUSEHOLD SIZE		
4-6 persons	207	63.90
7-9 persons	117	36.10
Total	324	100.00
OCCUPATION		
Civil Servants	153	47.20
Farmers	50	15.40
Traders	72	22.20
Others	49	15.10
Total	324	100.00
MONTHLY INCOME		
<₦30,000	1	0.30
₦31,000-₦40,000	184	56.80
₦41,000-₦50,000	89	27.50
Above ₦51,000	50	15.40
Total	324	100.00

Source: Authors' Field Survey, 2020.

The perception of the residents in the study area on their level of satisfaction with individual elements of the housing units is presented in Table 2. In terms of the general satisfaction with the estate, more than 65% of the respondents' express satisfaction with the condition of the estate, however 64.80% express neutrality regarding the general satisfaction with the estate, indicating that they still nurture some level of doubt about the condition of the estate. With regards to satisfaction with the number of rooms, it was discovered that 64.50% were satisfied while more than 14% were dissatisfied with the number of rooms they occupy in the estate. This implies that the satisfaction level in terms of number of rooms is apparently high.

In a similar vein, up to 7.10% of the residents in the study area expressed extreme satisfaction with the position of electricity outlets, 44.10% and 41.40% were satisfied and dissatisfied respectively. It is, however, encouraging that less than 1% of the respondents expressed neutrality towards the position of electricity outlets. It was observed that more than 55% of the respondents expressed satisfaction which indicates that the residents enjoy electricity supply and the services of EEDC is effective in the study area.

The resident's satisfaction level towards landscape elements in the study area is poor because its only 29.30% of the residents are satisfied while almost 50% are dissatisfied with the elements of landscaping in the study area. This implies that more trees, flowers and lots more need to be planted in the study area which will also help the ozone layer by absorbing pollutants.

The supply of potable water in the study area is poor because only 30.20% of the respondents' express satisfaction and more than 32% were dissatisfied while 36.40% express neutrality; this is an indication that there might be an outbreak of water borne disease(s) in the study area. Majority of the residents in the study area, which represents 58% expressed much satisfaction towards the availability of refuse disposal system while 34% and 8% expressed dissatisfaction and neutrality respectively, it indicates that the study area is relatively clean. Similarly, majority (56%) of the residents expressed dissatisfaction with the drainage facilities in the housing estates in Owerri. The RRSI revealed that the lowest level of satisfaction was recorded for drainage facilities (0.40) and kitchen (0.49). This implies that the residents are extremely dissatisfied with the condition of the wastewater drainage system and kitchens connected to the residential units. However, the highest levels of relative satisfaction were recorded for the dining space, roofing members and dwelling unit with an RRSI of 0.79 each, implying that the residents are highly satisfied with these elements.

Table 2: Perception of Residents of Public Housing Estate towards Household Facilities and Environmental Elements

S/N	S atisfaction with the...	*Percentage (%)*					*RSI*	*Rank*
		ES	S	N	D	ED		
1	estate in general	0	35.20	64.80	0	0	0.67	6th
2	dwelling unit	21.90	50.30	27.50	0.30	0	0.79	1st
3	number of rooms	0	64.50	21.30	14.20	0	0.70	4th
4	size of rooms	14.20	56.50	23.50	5.90	0	0.76	3rd
5	height of ceilings	36.40	42.60	7.10	13.90	0	0.78	2nd
6	position of electricity outlets	14.20	44.10	0.30	41.40	0	0.66	7th
7	operation of electric fittings	7.10	42.90	44.40	5.60	0	0.70	4th
8	design of streets	14.20	36.10	22.20	27.50	0	0.67	6th
9	design of rooms	21.90	51.20	19.80	7.10	0	0.76	3rd
10	number of rest rooms	30.20	27.50	35.20	7.10	0	0.58	9th
11	performance of the roof	21.90	50.90	27.20	0	0	0.79	1st
12	size of the plot	21.90	29.00	14.80	34.30	0	0.68	5th
13	design of kitchen	0	0	51.50	42.90	5.60	0.49	13th
14	location of kitchen	0	23.50	36.20	40.10	0	0.57	10th
15	living room and dining space	21.90	57.10	15.04	5.60	0	0.79	1st
16	operation of plumbing fittings	21.90	13.30	49.10	15.40	0.30	0.62	8th
17	position of doors	0	33.00	37.30	15.40	14.20	0.58	9th
18	size of windows	0	48.10	21.60	21.90	8.30	0.62	8^{th}
19	landscape elements	0	29.30	22.50	20.70	27.50	0.51	12^{th}
20	rate of potable water supply	0	30.20	36.40	5.90	27.50	0.54	11^{th}
21	refuse disposal system	14.00	44.00	8.00	6.00	28.00	0.62	8th
22	drainage facilities	0	8.00	36.00	6.00	50.00	0.40	14th

ES=Extremely Satisfied; S= Satisfied; N= Neutral; D= Dissatisfied; ED= Extremely Dissatisfied

Source: Authors' Field Survey, 2020.

Table 3 shows that there is a strong and positive relationship between socioeconomic attributes of the residents of public housing estates in Owerri and the level of occupants' satisfaction. In other word, the socioeconomic characteristics of the residents are a strong determinant of residential satisfaction in the study area. What this means is that there is a statistically significant relationship between the socioeconomic characteristics of the residents of public housing estates in the study area and their level of housing satisfaction.

Model Summary^b				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.995^a	.989	.989	.04948
a. Predictors: (Constant), Monthly Income, Marital Status, Occupation, Gender, Household Size, Age b. Dependent Variable: General Satisfaction with the Estate				

Source: Authors' Field Survey, 2020.

Further in-depth analysis of individual indicators presented in Table 4 indicated that the relationship between gender and housing satisfaction is very strong (r = .993), as women tend to express higher housing satisfaction than the men. The study also revealed that although occupation is a very week determinant of housing satisfaction (r = -.165), relationship between income and residential satisfaction in the study area is strong (r = .581), indicating that the higher the income of the residents, the higher their level of housing satisfaction. Age and marital status are having fair and positive relationship with housing satisfaction (r = .492 and r = .472 respectively), indicating that older residents tend to be more satisfied with their dwelling units than the younger residents; while married occupants experience higher residential satisfaction in the estates. However, the study shows that household size (r = -.065) have weak and negative relationship with housing satisfaction among public housing residents in Owerri, indicating that larger household size does not necessarily lead to residential dissatisfaction among residents of public housing estates in Owerri.

Table 4: Socio-Demographic Attributes of the Residents and Satisfaction with the Estates

Attributes	*Satisfaction with the Estate*		
	Pearson Correlation	Sig (2-Tailed)	₦
Gender	-.993**	.000	324
Age	.492**	.000	
Marital Status	.472**	.000	
Household Size	-.065	.243	
Occupation	-.165**	.003	
Income	.581**	.000	

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Authors' Field Survey, 2020.

5.0 Conlusion and recommendations

The need for adequate, decent and satisfactory housing cannot be overemphasised. Like several other socio-psychological attributes of man, satisfaction is a very important approach to understand the extent to which an intervention or a programme has met the expectations of the end-users. Public housing satisfaction surveys, such as the present study, investigate the perception of the residents of public housing estates on the performance of housing interventions. The need for such evaluation emerges following the realisation that most public housing development interventions are carried out without [adequate] participation of the would-be residents. Therefore, in most cases, wide gaps exist between the residents' expected housing conditions and the actual housing conditions.

This study has revealed that gender and income are strong determinants of housing satisfaction in Owerri, Nigeria. However, the study revealed that there is no enough statistical evidence to imply that household size and occupation predicts residential satisfaction. The study, therefore, suggests the need to encourage women and youth participation in public housing estates development in the study area. The need to also evolve and implement financial empowerment programmes on the residents of the estates in the study area is also recommended. Owing to the scope of this study, the relationship between weather conditions, housing design and proximity to places of work and the level of residents' satisfaction in the study area were not explored. Further studies are recommended to appraise these important factors.

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IMPACTS OF PHYSICAL PLANNING REGULATIONS ON STREET TRADING LIVELIHOOD: STREET TRADERS' RIGHT TO THE CITY PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

The present century is marked by high rate of urbanisation. This unprecedented rate of urbanisation is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. Urbanisation in most developing countries is associated with poverty and unemployment/underemployment. One of the approaches adopted by the urban poor in adapting to, and addressing the menace of poverty and low employment opportunities is by finding succour in the informal sector. A specific form of the informal economy is street trading; and this study takes a special interrogation of this sub-sector. This study, therefore, investigates the livelihood contributions of street trading, the impacts of physical planning regulations on street trade, and the implications of these regulations on the street traders' right to the city. The narrative review approach is adopted for the study. This study highlights that the informal sector has continuously experienced rapid influx of new self-employees who engage in street trading as their survival and entrepreneurial livelihood strategies. However, the study reveals that street traders encounter harassment and evictions as a result of their weak land tenure security status. This affects their right to trade in the city. The study recommends the securitisation of street traders' land tenure. It also suggests the need for governmental financial and policy support towards ensuring the livelihood sustainability of street traders.

Keywords: Livelihood, Security of Tenure, Street Trading, Unemployment, Urbanisation of Poverty.

Introduction

The phenomenal urbanisation of informality has been recognised by Mengistu and Jibat (2015) who noted that the expansion of the informal sector is linked to its ability to create employment opportunities for the poor. It has been estimated that the informal sector contributes up to 72% of secondary jobs in Africa (Benjamin *et al.*, 2014). Specifically, Mengistu and Jibat (2015) noted that more than 50% of the total workforce in Africa and South-East Asia are employed in the informal sector. With specific reference and comparison to other economic sectors, Racaud (2018) observed that up to 72% of non-agricultural jobs emanated from the informal sector of the economy. Brown et al (2010) reported that:

> In sub-Saharan Africa, the informal economy is now the main source of urban jobs for the burgeoning urban poor. Informal employment is thought to account for around 60 per cent of all urban jobs and to have provided90 per cent of all new jobs….

The informal sector of third world economies has consistently experienced rapid growth as a result of high rate of unemployment and poverty (Timalsina, 2011). Timalsina (2011) conceptualised informal economy as any economic activity that is both unregulated and unrecorded. The working condition of the informal sector employees is always poor. Furthermore, the informal sector is also characterised by job insecurity, small-scale production and small-medium-scale service delivery. Interestingly, Majale (2002) has argued that the existence of informality symbolises policy failures, poor regulatory approaches and poor urban governance.

Many definitions of street trading exist in the literature. However, from the town planners' perspective, Ouwamanam et al (2007) defined street trading as the act of engaging in commercial activities in illegal structures or open spaces within the building line. Following this perspective on street trading, Bogoro et al (2012) argues that street trading is a form of squatting which involves the perpetual display of gods (and services) along roadsides. Ouwamanam et al (2007) traced the history of the criminalisation of street trade to the ancient traditional planning in Yorubaland where it was considered illegal to trade on the streets. They, however, argued that the proliferation of traders on urban streets in recent times is linked to unplanned urban growth on the one hand, and the elitist and top-down approach to urban planning where there is no active participation of the residents on the other. This paper is aimed at investigating the impacts of physical planning regulations on street trade. It specifically investigates the livelihood contributions of street trading, the impacts of physical planning regulations on street trade, and the implications of these regulations on the street traders' right to the city. The narrative review approach was adopted for the study.

Informal Sector, Street Trading Livelihoods and the Right to the City

The concept of informal economy was first developed by Hart (1973) to describe the economic activities that take place at the margin or outside the boundaries of the formal sector of the economy. Chukuezi (2010) conceptualised the informal sector as a small-scale enterprise where the operation and management functions lie in the hands of small number of people who act in administrative capacity in the enterprise. The phenomenal urbanisation of informality has been recognised by Mengistu and Jibat (2015) who argued that the expansion of the informal sector is linked to its ability to create employment opportunities for the poor.

Mbaukaan and Sanusi (2018) viewed livelihood as the daily engagements of people which are undertaken in order to make ends meet. Eklund and Kabeza (2017) maintained that good governance strategies are imperative in dealing with issues of poor people's livelihoods and this includes urban planning approach to the issue of street trade. More so, it has been argued by Diao *et al* (2019) that social acceptability of livelihood policies and programmes play a significant role in ensuring the sustainability of livelihoods.

Oftentimes, in many parts of the world, street traders encounter forced eviction from public spaces which is sometimes accompanied with the arrest and humiliation of street traders and confiscation of their wares (Linares, 2018). Linares (2018) further noted that in most cases, street traders cite their rights to work and right to the space of the city. However, in the case of street traders in Lima, it was declared that the right of municipal authorities to regulate activities in the city supersedes the individual rights of street traders to trade and work in the city space (Roever and Linares, 2008). Conversely, however, Eto (2014) argued that the rights of street traders to free enterprise is protected by existing legal documents and international covenants, although such rights must not be exercised in a manner that breach the rights of others. Eto (2014) contended that there is little (if any) evidence to suggest that street trading affects the exercise of the rights of other residents of the city.

Crossa (2009) have reported that street traders in some cities have made concerted efforts to overcome the uncertainties that characterise their use of urban public space. Through continuous negotiation and rights-based claims, Martinez *et al* (2018) reported that street traders in Colombia have obtained legal status. As such, it is currently illegal to evict street traders in Colombia; and street traders must be adequately compensated where the need to relocate them arise (Martinez *et al.*, 2018). Same rights have also been accorded to street traders in Mexico (Crossa, 2009) and some parts of India (Jhabvala, 2010).

Meneses-Reyes and Caballero-Juarez (2014) observed that the labelling of activities in urban areas as informal and illegal has three broad perspectives. Firstly, the legalistic perspective uses legal language to illegalise those activities and maintain the supremacy of the rule of law (Azuela, 2006). Secondly, the regulatory perspective emphasises the objectivity of rules and regulations that aims at minimising negative impacts (Delaney, 2010). The third perspective is the critical perspective that sees informal activities as an approach to the management and consumption of space (Devlin, 2011). These three viewpoints are highly indispensable in analysing the rights of street traders (Meneses-Reyes and Caballero-Juarez, 2014). Nevertheless, in developing countries, the popular belief among regulatory agencies and municipal authorities is that street trading constitutes a breach of law (Meneses, 2013).

It has been argued that citizens have the right to trade goods and services in public spaces and on the streets (Davy, 2009); although such right is highly contested in the policy arena (Staeheli and Mitchell, 2010). Such contest has contributed to a redefinition of rights owing to the ideological conflict between the right to work and trade on the street and the right to free movement of commuters (Delaney, 2010; Devlin, 2011). However, practical evidence suggests that the right to work on the street has been commoditised, and is therefore, subject to the affordability of the traders (Meneses, 2013). For instance, in Mexico, there is a distinction between authorise and unauthorised street traders (Meneses-Reyes and Caballero-Juarez, 2014).

Authorisation of street trading is subject to the payment of stipulated levies after which the full right to trade and work on the street of the city is granted (Meneses-Reyes and Caballero-Juarez, 2014). Once the permit to trade on the street is obtained, the question of interference with free flow of traffic no longer arises (Meneses, 2013). This is an evidence of the prevalence of 'double-standards' in the existing urban planning and regulatory frameworks. Muller (2012), therefore, argues that urban planning and management policies in developing countries are targeted towards 'punishing the poor'.

Morange (2015), however, observed that owing to their consistent experience of eviction and arrests, street traders have developed resilience to enforcements. He noted that street traders lay claims to their right to the space of the city, their right to work, and their right to trade. Crossa (2015) reported that street traders in Cocoacan city of Mexico have embarked on several protests against the city's stringent planning regulations against street trade. The strict and inflexible urban policies and regulations create a scenario of 'they versus us' between street traders and municipal authorities (Muller, 2012).

The legality, formality and appropriateness of street trading, *inter alia*, are subjectively determined. With regards to their dynamics in the space of the city, Coletto (2010, 2013) attempted to investigate the level of legality of trading in public spaces, while Bellinvia (2013) traced the evolutionary trends of planning regulations on street selling. Adhikari (2017) maintained that the legal status of street trade is contested, thereby exposing street traders to tenure insecurity. He noted, however, that the adoption of the human rights approach by the street retailers has yielded positive results.

Security of Land Tenure among Street Traders in Cities

Sustainable Development Goal 2 aims at "making inclusive and resilient cities" (Kamalipour and Peimani, 2019). It is important to stress that inclusive cities must consider the priorities of the urban poor and economically disadvantaged groups such as street traders (Meneses-Reyes and Rodriguez, 2013; Adama, 2020). Kamalipour and Peimani (2019) argued that because of its ability to accommodate the poor and skill-less majority of urban residents, street trading is now considered as integral to the functionality of cities. However, owing to their status as illegal occupants of urban public space, and because they lack security of tenure, street traders are largely nomadic traders who run with their wares at the sight of municipal authorities (Steel *et al*, 2014; Omar and Ishak, 2016; Adama, 2020; Hossain and Wadood, 2020).

Olajide *et al* (2018) observed that because the urban poor are engaged in informality, they often lack security of tenure or face difficulty in an attempt towards securitisation of their land tenure status. As a result, they argued, urban planning policies and the livelihoods of the poor are usually in conflict.

In similar terms, it has been argued by Mazhambe (2017) that urban authorities have the tendency to deliberately harass street traders and see them as a nuisance to the urban streetscape. He maintained that, for instance, although street traders in Harare are effective tax payers, there has not been any public policy effort aimed at legalising the activity.

Kamalipour and Peimani (2019) noted that insecurity of tenure can lead to livelihood insecurity. Furthermore, Graaf and Ha (2015) argued that insecure livelihoods can lead to a wide range of social, economic and health challenges such as food insecurity, crimes, ill-health, low life expectancy and proliferation of slums and squatter settlements. Existing urban planning regulations in Nigeria such as setback regulations and zoning ordinance, for instance, contributes to the livelihood vulnerability and insecurity among urban poor residents (Olajide *et al*, 2018; Adama, 2020). The Nigerian Building Code specifically emphasises the need to deviate from the occupation of setbacks by temporary economic activities and stipulates strict punitive measures to deal with offenders.

It has been noted by Neuwirth (2013) that municipal authorities are sentimental and biased in their attack of street traders. Their selective attack is evident from the fact that they mostly target the poor and new immigrants whose businesses are relatively small (Omoniyi, 2013); while large businesses are left to operate freely on the street (Neuwirth, 2013). As Meneses-Reyes and Rodriguez (2013) observed, the eviction of street traders is engendered by selfish interests. This is seen in the case of Brazil during the World Cup of 2014 and the Rio Summer Olympics of 2016 (Omar and Ishak, 2016; Kamalipour and Peimani, 2019).

In recognition of the dilemma encountered by the street traders and their disfavoured identity, UN-Habitat (2016) advocated for the integration of the informal economy into the formal economy for the purpose of achieving inclusive and participatory urban governance. However, Kamete (2017) maintained that the potential flaws and complexities in such integration efforts are the reductionist approach to the formalisation exercise and the insensitivity to the needs of the beneficiaries of the process.

Physical Planning Regulations versus Street Trading Livelihood

The Physical Planning Act (2012) of Kenya identifies street trading as a major cause of disorderliness of urban streetscapes and stipulates severe punishment for unlicensed street vendors. In Colombia, the Local Planning Regulations of the city of Bogota reinforce the exclusion of street traders from public space (Falla and Valencia, 2019). In Ghana, the National Environmental Sanitation Policy ([NESP] 1999) both illegalises and criminalises street vending, and stipulates strict sanctions for offenders. The policy posits that street trade, particularly street food vending, is associated with poor environmental sanitation which undermines the efforts of planning agencies in creating health and aesthetically pleasing cities (Apaasongo et al, 2016).

In the pre-independence era, several laws in Nigeria discouraged and criminalized the use of roadsides for commercial activities. Aluko (2011) listed some of these laws to include the Town and Country Planning Ordinance (1946), Land Development (Roads) Law (1948), Building Line Regulations (1948) and Public Health Laws (1957). The same trend has continued into the post-independence era. In year 1984, the Federal Government of Nigeria declared a 'War against Street Trade' with the aim of clearing street traders out of the streets of Nigerian cities (Mabogunje, 1993; Gani, 2015). Gani (2015) stated that the objectives of the programme include improving the sanitary condition of the streets where they are located, improving traffic flow, and estimating higher tax turnover through the formalisation of the informal economy. The Nigerian Urban and Regional Planning Act ([URP Act] 1992) also discourages the use of unapproved locations such as the right-of-way for commercial activities. In Abuja, Nigeria, the local planning agency responsible for solid waste management and the regulation of street trading is the Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB).

Impact of Urban Regulations on Street Trading: Implications for the Right to the City

Adama (2020) observed that AEFB have maintained the culture of forcefully evicting traders from the streets without the provision of alternative adequate and well-planned location for the small-scale survivalist entrepreneurs. She noted that the activities of this agency infringes on the street traders' right to livelihood and the right to the city by consistently subjecting them to evictions and arrest on the one hand, and subjecting their sheds to demolition on the other.

The violation of the street traders' rights to trade in the space of the city is the outcome of the setback and zoning regulations in Nigeria. Ebo (2013) noted that zoning regulations in

Nigeria prohibits non-stationary commercial activities in the city. For instance, Abuja Environmental Protection Board Act ([AEPB Act] 1997) criminalised street trading on the ground that it causes traffic congestion, littering of the streets and environmental degradation. Omoegun (2015) and Omoegun et al. (2019) reported that [almost] all urban planning policies and regulations in Lagos maintain zero-tolerance approach to street trade. Similar observation was made by Gandy (2005) who noted that transport policy, environmental policies and building codes in Nigeria disallows any economic activity beyond the building line.

The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (2008) observed that planning in Nigeria is characterised high level of enforcement of setback regulations, thereby resulting in the consistent eviction of [economically] marginal citizens, including street traders. This trend is not maintained by planning agencies across the world. For instance, in India, town planning agencies adopt the National Policy for Urban Street Vendors for restraining potential street traders from utilising the street for their trading livelihood (Sundaram, 2008). According to Sundaram (2008), their harsh enforcement of this anti-street trade policy is evident in their brazen destruction/seizing of the street traders' wares, demolition of their physical structures and even arrest and detention of the traders.

The Oyo State Urban Development Policy/Planning Act illegalises street trading, including the erection of temporary sheds by street vendors on 'areas not approved or approvable' (Olajoke and Adeboyejo, 2013). Similarly, Enugu State Planning Act illegalises urban informal economic activities, including street trading, on the premise that street vendors exhibit non-compliance towards setback regulations (Okeke, 2000; Onyebueke, 2000). More so, Edo State Town Planning Board has constituted mobile courts aimed at prosecuting street vendors for creating disorder in the city and constituting eyesores to the streetscapes of the city (Enogholase, 2009).

The foregoing justifies the argument of Watson (2009) that urban planning policies and regulations in third world countries are usually anti-poor. To address this, Adeboyejo (2013) suggested the need to reinvent urban planning and governance such that the peculiarities of the poor, vulnerable and marginal persons can be incorporated into the urban design, urban development and urban policies.

Street trading is the largest livelihood activity in the informal sector (Turner and Schoenberger, 2011). To buttress this claim, Chukuezi (2010a) and Mengistu and Jibat (2015) reported that street trading is a major employer of informal sector labour in Africa. Despite its contributions in job creation, however, it has been noted that existing urban land use plans does not take into consideration the peculiarities of street trading livelihoods (Etzold, 2015). The planning authorities, therefore, do not give title documents to street traders to operate on the streets where the sustainability of their livelihoods can be achieved, thereby denying them their right to livelihood in the city (Graaf and Ha, 2015). As a result, they often lack security of land tenure and their livelihood is often considered as illegal and informal (Devlin, 2015). Furthermore, Tipple (2001), Yahya (2001), Bellinvia (2013) and Mazhambe (2017) reported that physical planning regulations in sub-Saharan Africa are usually too bureaucratic and too discriminatory, thereby endangering the livelihoods of the people. Adama (2020) submitted that denying street traders the title documents to the space they occupy is an intrusion on their right to trade and livelihood on the one hand, and their right to the city on the other.

Graaf and Ha (2015) have reported that governments and their agencies in many parts of the world are expressing strong determination to eradicate street-based livelihoods. Specifically, Brown *et al* (2010) noted that although street traders are the largest sub-group in the informal sector and although street trading is the largest employer of labour in Africa, the daily operation and the security of the livelihoods of street traders is shrouded in uncertainty. Street traders suffer incessant exclusion from the urban planning and development process; yet, they are citizens who have both a right to the space of the city and the right to livelihood (Meneses-Reyes and Rodriguez, 2013; Xue and Huang, 2015; Adama, 2020).

Modern urban planning evokes the notions of orderliness and disorderliness in the urban space (Lombard and Meth, 2017). As Devlin (2015) observed, street trading and other forms of urban informal livelihoods are characterised in the planning milieu as contributors to disorder in cities. Furthermore, Gani (2015) noted that street trading contributes to environmental hazards and poor sanitation. He maintained that town planning discourages street vending in order to ensure better visual quality of the cityscape and minimise illegal use of space. Contrary to the view of Devlin (2015) and Gani (2015), however, Graaf and Ha (2015) and Kamalipour and Peimani (2019) maintained that street trade contributes to the visual quality of urban streetscapes. Lombard and Meth (2017) recalls that street trade is historically a necessary feature of urban development, maintaining that street trade gives [economic] life to the city while at the same time reinforcing the social capital of the residents.

Adama (2020) observed that since town planning is aimed at the 'production of space' to satisfy the needs of the urban residents, street trade cannot be effectively wished away because it creates livelihood opportunities, brings ease to life and constitutes the 'space of encounter' in the urban scene. Neuwirth (2013) submitted, therefore, that it is the present intolerant planning approach to street trading is a major factor responsible for the disorderliness created by street traders. Evidences from case studies by Roever and Linares (2008), Omoniyi (2013), Devlin (2015), Kamete (2017) and Linares (2018) suggests that that in areas where communicative planning ideals have been explored between planning agencies and street traders, street traders maintain orderly occupation of streets.

It has been argued by Majale (2002) that urban poverty in Africa is intensified by the policies and actions of urban authorities. He maintained that the livelihoods of the urban poor in developing countries are negatively affected by the existing regulations. Similarly, Tipple (2001) and Neuwirth (2013) submitted that physical planning regulations negatively affect both the life and livelihoods of the urban residents in the Global South. Similar argument has been advanced by Yahya (2001) and Njoh (2006) who maintained that physical planning in Africa hinders/constrains the livelihoods of the poor majority.

Elsewhere (such as in India), pro-poor policies and regulations have been evolved to offset these issues (Majale, 2002). These pro-poor policies and regulations take into account the realities of the vulnerability context of poor people's livelihoods (Tipple, 2001; Neuwirth, 2013). However, Adama (2020) noted that zoning and setbacks regulations in Nigeria lend poor consideration to the fact that the street represents a viable location where majority of informal sector workers engage in their livelihood strategies. She argued that appropriating the space of the city and restricting livelihood activities violates the right of the residents. Arguing from the Lefebvrerian perspective, Graaf and Ha (2015) stated that street traders have been deliberately and arbitrarily denied their rights to trading space because of the 'commoditisation and privatisation of public space'. Because they cannot afford the commoditised spaces of the city, street traders are exposed to recurrent harassment from state officials (Etzold, 2015).

Adama (2020) argues that master planning approach to urban development does not serve public interest *per se*, but the interests of a specific section of the public. This follows the argument of Yahya (2001) that the regulations of most master plans are highly unrealistic, especially for the urban poor, unemployed and vulnerable groups. Since most street traders are nomadic (Devlin, 2011), Falla and Valencia (2019) suggested the need to ensure their active involvement throughout the planning process in order to capture their space needs in the urban land use plan. The role of planning approach and instruments in creating livelihood vulnerability for street vendors have been recognised by Sundaram (2008), Crossa (2015) and Falla and Valencia (2019) who noted that in the cities where incremental and participatory planning are adopted (such as in Mumbai in India, Cocoacan in Mexico and Bogota in Colombia), street traders experience a considerably higher freedom to trade in the streets of the city.

Therefore, Adama (2020) contends that (master) planning is the most visible instrument of socio-spatial exclusion of the urban poor, including street traders. To further justify street traders' experience of exclusion, Omoniyi (2013) reported that the street retailers in Abuja are subjected to consistent inhuman arrests and criminalisation by the police and urban planning authorities. As a result, street traders have adopted the ready-to-run approach in resilience to the arrests and violent confrontations they experience with the public agencies (Olabisi, 2013). It is apparent from the foregoing that physical planning in developing countries has not been favourable to the street traders' livelihood.

Skinner (2008) expressed that existing physical planning regulations in Africa such as traffic regulations, zoning ordinance, building codes and setback regulations represent 'a well-entrenched tradition of repression, persecution and prosecution' of street traders. This is the trend in Nigeria. Potts (2007) noted that exclusionary planning approaches in Africa have persisted over time, thereby giving rise to several anti-poor and anti-informality regulations. Hansen (2004) observed that these include 'post colonial regulations on markets, trading licensing, town and country planning and public health restricted trading … to established markets'.

The planning tradition of creating Central Business District (CBD) often creates traffic problems at the city centre even in the absence of any cognate business activity (Steel *et al.*, 2014). Generally, spatial planning approach in African cities encourages socioeconomic class-based spatial segregation (Hart, 2008; Steel *et al*, 2014; Mengistu and Jibat, 2015; Olajide *et al*, 2018). Apparently, the Central Business District provides multiple opportunities for street trade (Steel *et al*, 2014). However, it has been reported that the livelihoods of street traders are vulnerable to failure owing to their insecure tenure status (Olajide *et al*, 2018). Malaza, Todes and Williamson (2009) maintained, however, that although street trading presents a serious problem to physical planners by defying setback and building line regulations, it is a very vital livelihood strategy to the urban poor. They argued further that the impasse between street traders and physical planners in relation to obedience of planning regulations is traceable to the inappropriateness of the planning policies adopted. Brown *et al* (2010) opined that physical planning regulations such as certificate of occupancy, zoning ordinance and planning approval play a significant role in the denial of the street traders' citizenship. They argued that:

> In practice, citizenship is sometimes denied to the poor and marginal by powerful élites who assign to them 'outsider status', often used as justification for violence…. Arguments in favour of street trading may be presented as a libertarian perspective based on the freedom to sell and work. Arguments against street trading are often put forward by *urban élites*—for example, established businesses who seek to protect their trade … and city governments who—*based on Western norms of city planning and efficiency*—characterise traders from a modernist perspective as transgressors representing deviant behaviour that should not be tolerated in urban public space ….(*Emphasis ours*).

Conclusion and Recommendations

Street trading is one of the most easily accessible and viable livelihood strategies, particularly for the urban poor and new immigrants. It is the largest livelihood activity in the informal sector. The size of the informal sector in general and street trading in particular is traceable to the problem of inadequate formal sector jobs. Street trading has proven to be a sustainable livelihood strategy for the poor and low income groups in developing countries, including Nigeria. The extant literature on the impacts of physical planning regulations on street trade presents several important points for reflection. Some of these are summarised in the ensuing paragraphs:

Third World countries, including Nigeria, are experiencing unprecedented rate of urbanisation. This is accompanied by the urbanisation of unemployment, poverty and informality. The formal sector in the Global South is incapable of providing the needed employment for the citizens. The informal sector contributes significantly in job creation, thereby helping in the fight against the problem of unemployment, and consequently, reducing poverty.

Street trade is the largest livelihood activity in the informal sector of the economy. It is the highest contributor of the jobs in the informal economy. It is a valuable and highly sustainable livelihood to the urban residents in the third world, especially the new immigrants, poor and vulnerable groups.

The existing physical planning approaches in most African countries, including Nigeria, adopts the ideals of dichotomising between ordered versus unordered, regulated versus unregulated, legal versus illegal, formal versus informal and planned versus unplanned urban economic activities. This has led to the classification of street trade as informal, illegal, unregulated and unplanned economic activity in the urban space. Therefore, street traders lack policy support and their livelihood is exposed to constant threats of constant repression, persecution and prosecution.

The viewpoint of street trade as illegal and informal is a subject of 'double standards'. For instance, street traders are allowed to operate when they obtain licenses or when they are able to pay stipulated fees to the planning agencies. In other words, all the arguments of the negative implications of street trade cease to come to play when licensing and ability to pay the required fees comes into the equation. Another problem, however is that there is usually a limited number of licenses available for street traders and the level of encroachment that can be permitted is also limited. Therefore, access to trading license and space among street traders is predicted by the street trader's 'connection'.

However, this study has shown that existing physical planning regulations are anti-poor, thereby denying street traders their right to trade and right to the city. It also shows that planning authorities have adopted stringent and repressive control mechanisms that are aimed at eradicating street trade, and consequently, exposing the street traders to the worrisome web of poverty. The study recommends the securitisation of street traders' land tenure. It also suggests the need for governmental financial and policy support towards ensuring the livelihood sustainability of street traders. Furthermore, the study suggests the formulation and implementation of pro-poor and pro-street traders' planning policies in order to ensure the attainment of inclusive cities in Nigeria.

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PREDICTORS OF URBAN GROWTH AND INFRASTRUCTURAL CONDITION IN PERI-URBAN NEIGHBOURHOODS IN MINNA, NIGER STATE

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Abstract
The rapid expansion of cities in the 21st century is a cause for concern. More worrisome is the uncontrolled expansion of urban areas in the cities of developing countries and the associated housing and infrastructure deficit. Third world urbanisation is associated with unplanned development at the periphery of cities, thus engendering unapproved land use and land cover changes. This study is aimed at assessing the predictors of urban growth and infrastructure condition in peri-urban areas of Minna, Nigeria, and the objectives are to examine the spatio-temporal change of peri-urban areas of Minna between 1989-2019; appraise the condition of infrastructural facilities and services in the study area; identify the factors responsible for urban expansion in Minna; and examine the relationship between urban growth and infrastructural condition in the study area. This study relies on both primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected through oral interviews and direct observation, while secondary data are through Landsat imageries and review of existing literature. Purposive sampling are used to select professionals for oral interview. The satellite imageries of 1989, 1999, 2009 and 2019 are also used to determine the spatio-temporal change and are analysed using remote sensing and geographical information system techniques. The study reveals that the main predictors of urban growth areshift from rental tenure to home ownership, cheap price of land, increase in household formation, rising living standards, low rent of housing, weak land use planning, proximity to place of work and Safe environment.The study, therefore recommends active and judicious implementation of land use plans; simplification of plan approval process; public enlightenment campaign on the need to obey planning regulations with strict penalties attached to contravention; and monitoring of town planning agencies by appropriate authorities in order to checkmate corruption.

Keywords: Housing, Infrastructural condition, Peri-Urban areas, Sprawl, Urban growth

Introduction

Rapid pace of urbanisation is a major problem presented in many developing countries of the world (Owoeye and Akinluyi, 2018). According to the United Nation report on urbanisation, 54% of the world's population lives in cities and is expected to reach 68% by 2050 (United Nations, 2015). The inevitable consequence of urbanisation are the spatial expansion of towns and cities beyond their juridical limits and into peripheries . With the increasing urbanisation, concerns for peri-urban interface have emerged widely . Such areas are characterised by higher residential, commercial and industrial value than the average for rural and urban areas, as well as higher rates of population growth and more land related changes (Mrinalini, 2018).

Urban growth is an increase in the urbanised land cover. One possible means of urban growth is by urban extension. Urban growth according to spontaneous or unplanned urban development is called urban sprawl (Claudia M. *et al,* 2019). Urban sprawl has gradually become one of the dominant urban spatial expansion patterns throughout the world . In other word, it is a form of city spatial expansion toward peripheral areas with, low density, single-use, extensive road and highway networks, car-dependent, open up vast space of territory, scattered and ribbon development in an mono-centric urban structure (Gomez-Antonio *et al,* 2014).

Urban growth is identified with Urban sprawl, as urban sprawl is referred to as an 'uncoordinated growth' (Fouberg, 2012; Nnaemeka-Okeke, 2016; Idowu *et al,* 2017) and scattering of new development on isolated tracts, separated from other areas by vacant land. It often involves the construction of residential and commercial buildings in rural areas or otherwise undeveloped land at the outskirts of a city. Omole (2000) referred it as a formless dispersal of congested urban area with little or no regard for the inter-relationship of such factors as transportation, employment, health, and recreational needs. This is evident in the poor environmental qualities of many Nigerian cities .

Based on the foregoing, the study aimed at assessing the predictors of urban growth and infrastructure condition in per-urban areas of Minna, Nigeria and to examine the spatio-temporal change of per-urban areas of Minna between 1989 to 2019, appraise the condition of infrastructural facilities and services in the study area, identify the factors responsible for urban expansion in the study area and examine the relationship between urban growth and infrastructural condition in the study area.

The Study Area

Minna is located within the geographical area on latitudes 9°31'20"N to 9°41'27"N and longitudes 6°24'59"E to 6°37'42"E. The State is bordered to the North by Zamfara State, Northwest by Kebbi State, South by Kogi State, Southwest by both Kwara and Kaduna States, while the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja borders the State to both its Northeast and Southwest respectively. Minna comprises of Bosso and Chanchaga Local Government Area and it lies within the central region of Nigeria known as the Middle Belt region. According to the 2006 population and housing census figures, Minna has a population of 348,788 and the highest proportion of the population comprised of Hausa, Gwari and Nupe.

***Figure 1*:** Minna and selected per-urban areas for this study
Source: Authors 2020

The Concept of Urban Sprawl

Elkin et al., (1991) believes that before the industrial revolution, people much preferred to live in rural areas. Although cities had been planned for decades, but after the industrial revolution only a small percentage of people lived in cities (Arbury, 2005). After the Industrial Revolution urban areas extended further than any other era in the history. This process was named urbanisation. This phenomenon is taking place in developed or developing countries where human beings live. Most countries have the basic potential to this universal phenomenon that is mainly responsible for increasing the number of population and economy (Sudhira *et al,* 2004). Excessive growth rate of population as a result of urbanization has led to upward growth of cities, which as consequence cities missed their realms and boundaries (Habibia & Asadib, 2011; Daramola & Ibem, 2010). Unplanned urbanization and dynamic urban development led to different types of urban forms that urban sprawl is a primary form of urban development (Bhatta, 2010; Sudhira, 2008; Arbury, 2005).

Defining Urban Sprawl

There are many definitions on urban sprawl . The exact definition of urban sprawl differs among researchers as the term lacks precision and sometime have negative connotation .According to oxford dictionary it has been defined as the disorganised and unattractive expansion of an urban or industrial area into the adjoining rural area. The European Environment Agency (EEA, 2006) has described sprawl as the physical pattern of low density expansion of large urban areas, under market conditions, mainly into the surrounding agricultural areas. Brueckner (2000) refers urban sprawl to excessive spatial growth of cities. Urban sprawl denotes expansion of human population away from the central urban areas into low-density areas that are mostly car dependent communities .

Scholars in Siera Club believe that definition of sprawl is not only based on its characteristics, but also is based on its effects. Longley et al (2002) interpreted that based on numerous crucial elements a definition of urban sprawl can be fed accordingly. Based on the last interpretation of sprawl, urban sprawl can also be defined based on form, land use, Impacts and density.

Urban Sprawl Definition based on Form

With respect to this type of definition, sprawl is not a particular urban form, but ranging from strip to scattered development. Accordingly, Ewing (1994) and Pendall (1999) refer these types of urban sprawl over a linear pattern of compact development to scattered development (Maier *et al,* 2006).

Urban Sprawl Definition Based on Land Use

Another criterion for defining urban sprawl is land use layouts. In (1998), "The Transportation Research Board" has listed the characteristics of urban sprawl such as low density housing expansion, single family houses with dispersed blocks, mixed of uses such as shopping malls and etc. As a whole, the essence of this approach is that sprawl is defined as low density urban development with a separation of functions (Maier *et al,* 2006).

Urban Sprawl Definition Based on Impacts

Ewing (1994) believes that different urban forms including sprawl are extremely debatable and important. Therefore, these terms are not distinguishable and it is suggested, that urban sprawl be defined by its costs and negative impacts. Al Gore (cit. in Wassmer 2002) believes that in such a circumstance, all negative impacts of urban form could be referred to urban sprawl.

Urban Sprawl Definition Based on Density

Scholars and researchers gave much more definitions of sprawl based on the density criteria. Generally, sprawl is directly related with low density urban growth. In many definitions, density in urban sprawl acts as an indicator of land use intensity which represents the ratio between the inhabitants of an area and a given land area (Maier *et al*, 2006).

Causing Factors of Urban Sprawl

Factors causing urban sprawl differ according to development level of countries or according to structure of society. For example, in America demand for having a large house detached with garden which is in touch with nature, introverted life styles (Bruegmann, 2005) and racism (Nechyba and Walsh, 2004) are the main reasons of urban sprawl. In a report prepared by European Commission, factors causing urban sprawl were drawn together (Table 1).

Table 1: Causing Factors of Urban Sprawl

S/N	Factors	
1	Macro-Economic factors	Economic growth, Globalisation, European integration.
2	Micro-Economicfactors	Rising living standards, Price of land. Availability of cheap agricultural land, Competition between municipalities.
3	Demographicfactors	Population growth, Increase in household formation.
4	Housing preferences	More space per person, Housing preferences.
5	Inner city problems	Poor air quality, Noise, Small apartments, Unsafe environments, Social problems, Lack of green open space, Poor quality of school.
6	Transportation	Private car ownership, Availability of roads, Low cost of fuel, Poor public transport.
7	Regulatory frameworks	Weak land use planning Poor enforcement of existing plans Lack of horizontal and vertical coordination and collaboration

Source: European Environment Agency (EEA, 2006).

Factors Responsible for Urban Sprawl in Nigerian Cities

Different factors are responsible for urban sprawl in Nigerian cities. The unprecedented increase in the population in the Nigerian cities continues to put pressure on the existing housing facility. The inability of the housing delivery to cope effectively with the housing need has succeeded in pricing out majority of the low income-earners from the housing market. Most affected groups are the immigrants from the rural hinterland that prefer to settle at the suburbs of the cities. Often times, this is responsible for the development of squatter's settlement at the peri-urban zones (Olujimi 2009).

Cities present unlimited socio-economic opportunities, particularly in area of landed property development. The operations of the economic forces in the supply of land for commercial development within the city centre are encouraging the acquisition of land at the suburb of the city for residential property development. This has sufficiently propelled the greed for land speculation and hoarding at the suburbs. Unfortunately, most of the isolated parcels of land hoarded at the suburb are not subjected to conventional design into layouts that could seek planning approval. Even when such parcels of land are designed into layouts, most of them are not properly charted to allow for coordination. Hence, most of the layouts are not linked to others for accessibility purposes .

Another factor that is responsible for the promotion of urban sprawl is the inability of government to effectively develop their compulsorily acquired parcels of land in some cities. This is predicated on the non-readiness of government to pay compensations on un-exhausted resources in the acquired land to the owners. Thus, the unwillingness of the owners to release fully the acquired land to government and their continuous disposal of the land to individuals, that continues to develop the land without reference to the planning authorities to seek planning permission . However, the planning authorities put in place are expected to control physical development in all parts of the city (including the sprawling areas) but the ineffectiveness of the development control tool at putting such sprawl at bay is hindered by a lot of factors. These among others include lack of political will to implement development control measures, insufficient planning staff to carryout effective monitoring, and lack of equipment such as development control monitoring vehicles. In spite of the shortcomings, efforts are being made at different quarters to check the sprawling growth of Nigerian cities.

Methodology

The research method or approach for this study is quantitative method. The analysis in this study is both from primary and secondary data. The survey was based on questionnaire and oral interviews. Data on factors influencing urban growth was collected using likert scale ranges from highly disagree to high agree. The satellite image processing and classification of 1989, 1999, 2009 and 2019 were the secondary data obtained from Landsat imageries to determine spatio-temporal change and were analyzed using remote sensing techniques and Geographical Information System (GIS). The study covers Chanchaga/Korokpanperi-urban area of Minna.
Results and Discussions

Land Use/Land Cover Changes in the Study Area

Figure 2 and Table 2 shows that built-up area in Chanchaga/Korokpan axis of Minna has increased consistently between 1989 to 2019. For instance, the built-up area constituted 8.09% of the total land area in 1989; while it grew to 13.25% in 1999; 23.16% in 2009; and 40.15% in

2019. This indicates that the built-up area almost doubles every 10 years. On the contrary, the undisturbed vegetation in the study area has experienced consistent diminishing from 76.29% in 1989 to 21.11% in 2019. This indicates that the rate of distortion of the vegetal cover in the study area more than tripled within the space of 30 years.

Furthermore, the disturbed vegetation cover increased from 10.94% of the total land area in 1989 to 33.57% in 2019. Interestingly, however, the water body in the study area has experienced only a relatively insignificant decrease from 3.03% in 1989 to 3.02% in 2019. However, the bare surface has grown from 1.65% in 1989 to 2.15% in 2019.

Zoom



Figure 2: Land use/Land cover of Chanchaga/Korokpan for 1989, 1999, 2009, and 2019
Source: Author, 2020.

Table 2: Land use/Land cover of Chanchaga/Korokpan for 1989, 1999, 2009, and 2019

Land use Chanchaga/ Korokpan	***1989*** Area (Hectares)	%	***1999*** Area (Hectares)	%	***2009*** Area (Hectares)	%	***2019*** Area (Hectares)	%
Built-up	147.6	8.09	241.4	13.25	422.1	23.16	731.6	40.25
Undisturbed vegetation	1390.1	76.29	693.5	38.08	917.1	50.33	218.3	21.11
Disturbed Vegetation	199.4	10.94	836.6	45.91	348.4	19.12	611.8	33.57
Water body	55.3	3.03	37.4	2.05	57.1	3.13	221.3	3.02
Bare ground	30.1	1.65	13.3	0.73	77.5	4.25	39.1	2.15
Total	**1822.2**	**100**	**1822.2**	**100**	**1822.2**	**100**	**1822.2**	**100**

Source: Author, 2020.

Factors Influencing Urban Growth in Chanchaga/Korokpan Area of Minna

The mean score of factors influencing urban growth in Chanchaga/Korokpan peri-urban area of Minna is presented in table 3. The average mean score of respondents in the area is 4.08. Eight factors were identified as the core factors influencing urban growth in the area and are ranked according to their order of importance by the mean score value. These factors are: Shift from rental tenure to home ownership (4.75), Cheap price of land (4.58), Increase in household formation (4.29), Rising living standards(4.29), Low rent of housing (4.28), Weak land use planning (4.23), Proximity to place of work (4.21) and Safe environment (4.13).

The auxiliary factors in the case are the supporting or supplementary factors that influence urban growth in the area and these factors are Population growth (4.03), Ethnic/religion (3.47), Housing preferences (3.33) and Availability of infrastructures (3.31).

Table 3: Factors Influencing Urban Growth in Chanchaga/Korokpan Area of Minna

S/N	*Influencing factors*	*Scales*						*Mean score*	*Ranking*	**C/A*
		Highly Disagree	*Moderately Disagree*	*Disagree*	*Agree*	*Moderately Agree*	*Highly Agree*			
1	Ethnic/religion	26	11	23	20	16	22	3.47	10	A
2	Cheap price of land	3	3	14	38	21	39	4.58	2	C
3	Low rent of housing	5	6	15	46	18	28	4.28	5	C
4	Availability of infrastructures	21	20	23	22	19	13	3.31	12	A
5	Proximity to place of work	6	7	18	37	25	25	4.21	7	C
6	Safe environment	7	13	12	34	30	22	4.13	8	C
7	Rising living standards	6	6	17	34	29	26	4.29	4	C
8	Population growth	12	7	21	27	28	23	4.03	9	A
9	Increase in household formation	8	4	15	37	26	28	4.29	3	C
10	Housing preferences	6	4	15	37	20	36	3.33	11	A
11	Weak land use planning	7	5	21	36	19	30	4.23	6	C
12	Shift from rental tenure to home ownership	6	1	12	26	26	47	4.75	1	C
								4.08		

Source: Author, 2020. **Determinants of Urban Growth in the Study Area**

An oral interview conducted with the staff of Niger State Urban Development Board (NUDB) on the determinants of urban growth in the study area reveals that several factors are responsible for the growth/expansion of Chanchaga/Korokpan axis of Minna. Some of these factors included the establishment of administrative functions in the study area, development of housing estates and establishment of educational institutions of different levels in the area. Other factors reported to be responsible for rapid growth in the study area are in-migration and high birth rate. These last two factors can be categorised under the broad heading of demographic change/population growth.

The officials of NUDB expressed worries on the rapid rate of growth in the study area. One of the officials stated that:

> With the way in which Chanchaga/Korokpan axis of Minna is growing, the management and planning of the area has assumed a worrisome dimension. The area exhibit considerable level of planlessness and squalor. Concerted effort is required to curb the rate of uncontrolled growth in the area because it affects the infrastructure in the area

negatively and some of the facilities are overstretched.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Spatial expansion of cities in developing countries is characterised by planlessness and lack of adequate control. This study has revealed that urban growth in the study area is rapid and uncontrolled. Furthermore, the study also reveals that the most noticeable determinants of urban growth in the study area are the establishment of educational institutions and administrative functions which serve as growth factors/growth poles, development of large-scale public housing estates, and uncontrolled population increase. The study therefore recommends that the establishment of public institutions and development of large-scale housing estates should be dispersed, rather than clustered. The need to develop and implement physical plans and other workable measures to checkmate the rapid rate of population increase in the study area is also suggested.

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SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE SOLID WASTE GENERATION AND MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIAN CITIES: A REVIEW

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Abstract

Urbanisation, modernisation and rural migration to cities create an increase in population that ultimately proliferate the uses of needed materials which results into a tremendous urban problem related to waste generation and management. Increase in waste generation reflects a substantial challenge to large urban centre globally and signifies a precarious issue for fast growing cities with accelerated population growth. Wastes are an unavoidable consequence of production and consumption activities that are mostly tied to the attitude and behaviour of people in any economy. A socio-cultural environment is the combination of social and cultural factors that have a significant impact on waste generation, due to the strong interaction that exists between them, it is somehow difficult to separately assess their influence on waste generation. There are different views from the scholars in motivating the relationship between the issue of solid waste and socio cultural factors. The focus of this paper is to describe the influence of certain socio-cultural factors as they influence solid waste generation and management in order to suggest ways of improving management strategies of limiting its adverse effects in Nigerian cities.

Keywords: solid waste, society, culture, urbanisation, waste generation, waste management

Introduction

The United Nations projected a rapid growth in urban population between 2017 and 2030. United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs cited in) projected a 66% increase in the urban population worldwide as against 52% in 2014. One of the consequences of the global urbanisation is increasing volume of solid waste. It was estimated in the year 2016 by the world Bank that the total amount of waste generated in the cities of the world was approximately 2.01 billion tons and it is still expected that by the year 2050 the rate will increase by 70% to 3.40 billion tons as a result of increased in population and urbanisation.This increase is tied to the economic growth that has impacted negatively on the management of solid waste generation particularly in the context of developing countries . Solid waste is one of the major problems that is gaining increased focused by every government in the world.

The increase in solid waste generation according to in most of the developing countries over time has been related to changes in lifestyle of the people. Other studies attributes include society, culture, income and family size.

Solid waste generation today has grown beyond the reach of the city authorities to control for a sustainable urban environment. This paper review literature on the socio-cultural factors that influences generation and management of solid waste in Nigerian cities.

Literature Review

Solid waste is the wastes in its dry form generated either from homes, other areas such as schools, farms, markets, industries or even from street sweeping, they are often referred to as the Municipal Solid waste (MSW). Society and culture have a significant impact on the waste generation, as proper management depends on households' participation, which is directly related to the attitudes and behaviours of the society in a large scale .

Developed nations tend to take a holistic approach in the collection, keeping, treatment and disposal of solid waste to make it harmless on environment, human and animal life. The case is different in developing nations as the issue of municipal waste management is solely channeled to the local authorities, and due to the financial burden and the capital intensive nature for the purchase and maintenance of waste management equipment, they were unable to cope with it. The down side of it is the indiscriminate disposal of solid waste on the environment due to the negative attitude and *inadequate awareness of proper solid waste disposal by the people* .

Studies shows that the largest percentage of municipal solid waste generated in the developing countries are mainly from households , while the composition varies in cities and nations due to differences in life style, economic situation, waste management regulations and industrial structure .

There are diverse views on the link that exist between socio-cultural factors and household solid waste generation and management.stated that the lifestyle, particularly the eating habits of residents affect waste generation. Similarly, observes that the perception of order, value and usefulness attached to waste based on the general and cultural believes of the people's daily life affect waste generation. , *on the other hand believed that waste generation* is due to the residents' socio-economic status (sex, education attainment, and household income) and geographic risk factors (residential area and residents' distance to municipal permitted dumpsite).

These views shall be integrated in order to examine the influence on waste generation and management in Nigeria particularly in Bida a cultural and a heritage urban area so as to suggest ways of improving management strategies for sustainable urban environment.

Solid Waste

Solid waste is one of the major problems of urbanisation in cities globally. Large scale of waste (solid/liquid) is generated due to the number of people while processing and handling of such amount of wastes becomes a challenge to the city authority. Solid waste was defined by as any discarded solid materials from households, healthcare centre, constructional site, agricultural land, commercial, industrial, or institutional area. It constitutes generally to man's unwanted materials that needed to be collected and properly managed depending on the man's attitudes and behaviour . The essential meanings of society and culture coincide in this study, culture can be thought of a group's heritage or a set of rules and beliefs that influence human behaviour while society is a group of humans sharing a common culture and social system. Combining the keywords “urbanisation”, “solid waste”, “society” and “culture” reflects that whatever one “sees as” or “chooses to be” or “has to do with” waste depend solely on the idea, customs or behavioral attitude adopted from his social system.

Literatures show that there is a strong relationship between peoples' attitude and solid waste generation and management, this study is therefore review literatures identify socio-cultural factors that influence waste generation in Bida Town.

Global solid waste generation:

The World Bank in global waste index report (2019) predicted the increase in global waste generation by 70% before the year 2050. In another report on global review of solid waste management (2019), it was also predicted that urban residents will be generating 2.2 billion tons of solid waste per year before 2025 as against 1.3 billion tons that is presently being generated due to the increase in urban population.

High income nations of the world generate more waste than the low-income nation. For instance, United States ranked the largest generator of solid waste in the world where each citizen generates an average of 808 kilograms per year. Ellis (2018) stated that rich countries of the world like United State, Canada, and members of the European Union constitute 16% of the world population generate up to 34% of world's waste.

Solid waste management is an issue of universal commitment that concern every person in the world (World Bank report, 2018). The report has it that over 90% of waste in the low-income countries were not properly managed in an environmentally safe manner, which make it vulnerable and contaminate the world's ocean, transmit disease and affect the economic development. It further stated that waste generation is expected to rise with economic development and population growth in the year 2050 mostly especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Middle East and North Africa which are major among the regions of the world.

Findings from these reports shows that the global waste generation and composition depends solely on the level of economic development, population growth, cultural norms and geographical location of a country while waste management is closely related to the income level of a nation where the low-income countries generate and manage less waste than the high-income countries.

Considering the challenge of increase in waste generation and management of solid waste to large urban centers of the world, suggested the use of Internet of Things (IOT) which predicts a world where physical, digital and virtual objects are interconnected in a network supporting higher order applications to modify the performance of solid waste management. In the study, Pardini reviewed the analysis of waste management models that are available in the literature based on IoT requirements to check with the related literature based on IoT infrastructure for well-organised management of waste generated in urban settings with the focus on the interaction that exist among the agents that are responsible for waste collection and the waste generators from the viewpoint of time, costs, and citizenship promotion.

The focus was based on waste bins which receive the dumps to generate information through IoT physical infrastructure provided like types of waste supported by the container, bins positioning, the pneumatic tube that automatically compacts garbage to decrease volume and recycling and processing points for the refuse to be returned as a raw material or to be processed for the correct disposal. Attention was also given to the IoT technologies to be adopted considering the Radio Frequency Identification support like types of sensors to be used, automatic actuators, cameras positioning, Global Positioning System (GPS) and IoT architecture. These were to be supported by the types of software to be used for analysis on how the information obtained shall be used in obtaining a dynamic collection planning.

In overall, findings from these studies revealed focuseson wastes were in Macro terms and little attention given on the primary generators of solid waste

Regional solid waste generation:

The low-income urban centrer of the developing countries tend to generate lower volume of waste than the higher income urban centres. This was discovered by in the study conducted on the trends of solid waste management in East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and as they were managed from the source to the final disposal. Okot-Okumu stated that waste management at the past have been a central control system monopolised by the urban authorities before the partnership with public and private service providers in different urban communities. According to the study, total waste generations were tied to the national GDP per capita such that the developing countries like countries in Africa and Asia generates less than 1.0 kg/cap/day while the developed economic were above 1.5 kg/cap/day.

Solid waste generation in developed nations

The study conducted on the effects of socio – economic factors on household solid waste generation and composition in Vietnam by uses income as a basis for investigation on some selected households,but further studies shows that income is insignificant rather the households' size and daily activities. Similarly, in studying the society and household behavior, culture and attitudes of people towards solid waste management as they are related to global solid waste generation in developed nations found out that the intervention of any solid waste management programme like recycling scheme is always influenced by demographic factors (age, education, income and household size) and attitudinal change of the people.

Culture plays an important role even in most of the developed countries that adopted the use of separate waste collection system as a policy to control waste generation. This was investigated by in the study of the *effects of neighbour influence and cultural consumption on separate waste collection system*. Focusing of twin events, Agovino first outlined the theoretical framework on the essential things that motivate the pro – environmental behaviors of people towards separate waste collection and then test the results by implementing a quantile regression on Italian municipal data for 2012.

Solid waste generation in developing Nation

Yiougo (2013) uses Geographical Information System (GIS) to evaluate the waste generation of two cities in Burkina Faso with focus on some selected variables like urban fabric, grey water outlets and household garbage dump sites. Findings shows that the most dominant urban fabric is low standard of living characterised by the existence of open spaces. While the solid waste dump site dominates the density of grey water discharge points.

Rapid urbanisation and economic growth in developing countries increase the amount of solid waste generation, while inadequate financial resources and deficiency of data on the amount and its composition make it difficult for the regulatory bodies in preparing a proper planning management system. in his study collect information on the average waste generation rate of four groups of residential areas in Gujranwala city of Pakistan for record and discover that the generation rate ranges of between 0.33kg per capita per day for low income areas to 0.46 kg for high income areas, while the composition is of 15 categories of waste products with kitchen waste as the largest components of between 43 – 68%.

Apart from solid waste generation, the behavioural attitude of household on solid waste management is another serious factor that influence solid waste in developing countries, examines these factors in Bahir Dar City. Stratifying the city into core, outer and the middle zones, it was discovered that households do not enjoy sufficient solid waste management services. Though, the per capita waste generation was 0.22kg/person/day in all zones with the highest generation in the core zone due to the household waste sorting that is more intensive in outer zone than the other zones.

The failing services on urban waste management in developing countries was traced to the lack of resources, infrastructures, awareness and institutional strength by . Though, these were addressed as the signs, indications, and facts that can be observed, measured or calculated form the review of the past literatures on the factors that restrain CDCs (Centers for Disease Control) from offering all of their citizens, companies and institutions access to good solid waste management services.

The volume and composition of waste varies in most of the developing nations, this was stated by when comparing waste generation within the traditional core zone, transitional zone that developed under colonial rule and suburban zones. It was found out that the variations were due to the differences in employment and livelihood patterns of the residents in the zones. Similar research carried out by indicate income, education and social status of the residents as the major contributing factors. While hold on to socio-economic differences of the residents. These studies were reaffirmed by the findings of other scholars (Babalola, 2008; Egbere et al 2000; Igbinomwanhia and Ohwovoriole, 2012; Kayode and Omole, 2011; Nkwocha et al 2011; Ogwueleka, 2003;) on intra city studies in Jos, Akure, Owerri, Nsuka, Minna, Benin and Ibadan.

Methods

This article reviewed literatures on socio-cultural factors that influence the generation and management of solid waste. The review was arranged thematically at the global, developed, and developing countries. Factors identified were integrate with relevant evidences that were used to evaluate a framework that summarise the relationship that exist between them.

The keywords used in reviewing the literature were the ones that refer to the issues concerning solid waste generation and management in Nigeria, that is combining the keywords "solid waste" and "Nigeria" with urbanisation, society, culture, waste generation and waste management. The review starts with the definition and identifying the relationship that exist between urbanisation, society, culture and solid waste generation and management.

Socio-Cultural Factors that Influence Solid Waste in Nigerian Cities

There are diverse literatures on solid waste generation and management, some of these literatures were adopted for review so as to identify, synthesis and integrate the relationship that exist between socio cultural factors and solid waste generation.

Researches on solid waste generation , , , , ' revealed that the largest percentage of solid wastes generated in urban centrer comes from the household sector which indicated that there is a strong relationship between the population and the volume of waste generation. Socio-cultural habit of the people and particularly the lifestyle mostly influences the rate of waste generation in urban centres. .

; identify the cities level of industrialisation, socio-economic status of the residents and kinds of commercial activities that dominate the town as the factors that influence the volume of waste generation. In the opinion of , factors such as educational status, occupation, income and types of building also contributed positively, observed that the most influencing factors include average income level, generation source, population, social behaviour, climate and industrial production. These key factors influence solid waste generation and management in Nigerian urban centers

Lifestyle

Cambridge Dictionary defines lifestyle as someone's way of living, it is the interest, opinions, behaviours and behavioural orientation of an individual, group or culture. Lifestyle typically reflects on individual's attitude, way of life, values or world view. It is, therefore, a means of forging a sense of self and to create a cultural symbol that resonate with personal identity. (Kahle & Close, 2011). According , there is no attributes that influence the rate of waste generation like lifestyle and family size of the residents. The study established that family size does determine the rate of waste generation.

Culture

Culture has different meanings; in a simple term it is a word used for the way a group of people do things or the way they live their life. define culture as a balance maintenance between humans, society and his physical environment, and a background for all human activities.Study have shown that culture provides a stage setting for which all human activities takes place and as such, cultural believes and practices must be adopted into a system for the survival of any intervention on waste management.

Population

Population plays an important role on the issue of waste generation, past studies ', , , and , have shown that the largest part of solid waste generated in urban centres originated from household which depends on the population. reveals that population plays role in the quantity and rate of solid waste generation, environmental education and citizens awareness and the effectiveness of solid waste management policies and enforcement of sanitation laws in various Nigerian cities. Similarly, in his study revealed a strong relationship between population and the volume of solid waste generated which indicates that the volume of waste increases with the increase in city's population.

Economic Status

Economic status is usually measured as a combination of education, income and occupation of an individual as they relate and influence on another. It discloses the household's access, privilege, power and control of resources. Studies , , and have shown that there is a positive relationship between the household size and waste generation, it was also noted that families with higher income generates lesser amount of organic waste than the families with low income. while differences in income determine the waste composition,

Conclusion

Solid waste is a global phenomenon that originated mostly as a result of the concentration of people. Society and culture have an impact on the rate and composition of solid waste in any environment. The attitude and behaviour of people towards waste handling is real though it may be different according to the culture in different societies. Solid waste management is a very good indicator in the performance of a municipality, though it could have been the best service any city authority could prefer to give to her citizens but flops either due to the attitude of the people or financial burden on waste management as in the case of most developing countries. Social and cultural habit of the people influenced greatly on the success and failure of waste generation and management in any city and so city authorities should always consider the socio-cultural factors of the citizens before intervening on waste management policies for effective and successful outcome.

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ASSESSMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN URBAN BLIGHT AND HOUSING QUALITY IN MINNA

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Abstract
The study assessed the relationship between urban blight and housing quality in Minna Niger State. The specific objectives of this paper include the examination of the condition of housing in the study area, causes of urban blight on one hand and its relationship with housing quality in Minna on the other. In carrying out this study, both primary and secondary data were sourced.The instruments of data collection employed in this study include personal observation and structured questionnaires. A total of 400 households were randomly selected across five communities in the study area based on the proportion of the estimated household population. The data collected were subjected to statistical analysis using frequencies, percentages and regression. The results revealed that high incidences of rural-urban and urban-urban migration, poverty, lack of maintenance and poor enforcement of planning laws are the most significant factors responsible for the emergence of urban blight and poor housing quality in the study area. The regression analysis result shows a significant relationship between urban blight and housing quality. It can be seen from the result that of the 9 independent variables included in the regression model, 7 were significant predictors of housing quality. The research recommends maintenance and provision, improvement of infrastructural facilities, implementation of planning laws so as to guide development and also improve the quality of housing in order to reduce urban blight.

Keywords: Assessment, Blight, Housing, Quality and Urban.

1.0 Introduction

Urban growth is one of the processes of urban development (Bhatta, 2009). The most striking feature of rapid urban growth process on the global scale is the increasing agglomeration of world population. While, in the past, urban areas have been and still are places of opportunities, today, they are described as hotspots of crime and numerous challenges (Wamsler and Brink, 2014). The urban environment is highly complex in terms of growth and development (Bolay, 2006). In the developing world, there is a high rate of migration to urban areas which has further worsened the situation. Couch (2013), noted that the high rate of urbanisation due to ever-growing population exerts powerful forces on urban residential areas, making them undergo internal spatial restructuring in response to social, environmental and economic pressure.

According to the United Nations (2006) estimates, the population living in urban areas exceeded 50% of the world total in 2006 and will approach 60% in 2020. Most if not all of this growth is taking place in developing countries (Saeed, 2011).

In Nigeria just as in many other developing countries, the problem of high population growth rate has created severe housing problems, resulting in overcrowding, inadequate dwellings and a situation in which many Nigerians can be said to be living in slum and blighted areas (FGN, 2012). Urban blight in the country is manifested in the form of social decay, decline in economic activities and opportunities and physical environmental degradation amongst others (Oluwasola, 2014).

Urban blight is described as the social depreciation of real property beyond which its existing condition or use is unacceptable to the community. From this context urban decay can be defined in relation to the community's acceptable standards. The minimum acceptable standards in the community depend on the social values of the community and may vary greatly due to differences in the cultural orientation, history and most significantly, the income of the communities (Oluwasola, 2014).

In cities experiencing urban blight like Minna, the study area, built-up structures degenerate in quality with age and obsolescence, the high rate of neglect and consequent deterioration of housing have made urban blight a common feature in many cities of Nigeria. However, if good quality housing implies its possession of good attributes, then the reality of housing situation in Nigeria is below ideal (Adeleye*et al,* 2014).

2.0 The Study Setting

Minna is the capital of Niger State. The study area lies on Latitude 9° 33¹ North, and Longitude 6° 29¹ East on a geological base of undifferentiated basement complex of mainly gneiss and magnetite. At the North-East corridor of the town lays a continuous steep outcrop of granite. In the present political zoning system, Minna is within the North Central Zone, and occupies an area of about 884 hectares. It is about 145 kilometres Southeastwards by road to Abuja, the Federal Capital of Nigeria.

Minna metropolis covers many wards, which are Bosso, Tungan-Danboyi, Chanchaga, Maitumbi, Maikunkele, Kpakungu, Saiko, Sauka-kahuta, Kongila, Ketern-Gwari, Dutsen-kura, etc. Minna metropolis is a growing regional capital of Niger State, with an estimated population of 307,414 (NPC, 2006).

Due to the increasing population in Minna metropolis, the largest percentage of the land is used for residential houses, offices, schools and other institutions to accommodate the rising population. A high percentage of the land is also used for construction of township roads for ease of movement. These are processes of urbanisation which are on the increase due to population pressure, and are exerting more pressure on the natural vegetation. Therefore, Minna town is a fast growing urban centre which accommodates all level of income earners; the high, low and medium income earners (Niger State Bureau of Statistics, 2012).

***Figure 1*: Niger State, Nigeria.**
Source: Niger State Environmental Protection Agency (2018).

Aim of the Research

The aim of this study is to assess the relationship between urban blight and housing quality in Minna, Niger State with a view to evolving a sustainable urban management framework in the study area.

Objectives of the Research

The specific objectives of the research are to:

- Examine the housing condition of the study area.
- Determine the causes of urban blight in Minna.
- Determine the relationship between urban blight and housing quality in Minna.

3.0 Review of Related Literature

3.1 *The Concept of Housing*

Housing is defined as the total residential neighbourhood/environment or micro-district including the physical structure, all necessary services, facilities and apparatus for the total health and social wellbeing of the individual and family (Salau, 1992) as cited by Ibem (2011). It is seen as the physical environment in which the family and society's basic units must develop. Housing structures are enclosures in which people are housed for lodging, living accommodation or even work places. According to Owoeye and Omole (2012), “housing is not only a shelter but also part of the fabric of the neighbourhood life and of the whole social milieu”. It touches upon many facets of economic activity and development. Thus, housing provides social contacts, good image, a sense of belonging and an indicator of social status. For many house owners, housing serves as a significant asset in their portfolio (Liman et al, 2015). The 1992 National Housing Policy for Nigeria identified shelter as the most essential human need after food. While adequate housing is crucial for effective performance of man, a considerable proportion of Nigerians live in sub-standard and poor housing as well as deplorable unsanitary residential environments Onibokun (1985), cited in Omole (2010). To this end, one can deduce that housing is the process of providing a large number of residential buildings on a permanent basis with adequate physical infrastructure and social services in planned, decent, safe and sanitary neighbourhoods to meet the basic and social needs of the population and is intended to provide security, comfort and convenience for the users (National Housing Policy, 2004; Osuide, 2004).

Housing (adequate shelter) is recognised worldwide as one of the basic necessities of life and a pre-requisite to survival of man (Agboola, 2004, UN–Habitat, 2006; Anofojie and Adeleye, 2011). Rapoport (2001) defines housing as a system of settings within which a certain system of activities takes place and, therefore, housing is more than the dwelling, the neighbourhood and its environmental quality profiles. In the traditional African setting, in particular, housing is, in fact, one of the greatly cherished material properties.

3.2 *Housing Quality*

A normative definition of quality of housing or housing quality standards generally refers to the grade or level of acceptability of dwelling units and their associated and immediate residential environment, including the design and functionality of housing structures, building materials used, the amount of internal and external space pertaining to the dwelling, housing utilities, and basic service provision (Mengand Hall, 2006). The definition of quality of housing embraces many factors which include the physical condition of the building and other facilities and services that make living in a particular area conducive. The quality of housing within any neighbourhood should be such that satisfies minimum health standards and good living standard, but should also be affordable to all categories of households (Okewole & Aribigbola, 2006). However, the quality of housing is a rather more complex concept with broader social and economic meaning. It accounts for both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of residential units, their immediate surroundings, and the needs of the occupants.

3.3 *Urban Blight*

The concept of urban blight in the context of urban planning is synonymous to that of urban decay and/or urban decline, and is subject to a number of definitions, connotations and interpretations that make it hard to distil. According to Lind & Schilling (2015), the term 'blight' originally comes from the field of plant pathology, but was adopted by urban reformers in the mid twentieth century to label the escalating urban malady associated with overrun, poor, working class neighbourhoods. In 1918, a Philadelphia planner, as cited in Gordon (2003), described a blighted urban area as one that is not what it should be. Gold & Sagalyn (2011) argued that considering its half-century of use, the concept itself has become a well-worn term of art.

Nevertheless, because its application to different contexts is so subjective and pliable, it is nonetheless acceptable to generally contain it on a paradigm underpinned by the edict that its judgment is in the eyes of the beholder. Justifiably, this is in parallel with the assertion by Robick (2011) that without a standard metric, every one judgment of blight would possibly redefine the concept. With that said, it therefore becomes of utmost importance to find common ground in that despite its universality, the crux of the concept remains rationally engrained on the contention that urban blight can be generally defined as a label for suggesting hostile urban conditions.

These are conditions where a previously well-functioning city, or part of it is dilapidated and fallen into disrepair (Robick, 2011). In this sense, the most blatant form of urban blight often presents itself in the form of a physically deteriorated or decayed conditions in an urban area, caused by any number of circumstances that worsen over time due to human neglect and disinvestment among other factors (Robinson & Cole, 2007). According to Durden (2013), these are conditions that literally pose a threat to the health and safety of not only the residents of the blighted area, but also the general public exposed to such conditions. On the bigger picture, these conditions also depress an area's quality of life, and jeopardise the social and economic viability of an area. From a valuation point of view, Robinson & Cole (2007) thus describe urban blight as a result of unguided urban growth and arguably an indiscriminate mixture of not only homes but also factories, warehouses, junk yards, and stores that in turn result in depressed property values.

Urban blight manifests itself in many dimensions, which can be grouped into different forms of either physical blight, frictional blight, functional blight or economic blight, or a combination of these depending on the context (Chetty, 2014). Justifiably, this traditional classification nonetheless provides a starting point for the development of a framework for measuring blight and determining blight eradication strategies, as they are understood to relate to specific elements of the environment.

4.0 Research Methodology

In carrying out this study, both primary and secondary data were used. The primary include the physical/structural condition of houses, socio-economic characteristics of residents of the study area as well as the housing and environmental conditions of the areas. The secondary data include map of Minna (sourced from the Niger State Ministry of Land, Works and Housing) and the population data of the study area (sourced from documents provided by National Population Commission). Variety of published and unpublished articles in reputable journals, dissertations, textbooks and seminar papers that deal directly with housing, blight and related issues were consulted. The sample size in this research was 400 respondents and purposive sampling technique was used in selecting the areas where the questionnaires were administered within Minna, while simple random sampling was used in picking the respondents in the selected areas. 350 questionnaires were returned and the response collected from field was subjected to statistical analysis using descriptive statistics; frequency distribution table with percentages. The evaluation of relationship between dependent and independent variables was carried out using the multiple regression models.

5.0 Discussion of Findings

5.1 *Condition of Housing*

On the condition of housing in the study area, five housing components were considered which included wall, window, doors, roof and floor.

5.1.1 *Condition of Wall*

As shown on Figure 2, 58.6% of the total number of the building walls in the study area were plastered and painted, another 25.1% were not plastered while 16.3% were cracked. Though some walls that were painted and plastered still looked old and rough which affected the



Source: **Author's** Field Survey, 2020.

5.1.2 *Condition of Windows*

The study revealed that 57.4% of the windows in the study area were intact, 37.7% were cracked or broken while 4.9 % were removed as shown in Table 1. This means that there were houses without windows. Mats, sack or corrugated iron sheets were used as window materials in these houses.

Table 1: Condition of Windows

Window Condition	Frequency	Percentage
Intact	201	57.4
Cracked/Broken	132	37.7
Removed	17	4.9
Total	**350**	**100**

5.1.3 *Condition of Doors*

The result of the study on the condition of doors as revealed in Figure 3 shows that 86% were intact while 14% were removed. Majority of the respondents also considered their door condition to be very good out of those doors that were intact. This shows that most of the doors in the study area were at good state which is because door is one of the most needed components of a house for security reasons.



***Figure 3*: Condition of Doors**

5.1.4 *Condition of Roof*

The study revealed that 30.6% of the roofs were intact, 60% were rusty while 9.4% were sagging as shown in Table 4.8. This indicates that most buildings in the study area were old because some of the rusty roofs were leaking.

Roof Condition	Frequency	Percentage %
Intact	107	30.6
Rusty	210	60
Sagging	33	9.4
Total	**350**	**100**

***Source:* Author's** Field Survey, 2020.

5.1.5 *Type of Floor*

The study revealed in Figure 4 that 90% of floors were made up of concrete while 10% were made up of mud floor although some floors in some buildings were cracked and do not meet the functional requirements in terms of strength and stability, resistance to weather and ground moisture, and also durability.



Figure 4: **Type of Floor**

5.1.6 *Condition of Housing Facilities*

In the study, 45% of the buildings had poor access roads which were in bad condition. There was little or no provision being made for air spaces between buildings, 70% of the buildings had no adequate air spaces. The condition or state of the buildings in the study area was either fair or bad as revealed in Table 4.7. Toilets, bathrooms and kitchen in most of these buildings seemed to be in critical condition with most of them located outside the buildings but within the compound.

Table 3: Condition of Housing Facilities

S/N	*Housing Facilities*	*Very good %*	*Good %*	*Fair %*	*Bad %*
1.	Accessibility	10%	15%	30%	45%
2.	Air space of buildings	5%	10%	15%	70%
3.	Toilet	5%	5%	30%	60%
4.	Kitchen	5%	10%	55%	30%
5.	Bathroom	15%	10%	25%	50%

Source: **Author'sField Survey, 2020.**

5.1.7 *General Housing Condition*

According to the data gathered, the general housing condition in the study area was classified as being good, fair or bad. It was discovered that the majority of the houses in the study area were in fair condition with 47.0% of the total number of houses that were sampled. Bad housing condition accounted for 34.0 %. Only 14.0 % and 5.0% of the houses in the study area were in good and very good condition respectively as depicted in Figure 5. Buildings that were considered to be very good were buildings that were structurally sound with functional housing facilities and no maintenance needed. The houses that were good were structurally sound but old.

Houses with fair condition were those houses that had little problems with or lacked some housing facilities with some of the housing components needing replacement or a lot of maintenance. Houses that were in bad condition were houses that were old and dilapidated with inadequate facilities.



***Figure 5*: General Housing Condition.**

5.2 Causes of Urban Blight

This section of the study reports the results of analysis carried out in pursuance of the second objective, which is to identify the causes of urban blight in the study area. It was also gauged through the use of Mean Score analysis to know the most important cause that is responsible for its formation. Causes of urban blightranked from 1st to 12th as presented in Table 4; High incidences of Rural or Urban– Urban Migration was ranked 1st (MS = 3.86), Lack of housing maintenance and inadequate infrastructure was ranked 2nd (MS = 3.83). Inadequate provision of site and services, eviction and poor resettlement programme by the government were considered to be the least important causes of urban blight (ranked 11th and 12th, MS = 3.60 and 3.55) in the study area. The average mean score for the overall causes of urban blight was 3.69, which corresponded to "very significant" of influence of causes.

Table 4: Causes of Urban Blight

Cause of Urban Blight	*Mean Score*	*StdDev*	*Rank*
High incidences of Rural or Urban – Urban Migration	3.86	0.72	1
Lack of housing maintenance and inadequate infrastructure	3.83	0.65	2
Poor enforcement of planning laws	3.81	0.66	3
Inadequate development control by planning agencies	3.72	0.78	4
Lack of affordable housing	3.69	0.73	5
High incidences of urban poverty	3.67	0.91	6
Housing shortage	3.65	0.79	7
High density of development and overcrowding	3.65	0.87	7
Inadequate neighbourhood facilities and services	3.63	0.91	9
Inadequate sanitation	3.62	0.82	10
Inadequate provision of site and services	3.60	0.93	11
Eviction and poor resettlement programme by the government	3.55	0.81	12
Overall Level of Cause of Urban Blight	**3.69**		

Source: Author's Field Survey, 2020.

5.3 Analysis on Relationship between Urban Blight and Housing Quality

Presence of urban blight was carried out using the optimal scaling method as the dependent variable and structure, finishing, aesthetics, accessibility, open space, materials used, toilet, kitchen and bathroom as predictors (independent variables). The result shows that much of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the regression model with Multiple R = 0.620, Adjusted R Square = 0.400 and the R Square value of 0.445. This implies that the regression model used explains about 44.5% of the variance in housing quality. The result (F=6.010, P=0.000) also implies that the result is statistically significant at P<0.0005. Table 5 shows the level of contributions of each predictor in explaining the dependent variable. It can be seen from this result in table 3 that of the 9 independent variables included in this regression model, 7 were significant predictors of housing quality. The variables in order of importance are materials used (Beta = 0.351, F=90.586; P value=0.000); this suggests that the use of standard materials is the strongest predictor of housing quality and thus a key contributor to explaining urban blight in this survey. Next to it is structure (Beta=0.138, F=10.890, P=0.000). Others are accessibility (Beta=-0.086, F=6.017, P=0.002), Bathroom (Beta=0.09, F=6.140, P=0.000), and Finishing (Beta=0.068, F=3.933, P=0.002) as well as Open space (Beta=0.088, F=4.074, P=0.018). Attributes such as Kitchen (Beta =0.034, F=0.912, P=0.34 do not make significant contribution to the housing quality.

	Standardised Co-efficients		Df	F	Sig.
	Beta	Std. Error	Beta	Std. Error	Beta
Structure	-0.138	.042	3	10.890	.002*
Finishing	-0.068	.034	5	3.933	.000*
Aesthetics	0.051	.036	11	1.957	.000*
Accessibility	-0.086	0.35	6	6.017	.000*
Open space	0.088	.044	2	4.074	.000*
Material used	-0.351	.037	2	90.586	.018**
Toilet	-0.048	.036	1	1.850	.000*
Kitchen	0.034	0.36	1	.912	.340
Bathroom	0.090	0.36	4	6.140	.000*

Table 5: Regression Coefficients of Predictors of Overall housing quality

*Statically significant at P<0.005, ** Significant at P<0.005
Source: Author's Field Survey, 2020

Conclusion/Recommendation.

This study assessed the relationship between urban blight and housing quality in Minna, Niger State. The major causes of urban blight in the study area are high incidences of rural or urban–urban migration, lack of housing maintenance/inadequate infrastructural facilities and poor enforcement of planning law. Finally the regression analysis result shows that there is significant relationship between urban blight and housing quality. It can be seen from this result that of the 9 independent variables included in this regression model, 7 were significant predictors of housing quality. The research recommends housing maintenance and provision/improvement of infrastructural facilities, proper enforcement of planning laws and development control so as to guide development and also improve the quality of housing.

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LIVELIHOOD IMPACTS OF WOOD FUEL TRADE AND CONSUMPTION IN NIGERIA: A REVIEW

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Abstract
Energy poverty is a universal problem, where a substantial proportion of the world population rely on unclean and unsustainable source of energy for attaining their households' energy need and satisfying energy demands. This trend has post difficulty in achieving Goal 1 and 7 of the United Nation Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, the consumption of this woodfuel has boosted the trade of fuelwood and charcoal which have direct impact on the livelihood of the traders. This study aimed at examining the trade and consumption of fuelwood and charcoal, with a view of investigating the livelihood impact of the traders. The objectives are to determine the socio-economic characteristics of the woodfuel sellers and consumers, the nature of charcoal and fuelwood consumption and to ascertain the livelihood characteristics of woodfuel sales. The thematic review approach was adopted for this paper. It was discovered that the low availability of clean energy sources, coupled with the low income status of majority of the urban households has engendered the high rate of consumption of unsustainable domestic energy sources, including wood fuels. This has led to the increasing rate of demand for wood fuels (that is, fuelwood and charcoal). This demand has created a market niche in the informal sector for the trade of wood fuel products. As a result, a substantial number of urban households are engaged in wood fuel trade as their source of livelihood. Particularly, this study has revealed that women and new immigrants are the major traders and consumers of wood fuels. It is, therefore, suggested that efforts should be made by the government at all levels, non-governmental organisations, and philanthropists to provide clean and sustainable domestic energy sources at subsidised rates. More so, there is a need for in-depth scientific research on alternative ways of using wood fuels without constituting negative environmental and health impacts. The study also recommended that the woodfuel traders (who are mainly women) should be empower in order to boost their financial capital. Finally, formal sector employment opportunities should be created in order to minimise the influx of the citizens into the informal sector.

Keywords: Consumption, Energy poverty, Livelihood, Woodfuel, Trade

I. Introduction

Biomass energy especially fuelwood is the most common and prominent traditional domestic energy in Nigeria. The majority of wood and charcoal users are the poor and mid-income poplations, in which the use of power or cooking gas is no longer affordable owing to the expensive nature of cooking appliances and fuel (Mugo and Ong, 2006). This results to bulky production of fuel woods and charcoal in commercial quantity which directly or indirectly serves as means of earning living. The excessive demand for fuelwood and charcoal with the rapid increase in population has subdued reasonable number of people to engage in the production, supply and distribution which is the trade.

Wood fuels such as fuelwood or firewood and charcoal are considered as man's initial energy source. Fuelwood and charcoal are regarded as the greatest energy consumed by low income households globally (Hosier, 1993). Energy is a basic need for the daily living and survival of man. In recognition of this, Goal 1 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals aims to "end poverty in all its forms and ramifications everywhere"; while Goal 7 aims to ensure "universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services" (World Bank, 2016; Tabary and Purdie, 2016; Bakare, Olaniyi and Oloruntola, 2019) for the whole world, regardless of gender, religious affiliation, class, race or age. This means that the achievement of Goals 1 and 7 of the SDGs are interdependent.

However, energy poverty has been one of the pronounce problems faced by a reasonable population of the global. For instance, almost 40% of the world population which is nearly 8 billion are suffering from energy poverty, and this consequently, compelled them to dependent on woodfuel as their domestic energy source (Tabary and Purdie, 2016). In other words, the accessibly to clean energy sources is difficult or majority may not afford such clean energy sources especially in developing countries where poverty is pronounce. However, the aftermath for this woodfuel demand as made fuelwood and charcoal business or trading in Nigeria have great impacts on people's livelihood where some people depend fully on the business for their survival that is, as the only source of their income while, as alternative source of income to others (Amous, 2000). He opined that anybody can engage on fuelwood and charcoal marketing, either as retailer selling from his or her shop or as wholesaler selling in large bags or as supplier selling in truckload of charcoal or fuelwood to other wholesalers (Amous, 2000).

Fuelwood refers to the various form of wood that are used as fuel for cooking, heating or to as bricks, remains the primary source of fuel for much of the world population. The use of wood as a fuel source is older than the recorded history, and is believed to be one of the primary innovations that allowed development of civilisation. Fuelwood could include firewood, charcoal, pelleted saw dust and chips (FAO, 2009; 2010). Fuelwood remains the major source of domestic fuel as well as the main source of energy for micro economic enterprise. It is the pivot of which domestic and economic lives of the people revolved (Gwandu, 1991).

The desire for fuelwood energy and its consumption is a universal phenomenon. Therefore, it will be difficulty to discuss fuelwood with the exception of charcoal as they are all wood fuels or biomass. Woodfuels such as fuelwood or firewood and charcoal are considered as man's initial energy source. Fuelwood and charcoal are regarded the greatest universally supply of energy used (Hosier, 1993).

Charcoal could mean hard remains resulting from distillation, pyrolysis, carbonization and tore faction of wood, such as branches, trunk and woody by products using continues or system of consignment such as bricks, metal kilns and pits (Obayelu et al, 2017). The used of charcoal can be approximately traced back to the 30,000 years ago normally in the cave era (Van Beukering et al, 2007). And more than two billion (2 billion) individuals universally depend on fuelwood as foremost energy source, particularly rural dwellers in an industrialised nations (FAO, 2010).Half of the global population adopted cooking with biomass fuels and (24 million tons) twenty-four million tons was consumed globally in 1992, with developing countries accounting for almost all the consumption and fifty percent (50%) of its consumption is in Africa (Martins, 2005).

The production of fuelwood and charcoal in 2009 world wised was at fourty-seven million (47 million metric tons) metric tons which is nine percent (9%) increase since 2004 (FAO, 2009), this implies that about 4,230,000 million tons increased within five (5years) years and also shows rapid consumption of charcoal globally, sixty-three percent (63%) of the universal production comes from Africa (FAO, 2010). Fuelwood and charcoal remains the main the source of domestic energy in almost all the developing countries. They still remain the dominant cooking and heating energy in households in sub-Sahara Africa (Jinadu, 1998 cited in Morenikeji et al, 2006, Anold et al, 2006, Zulu and Richardson, 2013). According to Bailis et al, (2007) approximately ninety-four per cent (94%) rural inhabitants and Seventy-three per cent (73%) of urban dwellers in Africa make use of fuelwood and charcoal of which the urban dwellers mostly depend on charcoal while rural inhabitants mostly capitalised on firewood.

This study aimed at examining the trade and consumption of fuelwood and charcoal, with a view of investigating the livelihood impact of the traders. The objectives is to the determine the socio-economic characteristics of the woodfuel sellers and consumers, the nature of charcoal and fuelwood consumption and to ascertain the livelihood characteristics of woodfuel sales

Energy Access and Energy Poverty

The concept of energy access in previous century was seen synonymous to accessibility to electricity by households. This brought about numerous definitions which includeconnection of electricity to households, settings of electric poles in villages and electric bulb in houses (Martins, 2005). Although, the quantity and quality of electricity provided is not taken into consideration. There has been numerous argument or debates on what energy access constitutes by scholars, international organisation and research group across the globe (ESMAP, 2014).

Energy access has been conceptualised into three (3) dimensions and they are also known as incremental steps energy access and they includes:

- *Basic human needs* – (electricity for lightening, health, education and communication approximately 50-100 gu of modern cooking fuel of improve biomass cooking stove).
- *Production uses* – that is, agricultural fuels such as (pumping water for irrigation farming, mechanise tilling). Electricity for commercial agricultural processing, cottage industries and other light industries. Electricity and modern fuel for transportation for instance, electric train (IEA, 2011).
- *Modern society needs* – modern energy ice for domestic appliances, increase requirement for cooling and heating (space and water) private transportation, electric usage is approximately 2000kwh per person per year (IEA, 2011).

According to Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change ([AGECC], 2010), the concept of energy access is seen as "a basic minimum threshold of modern energy service for both consumption and productive uses, that is reliable, affordable, sustainable and where feasible from greenhouse gasses emoting of energy sources". Energy access is the ability to avail energy that is adequate, available when needed, reliable, good quality, affordable, legal, convenient healthy, and safety from all required energy services across households, productivity and community uses (ESMAP, 2014).

Accordingly, practical action (PA,) sees energy access "as a term which the use of modern energy services by International Institute for Applied System Analysis (IISA, 2017) defines energy access to include access to three forms of energy, the essential benefits for economic and social development. Such as less polluting household energy for cooking and heating, electricity for powering appliance and light in households and public, and mechanical power from either electricity or other energy sources that improve the productivity of labour.

Despite the fact that there is no internationally acceptable definition of modern energy access yet, significant commonality exists among the various definitions and they include:

- Household access to minimum level of electricity;
- Household access to safer and more sustainable(that is, minimum harmful effect on health and environment as possible) cooking and heating fuel and stoves;
- Access to modern energy that enable productive economic activities for instance mechanical power for agricultural, textiles and other industries;
- Access to modern energy that enable public services for instance, electricity for health facilities, schools, and street lightening (IISA, 2017).

Concept of Energy Ladder

The energy ladder model assumes that households mimic the behaviour of a utility minimising the neoclassical consumer. This implies that households will move to modern and more sophisticated energy carrier with the increase in their income (Hosier and Dowd, 1987). The central model in the energy transition process is the energy switching considering as one fuel replacement by another, signifying an upward movement to a new fuel simultaneously from the old fuel (Helberg, 2005 cited in Bianca et al, 2011). The household preferences based on physical characteristics, including cleanliness, ease of use, cooking speed and efficiency determine the fuel inenergy ladder (Hiemstra and Hororka, 2008; Biaca et al, 2011).

The process of climbing energy ladder is described by a linear movement with three 3 distinct phases (Bianca et al*,* 2011). As soon as households socio-economics status increases they tend to leave the insufficient technologies, unclean and relatively cheap and shifts from globally dwelled on biomass fuel (agricultural waste, animal dung and fuelwood) to transition fuel (kerosene, coal and charcoal) and they are considered as the first and second stage of energy ladder (Bianca et al*,* 2011).

Finally, the third phase of the energy ladder is advanced fuel which include (liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and electricity). These are energy at the top of the energy ladder and they tend to be more efficient and cost, they do not required intensive labour and they are associated with the less discharge of pollution per units of fuel (Masera, 2000; Baca et al*,* 2011). Expensive technologies are perceived to be locally and internationally sign of high status as assumes by energy ladder. To achieve more efficient fuel or minimal exposure to pollution may not sometime be the reason of families to move up the energy ladder, rather to showcase or display an increase in socio-economic status (Masera, 2000 and Biaca et al, 2011). The energy ladder model portrayed the wood as the inferior economic goods, that is, goods for the poor. This implies the strong correlation between income and fuel choice. The energy ladder is illustrated in figure 2.1



Figure 2.1: energy ladder.
Source: Masera and Daniel, 2000.

The cross country comparison revealed a positive correlation between economic growth and modern energy uptakes, suggesting that as country progresses through industrialisation process, it reliance on the petroleum and electricity increases and importance of biomass decreases (Hosier and Dowd, 1987).

Critiques of Energy Ladder - Fuel Stacking Thesis

On a micro-level, empirical studies have confirmed the relation between income and fuel choice too (see, Hosier and Dowd, 1987; Davis, 1998; Gupta and Kohlin, 2006; Farsi et al, 2007). The linkages between fuel choice and income level are rarely as strong as assumed by the energy ladder (Arnold et al, 2006; Cooke et al, 2008; Bianca et al, 2011) and studies in developing countries have shown that fuel wood can be an important energy source for both urban and rural households at all levels of income (Hosier and Kipondya, 1993; Bhagavan and Giriapa, 1994; Brouwer and Falcon, 2004; Hiemstra-van der Horst and Hovorka, 2008; Mirza and Kemp, 2008 cited in Biaca et al, 2011). Opposes the view that the higher the income of a household the higher the preference of household's choice of fuel as assumed by the energy ladder by saying, there are also numerous examples of low income households using advanced modern fuels such as electricity and LPG (Davis, 1998; Masera, 2000; Brouwer and Falco, 2004; Bianca et al*,* 2011). The use of energy patterns of the poor and rich are certainly not same. The per capita modern fuel consumption among high income households is far greater than that of low income households. However, the above described observations indicate that the characterisation of wood energy as the "fuel of the poor" is an oversimplification (Hiemstra-van der Horst and Hovorka, 2008). It also suggests that a broader spectrum of influential factors besides income should be considered.

Similarly, energy ladder does not show sufficient macro-economic effects on energy use by households, it only focuses on the household-level of socio-economic as vividly displayed in figure 2.1. The assumption that, as household's income increases the household discard the consumption of traditional biomass fuel for the use of the modern fuel which they can afford. Several studies have shown that households often do not fully ascend the "energy ladder" rather "energy stacking" which mean that with increase in household income, traditional fuel are not completely discarded but rather used in conjunction with other transitional and advanced fuel or modern fuel (Eleri et al*,* 2012). Likewise, in researches conducted by a growing body of empirical studies on household energy use show that the energy transition does not occur as a series of simple, discrete steps; instead, multiple fuel use is more common (Leach, 1992; Davis, 1998; Karakezi & Majoro, 2002; Campbel et al, 2003; Brouwer & Falco, 2004; Heltberg, 2004; Martins, 2005; Arnold et al, 2006). With increasing income, households adopt new fuels and technologies that serve as partial, rather than perfect substitutes for more traditional ones (Elias & Victor, 2005). This empirical observation has lead to the development of alternative models to describe the energy transition process which is ("energy stacking"). There is growing is also growing evidence in literature that compelled households used of transitional or modern fuel other than the household increase in income, like distance of households from biomass sources, the increase fuelwood availability or shortage as a result of degradation may also serve as an importance factor for influencing households traditional fuel choice (HydsKohlan, 2003; Pachauri, 2004; Narain et al, 2008; Veld et al*,* 2003 all cited in Eleri et al*,* 2012).

Nevertheless, in many developing countries there are households with a large proportion of middle income earner could in principle afford modern and convenient form of energy continues to rely fully or partly on biomass fuel (Herltberg, 2003). A number of factors such as age, family size, level of education of the household head, types fo food cooked, taste of the cooked food with fuelwood, whether or not the household own a dwelling units are important factor determining household cooking fuel (Osiolo, 2009; Pundo & Fraser, 2006 cited in Eleri et al, 2012). Masera (2000) go a step further and suggest that there is no such thing as fuel switching and propose a multiple fuel model. Instead of switching fuels, households choose to consume a portfolio of energy options at different points along the energy ladder. The fuel portfolio of households can represent a combination of fuels from both lower and upper levels of the ladder. The process of households using multiple fuels at the same time is termed "fuel stacking". MasMasera (2000) found in their study that it is unusual for households to make a complete fuel switch from one technology to another; rather they begin to use an additional technology without abandoning the old one. For example, households in Jaracuaro in Mexico add cooking fuels such as LPG and stove types, but rarely abandon fuel wood completely.

The multiple fuel model is gaining increasing support in the literature (e.g. Heltberg, 2004 & 2005; Hiemstra-van der Horst & Hovorka, 2008; Mekonnen & Kohlin, 2008; Mirza& Kemp, 2009). Several complementary explanations have been given to explain fuel stacking behaviour by households in both urban and rural areas. First, Davis (1998) argues that fuel stacking is inherent to the poo's livelihood strategies. Irregular and variable income flows of households (derived from agricultural work or informal selling of goods) prohibit the regular consumption of modern energy. Therefore, specific budget strategies are applied in order to maximise fuel security. Second, fuel stacking behaviour is observed due to fuel supply problems (Soussan et al., 1990; Hosier & Kipyonda, 1993; cited in Masera, 2000). The supply of modern fuels is erratic and the reliability of supply channels low. Therefore, households must have one or two fuels which can be used as backups in the event that their primary fuels are temporarily unavailable (Hosier & Kipyonda, 1993). Third, fluctuations of commercial energy prices might make the preferred fuel temporarily unaffordable (Hosier & Kipyonda, 1993). Finally, culture and traditions also play a role in constraining a complete transition to modern fuels. Traditional methods of cooking are often rooted in local cultures preventing the use of modern fuels (Masera, 2000; Bianca et al*,* 2011). Thus, multiple fuel use patterns in households are the result of complex interactions between economic, social and cultural factors as shown in figure 3 (Masera,2000).



Figure 2.2: Energy ladder/stacking.
Source: Bianca et al, 2011.

Bianca's et al (2011) finding provided that the inverted U shape or the overlapping fuels boxes found in figure 2.2 for the number of fuels used for cooking in urban areas implies that during the development process the uptake of modern fuels shows a fuel stacking pattern but at the top end several traditional fuels are displaced indicating fuel switching. This may be an indication that fuel stacking is a transient phenomenon rather than a linear and continuous process. Studies in rural areas have not found such results and report only partial switching behaviour along income segments (Mekonnen & Kohlin, 2008; Mirza & Kemp, 2009). Fuel wood remains a very important energy source irrespective of household income.

Fuelwood and Charcoal Business in Nigeria

Fuelwood and charcoal business or trading in Nigeria have great impacts on people's livelihood where some people depend fully on the business for their survival that is, as the only source of their income while, as alternative source of income to others. Brew-Hammond, (2006) opined that anybody can engage on fuelwood and charcoal marketing, either as retailer selling from his or her shop or as wholesaler selling in large bags or as supplier selling in truckload of charcoal or fuelwood to other wholesalers. According to Oladosu and Adegbelugbe (2005) said a wholesaler or retailer may make profit from a bag of charcoal from the range of four hundred naira (N400) to over six hundred naira (N600) which a bag was sold at one thousand six-hundred naira (N1,600), this amount is as of then, this might definitely be more than that now. Presently the price of a bag of charcoal is two thousand naira (N2000).

The western part of the country are usually the main source of charcoal as they produce it in large quantity, and the discounts one could get from the supplier depend on the quantity ordered and the proximity to the western part of the country (Dayo et al*,* 2004).Charcoal and fuelwood has been an old source of energy and is as well still considered the modern source of energy for domestic activities cooking, heating and lightening or warming in both rural and urban areas(Jamala et al*,* 2013). Studies in Nigerian cities in Benin City, Kano, Yola and Lagos shows the main uses of charcoal to be cooking, roasting (suya, barbecue, maize, plantain, cocoyam and yam), blacksmithing and bronze casting (Dayo et al*,* 2004).

More so, in this 21st century charcoal has become an export commodity in Nigeria with huge market in Europe, USA, and Asia. The exporting price range from one hundred and seventy US Dollars ($170/ton) to Three hundred US Dollars ($300/ton) per ton and the market is all year round with slightly drop between July and September (Jamala et al*,* 2013).The amount gain from the sales of fuelwood and charcoal either within the country or outside the country (export) practically demonstrated the possibility or the reason why fuelwood and charcoal trade might serve as alternative source or the only means of earning living.

Livelihood encompasses the capabilities of possession (involving materials and social resources) as well as resources needed for earning living (Chambers & Conway, 1991). The means of safeguarding the basic necessities of life such as food, water, clothing and shelter is known as person livelihood. Therefore, livelihood can be seen as a set of activities and the capacity to acquire the necessities 0f life including water, food, security or safety, fodder, medicine shelter and clothing pursuing either at individual level or as group by using endowment for accessing the prerequisite of the self, and his or her household on a sustainable base with dignity (Chambers & Conway, 1991).

Fuelwood and charcoal has been considered as one the important domestic energy for many years and have wide spread market acceptance over the globe. They constitute the primary urban fuel in most Africa and developing countries and are major source of income. The obvious problem here is; rapid increase in population has breed high demand in fuelwood and charcoal for consumption purpose. However this high demand for fuelwood and charcoal brought about the excessive production, supply and distribution of the fuelwood and charcoal of which is considered as the trade. In order to meet this demand many people have engage in the business of fuelwood and charcoal especially women as we all know that they gain or made profit from it. But the question here is, do they dwell on the business as their main income or major means of earning living (livelihood)?

Several studies in the country and even outside the country have shown that fuelwood and charcoal consumption and business have both positive and negative impacts. For instance, United Nations University, (1996) opined that fuelwood and charcoal initiated markets and provide job opportunities for both men and women and the high demand of this fuels post danger on the environment through exploitation of forest to meet the demand. Jinadu, (1998) observed that the total outcome of the increasing wood business and the increasing rate of exploitation is the overall degradation of the entire forest of the country's wealth and heritage and a process that reduces soil nutrient, what the crop yield and the overall standard of life. FEPA, (1992) on National status more than 350,000km^2 of forest is what Nigeria loses annually which aid desert encroachment. According to the findings of Morenikeji et al (2006) confirms the assertion by several researches on fuelwood energy demand in Africa, who said that wood is the primary source of domestic energy. This is because the level of fuelwood consumption of urban household in Minna is up to seventy-four (74.7%), therefore, the consumption pattern in Minna indicated almost complete dependence on wood energy by households that are large ranging from eleven-fifteen (11-15) member of household despite the fact that there was no systematic increase in consumption in household sizes. The research also find out that most of the female retailer made weekly profit of about (₦794) and (₦4764) depending on their capital and this clearly shown on the research that they may recoved their capital in two weeks. Therefore, the study asserted that fuelwood trade is a profitable business in Minna. However the study also spell out the adverse and negative effect of the fuelwood trade both in Minna and places were the fuelwoods are source.

Woodfuels such as fuelwood and charcoal are product of woods from trees and have both positive and negative effects. Haphazard exploitation of land resources which has affected several Northern states, have begun in Niger State. This was notice through the use remote sensing data superimposed 1987 and 1997 composite map to examine landuse and landcover change trend, where he discovered that within the period of this ten years(10years)rapid decrease between fifty-to-hundred percent (50-100%) in the forest found in both west-central and south-western part of the state (Ogunrinde, 1999 cited in Morenikeji et al, 2006).

More so, recent researches has also emphasises on pointing out the benefit of fuelwood and or charcoal trade as well as their negative environmental effects, such as Jamala et al (2013) who reported that charcoal in this 21st century is an export commodity in Nigeria with a wide market in EU, USA and Asia where the price of a ton of charcoal ranges from one hundred and seventy US Dollars to three hundred US Dollars ($170 -$300) which is more than the minimum wage of the country and therefore concluded that charcoal trade is a lucrative business despite of it adverse effects on the environment and this related to the findings of (Gebreegziabher et al, 2010).

Gebreegziabher et al (2010) observed that fuelwood are the more preferable energy by households and as such makes the business popular of which the business men made profit. Zidago and Wu (2015) also observed that household are aware of the adverse effect of health and environmental risk associated with charcoal and fuelwood consumption; yet they preferred using it because of it affordability. Akpalu et al (2011) have related findings where he said biomass energy for cooking in developing countries has added in the rapid deforestation that resulted in substantial indoor pollution which has adverse effect on the number of individuals. However, the economic benefit attached to the fuelwood and charcoal production and business has make them to embraced cooking with biomass (fuelwood and charcoal). These were also the findings of (Baiyegunshi et al, 2014). Therefore, from the above we have seen vividly that numerous researches have explicitly identified the benefits and environmental impacts of fuelwood and charcoal energy. However, the livelihood impacts of fuelwood and charcoal trading and consumption have not be isolated and assessed. This study therefore intends to examine and assess the livelihood impacts of fuelwood and charcoal trade and consumption.

Conclusion and Policy Suggestions

Energy poverty is a serious menace encountered by the poor and middle income households in sub-Saharan African countries, including Nigeria. The problem is so severe to the extent that the concept of energy ladder is not totally applicable in developing countries. This is evidenced by the practice of fuel staking among the urban households. Access to, and affordability of, clean energy sources is limited, thereby entrenching urban residents in the cycle of energy poverty.

The low availability of clean energy sources, coupled with the low income status of majority of the urban households has engendered the high rate of consumption of unsustainable domestic energy sources, including wood fuels. This has led to the increasing rate of demand for wood fuels (that is, fuelwood and charcoal). This demand has created a market niche in the informal sector for the trade of wood fuel products. As a result, a substantial number of urban households are engaged in wood fuel trade as their source of livelihood. Particularly, this study has revealed that women and new immigrants are the major traders and consumers of wood fuels.

It is therefore suggested that efforts should be made by the government at all levels, non-governmental organisations, and philanthropists to provide clean and sustainable domestic energy sources at subsidised rates. More so, there is a need for in-depth scientific research on alternative ways of using wood fuels without constituting negative environmental and health impacts. Finally, formal sector employment opportunities should be created in order to minimise the influx of the citizens into the informal sector.

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THEME EIGHT
LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY

BUDGETARY ALLOCATION TO AGRICULTURAL SECTOR: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOOD SECURITY IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Food security is one of the challenges facing the world today particularly the developing countries. This study is aimed at investigating the nexus between government budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector and food security challenges in Nigeria, using annual time series data for the period 1986-2019. The study employed Auto-regressive *Distributed Lag (ARDL) model to assess the impact of government budgetary allocation on food security in Nigeria.* The study used food production index as proxy for food security being the dependent variable while the independent variables in the model include; budgetary allocation to agriculture, commercial bank credit to agriculture, population growth rate and inflation rate. Stationarity test was carried out using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test. The result of the stationarity test indicates that the variables have mixed order of integration, thereby lending support to the use of ARDL model. The *results* indicates too that government budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector and , commercial bank loans to agriculture *exerted positive and significant effect on food security in Nigeria.* Based on the findings, it is recommended that government should increase her budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector and commercial banks should grant more loans to the peasant farmers to boost agricultural production in order to achieve food security in Nigeria.

Keywords: Budgetary Allocation, Agricultural Sector, Food Security, Food insecurity, ARDL

1. Introduction

Food security is one of the challenges facing many countries in the world today, particularly the developing countries. According to the statistics from Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO, 2019) about 750 million people in the world are exposed to severe levels of food insecurity and about 2 billion people could not have regular access to safe, nutritious and sufficient food. For centuries, agriculture has been the driving force of economic growth in most African countries, but over the years, agriculture has lost its glory, thus leading to food security challenges. According to Aiyedun (2014), agriculture was the dominant sector of the economy of most African countries. It accounted for 65 percent of African employment and 75 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and provides the means of livelihood for over 70 percent of the population in developing countries and served as a major source of raw materials for the agro-allied industries.

In Nigeria, prior to the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantities in 1956 at Oloibiri in Niger Delta (now Bayelsa State) agriculture was the mainstay of the economy contributing about 62.1 percent of the country's GDP, employing over 70 percent of the country's labour force and providing food for the teeming population. In addition, it served as the major source of foreign exchange earnings and revenue to the government.

Hitherto, Nigeria was self-sufficient in food production and was described as an agrarian economy. However, the oil boom of the 1970s changed the economic profile of the Nigerian economy and agricultural sector was marginalised and relegated to the background in favour of the oil sector which culminated in food crisis. Consequently, Nigeria was transformed from food production to food import dependent economy and in order to bridge the food gap, the country went into food importation. Nigeria which occupied the leading position in the exports of major agricultural products has now become a net importer of several agricultural products like rice, sugar, wheat flour, fish, milk, tomato paste among others. Food import bill which stood at N11.47 billion in 1990 rose to N113.62 billion in the year 2000. In 2018, food import bill rose from N851.6 billion to N959.5 billion in 2019. Between 2016-2019, food import bill rose to N3.35 trillion (CBN, Statistical Bulletin, 2019). Despite the fact that Nigeria is blessed with abundant fertile land with a very large landmass of about 92.4 million hectares, more than 65 million Nigerian population are food insecure (Osagie, 2013).

As part of the global effort to achieve food security, African heads of states at the African Union summit held in July 2003 in Maputo, Mozambique, endorsed a declaration aimed at improving food security in Africa. Part of its declaration was that, at least 10 percent of the national budget be committed to agriculture. Despite this declaration, budgetary allocation to agricultural sector in Nigeria is less than 4 percent on the average compared to other African countries like Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya and Mozambique that spend over 10 percent of their total budget on Agriculture (Newettie, 2017; Okon & Christopher, 2018). Nigeria has also failed to meet up the 25 percent benchmark recommended by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) to be allocated to the agricultural sector.

In Nigeria, budgetary allocation to agriculture as a percentage of total budget stood at 4.5 percent in 1990, 3.7 percent in 2014, 3.2 percent in 2015, 1.25 percent in 2016, 1.82 percent in 2017, 2.23 percent in 2019 respectively (CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2019). These figures are far below the benchmark recommended by FAO. It is interesting to note that Nigeria is richly endowed with vast agricultural resources and abundant human resource potentials which if properly harnessed will transform the economy into the world food basket. Unfortunately, Nigeria has lost this glory because of inadequate budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector. Matemilola and Elegbede (2017) attributed the causes of food insecurity to factors such as; inadequate budgetary allocation to agriculture, corruption, lack of access to credit facilities, climate change, natural disasters, low technology for processing and storage, weak implementation of policies, poor market for agricultural products and population growth rate.

In order to revitalise the agricultural sector and overcome the challenges of food security, successive Nigerian governments have introduced a number of policies and programmes. Some of these programmes include National Accelerated Food Production Programme (NAFPP, 1972), Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs, 1975) Operation Feed the Nation

(OFN,1976), River Basin Development Authorities (RBDAs, 1977), the Green Revolution Programme (GRP, 1979), the Directorate of Food Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI, 1986), National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP, 2001), National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS, 2004), the Seven Point Agenda (2007) Transformation Agenda (2011), the establishment of Bank of Industry (BOI), Bank of Agriculture (BOA), Youth Empowerment Programme (YEP) among others. Despite these initiatives, Nigeria is still faced with the challenges of food security. In view of this, the paper is aimed at investigating the effect of budgetary allocation to agricultural sector onfood security in Nigeria.

This study is structured into five sections. Following the introduction is section two, which deals with literature review. Section three deals on the methodology and specification of the model to be empirically tested while section four deals with results and discussion. Finally, section five deals with conclusion and recommendations based on the findings.

2.0 **Literature Review**

2.1 *Conceptual Issues*

Food security is a condition which exist when all people at all times have physical, social and economic access to food which is safe and consumed in sufficient quantity and quality to meet their dietary needs and food preferences, and is supported by environment of adequate sanitary health services and for a healthy and active life (FAO, 2019). From the above definition, the concept of food security encompasses four basic requirements which include:

- Adequacy of food supplies in terms of quantity and quality;
- Stability of supplies;
- Physical and economic access, i.e., availability of supplies for all who need them; and
- Avoidance of undue risk in terms of hygienic and dietary quality.

World Bank (2011) identified four dimensions of food security which include availability, stability, accessibility and utilisation. The term food security refers to access by all people at all times to the food needed for a healthy life. Food security is said to exist when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life. Access in this circumstance entails quantity and quality as well as safety of food items that are consistent with dietary regulations.

Food insecurity on the other hand, is a situation whereby people are unable to consume enough food to allow for healthy and productive life. It occurs when an individual or group of individuals are unable to have access to adequate food supply both in quantity and quality to ensure a healthy and productive life.

______The term budget on the other hand_,refers to an estimate of projected expenditure and revenue of the government within a financial year. It provides details of projected expenditure and revenue within a stated period of time(Jhingan, 2010). Budgetary allocation to agriculture is the financial allocation made tothe agricultural sector.

2.2 *Theoretical Framework*

Theoretically, the Malthusian theory of population appear to be relevant to this study. According to this theory, the cause of food insecurity was that population tend to outstrip the available food supply. Thomas Malthus, in his famous theory of population, "An Essay on the Principle of Population" published in 1798 argued that the world population was growing at geometric progression while food supply exhibited arithmetic progression. He further concluded that if the population was not checked, they would be pressure on available resources and population would outstrip the available food supply. He, therefore, prescribed both negative and positive checks to reduce the growth rate of population. The preventive check otherwise known as negative checks include late marriage, birth control and abstinence from sex while positive checks include epidemics, war and famine. Malthus opined that if these checks are exercised, population would be reduced to the level that could be sustained by the available food supply (Dewett& Chand, 2005).

Although the theory failed to take into consideration the technological advancement and international trade in improving food situation, it has practical relevance in developing countries and Nigeria in particular in explaining the food security challenges facing the economies. Thus, the manifestation of food insecurity in Nigeria occasioned by escalation of food import bills lend credence to the theory.

2.3 *Empirical Literature*

Charlotte and Mazhar (2018) examined the effect of public agricultural spending on food security in Africa using panel data from 1991-2014. Variables employed include proportion of population suffering from under-nutrition used as a proxy for food security indicator which served as the dependent variable while GDP growth rate, population growth rate, public agricultural spending as a proportion of GDP, **a**nd inflation were used as explanatory variables. Using the baseline model, the results revealed that public spending on agriculture has not significantly led to increase in food production in Africa**.**

Newettie (2017) examined the effect of public expenditure on agricultural sector in Zambia, Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania for the period 2000- 2014. The study employed Vector Error Correction model for the analysis. The result revealed that agricultural growth responds positively to government expenditure across the chosen countries.

Chauke et al (2015) carried out a comparative study on the impact of government spending on agricultural output in South Africa and Zimbabwe from 1985 – 2014. Using Vector Error Correction model, the result revealed that budgetary allocation to agriculture had positive and significant effect on agricultural output both in the short-run and long-run.

Wangusi and Muturi (2015) investigated the relationship between government budgetary allocation on agricultural sector and agricultural output in Kenya for the period 1973-2012. Correlation analysis was used to analyse the data and the result revealed a positive and significant relationship between agricultural output and budgetary allocation on agricultural sector.

In Nigeria, Akanbi et al (2019) examined the nexus between government budgetary allocation on agricultural sector and agricultural output in Nigeria using annual time series data from 1981–2015.Vector Error Correction Model was employed for the analysis and their findings revealed a positive and significant relationship between budgetary allocation on agricultural sector and food production in Nigeria.

Romanus et al (2018) examined the effect of government agricultural expenditure on Nigeria's economic growth using annual time series data from 1990-2016. Variables used for the study include food deficit index used as proxy for food security which served as the dependent variable while the independent variables include Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (AGCSF), Commercial Bank Credits to the agricultural sector (BCRED), lending interest rate (LINTR) and total population (POP). Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Bound test procedure was used for the analysis. The result revealed that commercial banks credits and ACGSF increased food security by 8.12% and 0.002% respectively, while population reduced food security by 0.001%.

Ebiand Ebi (2018) investigated the effect of government budgetary allocation to agricultural sector and agricultural output in Nigeria using annual time series data for the period 2004-2015. Using *Ganger -Causality Test and Error Correction Estimation (ECM) technique, the results revealed a positive and significant relationship between agricultural expenditure and agricultural output in Nigeria.*

Idokoand Jatto (2018) examined the relationship between government expenditure on agriculture and agricultural output in Nigeria using annual time series data for the period 1985-2015. Variables used for analysis were government expenditure on agriculture_.Agricultural output capital formation, commercial bank credit to agriculture and domestic savings. The analysis was done using multiple regression and Johansen co-integration test. The result revealed that there exists a positive and significant relationship between government expenditure on agriculture and agricultural output in Nigeria.

In another study Abula and Ben (2016) explored the impact of government expenditure on agricultural output in Nigeria using annual time series data from 1981-2014. The variables employed include agricultural output, total agricultural expenditure, total commercial bank credit to the agricultural sector. Applying OLS estimation technique, their results revealed a positive and insignificant relationship between government expenditure to the agricultural sector and agricultural output in Nigeria.

Ewubare and Eyitope (2015) investigated the effect of government expenditure on agricultural sector and agricultural output in Nigeria for the period 1986 to 2010. The study adopted a simplified ordinary least squares technique for the analysis and the result revealed that government expenditure on agriculture had positive and significant effect on agricultural output in Nigeria.

Nnadozie (2014) examined the effect of budgetary allocation to agricultural sector on agricultural output in Nigeria using annual time series data from 1970-2008. Employing OLS estimation technique for the analysis, the result revealed that low budgetary allocation had adverse effect on agricultural productivity in Nigeria.

Okezie et al (2013) analysed the relationship between the Nigerian government expenditure on agricultural sector and its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Nigeria for the period 1980-2011. The study utilised Error Correction Model and Granger Causality Test for the analysis. The result revealed that government expenditure on agriculture had positive and significant effect on agricultural output growth in Nigeria. Similarly, the result of Granger Causality revealed that government expenditure granger caused agricultural output.

Oyinbo et al (2013) investigated the link between agricultural budgetary allocation and agricultural output in Nigeria using annual time series data for the period 1980-2010. The variables employed include budgetary allocation to agriculture, agricultural output, inflation rate, exchange rate and interest rate. The method of analysis was based on ordinary least squares

(OLS). Results revealed a positive and significant relationship between agricultural budgetary allocation and food production in Nigeria.

Ishola et al (2013) explored the relationship between government expenditure on agricultural sector and economic growth in Nigeria using annual time series data for the period 1981-201. The variables for the study include real gross domestic product, agricultural sector output, and government expenditure. The method of analysis was based on ordinary least squares (OLS). The result of the analysis revealed a positive and *significant relationship between government expenditure in the agricultural sector and economic growth in Nigeria.*

Adofu et al (2012) investigated the effect of government budgetary allocation to agricultural sector on agricultural output in Nigeria using annual time series data for the period 1995-2010. The variables utilised include agricultural output as the dependent variable while government budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector and commercial bank credit to the agricultural sector as explanatory variables. The method of ordinary least squares technique was employed for the analysis. Results revealed that budgetary allocation to agricultural sector has positive and significant effect on agricultural production in Nigeria.

From the literature reviewed, we discovered that studies that examined the nexus between budgetary allocation to agricultural sector and food security challenges in Nigeria are few. Though a number of studies like Adofu, Abula and Agama (2012) Oyinbo, Zakari and Rekwot (2013), Ewubare and Eyitope (2015), Abula and Ben (2016)Ebi and Ebi (2018), among others , investigated the effect of public spending on agriculture and agricultural output but the issue of food security challenges was not addressed in their studies. Therefore, this study seeks to examine the effect of budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector on food security in Nigeria using Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL).

3.0 Methodology

This study employed Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model developed by Pesaran et al (2001) *to assess the relationship between budgetary allocation to agricultural sector and food security in Nigeria.*

The study used annual time series data on variables such as food security proxy by food production index used as the dependent variable while the independent variables include budgetary allocation to agricultural sector, commercial bank credit to agricultural sector, population growth rate and inflation rate .The data were sourced from Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin (2019) and National Bureau of Statistics (2019).

3.1 Model Specification

The model for the study was adopted from the work of Adofu et al (2012) but with some modifications in areas of methodology used and variables employed. These scholars used OLS estimation technique and used only three variables (Credit to the agricultural sector, budgetary allocation to agricultural sector and agricultural output) in their study. This present study used autoregressive distributed lag model and incorporated some relevant variables like food production index used as a proxy for food security, budgetary allocation to agricultural sector

(BUG), commercial bank credit to agriculture (CBA), population growth rate (POP) and inflation rate (INFL) .

The general form of ARDL model is specified in Equation [1]

$y_t = \beta_0 + \sum \beta_I y_{t-1} + \quad x_{t-1} +$ .... [1]

where: y_t is the dependent variable, which is a function of its lagged values as well as the lagged values of the independent variables, ⩽ denotes the coefficients of the short run dynamics, μ_t is white noise.

The modified version of the model for this study is expressed mathematically as in Equation [2]

FPI=f(BUG, CBA,POP,INFL,) ....[2]

The econometric form of the model is specified as in Equation [3]

$lnFPI = \beta_0 + \sum \beta_1 lnBUG_{t-1} + \sum \beta_2 lnCBA_{t-1} + \sum \beta_3 lnPOP_{t-1} + \sum \beta_4 lnINFL_{t-1} + \mu_i$...... [3]

where:FPI represents food production index (a proxy for food security), BUG represents budgetary allocation to agricultural sector, CBA is commercial bank credit to agriculture, POP is population growth rate and INFL denotes inflation rate. β_0 is intercept term, β_1 -β_4 are the parameters to be estimated. All the variables in Equation [3] are estimated in their natural log denoted by *ln in the model* .

A priori expectations:

On a priori ground, β_1 and β_2 are expected to be positive and greater than zero while β_3 and β_4 are expected to be negative.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1 *Test for Stationarity*

The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test was performed to ascertain the order of integration. The results of stationarity test are presented in table 1.

Table 1: Results of Stationarity Test

Variable	At level	At 1 st difference integration	Order of Remark	
LnFPI	-0.037280	-5.263416	1(1)	Station ary
LnBUG	-0.739025	-5.736243	1(1)	Stationary
LnCBA	-0.483052	-4.368572	1(1)	Stationary
LnPOP	-4.347163	NA	1(0)	Stationary
LnINFL	-6.352612	NA	1(0)	Stationary
Critical value 5%	-2.957232	-2.967275		

NA = Not applicable.
Source: Computed by the Author (2020).

The results of the stationarity test indicate that at 5% level, food production index (FPI), budgetary allocation on agriculture (BUG) and commercial bank credit to agriculture (CBA) are integrated of order 1 (that is 1(1)) while population growth rate (POP) and inflation rate are stationary at level 1(0). These results indicate that the variables have mixed order of integration, thereby lending support to the use of ARDL model.

4.2 *Bounds Test for Co-Integration*

To test whether there is a long run equilibrium relationship between the variables, the study employed bound test. The results of the ARDL bound test are presented in table 2.

Table 2. Results of the ARDL Bounds Test for Co-Integration

Critical Bounds	***5% level of Significance***
Upper Bound	3.49
Lower Bound	2.56
F-Statistic	27.37681
F-Value	0.0000001
Decision:	**Co-integration exists**

Note: Upper bound and lower bound are obtained from Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001).
Source: Computed by the Author (2020).

The bounds test results in table 2 indicates that the calculated F-statistic (27.37681) is greater than the upper bound critical value of 3.49at 5% level of significance. This implies that there is evidence of a long-run relationship among the variables in the model.

Table 3: ARDL Long-run Static Regression Results
Dependent variable is lnFPI

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*t-Statistic*	*Prob.*
C	3.165148	0.991468	3.192387	0.0034
LnBUG	20.81180	6.559081	3.172975	0.0044
LnCBA	0.481236	0.238931	2.014126	0.0564
LnPOP	-0.230294	0.070307	-3.275566	0.0144
LnINFL	-0.546943	0.235609	-2.321397	0.0299
R-squared	0.832771	F-statistic		41.27468
Adjusted R-squared	0.812377	Prob(F-statistic)		0.000000
Durbin-Watson stat	2.010232			

Source: **Computed by the Author (2020).**

The long-run results in table 3 indicate that budgetary allocation to agriculture has a positive and significant relationship with food security as shown by the probability value. This result implies that a unit increase in budgetary allocation on agriculture would increase food security by about 20.8 per cent, *ceteris paribus*. This result is in line with studies conducted by Adofu, Abula and Agama (2012) who discovered a positive and significant relationship between budgetary allocation to agriculture and agricultural production in Nigeria.

Similarly, commercial bank credit to agriculture has positive and significant impact on food security. As the result indicates, *ceteris paribus*, if CBA goes up by one percentage point, on the average, food security goes up by about 0.48 per cent. Population growth rate has a negative and significant relationship with food security. This means that a unit increase in population growth rate would reduce foodsecurity by about 0.23 per cent. This is in line with a priori expectations and economic theory postulated by Thomas Malthus.

The R-square and its adjusted counterpart are 83 and 81 per cent respectively. This indicates a high explanatory power. It means that about 83% of the total variation in the dependent variable is determined by changes in the explanatory variables while the remaining 17% left unexplained is captured by the disturbance term (μ). Thus, the regression has a good fit. The F-statistic (41.27) indicates that all the variables are jointly statistically significant at 5 per cent level as shown by the low probability value of 0.0000. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.01 indicates absence of autocorrelation or serial correlation in the model.

The next step is to analyse the short-run dynamic impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable. The results of the short-run dynamics are presented in table 4.

Table 4: Dynamic Short-run Results
Dependent variable is (LnFPI)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*t-Statistic*	*Prob.**
D(FPI(-1))	0.032800	0.008810	3.723007	0.0012
D(BUG(-1))	0.093476	0.018518	5.047875	0.0000
D(CBA(-1))	0.204387	0.082175	2.487209	0.0209
D(POP(-1))	-0.230294	0.070307	-3.275566	0.3354
D(INFL(-1))	0.013705	0.006543	2.094691	0.0479
ECM(-1)	-0.229890	0.084211	-2.694731	0.0123
C	-10.94532	4.408250	-2.482916	0.0211
R-squared	0.961482	F-statistic		68.64537
Adjusted R-squared	0.947476	Prob(F-statistic)		0.000000
Durbin-Watson stat	2.148622	Akaike info criterion		8.389518

Source: **Computed by the Author (2020).**

The results on table 4 indicate that budgetary allocation on agriculture exert positive and significant effect on food security in Nigeria. This result is in line with studies conducted by Oyinbo et al (2013) and Akanbi et al (2019) who discovered a positive and significant relationship between budgetary allocation on agriculture and agricultural output in Nigeria.

The regression results also indicate that commercial bank credit to agriculture exert positive and significant effect on food security. As the result indicates, *ceteris paribus*, if CBA goes up by one percentage point, on the average, food security goes up by about 0.20 per cent. Population growth rate on the other hand, exert negative and significant relationship with food security. As the result indicates, *ceteris paribus*, if population goes up by one percentage point, on the average, food security will be reduced by about 0.23 per cent. This result is in line with economic theory postulated by Thomas Malthus that an increase in populationleads to food insecurity.

The estimated error correction term (ECM) is 0.22 and it is negative and significant at the 5 per cent level. This indicates that about 22% of the disequilibrium from the previous year's shock will be corrected in the current year.

4.3 Diagnostic Test

4.3.1 *Results of Serial Correlation Test*

Test for autocorrelation was done using *Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM* test. The results are presented in table 5.

Table 5: Results of Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test

F-statistic	11.96103	Probability	0.000191
Obs*R-squared	15.97245	Probability	0.000340

Source: Computed by the Author (2020).

From the results, the value of F-statistic is given as (11.96) and observed R^2 (15.97) with probability values (0.000191 and 0.000340 respectively). Theseprobability values are greater than 0.05level. The LM test confirmed the absence of serial correlation in the model as shown by the low probability values.

4.3.2 *Results of Normality Test*

The Jarque-Bera normality test was used to ascertain the distribution of the residuals in the model. The results of the normality test are presented in figure 1.



***Figure 1*:**Results ofJacrque -Bera Normality Test .

The result of the normality test shows a probability value of 0.596658 which is greater than 0.05. This result indicates that the residual is normally distributed.

4.3.3 *Results of Stability Test*

To determine the stability of the model, CUSUM and CUSUM of squares were used. The estimated model is stable if its recursive residuals lie within the two critical bounds and unstable if residuals lie outside the two critical lines. The results of stability test are presented in figure 2a and 2b.



Figure 2a**:** CUSUM of Squares Test.



***Figure 2b*:** CUSUM Test.

From the analysis in figure 2a and 2b, both the graph of CUSUM and CUSUM of squares are stable because the recursive residuals fall within the 5 per cent critical bounds. Thus, the result is satisfactory and robust for policy analysis.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper examinedthe effect of budgetary allocation on agriculture and food security in Nigeria, using annual time series data for the period 1986-2019. The study employed the autoregressive *distributed lag approach (ARDL) for the analysis*. The results of the analysis indicated that, budgetary allocation on agriculture (BUG) and commercial bank credit to agriculture (CBA) exerted positive and significant effect on food security in Nigeria. The policy implication arising from the findings of this paper is that an increase in budgetary allocation on agriculture and commercial bank credits to agriculture are capable of boosting agricultural productivity which will help Nigeria overcome the challenges of food security. Based on the findings, the following recommendations are made:

- Government should her budgetary allocations to the agricultural sector in order to boost agricultural productivity and overcome the challenges of the endemic food crisis in Nigeria.
- Agricultural output should be increased through various incentives to farmers such as granting loans and advances to farmers at low interest rate with or without collateral security. This will guarantee food security and overall economic growth and development in Nigeria.
- Commercial banks credit to the agricultural sector should be strictly monitored to ensure that such loans are judiciously utilised and not diverted to less productive ventures.

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ABUJA-BASED HOTELS AND NEED FOR FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT

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Abstract

Evidence has shown that fire occurrence in hotels indeed disrupt the 'going concern' in the tourism business sector. There are hardly a day without an incidence of fire outbreak, with its attendance destruction and devastating impacts on both human and infrastructural development. Therefore, the need for a mechanism for fire safety management in hotel business, towards limiting the potential and impacts of fire occurrence. The study adopts a pragmatic approach by sourcing data through a mixed method to explore this construct. The scope of the research is between 3 to 5 stars rated hotels in Abuja. The total population in the study area is 221 hotels, while the sample size is 142 in number. Data were sought using structured questionnaire and interviewer guide. Stratified random sampling technique was used for the selection of hotels while simple random technique was employed for the selection of respondents for questionnaire administration. The preliminary data are analysed with both descriptive and inferential statistics. The preliminary data suggest five main variables; structural fire protection, detection and warning, fire equipment, escape route, and training and education are critical to meeting fire safety requirement in hotels. This is followed by the Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA). It is used to establish the mechanism for fire safety management in hotels. The findings indicate that at least 0.83 (83%) improvement is required for Structural fire protection, 0.79 (79%) is required for fire fighting equipment and 0.78 (78%) status for fire detection and warning is required for adequate fire safety provision. It can be deduced that structural fire protection, can be improved in the design and construction of hotel facility and is very important in limiting fire incident among other factors in the proposed mechanism. It is, therefore, recommended that knowledge based decision making is required in the design and selection of fire retarding materials for the construction of hotel facilities, as well as proper adherence to the design codes.

Keywords: Abuja, Fire safety, Hotel facility, Mechanism.

Introduction

The scope of facility management more often goes beyond creating an environment for effective performance of procured facilities, in meeting the core objectives of any organisation in an efficient manner, but doing so in a safe and secured environment (Opaluwah, 2005). Businesses only strived in a safe environment, therefore, a holistic assessment of potential risks that can leads to clear understanding and adequate preparedness for mitigation in the working space is of utmost importance to any organisation management. Most common associated facility risks in the built – environment, which needs to be continually evaluated for minimal impacts are; accidents, components down-time, maintenance related issues and fire propensity (Opaluwah, 2005; Balamurugan and Senthamilkumar, 2014).

The main purpose of making a building fire-resistant is the protection of life, goods and activities within the building. Most building materials in use have affinity for fire, which practically limits the ability to eliminate completely fire occurrence in a building facilities. Occurrence of fire outbreak in the United States of America (USA) is estimated to occur as frequently as every 37 seconds each day, in a nation fully advanced in technology of building construction (Balamurugan and Senthamilkumar, 2014). In developing countries such as Nigeria, possible causes of fire outbreak could be as a result of several factors to include frequent power outages, power surge, electrical sparks, illegal connection of electricity fittings, substandard materials, defective or indoor use of generators, and negligence of household leaving minors at home without supervision, storing up adulterated fuel at home, arson and ignorance (Paul, 2014).

This fire incidents overtime have resulted into a loss of both human and materials assets in large magnitude that has crippled a lot of business endeavours. The news of a mere occurrence alone, with or without, major destruction can send a very strange signal to the stakeholders in an industry. Tourism sector is highly averse to negative comments - people out to spend their hard earn money on vacation in serene and safe atmosphere among alternate destinations; will definitely reacts adversely to issues of fire safety. Consequently, a hotel facility that is procured mainly for the provision of high quality accommodation for tourists cannot be susceptible to fire risk. Fire safety management of hotel buildings is a very interesting and challenging work. In 2005, between 4 and 6 fires occurred daily in hotels kitchens, lounges and rooms, with annual losses of millions of Euros (Pizam, 2010). Bharwani and Matthews (2012) posited that to survive in a competitive business, the hotel management needs to move from being proactive to identify, analyse, and assess the risk, and consider the risk as a part of their business strategies. The hotel owners/managers of hotels have a legal responsibility to take reasonable measures to prevent the occurrence of fire and to protect the lives and safety of guests/patrons and staff in the event of fire occurring in their premises. A fire safety management will be effective only if it is implemented in total, and it monitored on a day to day basis (Ortmeier, et al*,* 2005; Pizam, 2010).

Generally, the fire safety objectives may include life safety, protection of property and structure, continuity of business operation, heritage and environmental protection. However, the fire safety objectives of a building may vary with the activity, occupancy, structure and height of the building. The severity of fire is the main factor that determines the safety of a building and its occupants. It is, therefore, important to understand mainly the mechanism which controls the potential fire risk by studying; the ways in which buildings can be designed to minimise fire damages, possible fire safety issues that could arise in the move toward energy efficiency, environmental protection and sustainable design and construction (Krause, et al, 2012). This study focused on the mechanism for fire safety risk management in hotel facilities in the Abuja, in order to attain an efficient fire safety measures. The subsequent parts will be structured along the following sub-sections; literature review, research methodology, results and discussion, and conclusion.

Literature Review

The Fire Concept

Fire is the rapid oxidation of a material in the exothermic chemical process of combustion, releasing heat, light and various reaction products (Charles, 2000). Fire starts when flammable and/or a combustible material, in combination of sufficient quantity of an oxidiser such as oxygen-rich compound is exposed to a source of heat or ambient temperature above the flash point for the fuel and is able to sustain a rate of rapid oxidation that produces a chain reaction (Olaghade, 2012). Fire requires an ignition source and a combination of oxygen and fuel to sustain the fire (Henderson and Mackay, 2009). This is commonly called the fire triad in which fire cannot exist without the three elements in place and in the right proportions (Figure 1).

Fuel



Figure 1: Fire triad.

Generally, fires are initiated with a single fuel object. The smoke produced from the burning object is transported by a smoke plume and collects the upper portion of the space as a layer. The smoke plum also transports the heat produced by the fire into the smoke layer causing the smoke layer to increase in depth and also temperature (Charles, 2000). This smoke layer radiates energy back to unburned fuels in the space, causing them to increase in temperature. Fire spreads to other objects either by radiation from flames attached to the originally burning items or from the smoke layer. As other objects ignite, the temperature of the smoke layer increase further, radiating more heat to other objects (Charles, 2000). The fuel in this case is anything flammable or combustible store or kept in a building or in an open space including furniture, curtains, clothing, beddings, paper and inflammable liquid. The more combustible these materials are, the more severe the resulting fire hazards (Ohemeng, 2010).

Hotel Facility and its Classification

The hotel is an accommodation provided for visitors away from natural place of resident on commercial interest. The facility is meant to provide home away from home to millions of travellers and tourists. Accommodations were booked for varying purposes, so as the need and expectation of services rendered by the hotel facilities. The qualities of the services provided are normally used as the rating criteria (Stars ratings) for the classification of the hotels. Hotels can also be considered and classified based on their core mandates. According to Kumar and Narayan (2008) and Raju (2009), most hotels can also be classified as follows: *residential hotels,* normally an apartment houses that provide hotel services to guests on a long term basis; *transit hotels*, normally located close to airports and motorways on a shorter period; *resort hotels*, usually close to scenic beauty such as lakes, mountains, seas and beaches normally incorporating recreational amenities such as golf course, and swimming pool among others; *heritage hotels,* usually historical properties of aristocratic nature for special experience to tourists; and *commercial hotels,* mostly focuses on the busy commercial centre incorporating services such as business centre facilities and parking lots.

Common Fire Hazards in Hotels

The hotels industry became fragile and highly susceptible to challenges relating to fire risk. It is a daunting task for the facility/safety manager to navigate between fire code (protection and prevention) and guests' safety amidst potential fire triad in trying to meet the hotels main objectives. Some of the main causes of fire in hotels include kitchen fire from unattended cooking grease fires/chip pan fires, electrical systems that are overloaded, poorly maintained or defective, combustible storage areas with insufficient protection, combustibles near equipment that generates heat, flame, or sparks candles and other open flames, smoking (cigarettes, cigars, pipes, and lighters), equipment that generates heat and utilises combustible materials, flammable liquids and aerosols, Fireplace chimneys not properly or regularly clean, cooking appliances-stoves, ovens, electrical wiring in poor condition, personal ignition sources-matches lighters and exterior cooking equipment-barbecue (NFPA, 2013; Jacobs, 2014).

The Concept of Fire Safety Designs in Hotels

The nature of tourism business to any kind of risks makes hotels business highly fragile when susceptibility to fire hazard. In order to provide safety measures against fire, sufficient protection mechanism has to be incorporated from conception through design to construction stages of any standard facility. The design features in modern hotels are normally comprehensive to mitigate the high risk. These features include; structural fire protection, provision of escape routes, smoke control and ventilating systems, installation of automatic sprinkler system, fire detection system, installation of fire hydrant and hose reel systems, safe storage of dangerous goods and combustible materials among other (Chow and Kot, 1989; Siemens, 2014).

- ***Structural Fire Protection***

A structural member needs to be design for satisfactory performance in case of fire occurrence. The Hong Kong Building Regulations (HkBR, 1974) set out the minimum fire resistance periods (FRP) for the construction of building elements. The value depends on the volume or floor area in any one storey. For compartments, it is recommended to install fire-resisting doors and select non-combustible materials for duct or pipe works. In addition, it must be ensured that the guest floors are well separated from the other areas of relatively higher fire risks.

- ***Provision of Escape Routes***

The building planning regulation specifies the provision of means of escape for emergency (Code of Practice, 1986). An emergency **staircase** in the floor of the uppermost storey if more than **17 m** or **6 storeys** above the ground level, with specifications for basements, garages, car parks, and refuge floors. Hotel staffs are also trained toensure that problems such as the wedge-opening or locking of fire doors, the blockage of themeans of escape among other are done seamlessly (Siemens, 2014).

- ***Smoke Control and Ventilating Systems***

The amount of smoke involved and smoke movement pattern are central to smoke control mechanism. The purpose is on limiting the fire load on one hand, and providing either physical barrier to confine smoke and providing natural or mechanical ventilation for extraction. The escape routes should also be protected by pressurisation systems in controlling smoke movement as specified in the new code of practice on minimum fire service installations and equipment. Heat and smoke may spread from one compartment to another through the ventilating ducts. Therefore, protecting by fire dampers or using fire resisting ducts is essential for quality pollution resistance in standard facility such as hotel (Building Ventilating Systems Regulation (BVSR), 1974; Hobson and Stewart, 1994; Siemens, 2014).

- *Others Automatic Installations and Systems for Fire Safety Design in Hotels*

Other automatic installations and systems that was normally incorporated for improved fire safety design in hotel are; automatic sprinkler systems, fire detection system, fire hydrant and hose reel systems, handling of dangerous goods and combustible materials, and excavation procedures. All these are embedded in fire safety design systems for optimum fire risk reduction (Fire Offices Committee (FOC), 1986; Graham and Roberts, 2000; Siemens, 2014).

These components and equipment were recommended to be incorporated into hotel design as major part of fire safety strategies in; prevention, communication, escape, containment and extinguishment towards fire safety practices (Andrew and Anthony, 2017).

Research Methodology

This study is aimed at proposing a mechanism for fire safety management in hotel facility in Abuja. The study scope was restricted to between 3 and 5 stars hotels in Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Preliminary study have shown that the construct characteristics are well situated within this range of classifications, at minimum, a 3 stars hotel considered issues related to fire safety among its design and management framework. The study area was also adopted on the fact that Abuja is one of the fastest growing cities in Nigeria and houses most hotels in the country. This pragmatic research adopted mixed method design approach. Quantitative and qualitative strands of inquiry was utilised towards achieving the aim of the study, in order to fully explore and corroborate facts for better understanding of the constraints within the boundaries of the study context (Creswell, 2012; Babbie, 2014). Data were sought concurrently, using structured questionnaire survey and interview guide.

Considering the unit of analysis, the population according to Hotel Owners Forum Abuja (HOFA, 2019), a total of two hundred and twenty one (221) hotels were registered as a 3, 4 and 5 stars hotels in Abuja. Stratified random sampling technique was used for the selection of hotels while simple random technique was employed for the selection of respondents for questionnaire administration (Dougherty et al, 2014). A total number of 142 hotels were sampled, based on the Yamane (1967) methods of sample survey (*see* Table 1).

Table 1: Distribution of Target Population and Sample Sizes by Categories

S/N	Category (Stars)	Number	Sample Size
1	5	30	13
2	4	76	51
3	3	115	78
	Total	**221**	**142**

Source: HOFA, 2019.

Middle to top managers were the respondents in the study since that segment forms the fulcrum for decision making and daily management practices in any organisation operations. Structured questionnaire surveys were self-administered to obtained data from the respondents. This process lasted for about 7 weeks to allow for considerable rate of return. While a semi – structured interview question was adopted for the face – to face interview that lasted for about 20 minutes per period (Creswell, 2012). The data were analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics such as; Mean Item Score (MIS), Relative Importance Index (RII), Cronbach's alpha (α) and Factor Analysis to arrive at the most preferred variables for mechanism development.

A Multi-criteria Decision Technique (MCDT) was used given consideration to variables, which are the fire safety risk measure in hotels (Behzadian et al, 2012). The variables under consideration are Structural fire protection (M_1), Fire detection and warning (M_2), Fire-fighting Equipment (M_3), Provision of escape route (M_4), Staff training and customers' education (M_5). These measures were operationalised against three predetermined outcomes, which are: Reduce incidence of fire (C_1); Reduce casualty of fire (C_2); and Safety probability (C_3) as the criteria basis. The overall analysis of the MCDT was conducted using R-programming. The value of criteria weight (see, Figure 2).

Table 2: Decision Criteria on each Indicators and Performance Ranking

Criteria	*Normalised Ideal Best*	*Normalised Ideal Worst*	*Normalised Performance*	*Rank*
Structural fire protection	0.089	0.072	0.83	1st
fire detection and warning	0.110	0.037	0.78	3rd
Firefighting Equipment	0.06	0.11	0.79	2nd
Provision of Escape Route	0.041	0.078	0.72	4th
Staff Training and Customers education on fire safety management	0.074	0.045	0.71	5th

Sources: Fieldwork 2019.

The mechanism suggests that at least 83% improvement in structural fire protection is demanded for it to be considered adequate. 79% for firefighting equipment, followed by 78% status for fire detection and warning is required for adequate fire safety. Provision of escape Route takes the 4th ranking with 72.0% performance requirement, and lastly staff training and customers education on fire safety management ranked 5th with 71% demand.



Figure 2: Proposed Mechanism for Fire Safety Risk Management in Hotels.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The purpose of the research work is towards proposing a mechanism for fire safety risk management in hotel facility. This was achieved with mixed design methodology. The preliminary data and analysis suggest five main variables; structural fire protection, detection and warning, fire equipment, escape route, and training and education are critical to meeting fire safety requirement in hotels. This was followed by the Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA). It can be deduced that structural fire protection, as can be improved in the design and construction of hotel facility is very important in limiting fire incident among other factors in the proposed mechanism. It is, therefore, recommended that knowledge based decision making is required in the design and selection of fire retarding materials for the construction of hotel facilities, as well as proper adherence to the design codes.

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MARKET-ORIENTED AGRICULTURE: AN ANTIDOTE TO FOOD INSECURITY

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Abstract

Agriculture provides virtually everything we require for livelihood. Marketing plays important role in pre- and post-agricultural production. The aspects of ensuring that agricultural produce conforms to consumers' specification and, as well, reaches the consumers are among the functions of marketing. The mismatch between areas of production and consumption of agricultural produce occasioned by plenty in rural areas (areas of production) and scarcity in the urban areas (areas of major consumption) or plenty during the harvest and scarcity at off-harvest or planting season may not be unconnected to non-inculcation of marketing orientation in agriculture. Studies on market-oriented agricultural effects on food security is sparse. This study is an effort to bridge the gap. Thus, wishes to determine whether marketing oriented agriculture has significant positive effects on food security. Relevant data were conveniently drawn from farmers and consumers of agricultural produce from three states in Nigeria selected for the study viz: Benue, Enugu and Ondo. After the analysis of the data collected from the respondents and test of the hypotheses for the study, it is established that mechanised agriculture, food transportation, storage and processing have significant and positive effects on food security. It is concluded that effective mechanised agriculture, food transportation, storage and processing contribute greatly to food security. The study recommends that government at all levels should create enabling environment to support mechanised agriculture, food transportation storage and processing for the purpose of achieving food security.

Keywords: Agriculture, mechanised farming, marketing orientation, marketing functions, food security

Introduction

Agriculture, apart from providing the food we need for survival, contributes greatly to the economic growth of a nation. The quest to achieve food security especially in developing countries has become a mirage. A lot of concerns has been expressed over the danger of food crisis in many nations, Nigeria inclusive. The present contribution of agriculture to the Nigerian Economic growth fall short of expectation. The country's abundant land suitable for agriculture is underexploited. Means to overcome this predicament seems elusive. The domination of farming by the peasant farmers and government lack of pragmatic approach to improve agriculture account for the perennial food scarcity being experienced in the country.

In Nigeria, agricultural production has declined resulting to high incidence of rural poverty. Land and manpower especially youths who are expected to participate fully in agricultural production are rather pursuing other means of living. there is also concentration of farmers in the rural areas giving rise to plenty at place of the production (rural areas) and scarcity at major consumption central (Abugu et al, 2020). Food markets are located far away towns while food comes from different areas. (Ntakyo & Berg, 2019), Even ensuring that the produce are made available all year round has not been possible. The wastes of agricultural produce during harvest season also account for food scarcity. Market-oriented agriculture focuses on efforts aimed at farmers' identification of customers need and wants and providing them.

Agricultural marketing refers to all the activities targeted at ensuring that food and other produce are produced to conform to specifications and further facilitates the movement from the production centre to the areas of needs.

This study, therefore, interrogates the place of agricultural marketing as an antidote to food insecurity in Nigeria. That is to establish whether market-oriented agriculture has significant positive effects on food security. The hypotheses guiding the study are:

- To ascertain whether mechanised agriculture has significant positive effect on food security
- To find out if food transportation and storage significantly ensure food security, and
- To establish whether food processing has positive significant effect on food security

Review of Related Literature

Agriculture Marketing

Agricultural marketing can be defined as the social and managerial process by which exchange behaviours are nurtured, created, stimulated, facilitated and sustained between/among individuals and groups engaged in agricultural activities. It could also be seen as human activity directed at satisfying the needs and wants of consumers in agricultural market through the exchange process. It involves marketing research, product development, pricing, promotion and distribution of produce (Ejionueme & Nebo, 2014).

Scope of Agricultural Marketing

Agricultural marketing spans a whole spectrum of pre-production and post-production activities. These activities range from the conception of an agricultural produce, idea, produce planning, development, production, fabrication or processing through pricing promotion and distribution, packaging, packing, to transportation, financing risk taking, storage, grading, sorting, etc. Agricultural marketing begins before production when the farmer plans his production to meet the needs of the intended target audience of the market (Ejionueme & Nwora, 2014).

Agricultural marketing plays a veritable role in the sustainable growth of human and economic development. It performs the following roles in an economic system of a nation:

- Bridge the gap between production and consumption through effective transportation of agric produce by the marketing intermediaries which greatly aid in the management of perennial food scarcity.

- Minimises waste of a nation's resources especially agricultural produce through storage and processing.
- Adds value to the economy through provision of varieties of agric produce.
- Support agro based industries through the provision of certain agriculture produce which serves as raw materials to the industries.
- It helps to promote government agricultural policies through the use of marketing promotional tools such as agric exhibition, words of mouth marketing and public relation programmes, etc.
- Ensures efficient utilisation of agricultural funds through such efforts as providing profitable market for the purchase and sale of agricultural produce.
- Engagement in marketing research for purpose of constantly fulfilling needs.
- Uses of marketing information system (MIS) to gather and disseminate necessary information in respect of production, storage and demand, and uses of agric produce.

Conceptualising Food Scarcity

The literature focuses on food security especially in developing countries, Clover (2003), Smith (2007), Babatunde et al (2007), Swaminathan (2008), Oriola (2009), Fayeye and Ola (2007) are some of the works that have examined food security in developing countries. The authors argued that domestic policies in many developing countries have contributed very marginally to food security especially in Africa, and that, despite the growing global food production, hunger, malnutrition and famine are prevalent in many developing countries. Oriola (2009) states that Nigeria's case is particularly worrisome owing to the abundant natural resources endowed the country. Clover (2003) in particular examined food security in Sub-Sahara Africa. He acknowledges that 840 billion people worldwide are malnourished, the highest percentage of these being in Africa. This argues that actions and plans to address food security have continued to fall short, while food insecurity remains a re-occurring issue. To him, this failure can be attributed to faulty analysis and actions. He suggests going beyond conventional, orthodox wisdom to work more strategically in developing and implementing effective international, national and regional policies as a way out.

In the words of Jenkins & Scanlan (2001), food is the most basic of human needs and central to the discussion of human rights and social development. Food security exists when all people at all times, have physical, social and economic, access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (Idachaba, 2006). Food security for a household means access by all members at all times to enough food for an active healthy life.

Food security includes a minimum of:

- The ready availability of nutritional adequate and safe foods, and
- An assured ability to acquire acceptable foods in socially acceptable ways, that is without resorting to emergency food supplies, scavenging, stealing or other cropping strategy (USDA 2008).

Food insecurity, on the other hand, represents lack of access to enough food and can be either chronic or temporary. In chronic food insecurity, which arises from lack of resources to produce or acquire food, the diet is persistently inadequate (Adeoti, 1989). Food security "refers to uncertain availability of nutritionally adequate and safe foods or limited or uncertain ability to acquire acceptable food in socially acceptable ways" (American Dietetic Association, 1998).

It should be noted that availability of food alone does not seem sufficient to explain the attainment of food security in a country. Food can be available in a country because of effective agricultural policy; good harvest in a particular year or massive importation of food, or food handout (aid). Massive food import, particular by developing countries, usually has negative effect on foreign reserves and causes budgetary hemorrhage (Davis, 2009).

Food security does not necessary mean food availability either in quantitative or qualitative terms, food hygiene and safety should be given important consideration in order to protect the health of the people. Food, for instance, may be available but the source from which the food is produced or processed may be unhygienic or that the chemical substances used to produce or preserve the food may constitute a health hazard. Health and safety consideration therefore becomes important in food production. In essence, a country should be considered as food-secure when food is not only available in the quantity needed by the population consistent with decent living, but also when the consumption of the food should not pose any health hazard to the citizen (Davies, 2009).

Mechanized Agriculture and Food Security

Agricultural mechanisation is the modern approach to agricultural efficiency. Emama et al (2018) averred that mechanisation is a multi-dimensional concept and widely used in agriculture. Further that the developing countries approach in respect of applying mechanisation to agriculture is to achieve sustainable agricultural development which will result to food security. Studies has shown that in developed countries, mechanisation has played a significant role in increasing the productivity of agriculture and it has also contributed greatly towards the economic development.

Adamade et al (2014) opined that in order to improve agriculture productivity, cooperate organisation and government interest in agriculture especially agricultural mechanisation has to be aroused as viewed by Choudhury et al (1984), the way forward in the natural quest for improved agricultural productivity rest on the development of mechanised farming.

Food Transportation, Storage and Security

Adeofolalu (1977) stated that transportation is a place in production process which is not complete until the commodity is in the hands of the final consumers. Nigerian's transportation, infrastructure projects are inadequate (Akunna, 2015). Tunde and Adeniye (2012) stated that real transport plays an important role in agricultural development, that it is the major means of transporting agricultural produce from the farms to the markets as well as the different urban communities.

There is an urgent need to efficiently store and preserve food for purpose of achieving food security (FAO, 2004). Studies show that dryers reduces the need for complex storage and simultaneously increase food safety by removing the water content associated contamination. Schmitz & Kenedy (2016) stated that storage policies of individual countries have little impact on prices. A study by Kennedy et al (2018) provides positive evidence of the effect of storage on food security.

Food Processing Effect on Food Security

Produce processing increases lifespan of produce. Mary & Lynnel (2016) stated that food processing has a critical role in achieving food and nutrition security. Hyoyou (2010), reported that use of poor processing methods contributes to constraints to food security in Nigeria.

Materials and Methods

The respondents for the study comprised farmers and consumers of agricultural produce selected conveniently from Benue, Enugu and Ondo States, being the areas of the study. The researchers applied survey design method as such questionnaire was used to collect relevant information from the respondents on market oriented agriculture as an antidote to food insecurity The views the respondents were rated on a 5 points likert ordinal scale. The reliability of the researcher instrument is 0.82 determined through the use of Combach's Alpha and was considered suitable for the study (Revelle & Zinbang, 2004).

Out of a total of 375 copies of the questionnaire issued to the respondents only 320 were returned and used for the study. The respondents views were presented in tables and analysed as below:

Data Presentation and Analysis

Table 1: Mechanised Agriculture has significant positive effect on food security

Options	*Frequency*	*Percent*	*Valid Percent*	*Cumulative Percent*
Strongly Agreed	83	25.95	25.9	25.9
Agreed	64	20	20	45.9
Undecided	56	17.5	17.5	63.4
Disagreed	64	20	20	83.9
Strongly disagreed	53	16.56	16.56	100
Total	320	100		

Source: Survey data, 2020.

Analysing responses from the respondents in table one relating to whether mechanised agriculture has significant positive effect on food security, 83(25.9) respondents strongly agreed that mechanised agriculture has significant positive relationship with food security, 64(20%) agreed, 56(17.5%) were undecided, 64(20%) disagreed while 53(16.56) strongly disagreed.

Options	*Frequency*	*Percent*	*Valid percent*	*Cumulative percent*
Strongly Agreed	57	17.8	17.8	17.8
Agreed	78	24.4	24.4	42.2
Undecided	64	20	20	62.20
Disagreed	54	16.9	16.9	79.1
Strongly disagreed	67	20.9	20.9	100`
Total	320	100		

Source: Survey data, 2020.

Responses tabulated in table 3 reveals that 78(24.3) of the respondents strongly agreed that food processing has significant positive relationship with food security. 62(19.4%) agreed. 56(17.5%) were undecided. 64(20%) disagreed and 60(18.8%) strongly disagreed.

Test of Hypotheses

Hypothesis One

H_1: There is no significant positive relationship between mechanised agricultural and food security

H_2: There is significant positive relationship between mechanised agricultural and food security

Model 1: $ATM = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CBC + \mu_1$..................................(1)

In testing this hypothesis, data presented in table 1, were tested using Simple Linear Regression. The result of the regression on are shown below:

Table 1.1 Model Summary[b]

Model Summary[b]

Model	*R*	*R Square*	*Adjusted R Square*	*Std. Error of the Estimate*	*Durbin Watson*
1	.910[a]	.828	.799	3.61352	1.135

a. *Predictors:* (Constant) Mechanised agriculture.
b. *Dependent Variable:* Food Security.

Table 1.2 ANOVA[b]

Model	*Sum of squares*	*Df*	*Mean Square*	*F*	*Sig*
Regression	377.155	1	377.155	28.8	.002[a]
Residual	78.346	6	13.058	84	
Total	455.500	7			

a. *Predictors:* (Constant) Mechanized agriculture
b. *Dependent Variable*: Food Security

Table 1.3 Coefficients[a]

Model	Unstandardised		Standardidised Coefficients	T	Sig
	B	Std Error	Beta		
1.(constant) Mechanized Agricultural	21.934 -648	2.849 .121	 -910	7.700 -5.374	.000 .002

a. *Dependent Variable:* Food Security

Interpretation

As shown in table 1.R., the correlation coefficient which has a value of 0,910 indicates that there is a positive relationship between mechanised agricultural and food security. R square, the coefficient of determination, shows that 83.8% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the model. The standard error of estimate was low with a value of 3.613, which shows the appropriateness of the regression model. The Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.135, which was not more than 2, indicated that there is no autocorrelation.

The regression sum of squares (377.155) was greater than the residual sum of squares (78.345), which indicated that more of the variation in the dependent variable was explained by the model. The significant value of the F statistics (0.002) is less than 0.05, which means that the variation explained by the model is not due to chance. However, the F-test, which follows F-distribution, measures the overall significant of the model. The mechanised agricultural coefficient of (0.648) indicates relationship between mechanised agricultural food security consistency, which is statistically significant with (t=0.5374), thus, it is concluded that mechanised agricultural has a significant positive relationship with food security. ($R = 0.910$, $\beta = 0.648$, $t = 5374$, $p=0.002 <0.005$)

Hypothesis Two

H_1: There is no significant positive relationship between transportation and storage and food security

H_2: There is significant positive relationship between transportation and storage and food security

Model 2: REPS = β_0 + CSR + μ_1..................................(2)
In testing this hypothesis, data presented in table 2, were tested using Simple Linear Regression. The result of the regression on transportation and storage and food security are shown below:

Table 1.4
Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin Watson
1	.669[a]	.448	.356	11.65595	1.367

a. *Predictors:* (Constant) Transportation and storage.
b. *Dependent Variable*: Food Security.

Table 1.5 ANOVA[b]

Model	*Sum of squares*	*Df*	*Mean Square*	*F*	*Sig*
Regression	660.833	1	660.833	4.86	.040[a]
Residual	815.167	6	135.861	84	
Total	1476.000	7			

a. *Predictors:* (Constant) Transportation and Storage
b. *Dependent Variable*: Food Security.

Table 1.6 Coefficients[a]

Model	Unstandardised		Standardidised Coefficients	T	Sig
	B	Std Error	Beta		
1.(constant) Transportation and Storage	30.949 -631	8.127 .286	 -669	3.808 -2.205	.009 .040

Interpretation

As shown in table 1.4 the correlation coefficient which has a value of 0,669 indicates that there is a positive relationship between mechanised transportation and storage, and food security.

R square, the coefficient of determination, shows that 44.8% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the model. The standard error of estimate was high with a value of 11.65595, which shows the appropriateness of the regression model. The Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.357, which was not more than 2, indicated that there is no autocorrelation.

The regression sum of squares (660.1833) was less than the residual sum of squares (815.167), which indicated that more of the variation in the dependent variable was explained by the model. The significant value of the F statistics (0.040) is less than 0.05, which means that the variation explained by the model is not due to chance. However, the F-test, which follows F-distribution, measures the overall significant of the model. The transportation and storage coefficient of (0.631) indicates a positive relationship between transportation and storage and food security consistency, which is statistically significant with (t=2.205), thus, it was concluded that transportation and storage has a significant positive relationship with food security. (R = 0.669, $\beta = 0.631$, t = 2.205, p=0.040s <0.005)

a. **Hypothesis Three**

H_1: There is no significant positive relationship between food processing and food security

H_2: There is significant positive relationship between food processing and food security

Model 3: CFP = β_0 + PI + μ_1..................................(3)

In testing this hypothesis, data presented in table 3, were tested using Simple Linear Regression. The result of the relationship between food processing and food security are shown below:

Table 1.7

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin Watson
1	.377[a]	.143	.000	15.62372	2.135

a. *Predictors:* (Constant) Food Processing.
b. *Dependent Variable*: Food Security.

Table 1.8 ANOVA[b]

Model	Sum of squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig
Regression	243.397	1	243.397	.997	.357[a]
Residual	1464.603	6	244.101		
Total	1708.000	7			

a. *Predictors:* (Constant) Food Processing.
b. *Dependent Variable*: Food Security.

Table 1.9 Coefficients[a]

Model	Unstandardised		Standardidised Coefficients	T	Sig
	B	Std Error	Beta		
1.(constant) Food processing	38.206 -656	19.050 .657	 -377	2.006 -999	.092 .357

a. *Dependent Variable*: Food Security.

Interpretation

As shown in table 1.7, the correlation coefficient which has a value of 0,377 indicates that there is a positive relationship between food processing and food security. R square, the coefficient of determination, shows that 14.3% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the model. The standard error of estimate was high with a value of 15.62372, which shows the appropriateness of the regression model. The Durbin Watson statistics of 2.135, which was not more than 2, indicated that there is no autocorrelation.

The regression sum of squares (243.397) was less than the residual sum of squares (1464.603), which indicated that more of the variation in the dependent variable was explained by the model. The significant value of the F statistics (0.357) is less than 0.05, which means that the variation explained by the model is not due to chance. However, the F-test, which follows F-distribution, measures the overall significant of the model. The food processing and food security coefficient of (0.656) indicates a positive relationship between food processing and food security consistency, which is statistically significant with (t=0.999), thus, it was concluded that food processing has a significant positive relationship with food security. ($R = 0.377$, $\beta = 0.656$, $t = 0.999$, $p=0.357 < 0.005$)

Summary of Findings

Mechanised agricultural has significant relationship with food security ($R = 0.910$, $\beta = 0.648$, $t = 5374$, $p=0.002 < 0.005$)

Transportation and storage have significant positive effect on food security($R = 0.669$, $\beta = 0.631$, $t = 2.205$, p=0.040s <0.005)

a. Food processing has a significant positive relationship with food security. ($R = 0.377$, $\beta = 0.656$, $t = 0.999$, $p=0.357 < 0.005$).

Conclusion and Recommendation

Effective mechanised agriculture, food transportation, storage and processing contribute greatly to food security. The study recommend that government at all levels should create enabling environment to support mechanised agriculture, food transportation, storage and processing for the purpose of achieving food security.

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RURAL CONFLICT AND FOOD SECURITY IN NIGERIA: AN INTEROGATION OF THE NORTH CENTRAL NIGERIA

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Abstract
In the last decade, the Nigerian state has experience increase in the incidence of rural conflicts. These conflicts are exacerbated by the proliferation of small and light weapons in the rural areas of Nigeria. As the hub of food production in the country, the prevalence of conflicts in the rural areas affects food security in the country. It is against this backdrop that this paper examines the impact of rural conflicts on food security in Nigeria. The study is qualitative and employs secondary sources of data collection. Eco-violence theory was adopted as framework of analysis for the paper. The paper demonstrates that these conflicts disrupts farming activities, the distribution chain as well as destroys storages houses. As a result, the prevalence of rural conflicts has threatened the food availability, food accessibility and food utilisation in Nigeria. As a way reducing the prevalence of these rural conflicts, the paper suggests the establishment of ranches, mopping up of illicit arms and development of community based approaches.

Keywords: Rural Conflict, Food Security, Eco-Violence, Small Arms and Light Weapons.

Introduction

Rural conflict has been an issue of concern in recent times most especially in northern Nigeria with north-central inclusive. These conflicts became unstoppable during the fourth republic, particularly around early 2000, between Herders and Farmers which migrated into militancy and vice-versa (Okeke, 2014; Uchenna, 2017). Nze (2015), perceived the scenario as a result of the natural virginity of the green lands deemed best for crops and animal production that attracts herder's migration from the neighbouring dessert countries such as Sudan, Niger, Benin Republic, Chad among others. The movement into some parts of the country is increasing and their efforts to protect their animals have increased by day as they move freely with sophisticated and light weapons and let loose the animals to feed on farmlands which belong to farmers.

These attacks and destruction of farmlands by herders has posed a serious security threat to farmers' sustainability of livelihood and food security in the north-nentral states of Benue, Kogi, Niger, Plateau, Nassarawa and Kwara. There have been an interdependent relationship between herders and farmers because cow duns were said to have been of value as it improves soil fertility while the calories produced by crops were of nutritional value to herders animals. Notwithstanding therefore, the interdependent livelihood activity, the relationship is now based on unimaginable levels of attacks by herdsmen just to occupy the territory needed for grazing and settlement.

disagreement, nonetheless, there are scholarly views regarding the definition of the term conflict. According to Doherty and Paltzgraf (1981), it is an individual or group of human beings whether cultural, tribal, ethnic, religious, and political or otherwise consciously and constantly get involved in one or more identifiable groups in the same community what it perceives to be or appears to be incompatible goals.

To Zartman (1990), in Dodo (2003 p. 9), conflict refers to an inevitable aspect of all human interactions and an unavoidable concomitant of choice and decision. It is inherent to decision even when there is only one person. He further explained that only time resolves conflict and even after the wound heals, it leaves scars for future reference.

Conflict is, therefore, the act carried out by an individual or group through contact or communication. It is also a clash of interest which the basis may vary but still part of the society. Conflict is also a situation in which two or more persons desire goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other but not both. Each party is mobilising energy to obtain a particular goal, thing or situation and each party perceives the other or feel that the other party is an obstacle or a barrier and as such, a threat to that goal Stagnar (1967).

From the foregoing, rural conflict thrives on the complex of social political and agrarian contestation (Kay, 2001). It is also associated with armed criminality especial in the context of fragile state. Drivers of rural conflicts in Nigerian include communal disputation pertaining identity quality, power sharing, resource control, chieftain tussles among others. This is in addition to various dimension of harmed criminality such as banditry, castle rustling, kidnapping and cultism. There has been a rising rained of rural violence in Nigeria over the years. These developments exacerbated by the incidence of harmed proliferation and organised militancy in the country side.

Food Security

Food security on a general note entails the availability and standard quality to a majority population of a given society. In other words, it means when a majority of a country's population have free access to food in quality and quantity in a stable and long lasting period. Reuthinger (1985, p. 7) and Idachaba (2004, p. 2), argue that a country is food-secure when majority of the population have access to food of adequate quality and quantity consistent with decent existence at all times. It has negative and positive impacts which will be unveiled further in the research work.

Originally, the concept of food security was understood to apply at the national level, with a state being food-secure when there was sufficient food to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in the production and prices (Egbuna, 2001). However, a new definition emerged at the 1996 World Food Summit. The World Food Summit (1966, p. 234) defined food security as existing “when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life”. This definition shifted emphasises from the national to the individuals. In other words, it has to do with the nutritional states of the individual household members and the risk of that adequate states not being achieved or becoming undermined. Another important aspect of the definition is the introduction

According to Tonah (2006), the incessant attack by herdsmen on farmers is peculiar to coastal countries in West Africa with Nigeria inclusive, to more prone areas of the north-central region. The negative impact has become worrisome most especially within the hinterlands as it threatens the sustainability of livelihood depended on natural resources of land to survive. This according to (Moritz, 2010), not only on farmland alone, it affects lives, properties and homesteads. The devastating effects are more on crop farmers because of the overdependence on natural resources such as rainfall, traditional mechanisms or implements to survive.

These attacks on Nigerian communities in recent times could be seen as an organised trend, planned a long time ago as they are seen carrying along sophisticated weapons like AK47 and other communication devices that can hardly be found among security officials. These attacks are, sometimes, referred to as a systemic aggressive way to overthrow and takeover these communities found to be beneficial to serve their purpose. To Okoli and Lonshin (2018, p. 71) this group of people called herders has been involved in arms proliferation which includes arms bearing ranging from rudimentary to modern sophisticated weapons and communication devices of the highest grade claimed to be for self-defence for their grazing routes against wildlife, cattle rustlers, bandits among others, but these weapons tend to be used in annihilating communities who may rise to protest and protect against his farmland or crops as the case may be. This scenario is never peculiar to northern Nigeria alone but it include other parts of the country and eventually spread to the whole of Africa with emphasis on Somalia, Mali, Sudan, central African republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), northern Cameroun, to mention a few, and have gone beyond a mere herder/farmer clash or conflict but has put to mind terrorism or militancy in the hearts of many.

Conceptual clarification

Rural Conflict

To many, "rural" means the isolated areas such as hinterlands that are outside settlements, basically meant for farming and grazing, with a little population consisting of majority of illiterates. 'Rural' does not necessarily mean open spaces with a low population; it comprises of those areas and settlements on the edge of towns and cities where the space between buildings grow larger and where small plots of cultivated lands may begin to appear between industrial estates and other features that may closely associate with the urban concept.

According to Harriss (1982, 14-15) "rural "refers primarily to areas that have relatively low population density compared to cities, areas where agriculture and related activities usually dominate the landscape and economy. It also includes places where transport and communication need to cover relatively large distances, making travel and service provision relatively difficult and costly. To Harriss, the definition also include towns that are located in these areas and which are linked to them culturally and economically by acting as a focal point for people living in the surrounding area, i.e., places where they can meet, exchange goods and services, and find transport to larger urban centres.

On the other hand, there has been no concise definition of the term "conflict", just like "rural". All depend on one's perception as some people see conflict to mean violence or of the elements of physical and economic access to food. This implies that though food may be available in a society and yet some people may lack the economic access to the physical food hence hunger and starvation. Related to the above, the World Bank (2010) identified three cardinal elements of food security:

- Food availability (adequate aggregate supply of food items): sufficient food is available for the household members.
- Food Accessibility (adequate purchasing power): which also means reducing poverty, what it implies here is that one must be able to purchase food.
- Food utilisation (safe food for human consumption): This entails ensuring a good nutritional outcome. Good nutrition must be accompanied with other complementary resources such as nutrition, health care, safe water and better sanitation.

Food security incorporates a measure of resilience to future disruption on unavailability of critical food supply due to various risks factors including drought, shipping disruptions fuel shortages, economic instability and wars.

Nigeria is still characterised by high reliance on food imports. Malnutrition is widespread in the entire country and rural areas are especially vulnerable to chronic food shortages, malnutrition, unbalanced nutrition erratic food supply, poor quality foods and high costs of food (Akinyele 2009).

The Global Food Security Index, (GFSI) of the Economist Intelligence Unit has ranked Nigeria as the 80th among 105 countries with food affordability, availability and quality. According to the Index, Nigeria recorded weak scores in the areas of "public expenditure on agriculture research and development, 0.0; presence of food safety net programs, 0.0; proportion of population under global poverty line; food consumption as a share of household expenditure, 9.6 and protein quality, 12.8. "Nigeria however scored favourably in sufficient supply, micronutrient availability, volatility of agricultural production, diet diversification, protein quality, agricultural import tariffs and gross domestic product per capital" (Abdallah 2012, p.65). The above is illustrative of the severity of food insecurity. This worrisome development is exacerbated of the farmers and herders conflict in the rural of the country.

Theoretical Framework

Eco-violence is a modern theory that has been developed by Homer Dixon (1999). Dixon developed this theory in order to understand the causes of conflict responsible for the incessant clash between herders and farmers. Among the conflicts, herders/farmer has been one of the major causes that have affected food security in Nigeria; this is because the growing population of almost two hundred million people sustains their livelihood through peasant farmers. Herder/farmer conflict tends to be the most persistent conflict which in recent times is claiming lives and property.

Looking at the root causes of some of these major crises that turn violent, the theory explains that the limited resources, growing population of some certain groups tend to have occupied space and has intensified the scarcity of both crops, land, water; forests, among others, have been a major cause (Dixon, 1999, p. 30). The affected groups for comfortability migrate or move from one region to another, seeking for greener pastures and, by so doing, infringes the rights of others by encroaching into the territory that do not belong to them. This is commonly found among the herders where in the process of migrating, farmlands are, sometimes, destroyed.

According to Tonah (2006), the Eco-violence theory is of the view that both herders and farmer have a single problem and that is scarcity of land, this means while farmers migrate to more fertile land, so the herders look for greener pasture to settle with the animals and eventually they both clash. This scarcity is caused by the over-usage of land for a very long time by which it becomes weak and the human population as well as that of the animals which outnumber the physical space for grazing and farming are the outstanding factors that are pre-requisite to migration of the conflicting parties. To Tonah, he sees it as an increased competition for access and resource control, the farmer while in dire need to capture a vast land for cultivation, herders also in the same need to preserve the forest for cattle rearing. The relevance of the Eco-violence theory is basically assumed that competition over the scarcity of ecological resources aggravates and increasing in recent times (Iorbee, T. 2018, in Blench and Onuoha, 2007).

Research Methodology

This research work employs qualitative method, using secondary data through the use of journals, textbooks, national dailies and unpublished essays. The study also explore the use of relevant examples of displaced persons in refugee camps by herdsmen from 2015-date using a descriptive method of analysis.

An Overview of Rural Conflicts in North-Central Nigeria

Geographically, the north-central region is located in the centre of the country (Nigeria). The region is situate between latitudes “$7^{0}3^{0}$” North and $11^{0}15$ North, longitude 40 and 120 East of Prime Meridian (Dawan, 2002). In terms of landmass, it covers an area of approximately 342,390 km^2 or 37 percent of the total land area of Nigeria. The region is bounded in the East and West by the republics of Cameroon and Benin respectively (Okpeh, 2008). It is made up of, at least, six states which include Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. This region is an area with certain climatic coherence, stretching over two distinct ecological zones namely; the Savanna zone and the Rain Forest zone. It is also a region with complex relief of the Jos Plateau and has many ranges of hills mostly along its Eastern escarpment (Okpeh, 2008).

Furthermore, available geographical facts review that the north-central region is generally endowed with both human and natural resources and that in the past, it attracted people from both the northern and southern parts of Nigeria as well as from outside (Okpeh, 2008). Forde (2002) stated that its many waterways (mostly the Niger and Benue and their tributaries) facilitated the easy movement of different ethnic groups into and out of the region, just as their banks served as the foci of settlement for many groups during their formative stages in the remote past. This is what Forde (2002) aptly described as a great cultural watershed.

By the current geo-political structure, the Benue Valley Region consist of five states of Benue, part of Kogi, Plateau, Nassarawa, and Taraba. The Benue Valley has the greatest number of ethnic concentration in Nigeria. The Tiv ethnic group, though a minority in Northern Nigeria, is, however, the largest of all the minority groups in the entire northern Nigeria and constitutes the largest ethnic group in the Benue Valley. However, the Benue Valley is also the home of other ethnic groups such as the Igala, Idoma, Jukun, Chamba, Azara, Alago and a lot more (Jibo, 2005). Benue Valley is one of the least developed in Nigeria despite its huge natural and human resources.

The north-central region has a very fertile land which is suitable for farming activities with moderate vegetation and climate. The fertility of the region appears to have been of long-standing and even struck the attention of the early European visitors to the area in the 19th century. These geographical attributes are the major factors that have continued to attract the herders from various states in the north-east and north-west thus making the region the epicentre of pastoralist and farmers conflict in Nigeria. A study of major sources of conflict in the Benue valley revealed that land matter accounted for the highest percentage (42.9) of conflicts followed by political (32.08%) and Chieftaincy matters (28.3%) respectively (Gyuse & Ajene, 2006). A high percentage of conflicts arising from land disputes have to do with land matters and conflict between Fulani herdsmen and farmers over grazing land.

The north-central states of Plateau, Taraba, Benue, Kogi, are usually the most vulnerable areas in the north. For instance, in Plateau State, there are incessant conflicts, which have rendered many people homeless. Bonkat (2008) and Awotokun et al (2020) argued that many natives have had to abandon their homeland, which the Fulani invaders occupied till date. This issue needs to be viewed against indigenes (natives) versus settlers' dichotomy that underpins conflicts, particularly in Plateau state. The indigene/settler dichotomy is often used to justify exclusion and marginalisation. It is resistant to this classification that often engenders conflicts. The common narrative holds that the indigenes or natives are the original settlers on the land, while the settlers are the migrants, whose history of migration can easily be recalled by the natives (Awotokun, Nwozor & Olanrewaju, 2020). These natives are dominant in the political appointment, representations, and elective offices, however, not without the resistance of the migrants. The migrants whose history of migration had spanned more than a century are normally excluded from the ownership of land and traditional chieftaincy entitlements. Below is the summary of the incidences of rural conflicts in north-central Nigeria:

Table 1: Recorded Cases of Conflict between Farmers and Herders in North-Central Nigeria

	Casualties/deaths	Location
20/11/2011	4 Houses were burnt, farm produce destroyed and people deserted their homes	Akpanaja, Ondori Rukubi in Doma Local Govt. Area Nasarawa State
10/2/2011	1person was killed Houses and farm produce were damaged by both parties; girls were rapped	Udeni-Gida Nasarawa Local Govt. Area
17/4/2011	30 people killed, Damage of property, injuries of varied degrees; Population displacement	Border communities between Doma Local Govt. of Nasarawa State and Guma LGA in Benue State
13/1/2012	10 died, destruction of prosperity, population displacement	Doka, Kwara and Ungwan Yaran mada in Keana and Doma LGA
24/3/2012	10 Destruction of property; people displaced	Yelaw (Igbabo) in Ekye Dev. Area of Doma LGA
24/7/2012	About 35 dead and Property destroyed	Kotsona village in Tunga, Awe LGA, Nasarawa state
5/1/2013	5 (Fulani) were killed. houses were destroyed in Fulani camp; people was Displaced	Agbashi town in Doma LGA
6/1/2013	16 people were killed, houses and property were Destroyed	Agbashi town in Doma LGA
17/3/2013	5 people were killed, houses and property were destroyed	Ambane-Egga, Ladi Ende in N/Eggon LGA
4/8/2013	20 people killed and houses and property were destroyed	Kuduku, Ajo Villages in Keane LGA

January 4, 2016	Between 12 and 38 dead	Udeni Ruwa, Nassarawa state
January 10, 2016	About 45 dead	Agatu, Benue State
January 17, 2016	3 herdsmen dead, killed by cattle rustlers	Gareji village Wukari LGA, Taraba
January, 23, 2016	30 to 60 people killed, in cluding a police DPO	Demsare, Wunamokoh, Dikajam and Tabonugo, in Adamawa State
February 2, 2016	7 dead in Agatu	Benue State
February 7, 2016	10 dead	Tom Anyiin, Benue State
February 11, 2016	2 killed in Abbi	Enugu state,
February 24, 2016	Between 300 and 500 killed in Agatu	Benue State
February 28, 2016	9 killed in Agatu	Benue state
March, 7, 2016	8 killed in logo	Benue state
March 8, 2016	12killed in Mbaya-Tombo	Buruku, Benue State
March 13, 2016	2 killed in Mbaya-Tombo	Buruku, Benue State
March 17, 2016	15 killed in Tombo	Buruku, LGA, Benue State
April 3&4, 2016	APC chieftain killed in Tarka	Benue state leading to mass protest
April 10, 2016	Between 15 and 44 killed in Angai	Dashole, Dori and Mesuma villages, Gashaka LGA, Taraba state
April 18, 2016	18 killed in Moor	Kwande LGA, Benue State

Sources: International Crisis Group (2017), NBS (2018) with Author's Modification.

The table above indicates that 954 lives were lost in states collectively referred to as the north-central Nigeria. The data also points to the increase in number of attacks. In Benue State, the Fulani herdsmen with the aid of mercenaries with sophisticated weapons launched attacks on Tiv communities in areas such as, Guma, Gwer-West, Makurdi, Logo, Ukum, Katsina-Ala, Kwande, and Buruku Local Government Areas between 1999-2015 and destroyed thousands of lives and properties, farmlands and crops worth billions of naira, and rendered thousands of people homeless. These attacks brought to a standstill the socio-economic activities in the affected communities (Abagen & Tyona, 2018).

The Impact of Rural Conflict on Food Security in North-Central Nigeria

There is a consensus that majority of Nigerians resides in rural areas where production of crops and rearing of livestock is the main economic activity of the people. In this context, rural conflict especially between farmers and herders has tremendous impact on food security in the country. Okoli & Addo (2018, p. 20) succinctly captures the nexus between rural conflicts and food security in Nigeria thus:

> Communal conflict is correlated to food security and, under most circumstances, depresses production and income from cash crops and livestock. This reduction in production and income has serious implication on food security with the capacity to reduce coping capacity of those depending on food resources for their livelihood.

These conflicts limited production of food, it has the propensity to also deny people access to food and availability of food supply. Also according to Assessment Capacity Projects (ACAPS) thematic report (2017, p. 12) indicate that:

> Approximately, 132,818 are said to be facing IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) levels of food insecurity in Benue, 167.561 in plateau and 212,348 in Kaduna States as at December 2016, with 12,063 in Phase 4 in Plateau state. 46,000 are projected to face Crisis food security conditions in Benue, Kaduna, and Plateau States from June to August 2017, according to the report.

The majority of IDPs have identified food as their most pressing need. They have limited food access as their stocks were looted and there is little access to replenish farm stocks. Staple food and cash crop production is below average in Plateau State. Prices remain extremely high around the country and are expected to continue increasing due to current inflation and recession. Conflict affected households that face additional strain in accessing stable food due to their reduced purchasing power. Any food assistance has been inadequate and irregular. Members of the Goska District in southern Kaduna made up of about 156 households, report receiving food assistance once, and enough for only 30 families.

A further breakdown of the effect of rural conflict on food security presents a very disturbing scenario. Gaavson & Abughdyer (2019) discovered that in Benue State, for instance, the conflict between farmers and herders has resulted to severe hunger and food insecurity in the households in the communities that experience the conflict. Many households have reduced food intake by both children and adults as a result of unavailability of food. This violates the two cardinals of food security, the availability of nutritionally adequate and safe food and an assured ability to acquire acceptable ways (i.e., without resorting to emergency food supplies, stealing or other coping strategies.

Further, Okoli & Addo (2018) find that the rural conflict between farmers and herders has led to food shortage, increase in price of food items and limit people's access to food through destruction of infrastructure necessary for food production and ultimately resulting to famine. Herdsmen crisis also lead to physical destruction and plundering of crops, and livestock, harvest and food reserves. Apart from this, it drives young people away from farming activities. On the whole, rural violence has also disrupted the production, distribution, access and affordability of food in north-central Nigeria and the country at large. The majority now depend on aid from government and other international non-governmental organisations to meet their food needs. The implications of acute food shortage are far-reaching. It has also brought malnourished deaths, diseases, high mortality and crime among children and youths who are most vulnerable groups.

Conclusion

North-central Nigeria has become a hot spot for rural conflicts in Nigeria. The conflicts in this region are essentially between farmers and herders who are the major players in the country's food security enterprise. The preponderance of these conflicts has resulted disruption of farming activities for several farming seasons. Several communities in the north-central Nigeria that have been affected by the conflicts have experienced severe hunger and food insecurity. Many households have reduced food intake by both children and adults as a result of unavailability of food. This violates the two cardinals of food security, the availability of nutritionally adequate and safe food and an assured ability to acquire acceptable ways (i.e. without resorting to emergency food supplies, stealing or other coping strategies).

Recommendations

In the light of the devastating effects of rural conflicts on food security in Nigeria, the paper recommends the following:

- It appears the days of open grazing are over, the whole world embrace ranching as the best method of animal husbandry. Hence Nigeria cannot afford to be left behind. Nigerian government should enact a law to provide for the establishment of ranches (restricted grazing) so as to drastically reduce herders/farmers crises that threaten food sufficiency in the country. Benue state government has enacted the Anti-Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Creation Law in Nigeria. However, the implementation has suffered a lot of setbacks as result of lack of political will at the level of federal government that has enforcement apparatus. Hence there is need for federal government to cooperate with state governments to ensure the provisions of the laws are implemented to the later.
- The campaign for reforestation that is ongoing in all parts of Nigeria particularly in the drought prone areas of North East, Nigeria needs to be boosted. When this is done, it will create a lasting solution to the problem of southwards movement of the herdsmen which usually spark off a number of violent conflict in the area. They would be encouraged to sit tight on a particular land hence the vegetation remains luxuriant to support their livestock.
- Government of Nigeria should embark on peace building initiative by preaching peaceful coexistence between farmers and pastoralists in the North Central region of the country and beyond.

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SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM NORTH-WESTERN NIGERIA

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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of small-scale enterprises on economic growth in north-western Nigeria. The study seeks: to examine the impact of employment generation created by small-scale enterprises; and to determine the impact of poverty reduction by small-scale enterprises in north-western Nigeria. *The study employs survey method of research. Data are collected via the use of questionnaires. The hypotheses formulated for the study are tested using* Ordinary Least Square method of analysis at 5% levels of significance. *The findings reveal that* small-scale enterprises have significant impact on economic growth of north-western Nigeria as the sub-sector accounts for over 60% of the business enterprises. *It is recommended amongst others that* the establishment of Special Micro-Finance Banks (SMFBs) to concentrate solely on the funding of indigenous small-scale enterprises will assist, in no small measure, in boosting the economy of north-western Nigeria thereby generating employment opportunities and reducing poverty in the north-western geo-political zone and Nigeria. The SMFBs, if established, will help in combating the problem of undercapitalisation, by providing the necessary, cost effective and easily accessible funding for small-scale enterprises in the geo-political zone and Nigeria.

Keywords: *Small Scale Enterprise, Economic Growth, North-West, Nigeria*.

1. Introduction

Originally, people believed that only corporate firms contribute actively to a nation's economy due to sizes and earnings. However, this viewpoint is no longer feasible, as small scale-enterprises have proven to have significant impact on the nations' economy. Typical examples are countries like Taiwan, Japan, and Korea whose development was based largely on their small-based businesses. In other words, these countries' development, as recorded in their economic growth, was achieved through the grassroots level, and small-scale enterprises belong to the grassroots.

Small-scale enterprises have been found to constitute a major builder of the Nigerian economy as the sector accounts for over 87% of the Nigerian businesses (Gbandi and Amissah, 2014; and Oyelarin-Oyeyinka, 2010). It also accounts for over 90% of all the manufacturing activities and 70% of employment in the country (Terungwa, 2011). Thus, from all indications, small-scale enterprises could be described, among other things, as the creators of employment, pivotal of expansion, and revenue redistribution. Furthermore, small-scale enterprises promote indigenous entrepreneurship, in addition to encouraging the production of indigenous goods as a way of boosting industrial linkages.

According to Ojeka (2011), small-scale businesses play a very important role in the development of the Nigerian economy. As Ojeka pointed out, they serve as a source of employment-generation, innovation, competition, the economic dynamism which ultimately leads to poverty alleviation and national growth. Even though large corporate firms are said to play integral roles in the growth of economy, their success depends largely on the activities of the small firms since their major patronage comes from them. In other words, the small-scale businesses help the large corporate firms to attain their targets.

Safiriyu and Njogo (2012) are of the view that, for an economy to live up to expectation in the nation's development, such economy must achieve accelerated economic growth and development which is the prerequisite for improving the quality of life. Realising this fact, the federal and state governments in Nigeria are presently campaigning for the growth of small-scale businesses as a strategy towards attaining economic prosperity. This move is necessary because the majority of the population of every nation depends on small-scale businesses. The nation's economy depends on its working population for economic growth and development in which the youths constitute greatest percentage and this further establishes the reason the youth should be gainfully employed. Safiriyu and Njogo (2012), pointed out that the youth should be encouraged to develop and nurture entrepreneurial spirit since entrepreneurship reduces poverty and improve the standard of living.

A study carried out by the Federal Office of Statistics shows that in Nigeria, small-scale businesses make up 87% of the economy (Ariyo, 2005). Ojeka (2011) acknowledges that, over the years, small-scale businesses have been an avenue for job-creation and the empowerment of Nigeria's citizens providing about 50% of all jobs in Nigeria and also for local capital formation. In other words, small-scale businesses contribute to better income distribution. Being highly innovative, they lead to the utilisation of our natural resources which in turn translates to increasing the country's wealth through higher productivity. Small-scale businesses have undoubtedly improved the standard of living of so many people especially those in the rural areas.

The benefits of small-scale businesses to any economy are easily noticeable. For instance, Panitchpakdi (2006) sees them as a source of employment, competition, economic dynamism, and innovation that stimulate the entrepreneurial spirit and the diffusion of skills. Small-scale businesses also contribute to the economy in terms of output of goods and services; creation of jobs at relatively low capital cost, especially in the fast growing service sector; provide a vehicle for reducing income disparities; develop a pool of skilled and semi-skilled workers as a basis for the future industrial expansion; improve forward and backward linkages between economically, socially and geographically diverse sectors of the economy; provide opportunities for developing and adapting appropriate technological approaches; offer an excellent breeding ground for entrepreneurial and managerial talent, the critical shortage of which is often a great handicap to economic development, among others.

Uzor (2004) believes that the constraints faced by small-scale businesses in developing countries are not only accentuated with ineffective policy design, but also by market failures in the region. Their lack of information technology and knowledge of automation are gradually being reduced given that they serve as contractors for larger firms. A major difficulty faced by small-scale businesses is that of lack of access to short and long-term capital. A publication of the Weekly Trust Newspaper of Saturday, January 22, 2011 recognises the fact that collateral based financing has become increasingly difficult for small-scale enterprises, whether as existing businesses, in their expansion state or as startups hence more small-scale businesses are resorting to viability lending in which case they obtain loans based on the viability of the business and health of cash flow. Banks are usually reluctant to lend to small-scale businesses and this is because of problems such as their inability to meet the bank's lending requirements, promoters' low education, management and entrepreneurial skills and poor and unreliable financial records which makes financial review difficult (Aderemi, 2003). These are just few of the numerous challenges confronting small-scale enterprises in Nigeria that hamper its effects on the nation's economy. Perhaps, small-scale enterprises may be an efficient vehicle for the transformation of Nigerian economy. As Obi et al (2018) in their study stated that small scale enterprises are significant driver of economic development, especially in transition economies like Nigeria and that government of such economies must focus on initiating programmes that encourage the creation of small scale enterprises, while also motivating existing ones to sustain performance and growth.

Notwithstanding the fact that small-scale businesses play a central role in developed and developing economies of Sub-Saharan African countries, this sector is usually neglected by the governments. The impermanence rate of small scale businesses is very high. According to the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN), in Nigeria, 80% of small scale enterprises die before their fifth year anniversary. Among the factors responsible for these untimely close-ups are tax-related issues, ranging from multiple taxations to enormous tax burdens, etc. Also, some government policies ensure that these firms meet certain conditions that may not necessarily be for their advantage. For instance, a survey of Turkish Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2004 showed that they were suffering the consequences of policy inconsistency, poor access to finance, insufficient know-how and low level of technology, and so many others. The similar problems were also registered by other authors concerning other regions like the Philippines, Malaysia, and other European states and, of course, in Sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria inclusive) as shown by different authors on the issue.

To this end, the present study focuses on examining the impact of small-scale enterprises on economic growth of Nigeria.

2. Methodology

The study employs survey method of research. Sample is drawn from population that covers all small-scale enterprises that have been in operations for at least five (5) years in north-western Nigeria. Data are collected via the use of structured questionnaires. Validity and reliability of data collection instrument are ascertained using content and alpha crombach respectively. Descriptive statistics such as frequencies and percentages are used to analyse the data. Meanwhile, Ordinary Least Square method of analysis is also used in testing the hypotheses formulated for the study at 5% levels of significance.

3. Results

Presentation of Results

Dependent Variable: Economic Growth	t-stats	Sig. Level
Constant	17.50	0.002
SE's	1.75	0.001
R	0.83	
R^2	0.69	
R^2- Adjusted	0.65	
F- ratio	15.25	
Sig.	0.000	

Source: Computer Analysis (2020).

Note: Questions on Small Enterprises (SE's) were added together to form the independent variable and those on Economic Growth were added to form the dependent variable in order to formulate the regression equation to validate the hypotheses of the research work.

$EG = f(SE's)$

$EG = b_0 + b_1 SE's + e$

Interpretation of Result

The meaning of various statistical tools used in this study was given in this sub-section.

Co-efficient of Correlation (r).

A strong positive correlation existed between the dependent variable (Economic Growth) and the independent variable (SE's). This was revealed by the correlation coefficient of 0.83 as shown in the table of analysis above.

Co-efficient of Determination (R^2)

From the table, it is seen that 69% of the variations in Economic Growth was attributable to SE's. It follows, therefore, that about 30% were accounted for by factors outside the model.

Student T-Test (t-test)

This test shows the individual significance of the parameters used in the model. A parameter is significant if its calculated value is greater than the tabulated value at a given significance level or its p-value is lower than 0.05. From the table above, the constant of the model was significant because its calculated value of 17.50 has a p-value lower than 5%. SE's was also significant because the p-value of its calculated value of 1.75 is lower than 0.05.

F-statistic (f-test)

This test validates the overall significance of the model, i.e. the goodness of the model and thus provides a basis for validating the hypotheses. A model is said to be significant if it's f-calculated or f-ratio is greater than the tabulated f-values, at a given level of significance or the p-value is lower than 0.05. For this model, the value of 15.25 was significant at 5% level of significance because its p-value of 0.000 is lower than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypotheses were rejected.

4. Discussion

Hypothesis Testing and Discussion of Results

As earlier stated, a null hypothesis will only be accepted when the calculated value is lower than the tabulated value at a given level of significance or the p-value higher than 0.05, otherwise it will be rejected. Based on the empirical findings of the research work, all the null hypotheses (There is no significant impact on employment generation created by small-scale enterprises in the economic growth of north-western Nigeria; There is no significant impact on poverty reduction made possible by small-scale enterprises in the economic growth of north-western Nigeria were all rejected.

On this note, it was generalised that small-scale enterprises have significant impact on economic growth of north-western Nigeria.

5. Conclusion

Nigerian government needs to understand the fact that small-scale businesses are the backbone of any economy because they bring about development of local goods, provision of employment, reduction of poverty among individuals and industrialisation in the country.

Nigerians are probably the most entrepreneurial people on earth. But this is not enough. In order to positively encourage the spirit of enterprise among our young people, our universities and other institutions of higher learning must be encouraged to develop more ties with local businesses and hold more business related activities on campus. This will ultimately help to reduce the pool of unemployed young people in the country.

If Nigeria is to reach its full potential in terms of economic and social development, it cannot afford to ignore the importance of its indigenous small-scale enterprises, and the contribution they make to the country's economy. In this wise, trade liberalisation and the encouragement of foreign direct investment has to go hand-in-hand with a thorough and concentrated effort to help the growth and development of small-scale enterprises. As such, the right institutional framework comprising of finance, infrastructure and policy should be developed to stimulate the growth and development of economy-impactful small-scale based businesses.

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THEME NINE
CLIMATE CHANGE: VULNERABILITY, RESILIENCE, MITIGATION, AND ADAPTATION

CLIMATE CHANGE AS A PUBLIC HEALTH THREAT: IMPLICATIONS AND WAY FORWARD

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Abstract
This paper focuses on climate change, its impact on public health and way forward. The paper also discusses the mechanics of the earth's climate system, and describes the connection between climate change and health as the greatest public health threat of our time. This is because climate change threatens the essential ingredients of good health like clean air, safe drinking water, nutritious food supply, safe shelter, and has the potential to undermine decades of progress in global health. Climate change can lead to trauma, mental health issues, and loss of community and social networks; resulting from increases in heat-related morbidity and mortality, the health consequences of more frequent and stronger extreme weather events, and the impacts of drought, flooding, and rises in sea levels. The risk of malnutrition due to threatened agriculture and fisheries, and to reduced nutritional content of foods is also highlighted. Climate change harms the health of the most vulnerable, such as children, the elderly, those with chronic medical conditions as well as people of lower socioeconomic classes. To address these problems, intervention strategies which must include both those designed to mitigate greenhouse gases so as to prevent worsening and potentially catastrophic climate change and those designed to adapt to and manage, to the extent possible, impacts of climate change that cannot be avoided, must be employed. However, national, state, and local health agencies and organisations should develop climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies and policies to prepare for and manage the health risks of climate change, doing so in ways that promote equity and sustainable development.

Keywords: Climate, Climate Change, Public Health Threat, Implications, Way Forward

Introduction
Climate change is impacting human lives and health in a variety of ways. The connection between climate change and health has been called the greatest public health threat of our time (Watts et al, 2015). Climate change threatens the essential ingredients of good health; clean air, safe drinking water, nutritious food supply, and safe shelter, and has the potential to undermine decades of progress in global health. The term '*climate'* refers to the general weather conditions of a place over many years. Climate *change* is a significant variation of average weather conditions; may be, conditions becoming warmer, wetter, or drier over several decades or more. It is that longer-term trend that differentiates climate change from natural weather variability. And while "climate change" and "global warming" are often used interchangeably, global

warming; which is the recent rise in the global average temperature near the earth's surface, is just one aspect of climate change (Melillo et al, 2014).

The mechanics of the earth's climate system are simple. When energy from the sun is reflected off the earth and back into space (mostly by clouds and ice), or when the earth's atmosphere releases energy, the planet cools. When the earth absorbs the solar energy, or when atmospheric gases prevent heat released by the earth from radiating into space (the greenhouse effect), the planet warms (Watts et al, 2015). A variety of factors, both natural and human, can influence the earth's climate system.

Climate Change as a Public Health Threat

Climate change leads to a broad range of negative health outcomes (Mills, 2009). Recent emerging health concerns, such as an association between increased heat and microbial resistance to antibiotics, reveal that the understanding of these health risks is still in its infancy (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2013). Importantly, climate change disproportionately harms the health of the most vulnerable, including children, the elderly, and those with chronic medical conditions as well as people of lower socioeconomic classes. According to the World Health Organisation (2015), "climate change is expected to cause approximately 250,000 additional deaths per year" between 2030 and 2050". As the global temperature rises, so do the number of fatalities and illnesses from heat stress, heatstroke and cardiovascular and kidney disease. As air pollution worsens, so does respiratory health, particularly for the 300 million people living with asthma worldwide; also there are more airborne pollen and mold to torment hay fever and allergy sufferers, too.

Extreme weather events, such as severe storms and flooding can lead to injury, drinking water contamination, and storm damage that may compromise basic infrastructure or lead to community displacement. Indeed, historical models suggest the likelihood of being displaced by a disaster is now 60 per cent higher than it was four decades ago and the largest increases in displacement are driven by weather- and climate-related events (IPCC, 2014). It is worth noting that displacement comes with its own health threats, such as increases in urban crowding, trauma, social unrest, lack of clean water, and transmission of infectious diseases. A warmer, wetter world is also a boon for such as dengue fever, West Nile virus, and Lyme disease.

Climate change, on a global scale, affects health and welfare of all society, but some population groups are more exposed to the impact of risk. Factors such as age, sex, health, ethnicity, social status and economic security create different groups of the population **(**Patz et al 2014). Scientists point out that due to various aspects an individual of today's society is biologically more sensitive to climate change-related health risks than in the past. For aging of the population, longer life is expected resulting in higher organism's susceptibility to infectious diseases, heat and other environmental emergency events. Also, significant spread of non-infectious diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, respiratory diseases, metabolic disorders, that increases the organism's susceptibility to heat and other pressures by increasing risk of strokes, heart attacks, respiratory failures etc. Most importantly, high temperature both, outdoors and indoors (at home or at work) that increases susceptibility to heat, dehydration and risk of kidney damage (IPCC, 2014).

Implications of Climate Change

The global health threat of climate change is both serious and urgent; hence, several authorities have convincingly demonstrated that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are primarily responsible for this threat (Anderegg et al, 2010; IPCC, 2013; Melillo et al, 2014). Climate change has occurred and is projected to continue through this century, even with significant reductions in future emissions (Melillo et al, 2014); however, projected impacts differ substantially under different scenarios, ranging from “business as usual” to significantly reduced greenhouse gas emissions (Moss et al, 2010; IPCC, 2013).

Public health risks associated with even moderate degrees of global warming (premised on significant emissions reductions include increases in heat-related morbidity and mortality, the health consequences of more frequent and stronger extreme weather events, and the impacts of drought, flooding, and rises in sea levels (Nitschke et al., 2011; IPCC, 2014). Health risks may arise from changes in the intensity and range of transmission of vector-borne and other infectious diseases, and increases in ground-level ozone air pollution and aero-allergens related to higher ambient temperatures increase the risk of respiratory and cardiovascular illnesses (Sheffield et al, 2011; Chang et al., 2012). There is risk of malnutrition due to threatened agriculture and fisheries (especially in developing countries) (Lloyd et al, 2011) and to reduced nutritional content of foods (Myers et al., 2014). Workers' health and safety are at risk as a result of the physiological limits to coping with heat exposure while working, creating potential economic impacts through reduced work capacity and reduced labour productivity (Kjellstrom et al, 2009).

Climate change can result in trauma, mental health issues, and loss of community and social networks resulting from dislocation, loss of livelihood, or environmental uncertainty (McMichael et al, 2012); mass dislocation or migration in response to extreme weather or other climate change consequences has already occurred and would compound other risks (Melillo et al, 2014). Interpersonal violence and political violence or armed conflict in response to climate change pose direct threats to human wellbeing, and political violence involves indirect threats as well through its impact on resources, political structures, and social stability (Burke et al, 2014; Levy & Sidel, 2014).

Many climate-related health impacts are already occurring, as noted by the World Health Organisation (2009). However, disadvantaged populations with limited resources with which to adapt will experience disproportionately greater impacts to health and wellbeing (IPCC, 2014). World Health Organistion (2014) projects that between 2030 and 2050; at least 250,000 additional deaths per year will be attributable to climate change, noting that this count omits difficult-to-estimate mortality pathways such as heat waves and water scarcity. However, the interactions of poverty and climate change, together with demographic changes such as aging populations, urbanisation, and migration, may place substantially greater numbers of people at risk.

Meanwhile, adverse health impacts are and will be especially severe among susceptible population groups, including pregnant women, children, the elderly, some categories of workers, individuals with underlying chronic diseases or disabilities, economically disadvantaged communities (including the rural and urban poor), and marginalised communities such as indigenous peoples and certain racial and ethnic minorities (Balbus, & Malina, 2009, IPCC, 2014). Within and across nations, the disproportionate impacts and risks of climate change among disadvantaged and marginalised populations pose a substantial threat to social and health equity. Moreover, climate change puts at risk several decades' worth of gains in global development and global health (Melillo et al, 2014).

Climate change thus presents significant global ethical challenges; it presents, as well, intergenerational and interspecies ethical challenges. Even with significant emissions reductions, climate change threatens the health of future generations, while the benefits of activities producing such emissions have accrued to current and previous generations. Climate change compounds the effects of other environmental impacts such as habitat fragmentation and ecosystem degradation and thus contributes to species vulnerability and extinction and the emergence of infectious diseases (IPCC, 2014).

Moreover, disparities in climate impacts and risks between developed and developing nations represent a political challenge to global agreements addressing climate change, a challenge made particularly acute by the responsibility of developed nations for the preponderance of historical greenhouse gas emissions. Meanwhile, the direct and indirect impacts and risks of climate change, including resource scarcity and environmental migration, represent threats to global security (Burke et al, 2014). There is a need to develop a multidisciplinary ethical framework to inform climate change strategies and decision making (Singh, 2012).

Evidence-Based Interventions and Strategies

Public health has a critically important role to play in addressing environmental threats to human health. Given the complexity of projecting future climate change, the magnitude and diversity of its threats to health, and the wide range of possible strategies to address it, interventions to protect human health will continue to involve uncertainties (Melillo et al, 2014). The precautionary principle, which guides public health action in the face of scientific uncertainty when failure to act would threaten health and safety, should be brought to bear. Intervention strategies must include both those designed to mitigate greenhouse gases so as to prevent worsening and potentially catastrophic climate change and those designed to adapt to and manage, to the extent possible, impacts of climate change that cannot be avoided (IPCC, 2014).

Mitigation and adaptation strategies that offer the greatest health co-benefits and health cost savings while achieving critical mitigation targets should be preferred over other solutions. While a range of viable and promising mitigation and adaptation strategies exist, political barriers remain significant (Watts et al., 2015). Thus, communicating the importance and urgency of addressing climate change is itself a key strategy. The health and public health sectors have important roles to play in protecting and promoting health in relationship to both mitigation and adaptation strategies as well as in communicating to the public and decision makers the health threats and opportunities associated with climate change and strategies to address it.

To quickly and substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions, mitigation efforts must prioritise interventions in those sectors responsible for the greatest proportion of current and projected greenhouse gas emissions, including energy production, transportation, and forestry and agriculture. All of these sectors offer opportunities for health co-benefits and health cost savings that can offset implementation costs. The greatest global greenhouse gas contributor is energy production through the extraction and burning of carbon-based fuels (IPCC, 2014). WHO estimates that, currently, 7 million deaths annually can be attributed to indoor and outdoor air pollution, mostly from coal, wood, and biomass-based cooking and heating (indoor) and fossil fuel-based electricity generation and transportation (outdoor) (Smith et al., 2014). Shifting to low carbon energy production through increased energy efficiency and low carbon renewable energy technologies, with a particular emphasis on eliminating use of coal, is technically feasible and would offer significant health co-benefits (Hertwich et al., 2015). This effort must include technical and other support to lower-income countries so that they can move directly to the use of renewables and meet goals related to access to energy (and the health benefits thereof) while also meeting mitigation targets; access to clean energy for low-income countries supports adaptation goals as well, reducing vulnerability by decreasing poverty and increasing community socioeconomic resilience (Watts et al., 2015).

Critical roles for the health and public health sectors in advancing priority mitigation strategies include assessing and comparing the health risks and costs of failure to mitigate climate change with the costs and benefits of proposed mitigation strategies, communicating those relative risks and costs to policymakers and the public, promoting mitigation activities that enhance community resilience, promoting equitable mitigation approaches by identifying vulnerable populations and disparate impacts of climate change and mitigation strategies, and partnering across sectors to ensure that health considerations are addressed in all approaches (Patz et al., 2014; Watts et al., 2015). Public health ethics resources may help agencies, groups, and communities discuss moral and ethical values from various points of view.

Adaptation strategies must address the direct and indirect effects of climate change, including storms, floods, sea level rise, droughts and heat waves, air pollution, infectious diseases, food insecurity, loss of livelihoods, and dislocation or migration and their attendant impacts on human health (Melillo et al, 2014). Adaptation processes may also intersect and interact with mitigation processes and should support sustainable development. Given the pace of change, adaptation planning cannot rely upon past climate as a guide but must look to future projections, including possible tipping points and "tail risks": the low probability but high consequence risks at the outer edges of projected impacts (IPCC, 2014; Patz et al., 2014). Moreover, to address impacts as they manifest locally, adaptation must be place and context specific. Adaptive management provides an approach that is flexible, iterative, and able to address inherent uncertainties and complexities; also, it allows interventions to be tailored to specific contexts. Because vulnerability to climate change impacts depends not only on exposure to climate change hazards but also on community and individual resilience, increasing general resilience (through addressing social determinants of health such as poverty, educational level, social capital, and access to healthcare), in addition to implementing specific climate change–oriented resilience measures, is critical to reducing vulnerability.

The current progress of adaptation efforts nationally and globally is nascent and varied; adaptation efforts to date are not sufficient to address the risks of climate changes. Proactive adaptation will be more effective and less costly than delayed action. Important lessons and promising practices are emerging in some localities, regions, and nations and in some sectors, but a robust evidence base is still lacking (Melillo et al, 2014). Nevertheless, recommendations are emerging to help guide health adaptation planning processes. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015) provides a useful framework for adaptation planning and action: with stakeholder engagement throughout; forecast climate impacts and assess vulnerabilities, project the disease burden, assess public health interventions, develop and implement climate and health adaptation plans, and evaluate impacts and improve the quality of activities. Public health adaptation efforts should be based on the best available science and should include strengthening public health infrastructure, incorporating climate change into health sector planning and management, linking with other sectors, participating in climate change planning and management processes to ensure attention to health, and prioritising strategies that protect the most vulnerable (IPCC, 2014). Ecosystem-based adaptation and community-based approaches that improve community resilience are "low regrets" strategies that offer substantial promise for providing health co-benefits, and therefore such approaches should be prioritised whenever appropriate (Patz et al., 2014).

Public health involvement in addressing climate change can help ensure that health co-benefits are realised. For example, urban planning to create more energy- and water-efficient cities with improved green space, public transit, and active transportation options can reduce greenhouse gas emissions and chronic disease while increasing resilience, physical activity levels, and social cohesion (Melillo et al, 2014). Shifts to more plant-based diets in high-meat-consuming countries would decrease demands on fresh water and methane emissions while also reducing heart disease. Provision of modern family planning services to all women and men who want them can support climate mitigation, adaptation, and resilience while decreasing maternal and infant mortality and enhancing opportunities for women (Patz et al., 2014). Health sector involvement in climate change decision making at all levels, from local to global and including both the public and private sectors, is needed to ensure that health co-benefit opportunities are identified, fully considered, and optimised and that health and social equity are protected.

Way Forward

- National, state, and local health agencies and organisations should develop climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies and policies to prepare for and manage the health risks of climate change, doing so in ways that promote equity and sustainable development.
- Public health departments and health care systems should incorporate climate vulnerability assessments, planning, tracking, and interventions into public health strategies and health care provision.
- Policymakers and public administrators should actively include community members when developing climate change strategies and policies at the local, regional, state, and national levels.

- Public health and healthcare communities should communicate the critical importance of mitigating and adapting to climate change, including advocating for reducing emissions of heat-trapping greenhouse gases, communicating the impacts of climate change on human health, promoting community resilience and adaptation to changes in climate that cannot be prevented, and promoting strategies to address climate change that maximize benefits and co-benefits to health.
- Federal, state, and local governments should provide health agencies and organisations with the mandate, leadership, and adequate resources to support climate change activities;
- All health agencies and organisations should demonstrate leadership by adopting firm commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and increase energy efficiency related to their activities and to communicate publicly about the reasons for adopting such practices.
- All training programmes for health professionals, including public health, medical, and nursing programs should include climate change in their curricula.
- Post-secondary education programs in all relevant earth sciences should include instruction on the public health consequences of climate change;
- Public health departments and health providers should incorporate climate vulnerability assessments, planning, tracking, and interventions into emerging population health approaches that integrate healthcare provision with public health strategies.
- Public health community should help to ensure more equitable, community-based approaches to disaster risk reduction and with ensuring that these processes address the risks of climate change and that health co-benefits from disaster risk reduction measures are emphasised and realised.
- International partners should substantially increase funding for sustainable development projects that promote economic and social equity, reduce or minimise greenhouse gas emissions, and result in co-benefits to communities while building health system capacity and infrastructure in developing countries, as well as funding for climate change adaptation projects that increase the resilience of individuals living in poverty to help protect against adverse climate effects.

Conclusion

The negative health impacts of climate change are evident in the society today. Unprecedentedly, the world population is encountering unfamiliar human-induced changes in the lower and middle atmospheres and world-wide depletion of various other natural systems (e.g., soil fertility, aquifers, ocean fisheries, and biodiversity in general). Beyond the early recognition that such changes would affect economic activities, infrastructure and managed ecosystems, there is now recognition that global climate change poses risks to human population health. Climate change is emerging as a major theme in population health research, social policy development, and advocacy. Indeed, consideration of global climatic-environmental hazards as a threat to human health will become a central role in the sustainability transition debate. Hopefully, this will implore the world at large to adopt mitigation and adaptation intervention strategies in tackling the problem of climate change.

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THEME TEN
BIODIVERSITY, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION

GROUNDWATER QUALITY CONTROL IN UDI/EZEAGU WATERSHED NIGERIA

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Abstract
Groundwater is a preferred source of potable water supply in most communities. The global threat of this precious resource due to human activities has prompted the need for periodic monitoring and assessment as a result of health implications consumption of unsafe groundwater may pose on consumers. This paper studies the groundwater quality control in Udi/Ezeagu watershed, Nigeria. To achieve this aim, groundwater samples were collected from six different sites in the study area and analysed for physico-chemical properties in the laboratory and compared with World Health Organisation (WHO) standard. The result shows that the groundwater samples from the six sites are slightly acidic with varying values of 4.38, 4.29, 4.56, 4.61, 4.43 and 4.55 for site A, B, C, D, E and F respectively. A one sample t-test is used for the data analysis. Magnesium was significantly higher when compared to the WHO limits ($p < 0.001$). The study suggests seasonal monitoring and analysis to keep the groundwater quality under control. It recommends analysis of heavy metals and other potential contaminant like radionuclides and disinfectants.

1.0. Introduction

Groundwater is one of the major sources of water supply. It is a preferred source of potable water supply in most communities worldwide (Lol et al, 2020; Nwobodo et al, 2015). According to Epbrahim (2011), it is free from contamination as it is being naturally filtered during their passage through the ground. However, some studies show contrary view (Fuest et al, 1998; Nolan and Stoner, 2000; Reid et al, 2003; Ngaje et al, 2010; Azzellino et al, 2018). There is risk of diffuse contamination by agrochemicals such as nitrate and pesticides in areas where agricultural activities are widely practised (Spalding and Exner, 1993; Goss et al, 1998; EEA, 1999). Zhao et al (2020) studied the occurrence and distribution characteristics in groundwater, the result show that aromatic hydrocarbons were detected in 59 out of 355 samples which is attributed contamination originating from anthropogenic sources. Groundwater quality is a factor of the existence and concentration of different chemical components influenced by the geological properties of the aquifer (Selvaku-mar et al, 2017; Parameswari and Padmini, 2018). Groundwater has being contaminated by different trace elements from rock weathering, fertilisers from farmland, seepages from septic tanks effluents and leakages (Giri and Singh, 2015; Selvam et al, 2017; Ahmed et al, 2019). The persistence, toxicity and carcinogenic nature of the contaminants can pose serious health risk to the consumers (Krishna and Mohan, 2014; Naz et al, 2016).

Good quality water supply is a major key in providing good life quality to the people and also vital for economic growth in cities (Bailey et al, 2015). Global rise in urbanisation and industrialisation has brought to limelight the issue of urban water supply due to groundwater contamination (Parkinson and Tayler, 2003; Navarro and Carbonell, 2007; Kumar et al, 2017; Vetrimurugan et al, 2017).

Impact of land use on groundwater pollution has stirred the need for urban water resource management and protection (Reddy et al, 2012; Chisala et al, 2007). Punjab in Pakistan and Kharkiv city in the Eastern Ukraine experience the menace of industrialisation in their groundwater which is a major source of drinking water for the urban residents (Farooqi et al, 2009; Vystavna et al, 2017). Low pH causes leaching of heavy metals into the environment (Król et al, 2019). According to Scatena, 2000 electrical conductivity depends on factors such as agricultural and industrial activities and land use. Mineralisation rate (existence of minerals such as potassium, calcium, and sodium) and the amount of chemical reagents used to treat this water can influence this parameter (Kavcar et al, 2009; Cidu et al, 2011; Muhammad et al, 2011; Khan et al, 2013).

Point and non-point sources of groundwater contamination have been reported in many countries of the world (Qasemi et al, 2018; Zhai et al, 2017a, b). In recent decades, high nitrogen fertiliser application rates has increased nitrate leaching affecting groundwater nutrient loads (Almasri and Kaluarachchi, 2007; Su et al, 2013; Wilson, 2015). Access to safe drinking water is a fundamental human right (Yang et al, 2013; Bodrud-Doza et al, 2020; Wu et al, 2021). The efficient control of its quality is a basic necessity for maintaining good health. World Health Organisation (WHO) gave drinking water guidelines to assist in monitoring and keeping water quality properties for drinking purposes in check. Standard limit values are assigned to different parameters to aid comparison, monitoring and management plan (WHO, 2011).

The study area is known for its prolific aquifer with several boreholes at different locations. These boreholes serve as major dispensing points for tanker water supply that supply water to Enugu metropolis for different uses majorly for drinking purposes. The high elevation of the area gives the assumption that water from the area is completely safe for drinking and other domestic use. The objective of the study is to access the groundwater quality in the study area and compare with WHO standard. This will help keep the groundwater quality under control through periodic analysis and monitoring of the watershed since it's a major source of drinking water and other domestic uses for Enugu urban residents and beyond.

2.0 Materials and Method

2.1. *Study Area*



Fig 1. Map of the study Area

Udi Local Government Area lies between longitudes $7^0 9'$E and $7^0 28'$E and latitudes $6^0 12'$N and $6^0 41'$N in the southeastern part of Nigeria encompassing an area of about 897km^2, with an elevation ranging from 231m to 500m above mean sea level. Udi Local Government Area has a tropical climate with sharp variation depending on rainfall. Rainfall is seasonal with a wet rainy season and a dry harmattan season controlled by the north-east and south-west wind. It consists of fine-medium grained, white to grey sandstones, shaly sandstones, sandy shales, grey mudstones, shales and coal seams. The study area has conglomeration of manufacturing industries and automobile repair stations.

2.2. *Data Collection*

This study employed experimental method. Groundwater samples were collected in triplicates from six locations in the study area in February, 2020 (dry season). The parameters analysed were fifteen (15) in number. They include: Temperature, pH, Conductivity, Total Dissolved Solid (TDS), Total Suspended Solid (TSS), Total Solid (TS), Total Hardness, Calcium Hardness, Magnesium Hardness, Chloride, Bicarbonate, Nitrate, Silica, Iron and Alkalinity. The water samples were collected in a clean 1.5 litre plastic jar with screw caps and packed in a cooler and transported to the laboratory immediately. The groundwater samples were stored in the refrigerator at 4°C until analysis was completed.

An *in-situ* test was carried out using portable digital meter for Temperature, pH, Total Dissolved Solids and Electrical conductivity. The instrument used for measuring the temperature was thermometer and HANNA instruments with models, pHep was used in measuring pH and H196301 used in measuring Electrical conductivity and Total Dissolved Solids. The water samples were collected in a clean 1.5 litre plastic jar with screw caps and packed in a cooler and transported to the laboratory immediately. The groundwater samples were stored in the refrigerator at 4°C until analysis was completed. The statistical analysis used was one sample t-test to ascertain the significant between the laboratory result and WHO standard.

3.0 Results and Discussion

The physico-chemical properties obtained from the six sites were presented in figure 2 and the values compared with the WHO standard limit in Table 1.

3.1 *Temperature*

This is the degree of hotness or coldness of a body. The standard value of water temperature is 20-30°C (Santhosh and Singh). Water temperature of the sampled sites range from 28 °C to 30°C. The results of the sites were found within the WHO permissible limit.

3.2 *pH*

This is a measure of acidic (free hydrogen ions) or basic (free hydroxyl ions) nature of water. It ranges from 0 to 14 with 7 being neutral. pH less than 7 indicates acidity while greater than 7 indicates a base. The standard value of pH of drinking water is 6.5-8.5 (WHO, 2011). The pH of water helps to determine the solubility, availability biological constituents and heavy metals. Metals are likely to be toxic at lower pH because they are more soluble. The results of the sampled sites range from 4.29 to 4.61. The present pH results were in contrary with that of Nwobodo et al (2015), which the pH carried out during the dry season were within WHO permissible limit. This present results showed that the groundwater quality of sampled sites were slightly acidic in nature. Low pH influences leachability of heavy metals (Król et al, 2019) causing metal poisoning or toxicity. It can also erode tooth enamel and metal plumbing causing leaks. The results of this study were found not be within the permissible limit.

3.3 *Electrical Conductivity*

Electrical conductivity is the ability of water to carry an electric current. The presence of dissolved solids such as calcium, chloride, and magnesium in water samples carries the electric current through water. According to WHO, the maximum allowable level of conductivity is 1000 ⩽S/cm. The electrical conductivity of the six sampled sites range from 15.09 ⩽S/cm to 36.60 ⩽S/cm. This showed that all the sampled sites were well below the standard limit. Scatena, 2000 highlighted the differences based on various factors such as agricultural and industrial activities and land use, which affect the mineral contents and thus the electric conductivity of the water. It is determined for several purposes such as determination of mineralisation rate (existence of minerals such as potassium, calcium, and sodium) and estimating the amount of chemical reagents used to treat this water (Kavcar et al, 2009; Cidu et al, 2011; Muhammad et al, 2011; Khan et al, 2013).

3.4 *Calcium and Magnesium Hardness*

This is the sum of calcium and magnesium concentration. It also measures the ability of water to precipitate soap. The concentration calcium hardness ranges from 26mg/L to 58mg/L while that of magnesium hardness ranges from 2.00mg/L to 3.50mg/L. The results of calcium hardness in the six sites were found to be within the permissible limit while magnesium hardness was above the permissible limit.

3.5 *Total Hardness (TH)*

Total Total hardness ranged from 28-104 mg/L in the six sites. Based on TH, WHO (2011) classified water as soft (TH 0-75 mg/l), medium-hard (TH 75-150 mg/l), hard (TH 150-300 mg/l), and TH above 300 mg/l as very hard. This shows that sampled sites values were between soft and medium hard classes. Groundwater of the Sites B, C, D, E and F soft with the following values 50mg/L, 28mg/L, 44mg/L, 40mg/L and 60mg/L while site A is medium hard water with the value 104mg/L.

3.6 *Alkalinity*

Alkalinity is majorly due to carbonated, bicarbonate and hydroxide contents. It ranged from 50-100 mg/L. The permissible limit of Alkalinity for water is 100 mg/L. The present results of alkalinity of the six sites were within the permissible limit.

3.7 *Total Suspended Solids (TSS)*

The maximum recommended TSS limit set by WHO is 30 mg/L. The TSS values of all the drinking water samples studied are shown in Figure 1. It was also found that the groundwater samples collected from the six sites showed no TSS content. This may be that the sample collection points in these sites had filtration systems attached to the taps, thus removing all the suspended particles such as silt, clay, and other inorganic particles.

3.8 *Total Dissolved Solids (TDS)*

These are the inorganic matters and small amounts of organic matter, which are present as solution in water. Figure 1 shows TDS values for all six drinking water samples. The standard or allowable value of the TDS is 500 mg/L . The values found from the drinking water samples were all within the maximum limit of 500 mg/L. The highest TDS value is 240 mg/L while the lowest TDS value is 20 mg/L.

3.9 *Chlorides*

These are inorganic compounds resulting from the combination of chlorine gas with metal. A little concentration of chlorides is needed for normal cell functions in animal and plants. The results of this study range from 15.89 mg/L to 20.85 mg/L. This showed it was below the permissible limit of 200mg/L.

3.10 *Iron*

This metal is the second abundant in the earth's crust and an indispensable element in human nutrition. The iron concentration in the sampled groundwater range from 0.01 mg/L to 0.2mg/L. Sites A, B and F showed no iron content in the groundwater samples. This zero concentration is not a good result since iron is an essential element in human nutrition. Although, excess concentration of nitrate may cause the ill-health, such as methemoglobinemia.

3.11 *Sulphate*

The results of sulphate range from 347.34 mg/L to 348.97 mg/L in the sampled groundwater sites. These concentrations were found to be within the permissible limit. As shown in Table 1.

3.12 *Bicarbonate*

The values range from 49.99 mg/L to 99.99 mg/L in the six sampled sites.




Calcium Hardness (Mg/L)
Chloride (Mg/L)
Bicarbonate (Mg/L)
Nitrate (Mg/L)
Sulphate (Mg/L)
Silica (Mg/L)
Iron (Mg/L)
Alkalinty (Mg/L)
Sites
A B C D E F

Table 1: Physiochemical properties of the groundwater samples

Parameter	Units	A	B	C	D	E	F	WHO STD
Temperature	^0C	29.00	30.00	28.00	30.00	28.00	29.00	30
pH		4.38	4.29	4.56	4.61	4.43	4.55	6.5-8.5
Conductivity	ƵS /cm	36.60	30.80	15.96	15.09	16.62	23.30	500
TDS	Mg/L	60.00	120.00	100.00	100.00	20.00	240.00	500
TSS	Mg/L	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	30
TS	Mg/L	60.00	120.00	100.00	100.00	20.00	240.00	1000
Total Hardness	Mg/L	104.00	50.00	28.00	44.00	40.00	60.00	250
Magnesium Hardness	Mg/L	3.30	3.50	2.50	2.00	3.00	2.80	1.00
Calcium Hardness	Mg/L	58.00	44.00	26.00	34.00	32.00	50.00	200
Chloride	Mg/L	19.86	15.89	17.87	16.89	20.85	19.86	200
Bicarbonate	Mg/L	99.99	99.99	49.99	99.99	99.99	49.99	
Nitrate	Mg/L	12.34	12.36	12.26	12.35	12.27	12.28	50
Sulphate	Mg/L	348.97	347.75	347.34	348.83	348.40	348.70	500
Silica	Mg/L	Nil	0.02	Nil	0.14	Nil	0.25	
Iron	Mg/L	Nil	Nil	0.12	0.20	0.01	Nil	0.3
Alkalinity	Mg/L	100.00	100.00	50.00	100.00	100.00	50.00	100

Table 2: One-Sample t-test comparing the Physiochemical properties of the groundwater samples in the study area and WHO standards.

	Study area Mean ± SD	WHO standard	T	P value
Temperature	29.00 ± 0.89	30	2.739	0.041
PH	4.47 ± 0.12	6.5-8.5	60.121	< 0.001
Conductivity	23.06 ± 8.93	500	130.827	< 0.001
TDS	106.67 ± 74.48	500	12.937	< 0.001
TSS		30		
TS	106.67 ± 74.48	1000	29.381	< 0.001
Total hardness	54.33 ± 26.55	250	18.055	< 0.001
Magnesium hardness	2.85 ± 0.55	1.00	8.287	< 0.001
Calcium hardness	40.67 ± 12.11	200	32.227	< 0.001
Chloride	18.54 ± 1.95	200	227.932	< 0.001
Bicarbonate				
Nitrate	12.31 ± 0.04	50	2064.366	< 0.001
Sulphate	348.33 ± 0.65	500	570.827	< 0.001
Silica				
Iron	0.11 ± 0.09	0.3	3.450	0.075
Alkalinity	83.33 ± 25.82	100	1.581	0.175

Table 2 shows that the Physiochemical properties of the groundwater samples in the study area were significantly lower when compared to the WHO limits ($P < 0.05$). Conversely, Magnesium was significantly higher when compared to the WHO limits ($p < 0.001$). However, Iron and Alkalinity were not significantly different from the WHO limits, which means that they met the WHO standards.

The study recommends seasonal monitoring and analysis of the groundwater quality. More heavy metals, microorganisms, radionuclides (radioactive material such as uranium), and disinfectants should be analysed in order to assess the overall groundwater quality

3.0 Conclusion

The values of groundwater quality parameters collected from all the six sites such as temperature, conductivity, TDS, TSS, calcium hardness, total hardness, sulphate, iron, nitrate, chloride, and alkalinity were found to be within the WHO permissible limit. However, pH and magnesium hardness were above the standard limit. Although, the quality of the groundwater in the study area is relatively good, the study found variation in the pH of the groundwater quality in time. It suggests seasonal monitoring and analysis to help keep the groundwater quality of the area under control. Furthermore, it recommends assessment of other potential groundwater contaminations such as other heavy metals, microbial and radiological materials due to industrial activities going on in the area in order to assess the overall groundwater quality of the watershed.

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THEME ELEVEN
GOVERNANCE, STATE INSTITUTIONS AND JUSTICE

GOVERNANCE CRISIS AND INCAPACITY OF THE NIGERIAN STATE: IMPLICATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue the view that poor performance of Nigerian state results from State's incapacity to resolve the problems of governance. I further insist that Nigeria state's crisis of governance is shown in state's ineptitude to secure the lives and property of the citizens, promote the rule of law, and offer apt leadership. Moreover, I maintain that the failure of the state in these three cardinal areas constitute a great hindrance to sustainable development in Nigeria. To support this claim, I shall refer to the activities of the government to demonstrate that non-visionary leadership largely points to state inability to drive forward governance in Nigeria. I shall pursue a critical stance and source data from primary observations as a Nigerian and secondary library sources.

Keywords: Governance, Rule of law, Security of lives and property, Leadership, State incapacity.

Introduction

Why are many African states still bogged down with the challenges of good governance? After the third wave of democracy in the 1990s (Huntington 1993), nearly all African states became democratic. While "good governance," for our purposes, stands for the process of decision-making, how government and civil society take decisions, and the implementation of the decisions (Kahar and Nath 2018), "democracy" is etymologically understood to mean government of the people. In what comes to the same thing, Yagbojeya and Akinola (2019) define democracy attractively as " the people's rule." Of the countries that embraced democracy, a handful few are engaged in their pursuit of good governance. Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco, Kenya set out on the right foot for good governance. According to Ibrahim Index (2018, p. 17) of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, Côte d'Ivoire has been constantly improving for 2008-2017 with the score (+ 12.7) points, while Morocco has progressed to (+7.3) points, and Kenya ameliorated to (+ 6.1) point. In spite of African Union's stance in its plan to transform and develop Africa (African Union's Commission, 2015), many African states are backing down from embracing good governance. Why is good governance proving problematic for developing countries, especially for African states? Why does Nigeria, in spite of her natural endowments, fail to rise to the challenges of good governance? Why does the Nigerian state lack the capacity to perform?

I argue the view that poor performance of the Nigerian state is attributable to her failure to engage in good governance. Good governance implicates governance reforms (Mbaku, 2018, pp. 23-32). This means reform of institutions and a design of a newly democratic constitution.

The recent uprisings in Nigeria, where the different ethnic nations threaten to break away (self-determination), result from the Nigerian state leadership's refusal to undertake institutional reforms. The 1999 constitution, which sections the Nigerian lawmakers amend piecemeal, is the sole handiwork of the military dictator and is nothing but decrees. Rather than draw up a newly democratic constitution, the lawmakers insist on patchwork of some sections. This strategy reflects the leadership's lack of political will to design a new constitution. Both institutional reforms and the enthronement of a democratic constitution have a significant purpose in governance. Institutional reforms hinder any dictatorship from either forcefully removing a democratically elected government, forestall weak and purposeless leadership, and internecine conflicts. It promotes economic transformation, service delivery, sustainable development, and offers peace and security to the citizens. Those African countries, engaged in the pursuit of good governance, have embarked upon far-reaching institutional reforms and drawn up democratic constitutions. The Nigerian state is grouped together with Afghanistan, Iraq, among the first three countries impacted with terrorism, according to Dudley (2019). Burdened with poor, and ineffective structures, it has proved an uphill task for a naturally endowed Nigerian state to fight off poverty and make any headway in human resources development.

The consequences are anarchy, the emergence of the Hobbesian Leviathan, or nihilism. Only a recourse to the Kantian balance of reason may possibly lead to the renewed and firm pursuit of good governance. Although the paper is interdisciplinary, cutting across history, political science, public administration etc, I shall privilege the philosophical perspective. My strategy is to critically draw the dire consequences of the Nigerian state's incapacity to perform responsibly in the fields of rule of law, security, and leadership only. In these areas, I shall demonstrate the failure of the Nigerian government to deliver requisite services to its citizenry. This incapacity impacts on sustainable development. I shall not venture into a detailed demonstration of the Nigerian state's incapacity in the stipulated areas. Rather, it suffices for our purposes to illustrate state incapacity in terms of lack of the political will, neglect and failure to embrace the salient features of good governance in government's activities and policies.

The paper has four sections and a conclusion. Section one deals with the idea of good governance and the idea of capacity of the state. Stipulating the core pillars of governance, the paper argues the need for the Nigerian state to embrace the challenges of good governance. The second section evaluates the Nigerian state's underperformance in security, and the rule of law - all a result of its ineffective leadership. The underperformance results from its unsuccessful leadership (Achebe 1988). Section three discusses the effects of the failure to embrace good governance and the various options open to the government. Section four discusses Kant's balance of reason as a guide to the Nigerian state's embrace of good governance. It graphically examines the implications of good governance for sustainable development. Finally, the paper ends with a conclusion.

State Capacity

The Nigerian state, like many African states, is persistently criticised for its underperformance. It functions far below expectations. This underperformance arises from the state's lack of capacity.

This lack derives not from the absence of this capacity but its inept leadership to pursue good governance. This is the prevalent view among scholars like Yagboyaju and Akinola (2019, pp. 1-2) and Akinola (2018). Lack of state capacity entails inability to drive development and to deliver on good governance. More positively, Yahaya (2004, p. 167) defines a state capacity thus:

> Capacity in its context of public sector is the ability of the government, by the combination of resources, to design and implement good policies for sustainable development, promote human welfare and create enabling environment for economic growth and prosperity.

Any government, which is incapable of effectively discharging its responsibilities, as listed above, is no longer functioning adequately as it should. Such a government, as Yahaya (2004) describes it, has not much to show in terms of the rule of law, security, and political authority. Such a state would face several problems like anarchy, ethnic violence especially in Africa, and nepotism. The state is tending gradually towards collapse. While some thinkers refer to such a state of affairs in a state as evident signs of state collapse, the World Bank (1997) sees it as state incapacity. According to Akinola (2018, p. 88), a state works when it plays its role, fulfills its functions effectively vis-à-vis the citizens and the population occupying its territory. This would mean that government ensures equality and promotes fundamental human rights. There is no ceiling to what responsibility the government engages in. The government's responsibility to the sate and its citizens is ever expansive and englobing than merely undertaking a limited one.

Good Governance

Not until Plato had proposed the idea of philosopher-king as his solution to the problem of governance in the Athenian Greek city-state did philosophers elaborated theories about the complexities of governance. So intricate was governance that he maintained that the world would hardly know peace unless rulers become philosophers or philosophers become rulers (Plato Republic).

African Development Bank ((2000) insists that good governance is founded on three pillars: (*i*) effective state, (*ii*) mobilised civil society, and (*iii*) an efficient private sector. Generally, the component elements of good governance for several scholars are generally essentially the same. Kahar and Nath (2018, 1000342) insist that the elements are participatory in nature: combatting corruption, raising accountability of actors and promoting transparency in the functioning of the state. These features portray a certain conception of government - a participatory form of government.

Nzongala-Ntala (2003) proposes three aspects of governance. They are as follows: (*i*) *Political Public Governance* - this type of governance has to do with "the processes by which a society organises its affairs and manages them. Any of these - the state, government, or public sector constitutes the source of its authority; (*ii*) *Economic Governance* - concerns the private sector and deals with "the policies, processes, and institutional mechanisms pertinent to service delivery"; and (*iii*) *Social Governance* - is yet another type of governance which, according to Nzongala-Ntala (2003), is the type of governance that has to do with a "system of values and beliefs necessary for social behaviours to happen and for public decisions to be taken."

These three types of governance interface, cooperate and generate development. A question arises, what does governance crisis in African states signal.

Failure of Governance

For the purposes of this paper, I shall limit my discussion of crisis of governance in Nigeria to select fields of government. These areas include security, rule of law, and leadership. I shall begin with security.

(i) Security

Thinkers insist that there exists some relationship between security and development. Foreign investments seek out a peaceful and a welcoming atmosphere. Investors are wary of those regions embroiled in violence. The Global and Peace Index has continuously downgraded Nigeria as one of the restive nations. Out of 158 countries, Nigeria ranked 117th in 2007, 129th in 2008/2009, and 146th in 2012. Thus, Nigeria has once been ranked with Sudan, Iraq, and even Somalia (Omilusi, 2013). A state, which lacks the capacity to secure life and property in its territory, is a failed state Omilusi (2013, pp. 1-9). Here Omilusi maintains the view that the loss of state security services implies the non-existence of the state. As he put it, the state plays the role of the "guarantor of last resort of personal safety, liberty and property of the citizen." He distinguishes between the external and internal aspects of security. Further, he specifies the two dimensions of the internal spectrum of the security of the state: state security and the people's security. Relating to the people, Omilusi (2013) explains that security in no way refers to any use of arms. Rather, it consists in meeting the citizens' needs - the social, political, cultural, economic and human rights. To assure the people's security in times of need is "the only and best guarantee of security of the state" (Omilusi, 2013, pp. 1-4). The external dimension of the security of the state refers to foreign armed invasion of a state.

Following the thought, Omilusi (2013) and Nzongala-Ntalaja (2013, pp. 96-97) insist human security is double-pronged. In the first place, it refers to a shield against violence and in the second, it refers to provision of access to people's rights to education, initial healthcare, supply of the basic amenities, right to clean environment, ready response to disasters like the provision of COVID-19 palliatives, etc. Nigeria boasts of various levels of state security institutions and services. Despite those levels of insecurity, palpable insecurity exists in Nigeria.

. Nigeria's economy depends entirely on oil. The South-South region of the state is the locus for tremendous oil reserves in the country. Ethnic strifes among different ethnic nations did envelope the region in the past. The flaring of gas, the nonchalance of various corporations about the environmental pollution of the region - together drew the ire of the region to engage in wanton destruction of the corporations' equipment, kidnapping, blowing up the oil pipelines, etc. Constituting a threat to the state's economy, the Yar' Adua Presidency granted the various warring factions amnesty. Only recently, some groups have renewed their threats to go on a rampage.

Presently, Boko Haram terrorists remain the highest threat to Nigerian state. The Northerners are wont to trace the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria to injustices perpetrated against the Northern region. Yet, the North has been ruling the country for decades! Boko Haram is the last in a series of the North's demands for an Islamic state. Preceded by Maitasine riot, Boko Haram arose as a fledgling Islamic group under Shekau. Unaware of the dangers it posed to the nation, the Federal government (FG) handled the initial emergence of Boko Haram with woolly gloves until the group built up its own armory.

Following in the heels of Boko Haram are the Fulani herders. Although the herders did not belong to any of the agents of security, the FG never deals them any hard blow. The Fulani pastoralists have generated unrest in most parts of the Nigerian state. They maim, rape, kill, kidnap and plunder. Both the Buhari-government and the rampaging Fulani ethnic nation have lost sight of the modern mechanised way of herding cows. The rejection of the peaceful modern avenues of pastoralism has made their activities suspicious. Other regions of the Nigerian state have rejected the Fulani occupation of their ungoverned spaces within their ancestral lands. That the Buhari-led FG turns a blind eye on their activities places the Fulani herders above the law. The emergence of Eastern Nigeria Network (ESN) and Amotekun are traceable to the obnoxious activities of the Fulani herders.

(ii) Rule of Law

This is the next significant element for successful governance, especially in a democratic government. It is not merely sufficient to understand democracy generally as government by the people. The stakes are higher than an emphasis on rule by the people. A state's constitution and an overarching rule of law guarantee a successful governance and a protection of life and property within a democracy (Yagboyaju and Akinola, 2019, p. 5). In fact, it is the rule of law that gives democracy the bite it possesses, and also affords the people the chance to contend for public offices in a well-organised and responsible elections. Within an established judiciary, the rule of law offers the legal structure for adjudication of disputes and oversees the activities of the executive arm of government.

In Nigerian democracy, the judiciary has oftentimes reneged on its duties - especially to check the activities of the executive. A few illustrations here are adequate. Within the First Republic (1960-1966), the judiciary took sides with the executive in the adjudication of the 1965 election petitions. The same scenario played out in the Second Republic (1979-1983) and throughout the military dictatorship. The judiciary served to rubber-stamp the decisions of military tribunals. The Fourth Republic (1999 till the present) has recorded many cases of the judiciary impugning the law. Worth mentioning is the case of President Buhari's dismissal of the Chief Justice of the Nation (CJN) - Chief Justice Onoghen on frivolous grounds. The Judiciary was unable to muster a united front in addressing the issue. This failure influenced the Chief executive to appoint an Islamic Justice as the CJN. The next instance illustrates the apex court's compromise of the integrity of the judiciary in its adjudication of the winner of the 2018 gubernatorial election in Imo state. The Supreme court of justice declared Mr Hope Uzodimma winner, in an election that placed Uzodimma in the fourth position. In an unguarded moment, Mr Uzodimma admitted to the public that the Chief of Staff - Abba Kyari - facilitated the arrangement. Apart from one chief Justice of the apex court who retracted his position in a re-trial, the apex court maintained its position. The outcome is similar to the apex court's decision in the case of President Buhari's non-possession of the First School Leaving Certificate (FSLC). Nigeria's judiciary was written off as no more than a miscarriage of justice. In all the cases, the judiciary fully approved the actions of the executive.

(iii) Leadership

A number of scholars have lampooned the ineptitude of Nigeria's leadership (Achebe 1988). If we divide Nigeria's democracy into four Republics. The First Republic (1960-1966) never lasted long before the military scuttled it. The Second Republic (1979-1983) was much shorter. The Third 'Republic' (1983 and 1984) need not be considered a "republic" because the military dictators combined military rule and some form of representation of the people. The Fourth Republic (1999 till the present) has been so far the longest republic. All through the republics (first, second, fourth), the leadership has proved incapable of steering the affairs of the Nigerian state. Notable for its natural endowment in terms of oil and liquefied natural gas reserves, the leadership has failed to improve the state's poverty index by a great margin. In 2021, Nigeria was designated the World capital of poverty. Not only has the leadership mismanaged the "cheap capital from those natural endowments" (Agbakoba, 2019, p. 297) it has allowed the endowments to waste away. The leadership has failed to reconstruct its dilapidating refineries, allowing them to waste away. Nigeria's ongoing project of new refinery is surprisingly located in Niger, a neighbouring country! Most of the nation's industries were shut down between 2015 and 2016 (Vanguard News, p. 16). Until the discovery of oil reserves in meaningful quantity, Nigeria invested previously in agriculture and exported some cash crops. However, the discovery of oil and gas reserves led the leadership into abandoning agriculture. Yet, it has proved incapable of feeding her population, offer its citizens the basic needs of healthcare, basic education, housing, etc.

For its extreme pursuit of the Islamic agenda - the Islamisation of Nigeria - Buhari's leadership has failed the nation. Elected on the promise of counterterrorism, the Buhari leadership has failed to deliver on his election promises. Indeed, several parts of the Nigerian state are engaged in tensions of pronounced insecurity of lives and property. The leadership's announcement of the utter defeat of the Boko Haram terrorists was after all a political strategy. For the terrorist group has not only established links with the North African Al-Qaeda, it has amassed armaments for the establishment of the Islamic state of West Africa. Buhari leadership's rejection of restructuring of the Nigerian polity and devolution of political power have provoked some ethnic nations to argue for self-determination. The outcome of the failure to restructure breeds ethnic restiveness, insecurity and the quest of some ethnic nations to carve themselves out from Nigeria.

The specter of Islamic sectarian violence has gradually spread over the continent. The goals of the Islamic sects is to overthrow elected governments in a wave of a renewed Jihad. If France had to intervene in Mali to forestall the Islamic sect from overthrowing a a democratically elected government, Nigeria only requires good governance to defeat its own politically bred Boko Haram terrorists - the nightmare of the Nigerian state. The Islamic terrorists in West Africa established strong links with Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM procures the financial support, arms supplies, and offers training to conscripts in Al-Qaeda camps littered throughout Africa. Should the Islamic quest succeed, the continent would be a veritable ground for the fight against Islamist terrorists.War is, however, not the sole indicator of failed governance. Other indicators comprise extreme poverty, unavailable medicare, HIV/AIDS pandemic, Ebola and other diseases, corruption, rogue states, presidents-for-life syndrom, massive youth unemployment. All that constitute glaring indicators of incapacitated state.

Effects of Governance Failure

The major effect of dysfunctional government is anarchy. The installation of anarch is no less than Hobbes' idea of a state of nature. Hobbes (1651/2016) not only argues that no state or society exists in the state of nature, above all, he insists that man's life in such a condition is "solitary, nasty, brutish, and short." The emergence of a Leviathan constitutes a huge problem. Not only are citizens unable to prefer any case in court against him. They remove him either. The Leviathan cannot be charged with injustice towards any subject since he is free to employ any means to safeguard the people. He maintains absolute power in a civil society and is above the law. There is, however, one constraint against him. The restriction derives from the purpose for which the Leviathan emerged - the protection and safety (self-preservation) of the people whose security the Leviathan guarantees. This is the hidden assumption of Hobbes' arresting story. If eventually the Leviathan fails to preserve the life and property of the people he undertakes to safeguard, then the subjects are free to "disobey and even rebel" (Grayling, 2017, p. 57). Hobbes' idea of human nature on which he founds government is questionable. Drawing from the situation of the 17th Century England, Hobbes elaborates his idea of government. The 17th Century England signaled a situation of scarcity (Orbell and Rutherford, 1973/2009, pp. 383-409). A state of conflict of necessity would arise if all men go after the same need and the need is scarce. If the need is abundant and everyone could lay his hand on it, there would rarely be conflict or the struggle for it. However, in a state embroiled in anarchy, security is definitely in short supply. Consequently, if human life is not evidently naturally bad, security is always in short supply in a state of anarchy. This means that the rise of the Leviathan is a logical necessity since the Leviathan guarantees security, self-preservation and peace.

However, if the Leviathan leads to violence, while providing security, then the emergence of the Leviathan's provision of security must include prevention of violence. Else the project becomes unjustified. If I understand "security" to stand for peace but not absence of violence, the Leviathan has failed in its project. Where the Leviathan is the source of violence, then the figure of a Leviathan renders the project impossible. In the Nigerian state, the emergence of a Leviathan would definitely lead to violence. The selection, the Leviathan's ethnic nation, the fact of the leviathan being above the law, the Leviathan's contrived injustice against a certain ethnic nation, etc - all that would create a problem in the Nigerian context. Let us consider the military dictators. The military dictators, who annulled the different Republics, pretended to offer some security to the people. In spite of the military rule, various militias had vied among themselves for the control of Nigeria's oil rich region. At the time, war had become, in Okere's expression, "the quintessence of the failure of governance." The situation of war implies the creation of terror and spells the insecurity of life and property.

The trend of war in Africa during military rule vegetated different militia groups, the phenomenon of children-soldiers, and led to hordes of thousands of refugees displaced from their homes. It bred youth unemployment, and created an unimaginable movement of sophisticated arms within the continent. In the keeps of rebels and Al-Qaeda militants, the arms proved more dangerous. The rise of the Leviathan would spell anarchy for the Nigerian society. Locke's theory of representative government aims to criticise Hobbesian idea of a Leviathan with absolute powers. Which is why Locke abolished Leviathan's exercise absolute powers and argued that no person was above the law.

Kant's Balance of Reason and Good Governance

Kant's discussion of nature's plan for the human race traces the emergence of reason and man's ability to make a choice between alternatives. Incidentally, these capacities were not the only ones available to man. Nature equally accorded man other indefinite number of other powers to facilitate the human ability to reason and be reasoned with; and also to choose (Kant 1976:372ff). The development took a gradual process and eventually led to the formation of society. Human beings, possessed social and anti-social virtues. The social virtues made possible association with other people whereas anti-social virtues provoke wars and conflicts. Since as reason is a peculiarity of human beings, so these beings employ reason to sue for peace. People reason with one another to forestall future wars. It is not the case that only evil derives from conflicts. Great technological inventions followed from the World War II. Human reason always chooses a particular line of action rather than another. In this way, man develops great organisations and society. Peculiar to this paper, is the fact that human power of reason chooses between alternatives. Sometimes, it is a case of some desirable object, at another time it goes in pursuit of a non-desirable one like conflict. And this, in spite of the fact that the object of human choice, may be injurious to human society. Consequently, there are two types of reason - reason that, on the one hand, chooses an object commodious to a human society. On the other hand, the other type of reason makes a choice for an object harmful to human society. There is, thus, a conflict between the various aspects of reason. This conflict, for Kant, contributes to the growth of human society.

The pursuit of good governance and the lack thereof is likened to the place of reason in human society. The pursuit of reason relates to the choice of human beings. Reason guides human choices. In the case of the choice between anarchy and good governance, it is up to reason to make the choice. Unless there is a deformation of reason, it will make the choice for the best. In this case, reason goes for good governance rather than anarchy. Why has reason not made the choice for a long time since the third wave of democracy? Events in history and nature will definitely suggest a pursuit of good governance in trying times. Once made, the features of good governance would become manifest in Nigeria. It would lead to sustainable development and service delivery in Nigeria.

Evaluation

The implications of Nigerian state's failure to embrace good governance robs off on sustainable development. Unless the leadership undertakes massive institutional reforms, a drawing of a democratic constitution, the chances for the enthronement of anarchy in the state are not far-fetched. About institutional reforms, the restructuring of the state and the decentralisation of powers require urgent attention. There is the lopsidedness in the issue of political leadership. Judging from the first to the Fourth Republics, a particular ethnic nation - the Fulani ethnic nation - has accessed national political power far more than other ethnic nations did. The idea of political leadership of the nation as the birthright of this ethnic nation was incidentally born. This fact has become so significant in Nigerian polity that other ethnic nations threaten to break away if massive reforms are not undertaken in this regard. Following the civil war (1966-1970), the Igbo ethnic nation has been hindered from gaining access to political power. Yet, the war ended a long time ago. Just as one ethnic nation purposes to constitute national political power in Nigeria a birthright, so also an ethnic nation has been obstructed from access to political leadership.

Nigeria possesses a 1999 decree-orientated Constitution. It is seen as a dictator's constitution ever since the military dictator (in civilian garb) restructured it with the help of some legal luminaries. The Constitution truly establishes the principles of separation and the decentralisation of powers. In spite of these principles, the constitution still reserves certain powers to the President, unshared and particular to him. Although the National Assembly is empowered to legislate on some matters in the list, the State House of Assembly does not possess similar powers. Consequently, there are discrepancies in the system of government, discrepancies that could readily be resolved from the beginning (Ogwezzy, 2019, pp. 180-196). A great feature of the 1999 Constitution is its emphasis on the federal ideology of governance. Given Nigerian state's multiethnic population, the preferred system of government has been the idea of a federation. The idea of the federation of the 1960s concisely emphasised the different regions, which regions maintained their autonomy, international relations, economy, etc. The centre maintained a central army and the police for the security of the nation. The federation worked out well until the military intervened. Ever since, the idea of Nigerian federation lost its peculiar elements. It came to prioritise quota system and to benefit the Northerners. Institutional reforms have to comprise a re-conception of the idea of the federation of yore. In this regard each region develops on its own and oversees its own economy. Whatever problems there are, it would be far easier for the regions to pursue good governance and develop on their own than the amorphous entity that is Nigeria.

In a recent publication, Suberu (2018) profusely adulates the political leadership of President Buhari. He presents the Buhari regime as committed to fighting corruption. As objective as the paper is, it lacks adequate touch with the reality of the Nigerian situation. President Buhari was elected on the platform of his anti-corruption stance. As a military dictator, who sacked a democratically elected government, General Buhari undertook to clean up the nation's orgy of corruption. With the help of Brigadier Idiagbon, his brief rule, lasting for two years, emphasised anti-corruption and a war against indiscipline. So brief was their rule that the Nigerian citizenry did not get the chance to assess it. Currently, as a civilian President, President Buhari has spearheaded the worst democratic government in Nigeria. Acting *ultra vires,* President has fraudulently rigged presidential elections, sponsored Islamisation programme of Nigeria, consistently marginalised a region of the country - the South East - just because the region did not vote for him. He has flouted the idea of the federal character in all his appointments. Indeed, he appointed his close relations and core northern muslims to many federal and key positions. It is true that the Prime Minister David Cameron at the onset of President Buhari's Presidency referred to the Nigerian state as "fantastically corrupt" (Suberu, 2018, pp. 184-201). Were he to visit Nigeria presently, he would be baffled with the stupendous corruption that undergirds Buhari's administration. An unexpected groundswell of the Nigerian

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LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE: AN INTERROGATION OF NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

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Abstract
One of the functions of the legislature in any democratic state is to check the excesses of the executive arm to ensure accountability of governance. The paper examined legislative oversight and accountability in governance in Nigeria during the Fourth Republic. The methodology employed in this paper is a qualitative approach via secondary sources of data collection. The paper adopted structural functionalism as its framework of analysis. Major findings reveal that the National Assembly has mechanism to checkmate the excesses of the executive arm of government and its agencies to curb waste in governance, corruption and excess exercise of power. However, the conducts of oversight function by the National Assembly have resulted to yield some useful results and outcomes. However, these outcome and recommendations arising from committees' reports alone has not promoted accountability in governance. The result also availed that members have abridged this important responsibility to blackmail, extortion of money from the parastatals and ministries under its supervision for selfish or personal aggrandisement. The paper recommends among others that, people of integrity should be elected in both houses of the National Assembly and the constitution should be amended to the enable the National Assembly enforced their resolutions.

Keywords: Legislature, Oversight, Democracy, Accountability and Governance.

Introduction

Separation of powers is a model for the governance of a state. Under this model, the state powers are divided into branches, each with separate and independent power and area of responsibility so that the powers of one branch are not in conflict with the powers associated with the other branches. It can be contrasted with the fusion of powers in some parliamentary systems where the executive and the legislature and, sometime, the judiciary are unified. Among the democratic institutions that restrain the exercise of power and enforce accountable government, is the legislature. As a representative of the people, the legislature is endowed with enormous powers not only to make laws for the good governance of the state but also to ensure that the executive is accountable. To achieve these lofty objectives, the legislature is saddled with the power to make approvals for the executive's engagements (Onwe, Ibeogu and Nkwedi, 2015).

In Nigeria, the importance of legislative oversight has captured the attention of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). Indeed, the Section 4(1) of 1999 Constitution vests the legislative powers of the Federation in a National Assembly, which comprises of a Senate and a House of

Representatives. The constitution thus provides for a bicameral legislature with the composition of the Senate based on equal representation of three Senators from each State and one from the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and the House of Representatives composed of three hundred and sixty members representing constituencies of nearly equal population Sections 48 and 49). Specifically, Subsection 2 of Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution invests National Assembly with "power to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of the federation …' (FRN 1999).The Constitution also gives National Assembly powers and control over public funds and other matters such as: the establishment of revenue fund, authorisation of expenditure from consolidated revenue fund, authorisation of expenditure in default appropriations, contingencies fund, remuneration, etc., of the President and other officers, appointment of Auditor-General among others.

After twenty years of the country's democratic experience, it has become expedient for evaluation of the legislature oversight to ascertain how the performance has enhanced or hindered accountability in governance. This, therefore, examines legislative oversight and accountability in governance in Nigeria's fourth republic.

Conceptual Framework

Legislature

A legislature is a deliberate assembly with the authority to make laws for apolitical entity or city. Legislatures form important parts of most governments. In the model of separation of powers, legislatures are often contrasted with the executive and judicial branches of government. Awotokun (1998) states that legislature is an arm of government made up of elected representatives or constituted assembly people whose duty is to make laws, control the activities of the executive and safeguard people's interest. In this context, legislature play the role of making, revising, amending and repealing laws for the well being of its citizenry it represents. Okoosi- Simbine (2010) asserts that legislature is law-making, and policy influencing body in the democratic political system. The law makers can be described in the site of sovereignty, the expression on the will of the people. This is derived from the people and should be exercise according to the will of the people they represent.

Legislative Oversight

According to Ndoma-Egba (2012), legislative oversight refers to the power of the legislature to review, monitor and supervise government agencies, programmes, activities and policy implementation strategies of the executive arm of government. This is to ensure that the arm sustains the principles of good governance, remains responsive, transparent and accountable to the electorates. The committee structure of the National Assembly (House of Representatives and Senate) is being used to execute oversight functions through supervision, watchfulness, or curtail excesses, review of executive actions and activities. Oversight functions ensure that activities of the executive arm of government and its agencies are kept under constant surveillance and scrutiny by the legislature. A leading role for the legislature has always been adjudged an essential defense against executive tyranny.

Hugh et al (1999, p. 2) conceive oversight functions to mean the “crucial role of the Legislature in monitoring and reviewing the actions of the executive arm of government”. Ndoma-Egba (2012, p. 1) maintains that legislative oversight functions “refers to the act of Congress, looking over the executive branch as well as monitoring and supervision of the implementation of public policies”. In a similar context, Adeniran (2013, p. 5) defined oversight functions as “the powers to oversee and supervise the funding of all governmental machineries including ministries, parastatals and agencies vested in the parliament. Agena (2013b) construes oversight functions to “encompass the monitoring, overseeing, supervising and investigating of public activities of the executive arm of government and in some cases the private sector if the need arises”. This definition, apart from viewing the legislature as a constitutionally and conventionally prescribed agency “in charge” of controlling and monitoring the executive, it also extends oversight scope to cover the private sector of the economy. The hallmark of legislative oversight is to promote accountability in governance.

Governance

Ansah (2007) sees governance as encompassing a state's institutional and structural arrangement, decision-making processes and implementation capacity and the relationship between government officials and the public. Its connection or relationship with democratic accountability may occur when the use of public authority create a conducive environment for the people to engage their government by providing feedback, reward and sanctions when necessary.

Thus, in the opinion of Sen (1990), governance has some basic ingredients that fuel democracy and accountability. These include freedom of the people to make choices and their involvement in the decision-making process. Similarly, Akpa (2008) also outlines some basic qualities of governance to include, the conduct of an inclusive system of management wherein all the critical stakeholders are allowed to have a say in the government decision-making process. The World Bank (2003) also identifies the fundamental core value of governance to include inclusiveness and accountability. These are devices that provide people, the platform to engage their government. Inclusiveness according to the study means that all citizens are equally guaranteed certain basic rights including equality before the law and the right to participate in the governance process on equal basis. In other words, it means the absence of exclusion and discrimination in all citizens dealing with the government. Accountability in governance process on the other hand refers to the idea that those who are selected to act in the name of the people are answerable to the people for their failure, as well as credited for their success. Ilufoye (2010) conceptualise governance to mean the process of allocating resources through the instrumentalities of the state for the attainment of public good. The proper allocation of resources by the state may result in the development of the people. It can equally create the enabling political atmosphere for the people to be involved, actively, in governance, especially when allocation results in the advancement of people's economic and political life. Simply, Keohane (2002) defines governance to mean the making and implementation of rules and the exercise of power, within a given domain of activity. The primary agents of governance that determine democratic accountability are; authorisation, support and impact. Authorisation occurs when one entity directs another to act on its behalf. This may confer right on the authoriser and obligation on the agent. While support occurs when a group of people provide financial or political assistance to a ruler and hence the claim to hold such ruler to account.

The Concept of Accountability

Accountability is often used synonymously with such concepts as answerability, enforcement, responsibility, blameworthiness, liability and so on. Adeyinka (2009, p. 17) defined accountability as:

> The acknowledgment and the assumption of responsibility for actions, products, decisions and policies including the administration, governance and implementation within the scope of the role or employment position and encompassing the obligation to report, explain and be answerable for resulting consequences.

In ordinary human relations, accountability to Ijewere (1999) means a process by which anyone who exercises power over a people or in control of the assets belonging to others is answerable to such people or such others as to how one has discharged ones responsibility. In this sense, accountability, therefore, involves the exercise of powers and the taming of powers. He further describes accountability in public life as the process for ensuring the responsible exercise of powers in the interest of fair play, respect for rule of law and order and the efficient utilisation of public resources. Accountability as commonly understood by these scholars is that being accountable means answerable to someone or group of persons for the exercise of authority over these people and or resources belonging to them in order to ensure that power is not used in a manner that is contrary to the requirement of ethics, morality and efficiency.

Hugh et al (1999, p 2) describes accountability as:

> To give an account of actions or policies or to account for spending, it can be said to require a person to explain and justify against criteria of some kind, their decisions and actions. It also requires that the person goes on to make amends for any fault or error and take step to prevent its recurrence in the future.

Ijewere (1999), Hugh (1999) and Adeyinka, (2009) view the subject matter of accountability from leadership answerability model. That when a leader is entrusted with powers, the basic rule of human society require the leader to be accountable or answerable to such people for his actions and inactions. Such a leader must explain to the conviction of the people how and for what purpose, resources are utilized.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts structural-functionalism as its theoretical framework for the analysis. Structural-functionalism was a major framework for sociological research. The chief exponents of this approach in Sociology. Talcolt Parson and Marian Levy postulated that every social system has four functional objectives namely goal attainment, pattern maintenance, adaptation and integration to enable the system to survive.

However, until the late 50s and early 60s, the theory came to be recognised in Political Science by Gabriel Almond and his colleague at the University of Princeton in the United States of America. The main argument of these theorists is that all systems have structures which can be identified, and that the parts or elements of these structures perform functions within the system which has meaning only in terms of the working of the system.

The Structural-functional approach revolves around certain concepts. The most important of these concepts, however, is that of structure and function. In explaining the concept of structure, Varma (1985) refers to it as those arrangements within the system which perform functions for the continuous existence of the system. Verma's postulation presupposes that structural-functionalism include a clear treatment of the social structure of various functions. Specifically, the theory argued that every system has a set of functional requisite that must be satisfied if the system must continue to exist. To enhance our understanding of the theory, Varma suggests certain features which include:

- it places emphasis on the whole system as its unit of analysis;
- it postulates that a particular function is a requisite to the maintenance of the whole system; and
- it is concerned with the demonstration of the functional inter dependency of diverse structures within the whole system.

This approach like every other has its own weaknesses. The obvious weakness stems from the fact that it has been accused of not providing any criteria for determining when a system is maintained. The approach is also criticised as been conservative and bias against social change. The above short comings notwithstanding, the structural-functional approach is still useful in the explanation of the role political institutions like the legislature with a constitutional and conventional powers play in ensuring accountability in the process of governance.

Incidences of Legislative Oversight in Nigeria

The instrument used by the National Assembly to promote accountability is oversight. In the conduct of oversight functions, the National Assembly uses some mechanisms/instruments. These instruments include: Briefs, Visit to MDAs, Project Inspection, Engagement with Appropriation Bill/Budgetary Function, Public/Investigative Hearing, Public Hearing, and Public Petitions, confirmation/Screening of Nominees, Interactive Meetings/Sessions, Interviews, Bill Referrals and Resolution.

The oversight function of the National Assembly centred on four core areas, namely: *(i)* detection and prevention of poor administration, exposing corruption, waste and illegal conduct; *(ii)* evaluation of government programmes, policies and performance of MDAs; *(iii)* gathering of information for the development of new legislations or for the amendment of existing laws; and *(iv)* protection of civil liberty and constitutional rights.

An important oversight objective is the improvement of the administration of government activities in terms of their efficiency, effectiveness and economy. In this regard, several Committees reported findings that cover this aspect. The greatest oversight function performed by the Aviation Committee of the Senate, and probably the entire Senate during the

2008/2009 Session, was the investigation of the corrupt practice associated with the N19.5 Billion Intervention Fund released by the Federal Government in year 2006 for Aviation sector development. The Committee revealed that there was nothing concrete on ground to show that the fund was properly managed and utilised, the Committee conducted a public hearing, which lasted for 7 days beginning from Tuesday, 24th June, 2008 (Hamali, 2010). In a debate after presenting its report to the general House, important resolutions were made by the upper chamber. In this direction, and importantly, the Senate urged the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Police to take necessary actions to recover the sum of N5 Billion being inflated cost of the Safe Tower Project. This project was said to have been used by the then Minister of Aviation, Prof. Babalola Borisade, the Managing Director, KAMA, Capt. Roland lyayi and the Contractor. In addition, the EFCC was to investigate the source of the fake Due Process Certificate said to have been issued by the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) for the award of the N6.5 Billion Project (Statistical Bulletin on Nigeria Democracy 2011). In a similar vein, after its interactive meetings with the Honourable Minister of Aviation during the period, the Committee resolved to investigate the Total Radar Coverage of Nigeria (TRACON) Project, following findings that the contract figure was raised from N4 Billion to ₦12 Billion (Hamalai, 2010).

There was a similar oversight visit to the RBDAs by the House Committee on Water Resources from 18th - 23rd, November, 2007, the purpose of which was to assess the implementation of the 2007 budget. Another investigative tour was carried out by the Committee to Kebbi State on 13th - 14th January, 2008. Generally, it was discovered that the RBDAs were unable to access funds for the 2007 budget; hence, no projects were undertaken during the period (Statistical Bulletin on Nigeria Democracy 2011). The major reason for this was the delay in the submission of successful bidding documents by them to the BPP. In spite of lack of funds, the Committee was pleased to see that the Ogbowo Water Scheme in Anambra State had progressed tremendously because the contractor decided to use his personal funds to execute the project. The Committee also acknowledged the need to allocate more funds for rural water supply, and more importantly it resolved to raise budgetary allocation to the Ministry in 2008, to complete various Dam Projects, particularly as there was need for more funds to complete reticulation and water treatment plants in Oyan Dam in Abeokuta and Owena Dam in Akure. The Otamiri Water Project too, which is expected to serve 5 Local Government Councils, was also in need of additional funds for completion. Hence, during the consideration of the budget, the Committee recommended a total allocation of Nl36.1 Billion, out of which ₦34 Billion was approved by NASS, although it received a proposal of ₦113.6 Billion from the Ministry (Statistical Bulletin on Nigeria Democracy 2011). Another important consideration for raising the 2008 budgetary allocation was the urgent need to continue the implementation of the Kashimbila Dam Project in order to save part of the country bordering Cameroun from flood disaster and poisonous emissions from Lake Nyos. The sum of ₦4bn was approved for this project. *Also, after a* comprehensive oversight visit by the Senate Committee on Water Resources to major water projects, particularly irrigations, in the Northwest geo-political zone of the country during the 2008/2009 Session, it discovered what appeared to be fraudulent practices associated with the execution of the projects. It observed that in the process of contract execution, other components of the project, which were initially not budgeted for, were added. This had made the determination of the cost of the projects very difficult and had also unnecessarily extended their end dates. As things stand, there are no end dates for these irrigation projects. They now constitute a perennial component of the government budget. As further observed by the Committee, the amount of work executed was not commensurate with the amount of money expended, thus necessitating an inquiry into the expenditures on these projects.

There were also issues surrounding the agreement reached between the Burea of Public Enterprise (BPE) and Global Infrastructure Nigeria Ltd (GINL) on the concession of the Ajaokuta Steel Company (ASC) and the National Iron Ore Mining Company (NIOMCO), Itakpe, both in Kogi State, as noted by the House Committee on Power and Steel. Related to this, was a concern raised by the Senate Committee on Land Transport about railway modernisation. During the privatisation Programme conducted by the BPE, GINL was reported to have won the bid to manage the Ajaokuta and Itakpe Steel Companies on concession basis, while it acquired 80% ownership of the Delta Steel Company (DSC), Aladja, Delta State. But, right from the time the agreement was reached with the company in 2004, there had been opposition from different quarters calling on the Federal Government to revisit and possibly cancel the agreement. The contention was that the transaction was hastily and poorly packaged, and could not have met the conditions of due process. Efforts made by the Senate Committee on Privatisation to find out how GINL won the bid during one of its oversight visits to DSC proved abortive. The Committee decried its inability to conduct an oversight visit to the National Council for Privatisation (NCP) and BPE because of the refusal of officers to supply the information required.

There was an investigative hearing on a similar issue by the Senate Committee on Land Transport, which involved the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), the Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC), the Federal Ministry of Transport (FMT), and GINL (Hamalai, 2010).

In an attempt to address concerns about non-remittance of revenue generated by the revenue generating agencies of the government, the House Committee on Finance during the 2007/2008 Session conducted a large-scale investigation into this issue. The Committee made it clear that the era of squandering government money was over. Over 300 organisations, which generate revenue for the Federal Government, were invited for the investigative hearing, covering all the MDAs and institutions, including all Federal Universities, Teaching Hospitals, Federal Medical Centres, Polytechnics, Education sector among others (Statistical Bulletin on Nigeria Democracy, 2011).

The House Committee on Finance, in the process of reviewing and scrutinising the financial records of MDAs during the budget defense, discovered a huge amount of money totaling N563.11 Billion in undisclosed accounts maintained by the MDAs (Hamalai, 2010). The money has been paid into the Federation Account. Another achievement of the Committee was the preparation of Finance Budget that: guided and provided a source of funding for the 2008 Appropriation Act. According to the Committee, this was the first time a revenue Bill was prepared. It contended that an Appropriation Act should be accompanied by a Revenue Bill showing how the government intends to finance its expenditures. The Bill upon passage into law would legalise the source of funding for the Appropriation Act and thereby avoid government using unauthorised sources. A case in point was the funding of the National Integrated Power Projects (NIPP) from the Excess Crude Account, which the court declared illegal following a suit by the Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission. It was a landmark achievement during the 2007/2008 legislative year. The House Committee on Power and Steel carried out a comprehensive and thorough investigation into the activities of the power sector from 1999 to 2007. At inauguration, members of the Committee were already aware of the commitment of the immediate past government in the power sector in terms of finance accompanied by necessary legislative and administrative reforms (Hamalai, 2010). The committee further resolved to interact with key stakeholders in the sector, establish what previous administrations had done and then set realistic goals for itself. Moreover, there were allegations that huge sums of money totaling about $10 Billion had been spent by the government on power generation, transmission and distribution over the 8-year period, yet the power situation had not improved in the country (Statistical Bulletin on Nigeria Democracy, 2011). Consequently, in a motion on 31 January, 2008, the Committee was mandated to conduct an inquiry into the issue and report back to the House within four weeks. Considering the enormity of this task, the Committee organised the investigation into four main parts.

The first, which was technical in nature, involved determining the technical soundness of policies, programmes and projects undertaken in the power sector during the period under consideration. It was also aimed at ascertaining the performance of the institutions saddled with the task of implementing the policies of government in the sector, and they include the Niger Delta Power Holding Company (NDPHC), the National Integrated Power Project (NIPP, Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), the Rural Electrification Agency (REA), among others. The second aspect concerned the assessment of due process compliance of the contracts and payments. In this regard, the performance of the BMPIU and the BPP were examined. The third related to legal issues, covering the effectiveness and compliance by parties involved, status of contractors and consultants, legality of funding and payments process and framework, and the legal status of the entities operating in the sector. Finally, there was a financial aspect, which among other issues, centred on the viability or otherwise of funding mechanism and the appropriateness and legality of payments and invoicing procedures by the various agencies Hamalai, 2010).

The Committee's findings in all the locations, which were largely similar, are summarised as follows:

a) The Uyo PHCN Distribution District Office could not render proper account of its revenues and expenditures;

b) The only noticeable work done at the Ikot-Ekpene transmission substation was site-clearing in addition to the equipment the contractor claimed to have supplied. The sum of N4.5Billion had been paid to the contractor for the contract worth N5.96 Billion;

c) Inflation of contract for the Calabar NIPP by N224m;

d) Some contractors did not even know the project sites, while some sites were fake or disputed, whereas advance payment had been made. For example, the site for the Onike-

Yaba Distribution Sub-station was no: genuine. The Committee wondered how the project design was done, and the information the contractor supplied during the bidding process,

e) The contracts for some projects were signed in year 2006 out of which over 70% payment had been made, yet the only work done was bush clearing (Hamalai, 2010).

One implication of this oversight is that it revealed the lapses inherent in project conceptualisation, award, implementation, and the process of payments. Table 1: below further highlight these findings.

Table 1: Summary of Selected Oversight Findings/Achievements Related to Poor Administration, Corruption and Illegal Conduct

s/n	Committee	Findings/Achievements
1	Senate Committee on Aviation	? The investigation into the utilisation of the ₦19bn Aviation Fund served as deterrent to managers in the airline industry to handle public funds transparently. ? It pressurised the government to transfer the management of the Account to the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) with a resolve to monitor the utilisation of the Account for the Aviation Industry.
2	Senate Committee on Federal Character and Intergovernmental Affairs	? Observed and summoned for questioning some organizations that violated the Federal Character Principle on recruitment into Federal Government establishments.
3	Senate Committee on Local and Foreign Debts	? Noted that the executive arm of government does not involve the National Assembly in the negotiation of foreign loans, which was a breach of the Debt Management Office Act, 2003.
6	Senate Committee on Communications	? Observed an incidence of high tariff, absence of per second Billing, poor interconnectivity and high rate of dropped calls during oversight activities in the 2003/2004 Session. A deadline was given to all send providers to address all these problems
7	House Committee on Transport (Land)	? Found out that the properties belonging to FUMTA in Nassarawa, Lugbe and Garki Area 2 were still occupied by ex-staff. Information is not available on the follow-up action taken on the Committee's findings.

8	HouseCommittee on Public Accounts	? Observed cases of financial impropriety, including wasteful use of government property ? There were cases of public officers conniving with contractors on the road projects in Yobe State, Owerri, Obowo-Umuahia in Imo State ? No information on the follow up actions/ recommendations. ? Also, in a verification visit by the Committee to the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, it discovered a breach of due process in the loans granted to 12 shipping companies in year 2005. It then recommended that the EFCC should recover the loans.
9	Senate Committee on Transport	? Top Ministry Officials were in the habit of compelling parastatals to sponsor their trips and transport, including training within and outside the country. This was being done from the budget of the parastatals. ? The Committee recommended that the affected officials should be cautioned to desist from the acts.
10	House Committee on Defence	? Former drawings for the permanent site of the National Defence College were abandoned after payment of ₦250 million to the Architect. To theCommittee, this waste of resources is avoidable. The Architect could have been asked to re -scale the original drawings for a lesser fee.
11	House Committee on Power and Steel	? Oversight activities, in particular, the investigativepublic hearings conducted, exposed the several problems associated with power generation and steel development. ? Power sector investigation prepared the Federal Government for the planned state of emergency in thepower sector. ? The Ministry and its four parastatals under the Committee's jurisdiction arbitrarily spent their internally generated revenue without approval from NASS.
12	House Committee on Niger Delta Development	? Harmonized the computation of 15% total monthly statutory allocation to the NDDC. ? Stopped the practice of unilaterally varying project costs by MDAs without approval from NASS.
13	House Committee on Public Account	? In a verification visit to the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, a breach of the due process procedure was observed in the loans granted to 12 shipping companies. The Committee requested the EFFC to recover the loans.

Source: Policy Analysis and Research National Assembly, 2010.

From the discussions, it is quite clear that legislative oversight activities of the National Assembly Committees have yielded some useful results and outcomes. The significance of the oversight findings, outcomes and the recommendations of Committees lie in the extent to which they have influenced executive behaviour, and ultimately shaped overnment's policy direction. For example, consider the case where oversight outcome involved exposing corruption.

The Challenges of Legislative Oversight and Accountability in Governance in Nigeria

The oversight functions of the legislature or its investigative power has attracted some degree of criticisms against its apparent abuse of this parliamentary mechanism since the inception of 1999 democratic dispensation. There are several factors that have contributed in diminishing the capacity of the legislature to engage in steady and resourceful oversight of the executive arm of government in Nigeria as well as various literatures that tend to explain the phenomena weakening legislative capacity in performance of its oversight. Some of these challenges include the following:

Personal Ambition, Interest and/or the Agenda of the Legislators Themselves

This ugly culture has been demonstrated in the frequent confrontation with members of the executive, resulting in an ultravire misapplication of power. Oyewo (2007, p. 18) revealed the leadership of the National Assembly or the State House of Assembly sometime demonstrate propensity for confrontation with the executive, without reflecting on the negative impact on the national or public interest. The leadership of Speaker Ghali Umar Na'Abba of the House of Representatives and Senate President Chuba Okadigbo and Anyim Pius Anyim of the Senate epitomised the propensity to pursue some personal or ethnic agenda in the misuse of oversight functions and powers.

Absence or Lack of Implementing Powers

In a presidential system of government the legislature conduct investigation on corrupt related matters and recommend punishment, however, the executive is required to put such recommendations into effect. As Onoja (2013, p. 194) has argued:

> The legislature in carrying out its quasi-judicial functions can only probe/investigate but cannot prosecute or convict. It cannot go beyond the level of recommending indicted culprit for prosecution or sanction, the onus lies with the executive and judiciary to pursue such indictment to its logical conclusion. The power to sanction and prosecute can only carry the seal of the executive and judiciary to be effective.

The lack of implementing capacity may be a significant challenge because the Constitution only empowers the legislature to conduct investigation and make recommendations to the executive who carry out the implementation activities. In any case, the legislature has the impeachment power to bring to the table if the government is found in the habit of putting legislative probes and its recommendations under the carpet.

Executive Conspiracy against Legislative Probes

The probe panelists, or committee members demanding for gratifications and settlement from those under probe and the use of top hierarchy of party machinery to either dissuade, or intimidate committee members to tow the wishes of either the party leadership and/or the executive. These practices have weakened the strength and efficacy of the oversight functions. In the opinion of Ukase (2013) and Agena (2013), the impediment to oversight responsibility, is linked with the prevailing executive-legislative relations in Nigeria. The relation between the executive and the legislature, especially in the Fourth Republic is characterized by perpetual conflicts, struggle, rancor and sometime direct confrontation with one another. This ugly situation, the studies argue occur as a result of the following factors. First, the desire to plant "Pliant Leadership" in the legislature by the executive which often result in the division of the House into two warring camps. The second factor is the dubious welfare packages members of the legislature unilaterally allocate to themselves far above members of the executive arm of government. Third is the supremacy over law and policy making process, and finally, the colonial history of legislative development which regard the institution as a subordinate to the executive and as such a mere "window dressing", hence, the constant struggle by the legislature to reassert her independence.

Corruption

Corrupt legislative oversight has been institutionalised as the foundation of governance at all levels of government in Nigeria. Institutions' decay is unprecedented as available meagre resources are siphoned and opportunities for good governance are derailed and debased. This undermines accountability and responsible government as due process is subverted and subsisting laws, rules and regulations are compromised for selfish aggrandisement. These shortcomings have not only inhibited the effective performance of the legislature but have served as catalyst for corruption in a drifting nation.

Conclusion/Recommendation

The focus of this paper was to assess the impact of legislative oversight on the promotion of accountability in governance. Legislature is the eyes of the people in government that watch and monitor the activities of the executive arm and its agencies in the implementation of laws, programmes and policies meant to serve the collective interest of the electorates. It dictates waste, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, corruption, mismanagement of public resources, etc. Its relevance in democratic governance need not be overstressed. Regrettably, since the inception 1999, members of the National Assembly have reduced this important responsibility to blackmail, extortion of money from the parastatals and ministries under its supervision for selfish or personal aggrandisement. The paper recommends that among others that, people of integrity should be elected in the both houses of the National Assembly and the constitution should be amended to the enable the National Assembly enforced their resolutions.

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MEASURING POLITICAL CAPACITY OF THE STATE IN AFRICA

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Abstract

It is trite that the essence of governance is social provisioning or what may be described as provision of security and dividends of democracy. In fact, the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, in its Chapter Two, clearly spells out what any government worth its salt should do for its citizens. Judging Nigeria by this, it would seem that Nigeria is, at best, a dysfunctional state, if not a failed state. Our paper, entitled "Measuring Political Capacity of the State in Africa," critically assesses the extent of the damage done to states in Africa by colonialism which, several centuries after, still haunts the decolonised states. Using Nigeria as a paradigm case, the study looked at other states with similar antecedents to see if the present predicaments of the states could be traced to colonialism and its child, neo-colonialism. The objective is to enable states in Africa introspect by looking inwards for solution. The theoretical framework used was the Failed State Theory which was highlighted by scholars like Zartman (2005), David et al (2015), Brinkerholf (2015), etc. It was discovered that the effect of colonialism weakened the states of Africa and, as a result, they found it and still find it difficult to provide good governance for their citizens. The paper, therefore, recommends a total overhaul and radical revolutionising of the entire state structure. In addition, it recommends aggressive resource (both material and human) mobilisation to address the challenges of bad governance and injustice in the state.

Keywords: Governance, Justice, State, Capacity, Colonialism, Post-Colonial

1. Introduction

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) says that before the coming into being of the state, men lived in the state of nature. In this hypothetical state, man was not ruled by his reason or intellect but by his personal desires and appetite. Thus, there was struggle for survival; in fact, the rule was survival of the fittest and, so, life was "solitary, nasty, poor, brutish and short" (Guaba, 2007). To ensure security in this state characterised by the law of the jungle, men then surrendered their rights to a sovereign in what was described as a social contract. In his own social contract theory, John Locke (1632-1704) equally opines that men surrendered their natural rights and formed a state to attain order, peace and security. This is because man is a creative and productive being whose wants and needs are insatiable, there was fierce competition leading to struggles and conflicts some of which are irreconcilable. So, for the society to sustain, reproduce, protect and promote order and wellbeing of its inhabitants, these irreconcilable and contradictory interests must have to be harmonised and regulated somehow.

Thus, the major institution that fulfils this onerous function of conflict regulation is the state. Due to its complexities in nature, character and historical antecedents, the state has become an omnibus and nebulous concept in political discourse. The difficulty in conceptualising it stems from the views of major protagonists – the liberals and the Marxists. Okolie (2016, p. 42ff), taking the liberal view, sees the state as being there basically to protect private property. It is also an impartial arbiter or umpire that emerged to keep social dissents within manageable order. In summary, the state is not superior to other institutions; it is the supremacy of law that reigns. On the other hand, Marxists insist that the state is supreme; it exists as the instrument of domination of class, used by the owners of means of production against those with only their labour power. The state is the executive committee of the ruling class which employs the law as a means of oppression against the proletariat. Suffice it to say that Marxist scholars believe that the state is a historical creation. It arose when class cleavage was witnessed and the society was torn into hostile camps between those who own property and those who do not. As an instrument of power, the state services those who hold power to advance their economic interests and those of their clients

Early philosophers like Aristotle, Plato and, to some extent, even modern theorists have demonstrated their own comprehension of the state in respect of its role and capacity in satisfaction of man's basic needs. These theorists saw the state as a natural phenomenon which is everlasting and caters for the need of all in the society. Probing further the relationship between a state and a society, Guaba (2007, p. 12) observes that: The state is formed out of society so society is a primary association. It is the society which chooses the pattern of its political grouping. States may be created, altered or dissolved, but the society goes on forever. Men can live without a state but not without society. That is why man is described as a social animal by nature.... The state depends on the society for the existence, not vice versa.

The role of the state for liberalists which is to be preferred, is that of regulating the conflicts (due to conflicting social, private and public interests) in society and maintenance of law and order. The state also possesses political capacity which, according to Hanson et al (2013, p. 3) might be looked at from three dimensions, namely extractive capacity, coercive capacity and administrative capacity. We shall come back to this later.

Over the years, colonialism as a subject has generated a lot of literature. John, in his work titled "Colonialism in Africa and Matters Arising – Modern Interpretations, Implications and the Challenge for Socio-Political and Economic Development in Africa" after cataloguing the evils of colonialism, argues that there is no justifiable reason to blame colonialism for Africa's underdevelopment in spite of the fact that many socio-political and economic thinkers do this. For him, "the biggest problem facing African continent from time immemorial has been that of political leadership, that is, the inability to have a strong and purposeful political leadership." This is the reason Africa is backward. Bayeh (2015) also agrees that the effect of colonialism in the political and economic conditions of African states is devastating. It not only led to "Post-independence African political system being characterised by ethnic based exclusion and marginalisation," it also created "contemporary African leaders [who] are authoritarian, rent-seekers, corrupt and exclusionary to other opposition groups." However, Africans should not externalise all their weaknesses to colonialism. Rather, they should also "attribute their failures to themselves and be committed and vigorously strive to bring changes in political, economic, and social development of the continent." The author did not say how this should be done. Writing from a legal point of view and using six decolonised states as a case study, Anyanwu (2006) attributes the problem of African states incapacity to the colonialists mere replicating their own forms of government in the colonised states. The result of this is crisis of identity; language; law, constitution and political system; legal education; justice; economy; policy; civil society and national security in the declonised states. The solution is for the instability in these states is autochthonous constitutions, he says. However, our interest in this topic goes beyond all the above. Our work interrogates the origin of colonialism with a view to proffering solution for the problem of incapacity of declonised states especially Nigeria from the root by curing the disease and not by merely addressing the symptom. This is the knowledge gap our work seeks to fill.

It is the thesis of this discourse that the political capacity of states in Africa has been vitiated by one factor which has made it difficult for them to achieve, to the fullest, those things expected of such states. The work also argues that the post-colonial state has its roots in the colonial state with its weak foundation and as such the post-colonial state that emerged to a great extent, exhibits same weakness making it decadent, dependent and fascist in nature. Thus, the ability of the post-colonial state to deliver social-economic goods and services to her citizenry is truncated and vitiated by the same colonialism. In fact, Alavi (1972) argues, and rightly so that the colonial state sets the basis of the power of the post-colonial state. It is in this vein that Gauba defines colonialism as:

> The process under which a nation- state after consolidating its national power extends its domination over territories and the people of other countries for exploiting their natural and human resources. The colonial power establishes its own administration in the subject country and brings all resources under its own control.

Majority of the African states, such as Nigeria, Algeria, Ghana, Libya, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Namibia, etc., gained independence after the Second World War (1939-45). The social, economic and political life of citizens of these countries were shattered during the colonial rule and today they are faced with the gigantic task of development, challenge of poverty and disruptive forces within, largely because of exploitation of the masses by the ruling classes, sometimes in collision with former colonialists in the form of neo-colonialism. But the big question is; what is the way forward for African countries? To answer this question, Ake (1981), Rodney (1982) and Nwoke (1988) proffered "De-linking" as the solution. However, as globalisation strengthens the incursion of capitalism in Africa and drives growth and development, no nation could afford to stand in isolation (Okekwe 2020). It is in the light of the above that Okowa, (1996 p xvi) concludes that:

> We have to live and work with imperialism and capitalism, we have to welcome both so that we can learn from both, let the capital come in, let the imperialism also come in, we need to copy their method if we are to productively confront them. It is a price we have to pay for our underdevelopment. If we insist that we cannot live with capitalism and imperialism, and we have a right to so insist, then we must be prepared to pay the terrible price of being left behind by developing humanity and being subsequently enslaved perhaps on a more or less permanent basis.

As further illumination of this theory, the 1999 Constitution of the Nigerian Federation expressly notes (Chapter 11) that the essence of government is the provision of security and delivery of the dividends of democracy to the masses. This is the whole essence of government. Arising from the foregoing, the main objective of this work is to examine the nature and role of the state in Africa. Has the state been effective in meeting its expected capacity in Africa? Above all, what factors have stalled the African states from performing their mandate and how can these issues or challenges be handled?

The theoretical framework used is the Failed State Theoretical Framework. The framework is an off-shoot of post-cold war era as scholars seek reasons for the escalating intra-state conflicts. The major proponents of this theory are Zartman (2005), David *et al* (2015) Brinkerholf (2014) *etc*. The main tenet of this theory is that the basic essence of governance is positioning that obviously guarantees “citizens” security; negation of this is a pointer that the hegemony has failed in its responsibility. What is governance when "citizens” security is not guaranteed? The theory is apt because it goes a long way in assessing the capacity of any particular state in performing what it is elected to do for its citizens.

2. Conceptualising the State and Political Capacity

For some, the state is an ancient institution dating back to Roman and Greek empires and described by Plato, Aristotle and other classic philosophers. Others however, insist on the unique features of the modern state with its extensive rule of law, citizenship rights and broad economic and social responsibilities. A state is more than a government. Oftentimes, people make the mistake of equating the state with 'government', that is the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. This is very wrong. The state could better be conceptualised as a complex institution, with structures, interests and processes that facilitate the reproduction of society. In fact, governments change, but states endure.

A state is a sovereign territory which comes in a variety of sizes ranging from enormous China, to tiny Andorra. It is composed of an executive, a bureaucracy, courts and other institutions. But above all, a state levies taxes and operates military and police forces. This dimension of the state is what Hanson et al (2013) describes as the administrative, extractive and coercive capacities of the state respectively. States distribute and redistribute resources and wealth, so lobbyists, politicians and revolutionaries seek in their own way to influence or even to get hold of the levers of state power. In all but a short term, states are in flux, changing. They expand and contract as military and political fortunes change. Some like Poland even disappear and reappear later. Or they may be divided up (sometimes, peacefully) by communities that prefer to go their separate ways (Czechoslovakia), others such as Iraq run as a colony or protectorate.

While globalisation and regional integration (like the European Union) challenge a state's power, the state is still the dominant area of domestic politics as well as the primary actor in international relations. It must be noted, at this juncture, that it is impossible to talk of the state in isolation from an understanding of the productive process and exchange. In fact, some scholars have argued that the state as a political phenomenon did not exist *ab initio*. That it appeared at a particular point in the history of the development of human society. By this the church, schools, secret societies, bureaucracies, markets, etc., also constitute an arm of the state.

In the Marxist-Leninist view, the state is perceived as the instrument of coercion. This perspective opines that the state will always reflect the interest of the hegemonic class. This is not in our opinion, a very good conception of the state. As a matter of fact, it is not sufficient to see the state simply as an institution for class domination. It is important, however, to see and understand the specificities of a particular state. Specificity means that the state of Nigeria is different from that of say, Kenya so that the motives of a state are informed by the peculiarities and tendencies of that state. So, to understand the state, one just has to understand not just history but the forces of history. Specificities help to remove the problem of generalisation. With this, therefore, the study of the state in a capitalist formation must be located within a totality. Totality refers to instances or involves alternating the existing mode of production.

The state is not a monolithic term. There are factionalisation (conflict within the same class) and fractionalisation. At this juncture, it is apposite to state that owning to the concretised conception of the state, the work would show below why and how the state especially in post-colonial Africa was incapable of successfully prosecuting the expected political capacity. This is so because the post-colonial states in Africa are products of colonialism. The structures of the state – including its social, political, economic, etc., structures were vitiated, underdeveloped, weakened, etc., and so these rubbed off on the performance of the states in Africa with respect to their political capacity.

States can also 'fail' when their governing institutions collapse due to civil war and internal strife (as in Somalia) or because the state has little authority outside the central city (Afghanistan). A failed state is a political body that has disintegrated to a point where basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government no longer functions properly. A state can also be a failed one if the government loses its legitimacy. Also, the "Fund for Peace" (google.com) characterises a failed state as manifesting the following:

- loss of control of its territory or of the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force;
- erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions;
- inability to provide public service; and
- inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.

Furthermore, common characteristics of failing state include:

> A central government so weak or ineffective that it is unable to raise taxes or other support, has little practical control over much of its territory and so a non-provision of public services follows. When this happens, issues such as wide spread corruption and criminality, inherent disquiet among state and non-state actors, appearance of refugees and involuntary movement of populations, sharp economic decline and fragmentary intervention can occur. Does this describe Nigeria of today? In the course of this work, it would be shown clearly that 'state failure' is very real in most African states.

What does political capacity mean? Capacity is the ability to carry out tasks, to meet goals, to get assigned work done. Political capacity then is "the ability to carry out the tasks and functions that governments are supposed to do."What are the duties of government? Hanson et al (2013, pp. 1-2), however, choose to define political capacity differently. Citing Sikkink (1991), they define it broadly as the ability of state institutions to effectively implement official goals. Or put differently, the ability of the state to deliver socio-economic justice to the people. In justifying this definition, Hanson et al (2013) note that the definition avoids normative conceptions about what the state ought to do or how it ought to do it. Instead, they adhered to the notion that capable states may regulate economic and social life in different ways and may achieve these goals through varying relationships with social groups. They categorise the government's tasks or function into three types, namely administrative capacity, coercive capacity, and extractive capacity.

Extractive capacity refers to the ability of the state to raise revenue for its statutory functions. In fact, nothing is as central to the concept of state capacity as raising revenue. Raising revenue is not only a critical function of the state, but it also encompasses a particular set of capacities that are fundamental to state power. In particular, States must have the wherewithal to reach their population, collect and manage information, possess trustworthy agents to manage the revenue, and ensure popular compliance with tax policy. It is equally through this medium that the state pays its work force and be in a position to provide the needed infrastructure and amenities for its citizens.

Next is the coercive capacity. This is central to the definition of the state, particularly in the Marx Weber's definition of the state as the organisation possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its territory. Coercion relates to the state's ability to preserve and protect its borders, protect against external threat, maintain internal order, and enforce policy. In fact, to achieve broader policy goals, a state must be able to tame violence. This is by possessing the force necessary to contain threats throughout its territory or, at least, convince its rivals that this is the case. Coercion represents a key aspect of the ability of state to survive and implement policies.

Finally, administrative capacity includes the ability to develop policy; produce and deliver public goods and services and regulate commercial activities. Indeed, effective policy administration requires technical competence, trusted and professional state agents, monitoring and coordination mechanism, and effective reach across the state's territory and social groupings. Of particular note here, is the importance of autonomous and professional bureaucracies that legitimise the authority of the state, manage complex affairs and ensure efficiency, including the control of corruption. These three capacity types are interrelated and mutually supporting. For instance, extractive and coercive capacities are likely prerequisites for higher levels of administrative capacity.

The essence of government the world over is to distribute democracy dividends to the masses and more importantly to ensure the security of life and property for the citizenry (Okekwe, 2014, p. 24). Some of the main tasks of governments can be itemised as follows:

> Guarantee protection, security and basic human rights for all citizens, provide infrastructure needed for economic activities, such as roads, communication networks, ports, railways, etc; stimulate economic growth, encourage investment and job creation;

provide basic social services- schools, assessable and affordable healthcare, adequate housing, clean water healthy environment, etc.

The above list is by no means exhaustive. Unfortunately, these functions are rather carried out in default by majority of African states. The reality is that individuals who constitute the state bureaucracy find themselves in government to feather their own nests. In facts, as noted elsewhere by Okekwe (2014, p. 10) and Richard (1987), political office-holders view their office as avenues to line their pockets.

3. Origin of Colonialism in Nigeria

To put things in the proper perspective, it is important to discuss colonialism in Nigeria to enable us treat issues emerging therefrom. On arrival in what is today known as Nigeria, the British met many independent nations with sophisticated governments. It went ahead to amalgamate the different nations under one government. It has been established that the first factor, which informed this, was economic and self-interest rather than altruism or a genuine desire to produce a strong and united country (Nwokedi, 2002, p. 36; Sagay, 2001, p. 7; Mamman, 1998, p. 79). The fact is that the protectorate of the Northern Nigeria was not economically viable. The only revenue, which it yielded, was from direct tax, and there were not many people able to pay taxes then. British taxpayers' money back in England was used to run the protectorate, thus constituting a drain on her majesty's fund. The southern protectorate, on the other hand, was economically buoyant to the extent that it was producing surpluses every year. Its wealth came largely from import duties on liquor which was imported, in large quantity. The objective of the amalgamation was, therefore, to remove the financial burden created by the north from her majesty and pass it on to the south. Lord Harcourt, the then British colonial secretary of state succinctly, albeit humorously, captures the situation when he says;

> We have released northern Nigeria from the leading string of the treasury. The promising and well-conducted youth is now on an allowance of his own and is about to effect an alliance with a southern lady of means. I have issued the special license and Sir Fredrick Lugard will perform the ceremony. May the union be fruitful and the couple constant (quoted by Sagay, 2001, p. 7).

Commenting on this, Sagay (2001, p. 7) says:

> Thus, in this "marriage" the North right from the beginning was to be the "man" and "husband" and the South, the "woman" and "wife". The use of the term "Youth" (man) for the North and "Lady" (woman) for the South was not an accident or an exercise in humour. It was a deadly serious matter, with the game plan being to bring two parties together in order to give the North political power over the South and permanent control over Southern resources.

From the amalgamation, Nigeria had a unitary government until 1951. The end of the World War II brought with it changes in the British policy due to increase agitation by the Nigerian elite for self-government and independence (Tamuno, 2000, p. 15). This led to several constitutional conferences within and outside Nigeria (Osadolor, 2000, p. 39). One of them was the General Conference at Ibadan that brought about the 1951 Constitution which was the first to make Nigeria a true federalism. A drafting committee set up in 1949, made up of, amongst others, three representatives from each region, and a representative from the colony of Lagos preceded the constitution. It was to prepare a draft of recommended constitutional changes to be presented to a Constitution Review Conference. The conference sat in Ibadan between January 9-28, 1950. It was highly representative in that it had 18 members from the North, 12 each from the West and East (including 2 members from Calabar) and 6 from Lagos amongst others. The conference recommended a federal system of government consisting of three regions. The regional Houses of Assembly were to have legislative powers within their boundaries on such subjects as agriculture, local government, education and public health, while the central legislature was to have powers to review these regional legislation and reject any that was not considered in the national interest (Osadolor, 2000, pp. 39-42). Other proposals adopted by the conference were:

- an increased regional autonomy within a United Nigeria;
- to give Nigerians ministerial responsibility that is a full share in shaping of the Government action in a Central Council of Ministers and Regional Executive Council; and
- the creation of larger and more representative regional legislature with increased powers.

It was at this time that the problem which still bedevils Nigeria even at this present time came to the fore. The representatives of the Northern Province demanded that 50% representation be reserved for them while the Eastern and the Western delegates wanted the seats to be shared in the ratio of 45 for the North and 33 each for the East and the West (Sagay, 2001, p. 8). The conference was deadlocked. In spite of this, the British went ahead to share the seats on a ratio of 68 for the North, 34 each for the East and the West, ignoring the protest of the East and West and gave no reason for their action. However, facts that are now available show that it was the British who apparently conceived the idea in the first place. An insider in the colonial administration in Nigeria, Harold Smith, (2005) writing his memoir many years after says:

> The British claimed that the Northerners had demanded and must have fifty percent of all the seats in the federal legislature. Was it really the emir's who thought this up or did the British put them up to it?...The British and the Northern elites work so closely together that differences of policy could hardly exist.

Again, the fact that the foundation for tilting the political scales in favour of the North had earlier on been laid lends credence to this. This, they (the British), did by influencing the result of the very first census ever conducted in Nigeria. Many scholars confirm this. One of them, Sagay, (2001, p. 8) says:

> Thus, in preparing the North for its future role as ruler of Nigeria, the British rigged the very first nationwide population census conducted in 1931, in favour of the North. The figures awarded by the British were as follows: Northern Region 11,434,000, West Region 3,855,000, and Eastern Region 4,641,000. Total 19,930,000. Plurality in favour of the North = 2,938,000.

The British, in the subsequent census of 1952 repeated the same thing. The growth rate of the population for a period spanning 25 years was along the census figures of 1931. Birth rate in the North was 67.89%, West 60.52% and East 58.22% resulting in figures of 16,840,000 for the North, 6,369,000 for the West and 7,971,000 for the East. This, again, gave the North a plurality of 2,500,000 over and above the other two regions put together. Subsequently, the colonial masters used the pre-independence census figures for the division of the country into federal electoral constituencies. There were 312 of such constituencies. The North had nine seats over and above the combined seats given to the two southern regions. This skewedness in the distribution of political benefits has persisted till today, as a result of the fact that subsequent sharing followed the ratio set by the colonial masters.

Another vestige of colonialism that is still haunting Nigeria today is the oversized structure give to Northern Nigeria. One of the essential features of a federation is that the federating units should, as much as possible, be equal in size so that none of them could override the other and get the central government to do its will. In the words of John Stuart Mill:

> There should not be any one state so much more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined. If there be such a one, and only one, it will insist on being master of the joint deliberations. If there be two, they will be irresistible when they agree; and whenever they differ everything will be decided by a struggle for ascendancy between the rivals (quoted in Nwokedi, 2002, p. 60).

Confirming this, Yakubu Gowon, Nigerian's one-time Head of State says that "our constitution was a glaring contradiction of fundamental principles of federalism. The most important principle to ensure the success of a federation is that not a single state or region should be so large and powerful as to be in a position to dominate the rest or hold them to ransom..." (quoted in Oyovbaire, 1985, p. 39). That the British did not adhere to the above admonition is not an act of omission or ignorance of the implications of lopsidedness of power in the stability of a federation on their part. It was rather out of selfishness and vindictiveness on their part. Selfishness in the sense that it was "...a wilful act designed to sow seeds of discord in the Nigerian political system in furtherance of the age-long imperial tactics of divide and rule, a tactics which main object was to prolong British colonial rule in Nigeria (Nwokedi, 2002, p.158).

Also, the British used the oversized structure to reward the Northerners for their loyalty and to punish the Southerners for their confrontational attitude towards the British. The colonial masters did not disguise their preference for the Northerners whom they believed were docile and "well conducted", while they despised the Southerners. According to them, the Southerners, especially the Igbos, who "are quick to learn, volatile, uninhibited, gay", were troublemakers; the sort of people who are see injustice everywhere and protest to the Newspapers" (Smith, 2005, p. 63). To perfect the act of leaving power permanently with the North, it was not enough that the British resorted to gerrymandering as confirmed by Henry Breton (Smith, 2005, p.63) who says that "the very construction of the Northern Region, in the form in which it entered the era of independence, represents one of the greatest act of gerrymandering in history" they had to rig the election in addition. This was confirmed by Smith, (2005, p. 62) who was a principal actor in the saga. According to him:

> When I suggest that the British Government meddled with the democratic elections, I write as an authority. I was chosen by His Excellency, the Governor General, Sir James Robertson to spearhead a covert operation to interfere with the election... The British Government determined beforehand to whom it would be handing the keys of the Nigerian Kingdom. They were the rulers of the North, who had been long favoured by the British.

4. Colonialism in Other Jurisdictions

Space would not permit us to be as detailed as we were in the case of Nigeria but suffice it to say that most of the decolonised states have almost the same history. Anyanwu (2006) did a study of six decolonised states – Cyprus, Malaysia, Pakistan, Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria and found that majority of the states are crisis-ridden, unstable or failed. It was seen that none of the states was a single integrated nation; like in Nigeria ethnic nationalities were "cobbled" together and so forging a cohesive and peaceful statehood after independence continues to be a problem even till today. Also, the fact that the colonialists had to jettison the indigenous laws and institutions familiar to the ethnic nationalities and replaced them with strange and unfamiliar ones further compounded the problem of the colonised states. The conflict generated by this is still with us today. Again, during the colonial era, decisions were taken by the colonialists (and much later in conjunction with the few political elites at that time) without any impute by the indigenes. Thus, an author has said that "the colonial state in Africa was an authoritarian bureaucratic apparatus of control and not intended to be a school of democracy"(Copson, 2001, p. 12)." Being that colonialism is majorly for exploitation this is to be expected. All this is succinctly summarised by a commentator as follows:

> This malpractice inherited by the post-independence African leaders. It is due to this fact that Africa has suffered from, *inter alia*, evils of corruption and authoritarianism since the time of independence. Hence, what African states inherited from their colonisers is their undemocratic and authoritarian government.

5. Legacies of Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism

The legacies of colonialism and its child neo-colonialism are far-reaching economically and politically. According to Rodney (1972), the legacies are dependence and under development. In fact, he argues that:

> Colonialism fettered the development of the enslaved peoples. To facilitate colonial exploitation, the imperialists deliberately hampered economic, social and cultural progress in the colonies preserved and restored obsolete forms of social relations and fermented discord between nationalities and tribes (Rodney, 1972, p. 87)

Equally, Mbah (2012, pp. 18-62) maintains that African labour and resources were super-exploited and the continents capacity to develop was undermined (p. 31). Under colonialism, African countries were structured to permanently depend on western economies. They were consigned to the role of primary producers of products for processing by the west. Lending credence to this, Ezeogidi (2019, p. 31) itemised such agricultural products to include cocoa, palm produce, rubber, groundnut and cotton.

Specifically, in Nigeria, the worst legacy is the “skewedness” and the “lopsidedness” in Nigeria's structure foisted on us by the colonial masters. Following this, in the very first creation of states, in 1967, when twelve states were created, the North had six while the South had six (three each for the East and the West). In 1975, out of 19 states created the North had ten while the South had nine (four for the East and five for the West). The same pattern was followed in August 1991 when the states of the federation were increased to 30; the East and West had seven each while the North had 16 states. Currently, we have 36 states. Again, the East and West have nine each while the North has 18 in addition to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). This inequality also manifests in the number of local government councils in the country. Out of 774 local government areas, the three geo-political zones in the North each have at least 140 (making a total of 421). Thus, one observes that the Nigerian federalism has a structural defect right from its foundation and this is the genesis of its political trouble. The effect of this is the continued domination by the north as the west and east put together can never muster a simple majority of votes to make their voice heard let alone the two third majority required for serious issues in the National Assembly.

6. Assessing the Political Capacity of the State in Africa

The tasks of this section to assess if the states in Africa are capable of carrying out the tasks they are elected to for their citizens and if not why not; what challenges affect their ability to carry out these tasks? To start with, broadly speaking and following Grindle (1996), political capacity constitutes dimensions of state capacity. This presupposes that political capacity is an aspect of state capacity. Take the issue of provision of amenities such as clean water, healthcare services, good roads, housing, etc; or affordable and quality public education; or economic infrastructure needed for economic activities: what of in the area of job creation or ability to contain unemployment especially amongst youth? The question is how many states in Africa have performed above average? Rather what we have in majority of the states is lack of political capacity resulting in unprecedented violence, corruption, ethnic militancy, kidnapping, crushing poverty, unemployment, etc. Given the above, therefore, it is better imagined than discussed how far states in Africa have fared in the actualisation of their mandates. It follows clearly without fear of contradiction that majority of states in Africa seriously speaking, need to find their feet as far as carrying out their legitimate functions are concerned.

7. Recommendations and Conclusion

Various theorists have attributed the incapacity of African states to such evil as bad leadership, corruption, tribalism, unpatriotism, lack of autochthonous constitution, etc. We humbly submit that these are not the problem. We rather align ourselves with a commentator (Chinweizu, 2006) who says that…” these (i.e., tribalism, corruption, bad leadership) are symptoms, not the underlying causes; the fever not the malaria or typhoid parasites. Our problems are much more serious than corruption and co…" For him and for us and many others that think like us, the problem in Nigeria is what has variously been called (Smith, 2005) "the error" or "mistake" of 1914 which describes the lumping together of "a unity of opposites, of unequals, sometimes of strange bed-fellows and sometimes of friendly neighbours." The result of this is Nigeria, which "is not a nation but *noyau*-, i.e., a society of inward antagonism, one held together by mutual internal antagonism, one which could not carry on if its members had no fellow members to hate" (Oputa, 2006).

This agrees with the view of a lot of Nigerians who are concerned about the state of the nation. These people believe that there must be a forum where Nigerians will be given the opportunity to re-examine the basis of the present Nigerian union and re-negotiate a better union. According to them, the reign of justice and peace will continue to elude the nation, as long as the government continues to ignore the call for a national conference, that is, a forum where Nigerians will say what they want and draft their constitution accordingly.This call for a national conference cuts across ethnic borders. Some of the people who have made this call are David Dafinome, the chairman of the Union of Niger Delta which is made up of six states-Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (Newswatch, February 2001, p.10) on his own part, maintains that justice can only be achieved in Nigeria by giving everybody "a level playing ground". According to him, the answer to the problem in Nigeria lies in:

> restructuring, which is what we have been talking about and the beginning of all restructuring is to have a national conference. And the beginning of a national conference is to accept a total reconciliation within Nigeria and true federalism. This can be done in a very short time. A conference we can easily have, just an announcement.

According to Ojukwu, it is only when "we face each other across a conference table, (to) redraw our plans or make adjustments, restructure or structure *ab initio* a new Nigeria, that we can have a Nigerian nation." For him, what we have now is a group of nations. Balarabe Musa (Newswatch, February 2001, p.74), on his own part, says that to build a Nigeria of equality, justice and fair play, what we need is:

> Fundamental changes and you can bring about his fundament change only through going back to the people who have the ultimate authority to decide for the country…it is for this reason that we demand for a sovereign national conference, SNC, of elected representatives for a united and democratic Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Other prominent Nigerians who have, at various times, called for a national conference include Anthony Enahoro, Wole Soyinka, Kanito Bello, Uche Chukwumerije and Chukwuemeka Ezeife. Of all these calls, the most eloquent is the one by the Oputa Panel. Writing on the findings of the panel, *Tell* (17 June, 20005) says:

> In summary, the Commission, after adding up all its findings on all the volatile issues that almost drove Nigeria to the precipice, infers that Nigeria and Nigerians cannot escape the

convocation of national conference. It is necessary condition for genuine reconciliation, national cohesion and continued peaceful coexistence among the various ethnic nationalities.

Majority of people the world over agree that America represents a model of what a country should be. The strength of America comes from the fact that the union came into being by the conscious agreement of stakeholders who agreed to be bound together by what was first known as the Articles of Confederation before the present Constitution of the United States of America (Okiche, 2008). We believe that if Nigerians sit down to talk to negotiate the basis of their union, such nagging issues as self determination, lopsidedness in the size of the federating unit, marginalisation, insecurity of life and property, ethnic militancy, resource control, rotational presidency, overconcentration of power in the centre, revenue sharing formula and so on will be addressed and the nation will be the better for it. Postponing this will merely be postponing the evil day. We dare say that by extension the same is true of most of the decolonised sates since most have similar history with Nigeria.

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THEME TWELVE
POWER SHARING, QUOTA SYSTEM AND FEDERAL CHARACTER

FEDERAL CHARACTER PRINCIPLE, QUOTA SYSTEM AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: A FOCUS ON FORMER PRESIDENT GOODLUCK JONATHAN AND PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI'S ADMINISTRATIONS

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Abstract

The Nigerian state is heterogeneous and multi-ethnic in nature. This plurality has produced possible fear of domination among other three ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. Thus, the Federal Character Principle was introduced by Murtala Ramat Mohammed administration in 1975 to allay the fears of the minority groups. The paper, therefore, seeks to critically examine this principle of Federal Character whether its implementation has resolved the challenges of perceived or real domination of the minority groups in Nigeria that would ensure sustainable development. This paper will adopt historical design which will enable us elicit existing data to qualitatively discuss the variable of the study. The system theory will be adopted to explain the linkage between federal character principle, quota system and possible minority group access to state resources and eventual sustainable development in Nigeria. The paper intends to recommend, among others, possible policy options that will emerge from the findings of this paper; to enable improvement in the application of the Federal Character Principle in the multi-ethnic Nigeria. This will ensure sustainable development and unity of purpose.

Keywords: Federal Character Principal, Quota System, Marginalisation, Power-Sharing and Sustainable Development.

Introduction

The Nigerian state is heterogeneous and muiti-ethnic in nature. This plurarity has produced possible fear of domination among other three ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. Thus, the Federal Character Principle was introduced by Murtala Ramat Mohammed/ Olusegun Obasanjo' administration to allay the fears of the minority groups.

The amalgamation of 1914 brought southern and northern protectorates together as a country called Nigeria. Lord Lugard merged the regions as one country for administrative purpose and basically to overcome the challenges facing the colonialist, such as the shortage of officials, lack of fund and communication problem.

Nigeria state was colonised by the Britain and operated as a colony in 1906. The colonies are southern protectorate, northern protectorate and, of course, Lagos colony.

It is also important to note that the multi-ethnic nature of Nigeria confronted the British with sleepless night and a lot of thinking on how best to administer Nigeria with shortage of British officials and lack of fund. Based on this, Lord Lugard came up with the innovative idea of amalgamation of southern protectorate and northern protectorate in 1914. This marriage of inconvenience between southern and northern geographic region that has over 374 ethnic groups was carried out by the British for economic and administrative purpose (Salawu & Hassan, 2011). However, the British colonisation and subsequent amalgamation of 1914 created a major problem in Nigeria because the regions could not be eliminated or abolished completely for the unity of Nigeria. Obviously, the pangs of birth still very much hang in Nigeria (Osifeso, 2011).

Nigeria has been facing issues since Independence in October 1, 1960. These issues have divided the country along ethnic, religious, majority-minority, advantaged and disadvantaged lines. Based on this, the Nigerian government continued to engage in thinking ways/solutions to preserve the existence of the system that merged people of diverse origin, culture, tradition and regions into artificial political entity that was designed by the British to effectively consolidate their economic and socio-political interest at the detriment of the various groups, ethnic cleavages and region that were not consulted before the marriage of inconvience. (Babatunde, 2015). Accordingly, Babatunde (2015) stated that the practice of divide and rule consolidate the deepening division and spilled into the social life of the people, with the south exposed to western education/Christianity, while the north was quarantined against the possible influence by the south, hence widening the division, marginalisation and inequity became more glaring (Osifso, 2011).

In view of these, this paper states that the British policy and the amalgamation of 1914 created a very big problem in Nigeria based on the failure to achieve the expected unity of the country. Instead, they were very much interested in exploiting away our resources to better their economy. The British built on the existing pre-colonial system on various regions that make up Nigeria. This evidently seen from the advantage enjoyed by the British with the centralised system of administration in Northern region, quasi-centralised system in the West and decentralised system of administration in Eastern Nigeria. The British colonial policy succeeded in achieving their selfish aim and succeeded in helping to nurture our regional altitude, lack of unity and competition/struggle for political power to control the socio-economic and political structure of the country. In view of this, the first political parties formed in this country to take over the mantle of leadership from the British was regional based. Thus, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) founded in August, 1944 by Herbert Macauley and Nnamdi Azikiwe. The Northern People's Congress (NPC) founded in 1951 by Amadu Bello from the Northern Nigeria while the Action Group (AG) was founded in 1950-51 by Obafemi Awolowo as the head from the western Nigeria.

In all these, the Richard Constitution of 1947 basically divided Nigeria into three administrative divisions (Northern, Western Eastern Region). In the same development, the Macpherson Constitution of 1951 and Lyttleton's Constitution of 1954 actually reinforced the regional principle. The Macpherson Constitution of 1951 intensified rivalry among the regional political parties by providing for the formation of regional governments from the representative of the majority party.

The rivalry and struggle for political powers continued among the ethnic group/regions in Nigeria till date. This was evidently seen from the first military coup organised in January 15, 1966 that brought General Aguiyi-Ironsi as first military head of state but this was seen and interpreted by the Northern part of Nigeria as Igbo coup to take over the mantle of leadership of the country. Based on this, there was another counter coup organised by the Northern military that brought General Yakubu Gowon as the second military head of state. However, Gowon created 12 states from the regions on 27 May 1967.

Nigeria witnessed another military coup and headed by Murtala Ramat Mohammad on 29 July 1975. Murtala Mohammad was eventually assassinated on 13 February 1976. This brought Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo as the head of state, who eventually prepared the country for democratic government and handed over to civilian president, Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979. Thereafter, the military truncated the civilian administration through military coup in 1984 that brought General Buhari as head of state. Subsequent military coups included General Ibrahim Babangida, General Abacha Sani in 19 and General Abdusalami Abubakar who took over after the demise of General Sani Abacha. However General Abdusalami Abubakar prepared the country for democratic election and handed over to General Olusegun Obasanjo as the democratically elected president who ruled from 1999 to 2007. Subsequent elected president are Shehu Yar Adua 2006, Goodluck Jonathan 2010 and Buhari 2015 till date.

In view of the above, it is evidently clear that some regions in the country have not occupied that position till date, such as Eastern part of Nigeria. They are now agitating to be given opportunity to occupy the position as president of Nigeria. This, of course, will correct the imbalance and have sense of belonging as Nigerians. It is obvious that sharing of power, federal character and quota system will foster unity in the country. It is absolutely clear that Murtala Mohammad introduced the federal character principle in 1975 to address the issue of imbalance of power and marginalisation among the various ethnic regions in Nigeria.

Statement of the Problem

Nigeria is made up of so many ethnic nationalities, but basically divided into three regions as enshrine in Richard Constitution of 1922. They are Northern Nigeria, Western Nigeria and Eastern Nigeria. Based on this, there are so many agitations and protests over marginalisation and imbalance of power. This, of course, motivated the federal government (Murtala Mohammed to established federal character principle to support the already existing quota system.

In spite of this, some regions/geo-political zones are still marginalised and continued to clamor for balance of power. Based on this, the paper will critically examine the effective implementation of power-sharing, federal character principle and quota system and why people continued to agitate against marginalisation and balance of power.

The Objective of the Study

The main objective is to critically analyse the effectiveness and implementation of federal character principle and quota system in Nigeria while the specific objectives are:

- to examine the nature and challenges facing the implementation of federal character principle and quota system that prevents unity and equal access to state resources;

- provide a template for better condition of living in the country; and
- examine the nature and character of Federal Character Principle and Quota System as concepts.

Research Questions

- Does the nature and challenges of implementation of federal character principle and quota system prevent the unity and access to state resources ?
- Does the template provide a better condition of living in the country?
- Does the nature and character of Federal character principle and Quota system operate as a concepts?

Literature Review/Discussion of Relevant Literature

Theoretical Framework

System theory is the interdisciplinary study of systems. It is a cohesive conglomeration of interrelated and interdependent parts which can be natural or human-made. However, every system is bounded by space and time, influenced by its environment, defined by its structure and purpose, and expressed through its functioning which of course may be more than the sum of its parts if it expresses synergy or emergent behaviour.

In view of this, the paper adopts system theory to explain the concept of federal character principle and quota system and sustainable development in Nigeria. This was basically used because of the existence of multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society/geographical regions in Nigeria that were basically identified by their respective languages and culture.

Method of Study

This paper used historical design to elicit and analyse quantitative primary data from the various ethnic regions

Discussions of Related Literature

In this paper, relevant literature are drawn along the following order:

Conceptual Clarification

Federal Character Principle

Federal character principle was established in Nigeria in 1975 to address the issue of marginalisation, imbalance of power between the various ethnic regions in the country.

According to the Constitution Drafting Committee postulated that distinctive desire of the people of Nigeria to promote national unity, foster national loyalty and give every citizen of Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation irrespective of the ethnic of origin, culture, language or religion.

Okpata define the federal character principle in Nigeria as the democratisation of the public bureaucracy through the principle of representation as enshrined in the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Afigbo noted that federal character principle could be seen as the character of Nigerian Federation. However, the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) opined that federal character principle could be seen as the distinctive desire of the people of Nigeria to promote national unity, foster national loyalty and give every citizen of Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation irrespective of their different ethnic nationality.

In view of this, Usman (2004) stated that the effort of federal character principle was basically to re-address the imbalance structure and ethnic domination in government so that national integration could be achieved for sustainable development. This, of course, could be seen from the agitation of various ethnic group, like Niger Delta region, Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), MASSOB and the rest of them are still clamouring for restructuring of the country to correct the imbalance and marginalisation in the country.

Elaigwu (1992) stated that where sharing formula are working well to the satisfaction of every ethnic group/region, there will be less or absolutely no agitation. This will give the citizens a feeling of belonging and equity but on the contrary, where certain ethnic region are marginalised politically and socio-economic, they will continuously agitate for balance of political and socio-economic activities such as demand for national conference, restructuring, resource control and amendment of the constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Quota System

Quota system was introduced in 1958 to quell the agitation for access into police service.

The Federal Character Commission (1996) defined the quota system as lowering the entering qualification of the states considered disadvantages indigene/non-indigene dichotomy. It is most commonly used during admission into the higher institutions. JAMB refers it as catchment area. In view of this, Ogwonnaya (2009) opined that quota system and/or catchment area is a policy of the federal character in admission into schools, appointment to offices, and resource allocation.

Ekundayo & Ajayi (2009) asserted that the quota system and catchment area policies ensure equity and fairness in the admission processes. Similarly, Oduwaiye (2011) stipulated that as much as it is good that the educationally disadvantaged area is being encouraged, it should not be at the detriment of others in a situation where a candidate does not gain access just because of his birth place which is not too good. In the same development, Enemuo (2004) argued that the policy encourages social discrimination of one group against the other. He emphasised that quota system, in all its ramification, is the practice of favouring some candidates at the expense or detriment of others in the political and socio-economic development and admission on the basis of state of origin, local government area, tribe and others.

Table 1: Tabular Representation of selected ethnic regions in the country for the two administrations (Goodluck and Buhari)

REGIONS	GOODLUCK JONATHAN	BUHARI MUHAMMADU
North Central	Goodluck Jonathan	Buhari Muhammadu
North – East	Goodluck Jonathan	Buhari Muhammadu
North – South	Goodluck Jonathan	Buhari Muhammadu
South – East	Goodluck Jonathan	Buhari Muhammadu
South – West	Goodluck Jonathan	Buhari Muhammadu
South – South	Goodluck Jonathan	Buhari Muhammadu

These regions were selected because they represent the six geo-political zones in the country, which presented a better atmosphere and understanding to critically examine the power- sharing, federal character and quota system in the Nigeria.

Table 2 Goodluck Jonathan's Cabinet for July 2011 – 29, May 2015

NORTH – EAST ZONE				
GOODLUCK JONATHAN'S CABINET. MINISTRY		BUHARI'S CABINET		STATE
Agriculture and Natural Resources (State)	Bukar Tuani	Minister of State for Agriculture and Rural Development	Mustapha Baba Shehuri	Borno
Federal Capital Territory	Bala Muhammed	Education	Adamu Adamu	Bauchi
Minister of State for Finance	Yerima Lawal Ashiru	Minister of state for work and housing	Abubakar .D. Aliyu	Yobe
Women Affairs	Zaineb Maina	FCT	Muhammed Musa Bello	Adamawa
Transport	Idris .A. Umar	Communication	Ale Isa Pantami	Gombe
		Sale Mmman	Power	Taraba
		Minister of State for Industry, Trade and Investment	Maryam Katagum	Bauchi
OTHERS				
Head of service	Isa Bello Sslt	Secretary to Government of Federation	Babachir David Lawal	Adamawa
Chairman NAPEP	Muktar Tafawa-Balewa	Chief of Air Staff	Sadique Abubakar	Bauchi
		Ag. Director Gen. NIMASA	Baba Haruna Jauro	Yobe
		National Security Adviser	Babagana Monguno	Borno
		Chief of Army Staff	Tukur Buratai	Borno
		Comptroller Gen. Nigeria Custom Service	Hameed Ibrahim Ali	Bauchi

TABLE 3: NORTH-WEST ZONE

MINISTRY		**BUHARI'S CABINET**		**STATE**
Education	Rugayyatu Rutai	Water Resources	Suleiman Adamu	Jigawa
		Finance, Budget & National Planning	Zaineb Ahmed	Kaduna
Mines and Steel Development	Mohammed Musa Sada	Aviation	Sirika Hadi	Katsina
National Planning	Shamsudeen Usman	Agriculture	Sabu Nanono	Kano
Sports	Yusef Suleiman	Police Affairs	Maigari Dingyadi	Sokoto
Defence	Bello .H. Mohammed			Kebbi
Works (State)	Basher Yugudu	Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management, Social Development	Sadiya Umar Farak	Zamfara
		Environment	Muhammed Mahmood	Kaduna
		Defence	Basir Salihi Magashi	Kano
OTHERS				
Air Marshal Mohammed Dikko Umar	Chief of Air Staff	Aide de Camp to President & Husband to Buhari's Foster daughter	Lt. Col. Abubakar Lawal	Kano
Hafiz Abubakar Ringim	Inspector – General of Police	Ag. Chairperson, INEC	Amina Zakari	Jigawa
Alhaji Abdullahi Dikko Inde	CG. Customs	Director General State Security Service (SSS)	Lawal Daura	Katsina
Madam Lamido Sanusi	CBN Governor	Accountant General of the Federation	Ahmed Idris	Kano
Mr. Rabe Darma	Secretary, PTDF	Senior Special Assistant Media & Publicity	Garba Shehu	Kano
Prof. Attahiru Jega	Chairman INEC			Kebbi

		Ag. Chairperson INEC	Amina Zakari	Jigawa
		Managing Director, Nigeria Port Authority (NPA)	Habibu Abdullahi	Kano
		Executive Vice Chairman/Chief Executive Officer, Nigeria VE Communication Commission	Umaru Damatta	Kano
		Director General, Budget Office of the Federation	Aliyu Gusau	Zamfara
		Senior Special Assistant on National Assembly Matters (House of Rep.)	Suleiman Kawu	Kano
		Managing Director, Asset Management Company of Nig. (AMCON)	Ahmed Lwan Kure	Kano
		Director, Dept. of Petroleum Resource (DPR)	Modecai Baba Ladan	Niger
		Commissioner for Insurance & Chief Executive of the National Insurance Commission	Mohammed Kari	

TABLE 4 **NORTH – CENTRAL ZONE**

Attorney General, Justice	Mohammed Bello Adoke	Minister of Special Duties and International Affairs	George Akume	Benue
		Minister of State for FCT	Ramatu Tilani	Kogi
Information	Labaran Maku	Minister of State for Science and Technology	Mohammed Abdullahi	Nasarawa

Niger Delta	Zaineb Ibrahim	Minister of state	Zuber Dada	Niger
Niger Delta Affairs (State)	Zaineb Ibrahim Kuchi	Minister of state for Foreign Affairs	Zuber Dada	Niger
		Minister for Women Affairs	Paulen Tallen	Plateau
Youth Development	Bolaji Abdullahi	Minister for Information and Culture	Lai Mohammed	Kwara
Interior	Comrade Abba Moro			Benue
Trade and Investment	Samuel Loraer Ortom			Benue
OTHERS				
Chief of Naval Staff	Vice – Admiral Ola Ibrahim			Kwara
NNPC GMD	Mr. Auten Oniwon			Kogi
Aude for General of Federation	Mr. Samuel Orkura	Chief of Defense Intelligence	Monday Riku Morgan	Benue
Chairman EFCC	Mrs. Farida Waziri			Benue
DG, NDLEA	Femi Ajayi			Kwara
		Comptroller General Immigration Service	Kure Martin Abeshi	Nasarawa
		Group Executive Director NNPC	Isiaku Abduirazaq	

Table 5 SOUTH-EAST ZONE

Finance	Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala	Minister of State for Mines and Steel Developemnt	Ikechukwu Ogah	Abia

Aviation	Stell Oduah Ogiemwony	Minister for Labour and Employment	Chris Ngige	Anambra
Health	Onyebuchi Chukwu	Minister of Science and Technology	Ogbonnaya Onu	Ebonyi
Foreign Affairs (State)	Viola Onwuliri	Minister of State for Education	Chukwuemeke Nwajiuba	Imo
Power	Chinedu Nebo took over from Bart Nneji	Minister for Foreign Affairs	Geoffrey Onyeama	Enugu
Labour	Emeke Wogu	Minister for Foreign Affairs	Geoffrey Onyeama	Enugu
		Minister for Labour and Employment	Chris Ngige	Anambra
		Minister of Science and Technology	Ogbonnaya Onu	Ebonyi
		Minister of State for Education	Chukwuemeke Nwajiuba	Imo
		Minister of State for Environment	Sharon Ikeazor	Anambra
		Minister of State for Mines and Steel Development	Ikechukwu Ogah	Abia

OTHERS

Chief of Army Staff	Lt. Gen. Onyeabo Azubuike Ihejirika			Abia
CG, Immigration	Rosemary Chinyere Uzoma			Abia
Secretary PPRRA	Engr. Goody Chike Egbuji			Enugu
Chairman RMAFC	Elias .N. Mbam			
DG, BPP	Engr. Emeka			Rivers

		Group Executive Director NNPC	Dennis Nnamdi Ajulu	
		Executive Director AMCON	Eberechukwu Uneze	

TABLE 6 **SOUTH-WEST ZONE**

Foreign Affairs	Olugbenga Ashiru	Minister of Mines and Steel Development	Olamilekan Adegbite	Ogun
Trade and investment	Olusegun .O.	Minister of Work and Housing	Babatunde Fashola	Lagos
Communication Technology	Mrs. Omobola Johnson	Minister of State for Niger – Delta	Tayo Alasoadura	Ondo
FCT (State)	Olaiamoke Akinide	Minister of Youth and Sports	Sunday Dare	Oyo
Police Affairs	Caleb Olubolade	Minister of Industry, Trade and Investment	Richard Adeniyi Adebayo	Ekiti
Defense (State)	Erelu Olusola Obada	Minister of Interior	Rauf Aregbesola	Osun
		Minister of Work and Housing	Babatunde Fashola	Lagos
OTHERS				
Chief of Defense Staff	Air Chief Oluseyi Petinirin	Special Adviser, Media & Publicity to President	Femi Adesina	Osun
CG. Prisons	Olusola Ogundipe			Ogun
Secretary PEF	Mrs. Adefunke Kasali			Ogun

DG, BPE	Mrs. Bolande Onagoruwa			Ogun
		Trade & Invdstment	Olusegun .O. Aganga	Lagos
		Chief of Defense Staff		Ekiti
		Executive Chairman, Federal Inland Revenue Service(FIRS)	Babatunde Fowler	Lagos
		Group Executive Director. NNPC	Babatunde Victor Adeniran	
		Executive Director. AMCON	Kola Ayeye	

Table 7: SOUTH-SOUTH ZONE

Niger Delta Affairs	Godsday Orubebe	Minister of State for Labour and Employment	Festus Keyamo	Delta
Petroleum	Diezani Alisonmaduleke	Minister of State for Petroleum	Timipre Sylva	Bayelsa
Science and Works	Ita Okon Bassey Ewa	Minister of Niger – Delta	Godswill Akpabio	Akwa – Ibom
Works	Mike Onolemenem	Minister of State for Budget and National Planning	Clement Agba	Edo
		Minister of Transport	Rotimi Amaechi	Rivers
		Minister of Health	Osagie Ebanire	Edo
		Minister of State for Power	Goddy Jedy Agba	Cross – River

OTHERS

Director – General SSS	Mr. Ita Ekpenyong	Chief of Naval Staff	Ibok – Ete Ekwe Ibas	Cross – River
NSA to Jonathan	Gen. Andrew Azazi	Special Adviser, niger Delta Amnesty Office	Paul Boroh	Bayelsa
Director, DPR	Andrew Obaji	Group Managing Director. Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNOCC)	Emmanuel Kachikwu	Delta
Chairman NPA	Chief Anthony Anenth			Edo
Chairman ICPC	Francais Elechi			Rivers
Vice Chairman NCC	Eugene Juwah			Delta
Chairman FIRS	Mrs. Ifueko Omoigui – Okauru			Delta
		Senior Special Assistant on National Assembly Matters (Senate)	Ita Eneng	Akwa Ibom

This paper critically examined and compared the Ex-President Goodluck Jonathan and President Muhammadu Buhari's appointment of ministers and other various appointments/head of government, Director-General and Chairman of Parastatals and Agencies. In view of this, from tables 2 to table 7 clearly indicate the various appointments of both administrations based on the geographical zones in Nigeria.

However, table 2 clearly shows that Ex-President Goodluck Jonathan appointed five ministers and two other positions of head of government and parastatals from North-East, while Buhari appointed seven (7) ministers and six other positions of Head of Government and Parastatals. The table two (3) shows that Ex-President Goodluck appointed six ministers and six other positions of Head of Government and Parastatals, while President Buhari appointed eight ministers and thirteen other positions of Head of Government and Parastatals from the North-West Zone where he hails from.

Table three (4) clearly shows that Ex-President Goodluck appointed six (6) ministers and 5 other positions of Head of government and parastatals from the North-Central.

Table 5 indicates that Ex-President Goodluck Jonathan's cabinet consist of six ministers from the South-East and five other positions of Head of government and parastatals, while Buhari's cabinet consist of six (6) ministers and two other positions of Head of Government and parastatals.

Table 6 shows that Ex-President Goodluck appointed six ministers and five other positions of head of government and parastatals. In the same vain, President Buhari's cabinet consist of seven ministers and six other positions of Head of government and parastatals from South-West.

Table 7. This table produced four (4) ministerial positions and seven (7) other positions of Head of Government and paraststals from South-South where the Ex-President Goodluck Jonathan hails from, while President Buhari appointed seven (7) ministers and four (4) other position Head of Government and parastatals from South-South Zone.

The above tables 2 to 7 indicate that Ex-President Goodluck favoured the Southern part of Nigeria with 32 political appointments while the Northern part of Nigeria had 32 political appointments. Buhari's administration consists of 43 political appointees from the Northern part of Nigeria while 32 political appointees is from the Southern part of Nigeria.

Comparatively, the Ex-President Goodluck Jonathan and President Muhammadu did not implement the federal character principle to the satisfaction of the zones and, by extension, Nigerians. The appointments were not evenly distributed to the geographical zones.

Conclusion

The paper observed that the equitable distribution of bureaucratic and political role that would have promoted national unity and eliminated the possible fear of domination from the minority group for the purpose of sustainable development were completely a mirage, in both administration, most especially, the appointment made by President Buhari shows a high level of marginalisation of other geo-political zones that were not privileged to come from President Buhari's geo-political zone where most juicy or strategic positions were given to Fulani Moslems. These, of course, raised so many agitations and anger from the oppressed geographical zones across the nation on the ineffectiveness and lack of implementation/ application of the Federal character principle and quota system. This was obvious from the election of the lawmakers of both chambers of National Assembly and House of Representatives.

The senate president and speaker of House of Representatives and other principal offices were zoned and stand elected from the northern part of Nigeria without recourse or consideration of other minority group/zones . . This factored the agitations of the minority group/geographical zones like IPOB, middle-Belt and Oduduwa for self-independence.

The paper equally discovered that President Goodluck Jonathan was more considerate in terms of implementation of the federal character principles and quota system compared to president Buhari.

Recommendation

The paper recommend as follows:

- The president should organise a constitutional conference to address the fear of domination of the ethnic minority group.

- There should be effective implementation of the Federal character principle and quota system.
- The president should restructure the and strengthen the body or Agency of Federal character principle/Quota system to have an equal representatives of the six geo-political zones that will effectively monitor the implementation of federal character principle and quota system that will promote the sustainable development in Nigeria.
- The power-sharing of the presidency and other heads of government and parastatals should be well defined and enshrined in the constitution to reflect all the ethnic minority groups, most especially the Eastern part of Nigeria that are currently agitating for the president to be zone to Eastern Nigeria.
- The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria should be amended to correct some of the lacuna in 1999 Constitution, most especially the imbalance of power between the majority group and minority group in Nigeria.

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THEME THIRTEEN
RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND CRISIS OF VALUE

THE FALSE PROMISE OF THE FEDERAL CHARACTER PRINCIPLE IN NIGERIA: THE BUHARI/APC ADMINISTRATION IN PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract
The most pronounced debacle to highly heterogenous societies is the preponderance of ethnicity and religion. Federalism has often been the recipe for such societies.The complexity of Nigeria's dichotomies was so peculiar that it compelled the drafters of the 1963, 1979 and the 1999 Federal Constitutions to instill an added measure – the Federal Character Principle of Nigeria – to manage the country's multi-ethnicity. The Federal Character Principle directs that the composition of government or its agencies must reflect the diversity of the country. However, in spite of this measure, the governance of the state in Nigeria has continued in disaggregation and clannishness. This paper, by means of qualitative methods, investigates the observance or otherwise of the Federal Character Principle under the President Muhammadu Buhari/APC Administration since 2015. The paper concludes that the Federal Character Principle observance or abstinence in Nigeria is administration specific; implying that the unity of Nigeria or threat to its unity in diversity depends on the administration in power. The paper recommends that successive administrations must consider the unity of the country beyond the primordial interests (ethnic, religion, sectional, economic, etc.) of any administration in power.

Keywords: Nigeria, Federal Character Principle, Buhari, APC, Administration

Introduction

In erstwhile British Africa, mutual fear of domination, discrimination, and not getting fair share in governance and in the commonwealth remains a primary reason for adopting federalism (Rothchild, 1960; Philips, 1964; Kirk-Greene, 1975; Nnoli, 1980; Agbaje, 2004). Nigeria is a unique case and her founding fathers – in the likes of Sir Ahmadu Bello, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, amongst others – found some common values which made them optimistic of federalism's workability (Philips, 1964; Sklar, 1967; Adamolekun, & Ayo, 1989).

To historicise a little, Malam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria's erstwhile Prime Minister said, “I hope that we are now all agreed that a federal form of government is the best for Nigeria and that any item to impose a centralised unitary system will just split the country” (Rothchild, 1960, p.192). On his part, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe said, “Nigeria may have been a geographical expression yesterday, but today Nigeria is an historical reality and this assertion cannot be controverted” (Rothchild, 1960, p.141).

Whereas the Nigerian state has existed for sixty years, there is a basic contradiction in the political system; and this may be stated briefly from the outset: The challenge of an enduring ethnicity (Rothchild, 1960; Nnoli, 1980). Ethnicity, though not without its due merits (McCready, 1983; Yinger, 1985), is identified by a study as a possible trigger to breakup of Nigeria in 2030 (Kinnan et al, 2011). Ethnicity in Nigeria is traceable to the British colonial policy of divide-and-rule and the limitations of post-colonial policies to address and mitigate this colonial policy has helped to exacerbate ethnicity (Nwankwo & Ifejika, 1969; Aniagolu, 1992; Dibua, 2011; Cornelius & Greg, 2013). The enormity of ethnicity in Nigeria is better imagined as the following instances suffice. First, it has caused the concept of indigeneity – the "idea that there is a meaningful distinction to be made between "host" and "settler" communities" (HRW, 2006, p. 1) – to ingloriously flourish in Nigeria. Sir Ahmadu Bello, erstwhile Premier of Northern Region, once said:

> *We do not want to go to Lake Chad and meet strangers catching our fish in thewater and taking them away to leave us with nothing. We do not want to go toSokoto and find a carpenter who is a stranger nailing our houses. I do not want togo to the Sabon-Gari in Kano and find strangers making the body of a lorry, or to goto the market and see butchers who are not Northerners. (HRW, 2006, p. 7).*

The implication is that rather than nationality, indigeneity clothed in ethnic colourations has become the touchstone of personal identity and manifest in inter-ethnic rivalries in the country (Selassie, 1992; Kinnan, 2011). *Second, to many Nigeria never exists. Malam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, for example, posited during the 1948 Legislative Council debates that:* "Many Nigerians deceive themselves by thinking that Nigeria is one. This is wrong. I am sorry to say that this presence of unity is artificial and it ends outside this chamber" (Omoruyi, 1981, p. 64). *Elsewhere, Tafawa Balewa submitted that:* "since the amalgamation of Southern and Northern provinces in 1914 Nigeria has existed as one country only on paper…It is still far from being united. Nigeria's unity is only a British intention for the country" (Ekpu, 2017, para. 2). *Chief Obafemi Awolowo also insists that:*

> *Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no 'Nigerians' in the same sense as there are 'English', 'Welsh' or 'French'. The word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not. (Awolowo, 1947, p. 47).*

Third, ethnicity has become the benchmark in allocating political and bureaucratic offices and the nation's commonwealth (Oko, 1998; Idike et al, 2019).

In recognition of this, deliberate constitutional provisions have been put in place to actualise the Nigeria of our founding fathers' dream (Touval, 1985). Several measures were adopted. First, a rigid and written federal constitution which demarcates levels of authority and their accompanying functions (Wheare, 1964; Philips, 1964; Akinyemi, et al, 1979). Second, the belief and foreknowledge that Nigeria is plural in nature enough to have a "federal character" principle – which mandates government and its agencies in appointments to recognise the diverse linguistic groups in their diversity instead of their similarities (Nnoli, 1980; Ayoade, 1986; *Diamond, 1987*).

The Federal Character Principle of Nigeria, as enshrined in Sections 13 (3) and (4) of the 1999 Constitution, was intended to making the workings of government in Nigeria subject to and beyond the reach of any given government (Abubakar, 2004; Agbodike, 2004; Festus, 2015). These constitutional provisions recognise the endemic character of ethnicity in Nigeria. Of course, the pervasiveness of ethnicity in a developing economy as Nigeria is the recognition of government as the sole determinant of the commonwealth (Ayoade, 1986).

However, while these deliberate efforts subsist, the endemic nature of ethnicity in Nigeria's body politics proves that the federal character principle has achieved little. This is because it has proven counter-productive. The undue emphasis on indigeneity or ethnic citizenship distorts the federal character principle by determiningwho gets what, how and when in Nigeria subject to where one's parents were born is the chief culprit (ICG, 2006; Majekodunmi, 2013). Disappointingly, therefore, federal appointments in Nigeria often undermine the linguistic, ethnic, religious and geographical heterogeneity of the country (Adamolekun et al, 1991). Thus, national integration is definitely a far cry in the country. What seems prevalent is a temporary, fragile and elusive elite's cohesion among the political class in Nigeria; a cohesion to share the gains of the nation's commonwealth (Ugoh, & Ukpere, 2012; Cornelius, & Greg, 2013).

There is a further angle to this enduring challenge in Nigeria – the challenge of a dominant Northern Nigeriain geography and population (Ojo, 1998; Ayoade, 2004). By this singular fact, the North has automatically had permanent control of the central government and this was entirely British influence and favourable to British colonial governance; an arrangement which stands to jeopartise the corporate existence of Nigeria (Philips, 1964; Nwankwo & Ifejika 1969). Be that as it may, any government in Nigeria must handle this Herculean task of enthroning a genuine federal character devoid of dominance of whatever region.

This paper essentially examines the management of ethnic plurality by the President Muhammadu Buhari/APC Government since 2015. Specifically, to what extent has the President Buhari/APC Government observed the federal character principle as an ethnic management device in Nigeria? This paper took its point of departure from the intense claims and counter-claims to the observance of the federal character principle by the President Buhari/APC administration. To achieve this purpose, the paper is structured as follows. Section II makes an analysis of the federal character principle in Nigeria. Section III critically examines the observance of the federal character principle by the President Buhari administration in Nigeria from the standpoint of the petroleum sector. In Section IV the paper draws conclusions and makes some recommendations.

Federal Character Principle of Nigeria: Some Basic Clarifications

A number of issues are germane for clarification in the discourse of federal character principle of Nigeria; including the underlisted:

a. *Federal Character Principle: Etymology*

Foremost historian, Tekena (2004, p. 13) noted that "neither history nor politics nor economics has given the cause of "federalism" in Nigeria a smooth ride". However, while this is not peculiar to Nigeria; for every known federalism is plagued by its peculiar challenges, a lot depends on how federalism's challenges in a given state are handled. In the case of Nigeria, it is the overriding challenge of ethnicity and the federal character principle was deliberately introduced to manage it. In proceeding, what is federal character principle in Nigeria? Ammani (2014, *para*.2) says federal character principle is:

> *the distinctive desire of the peoples of Nigeria to promote nationalunity, foster national loyalty and give every citizen of Nigeria a senseof belonging to the nation notwithstanding the diversities of ethnicorigin, culture, language or religion which may exist and which it istheir desire to nourish, harness to the enrichment of the FederalRepublic of Nigeria*.

It is obvious from the above that, definition is not controversy-laden. However, historicising the ancestry of the Federal Character Principle of Nigeria into Nigeria's constitutional development has generated enormous controversy. It is the erroneous consensus among federalism scholarship in Nigeria that the Federal Character Principle of Nigeria was first muted by General Murtala Ramat Muhammed in 1976 at a meeting of the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) and popularised by the drafters of the 1979 Constitution by embodying it into the 1979 Constitution (Agbodike, 2004; Ammani, 2014).

However, recent scholarship indicates otherwise. Two of Chief Obafemi Awolowo's books, "Awo: *The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo"*(1945) and "*Path to Nigerian Freedom"* (1947) are being credited with the first coinage and usage (Maduagwu, 2019). From "Towards Federal Union" as a chapter in his "*Path to Nigerian Freedom",* Chief Obafemi Awolowo noted that following the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914, the British government unsuccessfully worked to enthroning a unitary state in Nigeria; however:

> In the White Paper (Cmd 6599) …some attempt is being made to rectify this original mistake…The division into three Regions was arbitrary and made only for administrative convenience…There are a few sentences in the White Paper which indicate rather vaguely that the British Government now recognises the federal character of Nigeria. But nothing is done beyond this paper recognition. (Maduagwu, 2019, p. 99).

Queuing from Chief Obafemi Awolowo's usage, the 1979 Constitutional Drafting

Committee (CDC, 1975, p.2) defines federal character principle of Nigeria as:

> the distinctive desire of the peoples of Nigeria to promote national unity, foster national loyalty and give every citizen of Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation notwithstanding the diversities of ethnic origin, culture, language or religion which may exist and which it is their desire to nourish, harness to the enrichment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

However, the 1979 Constituent Assembly (CA) reviewed the above definition with the following phrase: "as expressed in Sections 14 (3) and (4) of this Constitution" (Maduagwu, 2019, p. 111) and as it is respectively contained in the same sections in the 1999 Constitution thus:

> (3) The composition of the Government of the Federation, or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies. (FRN, 1999)
>
> (4) The composition of the Government of a State, a local government council, or any of the agencies of such government or council or such agencies shall be carried out in such manner as to recognize the diversity of the peoples within its area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the peoples of the Federation. (FRN, 1999)

b. Federalism vs Federal Character-The Mix-up

Having settled the foregoing controversy, it is apposite to state that there is often a mix-up in the usage of federalism and federal character among federalism scholarship in Nigeria. This is because they tend to confuse the problems of federal character and federalism on account of the word federal common to both.

Specifically, Maduagwu (2019, p.115) identified a number of contributors to the following books, Ukwu (ed.) (1987) "*Federal Character and National Integration in Nigeria*" and Ekeh & Osaghae, (eds.) (1989) "*Federal Character and Federalism in Nigeria*" that committed the blunder. While in the Ukwu (ed.) two chapters written by Idrisu Alhassan Kpati and A. E. Afigbowere enmeshed in this mix-up, in the Ekeh & Osaghae (eds.), though of lesser mix-up, the chapter by Peter Ekeh, *"The Structure and Meaning of Federal Character in the NigerianPolitical System*", confused federal character with federalism (Maduagwu, 2019, pp. 115-119).

For purposes of clarifications, the idea of federal character principle was muted on how to bring about an accommodating policy to manage the ethnic diversity inherent in the country and not with the problem of federalism in Nigeria per se. Thus, the idea of federal character is a consciousness of the reality of ethnic heterogeneity in Nigeria (Dibua, 2011; Maduagwu, 2019). In corroborating, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi (in Kendhammer, 2014, p. 16) states that "diversity is not just ethnicity-driven, but you still have Muslims, Christians; northerners, southerners, women, men; and that is what is called federal character".

Ken Saro-Wiwa was optimistic that the federal character principle of Nigeria "will make for a more equal federation to which more people will owe loyalty because they see themselves represented meaningfully" (Agbodike, 2004, p. 183). Therefore, while federalism dictates how a given society is being run, federal character principle of Nigeria is but a device to settle the challenge of an enduring ethnicity that constantly bedevils Nigeria'scorporate existence.

c. Federal Character Principle in Nigeria: The Application Challenges

The introduction of the federal character principle of Nigeria as an ethnic management tool into the 1979 and 1999 Nigerian Constitutions respectively have continued to generate intense controversies, animosities, anger and anguish and in the process attractedbeing branded unprintable names in Nigeria. While Oyovbaire (1983, p. 19) called it "tribal character", Suberu (2001, p. 138) called it "geographical apartheid" that has never promoted national integration and where its "politics have proved to be extremely divisive in regional, ethnic, and religious terms".The animosity federal character principle has generated in Nigeria is most manifest in the North vs. South Nigeria claims and counter-claims to a number of sectoral imbalances (education, public service, political power, etc.,) even as the following instances suffice.

Malam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria's former Prime Minister, in eulogising the fears of the North of Southern domination in the context of Western civilisation posited that the majorly sea route entry of the British into the North, East and Westerns regions brought the different regions to fall under British rule at different times; a reason responsible for the difference in the:

> …rate of progress and developments in the Western European civilisation has been uneven with the vast Northern Region dragging behind…Man at times…is by nature suspicious and it is therefore natural for the people of the North, though greater than the South in numerical strength, to fear domination. I am sorry to say…that those fears still exist… (Albert, 2004, p. 52).

Similarly, Sir Ahmadu Bello, equally expressed the fears of the North in educational backwardness vis-à-vis the South. He notes in his autobiography, *My Life,* that:

> We were very conscious indeed that the Northern Region was far behind the others educationally. We know that individually the educated Northerners could hold their own against the educated Southerners, but simply had not got the numbers they had; nor had we people with university degrees necessary as qualification…for some of the higher posts. (Uroh, 2004, p. 196).

Unfortunately, scholarship in Nigeria has equally been dragged into this divisive ethnic politics in the country. For instance, Muhammad (2007) submits that superficially the North is dominant in the pollical sphere; however, in closer examination the South is in control of bureaucratic representation; albeit the region that alleges marginalisation. He substantiates his claim stating that "going by the 1996 federal staff audit, the entire northern region is said to have provided less than 20 percent of workers in all categories at the federal level. Even till date, there seem to have been no improvement in this trend…" (Muhammad, 2007, p. 201). Reacting to such scholarly dispositions, Uroh (2004, p. 197) countered that "…the present reality in Nigeria is such that, those from the educationally advanced states do not hold any advantageous position when it comes to politics, economic and other spheres of state power". This point needs further elaboration. As one may ask, between political power advantage and educational and public service advantage combined, which is much weightier in Africa's political contexts?

The fear of domination by the North has since compelled the region to adopt diverse approaches to measure-up with the South. One major approach, according to Omo Omoruyi (2001) is the adoption of a tripod approach to politics in Nigeria; where the North work assiduously to control the presidency, the armed forces and oil in Nigeria as one and indistinguishable entity and a necessary task to be accomplished by any means possible. This approach is in consonance with Kwame Nkrumah's admonition that Africa must first seek the political kingdom and every other thing will be added onto them. Therefore, the North has had dominance over other regions in sectors like the entire security architecture of Nigeria, immigration service, oil and gas, amongst others.

In proceeding the following questions are pertinent: Has the North not reasonably resolved the fears expressed by Sir Ahmadu Bello and Malam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa above? Is this dominance not suffocating other ethnic nationalities in Nigeria? If the response is in the affirmative, what then explains the deliberate skewing of the federal character principle in favour of Northern Nigeria? In the educational sector, there is no need in telling that the North, as at today, is no longer disadvantaged as they were in the 1970s. The region is proud of a huge chunk of brilliant men and women in all spheres of human endeavour. And of course, the reasons for the hitherto educational disadvantage in the First Republic (1963-1966) has been attributed to the appropriate quarters, including Lord Frederick Lugard's deliberate colonial policy never to allow Christian missionaries into the North in order not to tamper with the Islamic/Arabic education in the North either in colonisation and post-colonisation periods (Maduagwu, 2019, p. 137). Thus, the culprit here is Western education and its formal adoption in Nigeria as the official modus operandi of administration and governance by the British colonial administration. The adoption of Western education as the means to participation in both colonial and post-colonial governance in Nigeria remains the culprit has divided and creating fear in Nigerians. Equally interesting, is that colonial administration also tampered with the traditional religion and culture of the South and made them to embrace a foreign religion in Christianity instead (Maduagwu, 2019).

Therefore, Nigerians are the victims of the mistakes of the British colonial policies in education and public administration. And the federal character principle introduced to manage the ensuing ethnic imbalances has not fared any better because of the fear of the unknown among all ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. It is obvious that the federal character principle has done and still doing enormous disservice to Nigeria and Nigerians – simply serving elites interests (Agbodike, 2004); encouraging ethnicity while de-emphasising national integration.

The President Buhari/APC Government and Federal Character Principle in Nigeria

The founding fathers and drafters of successive constitutions in Nigeria have enshrined deliberate measures such as quota system and the federal character principle as remedies to mitigating the enduring challenge of ethnicity in the country (Osaghae, 1997; Agara, 2011). What values has Nigeria's these remedies served on Nigerians? In fact, political developments in Nigeria contradict one of federalism's dictum that "any account of federalism must begin with the values it serves" (Gerken, 2014, p. 1890).

General Olusegun Obasanjo, at the twilight of his administration in 1979, cautions that:

> any government as a human institution will have its shortcomings. But one major cause of failure of civilian administration in this country was that our leaders then concentrated on the part and ignored the whole. Hence regionalism, tribalism, sectionalism and ethnicity became the order of the day. (Maduagwu, 2019, p.106).

However, has successive administrations and in particular the President Muhammadu Buhari/APC Government heeding to and committed to genuine pieces of advice as that of General Olusegun Obasanjo in the interest of Nigerians?

The Muhammadu Buhari presidency assumed office on May 29, 2015. And after months of delay, the administration constituted its first executive council and making appointments into critical sectors of the polity: the security architecture, the economy, etc. However, the making of appointments by the administration has been simply blind to the constitutionally guaranteed federal character principle of Nigeria. The image makers of the administration, Femi Adesina, Special Adviser, Media and Publicity to the president and Garba Shehu, Senior Special Assistant on Media and Publicity to the president both approached this weighty matter from two angles.

First, it requested of Nigerians for patience with the administration since more appointments were still coming. Second, upon the conclusion of the appointments and the hues and cries became stronger and louder, an official document in the Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation shows a breakdown of appointments from the six geo-political zones in the country thus: North/West (19.5%), North/East (15.3%), North/Central (11.1%), South/West (33.7%), South/South (12.6%) and South/East (7.9%). In summary, 103 (54.2%) appointees are from the South while the North had 87(45.8%) appointees (Kumolu et al, 2017; Lawal, 2020). This breakdown, of course, is indicative that the South has superiority in appointments in President Buhari's administration. However, this analysis needs further elaboration – concerned Nigerians have since faulted the above. Ogunniran (2018, *para*.10), for instance, queries that:

> the list is an affront on the sensibility of Nigerians as all the key positions are from the North: The major security offices – Chief of Army Staff, National Security Adviser, State Chief of Protocol, Chief of Air Staff, Chief of Defence. The main economic offices –Accountant General, Deputy Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria, Group Managing Director, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Comptroller Generals of Customs and Immigration. Other core offices such as Chairman of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Inspector General of Police, Attorney General of the Federation etc. Summarily, there has never been such brazen abuse of the principle as witnessed in this administration. A former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo reiterated that the essence of the federal character is to avoid the concentration in a few ethnic hands or geographical places, as we currently have in the leadership of our security apparatus.

There is no need telling the obvious that having more Southerners in appointment is not enough to say the federal character principle is being observed by the President Buhari administration. The crux of the matter is this: If appointments into supposedly juicy ministries and critical sectors are being occupied by a section of the country and ministries and sectors at the fringe of the polity are handed over to other sections of the country, do we say the federal character principle is being observed? It is not a matter of number, but that of weight, intensity, or supposed impact of the sector concerned. For example, if the oil and gas sector (petroleum) and the top security echelons of Nigeria are all Northern Muslims, where is the federal character therein?Where is the federal character when in taking security decisions for the whole country, all heads of security formations are Northern Muslims or in deciding the key economic policies (especially in petroleum) decisions are entirely those of Northerners? Would the North not have genuine reason to express concern where the tables turn against the North?

However, these developments havesince elicited mixed reactions.Col. Dangiwa Umar, a retired independent minded military officer, in an open letter to President Buhari, states that:

> any conversation with you Mr. President cannot gloss over the chaos that has overtaken appointments into government offices in your administration. All those who wish you and the country well must mince no words in warning you that Nigeria has become dangerously polarised and risk sliding into crisis on account of your administration's lopsided appointments which continues to give undue preference to some sections of the country over others. Nowhere is this more glaring than in the leadership cadre of our security services. Mr. President, I regret that there are no kind or gentle words to tell you that your skewed appointments into the offices of the federal government, favoring some and frustrating others, shall bring ruin and destruction to this nation. I need not remind you, Mr. President, that our political history is replete with great acts of exemplary leadership which, at critical moments, managed to pull this nation back from the precipice and assured its continued existence.(Umar, 2020, *para*.10-13).

He justifies his stance that Northern political leaders early into Nigeria's political independence demonstrated their desire for a united one Nigeria in merit in the appointment of top military personnel by the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) leadership when:

> In February, 1965, the NPC-led Federal Government was faced with a decision to appoint a successor to the outgoing Nigerian Army General Officer Commanding, General Welby Everard, a Briton. Four most senior officers were nominated; namely, Brigadiers Aguiyi Ironsi, Ogundipe, Ademulegun and Maimalari. The first three were senior to Maimalari but he was deemed to be more qualified due to his superior commission. He was the first Sandhurst Regular trained officer in the Nigerian Army. His being a Muslim Northerner like the Minister of Defense, Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu and the Prime Minister, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, granted him added advantage by today's standards. But to the surprise of even the Igbo, and opposition from some senior NPC members, Minister Ribadu recommended Ironsi, pointing to his seniority. The Prime Minister concurred and Aguiyi Ironsi was confirmed as the first indigenous GOC of the Nigerian Army (Umar, 2020, *para*.15)

The Guardian in its editorial has been agitated as well by the federal character blindness the President Buhari administration demonstrates (Editorial Board, 2018, 2020). It is worried that when a public leader demonstrates an unbridled clannishness in his appointments it creates doubts over the constitutionality of the federal character principle and nonchalance of the government towards the constitution.Furthermore, it is not inappropriate to state that since assumption of office in 2015 as president, Muhammadu Buhari has distinguished himself in the following ways: an unrepentant parochial Fulani whose appointments favour mostly the Fulanis, failed the progressives, and has only worked for the interest of the politicians in his government and in the National Assembly (Idowu, 2018). In spite of the foregoing, the administration has since justified its appointments stating instead that:

> This is the nature of Nigerian politics. If they will do justice to me, as an elected Nigerian president, let them look at the Constitution a Nigerian president works with, there are people who will closely work with me that don't need to be taken to the Senate.If I select people whom I know quite well in my political party, whom we came all the way right from the APP, CPC and APC, and have remained together in good or bad situation, the people I have confidence in and I can trust them with any post, will that amount to anything wrong? I have been with them throughout our trying times, what then is the reward of such dedication and suffering? They did not defect because of positions, they did not involve themselves in the pursuit of personal gains, and they accepted their fate throughout our trying moments. What is wrong if I make you the secretary (of the federal government) because I have confidence that things will go normal? (Odunsi, 2015, *para*. 4-9).

Worryingly, these matters have remained front burners under the President Buhari administration (Eme & Okeke, 2017). In considering the manifest areas lacking in observance of federal character principle, this paper, for lack of space, only considers petroleum sectors.

a. The NNPC and Oil Block Allocation

Northern dominance in the petroleum industry is simply un-federal character. As shown in Table 1 below, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (hereafter NNPC) is simply home to Northerners leading to questions if the NNPC is simply Northern Nigeria Petroleum Corporation (*Onyekakeyah, 2020)?* Under this skewed arrangement, would policy decisions give due diligence to other regions, particularly, people of oil bearing areas and take cognisance of the environment?

Table 1: 20 Top Executive Positions in the NNPC

Name of Officer	Position Held
Mele Kyari	Group Managing Director
Umar Ajiya	Chief Finance Officer/Finance and Accounts
Yusuf Usman	Chief Operating Officer
Farouk GarbaSa'id	Chief Operating Officer, Corporate Services
Mustapha Yakubu	Chief Operating Officer, Refining and Petrochemicals
Hadiza Coomassie	Corporate Secretary/Legal Adviser to the Corporation
Omar Ibrahim	Group General Manager (GGM), International Energy Relations.
Kallamu Abdullahi	GGM Renewable Energy
Ibrahim Birma	GGM Governance Risk and Compliance
BalaWunti	GGM NAPIMS
InuwaWaya	MD NNPC Shipping
Musa Lawan	MD Pipelines and Product Marketing
Mansur Sambo	MD Nigeria Petroleum Development Company
Lawal Sade	MD Duke Oil/NNPC Trading Company
Malami Shehu	MD Port-Harcourt Refining Company
Muhammed Abah	MD Warri Refining and Petrochemical Company
Abdulkadir Ahmed	MD Nigeria Gas Marketing Company
Salihu Jamari	MD Nigeria Gas and Power Investment Company Ltd.
Mohammed Zango	MD NNPC Medical Services
Sarki Auwalu	Director, Department of Petroleum Services

Source: Editorial, The Sun Nigeria, June, 09, 2020, para.7 & 8.

If from Table 1 above, the 20 top management positions in the NNPC are Northern Muslims, where then lies the federal character principle of Nigeria under the President Buhari administration in the NNPC? And why is the graveyard silence from requisite commissions like the Federal Character Commission, National Assembly oversite Committees on petroleum?

It is even apposite to add quickly that the NNPC has been managed by General Managing Directors (GMDs) who superintend over oil and gas in the Niger Delta far away from the localities of the GMDs. Among several others Jackson Gaius Obaseki, Funsho Kupolokun, Abubakar Yar'Adua, Muhammed Barkindo, Shehu Ladan, Austin Olusegun Oniwon, Andrew Yakubu, Joseph Dawha, and Ibe Kachikwu are readily remembered.

These names, of course, is indicative of Northern and South-West dominance (Ajaero, 2008).

It is, indeed, worrisome that with the aforementioned privileges, the North contributes zero revenue to the central purse, have zero impacts from oil extractive operations, yet the North gulps an enormous chunk of the accruing revenue from oil and gas (see Table 2 below) and an undue vantage position in appointment into high-profile positions in the oil and gas sector.

Table 2: Injustice in Oil Revenue Allocation in Nigeria

Region	*% in Oil Revenue Receipt*
North/Central	20.00%
North/East	16.00%
North/West	21.00%
Total Receipt	57.00%
Contribution	0.00%
South/West	16.00%
Contribution	3.97%
South/East	11.00%
Contribution	2.75%
South/South	15.00%
Contribution	91.64%

Source:Tamuno, 2011, p. 181.

A particularly troubling aspect in the NNPC top-cadre appointments is the appointment ofSarkiAuwalu, a Northerner, as the Director of the Department of Petroleum Resources (hereafter DPR) by the President Buhari administration. The DPR determines if an oil spill is caused by equipment failure or simply sabotage. This is the sensitive nature of the DPR which presides over claims and counterclaims from oil Transnational Corporations (hereafter TNCs) and oil bearing communities over oil spill. Oil bearing communities have complained that DPR's spill assessment results often favour oil TNCs and in the process allow oil bearing communities to suffer undue hardships of oil spills on their environment and sources of livelihood. Oil bearing communities have continuously accused the DPR and oil TNCs of an unholy friendship to their discomfort. This is the nature of challenge a Northerner is entrusted to handle. Overall, it is indeed, the height of nepotism in Nigeria under President Buhari.

Recently, these developments in the petroleum industry, have compelled leaders of the Pan Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF)led by Chief Edwin K. Clark and a host of eminent persons,to file a legal suit (marked FHC/ABJ/CS/595/2020) against President Muhammadu Buhari, the Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF), Clerk of the National Assembly and the Federal Character Commission (FCC)for the sum of N50 billion for allegedly violating the dictates of the federal character principle of Nigeria.The suit filed by 10 Senior Advocates of Nigeria (SANs) led by Chief Solomon Asemota and Chief Mike Ozekhomeseek:

> a declaration that the various appointments into positions in government, especially into strategic government agencies such as NNPC, NIA and other strategic infrastructural and regulatory institutions are ethnically discriminatory and lopsided and these violate the express provisions of the constitution as contained in Sections 14, 171 (1), 171 (5) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and therefore unconstitutional, illegal and ultra-vires. (Enumah, 2020)

Another related sector lacking in federal character but copious in Northern dominance is oil block allocation (See Table 2). Of course, the power to allocate oil blocs is in the domain of President Buhari; who presently serves as both the executive president and minister of petroleum.

Table 3: Select List of Oil Block and Oil Well Owners in Nigeria

S/N	Name of Oil Block/Well	Owner	Capacity
1.	OML 110	Alhaji Mai Daribo	An OBE oil field that has an estimation of over 500 million barrels of oil.
2.	SAPETRO (OPL 246)	General Theophilus Danjuma	Exports up two 300000 barrels of crude daily
3.	International Petroleum Development Company (NOML 112 and OML 117)	Colonel Sanni Bello (in -law to Abdulsalami Abubakar)	International Petroleum Development Company
4	OML 115, OLDWOK Field and EBOk field	Alhaji Mohammed Ludimi (in-law to General I. B. Babangida)	Nil
5.	Nor East Petroleum Limited (OML 215)	Alhaji Sela Mohammed Gambo	Nil
6.	Express Petroleum Company Limited (OML 108)	Alhaji Aminu Cantata	Nil
7.	Yinka Folawiyo Ltd (OML 113)	Alhaji W. I. Folawiyo	Nil
8.	ASUOKPU/UMUTU marginal oil fields.	Prince Nasiru Ado Bayero (cousin to Lamido S. Lamido)	A capacity of 300,000 barrels of oil in capacity on a daily basis.
9.	Intel	Atiku Yaradua and Bayero	Nil
10.	AMNI (OML 112 & OML 117)	Rilwan Lukman	Nil
11.	Malabu Oil (operates the oil well OPL 245).	Dan Etete	Worth $20 billion dollars
12	Clewater Refinery and RivGas Petroleum and Gas Company (OPL 289 and OPL 233)	Dr. Peter Odili	Nil
13	Focus Energy in partnership with the BG Group (OPL 286)	Andy Uba	Nil
14	Starcrest Energy Nigeria Limited later sold to Addax Petroleum Development Company Limited (OPL 291)	Emeka Offor	Nil
15	Conoil (six oil blocks)	Mike Adenuga	Nil

Source: Ikechukwu Nwuzoh, 2018.

Table 2 above, discernible in Northern dominance in oil block allocation, is only but tip of the iceberg. Full list of 77 oil block and oil well owners in Nigeria can be found from InfoGuide Nigeria (Nwuzoh, 2018). This skewed oil block allocation politics is traceable to the 1969 Petroleum Act which empowers the minister of petroleum unfettered power to deploy whatever *modus operandi* in allocating oil blocks (Olisa, 1987).

This rare power of the minister of petroleum has instigated anti-federal character behaviours as the following instances suffice:

- it creates opacity and lack of transparency in the bidding process of oil blocks in Nigeria (Amaza, 2019);
- any sitting minister of petroleum is highly regarded as a revered cabinet member;
- the office is highly coveted and hotly contested by the political class; and
- it explains why Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) and Muhammadu Buhari (since 2015) both simultaneously served as presidents and minister of petroleum.

It is the practice in Nigeria that, the president appoints a minister of state for petroleum, a junior minister, yet the president retains overriding powers to award or cancel a lease at his discretion (Amaza, 2019).

While these anti-federal character developments subsist in Nigeria today, they heavily contradict this statement credited to Sir Ahmadu Bello:

> *We do not want to go to Lake Chad and meet strangers catching our fish in thewater and taking them away to leave us with nothing. We do not want to go toSokoto and find a carpenter who is a stranger nailing our houses. I do not want togo to the Sabon-Gari in Kano and find strangers making the body of a lorry, or to goto the market and see butchers who are not Northerners. (HRW, 2006, p. 7)*

If the North jealously guides their local economies as the foregoing statement illustrates, why would other regions not do same? Why would petroleum become a national property? Where is the sense of federal character principle of Nigeria in the above statement? What country parades a president in Muhammadu Buhari who does not recognise the federal character that makes up the country? Federalism, it is worthy to note, is not dependent on the constitutional or institutional structures but in the society, it serves (Livingston, 1957; Ramphal, 1979).

In closing where lies the dream of Malam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who was reputed in having said in a lecture at the University College, Ibadan: “the time may come after understanding one another better, and without one tribe dominating the other, when we can hope for a unitary form of government, but not now” (Rothchild, 1966, p. 278). Instead, what is preponderant is that:

> the social and ethnic divisions and contradictions in the country are so many that all leaders now pay lip-service towards the oil producing minorities, while the favoured ethnic nationalities are held together by the money that comes from the oil wealth to sustain the polity called Nigeria. What we must all know is that you cannot forbid a fowl and yet eat its eggs. (Tamuno, 2011, p.95).

Conclusion

The conclusion of this paper presents itself thus: That federalism, like marriage, remains an amiable effort at 'wedding' persons of diverse backgrounds. However, the 'marriage' of the diverse ethnic nationalities in Nigeria after sixty years of political 'wedlock'have not reconciled their 'marital' differences (Adebayo,1999). A 'marriage' of sixty years, no matter how heterogenous the different partners, ought to have had great grandchildren. However, Nigeria's federal 'marriage'has not demonstrated the expected maturity of a sixty-year wedlock due to the intense in-house 'quarrels' constantly being heard and even re-echoing; being bolstered by ethnicity and clannishness. The worst enemy to Nigeria's federalism is fear; the fear of the unknown has wreaked havoc on Nigeria by all policy actions indicative of ethnicity.

The paper has shown that deliberate state efforts like the federal character principle of Nigeria has not yielded the expected gains. Almost every government endeavourat the federal character principle is easily noticed to have been infiltrated by ethnicity – appointments or placements into political offices or into the state bureaucracy are dotted by with ethnic underpinnings. Thus, among Nigeria's ethnic nationalities there has been co-existence, contact, and compromises but coalescence is copiously lacking to achieve a genuine national integration (Eresia-Eke & Egberiye, 2010).

The paper establishes further how deep seated this menace pervades the President Buhari/APC Government in Nigeria since May 29 2015 and it has continuously made the federation in Nigeria a tensional federalism. In the light of the foregoing, the following recommendations are proffered:

- There is need to engage all stakeholders of the Nigerian project to review the subsisting federal system in order to retain its relevance in meeting the needs of all nationalities in the country; after all federalism is not the constitutional or institutional structures but the society itself – how it can harmonise or compromise their differences (Livingston, 1957).
- There is an urgent need to decouple the powers and functions of the central government in Nigeria. This is because the intense display of ethnicity in the country is all in a bid to have control of the federal centre and so dominate the sharing of the "national cake" (Suberu, 2001; Abubakar, 2004).
- In Nigeria,the constituent units are grouped into states in order to breakup single groups and instead combine different groups. Federalism and federal character was adopted to manage ethnicity. However, if the deliberate deploy of federal character is not yielding the expected gains, the solution then be sought in making the boundaries of the federating units to coincide with the boundaries of each ethnic group (Glazer, 1977).

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THEME FOURTEEN
TERRORISM, INSURGENCY AND ORGANISED CRIMES

AN ETHICAL EVALUATION OF THE KILLING OF TERWASE AKWAZA AND THE IMPLICATION FOR AMNESTY IN NIGERIA

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Abstract
There is a remarkable consensus regarding the indispensability of domestic amnesties in the achievement of peace and the forestalling of violence in a polity. In some situations, putting a stop to the destruction of lives and properties and the restoration of peace becomes more important than prosecuting the perpetrators of violence. Governments, at different levels in Nigeria, have employed amnesties over the years in attempts to broker peace and stem the tide of violence. The amnesty law is an internationally recognised instrument of governance, a contract and an ethical agreement whose breach in any polity has far-reaching negative effects especially when the perpetrators are those in lofty positions such as the holders of state authority. The recent extra judicial killing of Terwase Akwaza by the Nigerian military, an erstwhile militia who embraced an offer of amnesty from the Benue state government by surrendering to civil authority has opened a lot of debate bothering on sentiments and the legality of the action. Using the method of documentary analysis and applied ethics, this paper evaluates the ethical implications of the killing of Terwase Akwaza in spite of an amnesty. It argues that this action has serious rebound effects that will touch the very fabric of the nation such as, the value system, the integrity of the state and the viability of amnesty as a tool for curbing violence in Nigeria henceforth.

Keywords: Amnesty, Extrajudicial killing, Ethics, Violence, Terwase Akwaza

1. Introduction

On Tuesday September 8, 2020, Terwase Akwaza widely known as Gana was killed by men of the Nigerian army (Umeh, 2020). Research shows that the man, Akwaza, was many things to many people. Some described him as a militia fighting for his people of Benue state against being overran by armed and combatant Fulani herdsmen (Okoh, 2020; Abah, 2020), while others insist that he was a notorious criminal and murderer who had become law unto himself (Okenwa, 2020). The courts would have been in a position to decide the truth of the matter but have unfortunately been denied the opportunity by his summary and arbitrary execution by the Nigerian army. Therefore, the guilt or otherwise or the very nature of the crimes committed by Terwase Akwaza is not the concern of this article but the fact that he met his death at the hands of state security agents while under the protection of an amnesty duly offered by the governor of a state arguably empowered by the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria (CFRN) to do so (Okoh, 2020). The governor of Benue state – Dr. Samuel L. Ortom, in a bid to rid the state of prolonged violent clashes and other criminal activities, offered amnesty for the second time since 2015 to militants and alleged criminals in the Sankera axis of the state on the condition that they put down their arms and submit themselves to constituted authority. Terwase Akwaza along with 142 others came out to embrace the amnesty. They surrendered in the presence of traditional rulers, priests and local government officials at Akume Atongo stadium in Katsina-Ala Local Government Area of Benue State.

In spite of embracing the amnesty, Terwase Akwaza was arrested by the Nigerian military while in a convoy with some government officials on their way to the state capital, Makurdi, for a formalisation ceremony of the amnesty. He was taken to an unknown destination and later killed by same (Okoh, 2020; Abah, 2020). According to Governor Ortom, the military were aware of the amnesty arrangement and it seems that was the source of their intelligence regarding the whereabouts of Terwase Akwaza who until then has eluded their efforts to capture him. In the words of the Governor, "the process of the amnesty programme was known to the security operatives, so I don't know why they have to be arrested" (Sahara Reporters, 2020, para 4).This puts out of question, the possibility of their being ignorant of Akwaza's surrender or a mistake. It was an act committed with full knowledge of the facts on ground and fully acknowledged by the military too (Okoh, 2020). The claim of the military that he was killed in a gun battle with them is at best questionable because of other reports in which they admitted that Akwaza was first arrested together with some of his men who also embraced the amnesty, before he was killed and some of his men released afterwards. Akwaza had been among about 500 beneficiaries of an earlier amnesty granted by Governor Ortom in 2015 that surrendered about 700 arms to the government. However, following an accusation that he could be involved in the murder of an aide to the Governor on special security-Daeneen Igbana in 2016, he went back into hiding and allegedly reneged on his repentance rather than face the law. Though Akwaza has had some millions of naira bounty placed on his head by the state and federal government and had been on the wanted list for close to four years for his alleged criminal activities, on the plea of traditional rulers and leaders of thought from his native Sankera geo-political axis of the state which comprises of Katsina-Ala, Ukum and Logo local government areas, the state government offered Akwaza and other enemies of state in the Sankera axis a second amnesty to which Akwaza and his men responded (Nnadozie, 2020, Uja and Onogu, 2020).

The extra-judicial killing of Terwase Akwaza is not the first of its kind in Nigeria. In fact, extra-judicial killings in Nigeria by security and armed personnel is rampant and has reached such alarming proportions that has drawn both local and international attention (Ogunde, 2019; Mutum, 2020). It is, in fact, the main reason for the ongoing worldwide protest tagged "EndSars" embarked upon by the Nigerian youths. However, the case of Terwase Akwaza is peculiar for the fact that it seems to be the first time the victim of extra-judicial killing was supposed to be under the protection of an amnesty.

The arbitrary killing of Terwase Akwaza has been variously criticised by security experts and ordinary citizens and from different perspectives. For Obasi (2020), by killing Akwaza, the military has "eliminated a potential source of premium intelligence". From a legal perspective, Adamu (in Mutum, 2020) faults the killing in the sense that it contradicts the rule of law because according to him, "the rule of law must always prevail" (para 2). In the same vein, Shehu (in Mutum, 2020) sees the killing as wrong because "the rule of law and international humanitarian laws are sacrosanct and as such any killing of a suspect is unacceptable" (para 3). Expatiating, Shehu explains that a suspect is under the control of the one that arrested him; therefore, a professional military man cannot gun down a person under his custody. If Akwaza was too bad to be allowed to live among the society or his crimes are too much to be forgiven in a blanket manner, it is the duty of the courts to make such a decision. In other words, a repentant miscreant deserves an opportunity to show repentance or at least to face the justice system. From the perspective of social security, citing Boko haram and the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf as an example, others have observed that such an action is capable of sparking reprisal attacks (Okenwa, 2020). It is also observed that the killing has begun to fan the flames of conspiracy theories that are capable of igniting the polity. One of these theories has it that the military killed Akwaza in pursuance of the 'Hausa Fulani' takeover/Islamisation agenda that is, to make way for the complete overrun of Benue state by the terrorist herdsmen (Ezeobi, 2020).

There are others who have faulted the most recent amnesty granted by the Governor of Benue state. For Adamu (in Mutum, 2020), Terwase Akwaza was already declared wanted and that undermines the power of the governor to grant him an amnesty without a judicial injunction. There are yet others who expresses the belief that the crimes committed by Akwaza are too numerous and hurtful that granting him amnesty would amount to impunity and a denial of justice that would definitely not go down well with his victims. It is not the concern of this article to dispute any of these claims but to point out the pertinent fact that whether ill-conceived or not, the amnesty was already granted and a human life was taken in spite of the protection it entails. In view of this act, attempt will be made to evaluate the act ethically and examine what it portends for the future of amnesties with regard to peace keeping in Nigeria.

This article is structured in seven sections. The first part is the introduction, while the second part contains the methodology adopted in the writing of the paper. The third segment is an overview of amnesty in general and as it relates to Nigeria. The fourth part is concerned with an ethical evaluation of the act of extra-judicial killing of a person under the protection of an amnesty, while the implication of the extra-judicial killing is discussed in the fifth section. The sixth section has suggestions on the way forward and the seventh is the last and concluding part.

2. Methodology

This paper is a product of review of published literature and internet sources. There is no denying the fact that the use of primary sources of information such as interviews, questionnaires and focus group discussions with those directly involved would have been useful in filling gaps perceived in secondary data but, resource constraints prevented their use in this study. Nevertheless, it is believed that it did not derail from the essence of the paper. In structuring the opinion that props this article, facts were gleaned from books, academic journals, technical papers, newspaper reports and internet materials.

3. Amnesty as a Tool of Governance

The word amnesty derives from the Greek word *'amnesia'* and the Greek root connotes oblivion and forgetfulness rather than forgiveness of a crime for which a person has been criminally condemned (Orientlicher in United Nations, 2009). By the second half of the twentieth century, domestic amnesties were firmly entrenched as standard political tools (Pensky, 2008, p.6). Black's law Dictionary defines amnesty as "a pardon extended by the government to a group or class of persons, usually, for a political offence"; "the act of a sovereign power officially forgiving certain classes of persons who are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted" (p. 1137). Amnesties typically are limited to conduct occurring during a specified period or involving a specific event or circumstance such as conflict. Categories of beneficiaries are specified such as, rebel forces, political exiles or state agents. Particular crimes or circumstances for which persecution or civil actions are barred are sometimes specified.

All amnesties are not the same, there are blanket amnesties, that is amnesties covering groups of persons unconditionally. These are mostly efforts to circumvent domestic criminal laws whether as part of broader peace negotiations or international treaties, or as executive decisions simply aimed at cutting short any legal consequences of an ongoing or ended conflict (United Nations, 2009). These are mainly the kind of amnesties that has alerted the antennae of the human rights commission of the United Nations and set their body language towards what Pensky (2008) referred to as the "anti-impunity norm". he gives example with Argentina and Chile where military leaders operated amnesties for themselves and their henchmen to shield themselves from the legal consequences of their own crimes. Joinet (1985) had earlier observed that amnesty has become increasingly prone to misuse and abuse. Instead of its ideal of setting the innocent free from captivity and a symbol of freedom, it has become more and more an "insurance for impunity". Plensky (2008) decried the proliferation of "self-amnesties" proclaimed by declining military dictatorships anxious to arrange their own impunity while there is still time. The new norm is in a summary a warning and a stance against granting indiscriminate and blanket amnesties to the detriment of justice, human rights and sustainable peace. Amnesties it has been argued in many cases, impede justice and the international commitment to uphold human rights. Therefore, the United Nations and the international criminal court have severally stood against blanket amnesties that violate human and people's rights and deny justice to victims of crimes. Their stance is that amnesties should not bar prosecution for crimes like, murder, robbery, rape, indecent assault, statutory rape, theft, possession of arms or any crime involving fraud or dishonesty (United Nations, 2009). In Nigeria, the fear is that this observed abuse of amnesties may be taking the form of a degeneration in some cases to a shortcut, a form of bribe given to perpetrators of crime against the state and humanity to get them to put down their arms. An easy way out for governments that are too lazy to fish out and prosecute traitors and criminal elements within its borders. A cheap way to buy uneasy peace with underlying grudges and pains by victims of injustice and an unspoken message that violence pays (Nwankpa, 2014).

Some forms of conditional amnesties take care of retributive justice without necessarily resorting to punishment. An example is that issued by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission whereby individuals received amnesties for a narrowly defined set of criminal acts only conditionally on their satisfaction of numerous and stringent conditions. The most significant of such conditions is their willingness to provide testimony concerning the nature of their acts, their place in a chain of command, their subjective motivation, the disposition and whereabouts of their accomplices and victims and so on (Plensky, 2008, p.8). this is the most desirable type of amnesty in line with the global shift of emphasis from prosecution for the sake of punishment to advocacy to prosecution for the sake of justice, peace and reconciliation (Nwankpa, 2014).

State pardon is a related term and means, the relief from punishment associated with a conviction. In the words of Joinet (1985, p. 5)"pardon remit penalty but does not expunge the conviction". Distinguishing between the two in terms of effect, O'Shea (2004, p. 2) observes that "amnesty promotes peace or reconciliation" while a pardon "provides a discretionary mechanism for sidestepping the courts". Another difference is that unlike pardon, amnesty is usually addressed to crimes against sovereignty, that is, political offences in cases where forgiveness is thought to be more useful for the good of the populace and more important than seeking justice in the form of persecution and punishment. In spite of this remarkable difference, both terms might be used interchangeably in this article owing to the fact that in Nigeria as a polity, it seems so far that no clear line is drawn between both official acts. The term amnesty and state pardon has been applied to official forgiveness granted to both individuals and groups, strictly political offenders and those who committed crimes against humanity as well as both the convicted and those yet to go on trial. The operative connotation here in spite of whichever word is used is 'an official exercise of the prerogative of mercy or forgiveness either in full or partially; conditionally or unconditionally.

a. Amnesty in Nigeria

Section 175 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) gives the president of the nation the powers to grant a pardon to "any person concerned with or convicted of any offence created by an Act of the National Assembly". The same constitution in section 212 also confers similar powers on the governor of a state either free or subject to a condition. Olatokpe (2012) took it upon himself to examine the constitutionality or otherwise of the use of amnesty as a tool of governance in Nigeria. In his opinion, what the CFRN contemplates in section 175 and 212 is pardon to persons who have been convicted of an offence or persons related to such; whereas amnesty is forgiveness granted before trial. He went further to argue that though the prerogative of mercy is pardon by nature, the legal implication of both is different. Citing Black's law dictionary (1999, p. 137) he further distinguishes between amnesty and general pardon as enshrined the CFRN. He argues that unlike an ordinary pardon, "amnesty is addressed to crimes against state sovereignty with respect to which forgiveness is received and which is deemed more expedient for the public welfare than prosecution" (p. 26). Olatokpe expatiates by reiterating that the conditions prudent for amnesty are as follows: *i)* the beneficiaries must be a group and not an individual; *ii)* they must have committed a political offence and subject to trial but have not been convicted; *iii)* such group once granted an amnesty can no longer be prosecuted. In other words, amnesties granted by presidents and governors in Nigeria are unconstitutional as the constitution only confers on them the power to grant pardon in the actual sense of the word. From Olatokpe's point of view, such amnesties granted to the Biafra warlords, Niger Delta militants, members of the Boko Haram sects and most recently militants from Sankera axis of Benue state including the murdered Terwase Akwaza are unconstitutional.

However, the constitutionality or nomenclature of these official acts referred to as clemency, statepardon or amnesty and which has been in practice in Nigeria is not the major concern of this paper. Since they have been in useandunchallenged as tools ofgovernance in the polity, they are valid and a breach of them when already pronounced is akin to the breaking of a promise, the breach of a contract which is morally reprehensible and has far reaching ethical and social implications which this article is set to explore and expose.

Amnesties and state pardons have over the years been granted by different levels of governments in Nigeria and here are some examples:

> On the midnight of January 13th 1970, Major General Yakubu Gowon granted amnesty to what he termed "all those who were led into futile attempts to disintegrate the country" which one may understand to mean all those who fought in the civil war on the Biafra side (Fellows, 1970).

On 18 May 1982, President Shehu Shagari granted the self-exiled leader of the defunct Biafra nation - Odumegwu Ojukwu amnesty prior to his return to Nigeria from C?te D'Ivoir where he was living at the time (Obi-Ani, 2009, pp. 123-124). Also, in June 2009, President Umaru Yar'Adua signed a proclamation of amnesty for Niger Delta insurgents who surrender their arms and cease hostilities (Umanah, 2009).

On Thursday 17 April 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan approved the setting up of a committee to consider proposals for the granting of amnesty to the members of the Boko haram sect with a view to ending its uprising that had by then claimed the lives of thousands of Nigerians. The presidency under Muhammadu Buhari while receiving the Dapchi girls abducted by the sects and later released by them in 2018 reiterated that Boko Haram members willing to surrender their arms could be granted amnesty (Editorial, 2018).

On 9 April 2020, in furtherance of the federal government's resolve to promote social distancing in the correctional centres in the country and in a bid to curb the spread of COVID-19, president Muhammadu Buhari granted clemency to 41 inmates across the country. The governors of the 36 states of the federation were also expected to grant pardon to about 260 inmates in their states. On the same occasion the president granted posthumous pardon to Chief Anthony Enahoro a foremost nationalist and Prof. Ambrose Alli a second republic governor of the defunct Bendelstate. Other beneficiaries were Lt. Col. Moses Effion, Major E. J. Olanrewaju and Mr. Ajayi Babalola (Enuma& Tyessi, 2020).

4. Ethical Evaluation of the Extra-Judicial Killing of Terwase Akwaza under the Protection of an Amnesty

The only thing that convincingly distinguishes man from other animals is his ability to act at a rational level, such actions are human actions and a product of the reasoning faculty. The word ethics derives from the Greek word 'ethos' meaning custom or habit and ethics is defined by Njoku (2006, p. 48) as a normative science which "prescribes how people should act in order that they act truly as rational human beings". However, Mastin (2008) observes that ethics is not limited to specific acts and defined moral codes but encompasses the whole of moral ideals and behaviours. It asks questions like; how should people act? (normative or prescriptive ethics), what do people think is right? (Descriptive ethics), how do we take moral knowledge and put it into practice? (Applied ethics), and what does 'right' even mean? (Meta ethics). In making decisions about right and wrong behavior ethics largely employs ethical theories also known as moral theories. Ethical theories and principles provide analytical basis to seek answers to such difficult questions like why should we be moral or respect moral obligation in the first place? (Oji, 1985, p. 28). in other words, it is presupposed that as human beings and socialised members of a society, people already have a sense of what is right and wrong behaviour which is called morality and ethics is the systematic study (and presentation) of the fundamental principles underlying this morality. In structuring the ethical evaluation of the action under discourse, two dimensions were identified: the first is the ethical theory of contractarianism and the second is Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative.

a. *Evaluation from the Dimension of Contractarianism*

Contractarian ethics holds that moral norms derive their normative force from the idea of contract or mutual agreement; contracts are binding to all who understand and agree to its terms and moral rules guiding behaviour in a society are a sort of contract (Mastin, 2008). For instance, amnesty as a tool of governance is enshrined in CFRN and that means that since Nigerians understood and adopted that constitution, it is binding on all citizens of Nigeria-both the government and the governed. The theory is a modification of what Mastin (2008) call the theory of political contractarianism and the principle of social contract developed by Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke which principally holds that people give up some rights to a government in other to receive or jointly preserve social order. Therefore, morality in the form of faithfulness to agreements, promises, or contracts be it amnesty or any other, is a moral obligation to all members of the society including those entrusted with governance, or social order will be threatened. As Omoregbe (1993) rightly observes, for any society to progress and fulfil the purpose for its existence, its members must imbibe a basic moral disposition and an essential part of this moral disposition is honesty which is the basis for the keeping of promises and other related ethical norms. Furthermore, morality is a very vital component of governments and those entrusted with governance. "Remove morality, remove honesty and accountability, and what are governments but gang of thieves and treasury looters" (one may add and oppressors) (Omoregbe, 1993). In other words, observing the supremacy of the law and acting with respect to moral rules of every society are terms of a contract binding on every member of that society and its breach is not only unethical but morally reprehensible.

From another perspective, an amnesty may be accurately described as a contract between a government and an erstwhile armed enemy within its territory, a legally and morally binding agreement based on a promise of forgiveness by the government on the condition that the beneficiaries suspend hostilities and surrender their arms to constituted authority. When viewed this way, amnesty is morally binding on the parties involves just like any other contract or agreement. Von Mehren (2020) defines a contract in the simplest terms as "a promise enforceable by law" he goes further to explain that such a promise may be to do something or to refrain from something. Apart from being legally binding, an amnesty is a promise, an agreement and so is morally binding. Human beings are under moral obligation to keep their promises and in good conscience stay faithful to agreements unless in a situation where a breach of a contract is totally unavoidable, legitimate, or will serve a higher goal. The breach of an amnesty is a breach of a contract, the breaking of a promise and an agreement, it is tantamount to dishonesty and so is ethically wrong.

b. *Evaluation from the Dimension of Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative*

According to the ethical theory of categorical imperative articulated by Immanuel Kant, morality is rooted in the rational capacity of man and by same, some inviolable rights are asserted. It also holds that morality is attached to duty, it is the motive and not the consequence of an action that makes it morally right or wrong; in other words, for Kant, the end does not justify the means. The theory of categorical imperative also holds that one should only act in such a way that onewould want the "maxim" of one's action to become a universal law (Mastin, 2008).

To apply the theory to the case under discourse, some Nigerians have opined that the extrajudicial killing of Terwase Akwaza is excusable based on the consequence achieved by the action which is the supposed elimination of an alleged criminal element who posed a security threat to the society (Ezeobi, 2020). The pertinent question then becomes; will the Nigerian government want the extrajudicial killing of every alleged criminal to become a law in Nigeria? Put in other words, will the government want every citizen of Nigeria to take the laws into their hands so long such action will lead to the elimination of a perceived security threat? The answer would most probably be a resounding no because, that will surely lead to anarchy and a serious security crisis arising from lawlessness and mob action.

From another perspective, it is the duty of one who has another in his custody to ensure his safety until the law has taken its course. There even exists international laws concerning in relation to prisoners of war (Mutum, 2020). In Igbo traditional ethics, taking the life of one who had surrendered or under one's custody is similarly condemned as is portrayed by Achebe (1958). Okonkwo was warned by against the abominable act of having a hand in the death of the boy Ikemefuna who had been under his custody.Terwase Akwaza had surrendered to constituted authority representative of the government of Nigeria, therefore, the government failed in their duty as custodians and the military taking his life at that point is unethical.

From yet another direction and for the purpose of makinga point, let us ignore the fact that no court of competent jurisdiction has convicted Terwase Akwaza of his alleged crimes. Let us hypothetically assume that it was an established fact that he was a great danger to society, in that case, killing him extra-judicially would still have been unethical because it amounts to employing an immoral means to achieve a desirable end. By the standards of categorical imperative, the elimination of a security threat does not justify extra-judicial killing. This stance becomes even clearer in view of the fact that categorical imperative as an ethical theory stems from Deontology, an approach to ethics that focuses on the rightness or wrongness of action themselves and not on the consequences of such actions (Mastin, 2008).

5. Ethical Implications of the Extra-Judicial Killing of Terwase Akwaza under the Protection of an Amnesty

Ethical implication of the extra-judicial killing of Terwase Akwaza by the Nigerian military while under the protection of an amnesty here refers to the consequences that such action is likely to have on the beliefs and convictions of Nigerians relating to right and wrong behaviour. The importance of a reflection of this nature to the wellbeing of Nigeria as a nation cannot be overemphasised in view of the fact that belief and convictions are the basis of human action and attitude. For instance, a person who believes that the path to sustainable success is hard work is likely to work hard, while one who is convinced that it is right to pursue material success through shady deals and sharp practices is more likely to dedicate his time and energy to such immoral means.The ethical implications of the act under discourse shall be discussed in terms of the effect on tertiary socialisation and the value system of the nation.

a. ***Effect on Tertiary Socialisation***

Socialisation is the transmission of culture and culture in this context refers to the accepted and approved ways of organised life (Fitcher, 1957; Igbo, 2000). Igbo (2000) identifies three levels of socialisation-primary, secondary and tertiary levels. The first two stages are foundational and transitory in nature, it is carried out right from birth by specific agents such as the family, schools, the religious institutions etc. and its contents are more or less scripted. on the other hand, tertiary socialisation must be the basis of the timeless assertion that learning is a life-time process or that one continues to learn all through a lifetime. It is the continual influences in one's life after primary and secondary socialisation and its agents and contents are unscripted. At this stage of socialisation, character molding occurs more through the copying of models than by the traditional passing of information. At this point, action speaks louder than words and members of a society especially the youths take their cue regarding what is right and what is wrong from. those they see as models. Among this crème of models are parents, elders; in law courts the judgements and conclusions of judges are cited as norms to be followed in subsequent cases. Others are people in positions of leadership, successful people and more recently, influencers on the social media. In view of this fact, if the president and commander in chief of the armed forces of Nigeria approves the underhanded tactic of luring a wanted man out of hiding with a false promise of forgiveness (amnesty)only to gun him down at sight (Ezeobi, 2000), he is inadvertently sending out a message that is obviously contrary to objective morality, which is that, the end justifies the means. In other words, lying and deceit are good so long the perpetrator has an envisaged desirable end in view.

b. ***Effect on the Value System***

Value system refers to the order and priority an individual or society grants to ethical and ideological values and ethical values are those values which serve to distinguish between good and bad, right and wrong, moral and immoral. In the words of Peschke (2010, p. 36), "…values are thought of as some ideal entities, somewhat like Plato's ideal forms. They are not merely subjective conceptions, but essences in the ontic realm…". At societal level, these values usually form a basis for what is permitted and what is prohibited. It is also from these ethical values that ideological values proceed-what is permitted and what is prohibited as it relates to politics, religion, economics and social relationships; a kind of applied value system. For a society to attain social order and progress, it is essential that its value system be consistent.

Furthermore, the value system of a society feeds from its ethical culture base which in turn comprises of the culture formation exponents such as the ethical theories and principles upheld by the society plus the frequent moral choices of the majority (more especially the influential). The value system of a society is also fed by the reward system. The pertinent question is always, 'what pays?' in other words, over time, members of a society tend to unconsciously ascribe value to behavioural patterns that are repeatedly seen among the elite and the successful (the behaviour that earns reward). The behaviours in question could be virtues like patience, courtesy, lawfulness, etc., or vice like brashness, dishonesty, etc. and this has far reaching implications because the value system of a society plays an essential role in the ethical motivation of its members. Therefore, if the elite of Nigeria should exhibit behaviour that prioritise retribution and punishment over the rule of law, it is logical to forecast that a time will come when it will represent as a norm in the psyche of its members thereby truncating the value system of the society. An Igbo adage warns against this kind of trend as follows“*ajo ihe gbaa aro, o buru omenani”* meaning that if an abomination is ignored, it will over time begin to feel like the norm.

The value system is also related to conscience formation of the members of a society. In as much as acting true to one's conscience is the highest moral stance, a conscience needs to be educated withthe right form of information so as not to be erroneous (Fagothey,1963; Omoregbe, 1993) and the value system is one essential source of such information that educate the conscience of the members of a society.

c. The Implication of the Extra-Judicial Killing of Terwase Akwaza with Regard to the Future Use of Amnesty in Nigeria

Inevitably, in every polity, there comes a time when the amelioration of violence, the restoration of peace and reconciliation becomes more expedient for the welfare of the citizens than prosecution. In such circumstances, amnesty as a tool of governance becomes very relevant and extremely useful.In Nigeria, with the extrajudicial killing of Terwase Akwaza in spite of a covering amnesty, a deficit of trust has been created and the use of amnesty for the above purpose has clearly been truncated. The consequence of this deficit of trust is currently being felt in the polity with the developments being witnessed as regards the EndSars protest embarked upon by the Nigerian youths since October 12, 2020. The government had capitulated about two days into the protest and obliged the youths by disbanding the anti-robbery squad of the police force indicted for brutality and extra-judicial killings. The government also promised to address the other five issues raised as part of the protest. Owing to these moves by the government, the protesting youths were asked to end the protest, but they remained adamant and stayed on the streets, they needed to see concrete evidence of government action because they no longer set store by the promises of a government whose words cannot be relied upon. The alleged shooting of harmless protesting youths at Lekki, Lagos state by the military (BBC, 2020) is another indicator that extra-judicial killing and blatant disregard for the rule of law might have become endemic among those entrusted with governance in a supposedly democratic Nigeria.

6. The Way Forward

The deed is already done but the government can still achieve some damage control by not ignoring the incident or sweeping it under the carpet through denial or suppression of those affected by the act. To forestall feelings of bitterness, marginalisation and need for reprisal that might be incubating, the government should own up to its complicity in the unfortunate incident, apologise to the populace, do reparations, and not only promise, but put in place concrete measures to guard against a reoccurrence (extra-judicial killings). By taking these measures, the government will calm tempers, restore the people's confidence in the government, repair the value system and set a good precedent.

7. Conclusion

Terwase Akwaza was extra-judicially killed Nigerian military at a time that he was supposed to be under the protection of an amnesty. An ethical evaluation of the act from the dimensions of the ethical theory of contractarianism and Kant's deontological theory of categorical imperative has shown that the act is morally wrong. The act has negative consequences for the moral culture formation and value system of the country. It also has a negative implication for the future use of amnesty as a tool of governance in the country because a deficit of trust has been created. The way forward is seen in genuine acknowledgement of the wrongness of the action by the government, a sincere apology to the populace and a guard against reoccurrence. These actions are very imperative to forestall possible further violence, restore confidence in the government of the day, repay the system of moral values in the society, and generally ensure the survival of the country.

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APPLIED THEATRE DIMENSION TO COUNTERING TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

With the spate of terrorist attacks orchestrated by the Boko Haram in the North East and the vicious acts of the Fulani herders in Benue, Plateau, Nassarawa, Adamawa, Ebonyi, Enugu, Ogun, Delta and other parts of Nigeria, the need for an alternative solution to counter their activities cannot be overemphasised. Terrorism is the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or even ideological. Due to its secretive nature and small size of the terrorist organisations, they often offer opponents no clear organisation to defend against or to deter. Thus, pre-emptive action(s) are considered vital. The strategy of terrorists like the Al Qaeda, ISIS, ISIL, Boko Haram and recently the Fulani herdsmen's unending but unprovocative activities in some parts of Nigeria are to commit acts of violence that draw the attention of the local populace, the government, and the world to their cause. It is against the bedrock of the nefarious, inhuman and dastardly impacts of terrorism and the push factors leading to radicalisation that the study seeks to interrogate. The study aims at interrogating the underlying factors leading to radicalisation and offers solutions. The study, therefore, advocates the adoption of applied theatre with its direct contact with and intervention by the people in pursuing vigorous campaigns and value re-orientations to human sanctity that would lead to de-radicalisation of terrorism in Nigeria.

Keywords: Terrorism, violence, value re-orientation, applied theatre, radicalisation.

Introduction

Terrorism is a criminal act and a nebulous concept that is derived from the Latin word "terrorem" meaning "panic," "alarm," and "great fear" according to Rick Gladstone (2018, p. 10. Its usage widened with the 1793-94 French Revolution described as the "Reign of Terror" and which also gained popularity during the United States presidency under Ronald Regan. Terrorism has been described variously as both a tactics and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and inexcusable abomination. As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers coercive power with many of the advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost. The United States Department of Defence (2018, p. 1) sees terrorism as "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or even ideological." The implication of this is that violence is a common tool at the hands all terrorist groups. They commit acts of violence that draws the attention of the local populace, the government, and the international community to their cause. They equally plan their attacks in a manner as to attract the greatest publicity, sympathy and choosing targets that symbolize what they oppose. According to the Defence Department (2018, p. 2), “the effectiveness of the terrorist act lays not in the act itself, but by the public's or government's reaction to the act.” This shows that the terrorists' ultimate goal is to introduce fear to millions of people watching the act.

Terrorism has also been described by John Philip Jenkins (2018, p. 1) as “the systematic use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby bringing about a particular political objective.” This shows that terrorism is targeted at densely populated areas in order to cause inestimable havoc and terror. Because of its inherent ferocity and violence, terrorism as a term in its popular usage has developed an intense stigma and its reliance on fear distinguishes it from both conventional and guerrilla warfare. Terrorism has been engaged by political organisations, with both rightist and leftist objectives; by nationalistic and religious groups; by revolutionaries; and even state institutions like the armies, intelligence services, and police.

According to Magnus Ugwa and Okonkwo Chukwudi Joseph (2015, p. ii), “terrorism today is a cankerworm that has eaten deep into the fabrics of the global community.” Every part of the world has gotten its fair share of this social evil. Economists Walter Enders and Todd Sandler (2012, p. 1) view terrorism as, “the premeditated use of or threats to use violence by individuals or sub-national groups to obtain political or social objectives through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims.” The implication is that, outside of the immediate target, terrorists' main objective is to create havoc that will affect a large population. Tichaona Mapolisa (2003, p. 1) describes terrorism as, “a menace and is like an aching tooth which needs to be rooted out but has no immediate remedy.” It is an ill-wind that blows no good to both the subject and object of the crime. It's magnitude of destruction, loss of life, injuries and disabilities have all made human kind fail to find comfort, while citizens are left vulnerable to indiscriminate attacks of terrorists.

Since the emergence of the “Reign of Terror,” between 1793 and 1794 when the revolutionary government in France conducted mass execution by guillotine to intimidate suspected opponents, terrorist groups have not only proliferated but has also grown with utmost bellicosity. The world has witnessed daringly the emergence of different kinds of terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayyat Group (ASG), Al-Murabitun, Al-Qua'ida in the India Subcontinent (AQIS), Al-Qaída in the Arabia Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Quaída in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Al-Shabaab.

Causes and Classification of Terrorism

Research literatures on the causes of terrorism are varied and diverse depending on the objectives or intentions of the terrorist group. However, as Emile Nakhleh (2014, pp. 6-8) observes, “Muslims who trend toward radical ideas have identified domestic and foreign factors as drivers of their radicalism.” Domestic factors he argues included: unemployment, poverty, poor economic conditions, hopelessness, regime repression and corruption, injustice, inequality, and massive violations of human rights including women and minorities. On the other hand, he outlined foreign factors to include perceived anti-Islamic policies by the US and other Western powers, continued Israel occupation of Palestinian land and the suppression of Palestinian human rights and freedoms, the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, as well as Western lukewarm support of democratic uprisings and coddling of dictatorial regimes.

Other factors have been adduced as to the causes of terrorism. These factors include anger; dissatisfaction, disaffection, and disapproval on the side of the terrorists against some world super powers. Writing on the *Causes of Terrorism*, Maria (Marijke) Keat (2018, p. 1) equally identifies some multiple reasons that drive people to resort to terrorism. She identified ethnicity, nationalism/separatism in one aspect; poverty, economic disadvantage, and globalisation in another; while non-democracy, disaffected intelligentsia, religion, and dehumanisation as the third aspect. The totality of the above factors she reasons are the major causes why terrorist organisations resort to terrorism.

In Nigeria particularly, the rise of Boko Haram insurgency especially in the Muslim dominated northeast is not far fetched. Christopher Bartolota (2011, p. 1) argues that, "the movement's rejection of anything western; widespread anger over the country's wealth gap; and the political motive to create an Islamic nation in the 12 northern states of Nigeria, and eventually spreading to the rest of the country are the reasons for their cause. Apart from capitalising on the Nigeria's widespread poverty, and the lack of economic opportunities by the Boko Haram, Human Rights Watch report, show that corruption in Nigeria has resulted in police abuse, human rights violations, a lack of healthcare, and political violence. While a 2009 report by Amnesty International indicts Nigeria police force of hundreds of extra-judicial disappearances and killings each year, all of which have gone un-investigated.

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Javed Jounas (2008, p. 1) classify terrorism into two broad categories – domestic and transnational in which domestic incidents refer to situations where the perpetrators, victims and damaged properties belong to the venue-nation. This contrasts with transnational terrorism that involves different nationalities. To these effects, they argue that, developing nations are more vulnerable to terrorism because they are unlikely to have the resources to adequately combat terrorism. This is compounded by the factors of corruption, poor governance, and dearth of judicial systems or rule of law in these nations. Such institutional shortcomings, they contend, breed discontent in the population, which in turn can spur terrorism (Bandyopadhyaya and Younas (2008, p. 7).

Objectives of Terrorist Organisations

The objective of these terror groups is to fight secularism and Western influences, overthrow of Christian-secular and the establishment of Islamic law in the affected countries, especially in Nigeria North-East of Borno State. Islamic activism in Muslim Nigerian towns and villages in the north between the late 1980s and 1990s was driven by the feverish competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. While Libya's Maummar Gadafi was also busy funding Islamic groups in the area during the same period. They built mosques, Islamic educational institutions and libraries, community centres, and health clinics. Saudi-sponsored Koranic schools taught Nigerian Muslim children to recite the Koran in Arabic and preached to them how to become more committed Sunni Muslims. Nakhleh states that, the word 'jihad' became a central component of the discourse of proselytisation which underpinning argument was that Islam was under attack by all sorts of “infidels” and “apostates,” which demanded a “jihadist” response. While studying in Saudi Arabia, these Nigerian and other African students were subjected to the Salafi/Wahhabi interpretation of Islam and to the “duty” of “jihad.” They then returned to preach and teach what they had learned, inadvertently acting as a force multiplier for Saudi-driven Islamic activism.

Nakhleh (2014, p. 8) further states that, “Sunni-based terrorism in Africa and the Middle East has principally resulted from warped interpretations of religious “jihad” by poorly educated and ideologically motivated clerics and recruiters following Salafi/wahhabi ideology.” These teachings invariably began with the premise that, Muslims and non-Muslims who disagree with these interpretations are “unbelievers” or “”kafir” and “apostates” who must be killed. Consequently, these terrorists and recruiters have used the Osama bin Ladin message to recruit young men and women to carry out “jihad” against their enemies. Therefore, Muslims must wage a “jihad” against these perceived “enemies” by all means possible. Thus, the call for value re-orientation and ideological remodelling of these Muslim fanatics through radicalisation process using applied theatre perspective.

Book Haram, meaning “Western education is a sin,” wittingly opposes education in line with western values, who it believes contradicts the Islamic faith. Formerly known as Jamaát Ahl as-Sunnah lid Dahwah wa'l-Jihad until March 2015 is a jihadist militant organisation based in North-eastern Nigeria. Established in 2002 by a union of armed gangs led by its founder Mohammed Yusuf, a radical cleric and charismatic preacher and taken over of the group by Abubakar Shekerau since 2009; the group seeks to overthrow the government and replace it with a law based on the spirit of Islam and Sharia law.

The assassination of the group's leader, Yusuf, have not deterred in any way the group's barbaric and nefarious activities of cruelty, but has emboldened them in random slaughter of both civilians and military personnel, merciless murderous attacks on Christian institutions and religious educational institutions. Lately, some mosques have been attacked whose faithfuls do not key into their ideological framework. According to Forbes International (2018) there abound chilling testimonies of survivors' reports of the group's invasion and raiding of many villages and indiscriminately slaughtering women and children; of people being pulled out of their vehicles and massacred in cold blood, or of horrible executions through beheading by chainsaws.

Socio-Economic and Political Adverse Effects of Terrorism

Terrorism as a global phenomenon has left trails of woes in its effects. Its impacts on human and material resources of the affected nations are multifaceted and multifarious. Traumatically, Erez (200, p. 26) states that, “the potential effects on victims of terrorism can be devastating and multiple; it may be experienced at many interrelated levels – individually, collectively and societally. He posits that, from a victimological perspective, there are three circles of 'personal victimisation' which are determined in accordance with their proximity to the direct victim. The primary or first order victimisation is experienced by those who suffer harm directly such as injury, loss or death; secondary or second order victimisation is experienced by family members, relatives or friends of primary victims; while tertiary or third order victimisation is experienced by those who observe the victimisation and are exposed to it through television or radio coverage of the victimisation. Where abuse includes forms of sexual abuse, survivors may also experience sexual dysfunction, fear of intimacy, self-loathing and rejection of their body (Yohani and Hagen, 2010, pp. 208-209).

On broader human rights perspectives, Shapland and Hall (2007, pp. 178) contend that, "victims whether directly or indirectly affected, may suffer societal effects, involving changes to the victim's lifestyles normally to avoid the situation or context in which the offence occurred." Trauma can also impact upon the roles of parent, spouse, employer, citizens, etc. Thus engendering deterioration in social, educational and occupational functioning – leading to social withdrawal and isolation.

In their paper, *Trade and Terror: the Impact on Developing Countries*, Bandyopadhyay and Jounas (2008, p. 8) submit that, "greater terrorism in a developing nation raises the risk for foreign investors of not being able to get the returns on their investments." Hence, such investors will look for safe alternate nations to invest in. The argument has the support of Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal (2008, p. 8) that, "there is substantial diversion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from a venue nation of terrorism to alternate terror-free nation." They argue that, one standard deviation increase in the risk of terrorism in a particular nation can reduce the country's net FDI position by approximately 5 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which is a huge potential loss in capital formation for any nation.

In terms of international trade, terrorism raises the cost of doing business across national borders (Bandyopadhyay and Younas, 2008, p. 9). They believe that, if shippers have to buy insurance to cover possible damages in ports of terrorism-prone nations, invariably such cost are passed on to the consumers in the form of higher prizes, which will tend to reduce both exports and imports of terror-affected nations. Edwin Baker (2018, p. 1) is of the view that, "the fear of an act of terrorism can be a very powerful weapon. Thus in countries that live in constant fear of an attack, terrorists are in effect already successful without having to take any action." In Nigeria, the effect of terrorism has posed a big threat to government, local businesses, and multinational enterprises (Ugwa and Joseph, p. *ii*). It has led to inestimable number of deaths; loss of unquantifiable properties; eruption of numerous internally displaced persons camps; and disruption of many life-sustaining activities such as farming, genuine cattle herding, trading, travelling, working, among others leading to hunger and starvation in many part of the country.

Push Factors Leading to Radicalisation/Deradicalisation

Terrorist radicalisation is a process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action. Terrorist radicalisation may also occur in a great variety of circumstances in different ways and at different speeds. Each case of terrorist radicalisation and recruitment for terrorism, result from the unique intersection of an enabling environment with other personal circumstances of a given man or woman. But there is no clear-cut pathway towards terrorism. Terrorist radicalisation and recruitment does not occur in a vacuum. It should be viewed as an interactive process between the individual and external influences, including terrorist propaganda and recruiters, broader developments in society, and the actions of public authorities (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014, p. 37).

Psychological and cognitive factors such as one's self-image, a sense of identity and belonging, expectations, beliefs and attitudes, are dynamic and shape how a person experiences and reacts to his or her environment and event. These can have an impact on the development, of "being odd," – feeling of exclusion, rejection, relative deprivation, humiliation, victimisation, injustice, frustration, revolt or superiority. This can push someone to be more susceptible to the appeal of terrorism. Moreover, the spread of, and exposure to ideas and narratives that legitimise terrorism and foster its appeal are critical pull factors. As such, many terrorists and violent extremists skilfully tailor, package and disseminate their narratives in a way that will reach and resonate with the particular individual or group targeted for radicalization and recruitment. As OSCE (2014, p. 38) contends, sometimes, an individual need have no prior contact with a terrorist group, nor have ever travelled to those countries with extreme radical ideologies to become directly involved with terrorism. But terrorists are often radicalised remotely, sometimes through the internet alone. This current trend of self-recruitment has moved many governments and NGOs to look more closely at the internet's role in both terrorism and counter-terrorism.

In all of these, radicalisation is not a threat if it is not connected to violence or other unlawful acts, such as incitement to hatred, as legally defined in compliance with international human rights law. Radicalisation can be for good uses where, for instance, some political human rights had advocated and used radicalisation as instrument for the abolition of slavery or for championing universal suffrage who were at some point considered as being radical, as they stood in opposition to the prevailing views in their societies (OSCE 2014: 35).

De-radicalisation, conversely, connotes the process of divorcing a person, voluntarily or otherwise, from their extreme views. Successful de-radicalisation depends, according to OSCE (2014) upon and understanding of radicalisation itself. A sound de-radicalisation programme needs to learn from how individuals become radicalised – both radicalisation and de-radicalisation lean heavily on family or other social ties, and the internet is increasingly playing a large role in both (A New Approach, 2010). De-radicalisation programmes which are geared toward peacefully moving individuals and groups away from violent extremism have grown both in popularity and in scope. This is the pursuit of this study.

Sponsorship and Funding of Terrorism

Terrorist organisations receive funding from diverse sources. These sources include individuals, groups, Islamic organisations, and even donor countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya. Itai Zehoria of Forbes Israel in interviews with security experts and counter-terrorist specialists reports and analysis from NGO's, academic and government organisations, and think-tanks reveal some estimated numbers of the wealthiest terrorist organisations such as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) with annual turnover of $2-3 billion; Hamas ($1 billion); FARC ($600 million); Hezbollah ($500 million); Taliban ($400 million); Al-Quaeda ($150 million);

Lashar-e-Taiba ($100 million); Al-Shabaab ($70 million); REAL IRA ($50 million); and Boko Haram ($25 million).

The Boko Haram terrorist group is one of the world's deadliest organisations rivalling ISIS in terms of brutality. Its financial capacity according to Zehoria (2018, p. 2) "stood at $25 million annually which is sourced through kidnappings and ransom, fees and taxes, protection, bank robberies and looting." Kidnapping of Western citizens too and local women and school children are generally their major source of raising money. Its areas of operation include Nigeria, Cameron, Lake Chad and Niger Republic.

According to online report by Kingimi Ahmed of Thompson Reuter (2018), 276 school girls in Chibok town of North-eastern Nigerian in April 2014 were kidnapped some of whom have been released while others are still in their captivity. In a similar circumstance, Tara John (2018) reported that, the group on February 19, 2018 stormed a school in the North-eastern town of Dapchi, Yobe State abducting no fewer than 110 school girls. Though many of these girls have been released, but the fate of Leah Shaibu who has vehemently refused to denounce her Christian faith before release is still unknown. This occurred even as the Nigerian government under Mohammadu Buhari boasted before the global community that the extremist group has been defeated at one point; degraded at another point; and technically decimated afterward. The more this government boast of their prowess against the Boko Haram, the more daring their onslaught against innocent Nigerians. Despite national and international condemnation of the deadly, ungodly, and luciferous acts of the extremist group in Nigeria championed by the "Bring Back Our Chibok Girls'(BBOCG) and other Civil Liberty Organisations, the group has remained undaunted yet more ferocious; more bellicose.

In order to further their jihadist agenda, Boko Haram have been transmuted variously into herdsmen, bandits, militia or what have you - killing, maiming, raping, razing and annihilating many communities, especially in the north central geopolitical zone of Benue, Plateau, Taraba, Zamfara, and some other states in the southern part of Nigeria, especially Ondo, Oyo, Osun and Ekiti state . Instances abound which are too numerous to mention in this study since its renewed overzealous and nefarious activities in the above areas. However, few cases call for mention. Chika Abanobi (2018:6) records that, "in Plateau state, talk of crisis, it does not just rain, it pours." There was the mass killings, allegedly by Fulani herdsmen of residents of about 11 communities in Gashish and Ropp Districts of the State, leading to the death of between 86 people (official figure) and 200 (unofficial record). Gyang Bere (2018:11) reports that following resentment by the Chairman of the State Traditional Rulers Council and Gwom of Jos, Da Jacob Gyang Buba that, the Berom and Miango people in the state are worst hit in the attacks and killings perpetrated by Fulani herdsmen. This follows report by the Special Task Force (STF) Commander; Major General Augustine Agundu that, "the military has lost five soldiers in peace operation." Some of them were abducted and beheaded in the crisis areas by the militias. In an editorial titled, "The Killings in Plateau State," *Saturday Sun* writes on the violence in the University of Jos leading to deaths and missing of a retired Major General of the Nigerian Army. 18 innocent Nigerians were brutally killed on 3 October 2018 by suspected Fulani herdsmen. While Lawrence Ishaku, a community member revealed the wiping out of 8 family members in the attack as four others were hospitalised with gun shot wounds.

Chioma Igbokwe (2018, p. 13) in an article titled *Why We Wiped Out Zamfara Village – Killer Herdsmen*, reports the arrest of four suspected herdsmen by the Operatives of the Inspector General of Police (IGP) Intelligence Response Team, Lawal Abubakar, Shehu Sani, Yusuf Mande and Hanaisu Sani. They admitted they were members of the Buharin Daji group that has been linked to recent attacks on farmers and cattle herders across the state. They said the attack was in retaliation for their cows killed by some people in the affected communities. Yusuf Mande, 30 also confessed that, "we attacked Ruwanwesa village and we killed almost everyone there, including women and children."

In Benue State, the satanic activities of Boko Haram have left in its trails countless deaths of innocent citizens, worshippers and two (2) clerics. On Sunday, November 18, 2018 the Nigerian Army fighting Boko Haram terrorists in the northeast have suffered heavy casualties with the loss of 70 of its men in a deadly attack. According to *Premium Times*, "terrorists had overrun the 157 Task Force Battalion in Metele town, carting away large cache of arms and military equipment, leaving the base strewn with the corpses of dozens of soldiers." The attack followed a threat letter from the Boko Haram who vowed to take over four strategic military locations around the Lake Chad region. Currently, according to Pulse.com, "Nigeria is home to an estimated 6,900 terrorist fighters."

De-radicalisation of Terrorism through Applied Theatre

Though the aims and objectives of terrorist groups, especially Boko Haram are murky, nonetheless, there has been barrage of opinions on how to stop the menace at both national and international spheres. It is for the same reason that the study advocates for the adoption of Applied Theatre as panacea to countering terrorism in Nigeria where other media of communication such as the television, radio, newspapers, social media, etc. have proved ineffective in calling the extremists to their senses.

The question may be asked why the use of Applied Theatre or specifically Community Theatre to fight terrorism in Nigeria where military hard wares and intelligence has proved effete. A retrospective incursion into the emergence of Boko Haram and other insurgent or terror groups in Nigeria attest to the fact that, these groups need psychological and value re-orientation in order to redress whatever their grievances may be. Rightly or wrongly these terror groups has a mission to accomplish based on mere indoctrination by their sponsors. According to Emile Nakhleh (2014, p. 6), "Nigerian terrorism did not develop in a vacuum, but competing historical and ideological narratives; Saudi proselytisation and active recruiting by religious radicalisers in the past two decades have paved the way for radicalism."

Applied theatre using the strand of Community theatre has been adopted for the study as catalyst for countering terrorism in Nigeria because of its use of praxis in accomplishing its aims and objectives. As a genre of applied theatre it is a participatory theatre practice which allows communities to write their own stories and perform in a drama based on the messages that emerge from the storytelling process. It is a multi-dimensional tool that, addresses the issues of transformation, empowerment, and social change, among others through conscientisation, mobilisation, and sensitisation. It includes wide range of practices in which participatory dramatic activities and/or theatre performances are used for a broad-set of purposes including education, community-building, rehabilitation, conflict resolution, and advocacy (Snyder-Young 2013:4). Applied theatre also crystallises the use of theatre for extra-theatrical purposes which imply such things as education, social change and community cohesion. This according to Philip Taylor (2003) addresses the ways theatre can be an agent of change, empowerment, enablement, and transformation. The implication being that applied theatre is powered by the need to change by opening up new perspectives, posing options and anticipating change. Taylor, therefore, suggests diversity of purposes involved in applied theatre which includes raising awareness; posing alternatives/teaching concepts; healing psychological wounds/barriers; and interrogating human actions/challenging contemporary discourses.

In line with the participatory nature of applied theatre, Rhod Skidd (1988) advocates an applied theatre program whereby "everyone can participate in this kind of work, and provides a model that can be adapted across range of subject matters that cut across: warm up exercise; bridge-building activities; and activating material for the project." Community theatre, as Chris Nwamuo (1990, p. 22) submits, "is a popular theatre aimed at conscientising the people within a particular location in consciousness and awareness to the extent that they take positive action towards the improvement of their lives in the interest of communal stability and nation-building." It is a form of theatre created to serve as a means of conscientising, sensitising, and mobilising a target community or group into dramatising their problems and struggles and making them to be conscious of their capacity in solving those problems. Thus, the people, according to Freire (1978, p. 13) "… are able to go beyond their narrow horizons of their own village and the geographical area in which it is located to gain global perspective of reality." Through such conscientisation, men are made to see their problems as a consequence of a particular social order; and to use literacy programmes to teach people to reject a fatalistic view of life by jettisoning their culture of silence which they have imbibed through what Freire (1978) refers to as banking system of education. Through conscientisation too, the peoples mind become opened to new ideas. The resultant effect of conscientisation is that, "when men attain a new sense of awareness, they assume a new sense of dignity and hope (Gbilekaa, 1990, p. 29). Community theatre, therefore, enables people to identify their needs in line with their desired change, the place of change and the means of attaining such change.

As a tool of conscientisation, applied theatre involves analysis of issues that lead to change of attitudes through self-examination, situation of analysis by people themselves. It affords people to share, enhance and analyse their own knowledge and condition, and thereafter plan, act, and evaluate issues affecting them. To achieve this, Hagher (1990, p. 9) reasons that one of the major characteristics of TfD to be adopted is, active participation by the people themselves in solving their problems rather than depending entirely on outsiders. The Samaru Theatre Project in Zaria, Nigeria, for instance, was a forum of theatre for conscientisation that started in 1976 at Ahmadu Bello University by a group of ABU Collective, comprising of Michael Etherton, Brian Crow, Salihu Bappa, Oga Steve Abah and Tunde Lakoju. The intention of this group, according to Nwagbo (2013, p. 83) is premised on the fact that TfD is a theatre genre that makes people to look critically at their existence with a view to transforming them.

Empowerment is also at the core of applied theatre, for through it, people are equipped with the knowledge of how to identify, confront, and tackle their problems, thereby freeing them from the shackles of religious, cultural, economic, and socio-political bondages. To this end, Richard Boon and Jane Plastow (2004, p. 7) aver that, "the empowerment process of theatre can lead to the liberation of the mind and spirit of participants who often see themselves and are seen by others as 'subhuman'." To free people from social bondages, Augusto Boal (1985, p. 122) adopted a technique in which theatre can be used as a tool to address social issues that allow citizens to civically dialogue about their challenges. This technique acts as stimuli for change in which theatre is seen not as revolutionary itself, but as surely a rehearsal for the revolution. In his essay, *Applied Theatre: The Mystery Unravelled*, Jennifer Hartley (2010, p.14) contends that, irrespective of the nomenclature, all streams of applied theatre have ethnocentric concern with personal social change that stems from the basic desire to change and/or transform human behaviour and thinking through the medium of theatre.

As a transformative and rehabilitative tool that can draw from other practices outside of theatre such as psychology, anthropology, sociology, and education, good applied theatre aims to devise roles and situations that explore the human condition, not as a way of answering the problems of the world but to help develop a perspective on the world and to understand or at least struggle with the perspective of others as we move towards a sense of social justice and equity.

In his book, *Beyond the Fourth Wall: Theatre at the Frontier of Human Development*, Chiduo C. Obadiegwu (2015, p. 3) regards Community theatre as "panacea for community problems arising from neglect;" one in which the practitioners describe as "one of the most potent theatres for the development and education of both rural and urban people in contemporary society as well as offers a dialogical and cultural action for the emancipation of the oppressed masses." As a trending theatre genre (being in contradiction to the Aristotelian theatrics with its anti-dialogical matrix and fatalistic acceptance of the ways of the world), it is a theatre practice at the services of the people for the purpose of discussing and working out strategies for dealing with their problems. Community theatre is a participatory theatre at the service of the people for their socio-political development which borders on dialogue and acting, leading to critical consciousness and emancipation of the society or the target audience.

In a paper titled *Participatory Theatre: Issues and Cases*, Ogah Steve Abah (1990, p. 17) describes Community theatre as, "the type that speaks to the people in their own language and idioms and deals with issues that most affect their life; it is a participatory theatre which everyone that aspires for change must actively take part." The implication of this is that community theatre uses the people's familiar language as a means of solving their problems. To this end, when the people are able to see and analyse their way of being in the world of their immediate daily life including the life of the community, and when they can perceive the rationale for the factors on which their daily life is based, Ross Kidd (1984, p. *xii*) reasons that, "they are enabled to go beyond the narrow horizon of their own village and the geographical area in which it is located to gain global perspective of reality." Community theatre, therefore, ennoble people to arise above their age-long and primordial ideology and align themselves with current democratic principles.

It is a kind of theatre, according to Adele Janadu (1982, p. 126) "in which individuals are capable of rationality, have self-interest and will to choose action strategies that will enable their net wellbeing within the institutional networks provided by the society." By this, community theatre enables people to weigh themselves with the purpose of improving their psychological, environmental, social and political wellbeings.

From the above, it is noteworthy that community theatre involves participation, conscientisaton, sensitisation, communication, mobilisation, and emancipation of the target community. The community here represent the terrorist groups. Terrorists are human beings and not ghosts. Apart from those who operate from outside our borders and their financiers, majority of others live, interact and operate amongst us. Their activities are daily reported in the various media of communication, yet they have remained undaunted. Thus, the needs for a paradigm shift using Community theatre to reach and appeal to their conscience. Above all, since community theatre is participatory, it requires taking theatre to both urban and rural communities in the prone communities to conscientise, sensitise, and mobilise them in a language familiar to them in order to free them from the cage of ideological indoctrination and sectarianism. Considering also the fact that this form of theatre requires active participation of the target community (terrorist members included), the drama skit should be harnessed in such a way as to appeal to their psyche that Islamic religion is not after all a violent religion as they tend to believe, albeit, blindly. The drama should, therefore, teach them the need for peaceful co-existent among other religious faiths and how to channel their demands to the appropriate authorities for solution instead of resorting to violence to press for their demands. They should be meant to understand that no matter the extent of inducement and indoctrination by their recruiters, financiers, and their clerics, they are the likely end losers while their sponsors are the end gainers.

Conclusion/Recommendations

Apart from the use of Community theatre as a tool to counter terrorism in the society and Nigeria in particular, there are other factors that should be considered. The underlying factors that breed terrorism should be critically check-mated before proffering solutions to terrorism. For instance, terrorism is compounded, according to Bandyopadyay and Younas (2008, p. 7) by corruption, poor governance, and lack of proper judicial systems or rule of law," in the terror-infested nations. Such institutional shortcomings breed discontent in the population, which invariably spur terrorism.

Government should also endeavour to redress the issue of inequality, nepotism/tribalism, injustice, lopsidedness in economic development, appointments into federal portfolios, admission quota system into federal institutions, preference of one religion over others, etc. Government should rather provide job opportunities for the youths who are the major and willing agent for terrorism.

Experience has shown that government/public invitation for foreign assistance such as the US, France, UK, Israel, among other advanced nations to fight terrorism have not yielded the desired result. Rather such actions have aided the extremists to attract more followers as being witnessed in Nigeria today. According to Bartolota (2011) "any international response will be a recruiting tool for Boko Haram." Rather, the international community could assist Nigeria through the use of foreign aids to create economic opportunities in the affected areas on the condition that; they have to be sure that the money is being used in its intended manner. The reason for adopting this strict position is mainly due to the current waves of corruption in Nigeria. For example, Transparency International ranks Nigeria 134th on its Corruption Perception Index (Bartolota, 2011). While the Global Tourist ranking in 2018 as broadcast on Channel Television on July 12, 2018 sees Nigeria as the 3rd most terrorist nation in the world.

Considering the evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria, the solution may not lay in the might of government security forces alone. Nigeria must look inward and remedy her social, economic, religious, environmental, and political problems. Moreover, since extremism breeds inequality, insufficient economic opportunities, illiteracy, religious bigotry, etc. Government must deal with these problems in order to achieve peace and security in Nigeria. As Vanda Felbab-Brown (2012, p. 3) noted, "Nigeria must move beyond the blunt use of lethal force by improving intelligence-gathering mechanism and build healthier civil-military relations. The reason being that, sending military tanks to the streets may appease the angry or traumatic public, but it is not an effective counter-terrorism policy.

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BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: A SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATION

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Abstract
It is an established fact that prosperity and general welfare of a people or a nation is anchored on the security and peaceful co-existence prevalent in the socio-economic and political milieus. Insecurity has bedeviled Nigeria, leading to senseless killings and destructions of property without government being able to provide effective security. It is against this background on the loss of national security and acrimonious coexistence brought about by the insurgency being unleashed on the people by the Boko Haram sect that this paper discusses, analyses, and factors in the socio-economic and political implications of the menace in our society. The paper explores how the activities of Boko Haram destabilises national security thereby threatening Nigerian unity, corporate existence, and reveals governments' incapability to effectively carry out its primary responsibility as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria in Section 14 2(b) which states that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.” However, two prominent perspectives on the origin of Boko Haram were examined thereby making it less vague. The paper further explores the theories of group “disequilibrium”, being the bedrock for the origin of Boko Haram, and on the other hand, “counter-insurgency”, being the operational step taken by the government to flush out Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the way forward to foster national security.

Keywords: Boko Haram, insurgency, insecurity, sect, national security

Introduction
Entrenchment of peace in society engenders social progress and collective development of a people, likewise conflict is antithetical to social wellbeing and collective progress of a people. Both peace and conflict or insecurity impact on humans and environment hugely, depending on whichever one that prevails per time. Onu (2017) remarked that there is established nexus between peace and prosperity, that most peaceful societies as obtained overseas are often

the most prosperous whereas the conflict ridden societies with insecurity such as in Africa are equally the most backwards. Hence there is a strong co-relationship between peace and prosperity, which conflict is at the middle of the two (peace and prosperity) determining and regulating to a reasonable extent if peace should attract prosperity or if conflict or insecuirty should prevail to hinder prosperity. Therefore, as noted by Rogers (2011) and Marc, Mogaka, & Verjee (2015), security is paramount and a facilitator for both endogenous and exogenous development/prosperity of a nation. Ofuho (1999) attested that Africa is mainly underdeveloped and consequently ranks high globally in profiling the largest record of violent conflicts in the world.

Similarly, Nigeria is not left out in the scourge of violent conflict that engulfs African Continent as evident in the myriads of attacks of Boko Haram insurgency which is brutally killing, decimating and displacing the national population, destructions of property, and other inhuman crimes the sect unleashes on Nigerians. With the magnitude of carnage done against Nigerians and the Nigeria-state by the Boko Haram sect, the federal government in the bid to keep its primary constitutional responsibility to the social contract entered into with the people according to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) which states *inter alia*: "the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government", has not been realised thereby leading to Nigeria-state struggling with the counter-insurgency measures being deployed to reclaim peace and confidence of the people in the polity, by wadding off Boko Haram activities. Yet, it does appear that Boko Haram is winning the war against the Nigeria-state, having given birth to the Fulani herdsmen terrorist group and the most recent sect known as banditry, all originating from the Northern Nigeria and wedging war against the state thereby threatening the unit and corporate existence of Nigeria.

Some of the research data on the activities of the sect reveals the height of horror Boko Haram and its sister terrorists groups have subjected Nigerians to; leading to untold socio-economic hardship and sharp political division that has polarised Nigeria into ethno-religious hatred between Moslems from the North and Christians from the South. Ibenwa et al (2017) noted that the USA in 2013 terror index classification ranked the Boko Haram as a terror group and consequently proscribed it. Report from Global Terrorism Index (2015) ranked Fulani herdsmen as the 4th most deadly terrorist group in the world. Whereas the International Crises Group report in (2017) has it that Fulani herdsmen in 2016 is responsible for estimated death toll of 2,500 persons, because government is not doing enough to stop the killings. In the same vein, Amnesty International (2018) has it that governments' inability to resolve the conflict between farmers and herders is responsible for the increasing death toll of up to 4,000 lives lost. According to Chima et al (2018), "a chronology of the deaths compiled by THISDAY Newspaper has shown that a total of 901 persons have been reportedly murdered in the Middle Belt alone in the first four months of 2018."

Boko Haram, in conjunction with the Fulani herdsmen terrorism and banditry profiles of organised violent conflicts in Nigeria as the above data depicts, proves the sects as organised violent social conflict terror groups that are rapidly ravaging the nation. It is apparent that Nigeria state has lost the monopoly of the use of force or legitimate use of violence which according to

Fund for Peace (2019) constitutes the indices of a failed state that contributed to ranking Nigeria 14th globally in the survey of Failed State Index (FSI) among nations. Human beings drive socio-political economy. The growth and decline of any socio-political economy is determined by relative peace that consequently engenders prosperity by fertilising the environments for lives, businesses, and governance to thrive in a polity. But evidently, the reverse is the case as seen in the magnitude of lives lost in Nigeria due to the activities of Boko Haram sect. Hence the paper investigates the negative impacts of the activities of Boko Haram in the Nigeria, the counter-insurgency tactics and strategies deployed by government to contain the menace, and proffers solutions on how to end the war.

Methodology

The method implicit in this study is qualitative. Data were gathered secondarily through textbooks, journal articles, internet materials, national dailies reportage on conflicts and peace journalism were scooped and contextually analysed and evaluated within the realm of the activities of Boko Haram and how it has negatively affected national socio-political and economic positions of Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework for Analysis

This paper takes perspective from two theories relevant to the problem of concern (Boko Haram insurgency). The first theory is: "Group Disequilibrium" which is the foundation for the origin of Boko Haram sect that seeks to overthrow the government and establish Islamic state in Nigeria, where Islamic laws (Sharia) shall be the order of the day in the conduct of national affairs, despite the secular nature of Nigeria-state. Ali et al (2016) pinpointed that the summary of the goals of Boko Haram is to overthrow the general westernisation of Nigeria and imposition of Sharia system of governance, with creation of Islamic Caliphate or Sultanate based on Sharia law (*Sunday Vanguard*, 2010). This sole objective they intend to achieve via terrorism; kidnapping, raid, bombing, and general application of insurgent activities for anarchy to occur via their insurrection so that they can have the balance of power altered to their advantage thereby achieving their objectives.

Group disequilibrium theory is an off shoot of group theory, which is the parent or larger umbrella that shelters other theories and models used in making analysis about a group/collection of a people. According to Anderson (1997, p. 28) group theory rests on the contention that interaction and struggle among groups are central facts of political life. One writer says, "what may be called public policy is the equilibrium reached in this (group) struggle at any given moment, and it represents a balance which the contending factions or groups constantly strive to weight in their favour". Sambo (1999) posits that public policy is as a result of group struggle; that group theory produces a dynamic characteristic into the knowledge of understanding of how policies originate and are crafted. He further stated that, from pluralist perspective, group theory sees public policy as the discussed and agreed consensus and compromises brokered between government and interest groups that form policy communities.

In the same vein, Ugwu (2006) opines that group theory is based on the realm of pluralist paradigm of politics which argues that power is distributed among different groups. The groups include anomic interest group like Boko Haram which is fighting and making demand upon the government to capture national power and establish Islamic state and laws in Nigeria (i.e., ideology). According to Olagunju (2011), we thought that Boko Haram people, because they say they do not want Western education, were really illiterates. We can see now that they are not. It is an ideological war that they are fighting. This ideology boils down to goal setting theory for the actualization of the Boko Haram ideology which is vehemently pursued under the platform of insurgency. Similarly, David (1951) posits that a group is a collection of individuals that may, on the basis of shared attitudes or interests make claims upon other groups in society. It becomes a political interest group "when it makes a claim through or upon any of the institutions of government." And many groups do just that. The individual is significant in politics only as a participant in or a representative of groups. It is through groups that individuals seek to secure their political preferences.

Meanwhile, the second theory is: "Counter–Insurgency" which is the aggregation of all operational modalities, tactics and strategies deployed by the Nigerian government to eradicate the insurgent activities of Boko Haram sect in Nigeria. The counter-insurgency approach is deeply rooted in military strategies, socio-economic reformation, political percolation, religious and educational reorientation, etc. all geared towards fighting and defeating Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, if properly deployed with correct political will.

According to Mao Zedong theory of counter-insurgency (COIN) which says that to fight insurgency "hearts and minds" of the population will be won because they provide "support and cover" for the insurgent group. This is because members of insurgent group live and operate amongst the populace, and perpetrate their evil acts against the populace in most cases and the state at large. Thus, the masses can easily know them, expose their hideouts, report suspicious movements, etc. which only the masses can do best than any government agency/institution in the bid to crush any upraising like Boko Haram insurgency. Mao Zedong also pointed out the three (3) phases of counter-insurgency as follows:

- Political work;
- Guerrilla warfare; and
- Conventional war.

Therefore, the 3 phases above must be correctly and adequately deployed in the right proportions, if Nigeria government is serious to defeat Boko Haram insurgency.

Four (4) Tenets of Fighting Insurgents

According to Dick Shultz in his book titled: '*The Marines Take Anbar*', these are the fundamental principles every government should know, apply, and be consciously guided with and in the quest to defeat insurgency. Proper understanding, correct and timely applications of the tenets are priceless if any government will successfully crush any upraising from any sect, no matter how powerful or well equip they are in their violent attack on the people and/or the state.

- Numbers matter…. if you use them right;
- Know your allies… as well as yourself and the enemy;

- Centralise control…. decentralise execution; and
- The rules are… there aren't no rules.

An Insight on the Origin of Boko Haram Sect

There are two popular perspectives among scholars on the origin of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Boko Haram whose real name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda' Awati Wal Jihad, which interpretation means the Sunni Community of People Committed for the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad (Abolurin, 2012), is a radical Islamic terror group founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf in North-east Nigeria. The group is also active in other geographically contiguous states which include Cameroun, Chad and Niger. Estimates put its membership between 600 and 10,000 (*The Guardian*, 2014). The words Boko Haram literally mean "Western Education is Sin." Boko Haram is a destructive ideology fashioned out by Islamic hooligans and Jihadists hiding under the cloak of Islamic religion to perpetrate evils in the society through which political opponents hijack as a tool to fight government by providing sponsorship to the sect in order to destabilise the social system and have their way politically and otherwise.

Moreover, from one perspective, Boko Haram sect started operation in 2002 under the leadership of Mohammed Yusufi Ali who was mobilised in Sudan by Osama Bin Laden disciple with three (3) Million US Dollars to come to Nigeria to spread the ideology of Al-Qaeda. Although Mohammed Ali founded the Islamic insurgent group in Nigeria but he was later killed in a raid by police in Northern Nigeria. The financial aid given to Mohamed Yusuf Ali to kick start Boko Haram by Osama Bin Ladin disciple is called "seed money". A take-off grant to pioneer the destructive operations of Boko Haram with the bid to forcefully propagate Islam through Modern Jihad platform called insurgency, with tincture of terrorism. This is one version of the foundation of Boko Haram and its international affiliation with other terror network groups like Al Shababu, etc.

From another perspective, Boko Haram is not entirely a new surge of extreme Islamic radical movement in Northern Nigeria. Rather, it is a remnant of the survival instinct of violent and radical Islamic wave of force that seeks to enthrone a political Islamic state. Abdullahi (2015) begins his traces of Islamic extremism when he posits that Sufism is a mystical and esoteric form of Islam predominates yet a *Salafist* orientation, most closely connected with radical Islam is burgeoning. Abimbola & Adesote (2012) also asserts that Salafist insurgency in northern Nigeria has roots that dates back to revolutionary *Mahdism* of the 19th century; which mobilised "radical clerics" "disgruntled peasants" and "fugitive slaves" in an unsuccessfully bid to overthrow the British colonial regime in 1906 and to reinstate pre-colonial Islamic Caliphate that ruled parts of what is now northern Nigeria, Niger and Southern Cameroon. Although colonial forces crushed *Mahdism,* it resurfaces in the 1980s through series of anti-state rebellion referred to as *Maitatsine that condensed into Islamic terror group which according to Ewetan & Urhie (2014) has been in the northern Nigeria right from the time of President Shehu Shagari administration*.

Sampson (2012) argued that the failure of state, after quelling *Maitatsine* in the 1980's to put up de-radicalisation programmes for the remnants of its cadres, led to the gradual but sustained incubation of its trace elements into more a radicalised and hardened Boko Haram. *Like* most extremists groups in the Sahel, Boko Haram operates first from a base of strength

(Northeastern Nigeria) and uses the region as launch pad for spreading campaign of violence across Nigeria, neighbouring Chad, Niger and Cameroun. Between 2013 to present and amidst intermittent dislodgement by Nigerian and multinational military force, Boko Haram seized and hoisted flags in dozen of communities in the bid to establish a *de facto* Islamic territory in the tri-country boarder areas of (Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon).

Moreover, the operational goal for any insurgent movement anywhere is usually to gain control of state power, install a government of its own, and wins "backdoor legitimacy" by gaining acceptance of the populace via suppression of the people and the state apparatus and paraphernalia of power politics. In this bid, the state will have no option than to engage them squarely head-on using counter-insurgent approach to defend the masses and the state from being dethroned by the insurgent sect thereby flushing them out to regain full control and confidence of the populace. See the below views of Joseph et al (2005):

> As a strategic category, the goal of counterinsurgency is always legitimacy. If every member of a society accepted the essential rectitude of a state and its institutions, there would be no insurgents. Since that is impossible, insurgency has been a regular feature of history. The strategic goal of the insurgents is a new society, one that is more "correct," more just. Their strategy is the creation of this counter-state; their operational art, the implementation of the lines of operation (LO) that realise the strategy. Consequently, the operational goal of the counter-insurgents must be the neutralisation of the counter-state, negating the insurgents' lines of operation. Tactically, on both sides, goal and strategy boil down to a contest for human terrain in local space. The insurgents seek to gain the population while the state, theoretically starting from a position of ownership, seeks to retain the people by providing security.

Current and Future Implications of Boko Haram Activities

To begin with the implications of Boko Haram, it is imperative we quote Udenta (2005) at length for graphically painting a vivid picture of the destructive impacts of terrorism globally thereby providing us with better perspective on the gross mess being orchestrated by Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, thus:

> No continent has been spared the scourge of terrorism: from North America to Australia, Africa to Asia, and South America to Europe. Everybody is afraid, even those imputed as terrorists… Terrorism is not a social, political but also an economic nightmare. Entire investments and investors may be annihilated. Then, there is the psychological dimension, which as part of the trauma is the sense of nothingness, helplessness and invariably, hopelessness, which is not good for development. Development is a futuristic thing. Only those who believe in a future plan, save, invest and carry out constructive research and development.

It is against the above illustration that we impinge the destructive consequences of Boko Haram sect on Nigeria economy, social welfare, political prospect, education, religious atmosphere, etc., have all being contaminated by the inhumane viral disease of Islamic sect called Boko Haram terroristic activities.

Socio-Economic

The economy of North-east Nigeria as the stronghold of Boko Haram scourge has been shattered and crippled as industrial formations, business activities, cities, banks, popular daily/weekly markets, etc. are often attacked with suicide bombs or threats of suicide bombs by the sect, thereby shifting business attention, production, human capital, progress, etc. from those places strongly affected to areas of less threats of the insurgent acts of Boko Haram. Commercial banks in the Northeast especially Yobe and Borno states were compelled to adjust their operational hours from 9:00 am to 12:00 pm daily against the normal working hours of 8:00 am to 4:00 pm due to Boko Haram attacks (Mohammed, 2012). Similarly, abduction of Chibok school girls made parents to stop sending their children to schools in Yobe state (Hassan, 2014) whereas all schools in Yobe state were shutdown in 2013 after the Chibok school girls abduction (Awortu, 2015).

Insurgency scares away foreign investors, foreign partners, foreign aid, and foreign exchange, etc., thereby constraining and strangulating economy from opening up to embrace the advantages of global economic hook ups. *The Nation* (2016) reports that for the real sector operators of the economy and the government in particular, the shrinking of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria is tied to the surge in insurgency, is the agonising reality to the time. Since 2009, when the Boko Haram gained national consciousness for all the wrong reasons, FDI in Nigeria is drastically decreasing, and releasing shocking messages to the government authorities. For instance, the World Investment Report (WIR) 2013 reports that FDI flows into Nigeria decreased by 21 per cent in just one year – from \$8.9 billion in 2011 to \$7 billion in 2012. This amounts to loss of \$1.9 billion, a huge figure that is very unacceptable for a country in critical need of increasing its revenue generation capacities.

Abdullahi (2015) captures succinctly the implications of the Boko Haram sect when he posits that Boko Haram has developed from an unknown local rebellion to a renowned sophisticated insurgency. Trajectory of insurgency is reversing hard-won development gains, heralding wider regional security implications and threatening vital global economic investments in the Sahel. Human capital drives development. But unfortunately, human capital is the first casualty in any conflict such as Boko Haram as people are killed, kidnapped, amputated, raped, abused, etc. thereby shattering lives and the sustainable environment built by human capital upon which life thrives. Eze (2005) remarked that the highest asset of any nation at macro level is the trained and skillful human capital/resource which should be valued more. Abah (2007) corroborates this when he noted that effective utilisation of other resources is dependent on the level of development of human resource/capital. Sadly, the activities of Boko Haram have made human resource the most endangered species upon which the sect preys on.

According to Joseph et al (2015) socio-economic development, to a large extent, is the main goal of every well-meaning government, and perhaps, it is generally anchored on the level of economic activities in a country. This stems from the fact that the level of economic activities is promoted by peaceful co-existence of the people. A case where lack of security is increasingly and brazenly the trending reality of our time, socio-economic development is not sustainable as it destroys socio-economic and human capital formation and ties. Indeed, the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria have retarded socio-economic development in various ramifications. The sect has forcefully uprooted people and farmers in particular out of their homes and farmlands, leading to proliferation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps in the country. Inhabitants of rural areas are abandoning their rural communities to migrate to cities and IDPs for safety, because Boko Haram theatre of war is villages where they kill with easy and disappear into bushes. Ohagwu (2010) noted that 80 per cent of Nigerians live in rural communities, and that the national resources are located in the rural areas where they are exploited for national development. Nigeria wealth is sourced from rural areas; where raw materials and many at times labour required for sustenance of urban industries are tapped from (Obodoechi, 2009).

The Social and Cultural Fabrics

The base and the superstructure which hold the society are destroyed by the activities of the sect thereby creating false sense of humanity, moral debasement, anti-sanctity of human lives, etc. in the people, which in turn triggers anarchy, apathy, and immoral views to life. The cultural heritage and pride of the people are shattered by the activities of the sect as they target institutions, religious worship centers, etc. Social and cultural activities especially in the Northeast stronghold of Boko Haram is witnessing low turnout as people are scared of being bombed while attending social and cultural rites. Nigerians mainly those in the North are already living with phobia for social gatherings due to suicide bomb attacks, even before the arrival of the COVID-19 lock down; social distancing and ban on social activities. Therefore, before COVID-19 pandemic, Boko Haram insurgency had taught Nigerians in the North to be cautious about social activities.

Social exclusion and apathy is high in Nigeria. People from the South now detest going to the North, as many graduate under National Youth Service Corp (NYSC) scheme have rejected picking up NYSC call-up letters on the ground that they were posted to the Northeast zone, and also, many innocent Moslems have been stigmatized based on false impression of being religious extremists, even though not all Moslems are Boko Haramists or fans to the sect (Mohammed, 2014). Boko Haram has broken the ties that hold Nigeria together both socially and culturally.

Political Division and Apathy

One of the greatest negative undertones of Boko Haram sect is the polarissation of Nigeria into strong political party enclaves based on ethno-religious views. Boko Haram has created more political division among the political elites in the north and south of Nigeria. The sect originates from Islamic doctrine of Jihad, the so called false believe in the destruction of infidel (God's enemy), enthronement of Sharia laws and Islamic principles in Nigeria thereby Islamising Nigeria to gain easy and unchecked access to political cake/power in Nigeria power relations. This no doubt has invariably weakened the political unity, ideology, structure, framework, objectives, and development agenda that Nigeria sets to realise with the bid to enhance living conditions of her populace, as a secular society.

The 2015 general election was postponed against the scheduled commencement date, just to roll back Boko Haram sect in the states they hoisted flags and controlled some communities in certain local governments, especially in the northeast Nigeria. This brought rancor and political acrimony as the then opposition party APC, now ruling party politicised the postponement of the presidential election.

However, the current and future implications of Boko Haram insurgency is too numerous to be articulated and anticipated, but we will list herein the noticeable ones such as: loss of manpower to derive the economy of the North eastern Nigeria due to millions of lives lost to bomb, loss of capital to resurrect the economy, loss of skills, loss of technology, people amputated, infrastructural decay making it hard to start normal life again when the insurgency is defeated, psychological and emotional debasement of the people to carry on with life again in a meaningful and serious manner, imputed belligerent spirit in the people, etc. are all huge problems to tackle at the moment and immediately after the collapse of Boko Haram terrorism.

Government Approaches to Combat/Eradicate Boko Haram Insurgency

Insurgency is an organised violent crime, and a movement with the intention to overthrow a constituted government through the use of subversion or armed conflict. Hence no government keeps quiet or smiles at the wake of insurgency, because it is a big threat to the government as it questions government's legitimacy, sovereignty, challenges government authority, power and existence with the sole aim to unseat the government of the day and usurp its powers. Therefore, following the insurgent activities of Boko Haram, government at all levels have taken the following crucial steps in the bid to counterinsurgency.

Community Policing/Vigilante Group

The only main way to fight insurgency is through counter insurgency and amnesty according to the popular work of Mao Zedong. Thus, government in line with this popular view is creating and empowering community/village vigilante groups to be ready to take up the challenges of security of lives and property in their areas as the people are in better position to know or discover members of insurgent sects who dwell and interact with the people so that the people can fish them out, fight them at sight with easy or alert appropriate authority to ruthlessly deal with them. The people of the North-east Nigeria are organising themselves into security watch groups (vigilante) powered and financed by the people, and in partnership with government and corporate entities instead of to seat back and wait for the government alone to provide them with security and have their sons, daughters, property, enterprise, etc. destroyed. Nigerian Army, police and Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) are created and deployed in the North-east to combat Boko Haram plague. This community policing approach was launched in July 2009 as an initiative of the British Department for International development, DFID. Its aim is for crime prevention and control (Udenta, 2007).

Space Surveillance Programme

Intelligence gathering is among the most viable means to fight insurgency, thus nations are encouraged to build intelligence networks and gain experience to nip plots of insurgent on the bud before they attack (Peled & Dror, 2010). The federal government embarked on wide CCTV installation in some of the major cities in Nigeria, using Federal Capital Territory (FCT) as a pilot test/run with a Chinese company ZTE Communications handling the multi-billion dollars surveillance project in Abuja from where it is hoped to trickle down to other major and minor places in the country, with the bid to ensure and enhance security via crime detection and prevention, before perpetration of social vices are launched by attackers. However, Culture Custodian (2019) reported that the Abuja CCTV project is a total failure thereby describing it as the "anatomy of a failed project" despite 470 million dollars loaned and sunk in the project, yet the failure is still blamed on paucity of funds by the authorities while Nigeria continue to pay the loan.

High-Tech Intelligence and Sophisticated Electronic Data Gathering Equipment

These are currently in use by Nigeria army, navy, air force, customs, police, etc., by the efforts of the government who also train and empower them on the uses. Unconventional wars are won based on intelligence and smart deployment of counter-measures of attack and offense concept, not giving room for defense by allowing insurgent groups to attack civilians first or security agency or institutions. Onuoha (2008) noted that to win a war against an enemy of a state, "offense-defense" theory which was marshaled out by Robert Jervis, George Quester, and Stephen Van Evera as an offshoot of realist theory have to be properly applied. Hence attacks (offenses) against BokoHaram as seen from time to time by Nigerian army are justified.

Advanced Training and Re-Training of Security Personnel

Nigeria security personnel are engaged in foreign training by the UK and the USA armies on how to fight insurgency and defeat it. International Crisis Group (2016) reported that Nigeria military despite being among the strongest in Africa and the backbone of peacekeeping in the region is facing fierce distress and flawed following Boko Haram insurgency. But to tackle the menace, reform is recommended in the military and partnership with international security agencies to enable her gain more resources (training of personnel, hardware-equipment, software-intelligence gathering & sharing, etc.) and defeat the insurgency. Through foreign internal defense, Nigeria invitation to the UK, the USA, the French, and the international community (UN) to help negotiate, train Nigerian soldiers and rescue the abducted school girls in Chibok is a nice step in the right direction geared towards curbing and defeating Boko Haram insurgency. Ross (2016) reported that both the US and the UK provided military support and increased the training given to Nigeria soldiers to enable them build the military capacity needed to handle Nigeria's myriads of insecurity.

Tightened Border Security

The national boundaries closer to countries like Chad, Niger, Cameroun, etc. are now focal points of attention as security apparatuses are strengthened there unlike before in order to checkmate invasion of terrorists from migrating from one country to the other in search of hide outs after operations or for operations. The partnership among Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroun leading to the popular Lake Chad Basin Authorities has created a MNJTF comprising the four regions/states coming together to combat insecurity posed by Boko Haram in the affected Lake Chad Basin.

Education of the "Amajiris"

This system of education was introduced in the northern Nigeria to educate the frustrated young people who have the tendency to join Boko Haram in later days in order to re-orientate and give them hope and future thereby deterring them from being brain washed to join the dangerous sect. The regime of President Jonathan is known very well for building and equipping modern schools with standard learning facilities in the north, to educate the illiterate Amajiris who often fall victim of being brain washed, radicalised, and consequently co-opted into Islamic terror groups like Boko Haram or Fulani herdsmen terrorists or bandits.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)

This is popularly known as drone or remotely piloted Aircraft (RPA). This was built and launched in Nigeria by Goodluck Jonathan's administration in Kaduna Military Base on 18 December 2013, to enhance security in the nation. It is the first indigenous UAV in Nigeria, and built by Nigeria Army via the sponsorship of the federal government.

Declaration of Emergency Rule (State of Emergency)

At the height of the insurgent destructions of lives and property by the Boko Haram sect in the Northeast, state of emergency was declared in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states in May, 2013 by President Jonathan's administration (Ibenwa et al, 2017), which helped to calm the surge of Boko Haram insurgency in those states and consequently allowed the security agencies to re-strategise on countering and containing the scourge.

Open confrontation

Since the visible outbreak of Boko Haram**,** government at one time or the other has been in constant mobilisation of forces to tackle the menace of Boko Haram in order to defeat them and bring back peace, security, and welfare to the masses in the affected areas. But the question is how well planned, equipped, timely, sincere, and coordinated are the counter-insurgent attacks launched by government forces against Boko Haram? In this regard, Steven Metz (2004) asserted that counter-insurgent planners should always remember that timing matters. As with health care, a small effort early is more effective than a major one later on. While it is difficult to discern, insurgencies do have a point of "critical mass" where they become much more formidable opponents.

Recommendations

- ***Re-orientation and education*** – the newly established system of education for the "*Amajiri*" children in North by Jonathan's administration is a step in the right direction. It is meant to be re-orientating the homeless, hopeless, and helplessly frustrated young teenage beggars with education and giving them hope and re-integrating them into the mainstreams of society so that they will not be recruited into Boko Haram out of negative values they have for life, as espoused by "Amajiri" system. But unfortunately, the current regime of President Buhari has failed to sustain this educational programme. The current government of Buhari should sustain the educational program of the amajiri children of the North.

- ***Government censorship:*** the need to censor and regulate religious teachings and doctrines in Nigeria are long overdue in order to curtail religious radicalism, which is the root cause of Boko Haram.

- ***Good governance:*** government should entrench good governance at all levels, provide social security and justice, infrastructure, reduce poverty and hunger which breed frustration and sense of hopelessness that lure people into joining Boko Haram and other deadly sects that wreck havocs of insecurity in the country.

- ***Expose sponsors:*** government should be bold and truthful enough to expose sponsors of Boko Haram publicly, trial, convict, and execute them when found guilty. This will serve as deterrence to others who sponsor terrorism and engage in conflict entrepreneurial.

- ***Stop releasing arrested Boko Haram members:*** there is urgent need for total stoppage of the unconditional release and integration of captured Boko Haram members into the Nigerian Army, stop sending them abroad for scholarship and into the larger society. All these encourage the young ones to join the sect willingly.

Conclusion

Boko Haram has a strong political undertone which is destructive and as such, government at all levels should be bold enough to crush Boko Haram sect before it destabilises this country in their bid to usurp power, enthrone, and forcefully establish Sharia laws in the South and Islamise Nigeria. The activities of Boko Haram have impacted negatively in the polity; ravaged the economy, killed thousands of lives, consequently divided Nigeria and threatens the unity, corporate existence and progress of the country.

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FINANCING TERRORISM IN THE LAKE CHAD REGION: LICIT PROCEEDS, ILLICIT VENTURES

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Abstract
This study establishes the role of terrorism financing, from licit trade, in the sustenance of insurgency in the Lake Chad region. In spite of efforts by Lake Chad region countries and their partners to suffocate the insurgency in the region, insurgents have continued to execute deadly attacks on civilians and communities, military positions, and aid workers. Extant literature show that the insurgency is sustained by factors like ideology, poverty, politics, secessionism, arms proliferation, money laundering, external influence, among others. Not much has been done by scholars to establish the link between proceeds from licit trade in the region and the sustenance of the insurgency. Using secondary data, the study provides evidence of how finances from licit trade have sustained the illicit venture of insurgency in the region. Thus, countries of the Lake Chad region should evolve coordinated mechanism to checkmate licit trade financing of terrorism in the region.

Keywords: Financing Terrorism; Insurgency; Lake Chad Region; Licit Proceeds

Introduction

Terrorism has emerged as a major threat to security in Africa (Clapham, 2003). The proliferation of terrorist groups and activities across the continent is aggravating the insecurity situation in the continent. In West Africa and the Sahel, terrorist groups are exploiting ethnic and religious faultlines to deepen insecurity by undermining the security architectures of states, exacerbating volatility, and escalating humanitarian crises (United Nations, 2020). Countries of the Lake Chad region, like Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon, are some of the most affectedby terrorist activities in Africa. Since the emergence of insurgency in the Lake Chad Region in 2009, the activities of the insurgents have assumed a deadly dimension and continues to exert heavy toll in lives and properties on the countries and people of the region. According to Antonio José Canhandula, at least 36,000 thousand people have been killed, most of them civilians, and millions displaced since the insurgency started in 2009 (United Nations News, 2019). The victims of these terrorist acts include civilians, aid workers, and security personnel. After sustained pressure from governments of the region and their international partners in 2014-2015 degraded the capability of the insurgency, rise in the number of attacks since 2017, the nature of targets and the toll of casualty indicates a resurgence in their activities (Amnesty International, 2017). The insurgents unleashed 90 armed assaults and 59 suicide attacks in 2017 (Wilson, 2018), and were associated with 2,700 reported fatalities in 2018 (Matfess, 2019). Terrorism related deaths in Nigeria increased by 25% in 2018 in comparison to 2017 (Global Terrorism Index, 2019, p. 12). Over 50 attacks were executed by the insurgents between late 2019 and mid-2020 (CSW, 2020). In 2019 alone, 275 people were killed by terrorist attacks in Cameroon's Far North, and about 160,000 people displaced from their homes (United Nations News, 2019). Between January and August 2020, at least 200 civilian deaths from attacks across Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger has been attributed to the terrorist groups in the region. In one of the deadliest waves of attacks against security forces in the region in recent times, 174 Nigerien soldiers, 100 Chadian soldiers, 50 Nigerian soldiers, and 21 Cameroonian soldiers were killed in separate attacks by insurgents between December 2019 and June 2020 (Africa News, 2020; Aljazeera, 2020; France24, 2020).

Beyond security issues, terrorist activities have worsened socio-economic conditions in the region. Due to the opportunities presented by the lake, the region was a thriving hub of agriculture, fishery, cross border-trade, livelihood and tourism before the insurgency (Idika-Kalu, 2020). However, much of the economic opportunities have been lost. In the territories controlled by State authorities in the region, movements are restricted. Food production in the region has dwindled and the agricultural value chain has been disarticulated due to reduction in human mobility caused by the insurgency (Kah, 2017; Pugliese, 2014). People don't feel safe in their farms, and markets in the region have been targets of suicide attacks in the past. Food and Agriculture Organisation assessment (2017, p. 1) found that 11 million people in the region need assistance, 6.9 million people are severely food insecure, while 515,000 children are suffering from severe acute malnutrition. Insecurity and socio-economic downturns in the region have unravelled monumental humanitarian crisis in the region. People from displaced communities pour into relatively safer communities, straining the limited resources. At least 2.5 million people are displaced (second largest displacement crisis in the world), 75.7% of which are staying with host communities, increasing their vulnerability (Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2017, p. 1). Under-five mortality rates in IDP locations are four timesthe emergency threshold (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2017, p. 1). There has also been a degeneration in health conditions due to hunger, poor hygiene and the spread of diseases. Human rights abuses both in insurgents-controlled and government-controlled territories are widely reported.

Insurgency in the Lake Chad region has persisted despite all efforts to contain it. After ten years of counter-terrorism efforts, the region still hosts the second deadliest terrorist group in the world, and Nigeria, one of the lake chad region countries, is the third most terrorised country in the world (Global Terrorism Index, 2019, p. 15). Scholars have attributed the persistence and sustenance of the insurgency to factors like religious ideology (Oriola & Akinola, 2017; Thurston, 2016), economic marginalisation, poverty and unemployment (Onuoha, 2014; Meagher, 2014), politics (Iyekekpolo, 2019; Iyekekpolo, 2016), separatism (Zenn, 2018; Ashiru, 2018), arms proliferation (Mangan& Nowak, 2019), external influence of foreign terrorist organisations (International Crisis Group, 2014), failure of strategy (Ugwueze & Onuoha, 2020), money laundering (Okoli, 2019; Eme & Ugwu, 2016), among others. While there has been studies that interrogated the role of financing in the resilience of terrorism in the region, most related studies have centred on understanding the role of state funding (Byman, 2020; Dingji

Maza et al, 2020a; Collins, 2014; Carter, 2012; Byman & Kreps, 2010) and laundered illicit funds in the financing of terrorism in the region (Okoli, 2019; Attah, 2019; FATF-GIABA-GABAC, 2016; Rock, 2016; Jacobson, 2010; Ping, 2008). Not much has been done in the literature to examine how terrorist organisations in the region are engaging in and exploiting legitimate trade to fund terrorist activities. Thus, this study focuses onhow fund generated from engagement in licit trade by insurgent groups is financing the sustenance of terrorism in the Lake Chad region. The study relied on data from secondary sources like published journal articles, books, book chapters, official publications of international organisations, national and international newspapers, among others. This introductory section is immediately succeeded by the conceptual clarification, an overview of insurgency in the region, strategies adopted to combat insurgency in the region, terrorism financing in the region, the role of proceeds from licit tradein financing insurgency in the region,and conclusion.

Terrorism conceptualisation

The concept of terrorism considered by some scholars as a strategy of insurgency (Merari, 1993; Unal, 2016) has been used interchangeably with insurgency (Hentz & Solomon, 2017). In this study, we have also adopted the usage of the two concepts to convey the same meaning. The difference in perspectives and subjective approaches to defining terrorism is implicated in the difficulty in the development of a universally acceptable conceptualisation of the phenomenon. Among scholars as with regional and multinational organisations, the difficulty in the conceptualisation of the phenomenon emanates from the fact that what is considered 'terrorism' to a viewpoint is considered 'freedom fighting' to another (Greene, 2017; Bruce, 2013; Hodgson & Tadros, 2013; Montiel & Shah, 2008; Ganor, 2002; Laqueur, 1987). The subjectivity of conceptualising terrorism has been abused by national governments to suppress dissenting views and minority agitations (Saul, 2008). States ideological blocs have also exploited the issue of terrorism to persecute groups and national governments with ideologically divergent views (Roth, 2004; Acharya, 2009; Zeiden, 2006). The conceptualisations can be classified into the prisms of cultural relativity (Montiel & Shah, 2008; Zeiden, 2006), philosophical forays (Coady, 2004), and legalism (Walter, 2003). The difficulty is further compounded by the United Nations Security Council measures since 2001 that allows States to unilaterally define terrorism to suit their sovereign interests (Saul, 2008).

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions on the conceptualisation of terrorism only serve as a guide to regional organisations and national governments. UNGA resolution 49/60 considers terrorism as:

> acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them (para. 3).

The European Parliament, on the other hand, conceptualised terrorism to be:

> acts committed with the aim of 'seriously intimidating a population', 'undulycompelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act', or'seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of acountryoran international organisation' (European Parliament, 2005, p. 2).

For the League of Arab States, it is:

> Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agendaand seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them,or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to causedamage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardise a nationalresources (League of Arab States,1999, p. 2).

The African Union defines terrorism as:

> Any act which is a violation of criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number of group of persons or causes, or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage, and is calculated or intended to: intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or create general insurrection in a state (OAU, 1999, pp. 3-4).

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) “generally understood” terrorismwithin the views of the African Union (ECOWAS,2019, p. 24). The couching of these definitions leaves them open to different interpretations and abuses. The League of Arab Nations and African Union conceptualisation blurs the line between crime and terrorism. Therein lies the concern that they can be easily abused to prosecute all crimes and suppress dissenting views. However, a common denominator in these conceptualisations is that terrorism is an illicit activity that relates to violent acts against a civil population designed to cause damage, instill terror, and to achieve an ideological goal. Terrorist actors within the Lake Chad region have adopted strategies which include, kidnapping, suicide bombing, extra-judicial killings, rape amongst others against the civilian population, in their bid to enforce their version of religious ideology on the region and its people.

Extremism and Insurgency in the Lake Chad Region: A Historical Overview

The Lake Chad Region consists of the territories of Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon straddling the Lake Chad in the Semi-AridSahelian zone of West/Central Africa, South of the

Saharan desert. The people of the territories immediately surrounding the lake Chad have had historical relations of trade, migration, religious association and inter-ethnic socialisation. Thus, even after states creation in Africa, trans-border interactions and movement in the region remained fluid. The Islamic religion has played a significant role in shaping politics and socioeconomic relations in the region. Some scholars have associated the evolution of extremist ideology in the region to a mixture of poverty, politics, poor education and extremist religious views.

Inset map showing countries of the Lake Chad Region
Source: **D W, 2016.**

Though the region has had centuries of exposure and interaction with Islam due to relations with North Africa and Middle-East leading to the emergence, from time to time, of scholars who advocated religious revival and spiritual renewal, the reawakening and propagation of fundamentalist Islamic views in the region in the 20th century has been attributed to the teachings of Mohammed Marwa, the leader of the Islamic fundamentalist *Maitatsine* uprising of the 1980s (Adesoji, 2011). Mohammed Marwa, originally from Cameroon, was an influential Islamic preacher predominantly active in the Nigerian cities of Kaduna, Kano, Yola, Gombe, Maiduguri, among others, who inculcated in his followers called *Yan Tatsine* a resentment of all forms of Western influence and attributes (Lubeck, 1985; Adamu, 2010). He cultivated a legacy of confrontational posturing against the State, intolerance of moderate Muslims or preachers that do not share his views, abhorrence of non-Muslims, and violence. The Boko Haram movement of the late 1990s and early 2000s and others that followed were said to have exploited the legacies of the *Maitastine* movement to advance their own extremist/Jihadist ideology (Adesoji, 2011; Agbiboa, 2013). There have been some active interrelated and independent terrorist organisations in the region since 2009. The major ones include Boko Haram,Ansaru, and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).

Boko-Haram

Boko Haram is a terrorist organisation that officially calls itself 'Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awatiWal Jihad.' The name is loosely translated to mean the 'people committed to propagating the Prophet Mohammed's teachings and holy war.' However, the group is popularly called Boko Haram by the locals in the Lake Chad region due to their abhorrence and rejection of Western education and all forms of Western influence. Boko Haram is a Hausa statement that loosely means 'Western education is forbidden.' Though the group's activities came to prominence after the death of its leader Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 while in the custody of the government of Nigeria, it is said to have been formed in Maiduguri, North-Eastern Nigeria in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf to advance the propagation of his radical Islamic ideology.

Boko Haram subscribes to the Salafist ideology which advocates the strict enforcement of the Islamic Shari'a law. Since the establishment of the group in 2002, its radicalisation process progressed and the members became confrontational, particularly with the security agencies. The armed terror dimension of the group's activities began after the leader of the group died in government custody in 2009. The group then relied on mass terror tactics like guerrilla warfare, suicide bombing, mass killings, executions, kidnapping, beheading, rape, forced marriages, ambush, robbery, extortion, among others in the pursuit of its objectives. Some of the major operations undertaken by the terrorist organisation include the attack on Bauchi prison to free its members in 2010, the bombing of United Nations headquarters in Abuja in 2011, Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping in 2014, massacre at the Baga Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) base in 2015, among others. Though the group has gone through some internal upheaval and have been pushed back by the MJTF, it has remained formidable. It still retains the capacity to undertake devastating operations against both military and civilian targets. It is the second deadliest terrorist organization in the world (Global Terrorism Index, 2019, p. 15)

Ansaru

Ansaru, a terrorist organisation active in the Lake Chad Region, also called 'al-Qaeda in the Lands Beyond the Sahel' identifies itself as Jamāʿ atuAn?ārilMuslimīnafīBilādisSūdān which loosely translates to the 'vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa' (Adibe, 2014). Ansaru grew from Boko Haram and allied itself with al Qaeda linked terror organisations like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Shabaab, from whom they benefitted in terms of training, expertise and logistics (Adibe, 2014). The ideology and operations of Ansaru were similar to that of Boko Haram. After a period of decline in its activities, the group claimed responsibility for an attack on the Emir of Potiskum in January 2020 that left about 30 people dead.

ISWAP

The fallout from the alliance of Boko Haram with Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/Levant (ISIS/ISIL) in 2015 led to the formation of the 'Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP)'

(United Nations Security Council, 2020). Though ISIS anointed Abu Musab al-Barnawi to lead Boko Haram after the merger with ISIS/ISIL, the tussle between Abubakar Shekau and Abu Musab al-Barnawi over who leads the group resulted in the formation of ISWAP (Jamestown Foundation, 2019). While Shekau remained the leader of the main Boko Haram group, Abu Musab al-Barnawi became the leader of the new splinter group. The group subscribes to most of Boko Haram's extremist religious ideology. The group differs from Boko Haram in the indiscriminate targeting of civilians. Their focus is more on military targets and less on civilian targets. By so doing, ISWAP succeeded in endearing themselves to the Muslim inhabitants of the Lake Chad Region and strengthening their position in the battle for hearts and minds (Institute for Security Studies, 2019). Beyond not attacking the local inhabitants, they have also undertaken the provision of amenities and social justice in the territories under their control (Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2019). In recent times, ISWAP has unleashed several frantic attacks against MJTF targets. Since its formation in 2015, the group has undertaken numerous operations mainly targeting military bases, positions and patrol. Prominent among their operations include the sacking of the MJTF base in Baga in 2018; the attack on a military base in Metele that resulted in the death of over 100 soldiers in 2018; the 2018 abduction of 110 schoolgirls and 3 aid workers in Dapchi; the attacks on MJTF bases in Marte, Kirenowa and Gubio in 2019; the ambush of military patrol along the Maiduguri-Damboa Road and the killing of 35 soldiers in 2019; the killing of 69 civilians in Felo, Near Maiduguri in 2019; the attack on Niger military base in the Tillaberi region resulting in the death of 60 soldiers; and the attack on the convoy of the governor of Borno State in Nigeria, among others (United Nations Security Council, 2020; Defence Post, 2020). The group is currently one of the most potent terror groups operating in the Lake Chad Region.

Strategies/Efforts to Combat Insurgency in the Region

Numerous efforts and counter-terrorism responses aimed at eliminating terrorist control of territories, repelling terrorist attacks, undermining terrorist activities and capacity, undercutting terrorist recruitment and financing, have been adopted by governments of the region individually and collectively to contain the terrorist activities. Some of these approaches include military and non-military responses (Ugwueze & Onuoha, 2020; Mahmood & Ani, 2018; Tella, 2017).

Military Responses

The military response to the insurgency in the Lake Chad Region was both national and multinational. The escalation of terrorism in the region in 2009 was originally viewed as a Nigerian problem, giving the root and initial targets of the Boko Haram terrorist organiSation (Comolli, 2017). The pre-2014 responses of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon were predominantly to surveil the activities of the terrorist group and in some cases, agree to non-aggression pacts with them, since they are not affected by the activities of the group (Comolli, 2017). Nigeria's initial response to the Boko Haram insurgency was a hard-military approach to clampdown on the insurgents through the declaration of a state of emergency, patrols, raids, and roadblocks, in the affected region, execution of several military operations like Operations Restore Order, Operation BOYONA, Operation Zaman Lafiya, among others, enforced by a Joint Task Force (JTF) drawn from all the national security forces (Osakwe & Audu, 2017). The use of Civilian Joint Task Force (C-JTF), a task force of vigilante groups from different communities in the region armed with sticks, knives, cutlasses, and locally made guns, was also part of Nigeria's national military response. The CJTF was made up of local hunters and local community security personnel. Due to their knowledge of the terrain and their role in identifying members of the terrorist group within their community, they were considered a useful 'knowledge broker' component of the counter-insurgency response (Agbiboa, 2018).

As the activities of the insurgents began to spread beyond Nigeria to other parts of the Lake Chad region, other affected countries became increasingly concerned. This led to the formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force in its current form with a strength of over 11,000 personnel, in 2014 to coordinate the counter-insurgency military responses of Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, with a mandate centred around creating a safe and secure environment, supporting stabilisation and normaliSation programmes, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance (International Crisis Group, 2020). This allowed the members of the task force to strategically coordinate their attacks on the insurgents from different fronts.

Non-Military Responses

Non-military responses to the insurgency in the Lake Chad region include amnesty programme for the insurgents to facilitate deradicalisation, disarmament, rehabilitation, reintegration, (Onapajo & Ozden, 2020), undercutting terrorist recruitment (Dingji Maza et al, 2020b), humanitarian programmes, and improvement in military-civil relations. The mechanisms designed to undercut terrorism financing is also part of the wider strategy adopted in response to the insurgency. Financial institutions intelligence units in the region were mobilised to target finances associated with terrorism funding (Rock, 2016). Despite these efforts, the terrorist organisations have remained formidable, sustained their activities and continue to hold on to some territories. This may be because mechanisms against terrorism financing largely target terrorism funding sources and illicit proceeds within the radar of the formal financial institutions. Thus, the vast proceeds from engagement in licit ventures by terror groups in the region continue to energise and vitalise the insurgency.

Terrorism financing

Countering terrorism financing is a fundamental aspect of curtailing terrorist activities. The management of terrorist organisations and the conduct of terrorism entails manpower, equipment and logistics which has financial implications (Freeman, 2011). Terrorist organisations fund their illicit activities with funds from one or more sources like contributions from state actors, laundered funds from illicit sources, or funds from engagement in licit ventures. These three sources underpin the theoretical perspectives of terrorism financing.

State sources

Lists of 'state sponsors of terrorism' are sometimes subjective political tool designed by national governments and regional political bloc in line with their ideology and geopolitical objectives (Byman, 2020). Nevertheless, states have been implicated in the sponsorship and funding of groups that employ terrorist tactics (Dingji Maza et al, 2020a). As with India's support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka in the 1970s and 80s, states implicated in the funding of groups that indulge in terrorism use the groups as proxy agents to pursue national and regional objectives (Byman & Kreps, 2010). The United States of America, for instance, has designated Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Iran, Sudan and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism (United States Department of State, n.d.). State involvement in the sponsorship of terrorism has gone through different stages. The phenomenon is said to have peaked in the 1970s and 80s, and since then undergone a decline, recording lower incidents since 2001 (Collins, 2014)

Illicit Sources

Terrorism has also been financed through laundered illicit proceeds of crime like drug and contraband trafficking, human trafficking, kidnapping for ransoms, piracy, and other forms of crime (Dingji Maza et al, 2020a). Proceeds from illicit activities are considered to be the major source of funds for terrorist organisations (Attah, 2019). In the Lake Chad Region, terrorist organisations have also sustained their struggle with funds from ransom money, human trafficking, cross-border trade in contraband goods, cattle rustling and extortion (FATF-GIABA-GABAC, 2016; Okoli, 2019; Rock, 2016; Attah, 2019).

Licit Sources

Terrorist organisations have also relied on the engagement in legitimate activities like farming, trading, transportation, and other legitimate businesses to fund their activities (Dingji Maza et al, 2020a; FATF-GIABA-GABAC, 2016). This source of funding for the illicit organisations is important because it is usually not blacklisted by the authorities, and may be difficult to associate the proceeds from the licit ventures with the illicit activities of terrorist organisations. The insurgent groups in the Lake Chad Region seem to be turning to this source of funds as the region's governments and their international partners clampdown on the different sources of fund for the terrorist groups. This study contributes to the understanding of the role of proceeds from engagement inlicit ventures in the prosecution of the illicit activities of the terrorist organisations that are active in the Lake Chad Region.

Financing Insurgency in the Lake Chad Region: The Role of Funds Generated from Licit Ventures

The economy of the Lake Chad Region is largely agrarian and is sustained by the lake and its outlets. Major aspects of the economy include agriculture, animal husbandry, fishery, and service provision. Smoked fish, pepper, grains and nuts are among the major products of the Lake Chad Region. The value chain of the agricultural and fishing activities provides employment and sustenance for millions of the region's inhabitants. The large-scale and small-scale red pepper industry, for instance, employs over 300,000 people. In 2015, the market in Diffa region of the Niger Republic alone sold about 7,000 sacks of red pepper at the cost of $72 per sack. Producers sell at $40, wholesalers sell at $72, while traders sell at $82 (Sissons & Lappartient, 2016). In

2014, the Diffa region recorded fish production of 22,612 tonnesvalued at $34.5m. On average, large-scale fishermen produce 80-100 50kg cartons of smoked fish per month, while small-scale fishermen produce 10–20. A carton of smoked fish sells for between $82 and $205 depending on the type of fish and quality of processing (Sissons & Lappartient, 2016). Smoked fish and pepper contributed 48 million dollars to the economy of the Niger Republic alone (van Lookeren Campagne & Begum, 2017). On the Nigerian side of the Lake Chad, Baga in Kukawa local government of Borno State hosts the biggest of the fish markets. On average, 7 trailer loads of smoked fish are moved from Baga to other destinations daily (Tanimu, 2017). Activities in the fishing industry transcend demographics in the region. Fishing is mostly undertaken by men while smoking and processing are mostly undertaken by women and children. Following years of insurgent activities, terrorist organisations have also ventured into these economic activities to raise fund as regional governments disrupt their external sources of fund.

Agriculture and Fishing

After occupying hundreds of communities, insurgents have undertaken the generation of incomes through engagement in licit ventures to fund their illicit activities. Terrorist organisation in the region are diversifying their fund base by both partaking directly in the lucrative trade in fish and pepper and supporting the participation of willing locals at a cost. Months after insurgents overran Baga, the major fishing community on the Nigerian side of the Lake Chad, and dislodged all residents, communities around Baga began to get smoked fish shipments from Baga. A fish trader in one of the communities around Baga that took note of the involvement of insurgents in the legitimate trade recounted thus in a Daily Trust (Nigerian Newspaper) publication:

> Everybody that survived that attack fled Baga. No soul was left behind except the insurgents. Since then there has been no fishing activity in the area when we suddenly realised that fish is being supplied to the market from Baga…That set off red flags, indicating something fishy was going on in Baga…since only insurgents are in Baga, it means they are the ones fishing and bringing to the market in Maiduguri to sell (Abubakar, 2015).

Overwhelmed by the sheer volume of work and unable to meet up with market demands, the insurgents invited back residents from Internally Displaced Person's (IDP) camps to return to their economic activity, guaranteeing their safety, so long as they accept and are willing to comply with the terms laid out by the insurgents. Hundreds of displaced persons that are disaffected with conditions inthe camps heeded the call and returned to resume farming and fishing activities in the islands. Fishermen pay about $13.8 for fishing permits while fish dealers pay $2.8 for every carton of fish (Institute for Security Studies, 2019). Salkida (2020) suggests that the insurgents now charge fishermen about $40 for a two-week fishing permit and a carton for every six cartons of smoked fish. In 2015, the MJTF detained over 200 vehicle loads of fish in Diffa on suspicion of being associated with terrorist organisations (Bello et al, 2018).
Major-general Olusegun Adeniyi also noted that:

> Fishing is one of the major sources of income that boosts the Boko Haram economy. Unfortunately, people from liberated areas who have no regards for lives and properties, or regards for the national cause to end this insurgency, and the common criminals who make money from everything, do go to Boko Haram camps, buy this fish, then bring it to sell in our markets…So, with that, Boko Haram now has a running economy that is generating funds for their dastardly activities (Oduoye, 2019).

A farmer recounted that his household has paid between N400,000 ($1,049) to N500,000 ($1,312) in rent to the insurgents within 3 years, even though he is not among the big farmers(Salkida, 2020). Beyond controlling concessions to farmlands, the insurgents use their terror network to influence and also control the lucrative red pepper market in the region (Koigi, 2020).

Social Service Provision

The provision of social services like security, microfinance, water, healthcare, education, are some of the licit mediums that terrorist organisations in the Lake Chad Region have turned to to generate fund for their illicit activities. In territories controlled by ISWAP, more civilians have returned to continue their normal lives as they are guaranteed protection by the group at a cost. Locals on the Nigerian part of the region complain about the heavy-handed approach to counterinsurgency by the MJTF like the closing of some major roads and trade routes, as having unintended devastating consequences on the civilian population. The condition endured by the civilians from MJTF actions is also compounded by the indiscriminate attack on civilians by the Boko Haram. Thus, ISWAP has exploited the situation to secure trade routes and provide security for local farmers, fishermen and traders. Institute for Security Studies (2019) reports that even wage labourers are returning to earn a living and to contribute to the ISWAP controlled economy. Pastoralists do not worry about their cattle being rustled as ISWAP follows a justice regime that punishes even their own fighters that violate compliant and law-abiding civilians (International Crisis Group, 2019). Herders pay according to the number of cattle in their herd. For every 30 cows in the herd, herders pay with one fully grown cow for a guarantee of six-month provision of security and access to fertile fields in a system called *Hedaya* (Salkida, 2020). Due to the reduction in human activities in some parts of the Lake Chad Region as a result of the insurgency, the environment became renewed, making farming, fishing and herding in the region lucrative. With the guarantee of safety at a cost considered reasonable by civilians in the region, this translates to more farmers, more fishermen, more pastoralists, more traders, and more proceeds for the insurgents.

Insurgent groups also provide microfinance to civilian inhabitants of the region, particularly the youths to support their engagement in farming and other economic activities. the provision of micro-credit facilities by the insurgents serves dual purposes. First, the insurgents receive interests on the credit facilities they have provided and also collect further proceeds associated with security provision and provision of access to farmlands, payable when the farmers harvest and sell their produce (International Crisis Group, 2019). The insurgents also undertake the provision of other amenities like potable water by digging wells and boreholes, mobile toilets, healthcare, and Islamic education (Institute for Security Studies, 2019; International Crisis Group, 2019).

Conclusion

Despite the difficulty in ascertaining the exact amount of proceeds generated by insurgent groups in the Lake Chad Region through engagement in licit trade to fund their illicit activities, evidence reviewed indicates that it is significant enough to sustain their campaign of terror. Insurgents control major trade routes, fishing communities and networks in the region. Even in areas under the control of the MJTF, the civilian population remit taxes to insurgents to guarantee their safety. The proceeds being generated by insurgent groups in the region from engagement in licit ventures like farming, trade, service provision, are estimated to be in millions of dollars annually. The Lake Chad Region countries, particularly Nigeria, is a huge market for fish consumption, among other agricultural produce. Fish plays a major role in meeting the nutritional needs of the countries of the region. The 0.5 million tones annual fish production leaves a huge gap in satisfying the 1.3 million tone annual fish needs (Tijani et al, 2014). The enormous market for fish in the region guarantees a steady stream of income for insurgents, as long as they can get their products to the market. These streams of income form part of the bedrock of funding that has been sustaining the insurgency in the region. In recent times, the insurgent groups have relied on guerrilla tactics in their activities. thus, targets are carefully selected to save cost and maximise impact. Executing a terror attack in this manner is not so expensive. And in any case, successful attacks on military bases yield bountiful weapons and equipment for insurgent groups. MJTF response of impounding and burning suspected cargo have not degraded the insurgent's sources of proceeds from licit ventures. This blanket approach inadvertently affects local traders and transporters that may not be associated with the insurgent groups, thus leading to the unintended consequences of further damaging civil-military relations, and undermining efforts to build trust, win hearts and minds, and to restore normal livelihood in the region. The MJTF must therefore readdress its approach to counter the engagement and exploitation of licit trade as a source of funds by insurgent groups in the Lake Chad Region.

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HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LIBYA, 2010-2018

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Abstract
Human trafficking is one of the dehumanising and challenging phenomena facing the entire human race globally. It is a very complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon, which affects the rights, privileges and freedom of individuals. Human trafficking involves illegal trading of people from one country to another, for the purpose of slavery, prostitution and forced labour. It is popularly referred to as modern day slavery. As a global phenomenon, it cuts across countries and different nations of the world, which poses a lot of challenge to the global community. Those that engage in this dehumanising business make enormous profits since they have both internal and international linkages, while the victims are heavily exploited. The theoretical framework adopted for this study is the conflict theory. The paper relied on secondary documentary evidence, it seeks to analyse how human trafficking affects socio-economic development in Libya, what has impeded government efforts from curbing human trafficking in Libya and what measures could be adopted to effectively curb human trafficking in Libya. It recommends that there are strategies on how the current tide of modern day slavery could be alleviated in order to achieve socio-economic development in Libya, also policy makers need to improve their potentials to combat the challenges of human trafficking and its effects on the nations that are faced with this terrible scourge.

Keywords: Human trafficking, migration, development, socio-economic, Libya

Introduction

Human trafficking is one of the dehumanising and challenging phenomena facing the entire human race globally. It is a very complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon which affects the rights, privileges and freedom of individuals. Human trafficking involves illegal trading of people from one country to another, for the purpose of slavery, prostitution and forced labour. It is popularly referred to as modern day slavery. As a global phenomenon, it cuts across countries and different nations of the world. Trafficking in persons has given a lot of concern to the global community. Those that engage in this dehumanising business have both internal and international linkages. Human trafficking victims are either forced physically or they are lured into it through false promises made by the traffickers. However, the traffickers make enormous profits in this obnoxious business, while the victims are heavily exploited. The United States, Department data estimated that of the 600,000 to 820,000 persons trafficked across international borders each year; approximately 70 percent are women and girls (Wikipedia 2009). Further, Agbu (2003), stated that approximately 50,000 of those trafficked are taken to the United States of America. A conservative account of people trafficked to other parts of the globe especially Western Europe, the Middle East, Japan, North America and Austria in the year 2000 included 250,000 persons from South East Asia; 150,000 from South Asia, 100,000 each from the former Soviet Union and Latin America; 75,000 from Eastern Europe, and another 50,000 from Africa (Agbu, 2003). A United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report entitled "Trafficking in Person: Global Patterns", listed Thailand, China, Nigeria, Albania, Bulgaria, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine among the countries that are the greatest sources of trafficked persons. Thailand, Japan, Israel, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Turkey and the U.S were cited as the most common destinations (UNDOC, 2009, in Onah, 2013). UNESCO (2006) in Onah (2015) observed that within West Africa, the main destination for trafficked persons from Nigeria are Cote D'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea Island, Cameroun, Gabon, Guinea, Mali and Benin Republic.

On the other hand, Libya, Algeria and Morocco are the main destinations for persons trafficked to North Africa, while Italy, Belgium, Spain, The Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom are the main European destinations. The strategic location of Libya along the Mediterranean coast makes the country a central route for migrants, refugees and human trafficking activities to Europe. The most vulnerable group are women and girls who are forced into prostitution or otherwise exploited sexually. Trafficked men are found in fields, mines and quarries, or in other menial and dangerous working conditions. Boys and girls are also trafficked into conditions of child labour, within a diverse group of industries, such as textiles, fishing or agriculture (UNDOC, 2009). The International Labour Organization Global Report 2005 in WOCON (2008) noted that illicit profit produced by trafficked forced labourers annually is estimated at US $ 32 billion.

In addition, Women's Consortium Nigeria (WOCON) pointed out that the major beneficiaries of these profits are the traffickers, while the trafficked persons are subjected to horrific exploitative labours resulting in health related, economic and other social problems. Out of the three major North African countries, Libya has been the hub of human trafficking in the Maghreb region. On the other hand, United Nations Children's Education Fund (UNICEF, 2009) observed that children are trapped into trafficking mostly by abduction or kidnapping. But the vast majority of victims are trapped in more subversive ways.

Typically, the traffickers promise their victims, usually girls and young women, that they will have respectable jobs as waitresses, perhaps or domestic servant in a foreign country. Traffickers may also persuade poor parents that their children will have a better education abroad. However, the contrary is often the case as they are subjected to inhuman treatments on arrival at the destination countries. Libya has been identified as a transit territory for human traffickers and their victims to Europe (Njoku, 2015). Elaborating on this, United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO, 2006), explained that: Human trafficking is a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon involving multiple stakeholders at the institutional and commercial level. It is a demand driven global business with a large market for cheap labour and commercial sex . . . Nigeria has acquired a reputation for being one of the leading Africa countries in human trafficking with cross-border and internal trafficking. Trafficking in persons is the third largest crime after economic fraud and the drug trade. According to Okonkwo (2008) cited in Onah (2010) trafficking in persons has been declared as one of the most lucrative crimes today, ranking closely after the trade in arms and drugs. She further explained that human trafficking is an organised criminal business just as the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, with its various linkages spreading around the globe. The breakdown of the justice system in Libya has resulted in a state of anarchy, in which armed groups, criminal gangs, smugglers and traffickers control the movement through Libyan territories to Europe. Libya has remained a transit territory for human traffickers, although some human trafficking activities were done in Libya during Gadaffi's regime. The coast has become a hub for human trafficking and smuggling. The uprising in Libya has increased the illegal migration crisis that Europe has been battling to contain since 2014. According to Ali Younes (2017), in recent times, there is an emergence of slave markets in Libya where trafficked persons are sold due to slave fall in migrant arrivals in Europe during the summer. Since the Arab spring uprising that led to the ousting of Muarma Gadaffi in 2011, socio-economic development has been slowed down due to constant crises in Libya. The quality of life, social, political and economic life of the citizens has experienced a downward turn.

Drewnowski (1966) identifies socio-economic development with change in the quality of life and quantitative growth of various values. In his view, quality of life can be improved by improving the conditions of health, nutrition, education, transport and communication and so on. While development, from the economic point of view means the rise in per capital income or gross national product (GNP) or the general economic growth. The UNO experts identify development with the level of per capita income, while the UNESCO Conference 1974, conceived development as that which involves the development of human beings, the development of countries, in terms of the production of things, their distribution within the social systems or the transformation of social structure. Development is, therefore, a multi-dimensional process (Stamphowski, 1987; Chojnicki, 2010; UNDP, 2012; Bellu, 2011). Socio-economic development has been adopted as a process of quantitative, qualitative and structural change that are a result of actions of subjects taken within social (economic) practice.

These changes influence life conditions in the following field: material conditions (possibility to satisfy needs associated with consumption of goods and services; it is related to the phenomena of economic growth, economic structure and entrepreneurship, access to public goods and services (that results in changes of education levels, a way of taking care of someone's health etc), relation within social system (integration between individuals, trust, security, social conflicts), environment condition, and life satisfaction. Human trafficking deprives the country of its human resources. Although majority of the people trafficked are semi-literate or illiterate, some literate and talented people are also victims of trafficking. Most times, talented people are forced out of the African continent due to unpleasant domestic conditions. Consequently, a self-perpetuating cycle of poverty and under-development feeds crime and this, in turn, leads to even greater poverty.

In recent times, the definition of development has changed its focus from economic development to the concept of human development which considers the overall welfare of human beings. In other words, development is a process through which the overall wellbeing of the human being is achieved through concerted policy measures. The human development report uses a broad composite index popularly known as Human Development Index (HDI) to measure the average socio-economic development of a country or regions population in terms of three aspects. These include, life expectancy at birth (measuring a long and healthy life), educational attainment of population (calculated using adult literacy and combined gross enrolment ratio of primary, secondary and tertiary levels of schooling representing the access to knowledge); and per capita income which defines a decent standard of living represented by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita expressed in international dollars converted using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rates. It is, therefore, imperative that lack of development of a country generates problems like sex trafficking in vulnerable women and children and their exploitation. This establishes a definite link between development and trafficking. This shows that there is a relationship between human trafficking and development. Both the social life and economic development of the victims are affected. Many of the victims are captured during their teenage years when they are supposed to be in school and during this period, their lives are truncated. The human resources of the country are drained by human trafficking. Obviously, talented human resources are forced out of African Continent mostly due to domestic conditions of poverty and other deprivations. This culminates into increasing rate of unemployment. In the case of Libya, the situation worsened following the abrupt end of Gadaffi's rule. It was this economic situation that led to internal crises in Libya. The crisis opened the door to illegal migration, human trafficking, smuggling activities among others. According to Trading Economics.com, the gross domestic product (GDP) of Libya averaged 42.27 USD billion between 1990 and 2019 with its highest GDP of 87.14 USD billion in 2008 and the lowest GDP of 20.48 USD billion in 2002, while in 2011, the GDP dropped to 34.7USD billion showing a down turn on the economic activities in Libya.

Previous studies have focused on the causes, effects and consequences of human trafficking in different continents of the world. However, the impact of human trafficking on the socio-economic development of Libya has not been addressed adequately. It is on this note, that this paper examines human trafficking and socio-economic development in Libya, the study seeks to examine how human trafficking has led to the socio-economic challenges, the measures adopted to curb it, and it will also proffer possible solutions to the challenges of human trafficking in Libya.

Conceptual Clarification

Given the tendency for concepts to elicit varying meanings in discourses like this, matters of conceptual clarification are pertinent.

Human Trafficking

This could be defined as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of person(s) by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, or abduction, of fraud, of deception of abuse of power or of a position, of vulnerability, or of the giving or receiving, or payment of benefit to achieve the consent of a person, having control of another person, for exploitation.

Socio-Economic Development

This refers to the social and economic development of the society as indicated by key variables such as life expectancy at birth, literacy level, gross domestic product (GDP), among others.

Irregular Migration

Irregular migration implies moving to another country through unofficial means. Smugglers and traffickers play a major role in facilitating the journey of irregular migrants.

Regular Migration

Regular migration entails moving to another country after obtaining an official residence and/or work permit which involves fulfilling the required procedures of the host country.

Human Traffickers

Human traffickers refer to people who facilitate entrance of a migrant into another country with the aim of unlawful profit from the labour or sexual services provided by the trafficked migrants. This includes the sale of human organs such as kidneys for profit making or any human parts.

Migrants

Migrants refer to people or individuals who travel from one country to another as a result of economic, political, social or religious reasons.

Libya

Libya is a country situated in North Africa. It is one of the countries situated in Maghreb regions of North Africa along with Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework adopted for this study is the conflict theory. This theory was first propounded by Karl Marx, his concept of social conflict theory states that there is a constant conflict between two groups that is, the powerful or the `haves' and the 'have nots' or the less powerful group. Conflict theory is based on the sociological fundamental idea that crime is caused by the economic and social drives within society. Conflict theory can help explain the thoughts and reasoning behind human trafficking. It explains the struggle between classes, human trafficking, and the victims versus the traffickers.

The traffickers are mainly people who control a good amount of economic resources. In other words, these are money barons who exhibit their wealth, while the poor members of the society are usually lured by the wealth of these barons. They could approach poor families, promise to take and train their children abroad or send them abroad to work in shops or hotels as waitresses. Some individuals will readily accept such offers as help to assist them come out of their poor background and upgrade their status. In some cases, due to poverty, the parents of such children cannot afford to train them, and immediately the offer to take them abroad either to train them in school or a particular business, the parents usually oblige. Children, young boys and girls or even adult men and women have ended up becoming victims of human trafficking due to ignorance, poverty, among others.

Tenets of the Theory

- That there is a constant struggle or conflict between two groups.
- The first group involves the powerful or the 'haves' while the second group refers to the powerless or the 'have nots'.
- The existence of different value systems and norms, that influence the efforts of people to establish rules and to regulate behaviours. The powerful group is the stronger group both socially and economically, while the powerless group refers to the weak, both socially and economically.

Application of the Theory

Conflict in society could be a reflectionof the existence of different value system and norms that influence the efforts of people to establish rules and to regulate behaviour. Karl Marx's concept surrounding social conflict theory states that there is a constant conflict between two groups. Conflict theory explains that the powerful or the 'haves' are able to exploit the 'have-nots' through economic ways or with force. Many victims of human trafficking are lured through economic means and in some cases by force. The ideas behind social conflict theory are the general premise that is surrounding human trafficking. The traffickers, who are the more powerful group, use their power to exploit groups lesser than them. This could imply that human trafficking cannot stop until poverty is reduced and other class divisions are removed. The traffickers have the money, the victims' passports and other documentation, and it is almost impossible for the women to get out, without money. Consequently, they try to work their way out (sometimes through prostitution) and the cycle continues ceaselessly. This is because the traffickers make the rules and they have control over all the immediate social and physical environment of the victims.

Conflict theory is, therefore, appropriate to explain trafficking in persons especially women and children. The traffickers who are more powerful economically, use their power, wealth or influence to exploit lower groups with less economic power and they are the more vulnerable to traffickers.

The Case of Libya

Libya has remained a transit territory for migrants and human traffickers enroute to Europe. This territory has been a major launching pad for cross Mediterranean migration and human trafficking in recent years. The country has experienced a lot of civil wars and unrest since the overthrow and death of Muammar Gaddaffi in 2011. This resulted in breakdown of the justice system and fuelled instability which put the neighbouring countries like Tunisia, Mali, and Egypt under pressure that is, the entire Maghreb region of North Africa. A good number of powerful militias control chunks of territories while competing for the spoils of the state namely its oil wealth, critical infrastructure, and smuggling opportunities provided by the black market, including human trafficking. Human trafficking is a trans-border trade in which human beings are used in place of goods and services, and they are exploited sexually and a lot of inhuman treatments are meted on them. A victim of human trafficking in Libya informed an Aljezeera reporter in 2017 that some victims of human trafficking sleep among corpses as one of the terrible ill treatments given to them.

The victims of human trafficking are mainly able bodied men and women who should be part of human resources for development in Libya, some are lured out of their nations by their abductors, who make fake promises of better jobs for them in foreign countries. These victims are disenfranchised, denied the comfort of their homes and are made to become commodity for trade. They are cut off from their families and taken to foreign lands where they face a lot of ill treatments and exploitation of all sorts such as sexual exploitation, hunger and imprisonment. A worse scenario is that their travel documents are usually taken away from them by their slave masters and the remunerations they receive also collected from them. They are left with little or nothing to survive with. Hence, they are faced with social-economic deprivations by their masters. The children and young people who are involved are denied opportunities of improving themselves educationally. In foreign lands where they are taken to, they are not allowed to attend any educational institutions.

Also, the health conditions of the victims are often very poor. Since the female victims among them are mainly engaged as prostitutes with many men using them as sex machines, they are vulnerable to all kinds of sexually transmitted diseases (STDS) and exposed to other health challenges with little or no health care delivery provided for them. Human trafficking has been identified as a clandestine business. The traffickers do not always want to be identified with the business because it is not recognised both locally and internationally, but those that are involved have a place and have a way of contacting their customers along the Libyan coast.

According to Allen et al (2018), multiple smuggling economies also characterised Gadaffi's rule, with Libya's southern border largely uncontrolled even if the harshness of the terrain meant that only professional smugglers could be successful. These included networks involved in the extensive smuggling of migrants from other African countries needed to perform jobs that oil-rich Libyans would not take. Tens of Thousands of migrants entered Libya yearly, with some 2.5 million living and working there as of 2011, often subject to exploitation and state punishment.

Prisons sometimes served as lucrative sources of rented, forced labour. Such exploitation of migrants as well as other smuggling economies became widely normalised and entrenched in local communities. In view of the above challenges, sustainable socio-economic development could not be achieved in Libya within the period under review. After the September 2018 security crisis in Libya, Salami, Serral and Central Bank Governor Sadiq al-kabir transcended their differences to agree on exchange rate reforms and a modest reduction in fuel subsidies. As a result, the cost of commodities reduced substantially, in the following weeks. The dinar strengthened against the dollar, from roughly 1:1 to 5:1. Also letters of credit worth more than $1 billion were soon issued, with commodities beginning of law in. the market is now operating more freely and the militias have shrinking access to the parallel currency market. These steps could reduce the ability of militias to exploit certain black markets to entrench their positions. Human trafficking deprives the country of its human resources.

Although a good number of the people trafficked are semi-literate or illiterate, some literate and talented people are also trafficked across Libyan borders. Obviously, both talents and human resources are pushed out of African continent mostly due to domestic conditions. Consequently, a self-perpetuating cycle in which mass poverty and underdevelopment fuels crime and violence which in turn leads to abject poverty.

Highlights on Human Trafficking in Libya

Libya is both a transit and destination country for migrant- people on transit. This includes individuals migrating because of conflicts and persecution, due to extreme poverty, and lack of access to decent work, education and healthcare. The government of Libya, during the period 1970 to the 1990s, encouraged migration from other Arab countries and also from entire African continent in order to provide assistance to meet the domestic labour needs. Libya has been a key transit country for reaching Europe irregularly, especially for migrants from sub-Sahara Africa countries including Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan, as well as other countries in North Africa and West Asia. However, from the A.D 2000 onward, Libya began to be more restrictive in its approach to migrants in part, in response to pressure from European countries.

Also, visa requirement from all nationalities, except for those from countries in the Maghreb region (i.e., North Africa) were introduced, along with policies of detention and deportation of irregular migrants. In addition, there were bilateral agreements signed between Italy and Libya from 2007 to 2009 which included provisions to address migrants which led to migrants being intercepted in international waters and returned to Libya (otherwise known as Push backs). In 2012, the European court of Human Right found that in returning migrants arbitrarily from international waters to Libya and by exposing migrants from Somalia and Eritrea to the risk of ill-treatment in Libya. Italy had violated the European convention on Human Rights; specifically the right to non-refoulement and collective expulsion. The current policy of Italy as a state, and the European Union as a regional organisation, is that no person rescued by an Italian as a European Union vessel shall be taken to Libya. As articulated in relation to operation Sophia, all of the activities undertaken in each phase adhered to and respect international law, including human rights, humanitarian and refuge law and non-refoulementprinciple meaning that no rescued persons can be disembarked in a third world country. Bilateral agreement with Chad, Sudan, Algeria and Tunisia in 2010 and with Egypt in 2013 on security and border controls have not apparently led to systematic cooperation and have had little impact on the flow of migrants and the operation of criminal networks to smuggle and traffic migrants across land borders.

Although overall numbers of migrants in Libya are not known, it is estimated that the majority are irregular, arriving in particular from Egypt, Chad and Nigeria. According to International Organisation for Migration (IOM) migrants reached Italy from North Africa, mostly from Libya, compared to 168, 542 migrants that reached Italy for a similar period in

2016. It is quite obvious that there has been an increase in the movement of migrants through Libya borders. The International Organisation for Migration estimates that there are 700,000 to one million migrants in Libya, and more than 2000 died at sea in 2018. Most of the migrants in Libya were fleeing armed conflict, persecution or severe economic hardship in sub-Sahara Africa. The journey of the migrants usually begins with a deadly trek through vast deserts to Libya and then involves either braving the Mediterranean Sea on rickety boats headed to Europe or struggling to survive in one of the overcrowded detention centres run by smugglers on the Libya coastline (IOM, 2017).

According to the United Nations, forced labour, sexual abuse and fortune are widespread in these camps. Since, the Arab spring uprising of 2011 which ended the brutal and dictatorship rule of Col. Muammar el-Qadda, Libya's coast has become a hub for human trafficking and smuggling. The uprising has fuelled the illegal migration crisis that Europe has been scrambling to contain since 2014. According to Ali Younes (2017), a freelance reporter who has written for AI Jazeera and the Guardian, opined that hundreds of Africa refugees are being bought and sold in slave markets across Libya every week, with many of them held for ransom or forced. The recent emergence of slave market in Libya was attributed to the slave fall in migrant arrivals in Europe over the summer.

It was reported that the Italian government began paying the warlords controlling Libya's coast to curb the flow of migrants into the country. The traffic in persons affected socio-economic development in Libya in various ways. There is reduction in the supply of human capital and insecurity was very common. A lot of dehumanising treatments were meted out on the victims of trafficking. Human beings became the commodity for trade rather than goods and services. Dozens of powerful militias have been involved in controlling chunks of territory while competing for the spoils of the state which include its oil wealth, critical infrastructure, and the smuggling opportunities that black market provided, including human trafficking.

Effects of Human Trafficking on Socio-Economic Development in Libya

Human trafficking has effects on the individual or victims, the family and the nation at large. It has social, psychological and economic effects on the victims and socio-economic development of the nations. The victims of human trafficking are exposed to a lot of dangers. Many are subjected to physical and psychological abuse such as sexual exploitation, starvation, rape and severe beating. Some victims suffer threats against their families and drug addiction. They are also exposed to sexually transmitted diseases such as (STDs), HIV/AIDs unwanted pregnancy and other health related hazards especially as women and girls are most vulnerable to these terrific activities. They lack adequate health care, food and other health services. According to London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (2003): Trafficking often has a profound impact on the health and wellbeing of women. The forms of abuse and risks that women experience include physical, sexual and psychological abuse, the force or coerced use of drugs and alcohol, social restrictions and manipulation, economic exploitation and debt bondage, legal insecurity, abusive working and living conditions. In his view, Ilo (2008) emphasising on the fate of trafficked children stated that the survival and proper development of trafficked children are totally compromised and their right to a decent childhood, proper education, health, family life and social integration are denied. Family ties are also denied the victims.

Human trafficking disrupts the much-cherished family structure in Africa by depleting the number of economically active members of the family that originally provided support to older and sick family members in most cases, if the victims eventually return with health challenges, the family would be saddled with the burden of providing assistance to the individual. To the Libya society, the effects of human trafficking is quite enormous. It affects socio-economic development as the victims of human trafficking are mainly young people who could constitute the labour force of the productive population of the nation. The youths remain the life wire of any nation.

According to Amujiri (2007), youths are the lifeblood that sustain every nation. The stability and prosperity of any nation lies with the youths. The erosion of human capital reduces production activities in the country. The travel routes where the human traffickers occupy becomes a risk zone for anybody to travel through to Europe, including Libyan citizens who may be involved in legal economic activities. There is a lot of insecurity along the trafficking routes. The economic development in Libya has been hindered due to this illicit trade. The socio-economic development has been impeded due to this illicit trafficking in human beings, as the able bodied men and women are trafficked to Europe and other countries from African continent. Human trafficking is not a matter that should be swept under the carpet by the powers that be across the world and until a very strict and urgent action is taken to stem the tide of human trafficking, the world would recede into the unfortunate era of the slave trade that was said to have been eradicated in the early 19th century. It is obvious, that without serious and sustained political will at the top levels of governments and throughout societies; intervention will remain limited compared to the scope and magnitude of the human trafficking activities along the Mediterranean coast.

Summary

Human trafficking has been noted as the third largest organised crime in the whole world apart from drugs and use of arms by the United Nations drug organisation and crimes. It is a clandestine trade that poses a lot of threat on human existence. It deprives thousands of people their basic human rights and poses a serious public health risk and increases organized crime around the world. However, combined efforts at national, regional and international levels to combat the scourge of human trafficking in Libya and around the world is required. The study focused on human trafficking and socio-economic development in Libya. A global review of human trafficking was done, its causes and effects on the socio-economic development of Libya was presented. It was observed that the political crises in Libya that led to the ousting of Muammar Ghaddaffi opened the door for migrants to enter Europe through Libyan borders, some measures adopted by the Libyan government to curb the menace of human trafficking were identified, including efforts by the United Nations Organisations and other International organisations. In addition, some major constraints to reducing human trafficking to its barest minimum were also discussed.

Conclusion

The menace of human trafficking has been damaging very disastrous and dispossesses the victims of their fundamental human rights and separation from their families and the society at large. Human trafficking leaves the victims with psychological, social and health challenges such as HIV/AIDS, venereal diseases among others. The victims are exposed to various dehumanising treatments, violation of human rights, physical abuse, sexual exploitation of the female gender, harassment, arrest, detention, imprisonment and deportation. In view of the enormous challenges that human trafficking has caused, there is need for synergy of efforts to promote public awareness of the crime, develop strategies for rescuing the victims, counselling, rehabilitation and integration of victims.

Recommendation

The Libyan government should work in collaboration with non-governmental organisations, international organisations such as UNCHR, UNDOC, IOM to mention but a few. Also, appropriate measures should be taken against all those who are involved in illegal trade in human beings. Border should be strengthened to reduce the dehumanising trade along the Mediterranean coast. Security should be tightened along the travel routes to avoid molestation of migrants and to reduce to the barest minimum human trafficking and all forms of illegal migrant. The fragmented militia groups should be merged into one strong militia group for effective security activities in Libya to curb the arbitrary killings and exploitation of vulnerable people, especially women and children, violation of fundamental human rights and other forms of sexual abuse. There is need for forceful advocacy and public enlightenment programmes should be carried out to educate the Libyans on the ills of human trafficking to their socio-economic development and sustainable development. Such advocacy will reduce the vulnerability of Libyans to becoming victims of this dehumanising trafficking in human beings. The government of Libya should ensure good governance, equal opportunities and fair treatment to all citizens, and provision of facilities in order to minimise the rate at which the people try to leave the country for other nations of the world for greener pastures especially people of African descent. Adequate health and education facilities should be provided for the victims of human trafficking due to the poor environmental and health conditions that the victims are exposed to. They should have access to good health facilities and those of school age should be sent back to school to study. Government policies should be put in place to remove stigmatisation of victims of humantrafficking so that they would be reintegrated into the society and not be treatedas social outcasts. Rehabilitation centres should be provided for the victims where they could acquireskills that will enable them fit into the society. In order to combat human trafficking in all the regions of Africa especially along the Mediterranean coast, it needs concerted efforts of the government, non-governmental organisations, international organisations and other interest groups to work together to fight the scourge of illicit trade in human beings.

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UNGOVERNED SPACES AND INSECURITY IN WEST AFRICAN SUB-REGION: NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

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Abstract

One of the foremost challenges in West African sub-region is insecurity among other trans-border crimes. Several stringent measures to tame and control illegal trans-border activities proved futile. Extant literature shows that scholars have written copiously on factors that creates insecurity in West Africa, though less emphasis has been placed on ungoverned spaces and insecurity in West Africa. Therefore, the objective of the study is to explicate the ungoverned spaces and insecurity in West African sub-region. The paper utilises documentary source of generating data, while regional complex theory was adopted as a theoretical framework of analysis. Furthermore, the study argues that ungoverned spaces are safe haven predominantly for violent non-state actors in their terrorist's activities, trans-border crimes and other illicit transacts in the sub-region. Similarly, the study noted that poor policing of the vast porous borders was responsible for ungoverned spaces and insecurity in the region. In summary, the study recommends, *inter-alia*, integrated securitisation of west-African borders.

Keywords: Trans-border crimes, Ungoverned Spaces, Regional Complex theory, Securitization.

Introduction

An ungoverned space is not peculiar to West-African sub-region but replicated in generic terms. Thus, it epitomises security threat globally. Therefore, the incapacitation to govern effectively has created absence of governance. Since the 1990s, ungoverned spaces have increasingly been seen as a source of serious instability and threat to the international system (Taylor, 2016, p. 4). Ungoverned spaces pose security threat, but terrorist groups are rarely responsible for their creation; the reason for their emergence is poor governance that prompts the populations in these areas to render themselves ungovernable by the existing state structure. Many governments perceived ungoverned territories as a security threat because the borders of weak or failed states can produce spill over effects, with turmoil spreading like wildfire. As state capacities are challenged, withdrawn, or ejected, porosity created by these conditions tends to promulgate further upheaval and insecurity.

In the 1990s, the Liberian conflict metamorphosed thus thereby undermining Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Sierra Leone (Taylor, 2016, p. 4). In this light, terrorism, human/drug trafficking, criminal networks, infectious diseases, illegal migrants, arms smuggle and illicit trans-border crimes are said to elicit from ungoverned areas. To this end, to contain these spaces within the sovereign frontier of any state, strategic policy should be strengthen. The question now is: can a space ever be ungoverned? Therefore, how precisely are ungoverned spaces a threat to West-African security? It is against this seeming back cloth, that it is both apt and imperative for this study to explicate the ungoverned spaces and insecurity in West African sub-region.

Consequent upon this, the study is divided into three (3) sections; the first section gives introduction to the subject. The second part contextualised conceptual clarification, methodology and theoretical framework. Conclusively, the third section captures explanatory nexus of ungoverned spaces and insecurity in West Africa viz-a-viz its concluding remarks.

Conceptualisation

Ungoverned Spaces

An 'ungoverned space' is a term meant to connote a general condition of weak to non-existent state authority in a defined geographical area. Clunan (2010, p. 5) argues that ungoverned spaces are not necessarily due to state incapacity in many cases but these areas have been created as aftermath of the introduction of neo-liberal policies and the increased circulation of global flows. Theresa (2005, p. 2) makes the distinction between physical ungoverned spaces and 'non-physical' ungoverned spaces domains within a state where the government is unable or unwilling to exercise authority. These distinctions matter a great deal, as they present very different local operating environments for potential criminal and terrorist activities. As cited in Taylor (2015, p.2) that a more inclusive definition of ungoverned territory by the US Department of Defence is influenced strongly by the state failure. The thesis holds that an ungoverned space is:

> A place where the state or central government is unable or unwilling to extend control, effectively govern, or influence the local population, and where a provincial, local, tribal or autonomous government does not fully or effectively govern, due to inadequate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy, the presence of conflict, or restrictive norms of behaviour. 'Ungoverned areas' should be assumed to include under-governed, ill-governed, contested, and exploitable areas.

Corroborating the above, ungoverned spaces are not completely anarchical but experience some measures of weak control over land and maritime borders. However, the dominant perception and claim among political scientists remains that the state is indispensable, and that its absence conjures images of a Hobbesian anarchy. Yet, the absence of government does not necessarily imply the absence of governance. Thus, it may be more accurate to describe 'ungoverned' spaces as areas of 'hybrid' or 'contested' governance, or to simply refer to them as 'under-governed' (Fisher & Mercado, 2014, p. 3).

Ungoverned space is a physical or non-physical area where there is an absence of state capacity or political will to exercise control. Physical space can be land area, such as the Sahel region, where terrorists have successfully conducted attacks, or the Niger delta, where corruption and criminal activity is pervasive or something we often forget, maritime areas, such as the African coastal waters in the Gulf of Guinea or the Swahili coast. Non-physical space might, for example, involve financial space where there is little capacity or legal authority to prevent terrorists from raising and moving monies in support of attacks. This is space that terrorists thrive in and need to exist. Ungoverned space is not new, just like the threat environment in Africa is not new. What is new is the fact that we are now looking at this as a 21st century threat. This is a fundamental paradigm shift in terms of strategic thinking about threats. In the past, we were concerned about 'governed space' because massive military power could be built and sustained there and that was the only type of power that we believed could threaten us (Teresa, 2006, p. 64).

Insecurity

In order to conceptualise insecurity, the term security would be apt within the context of this study. Traditionally, security is conceptualised within the context of the capability of governments to ensure the protection of their countries from internal insurrection or external aggression through adequate preparedness of the military to ensure peace or safety. It also involved diligent in matters of intelligence gathering and secrecy, and the protection of resources and rights considered critical to the existence of states. However, this traditional realist mind-set of security is undergoing some transformations as a result of the complexity in the global politics (Hassan, 2014, p.10). As cited by Hassan (2014, p.10) scholar such as Saliu (2010), Nwanegbo & Odigbo (2013), Nwozor (2013), among others, have argued that the concept of security has changed from its state-centric perspective characterised by narrow, restrictive, militaristic and strategic views to a broader view that places premium on individuals. It is the condition of feeling safe from harm or danger; the defence, protection and preservation of cores values and the absence of threats to acquired values.

Therefore, insecurity is a direct obtuse of this condition. It is the feeling of fear, anxiety, uncertainty, poverty, injustice, unemployment and unrest in the polity. This paper however adopts a limited view of security as it views security as the protection of lives, wellbeing of the people and safeguarding their prosperity. In this context, insecurity denotes absence of protection from danger or other unpleasant. It is the prevalence of threats to human wellbeing as a result of physical and psychological abuses inflicted upon non-combatant individuals, including children, the aged and women in the environment of armed conflicts (Owutu, 2012, p.7).

Trans-Border Crimes

The task of defining or describing 'trans-border crime' would not be an easy one, because many elements have been recognised as constituting it. However, 'trans-border crimes' represent a number of illegal and notorious activities carried out by individuals and groups across national and international borders, either for financial or economic benefits, socio-political cum religious considerations. It is a set of criminal acts whose perpetrators and repercussions go beyond territorial borders. These would include human trafficking, money laundering, drug trafficking, arms smuggling or trafficking of weapons, cross-border terrorism, illegal oil bunkering, illicit trafficking in diamonds, corruption, and business fraud, to mention but these notable few (Garuba, 2010, p.15). Similarly, Addo (2006, p.2) argues that porous borders of West Africa continue to endanger crime and instability in the region, owing to inappropriate mechanism for monitoring movement and illegal activities across the borders.

Methodology and Theoretical Perspective

The documentary methods of data collection were utilised to extracting information for the study. It is the use of outside sources, documents to support the viewpoint or argument of the academic study. The process of documentary research often involves some form of conceptualising and assessing documents. The analysis of the documents in documentary research would be either quantitative or qualitative analysis (Agbaje & Alarape, 2010, p. 29). Therefore, the use of documentary method for this study is suitable because documents, files, books, and articles from scholars and organisations and even government records concerning the ungoverned spaces and insecurity in west Africa was interrogated to ascertain systematically the nexus. Further to this, the paper adopted Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) to explicate the dynamics and manifestations of ungoverned spaces and insecurity in West Africa. The founding academic linked to this particular theory is Buzan, with further contributions from Wæver. They conceptualised RSCT as:

> A set of units whose processes of securitization, DE securitisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another. (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 201).

This can only be applied to some situations and security issues but rather a way of viewing security issues in generic. The argument is that security analysed solely through a national perspective does not make sense since security dynamics are always relational. In order to understand the analytical components of RSC's Buzan and Wæver stated that RSC's are characterised by 'durable patterns of amity and enmity'. They go on to specify that this relation, in terms of security, is more often found between states with a close geographical proximity and that this interaction is most noticeable in the military, political, societal, and environmental sectors (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 45). It is argued by Buzan and Wæver that the security complexes of states depend primarily on the pressures deriving from geographic proximity, and the interplay between the anarchic structure and how balances of power play out in the system. They view the world as regional clusters, whereby security complexes are magnified within these clusters (2003, p.46). Buzan and Wæver further clarify the central ideas of RSCT as follows:

> The central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones, security interdependence is normally into regionally based clusters: security complexes. A process of securitisation and thus the degree of security interdependence are more intense between actors inside such complexes than they are between actors outside of it (2003, p. 4).

Furthermore, applying Buzan's theory gives an explanation as to why security concerns vocalised by one state are frequently echoed around neighbouring states with a relatively short time frame (Sheehan, 2005, p. 50). Consequently, it is crucial to acknowledge that security also entails a need for supply security and demand security. In addition, dependence can be both positive and negative between two or more states. While RSCT presents a plausible and applicable framework in terms of understanding security, it is limited in that it does not address the interaction of states at a global level.

Furthermore, it is undeniable that with the rise of globalisation, the integration and transfer of knowledge, and the power of technology, security is not confined solely within regional complexes. However, within the context of this study, regional complex theory, serves as clearer understanding of the dynamics and foundation of the current and on-going conflict in Mali, Sambisa forest north-east Nigeria. Hence, the theory allows us to understand the conflict in this regional perspective, by emphasising the regional dynamic. Therefore, the theory brings to bear the important of securitisation of ungoverned spaces among states actors by application of pre-emptive measures and mechanism against violent non-state actors in their various safe havens within the W/African borders.

Explanatory Nexus: Ungoverned Spaces and Insecurity in West Africa

Sequel of the above, the multiplying presence of outlaw groups in fragile states; environment thus generates insecurity and hampers development. Currently, Boko Haram has expanded its area of operation beyond its core states in north-east Nigeria, to carry out raids and kidnappings in Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. The sect also exploits Nigeria's vast porous and largely ungoverned borders for its terrorist drive. They smuggle weapons on top of camels in disguise as graziers en-route Nigeria from Chad and Niger. The group have exploited state weakness in areas that are remote (ungoverned) to set up bomb-making factories. Boko Haram operates part of their territories in Sambisa forest at the border with Chad. This forest is a game reserve covering an area of 60,000 square kilometres northeast of Nigeria, and Boko Haram has been using it as safe haven where they train, recuperate, and spring to carry out attacks and then retreat back. Similarly, on the eastern border with Cameroon, there are the Mandara Mountains, which are also considered hard-to-reach areas. Considering that the Nigerian government already has institutional weaknesses even among security forces; thus provision of law enforcement in these mountainous and other porous borders becomes troublesome, rendering such places ungoverned. It is undeniably that Boko Haram has made such places their homeland, a launch pad for terror acts in Nigeria and neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Niger, and Chad (Onuoha, 2013, p. 8).

Borrowing from ECOWAS Protocol on free movement, it is, however, considered very germane to the overall objective of the ECOWAS integration policies; this is so because; there cannot be any meaningful integration if free movement of the community citizens who are considered as agents of integration is hampered. The Protocol to liberalise trans-border mobility is borne out of the need to promote regional trade and engender regional integration. It is believed that this economic integration will increase wealth and better the lots of the community citizens (Akinyemi, 2013, p.5). On the contrary, terrorists, criminals and other violent non-state actors have availed themselves of this initiative to perpetrate their nefarious activities. Inherently, such spaces threaten state sovereignty, insofar as they allow all permutations of non-state actors whether nefarious or benign to establish alternative regimes, by co-opting governance functions unfilled or poorly filled by the state. (Fisher & Mercado, 2014, p. 1)

From extant literature, scholars such as (Ering, 201, p. 28; Addo, 2006, p. 6; Idehen, 2016, p. 9; Onouha, 2013, p. 7), among others, have noted that trans-border crimes are infiltration of violent non-state actors in West African sub-region. The scope of human and materials trafficking is widespread, this traverse across eleven of the fifteen Member States of the ECOWAS including Ghana, Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and Mali. As a result, the porosity has continued to engender cross-border crime and instability in the sub-region, owing to the lack of an appropriate mechanism for the monitoring movements and illegal activities across the borders (Addo, 2006, p. 2). Cross-border criminal activities obviously undermine good governance and security, with negative impacts on the rule of law, economic activities and growth, human rights and general societal and cultural advancement within the sub-region (de Andrés, 2008, p. 8). In this light, this paper argues that the porous borders have created ungoverned space as a safe haven for Islamic sects, terrorist groups, sea Pirates, narcotic peddlers, and criminal syndicates, among others in West Africa sub-region. This is consequent upon the weak integrated securitisation of West African borders.

Table 1: Locations of Ungoverned Spaces within the Context of Study

West African States	***Ungoverned Spaces***	***Violent Non- State Actors***
Benin	Border Areas	Trans-border criminals
Mali	Northern region	Islamic Sect
Nigeria	Sambisa Forest	Boko Haram
Gulf of Guinea	Nigerian water ways	Sea pirates /Niger Delta Militants
Republic of Chad	Border Areas	Trans- Border Criminal syndicates
Republic of Niger	Border Areas	Trans- Border Criminal syndicates
Benin/ Togo	Water ways	Piracy and armed robbery at sea, theft of oil and other cargo, illegal, unreported & unregulated fishing, trafficking of counterfeit items, people, narcotics and arms.

Source: *Nigerian Maritime (2016:1).*

Similarly, Arsenault and Bacon (2015, p. 22) also highlight factors that may encourage terrorist groups to thrive, including ungoverned spaces, by citing the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy: Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatred. If left unaddressed, however, these different causes lead to the same: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists. Idehen (2013, p. 5) the human security impact of terrorism cut across economic social and psychological life of the people. Evidently, the cost associated with more security check points, long queues on airports and highways due to the security checks portend negative impact on the external trade of emerging economies (Nigeria). For nations that have manifested symptoms of state failure the consequences of insurgencies and terrorism are unimaginable. Many foreign nations have warned their citizens about the risk of staying or even doing business in Nigeria due to security challenges, Nigeria have lost substantial inflow of FDI.

He further observed that the challenges of humanitarian fallout of terrorism, there are now scattered camps (internally displaced persons) IDP housing thousands of displaced people mostly women children in Nigeria. The humanitarian crises had spread to neighbouring countries. There is a great psychological depression in the system resulting from insecurity. The jingles and advert especially on the Nigeria televisions have contributed to the heightened psychological tension associated with insecurity. The fear of cars with tinted glasses, bags indiscriminately drop on the ground or a heavily bearded Muslim brother constitutes a greater challenge to the social cohesion originally known with the people. All these challenges are consequences of a weak link in the governance process created by the inability to make representation in the ungoverned space of the Sahel region of Nigeria. The nation currently grapples with the challenges of keeping the nation together. Idehen (2013, p. 6) stated that:

> Nobel laureate, Professor Wole Soyinka has recently pointed out that 'Nigeria is already at the verge of disintegration' mutual suspicion has heightened amongst the ethnic nationality especially between northerners and southerners as the dreaded Boko Haram phenomenon is believed to be associated with northern greed for power. The country stands at that twilight zone in which any wrong move or misguided action could spell disaster.

Extrapolating the above, there are ample implications of ungoverned spaces on insecurity in the sub-region. However, the paper noted that underpinning factor for illegal trans-border activities are complex manifestation of poverty, unemployment, and quest for greener pasture within and across the sub-region. To this end, violent non-state actors monopolised the ungoverned spaces to unleash their nefarious activities which breed insecurity and underdevelopment to the region.

Conclusion

It is becoming increasingly obvious that the ungoverned spaces often cultivate and pose serious security threat to states. No wonder St Augustine of Hippo (1917-1920) affirms that when government becomes corrupt rebellion may be ethically obligatory. However, several studies revealed that instability emanating from ungoverned spaces is contagious and can recur even when it appears to have been contained. Although interventions through bilateral, regional, and multilateral mechanisms may offer some orderliness in ungoverned spaces, the real solution may lie in addressing the latent causes of violence and instability which includes poverty, unemployment, frustration, religious extremism, embracing democratic practices, economic empowerment, strengthening government institutions among others: so that states are functional and spaces are governed.

Therefore, there is correlation between the ungoverned spaces and insecurity in West African sub-region. The failure of the state to provide the expected security on ungoverned spaces may not only threaten national security but endanger the economy of sub-region. Hence, this study strongly solicits for adequate policing of the porous borders with human and sophisticate gadgets. Meanwhile, leadership synergy and political cooperation must be foster. Finally, crafting of regional border laws and implementation would stamp out terrorist from ungoverned spaces within the sub-region.

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THEME FIFTEEN
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL POLICY

HARNESSING THE POTENTIALS OF VIRTUAL ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: THE WAY FORWARD

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Abstract
The emerging virtual entrepreneurial business has the potentials to create jobs and reduce poverty in Nigeria. However, entrepreneurial business research in Africa has basically focused on the conventional entrepreneurial business, and thereby failed to address the challenges facing the virtual entrepreneurial business. To understand the challenges and offer evidence-based suggestions on how best to resolve the virtual entrepreneurial business issues for socio-economic development, this current study addressed the following specific objectives: (i) the relationship between virtual business technology self-efficacy and virtual entrepreneurial business self-efficacy, (ii) the relationship between virtual entrepreneurial business learning and virtual business technology self-efficacy, and (iii) gender differences in virtual entrepreneurial business self-efficacy in Nigeria. Quantitative data were collected from the purposively selected 300 participants with equal gender representation. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient and t-test are used to test the formulated hypotheses. The outcomes reveal that a significant association exists between virtual business technology self-efficacy and virtual entrepreneurial business self-efficacy. Similarly, the relationship between virtual entrepreneurial business learning and virtual business technology self-efficacy is also found to be significant. However, contrary to the author's *a priori* expectation that is captured in hypothesis three, no significant gender differences are found in virtual entrepreneurial business self-efficacy in the analysis. It is concluded that virtual business technology self-efficacy and virtual entrepreneurial business learning are needed to achieve virtual entrepreneurial business self-efficacy for sustainable socio-economic development.

Keywords: Virtual entrepreneurial business, sustainable economic development, virtual technology, virtual entrepreneurial learning, gender

Introduction: Demographics, economics, and technology are altering the nature and organisation of work (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014). With the technology breakthroughs in the business world, businesses are now being conducted online without the convention brick-and-mortar business space. This virtual entrepreneurial business environment enables people with entrepreneurial business drive to create and conduct their own micro and small businesses with small start-up capital (Vamvaka et al, 2013).

The virtual entrepreneurs often deploy social media platform (blog, Tweeter, Facebook) for virtual entrepreneurship businesses. The social media platform is a computer-mediated network that connects people together on a virtual space irrespective of distance and locations so long as there is the availability of internet connectivity (Manyika et al., 2016).

Entrepreneurs who conduct their businesses in virtual space buy/offer goods and services for sales and earn income at the comfort of their disperse location. Goods such as clothing, household items, accessories, body care products, and many more are traded on virtual space. Similarly, training and teaching services are also rendered for a fee on virtual space in Nigeria (Vamvaka et al, 2020; Hardin et al, 2013). These virtual entrepreneurial business opportunities are potentials for sustainable development for Africa and Nigeria in particular. Therefore, exploring gender differences in intentions and self-efficacy in the virtual entrepreneurship model will enable the government to develop and implement an all-encompassing policy framework that will encourage both genders to tap into the emerging entrepreneurial opportunities to address the unemployment problem in Nigeria.

Despite the potentials of virtual entrepreneurship to create jobs and reduce poverty in Nigeria, literature has not fully explained the gender dimension to its innovativeness and entrepreneurial intention. For example, literature has only explained gender disparity between male and female in the convention work settings without extending such understanding to the virtual entrepreneurs conducting entrepreneurial businesses on the social media platform (Bloggs, Twitter, and Face book).

Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development:

The theory of planned behaviour (TBP) remains one of the most used models for explaining and predicting human social behaviour (Krueger & Brazeal, 1994; Ajzen, 2012). This intention-based entrepreneurial behaviour theoretical model basically proposes that entrepreneurship is a deliberate plan and volitionally guided behaviour that is inherently intentional and non-instinctive, through which an individual cultivates entrepreneurial intentions over time before making a move to create a new business enterprise (Krueger et al, 2000; Parker & Hay, 2001; Ajzen, 1985). Entrepreneurial intension has been established as a Strong predictor of planned behaviour aimed at creating a new business venture (Fayolle, 2007; Fatolle & Gailly, 2004; Lee & Wong, 2004). Based on this theoretical consideration, it is assumed that since behavioural intentions predict actual behavioural outcomes (Lopouter et al, 2011; Tausch & Becker, 2013), entrepreneurial theory explains the antecedents of such intension (Shapero & Sikol, 1982).

Entrepreneurial intension literature in the developed world where virtual entrepreneurship originated from did not sufficiently explain the gender dynamics in the conception and development of virtual entrepreneurial intension. The current study is unique in the sense that outcomes from previous studies suggested that career paths differ among genders despite the increasing involvement of women in entrepreneurial ventures as their male counterparts still double the women participation (Shirokova et al, 2016; Zampetakis et al, 2017). These findings only exist in the traditional work environment as research is yet to explain the presence or absence of such gender disparity in the traditional entrepreneurial business venture. For example, the conventional entrepreneurial business literature explains that the gender disparity in the business is accounted for by the aggressiveness, independence, and decisive nature of men which the women lack. However, research is needed to understand if such entrepreneurial business participation is characterised by such disparity particularly as literature has demonstrated that virtual entrepreneurial businesses are characterised by low start-up capital and, low physical efforts. This is because the business is conducted online at the comfort of the disperse location of the virtual entrepreneurs.

Entrepreneurial Intention, Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Learning

Entrepreneurial intention is a person's inclination that is geared towards the activation of entrepreneurial behaviour ((Vamvaka et al, 2020; Hardin et al, 2013; Fini et al, 2012). Inclination towards entrepreneurship is born out of a person's preference for self-employment rather than wage employment (Grilo & Irigoyen, 2006; Kolvereid, 1996; Verheul et al., 2012). Another angle to entrepreneurial Intention is commitment (3) as merely having a business intention is not sufficient to activate an entrepreneurial venture (Atasoy, 2015; Grilo & Irigoyen, 2006; Thompson, 2009). The commitment to entrepreneurial intention until it ends up in the activation of entrepreneurial behaviour is an indication that a person is focused enough to create a business venture (Welsch et al, 2003). The last stage in the entrepreneurship intention is what is termed "nascent entrepreneurship". This nascent entrepreneurship phase is the last transition stage from the commitment to gestation. An individual at this stage aggressively attends business seminars, builds social and financial capital network needed to nurture the nascent business (Aldrich & Martinez, 2001; Korunka et al, 2003; McGee et al, 2009).

Computer self-efficacy has been found to influence outcomes such as behavioural intentions in the information systems literature, (Compeau, and Higgins, 1995; Marakas et al, 1998). Computer self-efficacy encompasses strong constructs used in measuring activities such as spreadsheet performance (Johnson and Marakas, 2000), and creative performance in employees (Tierney and Farmer, 2010). Specific computer self-efficacy measures have been demonstrated to have greater predictive ability than more general measures (Vamvaka et al, 2020; Hardin et al, 2013; Marakas et al, 1998), and specific. In the same vein, it is expected that the virtual business technology self-efficacy constructs possess the strongest predicting ability of virtual world entrepreneurial self-efficacy. Creating a virtual entrepreneurial business requires a sound degree of technological skill. The author, therefore, assumes that the perception of the entrepreneurs' technological abilities should be a strong predictor of the entrepreneurs' ability to create virtual entrepreneurial businesses. Therefore, the author proposes the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Virtual business technology self-efficacy has a positive significant relationship with virtual entrepreneurial business self-efficacy.

To create a virtual entrepreneurial business, the intending virtual entrepreneurs need to learn the required skills that will enable them to start and run the business successfully (Vamvaka et al, 2020; Hardin et al, 2013). The next hypothesis is anchored on the social cognitive theory (SCT). The theory proposes that efficacy is developed through four processes: enactive mastery, vicarious experience, social persuasion, and affective states. Enactive mastery and vicarious experience are developed through behavioural modeling training and have been demonstrated to be the strongest predictors of self-efficacy beliefs (Davis and Yi, 2004; Gist et al, 1989). Based on the foregoing the author hypothesised that:

Hypothesis 2: Virtual entrepreneurial business learning has a positive significant relationship with virtual business technology self-efficacy.

Gender Differences in Entrepreneurial Self-Efficacy

Empirical finding on the influence of gender on entrepreneurial intention are mixed. Shnor and Jenssen (2014) reviewed 51 articles that covered 60 independent samples and found a direct relationship between gender and entrepreneurial intention in 21 of the samples while the contrary was found in the remaining samples. Similarly, Haus et al (2013) in a meta-analysis of 30 articles covering 52,367 sample size across many countries found no direct significant relationship between gender and entrepreneurial intention. Some of the studies that reported a positive significant association between gender and entrepreneurship intention in the conventional entrepreneurial business include Shinnar et al. (2012), Schlaegel and Koenig (2014), and Shirokova et al. (2016). For insistence, research has demonstrated that men exhibit a stronger negative relationship with entrepreneurial intention in the USA and Belgium while the opposite was reported in China.

Conversely, Nowinski et al (2019) reported no significant gender difference in the relationship between entrepreneurial self-efficacy and entrepreneurial intentions. A critical look at the current literature indicates a contradictory finding on the effect of gender on entrepreneurship intension. Also, it is clear that the literature does not report gender effect on entrepreneurship intension in virtual entrepreneurial environment. To advance scientific knowledge in the virtual workspace the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 3: There is no significant gender difference in virtual entrepreneurial business self-efficacy in Nigeria.

Methods

A survey research design was adopted in this study. The hypotheses were formulated in line with the objectives of the study. The purposive sampling technique was used to collect cross-sectional data from the 300 participants in Abuja, Nigeria. The participants were informed of the purpose and potential benefits of the research. The participants were assured of anonymity and uttermost confidentiality of the formation they supplied. All questionnaires were administered in person. Participation in the study was voluntary. The data were collected between 2nd and 27th August 2020. The data were checked and cleaned for missing data and out-of-range values before the analyses were done. The study had an equal number of 150 males and 150 females. The mean age and standard deviation of the participants were 20.9 (SD =1.9) years. The age range was 18–29 years old.

Measures

The structured survey questionnaire was designed in line with validated and reliable measurement scales found in the literature. All items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from "1 = total disagreement" to "7 = total agreement." A high score on an item indicated a high degree of agreement with the statement; a high score on a factor indicated more of the construct.

Equal gender representation was maintained in recruiting the participants to enable the author to test hypothesis three. The male participants were denoted 1, and the females denoted 2.

Virtual Entrepreneurial Business Exposure (VEBE) was measured with adapted constructs adapted from the Zhao et al's (2005) scale. Virtual Business Technology Self-Efficacy (VBTS) was measured with constructs adapted from the work of Hardin et al (2013). Virtual Entrepreneurial Business Learning (VEBL) variable was measured with a semantic differential scale which encompasses the assessment of the perceptions of virtual business learning. This scale was adapted from the work of Hardin et al (2013). Virtual Entrepreneurship Business Self-Efficacy (VEBS) was measured with constructs adapted from the scale development by Zhao et al (2005). Lastly, the Virtual Entrepreneurial Business Intention (VEBI) was measured with items adapted from the work of Zhao et al (2005).

Results

Hypothesis 1: Virtual technology self-efficacy has a positive significant relationship with virtual entrepreneurial business self-efficacy.

Table 1 **Correlations**

		Virtual technology self-efficacy	*Virtual entrepreneurial business self-efficacy*
Virtual technology self-efficacy	Pearson Correlation	1	.842*
	Sig (2-tailed)		.000
	N	300300	
V*irtual entrepreneurial business self-efficacy*	Pearson Correlation	.842*	1
	Sig (2-tailed)		.000
	N	300300	

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Researcher's computation, 2017.

Table 1 indicates that v *irtual technology self-efficacy has a positive significant relationship with virtual entrepreneurial business self-efficacy in* Nigeria (r = .842, n = 300, p = .000 ? 0.05).

Hypothesis 2: Virtual entrepreneurial business learning has a positive significant relationship with virtual world technology self-efficacy.

Table 2 **Correlations**

		Virtual entrepreneurial business learning	virtual world technology self-efficacy
Virtual technology self-efficacy	Pearson Correlation	1	.796*
	Sig (2-tailed)		.000
	N	300300	
Virtual world technology self-efficacyPearson Correlation		1	.796*
	Sig (2-tailed)		.000
	N	300300	

Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 2 result shows that Virtual entrepreneurial business learning has a positive significant relationship with virtual world technology self-efficacy(r = .796, n = 300, p = .000 ? 0.05).

Hypothesis 3: There is no significant gender difference in virtual world entrepreneurial self-efficacy in Nigeria.

Table 4.3.1 T-test table for hypothesis 1

Research Question	Respondents	Frequency	Mean	Standard Deviation	t- value	p-value	Decision
	Male	150	4.3143	0.71831	1.777	0.081	*Null is accepted which says no significant difference*
	Female	150	4.000	0.63246			

The null hypothesis is accepted which says no significant gender difference in the *levels of virtual world entrepreneurial self-efficacy in Nigeria* (t-value = 1.777, $n = 300$, $p = 0.081 > 0.05$).

Discussion of Findings

Virtual entrepreneurial business is an emerging phenomenon following the advent of technological breakthroughs in the business world. Traditionally, research into entrepreneurial business has always centred on the conventional entrepreneurial business conducted in a physical space, with little or no attention given to the virtual business.

Results from the test of hypothesis one indicate that a significant association exists between virtual business technology self-efficacy (VBTS) and virtual entrepreneurial business self-efficacy (VEBS). This empirical evidence supports earlier assertion by scholars that the diverse entrepreneurial ventures require corresponding skills to succeed (Carland et al, 1997). These diverse skills include technological proficiency to develop digital infrastructure and products needed for the virtual business to take-off. As demonstrated in the analysis section, VBTS significantly predicts VEBS. Virtual entrepreneurs do not only need to have the belief in their ability to create a new business venture but must possess the ability to use the appropriate software and APPs to run the business.

The outcomes from the second hypothesis suggest that virtual entrepreneurship business learning (VEBL) significantly relates to virtual business technology self-efficacy (VBTS). This is an indication that virtual business technology learning results in virtual business technology self-efficacy. Therefore, intending Nigerian entrepreneurs require virtual learning to boost virtual business self-efficacy. The result is consistent with the work of Hardin et al (2013) and Zbroa et al (2005).

In line with the author's apriori expectation, and findings from previous studies (Hardin, et al, 2013; Zhoa et el, 2005), this current study did not find significant gender differences in the virtual entrepreneurial business self-efficacy. This may be a result of the fact that virtual business can be conducted anywhere irrespective of distance and locations provider there is internet connectivity. This result from the current study suggests that virtual business has reduced or removed the cultural barriers militating against increasing women's full participation in the conventional entrepreneurial business. Such barriers include gender-bias household roles division against women, religious and socially-imposed full-time housewife practices. Virtual business seems to either reduce or eliminate these age-long barriers.

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LIVELIHOOD IMPACT OF COMMERCIAL MOTORCYCLE RIDING: A REVIEW

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Abstract
Poor transportation system and inadequate means of transports have forced urban residents to take succour in paratransit. Livelihood is inevitable in the existence of human being. Commercial motorcycle riding is one of the fast growing livelihood strategies among poor/low income youths in the city. However, commercial motorcycle riding is an informal economic activity, and therefore, a marginal livelihood. It served as a means through which people secure their basic necessities of life while the commercial motorcycle operation is seen as a channel of movement in everyday activities and overall means of living of people. The aim of this study is to investigate the livelihood impacts of commercial motorcycle riding. The main objectives of the study were to examine the concept to sustainable livelihood; identify the importance of livelihood assets framework on commercial motorcycle riding; trace a brief history of the evolution of commercial motorcycle riding; and identify the livelihood advantages of commercial motorcycle riding. The study adopted the thematic review method. The study concluded that, commercial motorcycle operation contributes significantly to livelihood improvement of the operators and facilitate movement of individual, hence increase social integration. The study, therefore, recommends that the government should consider and recognize commercial motorcycle operation as one of the means of living activities that fill the gap of youth employment problem. Provision of support in terms of loans to the operators of commercial motorcycles especially for those riders who hire/lease their motorcycles is also suggested. These will contribute to the reduction in unemployment and poverty rates.

Keywords: Commercial Motorcycle, Impact, Livelihood, Riding, Transportation

Introduction

Livelihood is about the way people earn and mobilise resources that make them to exist, either in the urban or non-urban areas. It comprises things which make human being have the requirements for living like food, water and housing (Young et al, 2002; UNHCR, 2014) and as observed by de Haan et al (2002), this is not as similar as acquiring a permanent job. However, deducing out of Chambers and Conway (1992), livelihood consist of abilities, assets and human activities need for existence: livelihood is sustainable if it is able to withstand and regain out of pressure and tremors, sustain or improve the abilities and properties, make possible sustainable livelihood chances towards next generation and which provides to different livelihoods both at global, continental, regional, national and local levels fora specific period. However, livelihood outcomes attained by the less privileged (poor) follow their utilisation of properties within agreed set of organisational terms. Commercial motorcycle can also be seen as important in everyday means of living of the unemployed youths (Hodder, 1965).

The study of commercial motorcycles is very important as they serve as channel of movement in everyday activities and overall means of living for the people in the area. It also provide employment for most people, which serve as a means of existence by creating excitement and standard vehicle is appealing, especially as other alternative can be available. The commercial motorcycle business can be flexible, and allowing other income-generating works (Kemtsop and Starkey, 2013; World Bank, 2011).

Therefore, those engaged in commercial motorcycle riding have reduced transportation problems faced most especially by the people and occupied essential part of the public transportation system in many places. By means of commercial motorcycle, human beings are able to move to places earlier inaccessible with vehicles. In recent time, majority of people are involving in commercial motorcycle as a means of living. As a result of extreme poverty facing most people and lack of employment in most part of the country, as force large number of people most especially poor's and jobless people to engage in commercial motorcycle operation as means of living (Abdussalam, 2014).

Statement of the Problem

As examined by the World Bank (2010) income poverty is a major challenge in the world today where Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the regions highly affected by poverty due to youth unemployment. While contending with the current economic crisis in the world, African countries will not cope with the growing number of economic crisis such as income poverty unless serious measures and alternative strategies are developed. In trying to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, the Millennium Development Goals encourage development by improving socio economic conditions. Some of these conditions can be improved through job creation.

Ajay (2011) conducted a study in third world countries and revealed that vehicle ownership is low and dependency on public transport is high. However, the financial conditions and performance of all forms of government-organised public transport are ineffective and are in decline. This situation has forced people and the market to develop creative solutions to address daily travel needs hence a resort to motorcycles either for personal mobility in addition to public transport. Ebonugwo (2009) has revealed that in Sub-Saharan Africa, motorcycle taxi popularly referred to as “Okada” in Nigeria or “Bodaboda” in Eastern Africa, has become generally accepted as a means of commercial transportation, also as possibly the best form of flexible public transportation system.

However, despite the availability and potentiality of commercial motorcycles in the study area and its operations, income poverty still persists. The level of motorcycle business activities is very high the cities and these activities has a positive significant effect on community's (people's) livelihood, since they can find jobs on it and also there are some challenges facing commercial motorcycle operation in the study area which include poor road infrastructure, road accident, security problem, harassment by union, over daily payment and traffic regulation. The study will also provide an in depth knowledge on the livelihood impacts of commercial motorcycle operation and will also serve as a reference point to policy formulation. The aim of this research is to investigate livelihood impact of commercial motorcycle riding with a view to determining the benefits of commercial motorcycle riding to the wellbeing of the people. Therefore, the objectives of this paper are to examine the concept of sustainable livelihood; identify the importance of livelihood assets framework on commercial motorcycle riding; trace a brief history of the evolution of commercial motorcycle riding; and identify the livelihood advantages of commercial motorcycle riding.

Concept of Livelihood Approach and Livelihood Framework

DFID (2000) established that livelihood framework is a tool to improve our understanding of livelihoods, particularly the livelihood of the poor. It was developed over a long period of term by the Sustainable Rural Livelihood Advisory Committee, building on earlier work by the Institute of Development Studies. The framework is centred on people. It does not work in a linear manner and does not try to present a model of reality. Its aim is to help stakeholders with different perspectives to engage in structured and coherent debate about the many factors that affect livelihoods, their relative importance and the way in which they interact. This, in turn, should help in the identification of appropriate entry points for support of livelihoods. Furthermore, the form of the framework is not intended to suggest that the starting point for all livelihoods (livelihood analysis) is the vulnerability context which through a series of permutations yields livelihoods outcome. Livelihoods are shaped by a multitude of different forces and factors that are themselves constantly shifting. People-centred analysis is most likely to begin with simultaneous investigation of people's assets, their objectives (the livelihood outcomes which they are seeking) and the livelihood strategies which they adopt to achieve these objectives. However, commercial motorcycle operation contributes to the socioeconomic stability of the society which serves as a means of livelihood of the urban poor.

The framework is intended to be a adaptable tool for use in planning and management. It offers a way of philosophy about livelihoods that helps order complexity and makes clear the many factors that affect livelihoods. A more important task than perfecting the framework itself is putting the ideas that it represents into practice. Furthermore, use of the framework is intended to make a distinct contribution to improving DFID's ability to reduce poverty. However, this research work adopted DFID Livelihood framework, because it provides a useful theoretical base for understanding both rural and urban poverty and the situation of people living in poverty in their areas.

Schafer (2002) revealed that livelihood approach views of the individuals and social groups who are trying to make a living in volatile conditions and with limited assets. It provides a framework for understanding the opportunities and assets available to poor people and the sources of their vulnerability, as well as the impact upon them of external organisations, processes and policies. The concept of livelihoods became prominent in the middle of the 1980s with work done by Robert Chamber and Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. Timalsina (2011) also states that the livelihoods approach and increased participation of the poor were means of correcting the inevitable biases introduced by outsiders deciding what was best for the people. Cahn (2002) asserted that multilateral and bilateral agencies have put reduction, elimination or eradication of poverty as the prime focus of their programmes. It was also realised that a new way of thinking about poverty reduction is needed. The basis of a life free from poverty reduction is access and entitlement to range of assets and livelihood strategies that can sustain households and individual through the stresses and shock of life (DFID, 2000). During the 1990s a new approach to poverty reduction, sustainable livelihood approach emerged. The sustainable livelihood approach is promoted by multilateral and bilateral organisation such as United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) and Department for International Development (DFID). Furthermore, Ellis (2000) has emphasised more the access to assets and activities in dealing with livelihood which is influence by social relations and institution. The livelihoods framework is a tool to understanding of livelihoods, particularly the livelihoods of the poor. However, the concept of livelihood framework will be useful in dealing with changes to livelihood of migrant commercial motorcycle operators.

Assets

Moser (1998), cited in Makhetha (2010), observed that when discussing the poor, it is important to refer to the assets that they have access to in order to draw focus on what they have rather than what they do not have. These would allow us to understand how they make use of what they have in order to compensate for what they do not have. The relationship between assets and vulnerability is present in the fact that the more assets that people have access to, the less vulnerable they are, and the greater the erosion of their assets, the greater their insecurity (DFID, 2000). Individuals draw on their assets in a number of ways, and this includes pooling resources and the skilful use of social networks in order to avoid the poverty cycle (Hossain, 2005).

Furthermore, Moser (1998) refers to the assets that the poor draw on in terms of an asset vulnerability framework while Rakodi (1999) refers to them in terms of capital asset framework; the two essentially refer to similar assets, the difference in-between is that Moser (1998) discusses the assets that people draw on as a response to economic crises, while Rakodi (1999) focuses on the response of households to poverty and sustaining their livelihoods. The two authors, therefore, refer to the same assets, but what sets them apart is the fact that they refer to them under different contexts. Rakodi's account of assets will, therefore, be referred to for the purpose of this review due to the fact that it is concerned with individuals' or households responses to poverty and the assets on which they draw. Capital asset comprises of financial capital, physical capital, natural capital, human capital and social capital.

Financial Capital refers to the financial resources available to people including savings and remittances that enable them to pursue their livelihoods (Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones, 2002). ***Physical Capital*** includes basic infrastructure such as transport, roads and service shelter, tools and equipment and means that enable people to pursue their livelihoods (Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones, 2002). ***Natural Capital*** refers to as being made up of natural resource stocks from which resource flows useful to livelihoods are derived, and it is stated that direct access to and the utilisation of natural capital (land, water and aquatic resources, and tree and forest products) is less significant to the urban poor (Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones, 2002).

More so, ***Human Capital*** refers to both the quality and quantity of labour resources available to households, and this include skills and physical wellbeing (Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones, 2002), education and the capacity to adapt (Serrat, 2008). Chamber (1995) indicated that the body is a major source to the poor and that physical weakness, such as disability and sickness, results in them being unable to carry out their daily activities and strips them of an asset in the form of a fit and strong body. However, this indicates that a healthy and fit body is very important to the poor as they rely on it to carry out their daily activities that may include securing a livelihood.

Nonetheless, ***Social Capital*** refers to the networks and relationships of trust and reciprocity on which people draw in pursuit of livelihoods (Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones, 2002). They place a lot of importance on social capital and assets that it contributes to the sustainability of the poor's lives. But some authors, such as Skinners, argued that this one sided view that presents social capital as being a good thing is misleading due to the fact that not all relation can be good.

Assets theory can be use to explain on how commercial motorcycle operation facilitates the livelihood diversification as an aspect of capital assets. According to livelihood framework, communities require accessibility to supplies services, facilities and work opportunities.

Livelihood outcomes attained by the poor result from their use of assets in a given set of structural and institutional conditions. Transport infrastructure and services are part of both the poor's asset base and the institutional framework that helps to determine its use. Improvements in the transport services and infrastructure can, thus, both improve the poor's asset base and make the institutional environment more favourable. Improvement in transport services open up the potential to make livelihoods more sustainable by, freeing up time; enabling livelihood diversification; and promote accessibility for social services (Bebbington, 1999). However, the livelihood framework was used in this research work as it indicates the different capital aspects that have to be achieved in gaining and improving livelihood diversification.

Bebbington (1999) revealed that sustainable livelihoods framework (Figure 1) forms the core of the sustainable livelihoods approach and serves as an instrument for the investigation of poor people's livelihoods. It provides a useful guide for the analysis on livelihoods suggesting that livelihoods comprise capabilities, assets and activities required to make a living. Livelihood assets and capital are used interchangeably as they are an important component of the sustainable livelihood framework because they form the strength upon which people construct their livelihoods and achieve their goals.



Figure 1: Sustainable livelihood framework
Source: DFID, 2000



Figure 2: Conceptual Framework Showing Relationship between Commercial Motorcycle Operation and Its Contribution on Livelihood Diversification
Source: Herieth (2017)

Evolution of Commercial Motorcycle Riding

The emergence of the commercial motorcycle as means of public transportation is a popular phenomenon across the nation of the world especially in the low and middle income countries (WHO, 2004). Nwadiaro et al (20110 asserted that they operate as low capacity mode of transportation in many urban areas as an alternative to public transportation in the Tird World countries. For instance, commercial motorcycles are used in Togo, Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Niger, Sierra Leone and other African countries for public transportation.

As observed by Ajay (2011), Ikot et al (2011) and Nwaorgu (2013), that prior to 1980, motorcycles or motorbikes were primarily used for private purposes such as for individual mobility and for domestic purposes like fetching water and firewood, as well as for conveying farm produce from the farm or to the market. Tijani (2013) argued that it emerged as a means of transportation within rural communities. They also served as status symbol for the low income earners who could afford them (Christopher et al, 2013). Nwaorgu (2011) revealed that commercial motorcycle however found its way as a means of public transportation within the country's cities from late 80s to 90s.

However, several reasons have been advanced for their emergence as an acceptable means of public transportation within Nigeria's urban and city landscape. These include the inadequacy in the scope, coverage and services rendered by the public transport system. Increasing incidents of unemployment among the youths and finally lack of an articulated transport infrastructure to ensure sustainable development of transport policy, structure to ensure sustainable development of infrastructure capacity (Badejo, 2011). Ganne (2010) established that it is instructive to observe that similar factors influence the decision to use motorcycles for commercial purposes in Nigeria. The operational factors in focus are the easy manoeuvrability of commercial motorcycle, their ability to travel on poor roads, and the ease with which they can reach distant and remote places. However, commercial motorcycle operation came into fill the service gap created by the unavailability or inadequacy of cars and other modes of mobility on land.

Livelihood Advantages and Opportunities of Commercial Motorcycle Riding

Skinner (2008) argued that the term livelihood is concept that tends to be applied to urban poverty, and it is defined as comprising the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a living. Livelihood is also considered to be sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in future. The concept livelihood is important because it begins to expose the fact that households are not passive victims during times of disasters, but that they are active in ensuring that they survive harsh conditions by drawing on a number of assets (Rakodi, 1999). Applying this concept to the daily lives of informal commercial motorcycle operation will be useful in helping us gain a better understanding of the various activities they engage in and the assets on which they draw in order to make a living and survive in the city. It has been established that the informal commercial motorcycle operation is an important source of livelihood to many poor urban households as it brings in a steady flow of daily income both to operators and motorcycle owners who happen to rent out their motorcycles. The commercial motorcycle operations also create employment opportunities to many unskilled urban labour and further job opportunity to informal sector workers who wish to switch jobs in search of higher rewards (Timalsina, 2010).

According to Timalsina (2007 and 2010) lack of gainful employment couple with poverty and conflict in rural areas has pushed many people out of their villages in search of a better existence in the cities of the third world countries. These migrants do not possess the skills or the education to enable them to find good paid, secure employment in the formal sector and they have to settle for work in the informal sector and put up their own business to earn their livelihoods. This has led to a rapid growth of the informal sector in the most of the cities in the third world countries. Furthermore, low skilled rural migrants live in all countries of Asia, but they are more prevalent in the poorer countries.

Due to the violent and conflict as well as hard working life in rural areas, working people have been displaced from rural areas. Peasant and conflict affected families seeking work as well as well safe place to live, have moved to urban areas where employment in the informal sector are very limited (ILO, 2004). Singh (2005) revealed that informal sector is characterised by a large number of small-scale production and service activities that are individually or family owned and labour intensive, does not fall under the purview of organised economic activities. Most workers entering the sector are recent migrants unable to find employment in the formal sector and their motivation is usually to obtain sufficient income to survive, relying on their own indigenous resources to create work. As many members of the household as possible are involved in income generating activities and they often work for very long hours. It is difficult to estimate the exact magnitude of the informal sector but there is general agreement that the informal sector comprises a growing proposition of economic activity, particularly in third world countries. However, informal commercial motorcycle operation has become an opportunity to many to make a living in the urban areas.

Muiruri (2010) asserted that commercial motorcycle operation is one of the activities within the informal economy that has been in existence for a long period of term and fast growing and becoming source of livelihood to many in some part of the third world countries; it is not uncommon in the developed world. Timalsina (2011) opined that commercial motorcycle operation is not only a source of employment but it provides affordable services to the majority of the urban poor. They constitute an integral part of the urban economy, provide an essential service, create their own employment and contribute to economic growth. The role played by the commercial motorcycle operations in the economy, therefore, is as important as it facilitates the movement of people, goods and services from one point to another. Furthermore, Timalsina (2011) revealed that commercial motorcycle operation attracts those who have limited opportunities for obtaining formal employment or prestigious business and minimises chances of social exclusion and marginalisation.

Commercial motorcycle operation is increasingly becoming livelihood option for those marginalised people. On the other hand it is an important livelihood securing sector for the urban poor. It provides seasonal employment to the rural poor and has become a source of economic earning to them. They also contribute significantly to the urban employment creation where unemployment and poverty issues are more acute. Very poor people migrate to the urban areas for survival creating their own work. It is also prevalent that some better off people also migrate to urban areas for work and earn cash income. This sector also links to the formal sector by providing labour forces unlike other sections of the urban population they do not demand that government create jobs for them or engage in begging, stealing or extortion. They try to live their life with dignity and self-respect through hard work. Hart (1973) cited in Uwitije (2016) argued that commercial motorcycle operation is becoming an important activity for the survival of many urban poor people most especially around the Third World countries by helping them create their own jobs and earn cash income. Thus, commercial motorcycle operation avails good opportunity for the urban poor to work and to be self-employed. This sector, therefore, has been neglected and under estimated.

As stated by UN (1996) perceived commercial motorcycle operation as an important sector, having vast vitality for promoting economic growth, employment creation and on the job training or developing entrepreneurial skills. In fact, it has a potential role in alleviating poverty through income generation from the sector. Furthermore, it is a means of survival and confers financial independence. Commercial motorcycle operation creates economic resources to sustain the livelihoods of operators and other people who benefit from their services, especial low income families (Tripp, 1997). In all these cases, the profit margins from commercial motorcycle operation activities depend on the location of the business and the tax burden (Adhikari, 2011; Bell and Loukaitou, 2014). Kamala (2007) observed that commercial motorcycle operation is associated with the people having no professional skills, have low levels of education, so they cannot get jobs in the formal sectors. According to Itodo (2005), Borno State Government earmarks N1billion for motorcycle procurement to boost public transportation and alleviate poverty, also revealed that commercial motorcycle operation business has impacted significantly on the Nigerian economy and society in many ways. One important positive impact is the provision of employment for millions of unemployed people and has empowered many Nigerians economically.

Furthermore, Itodo (2005) stressed that many unemployed youths and retired people have found gainful engagement in the commercial motorcycle operation business. Some of those who are employed in government service still engage in commercial motorcycle operation known as okada business either as owners or riders in order to augment their regular income with whatever they are able to make from okada business. Some state governments in the country have also used motorcycles as poverty alleviation scheme by procuring and distributing motorcycles to the unemployed in their states as part of poverty eradication programme.

It would appear that socioeconomic factors form the major driving force for commercial motorcycle operation in Nigeria. These factors include the low initial purchase cost, low operating cost which is generally related to the superior fuel economy or efficiency of motorcycles in relation to cars, their relatively low maintenance and perhaps the most important in Nigeria's context, is the employment opportunities it offers to our teeming unemployed youths (Solagberu et al*,* 2006). According to Adekunle et al (2013); Ikot et al (2010) indicated that commercial motorcycle operation serve as a means of job opportunity to many people (unskilled and skilled) and also there's pleasure in riding motorcycle as the experience is equal to camel/horse riding for pleasure. Abiodun (2013) has reported that the most important consideration for people, especially the youths, to get involved in commercial motorcycle operation is the rise in the unemployment rate among youths coupled with the poor economic situation in Nigeria has greatly influenced the rise in the use of motorcycles as means of commercial transportation.

Ajay (2011) has revealed that demand responsiveness is another transport advantage offered by commercial motorcycle operation. It may be considered as products; intangible products that are also subject to the economic factor of demand and supply. What appears obvious so far is that whatever commercial motorcycles operate in Nigeria, the demand for their services have exceeded the supply. However, they seem to respond much more effectively and more efficiently than the other modes of land transportation. Christopher et al (2013) also noted that commercial motorcycle operation has created business opportunities for millions of Nigeria's, especially the youths, the retired and the retrenched persons, as well as the educated and even the uneducated in the society. The jobs created by the commercial motorcycle operation initially got a good proportion of the youths quite busy and thus removed their minds from vices that are generally associated with their age brackets.

Conclusion and Recommendation

A major challenge facing urban planners is how to incorporate an understanding of gender and differences on the one hand and livelihood systems on the other, into formal and informal planning process. A livelihood perspective is conventionally understood solely in terms of income earning and a conventional response is to promote employment creation and a local economic development. These are indeed important and appropriate responses. Furthermore, a broader perspective on livelihood system also points to how strategies around income and consumption at intra-household and inter-generational level are directed wherever possible, not merely at coping but at ensuring longer-term security. Efforts are further extended to inter-household and community level activities, which include participation in civil society organisations of various kinds. However, it is underscored here that collective actions as well as household and family level activities are included in the livelihood systems of the urban poor. They need, therefore, to be factored into the planning responses of city governance.

The study concludes that commercial motorcycle operation contributes significantly to livelihood improvement of the operators and facilitates movement of individual, hence increase social integration. The study, therefore, recommends that the government should consider and recognise commercial motorcycle operation as one of the means of living activities that fill the gap of youth employment problem. Provision of support in terms of loans to the operators of commercial motorcycles especially for those riders who hire/lease their motorcycles is also suggested. These will contribute to the reduction in unemployment and poverty rates.

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THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ON THE NIGERIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

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Abstract
Globalisation as the process of intensification of economic, political, social and cultural relations across international boundaries captures the attention of everyone and especially economic development researchers. However, despite the prior prosperity promises of globalisation and the benefits of an information accessing society, the afterwards benefits have not been universal and global inequality has increased instead. Nigeria as a country is believed to be endowed with abundant of both human and natural resources. But with all this resources Nigeria still remained highly backward and underdeveloped. The question is what has gone wrong with this nation? That exactly is the purpose of this paper, that is, to provide an insight as to the effect of globalisation on the Nigerian political economy. The paper situated the problem within the unjust contact Africa/Nigeria had with the more developed world, which have impelled series of cumulative and conjectural crisis in the international division of labour and global distribution of economic and political power; thereby qualifying basic Nigerian feature to be poverty, diseases and unemployment among other crisis of underdevelopment. The paper argued along the Marxian political economy perspective. Finally, the paper suggests some recommendations among which are to improve democratisation process, policy reorientation and commitment to policy implementation, etc.

Keywords: Globalisation, Political Economy, Development, Socio-Economic relation, Nigerian Economy

Introduction
It is a fact beyond contestation that the world in which we live today is swiftly becoming an integrated whole, where the traditional divide (that had kept different areas separated) such as time and space are becoming increasingly irrelevant. This is engineered by so many factors; most prominent of which (according to some scholar and analysts) is technological development, which makes it easier for people at different and often far apart locations to relate, or interact and transact within the shortest possible time. This motivated Heywood (2002, p. 125) to assert that the world has become a "global village". Globalisation as the term implies is certainly not new and has received major attention especially in the last few decades. It is on record that globalisation is taking place at a faster pace Dreher et al. (2008). The benefits of African countries and Nigeria in particular of this phenomenon are not enormous because of their specific

problems in all of the area of development, due to the kind of unjust relationship at the international community. Undoubtedly, a major trend that cannot be wished away in the global political economy today is the phenomenon of globalisation and as a major force in the world system, globalisation enhances trans-borders' interaction which in turn stirs all aspects of the process, namely; economic, historical, technological, social and political among others. Globalisation of the economy includes the growing of internationalisation of trade, capital investment, finance, business and the technology of production Wade (1996). The dynamics of globalisation occur not only in the economic sphere but are also tangible and perceptible in the areas of communications and transportation. Indeed, it is as easy to observe and quantify the vast flow of capital, goods and services around the world as in observing the distribution of images and ideas across national borders through antenna dishes and television set.

Globalisation, according to Akindele (1990), refers to the process of the intensification of economic, political, social and cultural relations across international boundaries. Globalisation is principally aimed at the transcendental homogenisation of political and socio-economic theory across the globe. Ohuabunwa, (1999) once opined: Globalisation can be seen as an evolution which is systematically restructuring interactive phases among nations by breaking down barriers in the areas of culture, commerce, communication and several other fields of endeavour. Undoubtedly, globalisation is a complex process which was portrayed by its supporters as having the potential to accelerate Africa's development, if the continent economies would be reformed in accordance with market principles. But clearly, globalisation is widening the disparities between the developed and developing countries/economies of the world. Africa's economies in particular are experiencing acute stagnation and in some case decline Arthur (2000). The phenomenon of globalisation came to Nigeria for the first time, not just in the last century, as it is generally thought, but when the Portuguese and the British landed on our shores before the end of nineteenth century to establish new trade link, and to spread Christianity Iwara, (2004).

The goal of this paper is to examine both the positive and negative impact of globalisation on the Nigerian political economy. We ask whether globalisation has the potential to enhance the productive capacity of the Nigerian society. However, Nigeria, a post-colonial state, cannot feign ignorance of the force of globalisation. Of course, globalisation has the promise of new opportunities for expanded markets and the spread of the use of technology. To be properly integrated into the dynamics of the global arena, Nigeria should necessarily align with the demands of the new wave of technology, capital flow and vigorously pursue the goal of development and how Nigeria can minimise the adverse effects of globalisation and harness the benefits there in to engender national development.The paper is structured into four parts. First is the introduction. The second is the conceptualisation of globalisation and political economy, this is followed by the historical account of globalisation. Fourth which is the main work dealt with the impact of globalisation on the Nigerian political economy, and final, the paper draw it cotton with a concluding remark and suggest some recommendations.

Conceptual Clarification

Globalisation

The term globalisation means different things to different people. Some say it is the movement of people, language, ideas, and products around the world. Others see it as the dominance of multinational corporations and the destruction of cultural identities. Extracting from the work of Alozi (2005) globalisation broadly refers to the expansion of global linkages, the organisation of social life on a global scale, and the growth of a global consciousness, hence to the consolidation of world society. Such a definition captures much of what the term commonly means, but its meaning is disputed. It encompasses several large processes; definitions differ in what they emphasise. Globalisation is historically complex; definitions vary in the particular driving force they identify. The meaning of the term is itself a topic in global discussion; it may refer to "real" processes, ideas that justify them, or to a way of thinking about them.

Alozi (2005) see globalisation as the deregulation of the developing nations' economies. For instance, the Ghanaian cedes which did exchange for one U.S. dollar to the cedes now exchanges for about four thousand cedes for a U.S. dollar. The Nigerian naira has moved from 0.6 for the dollar to 127 naira for the dollar. Alozi laments that the developing countries simply do not have the expertise, technology and political will to salvage their national currencies.

According to Ali (2007) globalisation is the spread of lifestyle and ideas which has reduced the world to a global village and intensities consciousness of man's environment including culture, civilisation, knowledge, production and distribution of goods and services. For him, it is an epistemology that owes its origin to Europe and America from where it was extended to other parts of the world. In fact, it is argued that the principles of globalisation push the world economy ahead if national boundaries are opened to the world market mechanisms of demand and supply. But this principle, according to Ali, favours only the technologically advanced countries and destroys the economy of the less developed countries. He sees globalisation as imperialism in disguise and as a means of marginalisation of the less developed economies.Udoette (2004, p. 24) made a study of the positive and negative sides of globalisation and concluded thus:

> In fact, far from nurturing the basic human values that make for sane and fulfilled life, globalisation is already helping to corrode the same cultural and social values of third world countries. In exchange for these values, the typical Euro American values, diseases and problems are becoming increasingly globalised in the third world countries. This means that there is need to inject sanity and give direction to globalisation if it is to be positive and useful to all.

In this regard, Wang and Jando (2008, p. 121) see "globalisation as leading to identity crisis and cultural alienation for the developing nations". Bamgbose (2008) passes the same verdict when he writes: "the fact therefore remains that the western world still keeps on spreading their numerous ideas that will continue to overshadow the entire world". Ekiyor (2007, p. 51) states: "Globalisation has aided and abetted the movement of the multinational corporations, its products and vices to every corner of the earth". But Nwanna (2007) argues that in the true sense of globalisation, it is an idea of seeing the entire world as one community which is interconnected in several ways such as trade, electronic communication system, arts, culture and religion without having some nations in the centre and others at the periphery. In the same vein, Nnedum and Ezeokana (2008) argue that globalisation in-itself is neither good nor evil, but the globalisation of Western capitalism as well as its attendant ethnocentrism is the worst form of all versions of post-modern slavery.

Political Economy

Political economy is a comprehensive interdisciplinary framework that started in the 18th century with the part breaking work of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nation* which came out in 1776, as an intellectual justification of the bourgeois' economy, as it coincided with the emergence of industrial revolution in Europe. This was largely responsible for the predominant thinking that political economy is simply the study of capitalism. But this idea was later revolutionised by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels's social theories. Political economy seeks to identify the principles and laws that govern the process of change in all human societies including capitalism. Yuri Popov (1984, p. 48) offers a very clear and lucid definition of political economy as a branch of social science that "*studies the various mode of production. By mode of production is meant the unity of the productive forces and the relations of production at a given historical stage in the development of human society*". However, it deals with the production of material wealth ---- considered as the basis of human society. More importantly, it attempts to study the laws that govern the development of human society based on the economic relations of people in the process of production. But it does not study production as an isolated event; it studies it in its total and holistic form, including distribution, exchange and consumption. We can conclude that political economy is a historical science. It attempts to study the evolution of human society at various stages of development, from the simplest to most complex.

Globalisation in History

With this perspective it is possible to identify a number of major globalisation waves or episodes across the history of mankind. Quoted in Alapiki (2005, p. 7) noted that:

> Researchers have variously dated the onset of globalisation from the down of human civilisation or from the start of the modernisation, or from the middle of the nineteenth century, or from late 1970.

Alapiki (2005) further present the structure of the global economy has its roots in the economy history of the past four centuries, particularly in the history of the development and expansion of capitalism". He then identified four phases in this development; thus:

- 1500-1800; the mercantile period, which involved the transfer of economic surplus through looting and plundering that was disguised as "free trade"
- 1800-1950s colonial periods, which involved the transfer of economic surplus through unequal terms of trade by virtue of a colonially imposed international division of labor
- 1950s-1970s the neo-colonial period which involved the transfer of economic surplus through "developmentalism", technological transfer and rents.

However, a more detailed and sequential historical overview on globalisation was captured by Imade (2003, p. 2) thus: "The first consisted of the diffusion of world religions and the establishment of civilisations covering major parts of the continents, the main period extended from the fourth to the eighth centuries AD". This was the period when Christianity gained a strong foothold in the European continent and established outposts in Africa and India. Simultaneously, the other world religions, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam, expanded out of their core areas, across continents and from one continent to another. Confucianism spread across China and neighbouring territories.

All these religions had their own, unifying, holy languages and were carriers of specific cultures. The second wave of globalisation consisted of the creation of the most wide ranging continuous empire that the world has ever seen – up to the present day: The Mongol Empire. Out of incredibly small and volatile beginnings, a people consisting of perhaps a million souls at the beginning of the thirteenth century managed to wreak major havoc on all the major civilisations surrounding it and govern a territory that extended from Eastern Europe to the Sea of Japan, and from the Indo-Chinese border and the Persian Gulf to southern Siberia and the northern parts of European Russia. For the first time in history Europe acquired a reliable knowledge about China and the Orient, two continents were brought closer together.

The Mongol episode also served to solidify some of the long-distance trade network that had been established from about 1000 to around 1350, linking the British Isles in the west with China and Indonesia, and with parts of Africa south of the Sahara. Shortly after the fall of the Mongol Yuan dynasty in China, the Chinese undertook a series of major voyages that brought them to the east coast of Africa, and had it not been for a sudden inward turn in imperial policy they might well have discovered the sea route to Europe.

Instead, the protagonist role in the third wave of globalisation, that of the geographical discoveries and territorial conquests, fell to the Europeans, notably the two Iberian kingdoms of Portugal and Spain during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the Dutch, British and French thereafter, up to around 1750. Asia was linked closer to Europe, and the Americas made their entry in the global arena. Subsequently, European wars were fought not only on the European continent but on the lands and in the waters of overseas territories as well. War had acquired a global character. At this point, a major break with the past took place in world history: the industrial revolution. This first led to increased globalisation of commerce, via the triangular trade pattern that saw European manufactures flow to North America and Africa, African slaves supplying the American plantations, and North American raw materials going into the industrial production of Europe.

The industrial revolution also constituted the prerequisite for the fourth major globalisation episode: the gradual diffusion of the new technology across the European continent, eastwards to Russia, and to post-Meiji Japan, as well as the creation of the 'north-south' type of trade pattern that was to culminate in the golden age of transport revolution, commodity trade, labor migration and capital movements from about 1870 to the outbreak of World War I. During this period European manufactures were regularly exchanged for primary products from the regions of recent settlement and less developed regions elsewhere in America, Africa and Asia. China and Japan were opened up by force to international trade. This period also saw the culmination of the territorial competition between the major European colonial powers, with the division of Africa. The First World War and the Great Depression provided the end point of this globalisation wave, and a retreat from global patterns.

The fifth wave of globalisation began with World War II, which was a great deal more global than World War I, involving major war theatres not only in Europe but in North Africa, Africa East of India and the Pacific as well. One of the major results of the war was the gradual dissolution of the colonial empires, with the exception of the Soviet Union. Another was the regrouping of the major powers that resulted in the Cold War, involving all parts of planet earth. The collapse of the Soviet Union may perhaps be put as the symbolic starting point of the sixth, hitherto unfinished, globalisation episode, but some of the major mechanisms had evolved gradually during the late 1970s and the 1980s. International trade expanded, capital movements were increasingly freed of obstacles, the European and North Atlantic economies were linked closer to one another, not only in terms of commodity and factor movements, spread of technology and trans nationalisation of firms, but also in terms of policy interdependence, mainly economically, but to an increasing extent also politically. The former communist states have been drawn into the western orbit. The internationalisation of the means of telecommunication and the mass media has been little short of revolutionary. All these tendencies have grown stronger on the one hand, and have spread across an ever vaster geographic territory on the other.

The Impacts of Globalisation on the Political Economy of Nigeria

The nature and impact of globalisation has been the subject of profound debate within political economy. We have seen that globalisation is increasing interdependence among states; it is also increased global interconnectedness, and the capacity of some states to influence others. Globalisation has had significant impacts on all economies of the world, with manifold effects. It affects their production of goods and services. It also affects the employment of labor and other inputs into the production process. In addition, it affects investment, both in physical capital and in human capital. It affects technology and results in the diffusion of technology from initiating nations to other nations. It also has major effects on efficiency, productivity and competitiveness Intriligator (2003).

It should also be noted that the new drive for globalisation of the economies of the states of the world is ideologically sponsored by the leading capitalist state of the world, to integrate the world under its imperialist hegemony. Globalisation is capitalist expansion by imperialist means. This is done in strict compliance with the rules of the imperialist theory of comparative advantage propounded by western bourgeois ideologies and foisted on the less developed areas of the world to ensure that they operate as dependent appendages in the world economy. Omitola (2005), noted that, the Nigeria colonial state served the interest of global accumulation (once drawn into the global economic system), at the periphery through the local extraction and transfer of resources to the metropolis.

However, the exploitations of the periphery did not stop at independence; rather, it developed another character as the emerging ruling class at independence continued acting the script already written by the departing colonisers. The end result of such master-servant relationship of metropoles and periphery nations like Nigeria is a gradual underdevelopment of the economies of their economy. Owing to the underdevelopment of the economy of these countries, the ruling class thus lacks the economic base to control the state. Thus, lacking economic base, the Nigerian ruling class has recourse to politics, which, affords them the opportunity of controlling the use of the state scarce economic resources. This is achieved by amassing wealth using the instrumentalities of state Ake (1996). The Nigerian economy according to Olaitan (1995) has remained mercantilist with buying and selling of produce/products rather than developing its industrial sector to compete favourably in the global market. Turner (1978, p. 67) calls it a 'commercial capitalist economy' because, it helps to expand the market of the industrialised nations.

The implication of all these is that an entrepreneurial class nurtured on commerce has dominated the Nigerian political economy. Dike (1990) observed that Nigeria in the globalisation agenda since independence requires some in-depth study. To begin with, Nigeria is economically weak due to inadequate domestic economic capacity and social infrastructure needed to boost the country's productivity, growth and competitiveness. Secondly, the economy is made weaker by monoculture dependency and unfavourable terms of trade in its export trade as well as excruciating debt and debt service burdens. And thirdly, before 1986, economic regimes were regulated and the country pursued expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in its development efforts Obadan (1998).

At independence, Nigeria was one of the Africa country that had a very good opportunity to build a viable and strong economic base even up to the 1970s, no doubt, the country, with its huge market, robust urban centers, oil revenues, attraction to transnational, vibrant capitalist culture, and influence in the global system had the chance to exploit opportunities in the global order. Unfortunately, this did not happen. The opportunities were squandered and negated by a combination of structural factors and forces; an unstable and non-hegemonic state; an irresponsible, divided, quarrelsome and dependent bourgeoisie; inefficient and ineffective bureaucracy; weak industrial and economic structures; a predatory economic culture addicted to corruption, waste mismanagement and the mentality of getting it at all cost, coupled with foreign domination, manipulation, and exploitation. The chances for using oil rents to reverse the trend and constraints of underdevelopment and build a viable political economy were frittered away and state power was used to rationalise and legitimise not just corrupt attitudes but also a subservient and unequal relationship with profit and hegemony-seeking transnational corporations Ihonvbere, (2004).

Globalisation, in the cast of colonial legacy, came along in the eighties as a "liberating" force opposed to military politics and its corruptive influences. Its pervasive impact was felt even more strongly in the nineties, as information technology turned the world into a global village and revolutionised people's identity paradigms that negatively affected the economic system of the country and as well played up western political systems as models for Nigeria (Bigman, 2002). The military caved in, but post-military politics contributed in its wake awkward forms of identity politics that went from local and traditional alignments to global issues of human rights and obligations (Onwuka and Eguavoen, 2007).

The evidences of the negative impact of globalisation on Nigeria are legion, for example: (a) the controversial Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), an economic policy designed to liberalise Nigerian economy in the spirit of globalisation has produced serious negative effects – including inflation, and devaluation of currency, creating new threats to human development – the argument about its faulty implementation notwithstanding; (b) globalisation provides avenue for corrupt officials to loot the treasury of their countries. Many of Nigerian leaders, who had to forfeit hard earned foreign exchange to Western banks and collaborators with many of the loans secured for projects were repatriated abroad through money laundering. According to Ribadu (2006), the African Union estimates that as much as $148 billion yearly, or 25 percent of Africa's official Gross National Product (GNP), is lost to corrupt activities in Africa; (c) the collapse of local industries especially in the textile and automobile industries. Majekodunmi and Adejuwon (2012) estimated that, about 150,000 jobs loses from 1989 – 1999. Textile materials – Ankara brocade and Lace – are now massively being smuggled through the porous border with Benin Republic and up North with Niger Republic. The domination of the car importation segment by the Vaswani brothers finally led to the collapse of the close to 20 automobile plants strewn across the country.

Today, only Peugeot Automobile of Nigeria (PAN) is surviving with production cut from dozens of cars per day to about a dozen in a month. Such other auto firms like Steyr, Leyland, Mercedes-Benz-ANAMCO, Volkswagen, Nigeria Truck Manufacturing Company, etc., have become history. Even tire manufacturers like Michelin and Dunlop are facing stiff competition from imported tires from Asia and South America; (d) and last cultural erosion: today in Nigeria, Chinese cuisines are more popular than the local menu, and the economy of Nigeria could be said to be substantially in the hands of Lebanese, Indians, Koreans, Chinese, French people, Americans and Britons Ayandiji, (2006). The problem of labour market integration also applies to Nigeria. However, many highly skilled Nigerians have migrated to other African countries where their skills are required. This pattern follows what has been established in other regions of the world. The problem with labour migration as it affects Nigeria is that highly skilled personnel that are in short supply in the country are moving out in search of better opportunities. Labour migration in the industrialised countries releases only the portion of labour that is in excess supply. Thus, the country of origin is not disadvantaged Majekodunmi and Adejuwon (2012). In order for Nigeria to benefit from globalisation, efforts should be made to develop human capital and decode the mult-imedia super-corridor for relevant information. Thus, information technology should progress in line with the global trend. Above all, good governance, transparency and accountability are desirable for a strong and competitive economy

Conclusion

Trade liberalisation and the openness of national borders, coupled with other features of globalisation are the new gospel after the end of the ideological polarisation of the world, emphasis has been placed on the integration of national economies to secure maximum benefits from global economic prosperity. Globalisation has been facilitated by the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs), the multilateral monetary and financial system, especially the Bretton Woods institutions and the international trading arrangements. Globalisation has both positive and negative effects; the positive effects are international specialisation, which results in high quality and low cost products, improvement in welfare and the closer interaction between national goods and services, and financial markets. From the above analysis, it however, becomes crystal clear that the process of globalisation which the good side has been over portrayed to the world is mostly evil. Nonetheless, we are not saying that there is nothing good with globalisation, there are number of areas where globalisation has been commended especially by its supported (refer to the aforementioned positive impact); my argument is that globalisation has done more far greater harm than good to the third world in general and Nigeria in particular.

Recommendations

- There should be gradual policy reorientation and commitment towards implementing the existing good ones for national development.
- Address institutional capacity needs (i.e., create and/or strengthen institutions that are change-oriented, outward-looking and able to interact meaningfully with global actors). These institutions must be in all spheres of politics and public administration and they

must be tailored to have the ability to network with the private sector, civil society and the international community.

- There should be more effort toward social reorientation and civic education. This will go a long way in producing highly discipline and patriotic citizenry.
- Improve on the democratisation process that will lead to pluralism, where broad segment of the society will be empower to fully and genuinely participate in replacing the current extractive political and economic institutions for critical and meaningful development
- Strive to increase and strengthen the voice of Nigerian governments in the politics of international bodies (such as the United Nations, etc.) to offset the weaknesses created by the pressure of global actors at the local level, as the decision-power of world bodies is eroding the decision of states.
- Develop social capital, especially by investing in the education and health sectors. Such an attitude would then create a mindset for self-assessment and appraisal to see how the weakness can be conquered.
- Adopt a proactive approach to globalisation so that the challenges it poses and the benefits it offers can be foreseen and planned for. The reality of globalization force changes it.
- Address human capacity needs from a comprehensive angle (skills, knowledge, attitude, networks, and information technology).

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THEME SIXTEEN
POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION

ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION ON DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA FROM 1999 TO 2020

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Abstract
Nigeria has an estimated population of 202 million people and is Africa' s biggest oil exporter with the largest natural gas reserves on the African continent, yet it is beleaguered by the paradox of being the poverty capital of the world when she ranked 152 out of 157 countries in the World Bank's 2018 Human Capital Index. Nigeria's unemployment rate stood at 23% in 2018 and the lack of job opportunities has been adjudged to be at the core of the high poverty levels in the country. Despite the various poverty reduction strategies by the Nigerian government over the years, yet these interventions have not stemmed the tide of poverty. This paper questioned the impact of poverty, inequality and social exclusion on development in Nigeria amongst others. Findings reveal that poverty has impacted lack of development, increased civil unrest, insufficient infrastructure, weak and ineffective institutions as well as bad governance and financial improbity. Diversification of Nigeria's mono-economy and restructuring of the federating States into regions was proffered as strategies to break the cycle of poverty in Nigeria so that exportation of groundnut pyramids, palm oil, cocoa, rubber and precious stones can resume again, utilising the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement platform to increase foreign exchange earnings.

Keywords: Poverty, Inequality, Exclusion, Deprivation, Strategies, Development

1.0 Introduction

The United Nations (1998) stated that poverty is a denial of choices and opportunities, a violation of human dignity, lack of basic capacity to participate effectively in society, not having enough to feed and clothe a family, not having a school or clinic to go to; not having the land on which to grow one's food or a job to earn one's living, not having access to credit. It means insecurity, powerlessness and exclusion of individuals, households and communities, susceptibility to violence, and it often implies living on marginal or fragile environments without access to clean water or sanitation.

World Bank (2001) emphasised that poverty is a multidimensional phenomena and summarised the various dimensions as a lack of empowerment and a lack of security. Ucha (2010) said that unemployment, corruption, non-diversification of the economy, income inequality, laziness, and a poor education system can be considered to be some of the key factors contributing to poverty in Nigeria. In the same vein, Onibokun and Kumuyi (1996) described poverty as a way of life characterised by low calorie intake, inaccessibility to adequate health facilities, low quality of education system, low life expectancy, high infant mortality, low income, unemployment and underemployment, and inaccessibility to various housing and social facilities.

Poverty, inequality and social exclusion are different sides of the same coin. Inequality is the existence of unequal opportunities and rewards for different social positions or statuses within a group or society. There are different dimensions of inequality – gender inequality, income inequality, access to health inequality, literacy inequality, employment inequality, housing inequality, access to basic infrastructure inequality, standard of living inequality and so on. Unequal access to these amenities leads to a cycle of poverty and exclusion.

Social exclusion refers to the exclusion from the prevailing social system and its rights and privileges, typically as a result of poverty or the fact of belonging to a minority social group. Social exclusion or social marginalisation is the social disadvantage and relegation to the fringe of society. In Nigeria, some parts of the country are excluded from federal appointments and infrastructural projects and this has impacted adversely on their representativeness, equality and development. The result is that the excluded minorities live in abject poverty and underdevelopment. Poverty, inequality and social exclusion are interconnected variables and they most often impact negatively on development.

According to World Development Report (WDR, 1991), The challenge of development is to improve the quality of life, better education, higher standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more equality of opportunity, greater individual freedom and a richer cultural life.

Onah (2010) painted a picture of a new concept of development when he said that "Development is conceived as a state of human well-being rather than as a state of the national economy". He stated that this concern was expressed in a statement known as the Cocoyoc Declaration, which was adopted by participants in a seminar organised by the United Nations Council on Trade Development (UNCTAD) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in Cocoyoc, Mexico, in 1974. The Declaration stated:

> "Our first concern is to redefine the whole purpose of development. This should not be to develop things but to develop man. Human beings have basic needs: food, shelter, clothing, health, education. Any process of growth that does not lead to their fulfilment – or, even worse, disrupts them is a travesty of the idea of development." (Cocoyoc Declaration, quoted in Onah 2010, p. 15).

Over the years, Nigeria has rolled out National Development Plans, Visions and Poverty Alleviation Strategies and these too have failed to address neither the growth of the national economy nor the individual well being of Nigerians.

1.2 Statement of the Problem:

The world is experiencing the global scourge of poverty especially after the Covid-19 pandemic and Nigeria is not an exception. According to World Poverty Clock (2020)

102,125,917 persons representing 50% of the total population of 205,323,504 people in Nigeria are living in extreme poverty. When disaggregated by sex, 51,623,790 people representing 50% are males living in abject poverty while 50,502,127 persons representing 50% are females.

Onah (2010) identified the causes of poverty in Nigeria as corruption, civil, ethnic and religious wars and crises; poor leadership, flood and natural disasters, class structure and military rule amongst others. He also gave the indicators of poverty in Nigeria as hunger and food crises, lack of access to safe water, poor health services, unemployment and underemployment, political instability and insecurity, prostitution and sexual promiscuity and income inequality.

Omoniyi (2018) further stated that poverty persists due to epileptic power supply, overdependence on earnings from oil, inadequate infrastructural facilities as well as lack of access to improved technology. Other causes of poverty include non-availability of credit instruments and the exclusion of some 'regional groups' from participating in the democratic process, depreciation of the Nigerian currency (Naira), environmental degradation, worker retrenchment and lack of enabling environment for Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs). Some respondents interviewed posit that the 1999 Constitution in Nigeria with its concomitant exaggerated number of people in government is a major cause of poverty in Nigeria, as the large sum of money used to pay them sitting allowances could be used for development projects.

However, Danaan (2018) argued that despite a myriad of poverty reduction strategies and programmes applied by the Nigerian government to eradicate poverty over the years like, Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), Universal Basic Education (UBE), Better Life for Rural Women, Family Support Programme (FSP), National Directorate of Employment (NDE) National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) and most recently, the Social Investment Programmes comprising N-Power, National Cash Transfer Programme and National Home Grown School Feeding (NHGSFP); yet poverty alleviation has remained a mirage, as 50% of the population still wallow in poverty. This state of affairs has negatively impacted on development in Nigeria as unemployment is still on the increase; some regions of the country are excluded and marginalised in the area of representativeness in government through political appointments while the national income and development projects are inequitably distributed.

It is against this backdrop that the researcher threw up the following research questions.

- How have poverty, inequality and social exclusion impacted on Development in Nigeria?
- How can the national income be equitably distributed among the tiers of government to break the cycle of poverty, inequality and social exclusion in Nigeria?
- What strategies of poverty reduction and inclusion could be adapted for development and equality in Nigeria?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

Broad Objective

The overarching objective of this study is to assess the impact of poverty, inequality and social exclusion on development in Nigeria from 1999-2020.

Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of this study are:

- to ascertain specific impacts of poverty, inequality and exclusion on development in Nigeria;
- to identify methods of more equitable distribution of the national income among the tiers of government in Nigeria to break the cycle of poverty, inequality and social exclusion; and
- to proffer strategies for poverty reduction, equality and social inclusion that would lead to more development in Nigeria.

1.4 Significance of the Study

This study has both theoretical and empirical significance. Theoretically this study is significant for scholars in Public Administration, Political Science and Development Studies, as the issues thrown up by this research will provide further areas of study to scholars in these fields.

Empirically, this research is significant for Government Planners, Policy Makers, Civil Society Organisations and the implementers of government policies as strategies proffered in this study could be implemented for further development and poverty alleviation in Nigeria.

1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study

1.5.1 *Scope of the Study*

This study focused on the assessment of causes of poverty, inequality and social exclusion in Nigeria and their impact on developmental efforts in the country. The researcher reviewed the different poverty reduction programmes of the government over the years and questioned why despite all these efforts, poverty, inequality and social exclusion still persists in Nigeria.

1.5.2 *Limitations of the Study*

This study was limited by the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequential social distancing which limited access to key respondents for more extensive interviews for the study. The researcher overcame this limitation by using online interviews through Zoom applications or Google Duo to achieve the purpose.

2.1 Literature Review

2.2 *Theoretical and Empirical Literature*

The literature on different theories relating to this study were reviewed as follows:

2.2.1 The Culture of Poverty

According to Danaan (2018), this theory was developed by Oscar Lewis, an American anthropologist and it states that the culture of poverty is prevalent in developing countries and societies in the early stages of industrialisation as well as among the lower class in advanced capitalist societies. It is a reaction to low income and lack of opportunities such that people live for the present and believe in luck rather than personal effort to achieve success.

Aluko (2002) applied this theory in Nigeria when he stated that weak governance, impunity, systemic failures, illiteracy, income inequality, unemployment and corruption have entrenched this culture of poverty, manifesting in poor orientation, low standard of living and a high rate of social ills, political unrest and abuse of religion. Politicians and government officials tend to be selfish, greedy and corrupt, enriching themselves by looting from the common wealth of the country.

Smith (2010) opined that greed and selfishness seem to be embedded in the psyche of an average Nigerian in leadership position. Funds meant for development are mismanaged and embezzled by corrupt government officials. Good values and hard work are unrewarded and ill-gotten wealth is lauded and celebrated. Indiscipline, bribery and corruption, extortion, nepotism and tribalism are acceptable norms in every sphere. The result is a recurring cycle of poverty.

2.2.2 Progressive Social Theory

According to Danaan (2018) proponents of this theory do not view individuals as the source of poverty but economic, political and social distortions as well as discrimination, which limits opportunities and resources to create wealth and overcome poverty. They argue that people may work hard and have acceptable attitude but still be in the poverty loop as a result of dysfunctional social and economic systems. The theory ascribes poverty to economic, social and political structures that the poor fall behind regardless of how committed they may be.

Omoyibo (2013) correlating this theory with the situation in Nigeria stated that in Nigeria, government policies and actions exacerbate poverty. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and its various fallouts in the form of massive devaluation of the Naira, high inflation, factory closures, privatisation, commercialisation, inappropriate pricing of petroleum products and unlimited free market contributed to poverty in Nigeria.

Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999 and the Obasanjo administration established the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) to create jobs and reduce poverty. In 2004 the National Economic Empowerment Programme (NEEDS) was introduced to reduce poverty. The Jonathan administration in 2012 launched the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Program (SURE-P) to reinvest the federal government's savings from fuel subsidy removal, to provide safety net programmes to reduce poverty in Nigeria. In 2016, the Buhari administration rolled out the Social Investment Programmes for poverty alleviation in Nigeria. Yet, despite all these programmes and strategies, Aliyu (2017) stated that these poverty reduction strategies have been sabotaged by policy inconsistency, lack of effective mechanism for project monitoring, lack of accountability and probity in program implementation, poor coordination of programmes and inadequate funding. In spite of all these laudable poverty reduction programmes launched in the past, Nigeria is still alluded to as the poverty capital of the world. Dubai discovered oil long after Nigeria, but today they have turned their desert into paradise and a destination for shopping and sightseeing, which underpins the fact that Nigeria's problem is bad leadership.

2.3 *Gap in Literature*

This study assessed the impact of poverty, inequality and social exclusion on development in Nigeria using the MDG and SDG lenses to ascertain how far the poverty eradication programmes and strategies have alleviated poverty in Nigeria. Though other scholars have researched on this field of study, this paper tried to fill the gap of impact of poverty on development in Nigeria with a focus on how it has impacted on the achievement of the MDGs and SDGs.

2.4 Theoretical Framework

2.4.1 Social Exclusion Theory

Majid et al (2012) explained that Social Exclusion theory views poverty as a declining participation and access to resources. While Laderchi et al (2003) outlined the attributes of social exclusion as multidimensionality, dynamic, relational, active, relative and contextual. The multidimensionality of social exclusion exists in economic, social and political forms. He argued that social exclusion occurs when a person or group is deprived of its social status. When social exclusion occurs the individuals affected do not have an equal opportunity for jobs in the labour market. In the political arena, social exclusion occurs when a certain group including women and racial minorities are deprived of part or all of their political rights.

The application of the theory in Nigeria would be seen in the political appointments made by the Buhari administration which are lopsided as all the Security Chiefs come from a particular tribe to the exclusion of other tribes in Nigeria. The plum appointments and jobs are occupied by Northerners to the exclusion of the Southern Nigerians. The same goes with the distribution of resources and infrastructural projects, the North is favoured while the South and especially the South East are marginalised.

2.5 Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were formulated for this study:

- Poverty, inequality and social exclusion have impacted negatively on development in Nigeria.
- Inequitable distribution of the national income among the tiers of government is a major cause of poverty, inequality and social exclusion in Nigeria.
- Restructuring of the federating states into regional governments is a strategy that can curb poverty, inequality and social exclusion in Nigeria.

2.6 Operationalisation of Key Concepts

The key variables used in this research have been operationalised as follows:

- *Poverty* in this research means people living below $1 per day and as such is unable to provide the basic necessities of life like food, water, shelter, education and basic health care.
- *Inequality* refers to the uneven distribution of resources, employment, appointments, infrastructure, projects and the national income.

- *Social exclusion* is used here to mean excluding certain people from participating in social, political, economic or religious life in the society in which they belong.
- *Deprivation* in this context means the denial of access to acquire the basic necessities of life.
- *Strategies* were used here to refer to plans of action designed to reduce poverty.
- *Development* here means a process by which the economic well-being and quality of life of a nation, region, local community, or an individual are transformed and improved.

2.7 Research Procedure

2.7.1 Research Design

This study employed the qualitative empirical survey research method and used the descriptive technique to report findings. A total of 72 respondents were selected as a representative population for the 36 States of Nigeria. Primary data were generated from the field using unstructured interviews, while secondary data were sourced from Journals, textbooks, government reports and Internet materials.

2.7.2 Method of Data Presentation and Analysis

This study assessed the impact of poverty, inequality and social exclusion on development in Nigeria. Simple percentages, tables and Pie charts were used to analyze and present the data sets from the field.

3.1. Findings

This research assessed the impact of poverty, inequality and social exclusion on development in Nigeria using the MDG and SDG lenses. Most of the Sustainable Development Goals and MDGs are targeted towards reducing poverty. In 2016, the World Poverty Clock reported that 45% of Nigerians were living in poverty and in 2020 the population of persons living in poverty has increased to 50%. Hunger, disease, poor standard of education, lack of portable water and sanitation, unaffordable energy, unemployment, inequalities and conflict still predominates in Nigeria making development and achievement of the SDGs and MDGs a mirage.

Further findings in this work were discussed under the Hypotheses formulated for the study shown below:

Hypothesis 1: Poverty, inequality and social exclusion has impacted negatively on development in Nigeria.

Hypothesis 2**:** Inequitable distribution of the national income among the tiers of government is a major cause of poverty, inequality and social exclusion in Nigeria.

Hypothesis 3**:** Restructuring of the federating states into regional governments is a strategy that can curb poverty, inequality and social exclusion in Nigeria.

3.2 Discussion

***3.2.1 Hypothesis 1*:** Poverty, inequality and social exclusion has impacted negatively on development in Nigeria.

Despite the different interventions and poverty alleviation programmes by the federal government over the years, poverty still persists and in fact is rising, making development infinitesimal as illustrated in Table 1 below:

Table 1 Showing Comparison of Poverty Rates in 2016 and 2020

Year	No. of People living in Poverty	Total Population	Percent of People living in Poverty
2016	84,329,502	185,855,984	45%
2020	102,125,917	205,323,505	50%

Source: Table was generated by the Researcher using data from World Poverty Clock for 2016 and 2020.

Table 1 above suggests that poverty has increased by 5% between 2016 and 2020 in Nigeria and there can be no development where hunger, disease, poor standard of education, lack of affordable energy, water and sanitation, unemployment, inequalities and conflicts still persists. We therefore accept Hypothesis 1 which states that *Poverty, inequality and social exclusion has impacted negatively on development in Nigeria.*

3.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Inequitable distribution of the national income among the tiers of government is a major cause of poverty, inequality and social exclusion in Nigeria.

Poverty, inequality and social exclusion exists in Nigeria as a result of inequitable distribution of the national wealth among the tiers of government, bad leadership and governance including misappropriation of public funds. This trajectory has slowed down the rate of development in Nigeria, as funds mapped out for developmental projects are mismanaged and embezzled by corrupt government officials.

A look at the current revenue allocation formula displays inequitable distribution of the national wealth among the tiers of government where the federal government takes 52.68% of the monthly national income, while 36 states and 774 Local government Councils share the remaining 47.32%. The derivation revenue of 13% goes to the oil producing states. The unequal distribution of the national income among the three tiers of government perpetrates poverty, inequality and social exclusion in Nigeria as can be seen in this revenue allocation formula. If poverty alleviation and development are desired for Nigeria, then this revenue sharing formula should be revisited for a more equitable distribution of the national wealth among the three tiers of government.

Table 2. Showing the Revenue Allocation Formula among the tiers of Government

S/N	*Tier of Government*	*Allocation*	*Derivation Revenue*	*Remarks*
1.	Federal	52.68%	13%	
2.	State	26.72%		36 States and 774 Local Government Councils share 47.32% while the federal government alone takes 52.68%
3.	Local Government	20.60%		
TOTAL		**100%**		

Source: Table was generated by the researcher with data collected from the field.

Pie Chart 1 : Showing Revenue Allocation Formula in Nigeria



Source: Pie Chart was plotted by the researcher using data from the field.

In Table 2 and Pie Chart 1 above, it would be seen that the federal government collects more than half of the monthly allocation leaving below half (47.32%) of the revenue for 774 LGAs and 36 states to share. The inequality is so glaring and engenders poverty. We therefore accept Hypothesis 2 which states that *Inequitable distribution of the national income among the tiers of government is a major cause of poverty, inequality and social exclusion in Nigeria.*

3.2.3 Hypothesis 3: Restructuring of the federating states into regional governments is a strategy that can curb poverty, inequality and social exclusion in Nigeria**.**

Nigeria clocked 60 on 1st October 2020 yet the country is crawling at a snail pace in terms of development. Poverty, inequality and social exclusion still persists in Nigeria even with the Vision 20:2020 project, MDGs and SDGs. Despite all the poverty alleviation programmes in the past, yet little progress has been recorded in terms of development. Nigeria remains the poverty capital of the world. Before the discovery of oil, Nigeria operated a regional system of government and each region embarked on developmental projects with earnings from their agricultural produce.

A total of 72 respondents selected as a representative population of the 36 states were

S/N	No. of Respondents	Response	Percent
1.	48	AGREE	66.7%
2.	24	DISAGREE	33.3%
TOTAL	**72**		**100%**

Source: Table was generated by the researcher from responses in the field.

Looking at Table 3 above, out of the 72 respondents interviewed, 48 persons representing 66.7% agreed that restructuring the federating states into regions is a strategy to stop poverty, inequality and social exclusion in Nigeria, while 24 persons representing 33.3% disagreed. We therefore accept Hypothesis 3 which states that Restructuring of the federating states into regional governments is a strategy that can help curb poverty, inequality and social exclusion in Nigeria.

4.0 Conclusion

Over-dependence on oil and lack of diversification of Nigeria's mono-economy accounts for poverty in Nigeria. Food insecurity and hunger abounds as Nigeria imports food and depends on foreign food for the survival of its citizens. Before oil was discovered in Nigeria, there were massive exportation and earnings from agricultural products like palm oil, rubber, groundnuts, iron ore, cocoa etc. which were used to build infrastructures. Today even with the huge earnings from crude oil, regrettably this has not translated into poverty reduction for the rural poor. Each government rolls out its own poverty alleviation programmes, yet poverty, inequality and social exclusion still abounds among the larger population of Nigerians. This has been largely blamed on bad leadership, corruption, nepotism and lack of political will to monitor and evaluate programmes to make sure that it achieves its goals and objectives of poverty alleviation. In a recurring manner, money released for poverty alleviation programmes are siphoned by the rich politicians, leaving the poor masses poorer. Hence Nigeria is farfetched from achieving its vision 20:2020 and the MDG and SDG goals and objectives which literally translate to minimal development.

5.0 Recommendations

To reduce poverty, inequality and social exclusion in Nigeria, the following recommendations have been proffered.

- Amendment of the 1999 Constitution which paved the way for an expensive system of government. The money wasted in running a bogus government could be used for development and social infrastructure that could lift people out of poverty.
- Diversification of Nigeria's economy through mechanized agriculture to provide employment for the teeming youth, provide food security and increase foreign reserve earnings from exportation of farm produce making use of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA).
- Restructuring of the federating States into regions to make room for creativity and industry and reduce the reliance on the federal allocation for payment of salaries and developmental projects.
- The revenue allocation formula should be reviewed to make room for a more equitable distribution of the national resources among the three tiers of government.
- Creativity and initiatives to encourage SMEs for entrepreneurial growth which will drive employment creation should be put in place.

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INEQUALITY AND EXCLUSION IN NIGERIA: A CRITICAL VIEW OF BUHARI'S ADMINISTRATION TOWARDS IGBO PEOPLE OF SOUTHEAST

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Abstract

Several studies point to the importance of the nature and quality of governance in reducing inequality, exclusion and preventing conflict from breaking out. Democratic peace theory states that democratic society will not fight each other and is less likely to experience civil war. Democracy tends to reduce inequality and exclusion of the minority and dissident opinion in any country. Recent happening in Nigeria shows that democracy alone cannot reduce inequality and exclusion, because the country's political institutions of governance and leadership have compromised them. The study identifies empirical evidence that Igbo People which is located in the Southeast region of Nigeria are excluded from Buhari's administration which cuts across economic, political, social, and structural realms compared to other regions in the country, and these have created exclusion and tense in the country. The data for the study were gathered from secondary sources and the theoretical framework that anchored the study was the relative deprivation theory. The study recommends, amongst other vital ones, the introduction of power-sharing among the geopolitical zones, decentralisation, and devolution of power to the federating units to guarantee equity, equality, inclusion, and allay the fears of domination by one section of the country.

Keywords: Inequality, Exclusion, Security, Igbo People, Buhari's Administration.

Introduction

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic group with the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba constituting the three largest groups. Each of these ethnic groups, before the colonial invasion, had existed independently on its own and had its own socio-cultural, political, and economic systems by which the entire life of its members was organised and different from others. During the period of this colonial rule which lasted for several decades, the British colonial authorities through several socio-political and economic policies subjected the entire territory and people to all sorts of political arrangement and exploitations that brought acrimony, primordial and mutual suspicion between the three dominant ethnic groups in economic and political activities of the country. Before political independence in 1960, the colonial masters did not make any genuine move to unite these three dominant ethnic groups that were polarised and fractionalised.

According to Johnson & Olaniyan, (2017), the Igbo inhabit the Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and the Imo States, and these states are popularly known as the Southeast zone of Nigeria. Their representation in Rivers and Delta States is more than 30%, while their presence is also marginally felt in Benue, Akwa Ibom, and the Cross River States. The whole of Nigeria, from the bustling megapolis in the North and South there is no community without Igbo presence, most of who function as school teachers, doctors, artisans, merchants, produce buyers, and petty traders.

In 1967, the Igbo and other ethnic groups of South-Eastern Nigeria attempted to secede from the Nigerian state by declaring the Biafra Republic. Before that declaration, a series of efforts were made to appease them, but all were to no avail. This resulted in a three-year war that killed millions of people as well as inflicting massive destruction of property and the environment.

This work inequality and exclusion seek to identify practical, politically viable solutions to meet the targets on equitable and inclusive Nigeria because Buhari's administration has been accused that his government is characterized with distrust in a political appointment and polarisation of federal government agencies to favour some section, region or ethnic-national in the country. The promotion of inequality and exclusion has brought agitations for self-determination by the Igbo people which has affected the country. Just like Transparency International (2019) says anger over inequality and exclusion is a formidable political force. People's anger erupts when there is a situation that can serve as a lightning rod for their frustration. Nonetheless, our preoccupation in this work is to evaluate the political inequality and exclusion in Nigeria: a critical view of Buhari's administration towards the Igbo people of Southeast. Though, other ethnic nationalities, regions, section and other geopolitical areas of the country too have been complaining of inequality and exclusion from Buhari's administration.

Theoretical Perspective

The work adopts relative deprivation based on its apt conviction in providing a roadmap in explaining and linking up with inequality and exclusion in the society. It will link with the subject matter under investigation. Relative deprivation theory is a psychological theory of how individuals' perceptions and expectations about their material conditions shape their behavior. The theory has been used to connote people's perceptions of their wellbeing relative to comparative others.

Ige (2014) says that relative deprivation is used to refer to the emotion one feels when making negatively discrepant comparisons. Karim, et al (2017) opines that relative deprivation theory is often the starting point for thinking about how grievances can trigger violent behavior. In a similar vein, Langer and Smedts (2013) analyse Afro Barometer data to examine the relationship between individual perceptions of inequality between ethnic groups. They say individuals who perceived themselves and their ethnic groups to be politically excluded are more likely to perceive their groups as being relatively economically disadvantaged compared to other groups in society. Relative deprivation relates more to inequalities and exclusion. The spread of civil right movements, self-determination, agitation, insurgency, revolution, terrorism in society, these are made to realise that collective actions were rational actions to achieve specified objectives.

From the above theory, the Igbo people of Southeast, for instance, perceive themselves as the three worst-off ethnic groups in Nigeria despite their population as one of the tripods in the country. This explained interactions between Buhari's administration towards the Southeast Igbo's grievance. The discontent and frustration that arises from Buhari's appointments and infrastructural discrimination towards the Igbo people make them feel marginalised in Nigeria. The Igbo people compared themselves as the major ethnic group in the country are worst-off compare to Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba and the other five geopolitical zones of the country. The relative deprivation says the greater the discrepancy in political, economic, or social; the greater the motivation to fight for redistribution, equality, inclusion in the country. This has made the Igbo youths through the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) initiate conflict to preserve their tripod position and to access their national share from Buhari's political appointments, economic and infrastructural distribution in the country.

Conceptual Clarification

This part aims to explore the literature on inequality and exclusion. Under this section, the paper will conceptualise the following:

- Political Inequality; and
- Political Exclusion.

Political Inequality

The ancient Greeks viewed wealth inequality as a key source of political upheaval, with Aristotle postulating in Politics that the wealthy and the poor alike will fight for a regime more aligned with their preferences and interests, but in the case of the poor, only when they have the material means to do so. Later political theorists agreed on the combustive potential of class inequality, including de Tocqueville, Machiavelli, and perhaps most famously, Karl Marx. Both de Tocqueville and Marx argued that inequality between rich and poor has historically been the root cause of revolutions, with Marx going so far as to claim in *The Communist Manifesto* that the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Or in the words of de Tocqueville: remove the secondary causes that have produced the great convulsions of the world and you will almost always find the principle of inequality at the bottom (Karim et al, 2017).

Theories of political inequality draw to ethno-nationalism, the principle of self-determination, and on how ethnic capture of the state apparatus provide politically excluded groups with incentives to challenge the status quo. Political inequality requires group members to compare the status of their group to that of others, and such comparison is much more likely when groups are delimited and group members share an identity. IPOB rebellion was positively related to political differentials, defined as political inequality that result from Igbo in access to scarce resources and positions, also negatively related to political discrimination, defined as patterned social behaviors by other groups that systematically restrict group members' access to resources, opportunities, rights, and positions in the country.

Political Exclusion

There is no universally agreed definition or benchmark for political exclusion, lack of participation in society is at the heart of nearly all definitions put forth by scholars, government bodies, non-governmental organisations and others see exclusion describes a state in which individuals are unable to participate fully in economic, social, political and cultural life, as well as the process leading to and sustaining such a state. Political exclusion entails limited political participation and clout, such that excluded groups may lack influence over resource allocation and representation in policies and strategic positions in government (Carr-Hill, 2013)

The importance of political exclusion is emphasised in Bartusevicius's (2014) work, who finds that nation political exclusion is a key predictor of ethnic conflict, that political exclusion is likely to be even more explosive when a group has been suddenly ousted from a position of power can heighten widespread discontent. Political or social exclusion entails not only material deprivation but also a lack of agency or control over important decisions as well as feelings of alienation and inferiority. Exclusion is a complex and multi-dimensional process. It involves the lack of or denial of resources, rights, goods, and services, and the inability to participate in the normal relationships and activities, available to the majority of people in a society, whether in economic, social, cultural, or political arenas. It affects both the quality of life of individuals, and the equity and cohesion of society as a whole (Levitas et al, 2007).

Popay et al (2008) posit that exclusion consists of dynamic, multi-dimensional processes driven by unequal power relationships interacting across four main dimensions – economic, political, social, and cultural – and at different levels including individual, household, group, community, country, and global levels. It results in a continuum of exclusion characterised by unequal access to resources, capabilities, and rights which leads to inequalities. The salience of each domain depends strongly on the country and local contexts as well as on the stage of a people's life. Some symptoms of exclusion are; unequal access to resources; unequal participation; denial of opportunities.

Political exclusion leads to an increase in prejudice towards the political outgroup. Ren, et al (2018) have demonstrated that being excluded and ignored increases anti-social feelings (e.g., feeling disagreeable, angry) and behaviours (e.g., aggression). For instance, people dislike those who exclude them more and punish them if they have the possibility. Just like Cederman, Weidmann, et al (2015) say several studies have found that group-level exclusion from the executive, as well as a recent loss of executive power, increases the risk of group participation in civil conflict.

Political Exclusion of Igbo in Buhari's Political Appointment

The Nigeria civil war ended with a promise from the Federal Government to reconcile the Nigerian state and Igbo people. The then President Yakubu Gowon pledged to guarantee the security of life and property of all Nigerians, including the secessionist leaders and their followers (Johnson & Olaniyan, 2017). Enweremadu (2016) says the Gowon Administration's subsequent years' introduction of a host of other policies and decisions aimed at strengthening peace and national unity and guaranteeing political stability in the country.

Before the Fourth Republic and the emergence of President Buhari's government in 2015, the Igbo people have been short-changed and marginalised in the distribution of political, economic, and social offices compared to two dominant tribes of the country. Ikenna, et al (2018) opines that the existence of the Igbo ethnic group separatist movements such as the Movement for the Actualisation of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM), and the IPOB all point to the perceived feelings of inequality, exclusion, marginalisation, and discrimination of the Igbos of Southeast. These ill feelings are part of the issues that led to the Nigerian-Biafran Civil War between 1967 and 1970 have persisted to date. The Igbo felt they have lost political relevance in Nigeria politics because of Buhari's administration political appointments. This was also seen in the leadership of the legislative arm of government, maybe due to its mass voting for former President Goodluck Jonathan and Atiku Abubakar, all were Buhari's opponents of the People Democratic Party (PDP). This confirmed the President's statement in July 2015 that he would treat the different constituencies in Nigeria based on how they vote in the 2015 presidential election (West Africa Network Research for Peacebuilding, 2016).

Duruji (2014) differently points to the perception of inequality and injustice held by the Igbos by the different governments since 1979 to the inability of democratic institutions to contain the explosion of ethnonational grievances in Nigeria. According to Aribisola (2015), the root causes of the IPOB struggle for self-determination in Buhari's administration was as the result of inequality and exclusion. He observed that:

> In the eight years of Obasanjo and Yar'Adua/Jonathan Presidency, there was no headline-grabbing demand for Biafra. The Igbo demand for Biafra has become deafening without a doubt, the blame for this new impetus be laid firmly at the doorstep of President Buhari. Moreover, rather than attentive to it, the President and the All People Congress (APC) have exacerbated separatist tendencies in the country. As one of the major ethnic groups in Nigeria, the Igbo have been hard-done-by. Since the civil war, they have been treated as if they were a minority ethnic group in Nigeria. No Igbo has been considered worthy of being Head-of-State. The Southeast is the only one of the six geopolitical zones of the country with five States. All the zones have six or more. Indeed, the number of Local governments in the Northeast is virtually double that of the Southeast.

Dahiru (2019) aptly stated that the period between 2015 and 2016 can perhaps be said to be the most difficult in the political life of Igbo since the return of democracy in 1999. Ikanna, et al (2017) further their view that some narratives have emerged to explain this politics of exclusion, evident in the initial appointments by the Buhari's administration in which the Igbo were completely excluded. The tables below show clearly the regional character of Buhari's first appointments. The table shows there is the systematic exclusion of the Igbo people and Southeast region in his appointment.

Table 1: List of Buhari's First Appointments in 2015

Geopolitical Zone	Name	Position
North-West	1. Lt Col Abubakar Lawal 2. Shehu Garba 3. Lawal A, Kazaure 4. Ahmad Idris 5. Amina Zakari 6. Habibu Abdulahi 7. Umaru Dambatta	? Aide de Camp to president ? SSA, Media and Publicity ? Chief of Protocol (Presidential Matters) ? Accountant General of the Federation ? Acting Chairperson, Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC ? Managing Director, Nigerian Ports Authority. ? Executive Vice Chairman/ Chief Executive Officer,
	8. Aliyu Gusua 9. Suleiman Kawu 10. Modecai Baba Ladan 11. Mohammed Kari	? Nigerian Communications Commission ? Director General, Budget Office of the Federation ? SSA on National Assembly Matters (House of Representatives) ? Director, Department of Petroleum Resources, DPR ? Commissioner for Insurance and Chief Executive of the National Insurance Commission

South-West	1. Femi Adeshina 2. Babatunde Fowler	? Special Adviser, Media and Publicity to the president ? Executive Chairman, Federal Inland Revenue Service, FIRS
South-South	1. Paul Boroh 2. Emmanuel Kachikwu	? Special Adviser, Niger Delta Amnesty Office ? Group Managing Director, Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation, NNPC
	3. Ita Enang	? Senior Special Assistant on National Assembly Matters (Senate)
North-East	1. Baba Haruna Jauro 2. Babachir David Lawal 3. Abba Kyari 4. Hameed Ibrahim Ali	? Acting Director General, Nigerian Maritime Administration, Safety and Security Agency, NIMASA ? Secretary to Government of the Federation ? Chief of Staff to the President ? Comptroller-General, Nigerian Customs Service
North-Central	1. Kure Martin Abeshi	? Comptroller-General, Nigerian Immigration Service
South-East	None	? None

Source: Premium Times, Tuesday, January 13, 2015. Compiled and Arranged by the Author

Ndukwe (2016) also says right from earliest appointments, Nigerians have complained about Buhari's penchant for largely looking the way of North and his religion in choosing government officials, heads of security agencies, and most ministries, department, and agencies without recourse to the principles of equity and federal character. For the avoidance of doubt, Section 14 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria expressly states inter alia:

> The composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the Federal Character of Nigeria and the need to promote national, and also to command national royalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies. Nigeria is a multicultural, multi-religious, and multiethnic nation whose unity stands precariously on the delicate ropes of fairness, justice, and equity.

The table below shows the Buhari's military and paramilitary appointments, which excluded the Igbo and South-East zone to head any of the security agencies.

Table 2: Security Agency Appointment Under President Buhari First Term (2015-2019)

Zone	Security Appointments	Number
North-Central	? Inspector General of Police ? Commandant NSCDC ? Comptroller of Fire Services ? Director NIA	4
North-East	? Chief of Army Staff ? National security Adviser ? Chairman EFCC ? Minister of defense ? Chief of Air Force ? Comptroller of Customs	6
North-West	? Director of Secret Services ? Minister of defense ? Minister of Interior ? Director of National Emergency Agency	5
	? Comptroller of Immigration Services	
South-West	? Chief of Defense Staff ? Marshal of Road Safety Agency	2
South-South	? Chief of Naval Staff	1
South-East	? None	0
6		**18**

Source: Saturday Punch, July 2, 2016. Compiled and Arranged by Authors.

A pro-democracy and non-governmental organisation, the Human Right Writers Association of Nigeria (HURIWA) raised alarm over what they described as systematic marginalisation of the Igbo people by Buhari's government. HURIWA claimed while calling on the United Nations, African Union to take note of how Buhari is treating the South-East. The body said:

> Buhari is treating the over 50 million Igbo-speaking people just like the Rohingya tribal people of Burma through a well-coordinated deprivation and denials of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. The failure to appoint an Igbo speaking military chief to represent the Igbo which is a major ethnic group violates the constitution which demands the equitable distribution of positions to reflect national spread and federal character as stated in Section 14(3) & (4) of Nigeria Constitution (Daily Post, September 11, 2017).

Another Civil Society Group on 9 September 2019, Southeast Civil Society Activists and Human Rights Defenders also took the case of inequality and exclusion allegedly orchestrated against Igbo of Southeast by the Buhari-led administration to the United Nations (UN). The group listed:

> The alleged infraction in the lopsided appointment of the security chief, infrastructure deficit including; roads, railway, and seaports. They also listed unfavourable allocations from the federal government, concentration of interventions of development partners in the North. Others are excluded from the commanding heights of the nation's economy.

They also condemned the classification of the non-violent IPOB as a terrorist group instead of the Fulani herdsmen bandit.

The above literature review shows that Buhari's administration has excluded the Igbo people of Southeast in the military, security agencies, and kitchen cabinet appointments. Most of his appointments have created the perceived feelings of inequality, exclusion, marginalisation, and discrimination by his administration toward the Igbo people of the Southeast.

Political Inequalities and Exclusion of Buhari's Administration Toward Igbo in Infrastructural Development Compare to Other Regions of the Country

Aside from Buhari's administration's political exclusion toward the Igbo people in the appointment of heads of the armed forces, security agencies, and kitchen cabinet. There is political inequality and exclusion of Igbo in infrastructural development compared to other regions of the country. In November 2016, the members of the South-East Caucus in the Senate held a closed-door meeting with President. The then Deputy Senate, Ike Ekweremadu, and the Caucus Chairman of Southeast, Eyinnaya Abaribe, led the Senators to the meeting, which was bordering on lopsided appointments, IPOB, and infrastructural development in the Southeast zone. They said:

> The Southeast region in 2016 budget, received the lowest allocation for development. The details of the capital allocations for Southeast states as contained in a report of the National Assembly Budget and Research and Office (NABRO), the sum of ₦28.22 billion Naira was appropriated for capital projects for the five states in the region. A breakdown shows that: Abia state got ₦6.95bn, (24.55%); Anambra state got ₦3.02bn (10.20%); Ebonyi state got ₦4.63bn, (16.41%); Enugu state got N10.15bn, (35.98%); Imo state got ₦3.49bn, (12.36%). On the contrary, other zones, especially the Northwest got more than double what the South-East got (Ogunmade, 2017).

To further argued the inequality and exclusion of Buhari's administration towards Igbo people, according to Azuka (2020), in February 2020, the Senate approved the borrowing of the sum of $22.7 billion (₦8.1 trillion) to the President, and that amount is almost the same with the 2019 budget of Nigeria (₦8.92 trillion). The breakdown of the projects that the loan would be used as follows: Infrastructure, Social Investment, Power, Education, Economy, Communication, Agriculture, Health/Water, Governance, and Environment. He says from the breakdown, the distribution of the projects across Nigeria can be gleaned. The projects can be categorised into two groups. The first group contains projects that are general to Nigeria, while the second group contains projects that are specifically located within certain parts of Nigeria. See the table below and then broken down according to the geopolitical zone where the projects will be sited.

Table 3: $22.7 billion Loan and Infrastructural Development in Six Geo-Political Zones

Geopolitical Zone	*Amount ($)*	*Percent*
General (Nationwide Projects)	$5,790,900.000.00	26%
North-East	$5,288,225, 954.00	24%
South-South	$3,852,055,556.00	17%
South-West	$2,827,092,928.00	23%
North-West	$2, 772, 092, 928, 00	13%
North-Central	$1,633,577,055.00	7%
South-East	$5,555,555.56	0.8%

***Source**:* Azuka, O. (2020). "$22.7 Billion Loan: Buhari and the Senate Sink Nigeria Deeper". *Punch News*, March 10, 2020. Compiled and Arranged by the Authors.

Azuka rounded up the postulation by asserting that the document only:

> Mention of part of the South-East in the plan for the loan was under power where Enugu state was listed among the eight states plus the Federal Capital Territory where vocational training in the power sector would be conducted with $50 million. The nationwide projects

> that are not assigned to any location are isolated. The total amount that will be spent on these nationwide projects is $5.2 billion. That is about 30 percent of the entire loan. That means that this 30 percent will be spent on the 36 States of Nigeria plus the Federal Capital Territory. This is where the South-East states will get their share of the $22.7 billion loans Buhari's administration plans to borrow. Ironically, to pay them off the debt or bear the brunt of the debt, no Nigerian state will be excluded.

Because of the inequality and exclusion of Igbo people from the borrowing of $22.7 billion (N8.1 trillion). The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Femi Gbajabiamila suspend the consideration of the loan request by Buhari because of the agitations of the Southeast people on the loan (Daily Post Nigeria, March 18, 2020).

In total support of the Igbo people agitation, Aribisola (2015) says that the demand by the IPOB for self-determination is a result of Igbo being treated procedurally as second-class in Nigeria. According to Collier-Hoeffler model of evaluating causes of civil war especially in the 21st century show that there are factors responsible for civil war or intra-state conflict. A country with a relatively high level of dependence on exports of petroleum is at more risk of a civil war, another factor is ethnic dominances, marginalisation, nepotism in a country with by multi-ethnic group is near twice the chance of a civil war (Collier & Sambanis 2005).

The above variations show that the tendency of another civil war is inevitable unless some measures are taken by the Nigerian federal government toward inequality and exclusion that has led to insecurity and agitation in Nigeria.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, inequality and exclusion have increased over the five years of Buhari's administration especially toward the Igbo people of Southeast, in all economic, political, and social dimensions of Nigeria. This has led to unequal access to resources, unequal participation in politics and governance, and denial of opportunities in the country. The efforts to promote inclusion and inequality of Igbo people have stalled because of the kind of Buhari's leadership, and this has made his administration experience the high numbers of protests and demonstrations for secession than any democratic government in Nigeria. From the literature reviews, Buhari's administration has not make effort to address inequality and exclusion especially toward the Igbo people of the Southeast. In place of that, we recommend the followings:

- There are concentrations of political power at the federal level which has made the state, region, and ethnic national rely on the central government to run their state. Aside from the concentrations of political power at the federal level, there is political distrust and polarisation of institutions in the country. Therefore, Nigeria needs a constitutional amendment to decentralised power from the Center to other component units of the federation.
- We have identified that the causes of political inequality and exclusion were a result of divisive leadership rather than unifying leadership in the country. Selection of

Presidential candidates by political parties must be done like in the United States of America, where the presidential primary election is held in every state of the federation. This will give room for every national and geopolitical zone to assess and ask the aspirant about the diversity of the country, and also question the aspirant on the distribution of national resources and a political appointment in the country.

- The North and South presidential rotation practice has not addressed political inequalities and exclusions in Nigeria, rather conpounds the country's problems. The presidency should be rotated between the six geopolitical zones of the country. That means there should be power-sharing among the six geopolitical zones of the country.

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PERCEPTION OF RURAL DWELLERS ON THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN PROMOTING SOCIAL INCLUSION IN NIGERIA

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Abstract
What are civil society organisations? What are their functions? Are they relevant? How are they perceived? Do they promote social inclusion? Are they known by rural dwellers? These germane questions led to this study. The general objective of the study is to examine the perception of rural dwellers on the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in promoting social inclusion in Nigeria, using rural areas of Lagos and Ogun states as a case study. The study adopts a survey research design and utilised a structured questionnaire as the research instrument. Eight hundred questionnaires were administered to rural dwellers selected from twenty towns; twenty districts; and forty streets of Badagry and Ipokia Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Lagos and Ogun states respectively, using a multistage and random sampling technique. Quantitative data were analysed using descriptive statistics and Chi-square inferential statistics. Findings show that although rural dwellers of Lagos and Ogun states know of the existence of CSOs, they are not properly informed of their functions. The result also yields evidence that rural dwellers are not convinced of the relevance of CSOs and their role in social inclusion. The study, therefore, recommends that CSOs should intensify their efforts of social inclusion in rural areas and engage more rural dwellers of Nigeria in their programmes, particularly in the rural areas of Lagos and Ogun states. This, the study argues, is necessary for engendering sustainable development.

Keywords: Civil society, exclusion, rural dwellers, social inclusion,

Introduction

This paper aims to do several things. Generally, it seeks to examine the perception of rural dwellers on the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in promoting social inclusion in Nigeria, using rural areas of Lagos and Ogun states as a case study. Meanwhile, in specific terms, it seeks to assess the knowledge of rural dwellers of Lagos and Ogun states of CSOs; to measure the perception of rural dwellers of Lagos and Ogun states on the functions of CSOs; to evaluate the perception of rural dwellers of Lagos and Ogun states on the relevance of CSOs to social inclusion.

This paper adopts a mixed approach of qualitative and quantitative analysis. Briefly, it draws on secondary sources to establish a cursory review of literature, while the latter part dwells extensively on the primary source of data, its analysis, and interpretation. We were motivated to carry out this research seeing that most researches conducted on CSOs (and social inclusion) in Nigeria do not consider rural people as a unit of analysis and discussion.

According to Basaninyenzi (2020), in all societies, certain groups are faced with the challenge of participating fully in the economic, political, and social life. These groups are often excluded either based on their beliefs, attitudes, gender, age, or occupation. They may also be vulnerable to exclusion as a result of their identity (ethnic, cultural, religious), race, disability, or location. For whatever reason they are excluded, they end up being deprived of their dignity and chances at a better life. And when left unaddressed, exclusion can have a substantial economic, social, and political cost. It is on this premise that the United Nations – as contained in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – has committed to 'leaving no one behind' to help countries promote inclusive growth.

Societies must prevent social tensions among their members by engaging associations within the society, to collectively draw on their values and give opportunities for participation and a voice to all groups in the society. This can be achieved by collaborating with civil society organisations. The growing significance of civil society organisations toward influencing and driving policy change in the past decade is non-negligible. In Nigeria (as in other societies), community-based organisations (CBOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), professional associations, trade unions, and other civil society organisations (CSOs) or groups have been integral in designing and implementing key development strategies, especially poverty reduction (AfDB 2011).

According to Essien (2020, p. 939), CSOs are relevant in "the designing of strategies for development, as service providers through community-based organisations and national NGOs, and as watchdogs to ensure governments fulfill commitments." To be sure, CSOs can be used to promote social inclusion.

Social inclusion is instrumental to the World Bank's commitment to ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity. Social inclusion is "the process of improving the terms for individuals and groups to take part in society, and the process of improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of those disadvantaged based on their identity to take part in society." (Basaninyenzi, 2020, p. 1). According to Korzensky et al (2019), evidence suggests that progress in meeting the goals and targets of Agenda 2030 is stunted among disadvantaged and marginalised groups. It is as a result of this that social inclusion seeks to displace social exclusion, deprivation, marginalisation, and poverty.

Meanwhile, poverty is highly associated with rural areas. An estimated 79 percent of the world's poorest people live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for subsistence (World Bank 2018). This scenario – undoubtedly – calls for urgent attention. Efforts must be made to tackle prevalent poverty among rural people and move them into the larger society, to take advantage of environmental sustainability and socioeconomic gains (Korzensky et al, 2019). After all, family farmers, forest dwellers, pastoralists, rural food producers, and other small-scale food producers are key agents of change and the foundation of food security; producing over 80 percent of the world's food. Yet, these rural people are still characterised by limited access to productive assets, restricted education and training opportunities, lack of access to support networks, and social isolation (FAO, 2017).

In this regard, social inclusion and mobilisation are essential in helping rural people address their paradoxical reality. Herein is the role of civil society organisations germane as productive agents of change and inclusion, particularly in rural areas. This is quite important, considering the submission of Omede & Bakare (2014, p. 20) who claim that CSO's activities are majorly nationalistic in outlook and operation; they are mostly restricted to the federal government level. They lack national spread. "Most of these organisations are concentrated in Lagos and a few other state capitals in the country. This makes it difficult for a majority of the Nigerian population, which live in rural areas to appreciate the role they play, imbibe their doctrines and through the process, develop political consciousness and confidence to resist inducement from a politician"

Literature Review

In conceptualising civil society, it is important to understand the theoretical frameworks guiding the concept. Tabbush (2005) identifies two frameworks: the neo-liberal pluralistic paradigm and the neo-Gramscian paradigm. Drawing on the work of other theorists such as Fukuyama, Tabbush argues that the neo-liberal pluralistic paradigm holds that states are responsible for making political institutions transparent and efficient. This paradigm highlights certain aspects of civil society: "For example: *(i)* association is a way to protect the interest of minorities; *(ii)* there is a linkage between flourishing civil society and democratic practices; and *(iii)* civil society acts as a counterbalance to state involvement in every aspect of social life" (Tabbush, 2005, p. 18). Meanwhile, the neo-Gramscian paradigm argues that there is a distinction between the states and civil society. Instead, civil society links the state and market (Tabbush, 2005). Tabbush (2005, p. 18) submits that "civil society is seen as not just a place for creating social cohesion, but also as an arena where the struggle for hegemony is contested, and where these organisations are engaged in setting up and negotiating the rules of a given social order." This paradigm also recognises that "certain sections of civil society can reproduce oppression and undermine democracy" (Tabbush, 2005, p. 38). As Kocze (2012, p. 10) would have us believe, "the liberal pluralistic paradigm sees civil society as a force against the non-democratic enemies of the democracies" while the neo-Gramscian conceptualisation adopts a simpler approach by "highlighting the importance of the grassroots mobilisation in contrast with the elitist participation in civic organisations." For Kocze, the face of civil society is changing. Therefore, theorising civil society should reflect emerging global social, economic, and political crises, such as inequality, unemployment, violence, and decreasing social services.

According to Kocze (2012), civil society finds expression in several formal and informal practices, actions, self-organised, non-profit and non-governmental associations, social movements, and networks transcending national borders. In the words of Anheier, Glasius & Kaldor (2011, p. 17), "global civil society is the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organizations, networks, and individuals located between family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and economies." The Civil Society

Index (CSI) (n.d) define civil society as "the arena, outside the family, government, and market where people voluntary associate to advance common interests." Observably, both definitions point out that civil society is a public space where various value systems and interests interact, hence strengthen the social inclusion of the individuals or groups.

The civil society describes the domain for collective action around mutual interests, values, and purposes, which is distinct from government, commercial, or for-profit actors. Civil society includes community groups, professional associations, social movements, charities, trade unions, development NGOs, faith-based organisations, women's organisations, coalitions, and advocacy groups. Here, we have been alerted to the misconception that surrounds civil society. It is not homogeneous and the boundaries between civil society and government or civil society and commercial actors can be blurred (WHO, 2007). Examples of CSOs in Nigeria are: Academic Staff Union of Universities; Nigerian Labour Congress; Trade Union Congress; Nigerian Medical Association; Nigerian Bar Association; Entrepreneurial Development Initiative; Save the Earth Nigeria; Citizens' Forum for constitutional reform; National Council of Women Societies; African Women Agribusiness Network; Rice Farmers Association of Nigeria; Center for Constitutional Gov. & Dev; Women Development Project Center; Community Action for Popular Participation; African Center for Democratic Governance; and Nigeria Union of Teachers (Uchendu, 2000)

Essien (2020) calls our attention to two key issues noticeable from the creation of a civil society in Africa. One, social exclusion is prevalent while sustainable development in Africa is obscure. This remains so, despite the role of civil society organisations in promoting participation, supporting inclusive democratic governance, advocating for transparency and accountability. Two, extreme poverty, deprivation, inefficiency, inequality and marginalisation, continually record an increase, even in the face of civil society organisations. Arguing further, Essien (2020), submits that the management and distribution of services in the Nigerian society is largely inefficient and exclusionary, leading to a myriad of social problems. This has placed a strain on the discourse of inclusive society and sustainable development

According to World Bank (2007, p. 4),social inclusion is a "process which ensures that those at risk of poverty and social exclusion gain the opportunities and resources necessary to participate fully in economic, social and cultural life and to enjoy a standard of living and well-being that is considered normal in the society in which they live." As a core aspiration of the 2030 Agenda, "social inclusion a process which ensures that those at risk of poverty and social exclusion gain the opportunities and resources necessary to participate fully in economic, social, political and cultural life and to enjoy a standard of living that is considered normal in the society in which they live. It ensures that they have greater participation in decision making which affects their lives and access to their fundamental rights" (European Commission, 2004, p. 10). As United Nations (2016, p. 20) opines, "social inclusion is the process of improving the terms of participation in society for people who are disadvantaged based on age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, or economic or another status, through enhanced opportunities, access to resources, voice and respect for rights." Thus, social inclusion is both a means and an end. Promoting social inclusion means removing the barriers of social exclusion which hinders people's participation in society. It requires making a deliberate effort to integrate all persons and embrace equality.

Social inclusion is understood as a process by which efforts are made to ensure equal opportunities for all, regardless of background, so that all can achieve their full potential in life. It is a multi-dimensional process aimed at creating conditions that enable full and active participation of every member of the society in all aspects of life, including civic, social, economic, and political activities, as well as participation in decision-making processes (Essien, 2020). Social inclusion seeks to reintegrate people who have been hitherto excluded based on their identity, age, sex, orientation, economic status, or location, into society. A good example of such people is those in rural areas.

Rural areas generally experience a structural decline in employment and other traditional land-based industries. They are more dependent on traditional institutions such as the family and church; than on labour markets and the welfare state. This pace of change and its attendant dependency makes the ability of rural dwellers to survive and prosper in this world, more precarious. These risks are often not evenly distributed through society but inversely create a social class (Shucksmith, 2004). The issues facing people in rural areas, although similar to those in urban areas, are more entrenched. This includes a lack of access to quality education and training, unemployment, poor housing, and welfare. They are often disadvantaged and unable to access many of the facilities and structures open to urban dwellers. Rural dwellers may be additionally excluded from transport and leisure (Jentsch & Shucksmith, 2003). Faced with these restricted life-chances, these people turn to individual action in solving their collective problems and hold themselves responsible for their inevitable failure. As a result, social exclusion becomes communally individualised (Shucksmith, 2004).

On the whole, the literature suggests that CSO shave been instrumental in promoting social inclusion in Nigeria in the past decades. According to Olukoshi (1997), CSO shelped entrench democracy and governance through voter education, conflict mitigation, constituency outreach, election observation, public interest litigation, electoral reform advocacy, research, and documentation. CSOs checked government excesses and promoted inclusive growth. This view is substantiated by Ojo (2011), who avers that CSOs were instrumental to the restoration of civil rule in Nigeria and have since then been safeguarding against threats to democracy. CSOs also give expression to the marginalised and excluded. CSOs often enhance the participation of communities in the provision of services and policy decision-making (WHO, 2007). CSOs advocate for a corrupt-free society, promote democratic norms and governance, as well as defend people's interests (Gberevbie, 2013)

Christopher (2020) notes that during the wave of the coronavirus pandemic, CSOs were at the frontline of transparency and accountability advocacy in Nigeria by advocating for transparency in the collection and disbursement of funds meant to mitigate the effect of the pandemic. More so, CSOs engaged community members and developed a response that captures vulnerable communities. This contributed immensely to conforming to social order. Besides, a lot of CSOs are involved in humanitarian work by reaching beneficiaries in different communities using an organised model of distribution. They were also able to reach many hard-to-reach areas and populations.

Essien (2014) observes that to create an inclusive society, CSOs must pay close attention to critical factors, without which social inclusion is impossible. This includes the rule of law and human rights; effective leadership; cultural diversity; education; fairness in distributing wealth and resources; adequate security; strong presence; availability and access to public infrastructure and facilities; and access to information.

Observably, CSOs in Nigeria have been faced with several challenges that impede their effectiveness in promoting social inclusion. According to Omede & Bakare (2014), the limitations faced by CSOs are lack of unity, government patronage, lack of internal democracy, inadequate funding, corrupt and personal enrichment attitude, lack of state support and partnership, and lack of skills for CSOs. Dakyyen & Dang (2014) argue that many CSOs in Nigeria lack clear-cut objectives, experience, and organisational discipline, as many were formed without proper coordination. They also posit that ideological war among CSOs is yet another bane that mars their performance. Placing this in perspective, the authors state that "where the radicals perceive it as an arena to challenge the status quo and build new alternatives, while the neo-liberals situate it as an avenue to remedy the ills brought to the fore by marked failures to be engaged in service provision, not for profit" (Dakyyen & Dang, 2014, p. 50).

Methods

Study Area

The study was conducted in the Badagry Local Government Area (LGA) of Lagos state and IpokiaLGA of Ogun State, Nigeria. These states – both in the Southwestern part of Nigeria – were selected for logistical reasons such as proximity and ease of access to participants for data gathering. Lagos state is made up of twenty LGAs, out of which four LGAs are classified as rural areas. These are Badagry, Epe, Ibeju-Lekki, and Ikorodu. While Ogun state, also made up of twenty LGAs hassix rural areas namely: Ado-Odo/Ota, Egbado North, Imeko-Afon, Ipokia, Odeda, and Ogun Waterside. Badagry, which occupies 442,993 of the total 3,496,449 land size (km2) of Lagos state, is a town on the bank of creeks, waterways, and lagoons, connecting to Lagos and Porto Novo (Republic of Benin) and is bordered by Seme and the Gulf of Guinea to the west and south respectively.Ipokia on the other hand occupies 631,884 of the total 16,980,550 land size (km2) of Ogun State It is situated to the west of Ogun state and connects Lagos state and the Republic of Benin. In other words, the selected areas; Badagry and Ipokia, asides from being interlinked, are both located in the same axis connecting Seme, a border town in the Benin Republic (Federal Government of Nigeria [FGN], 2010; Harris, 2017; Oyeyemi, Ogunnowo & Odukoya, 2014).



Source: Authors

Study Design

The study adopted a descriptive survey method in an attempt to describe the perception of rural dwellers on the role of civil society organisations in promoting social inclusion in Nigeria. By choosing this method, the authors were able to describe the characteristics of the population and make use of a probability sampling technique to ensure an accurate representation of the population as well as to collect and analyse data from a subset of a larger group.

Sampling Strategy

The first step here was to determine the population of the selected areas, i.e., Badagry and Ipokia. The official 2006 Nigeria population census report shows that a total of 237,731 people are resident in the area with a gender distribution of 50.4 percent male and 49.6 percent female. Meanwhile, Ipokia has a population of 150,387 with a gender distribution of 49.6 percent male and 50.4 percent female, indicating that there are more male residents in Ipokia compared to Badagry (see FGN, 2010). Having stated the population, the next phase was to define the sample. Badagry and Ipokia LGAs were randomly selecting (by balloting) out of the respective four and six rural areas in Lagos and Ogun States. Having identified the LGAs to be sampled, multi-stage sampling was then applied to scale down the larger groups. For instance, Badagry LGA was divided into ten major towns: Ajara, Aradagun, Badagry, Gbaji, Ibereko, Itoga, Mosafejo, Mowo, OkoAfo, and Seme border. These towns were further divided into districts and consequently into streets. Then, two streets were randomly selected from each town to give a total of twenty streets from Badagry identified for the study.

In the same manner, IpokiaLGA was divided into ten towns: Agosasa, Aseko, Idiroko, Ifonyintedo, Ijofin, Ilashe, ItaEgbe, Madoga, Tongeji, and Tube. As was done in Badagry, the towns in Ipokia were further divided into districts and streets. Two streets were randomly selected from each town to give a total of twenty streets from Ipokia identified for the study. By implication, a total of forty streets were randomly selected for the study from both states.

To determine the actual sample size, Guilford and Fluchter formula for estimating sample size was applied and the following sample was arrived at:

N/1+QsquareN

Where N = Population size (Badagry) = 237731

Q = alpha = 0.05

Size = 399 $\approxeq$ 400

Population size (Ipokia) = 150387

Size = 398.93 $\approxeq$ 400

Therefore, the total sample size for the two areas is 800. Given a total sample size of eight hundred, the authors decided to disperse the sample size across the sample areas identified. As a result, twenty respondents were randomly selected from each of the forty streets in Badagry and IpokiaLGAs as participants of the study.

Data collection and analysis

The study made use of direct administration of survey instruments in data collection. The data collection process – which was carried out between July and November 2019 – was done using a structured questionnaire. To facilitate the data gathering process and ensure a degree of reliability in the responses, the authors ensured that only participants who could read and write partook in the study. Meanwhile, to lessen the burden of administration and guarantee efficiency, the services of three trained research assistants were employed and the instrument administration was done on a town by town basis. The questionnaire entitled “Perception on Civil Society Organisation and Social Inclusion Questionnaire” (PCSOSIQ) contained two sections. The first section elicited data on the socio-demographic characteristics of the participants while the second section contained questions bordering on the areas germane to the study: participants' knowledge of civil society organisations (CSOs), perceived functions as well as the role of CSOs in social inclusion. The data generated for the study were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) v. 22. The results are presented in the succeeding section. Meanwhile, one participant each was selected from the towns and interviewed on their recommendations for civil society organisations' role in promoting social inclusion in the rural area. By implication, a total of twenty participants were interviewed.

Results

Socio-Demographic Characteristics

All the questionnaire distributed for the study was retrieved and ascertained valid before coding for analysis. The result of the analysis is hereby presented in this section.

Table 1 shows the socio-demographic data of the participants wherein the majority – 455 (56.9%) male and 345 (43.1) female participated in the study. This indicates that there are more male residents in the study area. Concerning the age group of the participants, 138 (17.3%) fall within the age bracket of 18-25 years, 236 (29.5%) are between the age group of 26-33 years, 308 (38.5%) are within the age bracket of 34-40 years, while 118 (14.8%) participants are either 40 years or above. By implication, the majority of the respondents are within the age group of 34-40 years.

Concerning the education level of the participants, 78 (9.8%) attended only primary school, 376 (47%) have had secondary education, while 346 (43.2%) have post-secondary education. Hence, the majority of the respondents have secondary education; meaning they can read, comprehend, and respond to the items of the research instrument. About the employment status of the participants, 257 (32.1%) are employed, while 543 (67.9%) are unemployed. Thus, the majority of the study participants are unemployed.

Table 1: Sociodemographic variables

Sociodemographic characteristic of participants (n=800)	***Variable***	**₦**	**%**
Gender	Male	455	56.9
	Female	345	43.1
		800	**100.0**
Age group	18-25 years	138	17.3
	26-33 years	236	29.5
	34-40 years	308	38.5
	40 years and above	118	14.8
		800	**100.0**
Education level	Primary	78	9.8
	Secondary	376	47
	Post-secondary	346	43.2
		800	**100.0**
Employment status	Employed	257	32.1
	Unemployed	543	67.9
		800	**100.0**

Source:Survey, 2019

Knowledge of Civil Society Organisations

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	139.519[a]	9	.000
Likelihood Ratio	162.292	9	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.658	1	.103
N of Valid Cases	800		

Interpretation

A Chi-square test was conducted to determine rural dwellers' knowledge of civil society organisations. The result is statistically significant with a chi-square at 139.519 and a p-value of .000 which is less than the level of significance of 0.05. In other words, the null hypothesis is rejected while the research hypothesis is accepted. Thus, rural dwellers are knowledgeable of the existence of CSOs.

Functions of Civil Society Organizations

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.945[a]	6	.234
Likelihood Ratio	28.270	6	.094
Linear-by-Linear Association	13.833	1	.022
N of Valid Cases	800		

Interpretation

A Chi-square test was conducted to determine rural dwellers' knowledge of the functions of CSOs. The result is not statistically significant with chi-square at 8.945 and a p-value of .234 which is greater than the level of significance of 0.05. In other words, the null hypothesis is accepted while the research hypothesis is rejected. Thus, rural dwellers are oblivious to the functions of CSOs.

Role of Civil Society Organizations in Social Inclusion

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	13.292[a]	7	.312
Likelihood Ratio	27.723	7	.078
Linear-by-Linear Association	8.462	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	800		

Interpretation

A Chi-square test was conducted to determine the knowledge of rural dwellers on the role of CSOs in social inclusion. The result is not statistically significant with chi-square at 13.292 and a p-value of .312 which is greater than the level of significance of 0.05. In other words, the null hypothesis is accepted while the research hypothesis is rejected. Thus, rural dwellers are not convinced of the role of CSOs in social inclusion.

Discussion

The result of the analysis shows that even though the rural dwellers of Lagos and Ogun states know of the existence of CSOs, they are not properly informed of their functions. More so, these rural dwellers are not convinced of the role of CSOs in social inclusion, in their areas. The information gathered during the interview process also lends credence to this submission. It was gathered during the interview that the presence of CSOs is largely restricted to religious houses. It was also gathered that youth are not actively involved in the activities of the CSOs, who majorly operate as an arm of religious organisations. The participants berated the lack of sensitisation of CSOs in their area, as well as their lack of concern for the rural dwellers' plight. CSOs have not contributed notably to capacity development in the study area. For instance, one of the participants noted that rural areas are often neglected by non-government organisations in awarding a scholarship to deserving students. More so, little is being done in combating gender inequality in the area.

Limitations of the study

The research is limited to one rural area each from Lagos state and Ogun state. While the selected areas seem, representative, consideration couldn't be given to the entire rural areas in the country.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The thrust of this study is how civil society organisations are perceived by rural people in their efforts towards engendering social inclusion in Nigeria. This is not just another academic exercise and discourse, but an exigent attempt to provoke civil society organisations to intensify their drive towards social inclusiveness in Nigeria, particularly in rural areas. This is because social exclusion, multidimensional poverty, deprivation, marginalisation, and inequality have become recurrently debated issues in Nigeria's socioeconomic, socio-political, and socio-developmental strides. These issues are particularly pervasive in rural areas. As this study has shown, the knowledge of the existence of CSOs by rural dwellers though not in doubt, its functions and role in promoting social inclusion, are however elusive.

Based on the findings of the study, it is recommended that CSOs should maintain social media presence to engage rural dwellers.

- CSOs in collaboration with NGOs should increase their activities in rural areas, especially through the award of scholarships; creating employment opportunities; promoting poverty reduction programmes; and combating gender inequality.
- CSOs should involve youth in their sensitisation programmes by erecting situating billboards in strategic rural areas, schools, and places of worship. In addition to this, CSOs should establish clubs/associations in schools to indoctrinate youth and prepare them for civic responsibility.
- CSOs should pay serious attention to capacity development, promotion of entrepreneurial skills, and empowerment programmes.
- CSOs should consolidate the efforts of religious leaders and organise town hall meetings, share tracts, bulletins, and newsletters, to inform citizens of their activities and seek ways to consolidate them.

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THEME SEVENTEEN
POPULATION DYNAMIC AND DISPLACEMENT

POPULATION GROWTH, POVERTY INCIDENCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN NIGERIA

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Abstract
Economic growth which has been considered to be one of the fundamental objectives of macroeconomic policies across the globe is found to impact directly on the overall development and welfare of the citizenry. However, unabated population growth and ever increasing poverty in developing countries remains a challenge. This study, therefore, investigated the nexus between population growth, poverty incidence and economic growth in Nigeria. The study applied the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) technique to analyse data sourced from National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Bulletin and World Development Indicators (WDI). *The ARDL tests revealed the existence of both short and long run relationships between population growth, poverty incidence and economic growth measured by real GDP growth.* The findings from the study further revealed that population growth has a significant positive influence on economic growth in the long run. It also showed that net migration and household expenditure were found to be important indicators because they have a positive impact on economic growth. In the short run, a negatively significant relationship was established between population growth and economic growth, while poverty incidence has a significantly positive relationship with economic growth. The study concluded that, both population growth and poverty incidence significantly influence economic growth in the short run and long run in Nigeria. The study therefore recommends measures of population migration control along with massive infrastructural development and flow of productive human resources into the country to optimise the growth that results from the independent variables.

***Keywords**: ARDL, Economic growth, Population Growth and Poverty Incidence*

1. Introduction

Economic growth has been considered to be one of the main fundamental objectives of every nation's macroeconomic policies. The pursuit of a sustainable growth of the economy is necessitated by the major impact growth has in achieving overall development and welfare of the citizenry. Although growth is not synonymous with development, it is still a necessary condition for achieving the overall objective of a sustainable development. Achieving this growth objective has, however, been found to have resulted from the interplay of certain macroeconomic variables like unemployment, poverty, population, inflation among many others. Empirical studies from different countries, developed or developing, have revealed different roles for each of these macroeconomic variables. However, unabated growth in poverty, coupled with ever increasing population has constituted not a small hindrance to most of the developing countries. It is in view of the peculiarities of the political and economic circumstances in Nigeria that this paper examines the long-run relationship between poverty, population and economic growth in Nigeria.

Scholars believe that population growth is a beautiful thing but when the growth rate of population increases to a level whereby the resources available would not be able to serve the present population; this situation right here means that sustainable development is far from possible. Whereas the Nigerian population has been growing consistently at an average rate of 2.48%, economic growth rate is at 4.85% between 1990 and 2016 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2017). The consequence of this is increasing disparity in income distribution and the attendant increase in poverty incidence. Due to the rapid growth of population in Nigeria, 89 million Nigerians are presently living in extreme poverty which represents nearly 50% of its estimated population (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018).

Past governments have tried to reduce poverty and maintain sustainable development through the establishment of policies and programs like; Operation Feed the Nation, Free and Compulsory Primary Education, Green Revolution, Low Cost Housing, River Basin Development Authorities, National Agricultural Land Development Authority, Agricultural Development Programs, Rural Banking Programs, Family Economic Advancement Program, National Directorate of Employment, National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, and so on. The sad thing is that none of these policies was able to combat the incidence of poverty. According to Garba (2006) in poverty reduction and the attainment of the MDGs, Oshewolo (2011), all the poverty alleviation initiatives in Nigeria since conception of independence have yielded very little fruits. He claims that the programs were mostly not designed to alleviate poverty; they lacked clearly defined policy framework with proper guidelines for poverty alleviation; they suffer from political instability, interference, policy and macroeconomic dislocations; and are riddled with corruption, political deception, outright kleptomania and distasteful lootings.

Nigerian government has not really tried to reduce population, just talking about and enhancing family planning does not mean that her citizens will embrace it, because a number of factors militate against it. Asides from doing seminars about family planning, early marriage, etc. government has not done enough in attending to population growth neither has it allocated resources effectively and efficiently to address the increasing incidence of poverty in almost half of her population. The main problem in Nigeria, therefore, centres on how to reduce poverty effectively in the presence of overpopulation in order to achieve a sustainable economic growth. It is for this reason that this study examines the nexus between population growth, poverty incidence and economic growth in Nigeria. The study covers the period between 1980 and 2018. This was chosen to enable us capture the effects of the various policies adopted during the pre-SAP (Structural Adjustment Programme) introduced in 1985.

The study is made up of five sections. While the introduction is presented in section one, sections two to five are dedicated to literature review and theoretical foundation, methodology, results, findings and discussions, conclusion and recommendations.

2. Literature Review and Theoretical Foundation

Conceptually, population growth rate (PGR) is the increase in a country's population during a period of time, usually one year, expressed as a percentage of the population at the start of that period. It reflects the number of births and deaths during the period and the number of people migrating to and from a country (World Bank, 2015). On the concept of poverty, we align with the Scottish Poverty Information Unit which defines Poverty relative to the standards of living in a society at a specific time. People live in poverty when they are denied an income sufficient for their material needs and when these circumstances exclude them from taking part in activities which are an accepted part of daily life in that society (SPIU, 2019).

Empirical studies from various countries have been carried out by several researchers on the issues of poverty, population and economic growth. Taiwo and Agwu (2016) examined the critical and urgent problems causing poverty in Nigeria and the possibility of poverty eradication programmes in Nigeria. Poverty, unemployment, corruption, and material wealth are the major variables employed in the study. Using Poverty or Income Gap Index, Gini Index, Human Development Index, Corruption Perception Index, the study found that National security, political stability, discipline, infrastructural development, economic stability and provision of adequate welfare services are the solid base in reducing poverty. Nwosu, Dike and Okwara, (2014) attempted to ascertain the massive effect of population growth on economic growth with a view to investigating the casual link between population growth and economic growth from the year 1960 to 2008.

The theoretical foundations of the study were Malthusian model on population and Simon-Steinmann Economic Growth Model which made the endogenous variable to be economic growth and exogenous variables is Population growth (infant mortality/fertility rate, migration). Using the Vector Error Correlation Methodology, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) single equation method, Gaussion classical Regression model (CLRM) they found a proof of unidirectional causality between them, while also establishing the existence of a sustainable long run relationship. Danaan (2018), focused on the circumstances, events, appearances of poverty within the background of Nigeria is the main focus, by viewing the theoretical paradigms using theories like the Individual deficiency theory, Progressive social theory, Geographical disparities theory, Cyclical interdependence theory, Theory of social exclusion, Individualisation theory He found out that poverty is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon because it encompasses economic, social, cultural and psychological indicators through the use of Hydra-headed Approach. Olofin et al (2015) investigated the determinants of poverty level in Nigeria in a study that covered the period from 1990-2010. They found that population growth helped to realise that the presence of effective governance will promote accountability, policy solutions and new understanding of poverty reduction among the citizens. It was further found that occurrence of political terror has both negative and positive effects on the economy.

Dike (2015) investigated the ways to develop a mechanism for balancing economic growth with environmental sustainability and poverty eradication. He attempted to find the lost link between environmental sustainability, economic growth and poverty elimination in Africa. He concluded that African countries like Nigeria should reduce their population growth in line with their economic capability, protecting the ecosystem by adapting to improved agrarian economy reduces dependence on monolithic oil, gas or energy intensive sectors. Kato (2016), suggested that in order for there to be massive changes in economic growth, population growth should be average. That is population growth should be kept at a minimum. This is to find support for his findings that the relationship between population growth and economic growth is negative. Theoretical postulations from Solow growth model and Cobb-Douglas theory of production function, however, support the view that population growth should spur technological progress.

Aidi, Emecheta and Ngwudiobu (2016) examined the relationship between population dynamics and economic growth in Nigeria from 1970 to 2014. With the Neo-Classical growth model as their theoretical foundation, they applied OLS regression and VAR techniques for data estimation. The results revealed that there is a negative relationship between population growth and economic growth within the period of study. Further still, they found that while savings and rapid growing population have negative and positive influence respectively in Nigeria, the net-migration is a key determinant of economic growth. Okwori et al (2015) applied the Vector Error Correction (VEC) Model and Ordinary Least Squares method to investigate how population growth can impact positively on economic development in Nigeria. The result revealed that even though population growth had adverse effect on per capita income, poverty and sustainable development, there is no mutually reinforcing bilateral relationship between population growth and economic development. They, therefore, concluded that population growth has no significant impact on economic development in Nigeria.

Aiyedogbon and Orwofasa (2012) examined the effect of unemployment on poverty in Nigeria from 1987-2011. The OLS and the Cochrane Orcutt Iterative techniques were employed. Unemployment, agricultural and services as well as population have significantly positive determining influence on poverty level in Nigeria. On the other hand, however, manufacturing sector's contribution to real GDP and inflation rate were revealed to have negatively impacted poverty in Nigeria. Igwe (2016), focused on the appraisal of poverty reduction efforts in Nigeria along the lines of the MDGs within the period of 2000-2015. The methods used in this paper were interpretive approach, human development approach with poverty as the dependent variable and unemployment as the independent variable. Within the reviewed period, poverty remained widespread in Nigeria given the continued dominance of poor human development indication occasioned by widespread income disparity irrespective of significant economic growth was a major finding in this paper.

Ndubuisi-Okolo and Anekwe (2018), through the employment of sustainability Development Theory and conceptual approach, it was found that sustainable development relies deeply on an economy's ability to provide human elements with the basic necessities of life. Kanayo et al (2013) investigated the challenges and implication of sustainable development in Africa with Nigeria as the main focus. Applying the Human Development Index (HDI), they found that the responsibility for social, economic and environmental sustainability lies with federal governments and Nigerians, which would enable development to be adapted more readily to the Nigeria's economic and social conditions.

Egwemi and Odo (2013) posited that rural poverty level and underdevelopment in Nigeria is being aggravated by corruption, bad governance, unemployment, low productivity, unfocused policies, insecurity, leadership insecurity and a host of other factors. The best way to solve this issue is the adoption of an integrated rural development approach as a veritable tool for eradicating the scourge in the country. The main objective is to investigate the incidence of poverty in Nigeria and the use of Integrated Rural Development Approach, Human Development Index was employed. Ekperiware et al (2018) investigated the actual effect of a dominating active working age and a forecast of what happens when the working age population keeps increasing in the Nigeria economy, the scope of study is from 1999-2014. Dependent variable in this case is Population and the independent variables are fertility rate, mortality rate and migration. Methodologies used are the Vector Autoregressive scenario conditional forecasting model, Billeter index, Ordinary Least Square estimation, Vector Error Correction Model. The main finding was that conditional forecasting showed that increasing the working-age population in an economy constitutes catastrophe to economic growth if investment in human capital formation is not pursued.

Anyanwu (2013) viewed the effect of marital status and household size, among other correlates, on poverty in Nigeria between 2009 and 2010. Poverty indices, multivariate analysis, logistic regression were used as methodologies, and the variables were poverty, marital status, gender, educational attainment, employment and geographical residence. The author found that household work has a significantly negative effect on the level of poverty in Nigeria. From our review of empirical literature, we found that many studies have either considered the relationship between poverty and economic growth, or the nexus between population growth and economic growth in Nigeria. However, and to the best of our knowledge, fewer studies have been able to consider together the impact of poverty incidence and population growth on economic growth in Nigeria. This constitutes a major contribution of this study to the body of knowledge. For our theoretical underpinning, the study relied on the Malthusian theory of population and Solow growth model.

The Malthusian theory explains the relationship between the growth in food supply and in population. It states that population increases faster than food supply and if unchecked leads to misery. The Solow Growth Model is an exogenous model of economic growth that analyzes changes in the level of output in an economy over time as a result of changes in the population growth rate, the savings rate, and the rate of technological progress.

3. Methodology

This study made use of secondary data sourced from National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), CBN Bulletin, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Wall Street Journal Index, World Bank Data, and World Development Indicators (WDI).

The model adapted in this study is the neo-classical growth theory adapted from the work of Aidi et al (2016). This is premised on the understanding the theory offers a comprehensively rigorous treatment of population and income as important variables in the analysis of growth in any economy (Currais, as cited in Akintunde et al, 2013). Neoclassical economists are of the belief that population growth is correlated to technological advancement and positive economic outcomes. The neoclassical growth theory holds that growth in total productivity or output can be achieved either through increase in saving or reduction in the rate of growth of population. According to Grabrowski and Shields (1996), a slowly growing population will require less saving and investment for capital widening, thus making more saving and investment available for capital deepening. The aggregate production function of the traditional neoclassical growth theory is stated as follows:

$Y = Af(L,K)$……………………………………………….1

where:

Y is the output/gross domestic product (GDP)

L is the amount of Labour

K is capital stock and

A is productivity factor (i.e., exogenously determined level of technology).

This study employed an augmented neoclassical growth model in which vector of variables used as proxies for population growth as well as vector of all other variables that can influence economic growth are incorporated as demographic factor (A) and control variable (Z) respectively, while labour is dropped from the model since there is no reliable data or proxy for labour in Nigeria for the period under consideration. Note again that RGDP is used as proxy for economic growth respectively. Thus, equation 1 is re-specified as follows:

$RGDP = f(A,Z)$..2

The demographic factor (A) and control variable (Z) are thus defined as equation 3 and 4 below:

$A = f(FERT, MORT, NETMGR)$ 3

$Z = f(GOVEX, OT, HEX)$ 4

where:

MORT = total mortality rate (using life expectancy at birth as its proxy)

FERT = total fertility rate

NETMGR = net-migration (defined as immigration minus emigration)

GOVEX = government expenditure

RGDP= Real Gross Domestic Product

OT = openness to trade

HEX= household expenditure

Mortality rate, fertility rate and net-migration are independent variables of population growth, whereas, government expenditure and openness to trade are dependent variables of population growth. Household expenditure is an exogenous variable of poverty incidence. Real gross domestic product is a dependent variable of economic growth.

The focus of this study is to establish the nexus between population growth, poverty incidence and economic growth in Nigeria. Putting equation 3 and 4 into equation 2 will lead us to the functional form of our model expressed as follows:

RGDP = f(FERT, MORT, NETMGR, GOVEX, OT, HEX) ……………………5

Gujarati and Porter (2009) recommended the use of log-linear (i.e., log-log) model in measuring growth rate of any economic variable. Following this recommendation (since none of our variables is expressed in percentage form), equation 5 is expressed in log form as follows:

LGRGDP= f (LGFERT, LGMORT, LGNETMGR, LGOT, LGGOVEX, LGHEX)..6

The econometric form of equation 6 is expressed as equation 7 below (note that all variables are as earlier defined):

$$LGRGDP_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LGFERT_t + \beta_2 LGMORT_t + \beta_3 LGNETMGR_t + \beta_4 LGOT_t + \beta_5 LGGOVEX_t + \beta_6 LGHEX_t + \mu_t \quad \ldots\ldots 7$$

To establish the long-run relationship between the regrassand and regressors, the above (equation 7) was estimated using Augmented Distributive Lag (ARDL).

A' priori Expectations

δLGRGDP>0,
LGFERT
δLGRGDP<0
LGMORT
δLGRGDP< 0
LGNETMGR
δLGRGDP>0
LGOT
δLGRGDP>0
LGGOVEX
δLGRGDP>0
LGHEX

Estimation Techniques

For our pre-estimation test, the study carried the unit root test to determine the stationarity of the variables of study. It is necessary to note that while the ARDL techniques can be used to estimate data with unit root, it is only appropriate for combinations of data with 1(0) and 1(1). This explains the reason for the unit root test. The study also conducted a bond test to establish the presence of a long-run relationship between the dependent and independent variables.

For the empirical analysis, the study employed the ARDL techniques to estimate the variables of the study. The application of ARDL technique in this study is hinged on its advantage over Ordinary Least Square method (OLS). The ARDL technique does not require variables to be 1(0), but is also applicable even to variables that are mixtures of levels 1(0) and first difference 1(1). It also allows for the estimation of both the short-run and long-run relationship between the variables simultaneously.

4. Results and Findings

The Unit Root Test presents the stationarity level of the variables used to examine the relationship between population growth, poverty incidence and economic growth in Nigeria. The results are presented in Table1, indicating that variables such as population, net migration and trade openness are time trending since they are found stationary at first difference I(1). However, variables like real GDP, government expenditure and household expenditure were stationary at levels I(0). Two variables (fertility rate and mortality rate) were dropped because they were found not to be stationary at first difference which is generally not accepted in economic analysis.

Table 1: Unit Root Test

Variables	ADF Stat at level	Critical value	ADF Stat at first diff.	Critical value	Remarks
RGDP	-5.143942 (0.0009)	*** 4.226815 ** 3.536601 *3.200320	–	– – –	Integrate of order 0
POP	-1.866256 (0.6510)	*** 4.234972 ** 3.540328 * 3.202445	-3.707905 (0.0363)	*** 4.273277 **3.557759 * 3.212361	Integrate of order 1
NETMGR	-1.705422 (0.7287)	*** 4.226815 ** 3.536601 * 3.200320	-6.030895 (0.0001)	*** 4.234972 ** 3.540328 * 3.202445	Integrate of order 1
OT	-1.010311 (0.9299)	*** 4.234972 ** 3.540328 * 3.202445	-4.445107 (0.0071)	*** 4.296729 ** 3.568379 * 3.218382	Integrate of order 1
GOVEX	-5.259032 (0.0009)	*** 4.284580 ** 3.562882 * 3.215267	-	- - -	Integrate of order 0
HEX	-5.058661 (0.0011)	*** 4.226815 ** 3.536601 * 3.200320	-	- - -	Integrate of order 0

Source: Computed by the Author using E-view 10.

Bound Test

The results of the stationarity tests suggest that ARDL is the best estimation approach to employ when variables have mixed stationary features such as stationary at levels and stationary at first difference. This approach looks at both long-run relationship and short- and long-run estimates. If all variables are stationary at levels we use OLS but that is not the case. After all series are integrated of zero and one order, this sub-section of co-integration examines the long-run relationship testing between the dependent and independent variables using ARDL bound test in the stated hypotheses before the short-run and long-run estimates. This is necessary to ensure a convergence in the model, to prove there is a long run relationship among the series. This test shows the relationship between population growth, poverty incidence and economic growth measured by real GDP growth. ARDL is employed because it is suitable for variables at different order of integration. Thus, the derivation of the long-run relationship between population growth, poverty incidence and economic growth was estimated and reported as the F-statistics estimate which is presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Long-Run Relationship Using ARDL Bound Test (4, 3, 3, 2, 1, 4)

Test Statistic	**Value**	**K**
F-statistics (*RGDP | POP NETMGR OT GOVEX HEX)*	4.920304	5
Critical Value Bounds		
Significance (*RGDP | POP NETMGR OT GOVEX HEX)*	**I0 Bound**	**I1 Bound**
10%	2.331	3.417
5%	2.804	4.013
1%	3.9	5.419

Source: Computed by the Author using E-view 10.

The F-statistics of the normalised equations whose estimate is (F_{arb} = 4.920304) was greater than the lower and upper critical bound at 1% significance level. It implies that the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship is rejected at 5% significance level. In essence, the model is made of equilibrium conditions which ensures variables are applied together in the long-run. The implication of the above estimation is that there is existence of long-run relationship between population growth, poverty incidence and economic growth measured by real GDP growth in Nigeria

Table 3: Results of Estimated ARDL Model

Dependent Variable: Real GDP				
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 3, 3, 2, 1, 4)				
Sample: 1980 2018				
Short-Run Estimates				
Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**t-Statistic**	**Prob.**
? (RGDP(-1))	1.250413	0.261626	4.779398	0.0006
? (RGDP (-2))	0.723455	0.190848	3.790734	0.0030
D(RGDP(-3))	0.223979	0.118637	1.887931	0.0857
D(POP)	0.001068	0.000153	6.959966	0.0000
D(POP(-1))	-0.001462	0.000229	-6.385049	0.0001
D(POP(-2))	0.000569	0.000102	5.577916	0.0002
D(NETMGR)	1.765806	2.804927	0.629537	0.5419
D(NETMGR(-1))	-17.39468	3.530327	-4.927214	0.0005
D(NETMGR(-2))	-9.675169	3.231843	-2.993700	0.0122
D(OT)	-0.022591	0.092514	-0.244185	0.8116
D(OT(-1))	0.204004	0.086055	2.370631	0.0371
D(GOVEX)	-0.513006	0.291955	-1.757142	0.1067
D(HEX)	0.224953	0.137489	1.636154	0.1301
D(HEX(-1))	0.176053	0.128965	1.365124	0.1995
D(HEX(-2))	0.295501	0.125201	2.360219	0.0378
D(HEX(-3))	0.344605	0.125878	2.737616	0.0193
ECT(-1)	-0.264722	0.036284	-7.295803	0.0000

Long-run Estimates				
POP	-1.81061	0.505071	-3.595763	0.0042
NETMGR	1.048752	2.903771	3.611689	0.0041
OT	-0.100191	0.079971	-1.252843	0.2362
GOVEX	-0.501436	0.166858	-3.005169	0.0120
HEX	0.123152	0.237111	0.519384	0.6138
C	131.1417	39.62069	3.309929	0.0070
R-squared	0.893463	**F-stat**	24.451(0.000)	
Adj. R-squared	0.793194	**D-Watson**	2.232781	

Source: Computed by the Author using E-view 10

Result of Long-Run and Short-Run Estimates

The section answers the null hypothesis that population growth and incidence of poverty haveno significant effects on economic growth in Nigeria. It examines both the short-run and long-run estimates of population growth, incidence of poverty and economic growth as a measure of GDP in Nigeria using the estimated ARDL approach as described extensively in the previous section. However, the estimated ARDL model is a composite of short-run and long-run estimates of interrelationship among considered series in this study. The clear evidence of our empirical estimates from population (POP), net migration (NETMGR), openness to trade (OT), government expenditure (GOVEX), and household expenditure (HEX) on gross domestic product growth (GDP) are depicted in Table 4.3. The ARDL approach automatically choose the lag length on all variables as the model was set at three to ensure sufficient degree of freedom based on automatic selection of Akaike Information Criterion.

The coefficients of the short-run lag one of change in gross domestic product (GDP) has positive and significant impact on the current changes in GDP rate at 5%. The short-run parameter estimates of population at lag 2 and openness to trade at lag 1 were found to be positive and statistically significant at 5% indicating that they do influence changes in GDP in the short-run. Similar result was reported for household expenditure but its lag 1 was found to be insignificant while lag 2 and 3 were significant. However, the coefficients of net migration (NETMGR), government expenditure and population at lag 1 were negative and statistically significant at 5%, implying that they influence GDP growth in the short run.

The short-run estimation results also show the error correction mechanism which measures the speed or degree of adjustment. This is the rate of adjustment at which the dependent variable changes due to changes in the independent variables. The coefficient of the ECT is found to be negative and statistically significant at the conventional level. The ECT value (-0.264722) implied that in order to return to the long run equilibrium, it is of the opinion that the model corrects its short-run disequilibrium by 26.47% speed of adjustment.

The long-run estimates from Table 5 indicated that changes in net migration and household expenditure have positive impact on output growth in Nigeria. The result shows that the two indicators were in tandem with the theoretical expectations. In magnitude basis, 10% increase in net migration and household expenditure lead to an increase in output growth by 10.48% and 1.23% respectively. However, the table reported that changes in output growth react indirectly to changes in population, openness to trade and government expenditure which does not conform to *a priori* expectation. A 10% increase in population, openness to trade and government expenditure reduce real output growth by 18.1%, 1.002% and 5.01% respectively. In terms of partial significance, population, net migration and government expenditure are statistically significant at 5%, while openness to trade and household expenditure was not during the reviewed periods.

The coefficient of determination (Adjusted-R^2) is high (0.7932) indicating that about 79.32% of the total variations in output growth were explained by the variables in the model. The overall test using the F-statistic (24.451) is statistically significant at 5% level of significance showing that model is well specified and statistically significant. The Durbin Watson statistic (2.2328) shows that there is absence of serial autocorrelation in the model.

5. Discussion of Findings

The findings showed that population growth significantly influences economic growth both in short run and long run. Also, incidence of poverty significantly influences economic growth both in short run and long run. Increase in incidence of poverty decreases economic growth, sustainable development and leads to a downturn in the activities in the economy. Net migration and household expenditure were found to be important indicators because they have positive impact on economic growth, as indicated by the long-run estimates.

Net migration, government expenditure and population influence GDP growth in the short run. Population and incidence of poverty have their varying effects on economic growth. Rise in population growth leads to poverty, low standard of living and can end up affecting economic growth negatively due to lack of adequate resources to cater for the increasing population. There is existence of long-run relationship between population growth, poverty incidence and economic growth measured by real GDP growth in Nigeria.

The results from the short run and long run estimates showed that the short-run parameter estimates of population at lag 2 and openness to trade at lag 1 were found to be positive and statistically significant at 5% indicating that they do influence changes in GDP in the short-run. This means that openness to trade has a positive impact on GDP and population also has a positive impact on GDP growth.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

The study examined the relationship between population growth and poverty incidence and economic growth. The study provides empirical evidence that there is a positive relationship between population growth and economic growth, while poverty incidence has a negative influence on economic growth.

It is evident from the study that poverty incidence has a negative effect on economic growth, this suggests that Government and policy makers should continue to embark on effective poverty reduction strategies and programmes in order to enhance consistent economic growth.

The result of the findings of this study suggests that population growth enhances economic growth but to ensure sustainable development, the government should encourage that population grows at a steady rate rather than rapidly and this can be achieved through effective healthcare and policies that reduce mortality rates.Net migration as an indicator of population growth can be a driver for economic growth, if highly skilled and productive migrants are encouraged in the country. Hence, the Nigerian government needs to provide enabling environment for citizens and immigrants to thrive by implementing policies that will enhance the rapid development of infrastructure and ensure security of lives and properties.

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THEME EIGHTEEN
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, PUBLIC FINANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND MONITORING

EFFECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON PERFORMANCE OF DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS IN ABIA STATE, (A STUDY OF ECO BANK PLC AND ACCESS BANK PLC)

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Abstract
This study examines the effects of corporate governance on performance of deposit money banks. Corporate governance is the collection of mechanisms, processes and relations by which corporations are controlled and operated. Corporate governance is the system of rules, practices and processes by which a firm is directed and controlled. The main objective of the study is to examine the impact of corporate governance on the performance of deposit money banks. Other specific objectives are: *(i)* ascertain the impact of corporate governance on profitability of deposit money banks; *(ii)* determine the impact of corporate governance on productivity of deposit money banks; *(iii)* ascertain the effect of efficient corporate governance on the effectiveness of deposit money banks; and *(iv)* determine the impact of corporate governance on the market share of deposit money banks. Having analysed the distributed ninety-one questionnaire to staff of deposit banks, descriptive survey approach was adopted and analysed using SPSS regressions. The following findings are made: *(i) that there was* positive and significant relationship between efficient corporate governance and productivity of deposit money banks; and *(ii) that there was* significant relationship between efficient corporate governance and market share of deposit money banks. The study recommends, among others, that: (i) managers should allow for efficient production process that will boost the market share of the organisation.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Mechanisms, Processes, Stakeholders and Customer Relations

1.0 Introduction

1.1 *Background of the Study*

The word, “corporate governance”, is basically concerned through which a company is managed and controlled. It deals with the setting of rights and duties among different peoples being involved with the company affairs. It also involves with the setting of company objectives keeping in view the interest of stakeholders of the company. The most fundamental definition of corporate governance is based on the idea that is a contractual agreement between many parties for the purpose of achieving organisation's goals (Muhammad and Waqar, 2015).

Corporate governance can be defined as the relationship among shareholders, board of directors and the top management in determining the direction and performance of the corporation. It also includes the relationship among the many players involved (the stakeholders) and the goals for which the corporation is governed (Alagathurai and Nimalathasan, 2013).

Corporate governance is "the system by which companies is directed and controlled" .More simply we can say that "it is the framework by which the interests of various stakeholders are balanced "It shows a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance provide the mechanism by which the problems of corporation stakeholders, which include the shareholders, creditors, management, employees, consumers and the public at large are framed and resolved (Khaliq and Muhammad, 2013). In contemporary business corporations, the main external stakeholders are shareholders, debt holders, trade creditors, suppliers, and customers. Internal stakeholders are the board of directors, executives, and other employees. Good and proper corporate governance is considered imperative for the establishment of a competitive market. Corporate governance practices stabilize and strengthen good capital markets and protect investors. They help companies to improve their performance and attract investment. Corporate governance enables corporations to attain their corporate objectives and to protect the rights of shareholders (Khaliq and Muhammad, 2013).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Although a plethora of studies on corporate governance exist, none has investigated the connection between corporate governance and employee performance. For instance, studies have examined the relationship between corporate governance and organisational performance, corporate governance and employee job satisfaction, and corporate governance and customer satisfaction (AlQudah, 2012; Duke II & Kankpang, 2011).

However, empowerment literature reveals the importance of employee power in organisational engagement (Nadeem et al, 2013). Similarly, employees have been identified as important stakeholders among all others and therefore can be expected to have the biggest power in terms of stakeholder engagement (Emeka and Alem, 2016). In view of this, the present study sought to investigate the predictive effect of corporate governance on employees' performance in the banking sector of Eco Bank Plc and Access Bank Plc Umuahia, Abia State.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The major objective of the study is to examine the effect of corporate governance on employees' performance in the banking sector of Eco Bank Plc and Access Bank Plc, Umuahia, Abia State. Other specific objectives are to:

- identify the relationship between corporate governance and employees' productivity in deposit money banks..
- ascertain whether good corporate governance predicts employees' profitability in deposit money banks..

- highlight the relationship between corporate structure and employees' level of efficiency in deposit money banks.
- determine the relationship between internal controls and employees' level of satisfaction in deposit money banks.

1.4 Research Questions

The following research questions were formulated in the course of this study:

- Is there any positive and significant relationship between corporate governance and employees' productivity in deposit money?
- To what extent does good corporate governance predicts employees' profitability in deposit money banks?
- Is there any relationship between corporate structure and employees' level of efficiency in deposit money banks?
- Is there any relationship between internal controls and employees' level of satisfaction in deposit money banks?

1.5 Research Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were formulated for the study:

Ho_1: There is no positive and significant relationship between corporate governance and employees' productivity in deposit money banks.

Ho_2: Corporate governance does not predict employees' profitability in deposit money banks.

Ho_3: There is no positive and significant relationship between corporate structure and employees' level of efficiency in deposit money banks.

Ho_4: There is no positive and significant relationship between internal controls and employees' level of satisfaction in deposit money banks.

2.0 Review of Related Literature

2.1 Conceptual Framework

2.1.1 Corporate Governance Paradox

Corporate governance is about promoting corporate fairness, transparency and accountability. It is a uniquely complex and multi-faceted subject. Devoid of a unified or systematic theory, its paradigm, diagnosis and solutions lie in multidisciplinary fields i.e. economics, accountancy, finance among others (Cadbury, 2002). As such it is essential that a comprehensive framework be codified in the accounting framework of any organisation. In any organisation, corporate governance is one of the key factors that determine the health of the system and its ability to survive economic shocks. The health of the organisation depends on the underlying soundness of its individual components and the connections between them.

Corporate governance has been looked at and defined variedly by different scholars and practitioners. However they all have pointed to the same end, hence giving more of a consensus in the definition. Coleman and Nicholas-Biekpe (2006) defined corporate governance as the relationship of the enterprise to shareholders or in the wider sense as the relationship of the enterprise to society as a whole. Corporate governance involves a system by which governing institutions and all other organisations relate to their communities and stakeholders to improve their quality of life (Ato, 2002). It is, therefore, important that good corporate governance ensures transparency, accountability and fairness in reporting. In this regard, corporate governance is not only concerned with corporate efficiency, it relates to a much wider range of company strategies and life cycle development (Mayer, 2007). It is also concerned with the ways parties (stakeholders) interested in the wellbeing of firms ensure that managers and other insiders adopt mechanism to safeguard the interest of the shareholders. (Ahmadu and Tukur, 2005). Corporate governance is based on the level of corporate responsibility a company exhibits with regard to accountability, transparency and ethical values and the belief that in corporate governance there is great opportunity for them (Nadeem et al, 2019).

2.2 Theoretical Framework

2.2.1 Agency theory

The agency theory is a supposition that explains the relationship between principals and agents in business. Agency theory is concerned with resolving problems that can exist in agency relationships due to unaligned goals or different aversion levels to risk. The most common agency relationship in finance occurs between shareholders (principal) and company executives (agents).The agent represents the principal in a particular business transaction and is expected to represent the best interests of the principal without regard for self-interest. The different interests of principals and agents may become a source of conflict, as some agents may not perfectly act in the principal's best interests. The resulting miscommunication and disagreement may result in various problems within companies. Incompatible desires may drive a wedge between each stakeholder and cause inefficiencies and financial losses. This leads to the principal-agent problem.

The principal-agent problem occurs when the interests of a principal and agent are in conflict. Companies should seek to minimise these situations through solid corporate policy. These conflicts present normally ethical individuals with opportunities for moral hazard. Incentives may be used to redirect the behaviour of the agent to realign these interests with the principal's. Corporate governance can be used to change the rules under which the agent operates and restore the principal's interests. The principal, by employing the agent to represent the principal's interests, must overcome a lack of information about the agent's performance of the task. Agents must have incentives encouraging them to act in unison with the principal's interests. Agency theory may be used to design these incentives appropriately by considering what interests motivate the agent to act. Incentives encouraging the wrong behaviour must be removed and rules discouraging moral hazard must be in place. Understanding the mechanisms that create problems helps businesses develop better corporate policy.

2.2.2 Stakeholder Theory

The stakeholder theory, therefore, appears better in explaining the role of corporate governance than the agency theory by highlighting the various constituents of a firm. Thus, creditors, customers, employees, banks, governments, and society are regarded as relevant stakeholders. Related to the above discussion, John and Senbet (2004) provide a comprehensive review of the stakeholders' theory of corporate governance which points out the presence of many parties with competing interests in the operations of the firm. They also emphasise the role of non-market mechanisms such as the size of the board, committee structure as important to firm performance.

2.3 Empirical Framework

Ajanthan et al (2013), determined the relationship between corporate governance and banking performance and also find out the impact of corporate governance on banking performance. This study focused on four aspects of corporate governance namely; Board Size (BS), Board Diversity (BD), Outside Directors Percentage (OSDP) & Board Meeting Frequency (BMF). Banking performance has been measured through Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA). The results revealed that all variables of corporate governance are positively correlated with ROE in state banks as well as, in private banks except BD and BMF other variables have strong negative relation with ROE, which is significant at 5percent level of significance. Similarly, except BMF other variables have negative relationship with ROA in state banks. Private Banks also showed same relation except the variable BD. BD have strong negative relationship with ROA in state banks which was significant at 5 percent level of significance, but in private banks; positive relationship was denoted by BD which was not significant. Further corporate governance had a moderate impact on performance of both private and state banks.

Naresh and Sudesh, (2016), analysed the impact of corporate governance on the performance of selected top five public sector banks and private sector banks as per market capitalisation. The required secondary data was collected from corporate governance reports and audited annual reports of selected banks for the time period of five years, i.e., from year 2010-11 to year 2014-15. Panel data regression and Pearson correlation tools were used with help of SPSS. The study found that board size has positive significance impact on Return on Equity, Return on Asset and Net Non-Performing Asset whereas the ratio of outside directors and number of meetings had negative significance impact on Return on Equity in selected public sector banks. Increase in board size and ratio of outside directors have positive impact on performance variables Return on Equity and Return on Asset whereas decrease in the board size and ratio of outside directors have negative impact on Return on Asset in selected private sector banks.

Ben et al (2010), opined that anxiety over the current banking crisis in Nigeria is understandable. This was borne out of the fact that the economic development of any country is directly tied to its banking sector. The effectiveness and efficiency with which the banks perform their intermediary roles between the surplus and deficit spending units of the economy determines to a very large extent the prosperity of any nation. Corporate governance is systematic and formalised manners of ensuring that top management represented by the board of directors do not make decision making powers occasioned by management and ownership separation to pursue personal interests at the expense of other stakeholders. This study made use of structured questionnaire to elicit responses from conveniently selected respondents comprising of investment experts, academics, banks customers, public and policy analysts with in Lagos metropolis. It was hypothesized and the study confirmed that poor governance culture and supervisory laxities were majorly responsible for the current banking crises.

3.0 Methodology

3.1 Research Design

This research adopted the survey design which suits the research due its descriptive nature.

3.2 Sources of Data

Both primary and secondary source of data were utilized in gathering the information relevant for this work.

Primary data: Primary data were collected through the use of questionnaire.
Secondary data: Secondary data were also used in the study. Some of the secondary sources utilised included textbooks, seminar paper and related articles in academic journals and from the internet.

3.3 Population of the Study

The population of this study comprises the staff of the two selected financial institutions (Eco bank Plc and Access bank Plc in Abia State), totalling 210 staff (Annual Year book, 2019).

3.4 Sample Size Determination

For the purpose of this study, the researcher derived the sample size statically by using Taro Yamani (Abdullahi, 2012) as follow;
Using the formula;

$n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)2}$ Where;
n = Sample size
N = Population (210)
e = Margin of error (0.05) Thus, the sample size is:

$$n = \frac{210}{1+210(0.05)2}$$

$$n = \frac{210}{1+210(0.0025)}$$

$$n = \frac{210}{1+0.53}$$

$$n = \frac{210}{1.53}$$

$$n = 137.52$$

n= 138 Staff.

Therefore, the sample size for this study is 138 staff.

3.7 Method of Data Analyses

Data for the study were analysed using frequency distribution table, and percentages were used to analyse the data from the questionnaire, while simple regression and correlation with the use of SPSS were used to analyse the hypotheses.

3.8 Data Presentation and Discussion of Findings

Distribution of questionnaire and response rate

Total copies of questionnaire	Respondents	Percentage (%)
Total distributed	138	100
Total valid returned	120	87
Total invalid returned	8	5.8
Total not returned	10	7.2
Total	138	100

Source: Field survey, 2020

Results and Discussion

Regression result showing the relationship between corporate governance and employees' productivity in deposit money banks

Table 3.8.1

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.898[a]	.806	.803	.51380	.246

a) Predictors: (Constant), Employees productivity of Eco Bank and Access Bank is affected by the nature of training given to the workers, Board size of the banking sector of Eco Bank and Access Bank affects employee productivity.
(b) Dependent Variable: What is the degree of relationship between corporate governance and employees productivity of Eco Bank and Access Bank

Table 3.8.2
ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	128.704	2	64.352	243.764	.000[b]
	Residual	30.887	117	.264		
	Total	159.592	119			

(a) Dependent Variable: What is the degree of relationship between corporate governance and employees productivity of Eco Bank and Access Bank.
(b) Predictors: (Constant), Employees productivity of Eco Bank and Access Bank is affected by the nature of training given to the workers, Board size of the banking sector of Eco Bank and Access Bank affects employee productivity.

Table 3.8.3
Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.475	.225		2.115	.037
	Board size and employee productivity	1.118	.102	1.135	10.912	.000
	Employees producti vity and nature of training given to workers	-.340	.134	-.264	-2.537	.012

(a) Dependent Variable: What is the degree of relationship between corporate governance and employees productivity of Ecobank and Access bank.

Interpretation

R = .898
R-Square = .806
Adjusted R-Square = .803
F – Statistic (df1=2 & df2=117) = 243.864
T Statistics = 10.912

Table 3.8.1 above shows the regression results between corporate governance and employees' productivity in the banking sector of Eco Bank and Access Bank. The regression results showed that the estimated coefficient of the regression parameter have a positive sign and thus conform to our a-priori expectation. The implication of this sign is that the dependent variable Employees productivity of Eco Bank and Access Bank is affected by the nature of training given to the workers, Board size of the banking sector of Eco Bank and Access Bank affects employee productivity is positively, affected by degree of relationship between corporate governance and employees productivity of Eco bank and Access bank. The coefficient of determination R-square of 0.806 implied that 80.6% of the sample variation in the dependent variable degree of relationship between corporate governance and employees productivity of Eco bank and Access bank is explained or caused by the explanatory variable while 19.4% is unexplained. This remaining 19.4% could be caused by other factors or variables not built into the model. The high value of R-square is an indication of a very good relationship between the dependent and independent variable.The value of the adjusted R^2 is 0.803. This shows that the regression line which captures 80.3 per cent of the total variation in degree of relationship between corporate governance and employees' productivity of Eco bank and Access bank is caused by variation in the explanatory variable specified in the model with 19.7 per cent accounting for the stochastic error term. The F-statistic was also used to test the overall significant of the model. The F-value of 1243.864 is an indication that the model is statistically significant at 5 percent level of significant at degree of freedom df1= 2 and df2= 117.

Test of Hypothesis

Hypothesis one

H_o: There is no positive and significant relationship between corporate governance and employees' productivity in deposit banks.

$H_0=B_1=0$. Test the hypothesis that all slope coefficients are equal to zero.

$H_1 \neq B_1 \neq 0$. Test the hypothesis that not all slope coefficients are equal to zero.

With reference to table above, the calculated t-statistics of 10.912 is greater than the critical value (i.e.,1.962), the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative accepted. This means that there is positive and significant relationship between corporate governance and employees' productivity in the banking sector of Eco Bank and Access Bank Umuahia, Abia State.

Findings

The main objective of the study is to examine the effect of corporate governance on employees' performance in the banking sector of Eco Bank Plc and Access Bank plc. Umuaha, Abia state. The major findings of the study can be summarised thus;

That corporate governance which included the nature of training given to the workers, Board size of the banking sector of Eco bank and Access bank affects employee productivity **as** indicated table 3.8.3 were p-value 10.912 was greater than 1.962 that was (real 10.912 > rtab 1.962), the researcher reject Ho and accept the alternate hypothesis thereby concluded that corporate governance which include nature of training given to the workers, Board size has a significant effect on employees' performance of Eco bank and Access bank pl. Umuaha, Abia State

3.9 Conclusion

It is concluded that any organisation that has a low level of training given to the workers and small board size, would not only have un-encouraging employees' performance, but would experience uncoordinated free flow of governance and effectiveness, with the attending consequences of organisational failure in actualising its goal(s) and objective(s).

The empirical findings and analyses conducted in Eco Bank Plc and Access Bank Plc showed that corporate governance can directly contribute to employees' performance.

3.10 Recommendations

It is, therefore, recommended that banks and other organisations should abide to principles of corporate governance, by looking into the size of their board and giving adequate training and re-training programmes to improve employees' performance; effectively applying the acquired knowledge in practical terms, so that the desired goals and objectives could be achieved; using only the relevant ethical conducts that are believed to be very vital to the realisation of high organisational performance.

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT STATUTORY ALLOCATION IN THE PRISM OF NEW GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT (NFIU)

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Abstract
The 1976 Local Government Reforms set the path for the inclusion of local governments into the revenue allocation formula in Nigeria. This inclusion into the revenue allocation has thus strengthened the State-Local government financial relationship. The resultant effect of this financial relationship between states and local governments has thus given birth to State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA). The SJLGA was first established in 1981 by an Act of Parliament but its eventual adaptation and subsequent utilisation started in 1999 when it was reintroduced in section 162 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The aim of the Account is to strengthen the local governments and ensure control in the system as well as to facilitate development at the grassroots. The broad objective of this research is to examine the flow of local government statutory allocation into the State Joint Local Government Account and how the new guidelines of the National Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has affected the financial relationships between states and local governments. The research is qualitative in nature and data is derived from both primary and secondary sources. The primary source of data includes observations, interviews and surveys, while the secondary source consists of journal articles, newspapers as well as online publications and reports from various writers and scholars. The theory of fiscal federalism was used as the theoretical framework to explain the financial relationship between the three tiers of government and the constitutional provision with regards to the flow of funds and how it should be utilised. Findings of the study revealed that the SJLGA, which is the binding force between state and local government financial relationship, has been ineffective in providing adequate financial resources to the Local governments as manifested in their consistent short-changing and denial of access to their statutory entitlements by the state governments. The pronouncement of the new guidelines by the National Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) of May, 2019 on how the local government funds should henceforth be utilised, has made the state governors to become jittery pointing to the unconstitutionality of the proposal and their outright criticism and disapproval. The study therefore recommended for the enforcement of the NFIU proposal if any meaningful progress should be achieved at the local government level. This will ensure financial independence to the local governments in Nigeria and as well facilitate development in their respective communities. This is because, it is evident that the

SJLGA as practiced has not effectively enhances the capacity of local governments to deliver services.

Keywords: Local Government, Statutory allocation and National Financial Intelligence Unit

Introduction

Local government occupy a unique position in the governance process globally. Its importance and acceptance have led to its proliferation all over the world. Local government can be seen as a political authority under state for decentralising political power and delegation of authority Fajobi (2010).

The United Nations defined Local government as a political subdivision of a nation (or in a federal system, a state) which is constituted by a law and has substantial control of local affairs including the power to impose taxes or exert labour for prescribed purposes.

Bello (2007), argued that local government constitutes the most critical level of government at which the momentum to sustain national development can be created. He added that, in some Third World countries, local government is the only semblance of authority known beyond tradition.

From the definitions above, we can argue that, local government is a small political entity within a larger one created by law for the purpose of administrative convenience and having the power to carry out some social and economic responsibilities within its jurisdictional area. It is the closest tier of government to the people at the grassroots. It is because of its closeness that people at the grassroots found it convenient to report their grievances with the hope of getting prompt attention.

Local governments, in most part of the world, are engaged in a wide range of socio-economic activities including waste disposal, planning, primary education, primary health care, markets and motor parks, etc. Most of these activities if left with a more distant government would not be performed effectively and will failed to reach the people at the grassroots. Pervez (2011). This has necessitated the global trend towards decentralisation and devolution.

The former president of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, opined that Local government stands the tallest among the three tiers of government in terms of accessibility by the people. He added that development of every nation depends upon the geometrical progression of the third tier of government. He, therefore, concluded that it is imperative to constantly reiterate the importance of this tier of government and as well remind those agitating for its scrapping. Tide (2012).

From the foregoing, we can say that Local government is an important tier of government in many respects. Its closeness to the people makes it easily assessable and responds promptly to the peoples' need. It performs a number of functions including collection of taxes as well as political and socio-economic planning and development. Local government provides easy access to community participation, planning and other developmental activities. This will have enhanced the development efforts of the Local government.

The 1976 Local Government Reforms

The most important political and constitutional changes on the local government in Nigeria, however, was the 1976 Local Government Reforms by the military government under the then military ruler, Major General Olusegun Obasanjo. It was during this period that the system of local government in the country was unified.

The 1976 Local Government Reforms was aimed at enhancing the management and capabilities of local governments through adequate financial resources, harmonisation and professionalisation of personnel and career security of administration staff (Olasupo, 2012). It was in this Reforms that the name of Native Authority System was changed to local government while few statutory measures were included in the reform package to strengthen the system and make it an independent tier of government. All these were aimed at institutionalising the local government system in the country.

The 1976 Local Government Reforms gained wide acceptance and, therefore, became a subject of discussion particularly at the Constituent Assembly of 1977-1978 which led to its domestication in the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Obike and Nwaodu, 2010). This was the first time that local governments, in Nigeria, appeared in the constitution and a provision was made for them in the revenue allocation formula. We can, therefore, argue that the 1976 Local Government Reforms was the brain behind the inclusion of local governments in the revenue allocation formula. The Reforms have the following objectives:

- to make appropriate services and development activities responsive to local wishes and initiatives by developing or delegating them to local representative bodies;
- to facilitate the exercise of democratic self-government close to the grassroots of our society, and to encourage initiative and leadership potential;
- to mobilise human and material resources through the involvement of members of the public in their development; and
- to provide a two-way channel of communication between local communities and government (both state and federal) (Abubakar 2002).

Based on the aforementioned considerations and in an attempt to strengthen the local government system, the National Assembly passed a Law in 1981 establishing the State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA) known as “allocation of revenues (Federation Accounts) act, 1981” (Daily Trust, 2006). The provision of the constitution establishing the SJLGA was made in good faith. It was meant to protect the local governments' allocations from possible manipulations. Those who introduced the idea of a joint account never envisaged the problem that the system will breed (Omoruyi, 1985).

Statutory Allocation

Nigeria is a federating state with three tiers or levels of administration. The three tiers/levels received allocations from the federation account on monthly basis depending on the revenue allocation formula. Presently, there are 774 local governments in Nigeria each receiving monthly statutory allocation from the Federation Account as stipulated by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Constitution provides that 20.6% of the amount standing in the credit of the Federation Account should be given to the Local Governments based on some specified principles as provided by the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. This allocation goes directly into the State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA) of each state. Apart from the 20 percent share from the federation account, Value Added Tax (VAT) is also shared among the three tiers of government with the local government having 23 percent share. Excess Crude account which is an excess of the budgeted amount is also shared to the three tiers of government. All these share received by the local government must go through the SJLGA. The states are also constitutionally required to allocate 10% of their Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) to their local governments.

The SJLGA is operated in order to ensure effective service delivery, accountability and control in the Nigerian Local Government System. It is, however, expected that, such financial relationship between the state and local governments will serve as an important vehicle for carrying out the functions of local governments stated in the Fourth Schedule of the 1999 Constitution of the FRN; ensuring rural transformation, improvement in human development and standard of living of the populace in general.

State/Local Government Financial Relationship

Local governments were established to carry out functions and responsibilities and participate in socio-economic planning and development that have direct bearing on its people. In order to carry out these functions, Local governments have to be financially stable. Wheare (1963), opined that an efficient and effective discharge of statutory functions requires adequate financial resources. Each level of government within the federal system should have adequate financial resources to perform its functions without unduly appealing to other levels of government for financial assistance.

Jumare (2008), shares the same views with Wheare who also argued that effective and virile federalism depends to a large extent on the availability of financial resources. He pointed out that, for the three tiers of government to exist, they have to be financially healthy.

Nigeria operates a federal system of government with three tiers or levels of administration, i.e., federal, state and local government. Under this federal arrangement, the three tiers of government receive allocation of funds from the federation account as revenue. The history of revenue allocation to local governments in Nigeria begins with the 1976 Local Government Reforms even though the local governments receives grants and aid from the federal government and states before the reforms. The reforms were however, the brain behind the inclusion of local governments into the main stream revenue allocation formula.

During the periods 1981 to 1985, local governments continue to experience excessive control from the state governments who encroached into what would normally have been the exclusive preserves of local government and consequently there has been a divorce between the people and government at most basic levels (Abatemi, 2012).

The state governors continue to encroach, unabated, into the allocations of the local governments thereby crippling their capacity to function effectively.

The Ibrahim Babangida regime that came into power in 1985 made some far-reaching reforms that were aimed at enhancing the local government's capacity and ensure their autonomy. In 1989 there was a bold move by the government to revisit the financial autonomy of the local government. To this effect a provision was made in the constitution of 1989 under section 160 which stated that the allocation to the local governments should go directly to them. By this provision therefore, the SJLGA was abrogated. The regime also abolished the ministries for local governments throughout the country and statutory allocations were collected directly by the local governments from the Federal Pay Offices in their various states. It was also during this period that executive and legislative arm were introduced into the local government system. At the same time the allocation of the local governments was raised from 10 to 15 percent. The regime also conducted local government elections into the local government councils given room for democratically local government executives.

Having gained autonomy, the local governments started to operate independent of the state governments with full freedom to administer their funds without any interference from any other tier of government. However, within a short period of gaining this autonomous status, the local governments were enmeshed into cases of high-level corruption and mismanagement of resources around the country. The local governments became a centre of sharing money every month end and Chairmen and Councillors became an envy of the society. The activities of the local government political office holders became a thing of gossiping and outcry from different quarters of the society. This and many other reasons culminated into the birth and reintroduction of the provision of 1999 constitution of the State Joint Local Government Account which was included in section 162. The idea of the inclusion of the SJLGA was to restore confidence in the local government system and curtailed the excesses of the local government functionaries.

It was to be noted that the formulators of the joint account have good intentions for its establishment. However, this financial policy played into the hands of hawks such that the objectives were defeated as the supervision of the account by the state governments provided a vent for manipulation of the account through deduction, delay in the release of allocation to councils and diversion of funds into private use (Ojugbeli and James, 2014).

National Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU): Conceptual Clarification

The National Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) is an agency of the Federal government of Nigeria established by tan Act of National Assembly in 2018. The establishment of the NFIU is based on the requirements of recommendation 29 of the Financial Action Task Force Standards and Article 14 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. One of the key objectives of the Act is the creation of a legal, institutional and regulatory framework to ensure transparency, effective and efficient and management administration and operation of the Nigerian Financial Intelligence (ItaEnang, 2018).

The NFIU has, in May, 2019 made a pronouncement regarding the financial allocations to the local government that caught the Nigerian state governors off balance. The NFIU made the pronouncement through a new guideline titled 'NFIU enforcement and guidelines to reduce crime vulnerabilities created by cash withdrawal from local government funds throughout Nigeria' which was proposed to take effect on 1st June, 2019. The following were contained in the guidelines:

- that no local government should make a daily cumulative cash transaction of more than N500,00 daily;
- that no bank, financial institutions, public officers and other stakeholders in the country should tamper with the local council allocation;
- any bank that allows any transaction from any local government account without the funds first reaching a particular local government account will be sanctioned locally and internationally; and
- all transactions must be done through valid cheques or electronic funds transfer.

Some parts of the NFIU (2019) statement reads as follows:

> "having realised through analysis that cash withdrawal and transactions of the State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA) poses biggest corruption, money laundering and security threats at the grassroots levels and to the entire financial system and the country as a whole, the NFIU decided to uphold the full provisions of section 162 (6) (8) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution as amended which designated State Joint Local Government Account into which shall be paid allocations to the local government councils of the state from the federation account and from the government of the state. "The Amount standing to the credit of local government councils of a state shall be distributed among the local government councils of that state and not for other purposes."

The decision of the NFIU has generated a lot of controversy over its constitutionality among various stakeholders. Though there are criticisms against the move by the NFIU of trumping on the provisions of the constitution, the move is however in line with the federal government bid to check mass looting by local government officials and diversion of local government funds by officials of the state, the NFIU guidelines is meant to restore financial autonomy to the local governments. The NFIU guidelines will help in the delivery of good governance at the grassroots.

The implication of the new guidelines of the NFIU is that the state governors will no longer play any major role in the disbursement or making any transaction with the local government funds. While the new guidelines were expected to kick off on 1st June, 2019, the

Nigerian Governor's Forum has petitioned president Muhammadu Buhari kicking against the move. The Forum argues that the NFIU lack the powers to enact such rules. The NGF in a letter signed by its Chairman and then Governor of Zamfara State, Abdulaziz Yari, expressed dismay and angst over NFIU action as attempt to dabble into a matter that was beyond its mandate (Prompt News Online, 2019). Yari further accuse the NFIU of stocking mischief and also deliberately seeking to cause disaffection, chaos and overheat the polity. He maintained that the action of the NFIU was not only illegal but total disregard to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.

Despite the accusation levelled against the NFIU, the new guidelines are seen as a step forward in granting the much-awaited local government autonomy. But one may be tempted to ask whether the new guidelines of the NFIU were adhered to by the state governors.

It is almost ten months now since the implementation of the NFIU guidelines, but a study of the events happening in most parts of the country revealed that nothing much has changed with regards to the management of the local government funds. Though some states adhere to the guidelines, other states remained adamant. In his report of the activities of Ekiti State, Ayodele (2020) as reported by Onyedika (2020) in his study of the "unending wait for financial autonomy for local council" maintained that there is confusion as to whether or not the 16 local governments in Ekiti State have been enjoying appreciable degree of financial autonomy in line with the NFIU new guidelines. He pointed out that, though the local governments get their accounts credited, there was still the Joint Account Allocation Committee (JAAC) monthly meeting where the money was redistributed to fund joint projects and other sundry matters by the state government.

In Rivers State for instance, Ayodele (2020) in Onyedika (2020) reported that the issue of financial autonomy for local councils is still shrouded in secrecy in Rivers State. It is not very clear if the local government chairmen are truly in charge of their fund as none of them was bold enough to disclose the true state of things.

In Katsina, Zamfara and Kano States, the situation is not different from other states of the federation. A cross section of some stakeholders interviewed revealed that, though funds meant for the local governments are credited into the local governments' accounts, the state governments dictates how it should be allocated and utilized. In Zamfara State, for instance, some council chairmen revealed that the funds released to them are not commensurate with the funds disbursed from the federation account. What is released to the local councils from the federation account usually undergoes intensive deduction by the officials of the state government and little is left for the local government. Though Zamfara State has an elective council, the situation has never changed. In Katsina State, there are neither elected representatives nor appointed ones on ground. The local councils are left in the hands of administrative officials for quite sometimes now. Local governments funds received from the federation account are, therefore, emasculated by the state government unchallenged. The Administrators in charge of the local councils are civil servants and therefore has no authority to challenge the state government over any decision with regards to the local government funds. In such circumstances, the administrators utilised what is released to them.

Fiscal federalism: Theoretical Clarification

The basic theory of fiscal federalism postulates that the central government should ensure equitable distribution of income, maintain macroeconomic stability and provide public goods that are national in character such as defence and security, and money and fiduciary printing etc. Decentralised levels of government on the other hand should concentrate on the provision of local public goods while the central government provides targeted grants in cases where there are jurisdictional spill-over associated with local public goods.

According to Akindele (2002), fiscal federalism refers to the allocation of tax-raising powers and expenditure responsibilities between levels of governments. Fiscal federalism is concerned with understanding which functions and instruments are best centralised and which is best placed in the sphere of decentralised levels of government (Oates, 1999). The basic foundations for the theory of fiscal federalism were laid by Kenneth Arrow (1974), Richard Musgrave (1976) and Paul Samuelson (1978).

In broad terms, fiscal federalism is the division of power, functions and resources among the tiers (Federal, State and Local government) in a federating system. There are principles that guide fiscal federalism and sustain the overriding factors of administrative efficiency and fiscal independence.

Specifically, Nigerian fiscal federalism structure involves the allocation of expenditure and tax raising powers among the federal, state and local government. Fiscal federalism is deeply rooted in a political arrangement called federalism Abubakar (1992). As the financial relationship between and among existing tiers of governments, fiscal federalism deals with the system of transfer or grants through which the federal government shares its revenue with states and local governments.

Methodology

The study was conducted in three states from the northwest region comprising Katsina, Kano and Zamfara States. A cross section of respondents was interviewed while some were given questionnaires to fill. The secondary data was obtained from some journals writings where respondents provided some insight about the aftermath of the NFIU guidelines in some states in the country. The responses elicited from the respondents were analysed and recommendations were proffered.

Findings

The NFIU guidelines has indicated its readiness to grant financial autonomy for local governments and ensure grassroots development as well as good governance. Though the action was seen by many experts and stakeholders as breaching into the provision of the constitution, it is, nonetheless, a good development in the life of the local government councils. For several years, the local governments were under funded by the states and the trend will continue unabated unless a pragmatic attempt is made to resuscitate them. The followings are the research findings:

- The new NFIU guidelines has shown that financial autonomy to the local governments is practically possible if the federal government is really serious and sincere about the operations of the local government system.
- The criticism of the NFIU guidelines by the state governors has shown the extent to which the governors can go to protect the local government funds for their selfish interest, otherwise they would have willingly accepted the proposal if they don't have any hidden agenda for the funds.
- Though the NFIU has issued a statement on the new guidelines, some state governors refused to comply with the directives and continue to encroach into the local government exclusive preserves.
- The council chairmen who are representatives of the people are helpless as the state governors have the upper hand in maintaining the statutory allocation.
- Though the NFIU threatened to prosecute erring governors and stakeholders who contravened the order issued, some legal luminaries pointed to the unconstitutionality of the order and therefore not binding on the state governments.
- Some stakeholders pointed to the unconstitutionality of the NFIU order and therefore viewed the directives as one that will fail even at the court of law.
- There is the fear in some quarters that if local governments are given such leverage of financial independence, there will be a reverse to the previous situation where funds will be squandered to the state of not being able to pay even monthly salaries, a situation that lead to the implementation of the SJLGA.

Conclusion

It is important to note that the NFIU has made a pronouncement that is welcomed in most parts of the country and applauded by many stakeholders. However, it is equally important to note that there may be constitutional crises and debate as regards to the legality of the pronouncement and subsequent implementation of the guidelines by the state governors. In as much as the state governors adhere to the provision of the constitution, there is also the fear that they can be hunted even after leaving office and be prosecuted for an act committed legally. It is in view of this that the governors are treating the guidelines with caution so as not transcend beyond the boundaries of the law.

The NFIU guidelines can thus be said to lay foundation for financial prudence in the local government and reduce the level of corruption and diversion of public funds. This will make the local governments effective and provide good governance as well as grassroots development at the local level.

Recommendations

This section suggests recommendations which will further enhance the performance and improvement in the financial relationship between states and local governments in Nigeria.

Recommendation for practice, policy and academic purposes are offered in light of the findings of this research work.

- The federal government, through the NFIU, can play a major role by adhering to the earlier warning issued to the states not to encroach into the local government funds. Sanction can be applied to erring state governments so that the right procedure in spending local government funds will be strictly adhered to and reduce the level of corruption and diversion of the local council funds.
- The NFIU should also ensure compliance of the guidelines by strictly monitoring the local government funds and ensuring that the state governors did not divert them for their personal interest.
- State governors that refused to comply with the directives of the NFIU should be sanctioned. Those who floated the directives and make any transaction outside the local government account should be made to pay back the exact amount involved through their monthly allocation.

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PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA

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Abstract
This study attempts to appraise the content and performance of Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs) in Nigeria. MFIs have been adjudged to serve as a catalyst for enhancing economic growth, income redistribution and poverty eradication. To this end, the study investigates the problems that can serve as cog in the wheels of progress of these institutions with a view to finding plausible solutions that would serve as panacea to the identified problems. Exploratory and Descriptive research methods were used to review the relevant literature in order to achieve this objective. Operators of major MFIs in South-West Nigeria were interviewed and structured questionnaires were administered on 540 non-beneficiaries of microfinance in the study area. The outcome of the survey revealed that MFIs are yet to satisfy the poor in view of their terms and conditions. Government is, therefore, implored to pay more attention to the operations of MFIs in order to reduce poverty in Nigeria. Also, there is the need to assist the rural poor with micro-credit that would be disbursed with concessional interest rates without collateral conditions.

Keywords: Micro-Finance Institutions, economic growth, poverty eradication, income redistribution, South-West Nigeria

Introduction

Microfinance has been recognised all over the world as a method of credit that can be used to eradicate poverty. This is due to the fact that it renders financial services to the poor who possess low income, low assets and lack collateral to secure loans from conventional banks. The major objective of microfinance is therefore to reduce poverty by providing short term small credit facilities to low income earners and other deprived poor who are not "bankable" according to the commercial banks' standard. And they cannot pledge collateral securities to back their credits, they lack good documented record of previous credit history and they lack gainful employment. The Bank therefore requires high costs of transaction with such category of clients.

Although the initiative to extend credit access to the low income earners began in 1960s but it was more pronounced in 1989 when the World Bank devoted special attention to it in the publication of World Bank annual report in 1989 . In 1997, the World Summit on Microcredit considered microfinance as a functional approach to financing development including poverty reduction. This trend was followed in 2004 by the Tenth Francophone Summit in Ouagadougou, when some heads of states of some Southern countries were committed to give adequate support to Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) and ensure that the latter are adequately involved in the conventional financial sector . The agitation to extend credit facilities to the poor was further reinforced in 2006 when a target was set in Halifax to grant credit to 175 million poorest families in the world for self-employment and business, and other financial services, and; to ensure that at least 100 million families rise above the threshold of US$1 a day by 2015 .

Microfinance Operation in Nigeria

The provision of Microfinance services in Nigeria dates back to centuries of years. In its traditional form, microfinance functions in Nigeria with the provision of micro-credit to rural and urban low-income earners. They operate in form of self-help groups that rotate the savings and credits among the group members. There are other informal providers of microfinance services like cooperative societies; and savings collectors usually called "Baba Alajo". However, the major impediment of these informal microfinance institutions is the fact that they serve few people as a result of insufficient funds available to finance their customers' projects and extend the financial services to rural areas. In order to improve this situation, Nigeria governments in the past established series of financed micro/rural credit programmes that would assist the poor to fund his micro-business. Such programmes include the Rural Banking Programme, sectoral allocation of credits, a concessionary interest rate, and the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS). Others are the Nigerian Agriculture and Co-operative Bank Limited (NACB), the National Directorate of Employment (NDE), the Nigerian Agricultural Insurance Corporation (NAIC), the Peoples Bank of Nigeria (PBN), the Community Banks (CBs), the Family Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP) and in year 2000 the government established the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) with the mandate of providing financial services to alleviate poverty.

In Nigeria, it is on record that as at 2005, the formal financial system renders services to about 35% of the economically active population whereas the remaining 65% is left to the hands of informal financial sector like Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), money lenders, friends, relatives and Cooperative and Thrift societies. It is therefore important for developing country like Nigeria to enact a formidable finance policy that would integrate the activities of the existing informal financial institutions. And bring them within the umbrella of the apex regulator – Central Bank of Nigeria. This would ensure monetary stability that will be capable to engender sound economic growth and development through the adequate finance of micro, small and medium scale enterprises.

The practice of these microfinance services, in particular, those sponsored by government has been the adoption of the traditional supply-led, subsidised credit approach mainly directed to the agricultural sector and other businesses such as, tailoring, transportation, trading, blacksmithing, weaving and agro-processing. These programmes had contributed immensely to the economic growth but they lacked continuity and sustainability.

Some Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) also participate in microfinance activities. This was prompted by the lack of adequate funds from the formal financial sector to provide the services needed by the low income earners and the poor; and also with the declining support from development partners among others. Prominent among these NGOs are: Lift Above Poverty Organization (LAPO), Youth Empowerment Scheme (YES) in Minna, Country Women's Association of Nigeria (COWAN), The African Diaspora Foundation, Farmers' Development Association, Grassroots Women Foundation, People to People International and Women's Consortium of Nigeria. The NGOs are only membership based institutions that engage in charity, capital lending and credit. They shifted from supply-led technique to a demand driven strategy. Moreover, they could not reach out as expected because of the non-sustainability of the sources of their fund.

The prominent role of Microfinance Institutions is to provide financial services, especially microcredit to the poor and low income earners who were deprived such services by the conventional banks and other financial institutions.

Microfinance Institutions and programs have been recognised as agency of development strategy by serving as important tool for poverty reduction and upliftment of micro- and small enterprises.

Has microfinance played any important role in alleviating poverty in Nigeria? Has it improved the standard of living of the rural poor? Has microcredit made any meaningful contribution to the socioeconomic upliftment of the beneficiaries? These are part of the questions that this study is set to answer.

The study is classified into five sections. Following the introduction in section one is the review of relevant literature in section two. Section three deals with the methodology while section four discussed the analysis and the outcome of the research. The concluding part of the study is in section five which includes the recommendation.

Literature Review

This section reviews the literature on the conceptual meaning and other features o**f**

Microfinance

Microfinance is an economic development strategy that aims at poverty reduction by providing financial services to the poor, low income earners households and micro-entrepreneurs that are deprived of getting the same services from the formal financial market. These services include savings, credit, insurance and other development services like health, education, human empowerment, skill acquisition, training and environmental protection. Although microfinance is not a magic that can turn the poor into non-poor overnight, its development strategies and programmes can serve as a spring board that can uplift the poor households above the poverty line .

Operations of microfinance programmes are being discharged with different models. Prominent among them are village banking, group lending/ savings otherwise known as Grameen Model and Individual lending Scheme. Each group has its own peculiarities. While the individual scheme may require guarantor or collateral, Grameen solidarity groups use 'peer pressure' to ensure prompt loan repayment. The latter's joint liability can prompt loss of social capital for defaulters. Default of a member of the group can portend adverse effect on the other members in form of their inability to secure further loans. The peer pressure can therefore compel the borrower to take "risk-averse activities" by ensuring frequent loan repayment instalments. This can lead to the depletion of borrower's capital (Todaro & Smith, 2011, p. 742).

Characteristics of Microfinance

Microfinance involves the rendering of financial services to the poor and low income earners together with their micro-businesses. It is widely acclaimed that Microfinance can serve as an effective tool to solve poverty problem worldwide. To fully comprehend the features of Microfinance, it is very essential to know its basic characteristics. provide succinct description of the characteristics of Microfinance products as follows:

- usually involve small amount of loans and savings;
- duration of loans is short- term (one-year maximum);
- installmental frequent loan repayment schedule and/or deposits;
- both principal and interest comprise the installments which are amortised for a specific period;
- the loans attract high interest rates (always higher than commercial bank rates but not up to the rates from informal sector);
- closeness of MFIs' staff and the client enables the former to understand the financial and social status of the latter. This enhances the easy assessment of the clients;
- simple application procedures when compared to the commercial banks' cumbersome process;
- time-saving. It takes lesser time to process and obtain loan than that of commercial banks;
- provides incentives for timely loan repayment. Clients that complete their payment in time have opportunity to apply for more loans with higher amount than before;
- make use of 'tampered interest rates'. This involves the decreasing interest rates for repeated and higher amounts of loan. The higher the amount of loan, the less the interest rate charged; and
- loans do not require collateral. Unlike the commercial banks, MFIs do devise several methods to secure their loans save collateral.

It should be noted that the above highlighted points are the expected characteristics of what the microfinance products should possess. In practice, their requirements are not generally uniform. This is due to the fact that despite their common objective of poverty reduction through credit accessibility, yet they have different designs based on particular environment and circumstances.

Ideally, microfinance organisations are supposed to reach out to the very poor and deliver microfinance services to local clients daily. They are also expected to educate local communities about the opportunity to improve their lives with microfinance loans; and provide other financial services such as savings accounts; collect weekly loan repayments; and assist clients in solving some of the life challenges they may face. All these programmes focus attention towards the provision of financial services to the poor households. In practice, some Microfinance Institutions give priority to the sustainability of their programmes while others pursue the major goals of economic and social impacts on the beneficiaries .

Methodology

To achieve the objectives of the study, primary data were collected between July and September, 2014 from the study area: South-West Nigeria. The South-West zone, with six out of the 36 states of the Federation, has the highest concentration of microfinance institutions in Nigeria. It harbours 346 (about 40%) of total 870 microfinance institutions in six geopolitical zones in Nigeria. In the Southwest, the poverty incidence stood at 49.8 percent in 2010 with Ogun State having the highest incidence (69 percent) in the zone ; Obisesan & Akinlade, 2013). Within the zone, Lagos State has the highest number of microfinance institutions, followed by Ogun State. Since Lagos State has most of its area in Urban cities while Ogun state, with the population of 3,751,140 people has more rural areas; the latter can therefore serve as a better choice for taking large sample in the zone due to the fact that the study is focusing on rural poverty. The microfinance institutions contacted in the three selected states (Ogun, Osun and Oyo) include: Solid Rock Microfinance Bank, FUNAAB Microfinance Bank, Six-Covenant Microfinance Bank, Astra-Polaris Microfinance Bank, Egba-Yewa Microfinance Bank, Leggic Microfinance Bank and Iwade Microfinance Bank. Others are Sagamu Microfinance Bank, JKL Microfinance Bank, Excel Microfinance Bank, Omak Microfinance Bank, LAPO Microfinance Bank, Albarka Microfinance Bank and Egba-Owode Microfinance Bank.

The data for the research were obtained through structured questionnaire (primary data); complementary information was obtained through the interview of microfinance operators and secondary sources.

Results and Discussion

Interviews were conducted with the operators of 14 Microfinance Banks located in different parts of the study area. This exercise was facilitated by the need to have an in-depth knowledge about the problems and prospects facing the MFIs in Nigeria. It is also expected to instill more confidence in the findings and further clarify the knowledge on the evaluations of microfinance programmes in the study area.

The discussions were bothered on commencement of operations of each Bank, Government efforts to assist the institutions, training and interactions with the beneficiaries, rate of interest and repayment, type of collateral requested (if any) from clients, repayment period of outstanding loan, problems encountered from the customers, and procedures taken to smoothen microfinance operations.

The outcome of the discussions revealed the following:

- Commencement of Operation.
- It was discovered that the commencement of operations by the banks ranged from 1985 to 2011. Majority of them have more than ten years' experience in operation and solicit for clients through aggressive marketing.
- Loan Application Procedure.
- Information gathered from the operators revealed that applications were rejected mainly because the applicants could neither provide collateral securities nor qualified guarantors for the loan. This is one of the qualitative factors that prevent the accessibility of Microfinance loan to the rural poor who want to commence business for livelihood. To secure loan by such applicants may be difficult if not impossible.

- Efforts needed from Government to make microfinance loan effective.
- Further discussions with the operators of Microfinance Banks (MFBs) in the study area revealed that although the Central Bank of Nigeria (Apex Bank that supervises and controls Banks and other financial Institutions in Nigeria) gives Operations and Management Guidelines and Policies to Microfinance Banks; their modes of operations are not the same. For instance, while some MFIs request collateral from their clients, others demand for Guarantors' open cheque before loan approval. In addition, some MFIs request for group formation. This lack of uniformity in operation shows the lapses in CBN's monitoring and control. “Government should encourage microfinancing in Nigeria by creating enabling environment for both MFIs and SMEs to thrive in the rural areas”says one of the participants.
- Interest Rate.
- The interest rates charged by MFIs are not uniform. While some of them charge 10 percent on loan disbursed, others charge their clients as high as 21 percent; depending on the approved amount. On why some of them charge so high, most of the participants claimed that they charge commercial rates because the government was not subsidizing the loan. Hence, the cost of capital is high and they have to transfer same to the beneficiaries.
- On the sources of loanable funds, the operators lamented that there was no assistance from the government. The loans were mainly sourced through equity, hence the high interest rates were charged. Since the Government is not subsidizing, they would have to charge competitive rates in order to pay their creditors and make returns to shareholders. “We always plead to Government to assist the MFIs with sufficient fund to enable us serve the poor” says one of the interviewees.
- Training of clients on Entrepreneurship and Book-Keeping
- The investigations also confirm that while some Microfinance operators conduct trainings for their clients, others do not. This area is expected to be encouraged by the government in collaboration with microfinance operators for the efficient use of funds, timely loan repayment and positive impacts on the microfinance loan beneficiaries; particularly, the rural poor.
- Loan Repayment Period.
- With regards to mode of loan collection, it was revealed that collections were made on daily basis in some cases, it is on weekly basis for certain clients while others collect monthly installments depending on what the loan is used for. The maximum collection period is usually one year. This confirms that Microfinance loan is short term loan.
- Problems encountered with the clients.
- The microfinance operators also revealed that at times their clients divert the loans for personal use and to solve private problems instead of using it for investment. This always makes the loan repayment difficult. According to one of the operators “some of our clients make poor use of the loan which delays the loan repayment”.
- Source of Operation Procedures.
- According to the microfinance operators, the major sources of their operations are the Central Bank of Nigeria's directives and Management guidelines. More skill and experience is therefore required through periodic training, Research and Development (R

& D).

Furthermore, some other relevant qualitative information were collected through the surveyed questionnaires that specify other factors that can affect the household accessibility to microfinance loan. The non-beneficiaries (those who are eligible to take the loan and also into similar business with beneficiaries. They have similar characteristics with the latter and applied for microfinance loan in at least past three years but could not obtain approval for the loan) with the total number of 540 were asked through the questionnaire whether they still have interest in patronising Microfinance loan in future. Their response:

Microfinance Usage

As depicted in Table 1, 30 percent of the respondents were not willing to be involved in microfinance programmes any longer while the remaining 70% of the respondents were still interested. This shows that a lot of the rural poor are still willing to access microfinance loan but could not have access due to unfavourable conditions stipulated by the operators.

Motivating Factor for Microfinance Patronage

On the best motivating factor that would encourage the loan usage, nearly 60% of the respondents opined that they are ready for the loan when the MFIs can satisfy their needs. This confirms the report of CBN (2005) that asserts the notion that MFIs are yet to meet the poor people's demand. Other respondents stated that they were yet to understand MFIs' work(7.9%); while some were yet to understand the benefits of having account with MFIs (5.3%), part of the respondents want better conditions of loan (19.4%) and about 7% of the respondents were yet to trust them (see table 1). All these responses point to the fact that there is need for more public awareness on the role of Microfinance in the rural areas. This is a challenge to the operators and the Government.

Table 1
Non-Beneficiaries' Response to Non-usage of Microfinance Loan

	Non- Beneficiaries
	N=540
	% to N
Any Incentive to encourage the respondent to use Microfinance Loan	
No	30.0
Yes	70.0
Most important factor to encourage Microfinance loan Usage	
When I understand how they work	7.9
When I understand the benefits of having an account	5.3
Better loans should be on offer	19.4
When I start to trust them	6.5
When they meet my needs	56.1
Others	4.8

Source: **Field Survey Data (2014)**

From the above analyses, it can be concluded that there are some institutional –level factors that can serve as constraints for the rural poor from accessing microfinance loan. These include high interest rate, administrative requirements and bottlenecks during the loan processing period that can lead to the rejection of loan applications and discouragement for the applicants. In fact, some applicants can be reluctant to apply in future and prefer the informal loan sources to fund their businesses, due to latter's simplicity and prompt response to clients' needs, although more expensive. This confirms the findings of and which affirm that the financial institutions greatly contribute to inaccessibility of loan by their administrative bottlenecks and policies on lending. The results also imply that MFIs need to embark on real promotion of their programmes among the rural dwellers and make the households be fully aware of the opportunities of microfinance loan and its benefits over informal loans. This is expected to further enhance the participation of rural households in microfinance programmes in general and accessibility of microfinance loan in particular. The timing of the loan disbursement and repayment is also of paramount importance particularly for the peasant farmers who may not be able to repay their loans during the off-season period. Suffice to say that the MFIs should be sensitive to the "seasonal finance constraints" of their clients .

Conclusion

The results revealed that microfinance programmes in Nigeria are yet to achieve the main objective of poverty alleviation as their counterparts in Asian and other developed economies. Also, the study discovers that on average it took up to three months for the MFIs to approve loan for the beneficiaries while the loan is short term and repayable on weekly instalments in most cases. From the non-beneficiaries of microfinance loan in the study area, it was gathered that their applications were turned down because of inadequate security (collateral) and lack of reliable surety. In general, the study concludes that inaccessibility to microfinance loan by the poor is mainly caused by the MFIs' terms and conditions. This view is supported by the findings of Atieno (2001) and Umoh (2006) among others. Government is therefore implored to pay more attention to the operations of MFIs in order to reduce poverty in Nigeria. Also, there is the need to assist the rural poor with micro-credit that would be disbursed with concessional interest rates without collateral conditions.

For Microfinance Institutions, MFIs should endeavour to create more awareness to the poor and consider more realistic and pragmatic loan procedure that will encourage the poor to access microcredit loan. It is also important for the MFIs to create public enlightenment programmes that would spread their role as development agents for poverty reduction and encourage the poor people who are supposed to be their target audience. Moreover, MFIs should always adjust their loan terms and conditions towards the situation of their potential rural clients. For instance, short term loan and weekly repayment may not augur well for a rural peasant farmer whose harvesting period is seasonal and the crop gestation period is a bit long. In essence, MFIs should endeavor to make flexible client specific repayment schedules. This idea is corroborated by the findings of Abraham (2015).

Policy Recommendations

Adequate funding of microfinance banks is *sine qua non* to poverty alleviation. Government should organise enough cheap funds to the sub-sector. At least, one percent of the government's annual budget should be earmarked for microfinance banks for on-lending to their ever increasing poor clients. In addition, MFIs should have access to the 10 percent of Small and Medium Enterprise Equity Investment Scheme (SMEEIS) fund (Thom-Otuya & Chukuigwe, 2014).

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THEME NINETEEN
DIASPORA AND REMITTANCES

FORCED MIGRATION AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING: EFFECTS ON FEMALE POPULATION

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Abstract
The occurrences of forced migration and human trafficking have assumed alarming proportions, posing enormous threats to global peace and security. These extremely diverse phenomena have generated debates in the contemporary security discourse. The situation emanating from forced migration and human trafficking is an endemic problem, having significant impact on the female population. This is relatively not new, but it is hoped that it would attract the desired national, continental and global attention. Notably, the rising waves of these phenomena have overtime posed significant threats to the security and existence of women as well as girls. The research paper adopts the descriptive survey method. This paper explores various research questions predominantly relating to the effects of forced migration and human trafficking on the female population. The paper is anchored on the unitary theory on forced migration for its theoretical framework analysis. The research reveals that trafficking in women and girls is one of the most offensive forms of organised violent crimes against the female population and violation of their human rights. Other findings signified that people are involved in forced migration and human trafficking due to poverty, unemployment, inequalities and political instability, among several other reasons prompting the occurrences. The principal motivation which plays a crucial role in the issue is the expectation for safety and access to means of livelihood. The paper, therefore, recommends among others, that the government should constantly review its migration policy towards shaping the way that government agencies and decision-makers respond to forced migration and human trafficking issues. Equally, government at all levels should take adequate care of its citizens through protection their of the human rights.

Keywords: Forced Migration, Human Trafficking, Women Population, Criminality, Poverty, Human Rights

1. Introduction

Forced migration is the dehumanisation that occurs and necessitated by exploitation while human trafficking is a modern form of slavery. Both cases are extreme form of labour exploitation where women, girls, men as well as children are recruited or obtained and subsequently then forced to labour against their will through fraudulent or coercive means. Trafficking victims are often lured by false promises of decent jobs and better lives. The inequalities women and girls face in status and opportunity worldwide, make the female population particularly vulnerable to human trafficking (American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project Report 2010; Adefolarin, 2019).

The Report of the Expert Group (2002, p.6) asserts that human trafficking, especially trafficking in women and girls, is one of the most corrosive forms of human rights violation. It results in gradual and total destruction of a woman's personal identity and her right to live as a free human being in a civilised society. The report noted that globalisation has facilitated free movements of people, goods and services across international boundaries, unwittingly resulting in clandestine operations such as human trafficking. Furthermore, trafficking in human beings is the fastest growing form of transnational organised crime, involving extremely high earnings and exceptionally low risks. It thrives on the inadequacies of legislations to checkmate human trafficking in many countries. Also, victims are subjected to violence, humiliation and violation of their personal integrity which, in many cases, leave them with the lifelong effects of mental and physical trauma as well as stigma. The report also points out that the victims of such devastating violence are vulnerable to life-threatening disease conditions such as HIV/AIDS, STDs, drug-abuse and personality disintegration. More so, the report, acknowledges that, trafficked persons are denied the right to liberty, security and right to freedom from torture, violence, degrading treatment, housing, education, employment and health care. The Report in conclusion, corroborates the findings of other studies that rightly referred to human trafficking as a modern form of slavery.

Similarly, according to the American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project Report (2010), human trafficking victims are forced to work in the sex trade; many others are forced to perform other types of labour, such as domestic servitude, factory work or agricultural work. The report expounds clearly, that victims commonly experience physical and psychological abuse including beatings, sexual abuse, food, sleep deprivation, threats to life and isolation from the outside world. This unfortunate scenario has show-cased the inhuman treatment to which female victims of forced migration and human trafficking are subjected. Corroborating the foregoing, the *US Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report (2006), states that* worldwide, women and children suffer disproportionately from trafficking. Accordingly, poverty, gender discrimination, illiteracy and low levels of education, regional conflicts, and lack of job opportunities affect women in great numbers. Such conditions compel women to migrate and make them particularly vulnerable to trafficking as they are at the mercy of unscrupulous recruiters or employers who, through force, fraud, or coercion, place women in job situations from which they cannot freely escape. The report declared that an estimated 80 percent of trafficking victims worldwide are women and children.

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) Global Alliance Report (2005) estimates that, at least, 12.3 million people are victims of forced labour at any given time, out of whom 2.4 million toil in forced labour due to human trafficking. The report maintains that the hidden nature of forced labour and trafficking makes it extremely difficult to obtain the actual numbers of victims, hence the need to work with estimates. Today, several millions of people live outside their country of birth against their wish. Of the 258 million international migrants globally, 36 million are Africans, of which 19 million move within the Continent and 17 million move outside Africa to Europe, North America and other regions (Ashraf El Nour, Director of IOM, New York, Informed *Africa Renewal (2019) cited in Adefolarin, 2019, p.13).*

Forced migration and human trafficking is an endemic problem that a research on its discourse on female population is relatively not new, *but it is hoped that it would attract the desired national, continental and global attention. However, the rising waves of this phenomenon have overtime posed great threats to the security and existence of women and girls.* It is against this backdrop that this paper interrogates the effects of forced migration and human trafficking on the female population. *The paper is anchored on the unitary theory on forced migration for its theoretical framework analysis.*

2. Theoretical Framework

The Unitary Theory on forced migration adopted in this paper is constructed on a system of analysis which considers forced migration and human trafficking to be multi-factorial and multi-dimensional, integrating three fundamental ingredients namely; origin, destination (micro, meso, and macro) and global analysis as well as economic, sociological and political dimensions (Stefan, 2019). This theory essentially equates forced migration and human trafficking with the violation of human rights as the all-encompassing cause for the prospective migrant to decide to act and leave the country of origin for another destination (not necessarily being the one intended), thus making them vulnerable with limited rights. Its validity is determined because it is nascent from a paradigm that goes beyond the utilitarian perception of migration and promotes the inclusion of the protection of migrants' rights in the political parameters of migration (Stefan, 2019).

According to Stefan (2019), the elements in the unifying theory on forced migration are the theory of 'rational choice' and the 'push-pull model'. The 'rational choice' is to be used in combination with the concept of migration as being the consequence of 'human mobility resulting from the expression of the choice of the migrant to decide where to live' (De Haas, 2014). This therefore leads us to the 'capabilities' of the individual to move, which is tied to the cost-benefit analysis as explained by the 'rational choice' theory. Here, one is touching the capability-focused analysis of migration, wherein factors such as education, health, social security, inequalities, personal and political freedom are considered as migration determinants (Sen, 1999).

Berlin, (2013) on the other hand argues that the push-pull model explains the relation between positive and negative liberty. Negative liberty can be construed to be the push factor' being the very constraint on people's freedom, reaching the extent of being a threat to people's lives which causes the urge to forcefully migrate. This, therefore, implies that, for instance, democracy, conflict prevention and the promotion of the rule of law are seen as ways to promote people's freedom, including freedom of movement and resettlement as well as prevent forced migration and human trafficking. Forced migration and human trafficking can be construed as the result of the choice of individuals to move which choice is restricted (Stefan, 2019).

Consequently, it is imperative to grasp the multi-disciplinary perspectives integrated for the understanding of the causes of forced migration and human trafficking using the Unitary

Theory on forced migration for the framework of analysis, putting the effects on the female population in proper perspective. For example, from the sociological angle, the massive forced migration of African professionals to the developed economies can then be located within the context of the various conflicts, crises, violence and wars that have ravaged the Continent since gaining independence from colonialism (Shambhavi and Samuel, 2012). Furthermore, the political economy trajectory of this scenario is underlined by the fact that problems are essentially caused by unbridled competition for access to the resources of the state. As political dimensions are perceived as a sure avenue to instant wealth and capital accumulation in the continent, the struggle for public office became a winner-takes-all zero-sum game. In this process, a do-or-die orientation to political contestation and democratic government became an overt strategy for capturing political power. This, itself, manifests indiscriminately in electoral violence, rigging and other breaches of constitutional provisions for the conduct of a free and fair election (Shambhavi and Samuel, 2012).

Furthermore, De Haan (2007) mirrored the situation through the lenses of Marxian political economy on forced migration and human trafficking, focusing on economic factors resulting in exploitation. He argued that forced migration and human trafficking processes can best be understood as the outcome of interaction of diverse factors including social-cultural influences and economic forces as well as gendered norms, rules and how migration affect this interplay.

In this context, the victims of forced migration and human trafficking are the populations of women and girls who become vulnerable due to conflicts, poverty, inequalities, unemployment, absence of democracy and non/improper adherence to the rule of law. Paradoxically, in most of the crisis areas, the origin of migrants and trafficked female persons arise due to problems of leadership and governance, with the attendant policy inconsistencies, which further create an awkward working environment for skilled and unskilled women as well as girls who have no option but to look elsewhere for good living. However, on a good note is the positive push factors that include higher remuneration and standard of living as well as more favourable working conditions, including job and career opportunities, that encourage a modern educational system coupled with the prestige of advanced training and presumed emphasis on meritocracy, transparency, hard work and intellectual freedom (Shambhavi and Samuel, 2012). The foregoing could be mere false promises from unscrupulous recruiters or employers who, through deception, force, fraud, or coercion, place women and girls in job situations to which they did not consent and from which they cannot freely escape. The Unitary Theory on forced migration and human trafficking has thus given an insight into understanding these two phenomena and their devastating implications on the female population.

3. Conceptual Discourse

Forced migration and human trafficking present a composite-intrinsically link relating to understanding and appreciating the dynamics arising from conflicting interactions in different societies. The definitive insights about forced migration and human trafficking stem from the interplay of the causes and effects. Although the concept 'forced migration' is difficult to define, scholars and international organisations have attempted different definitions to situate it realistically. Castles (2003) and Itulua-Abumere (2013) argue that for proper understanding of the definitions of forced migration, one cannot ignore the global effect of forced migration so much so that forced migration is related to systematic changes at a global level. For instance, they point out that globalisation literature is in fact blurring the link between economic migration and forced migration. To this effect, one finds out that the asylum-migration nexus is tantamount to failed economics represented by weak states, predatory ruling cliques and human rights abuses. However, De Haan (2007) contends this from a Marxist perspective of political economy on migration, which seems to be unduly fixated on economic factors of exploitation. Heasserts that forced migration processes can best be understood as the outcome of interaction of a diversity of factors. These factors include socio-cultural influences, economic forces, gendered norms and rules which affect the interaction of structures and agency. Melander and Oberg (2003) identified the causes of forced migration as war, genocide, dissident violence, state repression and non-violent factors such as economic, political and demographic considerations. In the same vein, Schmeidl (1997) and Moore et al (2003) were of the view that armed conflict remains the obvious cause of forced migration, alluding to the dynamics of the decision-making process of a forced migrant which are explained in a simple decision theoretical model. For them, potential migrants utilise observational information in their environment to assess the threat to their persons as well as to form and revise the beliefs about their personal safety. To this end, migrants base their decisions on whether to stay or leave on these beliefs or threat assessments.

As Okeke (2008) poignantly elucidated, forced migration is a reaction to certain push and pull factors that include low wages and salaries, harsh living conditions, poor transportation system, inadequate housing, disrespect for merit, discouraging professional prospects and lack of research fund. Others are continuous decline in the quality of education and unstable academic calendar, occasioned by strike actions by staff unions, violent student demonstrations, cult activities as well as general breakdown of law and order reinforced by political instability, discrimination in appointments and promotions, which result in frustrations.

From the foregoing, there are several determinants of forced migration. According to Itulua-Abumere (2013) and Gzesh (2008), forced migration can be equated to migration which is caused by human rights violations (civil, political, social, economic and cultural) and so may encompass within its broad confines, economic refugees. However, Bacon (2008) and Kaye (2010) argue that, within the remit of coercive migration, vulnerable migrants are left with no choice except of exposing themselves to great risk, subjecting themselves to demeaning forms of labour and other forms of exploitation, which in the most extreme cases, end up in slavery. Stefan (2019) opines that 'forced migrants' include various legal or political categories, all of which involve people who have been forced to flee their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. He, however, warns that, definition of forced migration must consider strict scientific definitions, not just definition constructed out of political and legal concerns. In this vein, Castles (2005) highlights the categories of 'forced migrants' to include refugees, asylum-seekers, internally-displaced persons, returnees as well as development displaces, environmental displaces and disaster displaces. To him, any subjects of people trafficking and short from the aforementioned, falls within the category of economic refugees. Thus, different definitions point to the basic objectives of forced migration as an occurrence that happens in the society because of multiple factors such as dehumanisation, unemployment, political instability, injustice, deprivation, lawlessness, exploitation and desire for better living conditions.

Another crux of the definition to investigate is human trafficking. Article 3(a) of the UN Protocol sets out a definition of 'trafficking in persons' as 'Trafficking in persons' shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. In this case, exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of others for prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs (McSherry and Kneebone, 2008, p.68).

Notably, another relevant definition comes from the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women that recommended the separation of trafficking and prostitution. 'Trafficking of Women' was to be defined as 'All acts involved in the recruitment and/or transportation of a woman within and across national borders for work or services by means of violence or threat of violence, abuse of authority or dominant position, debt bondage, deception or other forms of coercion'. Kempadoo (2005), however, observed that this definition is similar to the definition in the year 2000 UN Protocol that, refers to trafficking not just for the sex-trade but in terms of forced labour or slavery-like conditions through coercion.

Kempadoo (2005) further argues that definition of trafficking clearly applies to forced labour other than sex work and is non-gendered; the title of the Protocol perpetuates the historical link between trafficking and prostitution. More so, Munro (2005, p. 96) contends that the forced migration context justifies 'the centrality of women' in the discourse. For him, women are 'disproportionately represented among the poor, undocumented, debt-bonded and international migration workforce'. Howbeit, men and boys are included in the Protocol; hence 'gender' is a central feature of the trafficking problem. The UN Protocol has, therefore, been criticised as being somewhat ambiguous in its focus (McSherry and Kneebone, 2008, p. 68).

Kempadoo (2005) as well as McSherry and Kneebone (2008, p. 68) maintained that the positive side of including 'the trade and exploitation of labour under conditions of coercion and force' in the definition of trafficking, is that trafficking becomes situated within the forced migration paradigm. To this end, Kempadoo (2005) asserts to recognise the impact of globalisation and in particular, the fact that there is global inequality in the distribution of wealth and access to education, as well as the effect of militarised conflicts, dispossession of land as well as racial, gender or ethnic conflicts as reasons for forced migration. Corroborating, the foregoing, Sanghera (2005) referred to human trafficking as the 'dark side of globalisation'.

McSherry and Kneebone (2008, p. 68) convincingly derived their definition from UN Protocol definition which emphasises the exploitation of vulnerable persons as the key to understanding the human trafficking definition crux and issue. To them, human trafficking is one of the contemporary evils of forced migration. Trafficking is put in the context of transnational organised crime, through a definition which constructs the trafficked individual both as a victim of crime as well as an agent, through the emphasis on exploitation. They also went on to say human trafficking, in comparison, involves some form of coercion or deception, with persons being moved across borders for the purposes of exploitation. The UN Protocol perceives trafficking and trafficking in women as an aspect of transnational organised crime associated with the phenomenon of 'irregular' international migration. The smuggling and trafficking of persons is an aspect of 'forced' (illegal and involuntary) migration that characterises recent international migration. In practice, the lines between smuggling and trafficking are sometimes blurred according to McSherry and Kneebone (2008, p. 68). Thus, conceptual discourse on human trafficking could be fathomed from presentations that entail an inclusive procedure toward comprehending the phenomenon conceptually. In this regard, human trafficking or what others rightly refer to as smuggling or trafficking in persons, comes in different forms and with attendant negative effects on victims, ranging from human right violation, to forced labour, sexual exploitation and slavery.

According to Human Rights Centre (2007) cited in American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project Report (2010), what is responsible for forced migration and human trafficking among female population is driven by a global demand for cheap, unskilled and exploitable labour. Global profits from forced labour total an estimated $44.3 billion annually.

Human trafficking is now the second largest criminal industry worldwide, after drug trafficking and the fastest growing criminal industry. However, several factors for instance, observed by the U.S. Department of State, have been identified to have contributed to the prevalence of forced migration and human trafficking. These factors include poverty, attraction to perceived better standards of living elsewhere, lack of employment opportunities in the immediate area, prevalence of organised crimes, violence against women and children as well as discrimination against women, government corruption, political instability and armed conflicts. However, at the root causes of trafficking, are the feminisation of poverty, displacement as a result of natural and man-made catastrophes, gendered cultural practices, gender discrimination and gender-based violence in families and communities (http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw). Perhaps, more concrete is the fact that people are involved in forced migration and human trafficking due to poverty, unemployment, inequalities and political instability, even though there are other reasons for occurrences. The principal motivation which plays a very crucial role in the issue is the expectation for safety and better livelihood.

4. Forced Migration and Human Trafficking: Recent Trends in Nigeria

The drive for survival and for greener pastures has continued to force millions of West African and particularly Nigerian women and girls to gamble with death in attempts to cross over to Europe and other parts of the world. This quest to escape poverty, hunger, unemployment and insecurity, among other reasons, has caused a major segment of Nigeria's population to seek alternatives for better livelihood for themselves and their families (UNODC, 2018 cited in Adefolarin (2019, p. 13). The Nigerian scenario is the focus of this section and we start by first examining, Increasing Women and Young Girls as Forced Migrants. Women and Young girls are more exposed to forced labour and sexual exploitation than men and also are more likely to accept precarious working conditions and poorly paid work than their male counterparts. They often work in gender-segregated and unregulated sectors of the economy, such as domestic work as well as entertainment and sex industries. More so, many who make it to Europe or the Middle East are usually forced into prostitution, used as mercenaries or deployed as household servants, factory workers, drug couriers and even as organ donors. While migration can lead to female empowerment, this does not occur always. Women's opportunities to migrate legally have been more limited than men's often because legal official recruitment efforts are frequently aimed at male-dominated employment in construction and agriculture. The death of 26 Nigerian women in the Mediterranean Sea on 4th November 2017 due to drowning after a rubber boat carrying 64 passengers, sank was a shock that further exposed the ills of irregular migration. Sadly, Nigeria has become a transit route for this illegal trade but also a source as well as a destination with female children and young adults, now becoming merchandise for what has become a cross-border crime (Adefolarin (2019, p. 14).

Second is the examination of Women and Young Girls as Trafficked Human. According to a survey by the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and other Related Matters, the major trafficking routes from Nigeria are in Edo, Kano, Kaduna, Sokoto, Katsina, Kebbi, Jigawa, Yobe, Borno, Calabar and Lagos, and from border areas around Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mali (NAPTIP, 2005; 2016, 2018). Nigerians have been emigrating, despite the associated risks. The total number of Nigerians living outside the country cannot be easily determined, because of the irregular pattern of their movements. A huge number of people travel without official documents, both at home and in the host countries (Obi-Paul, 2017). Most of these migrants are subjected to inhumane treatment, which they have to endure because of their failure or inability to obtain official documents permitting them to live and do business in their host-countries, while many are repatriated once they are caught. The circumstances of their departure such as using unofficial routes and improper documentation have made them vulnerable to be recruited by criminal gangs, into all manner of illicit businesses, with long jail sentences as consequences when caught (Graham, 2017). Nigeria has remained a major source, transit route and destination country of trafficked persons, children inclusive. Notable destinations of women trafficked from Nigeria include Mali, Cote D'Ivore, Equatorial Guinea, South Africa and southern countries of Europe, in particular Italy, where the women work as commercial sex workers (Carling, 2005; Nightingale, 2003; UNESCO (2006). According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in its 2015 report, many women and female children are trafficked to West, North and Central African countries as well as Europe and the Middle East, especially Benin Republic, Cameroon, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Libya, Italy, Greece, Spain and Saudi Arabia, among others, for forced labour. Most of the trafficked women in Europe are believed to be from Edo State, with Italy being their most frequent destination (IOM Report, 2015). The report also revealed that the number of people who have migrated without proper authorisation (either without documents or with false documents accounts for one third to one half of new entrants into developed countries, which is an increase of 20 per cent over the past 10 years. Irregular migrants fall into two categories namely, those who enter destination countries legally and overstay their visas and those who leave Nigeria without proper travel documentation and/or enter destination countries illegally. Although, precise figures on irregular migration remain elusive, irregular migration, like legal migration, is on the rise. Migrants who enter through unofficial routes fall under the definition of irregular immigrants. Irregular migration occurs both out of and into Nigeria. Those who overstay their visits do not only come from the ECOWAS region. Occasional repatriations of many expatriates in the commercial, professional and oil sectors of the economy have also taken place. These people either overstayed their visa period or entered without the necessary documents to be able to stay. The height of the issue of irregular migration in the country came to the fore when many Nigerians were reportedly sold for $400 in Libya in what could be termed modern-day slavery. When the news broke on CNN in November 2019, where the news channel aired a footage that appeared to show men being auctioned as farm hands after being smuggled across the Sahara. It looked like a fiction but it was real and got many, for instance, the Nigerian government agitated and it made efforts to address the matter by repatriating Nigerians trapped in Libya in order to forestall any further in-human treatment being meted to her citizens (Adefolarin, 2019, p. 15). This global violation of human rights occurs within and across the Nigerian borders.

5. Effects of Forced Migration and Human Trafficking on Female Population

Entrapment into prostitution is one great dangerous effect of forced migration and human trafficking on women and girls. Coincidentally, there are other problems, which prominently stems from forced migration and human trafficking. For instance, the enormity of forced migration and human trafficking has occasioned serious challenges to female population, who are sometimes treated as suspects of crime. Often, victims of trafficking are not identified as victims, but rather they may be criminalised for crimes connected with the condition of being undocumented migrants, for being prostitutes or for other related crimes (http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw). The American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project Report (2010) alludes to the fact that a victim of trafficking may be subjected to various conditions of modern-day slavery such as forced labour, involuntary servitude, debt bondage or peonage. If a person is forced to work through physical force or threats of physical force, he or she become a victim of involuntary servitude. Such a person is subjected to peonage if that person is compelled by force, threat of force or abuse of the law to work against their will to pay off a debt. If the value of a person's work is never reasonably applied towards payment of the debt, the person has been subjected to debt bondage. The report asserts further that "forced labour" is often used to describe all these forms of modern-day slavery.

Contemporary worsening human and social security conditions reflect the future of female population cut in the furnace of forced migration and human trafficking, which International Labour Organisation (ILO)(2009), cited in American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project Report (2010); Human Rights Centre *(2004)* pointed out the effects of forced migration and human trafficking on female population to include:

- ***Physical Abuse****:* Trafficked victims are often beaten *a*nd brutalized, raped and sexually abused. Victims also frequently are deprived of adequate food, shelter and sleep;

- ***Psychological Abuse****:* Traffickers commonly subject their victims to psychological *abuse* through threats, deprivation and isolation. Traffickers may threaten to kill or harm victims or their family members if they do not do as they are told. Very often traffickers deprive victims of freedom of movement by isolating them in the workplace and cutting off their contact with the outside world. Traffickers may subject their victims to patterns of abuse intended to cause fear and disorientation. For example, traffickers often employ severe verbal abuse and insults, intended to exacerbate feelings of isolation, shame, and betrayal that victim's experience; and

- ***Abuse of Legal Process**:* Traffickers sometimes use legal mechanisms to enforce their control over victims. For example, traffickers may deprive victims of their passports or identification documents or threaten victims with arrest or deportation if the victims do not continue to labour for the traffickers.

Furthermore, the Report of the Expert Group (2002) identified corrosive forms of violation of human rights as one effect on female population because of forced migration and human trafficking. Others mentioned include gradual and destruction of a woman's personal identity and her right to live as a free human being in a civilised society. Also, female victims are subjected to violence, humiliation and violation of personal integrity which, in many cases, leave them with lifelong effects of mental and physical trauma. The report also points out that the female victims of such devastating violence may end up with life-threatening diseases such as HIV/AIDS, STDs, drug addiction or personality disintegration. More so, the report, acknowledges the fact that, trafficked persons are denied the right to liberty, security of life as well as right to freedom from torture, violence, cruelty or degrading treatment and the infringement on the right to a home, family, education, employment and health care. Thus, forced migration and human trafficking is one of the most offensive forms organised violence against the female population and violation of their human rights which are manifested in health and life-threatening challenges as well as dehumanisation, loss of human dignity and poor living conditions.

6. Conclusion

The paper did some theoretical analysis and conceptual clarifications, drawing the linkage between forced migration and human trafficking. This paper does not only analyse the ills of forced migration and human trafficking in any society, but also elucidates their effects on the female population. Consequently, the paper makes a critical analysis of the forced migration and human trafficking in Nigeria, with the main purpose of examining the recent trends and effects on women. It was discovered that the drive for survival and for greener pastures has continued to force millions of West Africans, particularly Nigerian women and girls to gamble with death in attempts to cross over to Europe and other parts of the world. It was also discovered that women and young girls are more susceptible to forced labour and sexual exploitation through acceptance of precarious working conditions including paid work. Furthermore, it was discovered that the rising waves of these phenomena have overtime posed significant threats to the survival and existence of women and girls. Pertinently, the research and discourse on forced migration and human trafficking vis-a -viz their effects on the female population are relatively not new but, it is hoped that they would attract the desired national, continental and global attention.

7. Recommendations

The following recommendations are hereby made:

- The Federal Government of Nigeria should constantly review its migration policy towards shaping the way government agencies and decision-makers respond to the issues associated with forced migration and human trafficking.

- Government at all levels should take adequate care of its citizens through protection of their human rights.
- Government at all levels should take necessary measures towards guaranteeing the rights and privileges of forced migrants and trafficked female persons.
- The Federal Government of Nigeria should ensure that foreign victims of forced migration and human trafficking are given temporary residence and work permits as well as the chance of applying for asylum when safe return to the country is not possible immediately.
- The Federal Government of Nigeria should direct the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Women Affairs to conduct more research into the link between forced migration and human trafficking with a view to articulating more viable national responses.

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MODELING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIASPORA REMITTANCES INFLOW AND THE GROWTH OF NIGERIA'S DOMESTIC ECONOMY

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Abstract
The focus of this paper is to determine the extent Diaspora remittances inflow predicts the growth of Nigeria's domestic economy spanning from 1980 to 2019. This study is anchored on the famous Neo-classical endogenous growth theory of Cobb-Douglas form. To achieve such objective, the author adopts multiple regression methodology based on VEC Granger causality technique for estimation of the parameters specified in the model. This is complimented with other standard econometric diagnostic tests such as unit root tests, co-integration tests as well as vector error correction model to determine the properties of the time series data used for the analysis. The result of the analysis indicates that the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) reveals a negative and significant relationship between Diaspora remittance inflows and real gross domestic product in both short run and long run as indicated by a t-statistics coefficient of -6.874905 and a p-value of 0.0087 for the short run and 8.643742 and p-value of 0.0097 for the long run. The Wald test indicates no causality among Real Growth Product (RGDP) and other controlled variables included in the model. The implication of the study is that Diaspora remittance inflows have not translated considerably to the growth of Nigerian economy. In view of the above findings, the study makes the following recommendations: the federal government should adopt strict policy measures to regulate Diaspora remittance inflows to Nigeria by ensuring proper investment of greater percentage of all remittances. This can be done by insisting that all remittance above certain level be accompanied with an investment plan or properly taxed. In order to encourage remittances passing through the official channel, the Central Bank of Nigeria should ensure that transaction cost of international remittance inflows are kept very minimal.

Keywords: Diaspora Remittance inflows, Vector Error correction model, Granger Causality, Wald test, Correlation, Wald Test

1. Introduction

The increasing trend in Diaspora remittance inflows is filling the gap of foreign exchange shortages in Nigeria and other developing countries. However, some researchers argued that increase in the international remittance inflows contribute to brain drain in the developing countries. Singabele (2013), quoting Emeagwali (2008), stated that brain-drain was one of the greatest hindrances to the socio-economic development of African continent. According to Singabele, referring to the work of Dovlo (2008), argued that Africans, Nigerians inclusive, will remain at the mercy of poverty, disease, hunger and social unrest, if those who should build the pillar of the continent's development are abandoning their moral obligations for the so-called greener pastures.

Former South African President, Thambo Mbeki, in his "African Renaissance" speech in 1998 made emotional appeal, calling African professionals in developed countries to think about their continent. In his view, he looks forward to the return of Africa's skilled professionals from Europe and North America home to the continent. Mbeki argued that brain drain syndrome was being institutionalised in the continent. He opined that institutionalisation of brain drain was devastating African economy and crippling the very fabric of African development as the continent's potentials were left lying raw and under-utilised due to absence of experts (Singabele, 2013).

Brain drain has been a major argument against international remittance inflows to Nigeria. Other issues include the contribution of remittance inflows to the growth rate of GDP in Nigeria when compared to other international inflows, such as overseas development assistance (ODA). The trend of the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) and international remittance inflows in Nigeria, according to UNDP, World Development indicators (2015) is stated as follows: In 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015, gross domestic product growth rate were 4.2%, 8.3%, 12.77%, 2.5%, 5.4%, 6.94%, -0.23%, and 8% respectively while international remittance inflows growth rates within the periods were 0.03%, 0.03%, 0.03%, 2.82%, 3.0%, 13.4%, 5.35%, and 3.81% respectively.

The trend above is in contrast to general view of most economists who believe that there is a positive relationship between international remittance inflows and the growth of gross domestic product. The proponents of the positive relationship between the international remittance inflows and economic growth, such as (Docquier et al, 2007), in their optimistic theory of international remittance inflow, contended that remittance inflows decrease inequality in the recipient countries, enable household to relieve budget constraints, and stimulate demand of goods and services, which, in turn, stimulate increase in gross domestic product. The pessimistic theory, according to Stark et al (1986), argued against the positive effect of remittance flows. The pessimistic theory opined that remittance inflows may generate a level of domestic demand that exceeds the economy's production capacity, and thus may represent a source of inflation, or unemployment, if cheaper imports are brought in to expunge the remittance-induced excess demand. From the trend of UNDP, World Development Indicator (2015) as stated above, it is clear that the relationship between growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) and international remittance inflows did not follow a consistent trend pattern in Nigeria. There are no visible policy actions by Nigerian government regarding efficient application of international remittance inflows. Most previous studies concentrated on the analysis of the remittances as a contributor to brain drain in Nigeria. Also, these previous studies did not compare international remittance inflows together with other key and important variables like balance of trade, overseas development assistance, exchange rate; domestic credit to private sector, etc, thereby creating a need for further studies on their impacts and short-term and long-term relationships. Some researchers argue that oversea development assistance contribute meaningfully to economic growth through infrastructural and capital development more than international remittance inflows which end mostly on consumption. This study, in formulating research questions, objectives of the study, and hypotheses intends to look at the growth rate of international remittance inflows and growth of domestic economy in Nigeria with the hope of making policy recommendations.

2. Theoretical Literature Review

2.1 Optimistic and Pessimistic Theory

Proponents of the positive effect contended that international remittance inflows decrease inequality in the recipient countries (Docquier, Rapoport, and Shen, 2007). Also the optimistic argued that international remittance inflows enable household to relieve budget constraints, and stimulate demand of goods and services, which, in turn, stimulate production and employment (Stark et al, 1986, 1988; Taylor and Wyatt, 1996. Moreover, Quibria (1997) and Ratha (2003) argued that international remittance flows provide the much needed currency for importing essential inputs that are unavailable in domestic economy.

Pessimism about the positive effect of remittance flows has two main arguments. Firstly, remittance flows may generate a level of domestic demand of goods that exceeds the domestic economy's production capacity and thus may represent a source of higher inflation (Adams, 1992), or increasing unemployment, if cheaper goods are imported to expunge the remittance-induced excess demand of goods. Secondly, given the income effect of international remittance flows, recipients of international remittances could afford to work less. Resulting in the decrease in labour supply which, in turn, may somewhat lead to a negative effect of on domestic economic growth. As determinants of gross domestic product (GDP), international remittance inflows have been extensively studied by economists. However, the most existing works, both empirical and theoretical, either treated them separately (Rapoport and Katz, 2005; Beine et al, 2008), or when treated jointly (e.g., McCormick and Wahba, 2000), their economic growth implications are not discussed.

2.2 Endogenous Migration and The "Portfolio" Theory

Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) present a detailed theoretical review and insightful analysis of the literature on the causes of immigrant remittances, which applies well to all remittances. They divide this literature into two main strands: the "endogenous migration" approach, and the "portfolio" approach. The endogenous migration approach is based on the economics of the family, which include but not limited to motivations based on altruism. The portfolio approach isolates the decision to remit from the decision to migrate, and likewise avoids issues of family ties. In this view, the migrant earns income and decides how to allocate savings between host country assets and home country assets.

Remittances are a result of deciding to invest in home country assets. The portfolio view, therefore, is an informal theory of international remittance inflows that supports the view that international remittances behave like other capital flows. The rates of return on various assets, or return differentials are regarded as important decision variables affecting remittances in the portfolio view. The variables often included in such studies are interest rate differentials on comparable deposit accounts offered in the host and home (labour-sending) countries, incentive interest rates offered on home country deposits, black market exchange premium (if any), the return on real estate in the home country, inflation rates, and other returns. In addition, political risk and uncertainty may also affect the decision to remit.

The endogenous migration approach and the portfolio approach are the most prominent approaches employed to perform empirical estimations of international remittance inflows determination. Wahba (1991) introduced a dichotomy by dividing international remittances into "fixed" remittances, which go toward family support, and "discretionary" remittances, which are investment flows. In the view of this theory, the fixed remittances depend essentially on demographic and economic factors including family characteristics such as size and income level and, therefore, may be explained by the endogenous migration view. In general, empirical analyses include some demographic variables such as the stock of migrants in the host country (or family characteristics in studies that use micro data), economic variables such as wages or income, and financial variables such as interest rates.

The demographic and income variables tend to be significant in nearly all the estimations, while the financial variables' significance varies depending on the sample and specification. Chami (2003) pointed out that this is probably the most reliable stylised fact to come out of the empirical literature on the causes of remittances. While most papers have found evidence consistent with altruistic behaviour, only a few papers such as Lucas and Stark (1985) and Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) have tested altruism against alternate family arrangements. Lucas and Stark (1985) find evidence in favour of self-interested behaviour in Botswana, while Agarwal and Horowitz find evidence in favor of altruism in Guyana.

2.3 The Marxian theory on the Growth of a Capitalist World Economy

This theory looks at the social consequences of the competition among industrialised capitalist which usually drives down the per-unit prices of commodities, thereby cheapening the commodities of producing state and creating ever-widening development gap between the industrialised and non-industrialised nations. In the view of Marxian theory, competition among industrialised capitalist create a situation where the displaced local producers look for other kinds of gainful work to survive. According to this theory, as outlined by Wolff and Resnick (2012), the last two centuries might well be called the era of capitalist growth toward world dominance.

2.4 Neo-Marxist Theory

Neo-Marxist views migration with negative perspective. According to this school of thought, especially, as depicts by Azam and Gubert, (2007), migration and international remittance inflows reproduced and reinforced the capitalist system by encouraging inequality between developed and least developed countries. Neo-Marxist, as regards the socio-cultural perspectives, argued that migration and remittance were seen as having negative effect as they expose migrant family to the taste of foreign goods.

2.5 Structural or Dependence Theory

The structural or dependency theory was theory studied by Todaro (1997) and Chami (2003) which assumed that dependency on global political-economic system have been dominated by the industrialised nations. The theory argued that as capitals from the industrialised nations grow, migration was assumed to have negative effect on traditional societies by undermining their economic potential and motivating migration from the less developed to developed countries. According to this theory, brain drain is one of the negative outcomes of capitalism on less developed societies. Structural or dependency theory concurs with Marxist and Neo-Marxist Theories on the negative impact of migration from least developed to developed countries.

2.6 Altruistic and Self Interest Motive Theory

The motivating factor to migrant and remittance has become a heated debate recently. Altruistic and self-interest motive theory, according to Clarke and Drinkwater (2001) and Rapoport and Katz, 2005) was another hypothesis put forward as explanation of the determinant to migrate. In these views, altruism towards family members at home and the care for their consumptions and welfares were regarded as important determining factor for decision to migrate by intending migrants. On the other hand, self-interest was determinant for decision to migrate and remit to family in origin countries or to invest for future profit-making and preparing to return home in the near future. In general, this school of thought viewed remittance as result of inter-generation contract between migrants and their parents in the home country, concurred by Lucas and Stark (1985).

2.7 Neo-Classical Economic Growth Theory

Neo-classical theory as analysed by Roel (2006) opined that real salary differences between economies gave rise to bi-directional flows that culminated into a new international equilibrium in which real wage earning of all countries are the same. According to Roel, the flow starts from flowing of low skilled labour from low-wage earning countries to high-wage earning ones. His second assumption was capital flows from high-wage earning countries to low-wage earning ones. In his view, capital flows comprise labour intensive industrial capital moving together with high-skilled labour migration. Roel's second assumption agrees with Markovitz portfolio frontier theory and can be explained through utility function of Capital Asset Pricing (CAPM) which depicts that the cost of equity capital is determined only by the systematic or market risk. More so, Roel referred to Keynesian theory which views migration differently. He asserted that Keynesian regards labour supply to depend on the nominal wages, not real wage which implies that nominal wages is critical factor in labour migration. In essence, the major issue here is migration and income. Income is important variable to look at economic growth. The neoclassical production function of the Cobb-Douglas form in which output (GDP) is specified as a function of labour (L), capital (K), workers' remittances, and a technological factor or efficiency parameter (A) is very important function of economic growth.

2.8 The Late Neoclassical Theory of Human Behaviour

The late neoclassical theory of human behaviour is a contrast to traditional neoclassical theoretical concept of defining human behaviour in terms of a choice making person like a computer. Wolff and Resnick (2012) distinguished between traditional and late neoclassical theory. In their analysis, traditional neoclassic theory conceives a consumer as perfectly logical and wonderfully consistent in decision making or preferences, devoid of emotion, conflicting desires or contradictory preferences, and strangely immune from societal influences. Late neoclassical theories, on the other hand, depict a brief return to the concept of Marxian economics with its concept of "over-determination." The concept of over-determination states that any individual's economic behaviour (or indeed any behaviour) is understood as the product of different and multiple determinations emanating from all the natural, cultural, political, and economic processes comprising the total context in which that individual exists. The theory includes beliefs that the individual desires and behaviour are the combined effect of the whole host of natural processes of mind and body inherited from long line of mostly unknown ancestors and of emotional processes stemming from both conscious and unconscious feelings of love, hate, hope, fear, jealousy, anger, empathy, and so on. In addition, the late neoclassic asserted that individual desires and behaviour are influenced by political processes, such as legislation, administration, and adjudication of rules and customs created within family, clan, tribe, community, and state.

Traditional and late neoclassical economists regard the concept of homo economic us to represent human nature. Traditionalist views human nature of being selfish while the late neoclassical view the behaviour of Homo economicus of being in conformity not only to some inate human nature but also to moral laws and rules of behaviour imposed by the social structure into which Homo economicus is born and matures. The opposite of Homo economicus is Homo reciprocals introduced by some experimental economists as a completely new personality type with human nature which seeks to cooperate with those willing to cooperate and to punish those do not cooperate. Wolff and Resnick (2012) argued that a number of economists have delved into the fields of evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, sociology, and related disciplines focusing on the complexity of human behaviour. The late neoclassical theory of human behaviour concurs with Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) which distinguish the difference between endogenous migration and the Portfolio approach of analysing emigrant behaviours and their motives. Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) model is a classical approach to the study of motivation for remittance inflows and its economic implication.

3. Methods

3.1 Model Specification

In order to exhaustively test the specified hypotheses of the study, the researcher adopted two different models. Model one (1) explains the Output-Remittance model of neoclassical endogenous growth theory which assumes that the relationships between output and remittance are motivated primarily by altruism and hence will most often exhibit counter-cyclical characteristics (Chami et al, 2008). The assumption of altruistically motivated remittances is adequately captured within a system of equations characterised by three endogenous variables namely: growth rate of output (*YGR*), workers' remittances (*WR*), and per capita income (*PCI*). The neoclassical production function of the Cobb-Douglas form in which output (GDP) is specified as a function of labour (L), capital (K), workers' remittances, and a technological factor or efficiency parameter (A) is written explicitly as follows:

$$GDP = f(A, L, K, WR, PCI) \qquad (1)$$

where A is the technological factor of the efficiency factor within the system, can be re-written as:

$$GDP = AL^{\alpha} K^{(1-\alpha)} WR, PCI \qquad (0 < \alpha < 1)$$

2

where α is the relative share of labour in total output and (1-α) is the relative share of capital in total output.

The above model is modified to accommodate the relevant variables as:

$$RGDP = f(IRIGWT, ODAGNI, EXR, INFL, BOT) \qquad (3)$$

where,
RGDP= Real Gross Domestic Product (The Proxy variable for Growth of Domestic Economy),
IRIGWT= Growth rate of International Remittance Inflows,

ODA= Oversea Development Assistance(Gross National Index),
EXR= Exchange Rate,
INFL = Interest Rate,
BOT = Balance of trade

The second model was adopted to specifically address the fourth hypothesis of the study, using the finance – remittance framework explained through the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) which concurs with Markowiltz (1999) that studies the relationship between risks and returns, The CAPM is specified below:

$?(R_i)_t = R_f + \beta_i (E(R_M))_{t-1} - R_f + \pounds_t$ (4)

Where,
$?(R_i)$ is asset's expected return,
R_f is the expected excess return of the market portfolio's expected return over the risk-free rate,
β is beta which is the measure of asset sensitivity to movement in the overall market, and
$(E(R_M)) - R_f$ is the market premium, the expected excess return of the market portfolio's expected return over the risk-free rate.

The model is modified and stated functionally below in order to contain the relevant variables in the study:

DCPS= f(IRIGWT, EXR, INFL) (5)

where,
DCPS = Domestic Credit to Private Sector,
IRIGWT= growth rate of international remittance inflow,
EXR= Exchange Rate and
INFL = Inflation.

Equations 2 and 4 above are presented in a linear form for estimation as follows"

$RGDP_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 IRIGWT_{t-1} + \beta_2 ODAGNI_{t-1} + \beta_3 EXR_{t-1} + \beta_4 INFL_{t-1} + \beta_5 DCPS_{t-1} + \mu_t$ (6)

$DCPS_t = \alpha_{0+}\alpha_1 IRIGWT_{t-1} + \alpha_{2EXRt-1} + \alpha_2 INFL_{t-1+}\pounds_t$ (7)

where,
RGDP, IRIGWT, ODAGNI, EXR, INFL and DCPS are as explained above;
β_0 and α_0 = Constant term, α_1.....
β_4 = Regression coefficients of both dependent and independent variables specified; μ_t and εt = Error Term

3.2 Estimation Procedure

- The study estimated the variables used in order to obtain the description/summary statistics. The essence of this is to observe the characteristics of the data employed.
- The study tested for integration level of the data employed using unit root tests approach, to verify if the data are suitable for the purpose intended. It was discovered from the results of the unit root tests that the variables were all integrated of order one (1), meaning that all the variables were stationary at first difference.
- With the fact that the variables were not stationary at levels, the research suspects that there may be some co integrating vectors or equations. The researcher was advised to run co integration test to confirm the existence or otherwise of the stable long run relationship

(co integration) between the dependent and the independents variables. The results confirmed the existence of co integrating vector among the variables.

- With the existence of co integration established as indicated above, we are advised to employ the vector error correction mechanism (VECM) in the estimation of the research model to obtain the final results.
- The system equation of the VEC model was estimated to gauge for long run causality and establish the values of the coefficients of the independent variable to enable us interpret the results.
- Finally we conducted granger causality tests in the VEC environment to estimate the direction of the influence between the dependent and independent variables.

4. Results

After collecting data with the aid of important tools and method, the next essential step is to present the result, analyse and interpret the result with aim of getting the empirical solution to the problem identified in the research work. So data analysis means operating on the data to get the pattern and trends in data sets. Data analysis is a very vital step and it is the heart of every research work. Therefore the results for the data analysis are presented here.

4.1 Unit Root Test Result

The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistic was employed to test for the existence of unit roots in the data using trend and intercept. Test results presented below are model 1 and 2:

Unit Root
Table 1: Augmented Dickey – Fuller Unit Root Test Result

Variables	Level	5%CV	Pval.	1st diff	5% CV	Pval.	Decision
RGDP	-1.184539	-3.544284	0.8983	-10.64834	-3.548490	0.0000	1(I)
IRIGWT	-2.476189	-3.544284	0.3371	-6.250958	-3.548490	0.0001	1(I)
ODAGNI	-3.254943	-3.544284	0.7888	-5.430184	-3.548490	0.0005	1(I)
DCPS	-2.118668	-3.544284	0.5180	-4.633705	-3.548490	0.0039	1(I)
EXR	-2.159829	-3.544284	0.4961	-5.543668	-3.548490	0.0004	1(I)
INFL	-3.050712	-3.544284	0.1337	-5.428573	-3.548490	0.0005	1(I)
BOT	-3.04228	-3.552973	0.2488	-12.42141	-3.557759	0.0000	1(I)

Sources: Author's computation, 2017 using E view 9.0

The unit root test above showed that all variables are stationary at first difference in both model one and two. This was indicated by the t- statistics and p values that are less than 0.05 (5%) level of significance as shown in table 1. This implies that the data is suitable for use in the model estimation.

Co-Integration Test Results

Table 2: Co integration Test (First model)

In the first model, the co integration test is stated thus;

Hypothesised No. of CE(s)	Eigenvalue	Trace Statistic	0.05 Critical Value	Prob.**
RGDP *	0.770049	109.9820	69.81889	0.0000
IRIGWT *	0.650749	64.41551	47.85613	0.0007
ODAGNI *	0.392892	31.80463	29.79707	0.0290
BOT *	0.348950	16.33413	15.49471	0.0373
INF	0.093114	3.029881	3.841466	0.0817

Trace test indicates 4 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level

Sources: Author's computation, 2017 using E view 9.0

Table 3: **Co integration Test (Second model)**

Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)

Hypothesized No. of CE(s)	Eigenvalue	Trace Statistic	0.05 Critical Value	Prob.**
DCPS *	0.912973	183.7749	95.75366	0.0000
IRIGWT *	0.672657	103.2044	69.81889	0.0000
RGDP *	0.647726	66.35178	47.85613	0.0004
ODAGNI *	0.437824	31.92136	29.79707	0.0280
EXR	0.319334	12.91532	15.49471	0.1180
INF	0.006668	0.220781	3.841466	0.6384

Trace test indicates 4 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
Sources: Author's computation, 2017 using E view 9.0

The co-integration tests in the first and second model indicated four co integrating vectors respectively; this is indicated by the asterisk variables both in table 2 and 3. The implication of this result is that it can be relied upon for long run decision.

Granger Causality Test Results

The result of the causality test among the variables was reported using the Block exogeneity Wald test output as stated below. The result shows that causality does not exist between international remittance inflow and economic growth in Nigeria contrary to the outcome of the error correction term which is negative, fractional and significant. A negative error correction term implies a long run relationship among the dependent and independent variables as it is indicative of the speed of adjustment from the short run to long run equilibrium in the event of distortions in the economy.

VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Date: 05/08/17 Time: 15:33
Sample: 1980 2015
Included observa tions: 32

Dependent variable: D(RGDP)

Excluded	Chi -sq	Df	Prob.
D(IRIGWT_)	1.380991	1	0.2399
D(ODAGNI)	0.006309	1	0.9367
D(BOT)	1.175844	1	0.2782
D(INF)	1.044307	1	0.3068
All	5.657969	4	0.2262

Dependent variable: D(IRIGWT_)

Excluded	Chi -sq	Df	Prob.
D(RGDP)	0.994322	1	0.3187
D(ODAGNI)	1.076824	1	0.2994
D(BOT)	4.129850	1	0.0421
D(INF)	0.194218	1	0.6594
All	4.340801	4	0.3618

Dependent variable: D(ODAGNI)

Excluded	Chi -sq	Df	Prob.
D(RGDP)	0.354109	1	0.5518
D(IRIGWT_)	2.731441	1	0.0984
D(BOT)	0.419335	1	0.5173
D(INF)	0.524232	1	0.4690
All	3.283745	4	0.5115

Table 5: Continued

Dependent variable: D(BOT)

Excluded	Chi -sq	Df	Prob.
D(RGDP)	0.733787	1	0.3917
D(IRIGWT_)	2.335348	1	0.1265
D(ODAGNI)	0.009514	1	0.9223
D(INF)	0.004564	1	0.9461
All	5.648711	4	0.2270

Dependent variable: D(INF)

Excluded	Chi -sq	Df	Prob.
D(RGDP)	0.162189	1	0.6871
D(IRIGWT_)	0.384219	1	0.5354
D(ODAGNI)	1.699188	1	0.1924
D(BOT)	0.814575	1	0.3668
All	2.967906	4	0.5632

Sources: Author's computation, 2017 using E view 9.0

Discussions

5.1 Result

The findings of the result are discussed in order to bring out the basic information from the analysis of each variable in the model estimated and also to link the discussion of the findings with the existing theory on the particular research work.

(i) Co-integration Test

The result of the Johansen co integration test for real gross domestic product and international remittance inflow, overseas development assistance, balance of trade and inflation indicated four (4) co integrating vectors as shown in table 2 depicting the existence of stable long run relationship between the dependent and independent variables. This implies that the result of the estimation can be relied upon in taking long run decisions in the economy within the study period.

Also, the result of the Johansen co integration test for domestic credit to private sector, international remittance inflows, real gross domestic product, overseas development assistance, exchange rate and inflation also revealed four (4) co integrating equations as shown in table 3.This implies that the dependent variable (domestic credit to private sector) has stable long run relationship with IRIGWT, RGDP, ODAGNI, EXR, and INF, indicating also they can be relied upon in taking long run policy decisions. This result agrees with the findings in Singh and mehra (2014), Jawaid and Raza (2012), Salahuddin (2013), Nkoro and Uko (2012), Omobitan (2012) and Uda (2011) whose studies indicated long run relationship between international remittance inflows and economic growth.

(ii) Vector Error Correction Model (1)

ECM which stands for error correction model met required conditions. Result of the ECM was significant indicating that inverse and statistical significant of ECM coefficients are essential conditions in order that any disequilibrium to be corrected. In light of this, the coefficient of ECM (-1) = --0.014621. Inverse result of ECM satisfied one condition and the P-value [0.0411] < 5% [0.05] critical value satisfied another condition of been statistical significance. Result of ECM with the coefficient of (--0.014621) indicated that the speed of adjustment amid the short run dynamics and the long run equilibrium is 1%. Thus, ECM will adequately act to correct any deviations of the short run dynamics to its long-run equilibrium by 1% annually.

Computed coefficient of multiple determination (R^2) value of 0.715719showed that 71% of total change in economic growth is accounted for, by the explanatory variables: international remittance inflows (IRIGWT), overseas development assistance (ODAGNI) balance of trade (BOT) and inflation (INF) while 29% of the changes in economic growth (proxied by RGDP) can be attributed to other factors not included in the regression equation influence. F – Statistics = 4.577527, with p value of 0.001596 which is less than 0.05 shows that explanatory variables jointly influence dependent variable significantly. Result of DW which stands for Durbin

Watson is used to determine if there is autocorrelation among residuals, since the DW has the value of 1.67; it indicates the absence of auto correlation among the residuals**.**

(iii) Vector Error Correction Model (2)

The second model of the study was introduced to enable the researcher evaluate the third hypothesis aimed at understanding the influence of international remittance inflows on the growth of credit to private sector in Nigeria. The error correction term met the required conditions. Inverse result of ECM satisfied one condition and the P-value [0.0000] < 5% [0.05] critical value satisfied another condition of been statistical significance. Result of ECM with the coefficient of (--0.930569) indicated that the speed of adjustment amid the short run dynamics and the long run equilibrium is 93%. Thus, ECM will adequately act to correct any deviations of the short run dynamics to its long-run equilibrium by 93% annually.

Computed coefficient of multiple determination (R^2) value of 0.854965 showed that 85% of overall variation in domestic credit to private sector (DCPS) is accounted for by the explanatory variables: international remittance inflows (IRIGWT), real gross domestic product (RGDP) overseas development assistance (ODAGNI) exchange rate (EXR) and inflation (INF) while 15% of the changes in domestic credit to private sector can be attributed to other factors not included in the regression equation. F – Statistics = 8.615629, with p value of 0.000020 which is less than 0.05 shows that explanatory variables jointly influence dependent variable significantly. Result of DW which stands for Durbin Watson is used to determine if there is autocorrelation among residuals, since the DW has the value of 2.06; it indicates the absence of auto correlation among the residuals**.**

(iv) Causality Test

The VEC Granger test was adopted to evaluate the degree of causality between international remittance and economic growth in Nigeria as expressed in the first hypothesis. From the result, the p values of 0.3187 and 0.2399 respectively are greater than 0.05; therefore, the study accept the null hypothesis and concludes that causality does not run between international remittance inflows and real gross domestic product in Nigeria. This is contrary to the outcome of the error correction term. A negative error correction term implies causality among the dependent and independent variables as it is indicative of the speed of adjustment from the short run to long run equilibrium in the event of distortions in the economy.

5.2 Implication of the Results

The literature is divided on the effect of international remittance inflows on the growth of the domestic economy. While the optimistic theorist together with the altruistic and self-interest motive theorist contend that international remittance should benefit the recipient economy, the pessimistic, neo Marxist and dependence theorist argue to the contrary. The researcher has analysed the implications of the result in line with the tested hypotheses discussing the results as it affects the Nigerian economy as shown below.

(i) Diaspora Remittance Inflows and Economic Growth in Nigeria

The result of the VECM in the first model of the study showed a negative significant relationship between international remittance inflows and real gross domestic product in the short run as indicated by a t-statistics of -6.874905 and a p-value of 0.0087. This means that international remittance inflows contribute negatively to the growth of Nigeria's economy. This result agrees with the views of the pessimistic, neo Marxist and dependence school of thought who believes that international remittance inflows does not contribute positively to the economy of the recipient country. The finding also agrees with Kaasschieter (2014) and Agu (2009) who discovered negative relationship between international remittance and economic growth. The researcher is of the opinion that the attitude of recipients of international remittance could be responsible for this outcome. It has been argued that most international remittance especially to developing economies are usually consumed rather than being invested on productive ventures even as such free fund discourages the recipient from engaging in productive activities. Consequently, from the upper chambers of the VECM, international remittance inflow maintained a negative relationship with economic growth in the long run, implying that even in the long run, international remittance inflow has not been beneficial to the Nigerian economy

(ii) Causality between Diaspora Remittance and Growth of Nigerian Economy

The error correction term from the first model of the study is negative, significant and fractional. A negative error correction term implies causality among the dependent and independent variables as it is indicative of the speed of adjustment from the short run to long run equilibrium in the event of distortions in the economy. This is contrary to the result of the Wald test which indicated no causality among RGDP, IRIGWT, ODAGNI, BOT and INF. This implies that policy actions to manage international remittance inflow into the domestic economy could be discretionary. An increase in international remittance inflow can contribute to the growth of the economy if appropriate policy actions are taken to remedy possible gaps in remittance transmission process. The growth of the domestic economy can also assist in addressing negative issues associated with international remittance inflows, since a developed economy absorbs the best hands and saves such economy from brain drain.

(iii) Diaspora Remittance Inflow and the Growth of Credit to Private Sector in Nigeria

The result of VECM in the second model of the study showed a positive insignificant relationship between international remittance inflows and domestic credit to private sector in the short run within the period under consideration with a t-statistics of 0.053623 and p-value of 0.6807. This implies that though the contribution of international remittance to the growth of credit to private sector is positive, the impact is not felt in the economy. A possible explanation to this outcome could be the manner international remittance is transmitted to the recipient economy. Evidence suggest that most international remittance does not pass through the official channel for fear of being taxed hence avoiding the financial sector and even when the fund is received, most recipients after the process of currency conversion tend to spend their money directly. The financial sector in most cases is avoided in the transmission process and, consequently, denied the necessary impact this would have created in the creation of credit to the private sector of the Nigerian economy. However, from the upper chamber of the VECM in the second model, international remittance inflow indicated a negative relationship with domestic credit to private sector in the long run, implying that it does not contribute to growth in credit to private sector in the long run.

(iv) Overseas Development Assistance and the Growth of Nigerian Economy

The result of the error correction model in the short run as indicated by the lower chamber of VECM showed a positive significant correlation between overseas development assistance and gross domestic product as indicated by the t-statistics of 8.643742 and p-value of 0.0097. This means that overseas development assistance contributes significantly to the growth of the Nigerian economy in the short run.

However, the result from the upper chamber of the VECM indicates a negative relationship between overseas development assistance and economic growth in the long run. The implication of this result is that policy makers should promote overseas development assistance in the short run in preference to long run planning if the economy will reap the fruit of such investment.

Summary

This study considered the impact of international remittance inflows on the growth of domestic economy in Nigeria in additional to how such inflows has contributed to the growth of credit to the private sector. The researcher adopted co integration, vector error correction model and Wald test econometric procedure in the analysis of the data collected from central bank of Nigeria statistical bulletin (2015). The following results were found after the estimation of the hypothesis of the study.

The result of the Johansen co integration test for real gross domestic product and international remittance inflow, overseas development assistance, balance of trade and inflation indicated four (4) co integrating vectors. Also, the result of the Johansen co integration test for domestic credit to private sector, international remittance inflows, real gross domestic product, overseas development assistance, exchange rate and inflation also revealed four (4) co integrating equations

The result of the VECM in the first model of the study showed a negative significant relationship between international remittance inflows and real gross domestic product in the short run as indicated by a t-statistics of -6.874905 and a p-value of 0.0087. Consequently, from the upper chambers of the VECM, international remittance inflow maintained a negative relationship with economic growth in the long run

The Wald test indicated no causality among RGDP, IRIGWT, ODAGNI, BOT and INF. The result of VECM in the second model of the study showed a positive insignificant relationship between international remittance inflows and domestic credit to private sector in the short run within the period under consideration with a t- statistics of 0.053623 and p-value of 0.6807. However, from the upper chamber of the VECM in the second model, international remittance inflow indicated a negative relationship with domestic credit to private sector in the long run.

The result of the error correction model in the short run as indicated by the lower chamber of VECM showed a positive significant correlation between overseas development assistance and gross domestic product as indicated by the t-statistics of 8.643742 and p-value of 0.0097. The result from the upper chamber of the VECM indicates a negative relationship between overseas development assistance and economic growth in the long run.

Conclusion

This study considered the impact of international remittance inflows on the growth of domestic economy in Nigeria, in addition to how such inflows has contributed to the growth of credit to the private sector. The researcher adopted co integration, vector error correction model and Wald test econometric procedure in the analysis of the data collected from central bank of Nigeria statistical bulletin (2015). The following results were found after the estimation of the hypothesis of the study.

The result of the Johansen co integration test for real gross domestic product and international remittance inflow, overseas development assistance, balance of trade and inflation indicated four (4) co integrating vectors. Also, the result of the Johansen co integration test for domestic credit to private sector, international remittance inflows, real gross domestic product, overseas development assistance, exchange rate and inflation also revealed four (4) co integrating equations

The result of the VECM in the first model of the study showed a negative significant relationship between international remittance inflows and real gross domestic product in the short run as indicated by a t-statistics of -6.874905 and a p-value of 0.0087. Consequently, from the upper chambers of the VECM, international remittance inflow maintained a negative relationship with economic growth in the long run.

The Wald test indicated causality among RGDP, IRIGWT, ODAGNI, BOT and INF.

The result of VECM in the second model of the study showed a positive insignificant relationship between international remittance inflows and domestic credit to private sector in the short run within the period under consideration with a t- statistics of 0.053623 and p-value of 0.6807. However, from the upper chamber of the VECM in the second model, international remittance inflow indicated a negative relationship with domestic credit to private sector in the long run.

The result of the error correction model in the short run as indicated by the lower chamber of VECM showed a positive significant correlation between overseas development assistance and gross domestic product as indicated by the t-statistics of 8.643742 and p-value of 0.0097. The result from the upper chamber of the VECM indicates a negative relationship between overseas development assistance and economic growth in the long run.

In view of the above findings, the study makes the following recommendations;
The federal government should adopt strict policy measures to regulate international remittance inflows to Nigeria by ensuring proper investment of greater percentage of all remittances. This can be done by insisting that all remittance above certain level be accompanied with an investment plan or properly taxed.

In order to encourage remittances passing through the official channel, the Central Bank of Nigeria should ensure that transaction cost of international remittance inflows are kept very minimal.

This research concludes that international remittance inflows has not contributed positively to the growth of Nigerian economy; just as it contributed insignificantly to the growth of domestic credit in the economy within the period of the study.

Recommendations

In view of the above findings, the study makes the following recommendations:
The federal government should adopt strict policy measures to regulate international remittance inflows to Nigeria by ensuring proper investment of greater percentage of all remittances. This will stimulate growth in the economy and create employment. This can be done by insisting that all remittance above certain level be accompanied with an investment plan or proper tax.

In order to encourage remittances passing through the official channel, the Central Bank of Nigeria should ensure that transactionary cost of international remittance inflows are kept very minimal.

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THEME TWENTY
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS

AN ANALYSIS OF CARBON EMISSIONS, HEALTH OUTCOMES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN NIGERIA

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Abstract
This study analysed carbon emissions, health outcomes and economic growth in Nigeria. Data relating to the variables of the study was drawn from various editions of the World Bank development data base, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Bulletins for the period of 1970 to 2019. Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is used to determined stationarity properties of the data, Johansen Co-integration Test for long-run relationship, Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) approach was employed for the data estimation, impulse response and Variance Decomposition to ascertain the transmission channels and determining the relative importance of shocks in explaining variations in the variable of interest respectively. Based on the empirical evidences, the study reveals that, economic growth and carbon emission have positive relationship. In the same vein, carbon emissions have negative effect on health outcomes in the long run while economic growth has a pass-through effect on health outcome through carbon emissions in Nigeria. In addition, health outcomes have positive effect on economic growth though in the short-run. However, in the long-run, health outcomes negatively influence economic growth. This also supports the validity of the health outcome pass-through channel on real gross domestic product in Nigeria. The study recommends for the transitioning away from fossil fuels to renewable energies, strengthening legislations on market-based measures, such as green taxes, tradable permits, and payment for ecosystem services and increase investment in labour-intensive services such as sanitation and healthcare.

Keywords*:* Carbon Emissions, Health Outcomes, Economic Growth and VECM

1. Introduction

Global warming as one of the major environmental challenges is obviously believed to largely cause greenhouse gases (GHG) due to economic activities, predominantly from industrial, agricultural, and transportation sectors. In the same vein, depletion of resources and changes in climatic conditions remains the major environmental challenges globally. But the effects of these challenges and susceptibility to these challenges however, are not the same across regions of the world. Some continents are more susceptible to the effects of climatic variation and dilapidation of the environment than other continents of the world (Mesagan & Ekundayo, 2015). For instance, it is feared that Africa and, indeed Nigeria, may have the most insensitive impact of climate change than other regions and indeed countries of the world and it is also the continent that is least prepared to handle these impacts (Terr-Africa, 2009; World Bank, 2010). Evidence has shown from literature that emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) like CO_2 (carbon two oxide) and SO_2 (sulphur two oxide) are two main sources of climate change and their impacts are increasing daily due to human activities (Behera & Dash, 2017).

In a related development, economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to have improved slowly from 1.3% in 2016 to 2.4% in 2017, increase to 3.2% in 2018 and to 3.5% in 2019 (World Bank, 2019). It is interesting to note that, there is no way economic growth and development can advance without the use of energy. Energy is one of the required variables for economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa as well as in the entire world. Bazilian et al (2012) reported that accessibility to energy services are very important because of the abilities they have to handle the present global economic and social oppositions such as poverty, disparity, food security, environmental challenges, welfare, and education. Today, 80% of power generation comes from gas; most of the remainder comes from oil, with Nigeria the largest user of oil-fired back-up generators on the continent and has the second-largest vehicle stock in sub-Saharan Africa [International Energy Agency (IEA), 2020].With air pollution now identified as the leading cause of death in the world (WHO, 2018), and productive activities recorded to be the fastest way to get the air polluted, Nigeria's level of emissions measured by $PM_{2.5}$ reaches as high as 125 µg per cubic metre annually, and this is significantly higher than the recommended levels and world averages [International Energy Agency (IEA), 2020].

Interestingly, the third of the sustainable development goals (SDG-3) is to ensure healthy living and promote wellbeing for all by 2030. In line with this goal, it is expected that by 2030; there will be a reduction in the global maternity mortality rate to less than 70 per 100,000 live births; there will be an end to preventable death of new-born babies and children under 5 years of age, a reduction of under-5 mortality rate to 25 per 1,000; and to substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination. Unfortunately, Nigeria still has a high rate of under-5 mortality (estimated at 70 per 1,000) and a high maternal mortality rate (120 per 100,000 live births) (United Nations, 2016). A measure of Nigeria health status shows that 12.5 deaths per 1,000 live persons are recorded daily as against a global average of 7.6 deaths per 1,000 live persons. This places Nigeria as the 15th highest among countries of the world with high death rates per 1,000 live persons (WDI, 2018). Similarly, the rate of infant mortality which stands at 64.6 per 1,000 live births puts Nigeria as the 9th country globally with high infant mortality rate. This is in sharp contrast to the average 29.4 per 1,000 live infants that die across the world before reaching 1 year of age.

In view of the above, this study seeks to examine health outcome, carbon emission and economic growth nexus in Nigeria aim at providing an insight on health benefits of economic growth while ensuring that carbon emission is minimised at the same time towards achieving SDG-3 of promotion of healthy living and wellbeing for all population.

2. Literature and Theoretical Reviews

2.1 Conceptual Clarification

Carbon Emissions

EUROSTAT (2017) viewed carbon emissions as emissions stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement; they include carbon dioxide (CO_2) produced during consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels as well as gas flaring. Humanity and the Biosphere (MAHB) (2017) further pointed that, the concept of carbon emission is defined as the total amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emitted through land clearance and production and consumption of energy, food, fuels, manufactured goods, materials, wood, buildings, transportation and other services. The total emissions are expressed as CO_2 equivalents, the amount of CO_2 that would have the equivalent global warming impact, to facilitate comparison. DAVIS (2018) further pointed that, emissions are substances released into the air and are measured by their concentrations, or parts per million, in the atmosphere. It can be deduce from the above that, carbon emission is the amount of greenhouse gases primarily carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere by a particular human activity.

Health Outcomes

Health outcomes, although not defined precisely by clinicians, are understood in a similar way. According to Australia's New South Wales Health Department (cited in Michael, 2010), health outcome is the change in the health of an individual, group of people or population which is attributable to an intervention or series of interventions. University of Waterloo and Grand River Hospital (GRH) (2014) defined health outcomes as a planned measurement used to determine a change in health status as a result of interventions on participants in a clinical trial. Health outcomes measured in a clinical trial need to involve these three key elements; a change in health, the outcome is the result of a health intervention such that there is a before and after assessment (i.e., a pre- and post-) and the health outcome is an actual measured component and not something that is listed as a futuristic benefit. Australian Health Services Research Institute (cited in Sansoni, 2016) defined health outcome as change in the health of an individual, or a group of people or population, which is wholly or partially attributable to an intervention or series of interventions. Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (2019) reported that, health outcomes represent how healthy a county is right now. It can deduces that; health outcomes is an entire evaluation of all health professionals' efforts in ameliorating patients' health conditions, in relation to various dimensions of health. In the study, health outcomes are concern with mortality and life expectancy rate.

Economic Growth

In defining economic growth, Kuznets (2019) views economic growth as a long-term rise in capacity to supply increasingly diverse economic goods to its population, this growing capacity based on advancing technology and the institutional and ideological adjustments that it demands. Kimberly (2017) defined economic growth as an increase in the production of goods and services over specific period. Economic growth can, therefore, be seen as sectoral growth in such a way that the productive capacities of goods are on a consistent rise and this will have impact on national income, employment and consumption among others.

2.2 Theoretical Review

The study will be anchored on Environmental Kuznets theory first proposed by Simon Kuznets in the 1950s and '60s. The environmental Kuznets theory is a hypothesised relationship between environmental quality and economic development which holds that; as economic growth occurs, the environment will worsen until a certain point where the country reaches a specific average income. Then money is invested back into the environment, and the ecosystem is restored. This means that, dilapidation of the environment primarily hiked when a nation's income per capital is minimal over a period. Thus, as the economy experience growth, invariably dilapidation of the environmental reduces. This reduction leads to an upturned "U-shaped" relationship between income per capital, natural resources use and emissions waste (Sharma, 2011). This will consequently reduce health risks that accompanied the environmental degradations. Various indicators of environmental degradation tend to get worse as modern economic growth occurs until average income reaches a certain point over the course of development. Although subject to continuing debate, there is considerable evidence to support the application of environmental Kuznets curve for various environmental health indicators, such as water, air pollution and ecological footprint which show the inverted U-shaped curve as per capita income and/or GDP rise (Yasin et al, 2019).

2.3 Empirical Review

There are evidences of interconnectivity among carbon emission, health outcomes and economic growth in literature. However, the impact of carbon emission and health outcomes on economic growth is an issue of contention that demands for further study. Oluwatoyin, Romanus et al (2018) examined the long-run effect of emissions of greenhouse gas (GHG) on health outcomes in Nigeria using time series data from 1985 to 2016 engaging the auto-regressive distribution lag (ARDL) econometric approach to co-integration and it was observed that human activities increase GHG to the atmosphere, this is through combustion of fossil fuels and CO_2, these are two major sources of GHG emissions (GHGE). When the quantity of carbon dioxide increases in the air, more heat is stored in the atmosphere; and this comes upon human beings thereby causing a great harmful effect to human health.

Similarly, Ese et al (2019) adopted the use of a moderated mediation model to explain the interactions among economic growth, air pollution and health performance. The interactions were analysed with PROCESS macro, an analytical tool developed by Hayes. The study found air pollution and government expenditure on health as a significant interaction that affects health performance in Nigeria.

However, Suleman, Suryati, Normaz and Moukhtar (2018) examined the relations of energy consumption, emissions and economic growth as an important yardstick determining the level of economic activities in Nigeria using ARDL method to cointegration. The empirical results shown that in long and short-run analysis, the amounts of energy used have a significant and positive relationship with economic growth, this result shows that an increase in energy used in Nigeria is highly interconnected with the gross domestic product as an indicator of economic growth while foreign direct investment and fossil fuel are negatively related to gross domestic products.

In the vein, Goodness and Ebruvwiyo (2017) investigated the effect of economic growth on CO_2 emission using the dynamic panel threshold framework. The analysis is based on data from a panel of 31 developing countries. The results indicate that economic growth has negative effect on CO_2 emission in the low growth regime such as Nigeria but positive effect in the high growth regime with the marginal effect being higher in the high growth regime. Thus, the finding provides no support for the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis.

On the other hand, Joseph et al (2018) examined the effect of climate change on life expectancy, with particular reference to CO_2 carbon dioxide emission in Nigeria. The study adopted linear regression method and used ordinary least square (OLS) techniques to analyse the data. The data generated from World Bank publications between 1995 and 2013 were quaterised to have enough sample size to permit econometric tests. The coefficient of carbon dioxide emission turned positive indicating possible positive relationship between carbon dioxide CO_2 emission and life expectancy. Since it is not statistically significant, it suggests that CO_2 emission has not reduced the average number of years of Nigerian life.

3 Methodology Issues

The research design for the study is ex-post-facto or causal-comparative because it is intended to establish the cause-effect relationship among health outcomes, carbon emission and economic growth in Nigeria. Data relating to the variables of the study was drawn from various editions of the World Bank development data base, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Bulletins for the period of 1970 to 2019. This period is deliberately chosen as it marks the period of oil boom in Nigeria that increases the usage of natural gas as an energy source. Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) approach was employed for the data estimation, Johansen Co-integration Test for long run relationship, impulse response and Variance Decomposition to ascertain the transmission channels and determining the relative importance of shocks in explaining variations in the variable of interest respectively, while Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test was used to determined stationarity properties of the data. The VECM presented here is composed of five variables, namely; Real Gross Domestic Product Rate (RGDP) proxy for economic growth, Carbon Emission (CO_2E), Energy Consumption (ENC), Life Expectancy Rate (LEBR) proxy for health outcomes and Trade Openness (TOP).

$$\Delta RGDP_t = \acute{\alpha}0 + \acute{\alpha}1 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta RGDP_{t-1} + \acute{\alpha}2 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta CO2E_{t-1} + \acute{\alpha}3 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta ENC_{t-1} + \acute{\alpha}_4 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta LEBR_{t-1} + \acute{\alpha}_5 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta TOP_{t-1} + U_t \ldots\ldots 2$$

$$\Delta CO_2E_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta CO2E_{t-1} + \beta_2 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta RGDP_{t-1} + \beta_3 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta ENC_{t-1} + \beta_4 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta LEBR_{t-1} + \beta_5 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta TOP_{t-1} + w_t \ldots\ldots 3$$

$$\Delta ENC_t = a0 + a1 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta ENC_{t-1} + a2 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta RGDP_{t-1} + a_3 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta CO2E_{t-1} + a_4 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta LEBR_{t-1} + a_5 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta TOP_{t-1} + v_t \ldots\ldots 4$$

$$\Delta LEBR_t = \acute{y}_0 + \acute{y}_1 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta LEBR_{t-1} + \acute{y}_2 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta RGDP_{t-1} + \acute{y}_3 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta CO2E_{t-1} + \acute{y}_4 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta ENC_{t-1} + \acute{y}_5 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta TOP_{t-1} + z_t \ldots\ldots 5$$

$$\Delta TOP_t = \acute{Y}0 + \acute{Y}1 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta TOP_{t-1} + \acute{Y}2 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta RGDP_{t-1} + \acute{Y}_3 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta CO2E_{t-1} + \acute{Y}_4 \sum_{i=1}^{k\Delta} LEBR_{t-1} + \acute{Y}_5 \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta ENC_{t-1} + x_t \ldots\ldots 6$$

Where,
$\acute{\alpha}_0, \beta_0, a_0, \acute{y}_0$ and $\acute{Y}_0$ are the Intercepts,
$\acute{\alpha}_1 - \acute{\alpha}_5$, $\beta_1 - \beta_5$, $a_1 - a_5$, $\acute{y}_1 - \acute{y}_5$ and $\acute{Y}_1 - \acute{Y}_5$ are the Parameters to be estimated
while U_t, w_t, v_t, z_t and x_t are the Error or disturbance terms.

A priori expectation for parameter estimate is represented symbolically as thus:
$\acute{\alpha}_1 - \acute{\alpha}_5 > 0, \beta_1 - \beta_5 > 0, a_1 - a_5 > 0, \acute{y}_1, \acute{y}_2, \acute{y}_4$ and $\acute{y}_5 > 0$ while $\acute{y}_3 < 0, \acute{Y}_1, \acute{Y}_2, \acute{Y}_4$ *and* $\acute{Y}_5 > 0$ while $\acute{Y}_3 < 0$.
Larger values denote higher degree of the impacts of the exogenous variables on endogenous variables.

4. Empirical Results

Before the estimation of the model, all the variables of the study were subjected to unit root tests using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to determine the stationarity levels of the series. The results of the tests are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Augmented Dickey Fuller Statistics of the Variables

Variables	ADF Statistics @ Level	t-statistic @ 5%	ADF Statistics @ 1^{st} Difference	t-statistic @ 5%	Order of integration
RGDP	0.613027	-2.926622	-3.514414	-2.923780	1(1)
CO_2Et	0.255325	-2.926622	-3.165415	-2.923780	1(1)
ENC_t	0.095338	-2.926622	-7.237272	-2.923780	1(1)
$LEBR_t$	1.937039	-2.926622	-4.455262	-2.923780	1(1)
TOP_t	-2.816089	-2.926622	-7.919598	-2.923780	1(I)

Source: Authors' computation using Eviews 9.

The results from Table 1 show that none of the series is stationary at level as their test statistic are all smaller in absolute term than the 5% critical value of -2.926622 for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. However, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is consistently rejected for all the variables when they are expressed in first differences, suggesting that they are all integrated of order one (I (1)). The results reported are for those with intercept. The implication is that all the variables have mean reverting ability; suggesting long-run equilibrium among the variables.

But before confirming the existing of the long-run relationship, the optimal lag length for the VAR specification was considered. The results of three different information criteria, Akaike (AIC), Schwarz (SC) and Hannan-Quinn (QH), used unambiguously showed that the optimal lag length is one as identified by the asterisk (*) shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Optimal Lag Selection

Lag	LogL	LR	FPE	AIC	SC	HQ
0	-2869.853	NA	7.24e+45	119.7856	119.9805	119.8592
1	-2503.255	147.7363*	1.41e+40*	106.5939*	108.7380*	107.4042*
2	-2599.084	473.8471	2.60e+41	109.5451	110.7146	109.9871

* indicates lag order selected by the criterion.

Having confirmed that all the variables are I(1), the existence of a long-run relationship among these variables was determined using the Johansen cointegration technique as shown in table 3.

Table 3: Multivariate Johansen Cointegration Test Result

Null Hypothesis	Eigen Value	Trace Statistic	0.05 Critical Value	Probability
r = 0	0.899768	196.7298	69.81889	0.0000
r ≤ 1	0.696439	47.85613	86.31708	0.0723
r ≤ 2	0.324539	29.09272	29.79707	0.0601
r ≤ 3	0.184958	10.25948	15.49471	0.2613
r ≤ 4	0.009181	0.442723	3.841466	0.5058
Null Hypothesis	Eigen Value	Max-Eigen Statistic	0.05 Critical Value	Probability
r = 0	0.899768	110.4127	33.87687	0.0000
r ≤ 1	0.696439	27.58434	57.22436	0.2471
r ≤ 2	0.324539	18.83324	21.13162	0.1018
r ≤ 3	0.184958	9.816754	14.26460	0.2242
r ≤ 4	0.009181	0.442723	3.841466	0.5058

Source: **Extracts from E-Views Output**

From table 3, both the trace and the Max-Eigen value tests indicate that there is one cointegrating equations among the variables at 5% level of significance.Since carbon emission, health outcomes and economic growth are the targets of the study, the model was normalised on $CO_2E_{t,}LEBR_t$ and RGDP variables, in order to obtain the parameter estimates and possible inferences.

Table 4: Long-run Parameters of VECM Normalized on CO_2E_t

Parameters	Coefficient	Standards Error	t-Statistic
CO_2E_t(-1)	1	-	-
C	-1.6808	-	-
ENC_t(-1)	-2.3430	1.7474	-1.3408
$LEBR_t$(-1)	7.5214	6.7577	1.1130
RGDP(-1)	-8.3107	1.2007	-6.9215
TOP(-1)	1.4774	4.3969	0.33601

Source: Extract from E-views Output

The result in Table 4 shows that; ENC and RGDP have negative effect while LEBR and TOP have positive effect on carbon emission in the long-run. However, none of the variable is statistically significant at 5%. The negative effect of economic growth on carbon emission corroborate the findings of Goodness and Ebruvwiyo (2017) whose results indicate that economic growth has negative effect on CO_2 emission in the low growth regime including Nigeria. The positive relationship between health outcome and carbon emission is in line with Joseph, Fredrick, Romanus, Ambrose and Tochukwu (2018) who also found a positive but insignificance relationship between carbon emission and life expectancy in Nigeria.

Table 5: Long-run Parameters of VECM Normalized on $LEBR_t$

Parameters	Coefficient	Standards Error	t-Statistic
$LEBR_t$(-1)	1	-	-
C	-22.36482	-	-
CO_2E_t(-1)	-1.3307	6.7090	-0.1983
RGDP(-1)	-1.1013	1.1014	-0.9999
ENC_t(-1)	-0.0311	0.0021	-14.8095
TOP(-1)	0.01964	0.00604	3.2516

Source: Extract from E-views Output

The result in Table 5 shows that; CO_2E, RGDP and ENC have negative effect while TOP has positive effect on health outcomes (Life Expectancy) in the long-run. However, only CO_2E and TOP variables are statistically significant at 5%. The finding is in line with the findings of Oluwatoyin et al (2018) who found that, when the quantity of carbon dioxide increases in the air, more heat is stored in the atmosphere; and this comes upon human beings thereby causing a great harmful effect to human health. It also corroborate the findings of Ese et al (2019) who found that, air pollution and government expenditure on health have a significant interaction that affects health performance in Nigeria.

Table 6: Long-run Parameters of VECM Normalized on RGDP

Parameters	Coefficient	Standards Error	t-Statistic
RGDP(-1)	1	-	-
C	2.0214	-	-
$LEBR_t(-1)$	-9.0512	5.9011	-1.5338
$CO_2E_t(-1)$	-1.20321	6.22959	-0.19314
$ENC_t(-1)$	2.8211	2.3101	1.22120
TOP(-1)	-1.7811	5.5010	-0.32377

Source: **Extract from E-views Output**

The result in Table 6 shows that; LEBR, CO_2E, and TOP have negative effect while ENC has positive effect on economic growth in the long-run. However, only ENC variable is statistically significant at 5%. The negative effect of health outcome on economic growth is in line with Suleman et al (2018) who found that an increase in energy used in Nigeria is highly interconnected with the economic growth while foreign direct investment and fossil fuel are negatively related to gross domestic products in Nigeria.

Vector Error-Correction Modelling

Having reached conclusions on the inherent long-run relationships, short-run dynamics of the function are investigated. As the Engle-Granger Representation theorem suggests, the existence of co-integration among the I(1) variables entails the presence of short-run error correction relationship associated with them. The relationship represents an adjustment process by which the deviated dependent variable is expected to adjust back to its long-run equilibrium path. The results of the VECM for the short run dynamics of CO_2E, LEBR and RGDP are presented in the Table 7- 9.

Table 7: Short-run Dynamic Estimates of VECM Normalised on CO_2E_t

Parameters	Coefficient	Standards Error	t-Statistic
$\Delta CO_2E_t(-1)$	0.608135	0.208021	2.923427
$\Delta ENC_t(-1)$	-9.860564	9.353313	-1.054232
$\Delta LEBR_t(-1)$	-9.748762	1.1445369	-8.51765
$\Delta RGDP(-1)$	1.46E -06	1.58E -06	0.919632
$\Delta TOP(-1)$	5.270053	2.466583	02.13658
ECM (-1)	-1.054288	0.249939	-4.218188
Adjusted R^2 *=0.76*			

Source: Extracts from E-views Output

The result from Table 7 shows that LEBR has negative and statistically insignificant relationship with carbon emission (**CO_2E**) while RGDP has positive but statistically insignificant relationship with carbon emission (**CO_2E**) in the short run in Nigeria. The coefficient of the vector error-correction term is negative and statistically significant. The reported speed of adjustment is 1.054288 indicating that about 105.4288% of adjustment to the equilibrium level of carbon emission occurs annually in Nigeria.

Table 8: Short-run Dynamic Estimates of VECM Normalised on LEBR

Parameters	Coefficient	Standards Error	t-Statistic
$\Delta CO_2E_t(-1)$	5.26009	9.29010	0.566561
$\Delta ENC_t(-1)$	-0.001018	0.000418	-2.437467
$\Delta LEBR_t(-1)$	0.992938	0.051113	19.42638
$\Delta RGDP(-1)$	-7.38015	7.07015	-1.044323
$\Delta TOP(-1)$	0.002200	0.001102	1.996836
ECM) -1)	-0.630009	0.112009	-5.624628
Adjusted R^2 = 0.92			

Source: Extracts from E-views Output

Table 8 shows that RGDP has negative but statistically insignificant effect while CO_2E has positive and statistically insignificant effect on Health outcomes (LEBR) in the short run in Nigeria. The negative effect of RGDP on LEBR suggests that Nigerian economic growth is not translating in to the citizen well being largely due to the systematic corruption that characterised the Nigerian economy. In addition, it could be due to inadequate budgetary provision for the health sector to improve the citizens' life expectancy. On the other hand, the positive relationship between carbon emission (CO_2E) and health outcome (LEBR) indicated that, though, CO_2 emission has no significant effect on life expectancy, the result suggests that increased concentration of carbon dioxide in the air will not cause reduction in longevity in Nigeria in the short-run.The coefficient of the vector error-correction term for the health outcome model is negative and statistically significant. The reported speed of adjustment is 0.630009 indicating that about 63% of adjustment to the equilibrium level of life expectancy rate occurs annually in Nigeria.

Table 9: Short-run Dynamic Estimates of VECM Normalised on RGDP

Parameters	Coefficient	Standards Error	t-Statistic
$\Delta CO_2E_t(-1)$	-2.506480	2.057477	-1.218230
$\Delta ENC_t(-1)$	6.001209	9.222109	0. 650741
Δ LEBR $_t(-1)$	2.592101	1.0412912	02.47505
ΔRGDP(-1)	0.619426	0.157137	3.941957
ΔTOP(-1)	-3.702109	2.392110	-01.54376
ECM) -1)	-2.185276	2.458513	0.888861
Adjusted $R^2 = 0.86$			

Source: Extracts from E-views Output

The result from Table 9 shows that CO_2E has negative effect while LEBR has positive effect on economic growth (RGDP) in the short run in Nigeria. The result are however statistically insignificant. The coefficient of the vector error-correction term is negative and statistically significant. This further confirms that the variables are indeed co-integrated. The magnitude of the error-correction term reveals the change in economic per period that is attributable to the disequilibrium between the actual and equilibrium levels. The reported speed of adjustment is -2.185276 indicating that about 218.5276% of adjustment to the equilibrium level of economic growth occurs annually in Nigeria. Furthermore, the adjustment coefficient being statistically significant implies that the disequilibrium in economic growth would be corrected at different periods.

Analysis of the Pass-Through Effect (Transmission Chanel)

In order to examine the effect of health outcome on economic growth through carbon emission, the study focus on the effects of a positive health outcome shocks on economic growth (RGDP) through carbon emission To this effect, the study evaluated the pass-through effect of health outcome to economic growth via carbon emission in Nigeria by examining the response of economic growth to a shock in health outcome with and without carbon emission exogenised.

Figure 1 depicts the responses of real gross domestic product (RGDP), Health outcome (LEBR) and carbon emission (CO_2E), to positive innovations in real gross domestic product (RGDP).



Source: Extraction from E-Views

Figure 1 reveals the responses or reactions of the three variables to positive shocks or innovations to real gross domestic product in Nigeria. The figure shows that apart from carbon emission which shows a fluctuating response to the innovations or shocks in the real gross domestic product with positive but weak effect in the fourth and eighth year, all the other variables have responded positively to the shocks. Consequent to one standard deviation innovation to the real gross domestic product (RGDP), carbon emission (CO_2E) become negatively at initial stage and shows a short-lived reaction to positive real gross domestic product in fourth and eighth year. This shows that health outcomes appreciate continuously due to positive innovation on RGDP in Nigeria.

Figure 2 depicts the responses of real gross domestic product (RGDP), Health outcome (LEBR), and carbon emission (CO_2E), to positive innovations in Carbon emission (CO_2E)



Source: Extraction from E-Views

It is evident from Figure 2 that the responses of real gross domestic product (RGDP) and health outcome to one standard deviation innovation to carbon emission (CO_2E) are significantly negative, though health outcome insignificantly appreciated after the eighth year. However, the response of carbon emission (CO_2E) to its one standard deviation innovation or shock fluctuated significantly. Consequently, to one standard deviation innovation or shock to the carbon emission (CO_2E), real gross domestic product (RGDP) and health outcome depreciate significantly in Nigeria.

Figure 3 depicts the responses of real gross domestic product (RGDP), Health outcome (LBR), and carbon emission (CO_2E), to positive innovations in Health outcome (LBR)



Source: Extraction from E-Views

Figure 3 reveals the responses or reactions of the three variables to positive shocks or innovations to health outcomes (LEBR) in Nigeria. The figure shows that apart from carbon emission (CO_2E) which shows positive but weak response to the innovations or shocks in the health outcomes (LEBR), all the other variables have responded significantly positive to shocks in the health outcomes (LEBR). Consequently, to one standard deviation innovation or shock to the health outcomes (LEBR), real gross domestic product (RGDP) appreciate significantly while carbon emission (CO_2E) slightly appreciated in Nigeria.

Variance Decomposition

The variance decomposition provides information about the relative importance of each random innovation in affecting the variables in the VECM. The variance decomposition analysis provides a means of determining the relative importance of shocks in explaining variations in the variable of interest. It gives the proportion of the forecast error variance of a variable that can be attributed to its own innovations and to that of other variables. The results of the variance decomposition analyses of RGDP, CO_2E and LEBR are presented in Table 10, 11 and 12.

Table 10: Variance Decomposition of RGDP

Period	S.E.	RGDP	LEBRT	CO2ET	TOP	ENCT
1	1.08E+12	100.0000	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
2	2.47E+12	64.62804	23.35661	10.51153	0.007862	1.495963
3	3.62E+12	62.60226	23.63362	11.02586	0.327588	2.410665
4	5.21E+12	54.22236	31.22009	12.45828	0.201941	1.897331
5	6.59E+12	52.94589	31.05523	13.92934	0.687830	1.381720
6	7.68E+12	45.96737	39.11031	10.34993	1.364646	3.207747
7	8.93E+12	41.13387	45.81189	8.645486	1.538442	2.870311
8	1.01E+13	41.04527	46.90155	8.281626	1.301660	2.469895
9	1.16E+13	40.38162	46.87012	9.094917	1.039589	2.613761
10	1.29E+13	40.31162	46.79077	9.010167	1.130406	2.757034

Source: Authors' Computation using E-View

Results from Table 10 reveal that the variations in real gross domestic product (RGDP) accounted for 100% own variation in the first year and thereafter, own-shocks variations decreased consistently to a paltry 40.31% in the tenth year. The result also shows that health outcome (LEBR) became the highest contributor to variations in the real gross domestic product (RGDP) up to the tenth quarter. This also supports the validity of the health outcome pass-through channel on real gross domestic product.

Table 11: Variance Decomposition of LEBR

Period	S.E.	RGDP	LEBRT	CO_2ET	TOP	ENCT
1	0.039603	2.316477	97.68352	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
2	0.105024	2.711911	95.85888	0.520820	0.638704	0.269683
3	0.221823	3.745646	94.49273	0.174170	1.005235	0.582221
4	0.379438	5.515326	91.11710	0.133429	1.801478	1.432666
5	0.585063	4.707729	88.91167	0.143292	2.837520	3.399788
6	0.841839	3.578196	87.58121	0.380900	3.669735	4.789960
7	1.130219	3.006337	86.84639	0.579394	4.057133	5.510741
8	1.448352	2.936248	86.32350	0.540225	4.096338	6.103688
9	1.785695	3.136584	85.63026	0.444670	4.145144	6.643345
10	2.147616	3.173152	84.88079	0.429579	4.224076	7.292404

Source: Authors' Computation using E-View

Results from Table 11 reveals that own shocks or variations in health outcome (LEBR) account mostly for its own variations throughout the first to the tenth year. Indeed, LEBR is the most determinant of its own variations accounting for 97.68% in the initial first year decreasing to 84.88 % in the tenth year. The least contributor to improve health outcome in Nigeria is the carbon emission accounting for 0% in the initial first year and approximately 0.43% in the tenth year. With regards to the pass-through channel, real gross domestic product is dominant in the first to the fifth year while energy consumption rises gradually from approximately 4.79% in the sixth year to about 7.29% of the systematic variations in LEBR by the end of the tenth year.

Table 12: Variance Decomposition of CO_2E

Period	S.E.	RGDP	LEBRT	CO2ET	TOP	ENCT
1	11227846	33.23071	0.081113	66.68818	0.000000	0.000000
2	14025849	32.28068	6.367004	58.09503	1.988583	1.268706
3	16353434	27.98662	5.501363	46.52451	9.128157	10.85936
4	17404239	29.02352	5.023565	43.40278	12.95671	9.593422
5	17490901	28.73862	5.073940	43.72764	12.88303	9.576774
6	19758977	27.77183	5.423598	49.14320	10.15700	7.504377
7	20607904	25.61152	6.992975	45.58050	12.13319	9.681824
8	22818449	26.34396	5.928955	41.55705	14.99788	11.17214
9	23754304	27.93650	5.480545	40.40279	15.82998	10.35018
10	24009085	27.40437	5.797734	41.08636	15.50141	10.21013

Source: Authors' Computation using E-View

Results from Table 12 reveals that own shocks or variations in carbon emission (CO_2E) account for most variations in carbon emission (CO_2E) in the first through tenth year. Indeed, CO_2E is the most determinant of its own variations but this dominance wanes as the years proceed. For example, by the end of the tenth quarter, it only accounts for about approximately 41.09% of the variations. With regards to the pass-through channel, real gross domestic product (RGDP) is the most dominant determinant of variations in carbon emission (CO_2E) in Nigeria other than variations due to own shocks.

5. Conclusion and policies Recommendations

The study analyses health outcomes, carbon emission and economic growth in Nigeria using VECM approach. Based on the empirical evidences, the study concludes that, economic growth and carbon emission have negative relationship. In the same vein, carbon emissions have negative effect on health outcomes in the long run while economic growth has a pass-through effect on health outcome through carbon emission in Nigeria. Taking measures that can generate inclusive economic growth in the short term, while making progress towards climate goals to secure sustainable long-term growth will be beneficiary for the economy. In addition, Health outcomes have positive effect on economic growth though in the short-run. However, in the long run, health outcomes negatively influence economic growth. This also supports the validity of the health outcome pass-through channel on real gross domestic product in Nigeria. Taken measures that will improve health outcomes will be beneficiary to the economy. In view of these conclusions the study recommended for the following policy measures:

- Transitioning away from fossil fuels to renewable energies such as Solar, Wind, Hydro and Biomass will help significantly to reduce carbon footprint and decreases utility bills.
- Legislations on market-based measures, such as green taxes, tradable permits, and payment for ecosystem services should be strengthen or adopted. This approach is considered flexible, efficient, and effective as it can deliver environmental outcomes with the least cost, and thereby relax the trade-off between economic growth and improved environmental quality.
- There is a need for aggressive investment by the private and public sectors in labour-intensive services such as sanitation and healthcare as their net cost to society is actually very low, and gains can be substantial.

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THEME TWENTY ONE
EDUCATION, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

E-LEARNING AND EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: THE CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

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Abstract

The development of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in administrative, education and production activities has advanced the viability of teaching and learning all over the world. This creates opportunity for the advancement of the educational sector and improvement of the socio-economic system of the state. Different technological facilities have been made available for use in the teaching and learning process, although not without its challenges. This study, therefore, aims at examining e-learning and educational development in Nigeria, as well as its challenges and prospects. Secondary data is used to achieve the objective of the study. The systems theory was used as a framework for the study. The study conceptualises the issues of e-learning and educational development. The study identifies poor infrastructure, poor network, illiteracy, inability to pay for bill, etc., as some the challenges of digital learning in Nigeria; and finally the makes recommendations such that there is need for government and internet service providers to collaborate in order to solve some challenges associated with internet connectivity in Nigeria, government should encourage ICT companies in Nigeria to develop software and other applications needed for e-learning to be produced locally, government should provide the needed infrastructures to facilitate e-learning at various levels of the educational system in Nigeria, etc.

Keywords: E-learning, Educational development, Challenges, Prospects, Communication

Introduction

Education is seen as part of the means or ways of transferring the belief and other ways of life of a people from one generation to another over the years. It is also a way of introducing new ways of life, attitude, and tradition in the way people behave and live their lives. As one of the oldest industry in the society, education is that tool which helps society to preserve, maintain and upgrade its social equilibrium (Ogbaji, 1996). It has being very useful since the dark ages of the society. Fafunwa (1974) defines education as the different activities which each generation pass to their younger ones which, in turn, help them learn new attitudes, capabilities and norms which comprises the basic values in the society they live in. To Orji and Job (2013), education is basically adopted to develop the cognitive, psychology and psycho productive domains of Human beings. This means that it is an approach through which learning takes place. Education is, therefore, a process by which learning takes place and a person develop new skills and qualities. It is, therefore, apt to note that learning process can take place in any environment whether formal or informal in as much as new ideas, feelings, activities will be learnt.

The growth and development of any society reflects the level or quality of education which the people access and which to a large extent influence them. Article 13 of the United Nations 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognises a universal right to education. By this, all nation state party to this covenant is shouldered with task of providing quality and accessible education to their people.

The government of Nigeria on 29 July, 1993, became a signatory of this covenant with a promise to promote education advancement in Nigeria. A society that prioritises education is bound to excel in all other sector of the society and this is based on the fact that education is the bed rock of any society. Every other unit of the society anchors on the educational sector to survive.

But, the Nigerian society has being struggling in one way or the other to develop and advance the educational sector at different point in time which has led to the establishment of different policies in other to advance education in Nigeria. However, in many coastal areas, students find it difficult to access education because of the poor infrastructural facilities available for learning to take place and this has brought about slow rate of educational development. In October 2018, The Executive Secretary of Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), Dr. Hamid Bobboyi, disclosed that the number of out-of-school children in Nigeria had increased from the 10.5 million it stood before to 13.2 million (Joseph, 2018). Also, with the novel coronavirus pandemic outbreak in December 2020, according to UNESCO, an estimated 1.725 billion learners have been affected as a result of school closures, representing about 99.9% of the world's student population as of April 13th, 2020 (UNESCO, 2020).

Arising from the above, it becomes apt that Nigeria fully adopts the different channels of e-learning so as to help advance and develop the standard of education to the level experienced in other advanced societies of the world. With the growth in Information Communication Technology (ICT), there is need for us to advance our education through e-learning channels. Adeyinka & Olusola (2009) posits that the introduction of ICT adds value to the learning processes and organisation and administration of educational institutions. And that the internet is regarded as the powerful force that has rendered a significant contribution in promoting development and innovative practices.

ICT avails people the opportunity to enhance their education by picking from different e-learning channels available to them. To Fry (2001), e-learning is the manipulation of the internet or any other technology to develop learning packages, transfer knowledge to learners and also monitor the activities of organisations. E-learning helps educationist and students alike to use information and communication technology to enhancing exchange of knowledge between teachers and learners at all levels, and that constitutes a huge stride.

Also, with the availability of e-learning platform, it will be possible to defeat the challenges of learning such as distance, huge cost of education and it will enrich academic content and learning materials will be easily accessible. This will bring about high rate of academic development as experienced in developed nations.

Objective of the Study

The main objective of this study is to examine the implications of the use of e-learning in educational development, as well as its challenges and prospects.

Methodology

Documentary method was used in generating data for the study. Nwana (1981, p. 177) states that documentary methods avail researchers the opportunity to use already written documents in the course of their research. For this study, it involves the examination of various written documents on the issues e-learning and educational development in Nigeria. These documents include journals and other related materials. Content analysis was adopted to analyse the secondary data. As a tool, it provides the researcher the opportunity to analyse certain words and concepts used in the study. Content analysis is used to analyse the presence, meaning, and correlation between the words and concepts, and make inference about the content within the text.

Conceptual Review

E-learning

The growth in Internet activities and technology has brought about different channels to make available resources for research and learning for both instructors and learners at different levels so as to help in sharing of information (Richard & Haya, 2009). As the world advances in technology, there are innovations which help both learners and educators to interact and share knowledge at their convenience.

The concept of e-learning has no one generally acceptable definition. But from whatever perspective you define e-learning, it must connote the activities or interactions that take place without necessarily bringing learners and instructors together physically. In line with the above, Oblinger & Hawkins (2005) posits that the concept of e-learning has no one definition globally. Holmes and Gardner (2006) also made a comment concerning the difference in defining the concept by saying that there may be as many definitions of the term e-learning as there are different academic explanations of the concept. To Fry (2001), e-learning is the manipulation of the internet or any other technology to develop learning packages, transfer knowledge to learners and also monitor the activities of organisations. Rossi (2009), sees e-learning as that which covers wide range of applications, learning methods and processes that can be adopted for virtual learning to take place. Arising from the above definitions, we can say therefore, that e-learning is a computerised instructional medium which enables learning to take place at any given point in time in any selected location.

In today's digital age, learning mostly take place via the internet, unlike what happened in the early days of man where people must assemble together physically before exchange of ideas could take place According to scholars like Oblinger & Hawkins (2005) e-learning has evolved from a fully-online learning to using technology in delivering courses in part or full not minding the time and place. Meaning, with the availability of technological devices and gadget, learning can take place at any point in time. Distance to learning is no longer a barer as scholars can now access learning aids prepared and uploaded online by their teachers. Abad et al (2009) defined e-learning as any learning that is enabled electronically. E-learning activities usually take place via electronically channels such as radios, televisions, computers, ipad, podcast, etc. For them, e-learning constitutes any learning that is empowered by the use of technology to promote leaning activities.

Also, Gotschall (2000) posits that e-learning came into existence because of distance learning activities. Therefore, it is the transfer of knowledge from one point to another distant or closed location by way of video or visual presentations. This paper therefore, aligns with the definition given by Wentling, Waight , Gallagher, La Fleur , Wang & Kanfer (2000).

They refer to e-learning as the type of learning that are basically generated and distributed via any electronic means. To them, the digital computers and other electronic connections; but it is likely it will evolve into different systems made up of different channels such as wireless and satellite, and technologies such as cellular phones.

From the above, e-learning channels comprises but are not it is not restricted to the use of radios, televisions, computers and other gadgets in the transmission of learning activities from one person to another at different locations. Liu and Wang (2009) however claim that the progression of communications technologies, particularly the internet, did transform distance learning into e-learning. The model adopts different educational technologies that help in the improvement and development of education standard globally and therefore will help in the educational sector in Nigeria. It avails students the opportunity of familiarizing with latest technologies.

Models of E-Learning

There are three main digital learning models. They are explained briefly below:

Traditional Learning

Under this model of learning, lectures are conducted with both lecturer and students present in the learning room. Technological facilities are used to generate multi-media presentations which the teacher uses to engage the students face-to-face.

There is a show of relationship between learners and lecturers as the learning goes on. The use of the traditional model of learning can enhance the experience pattern of students as they are allowed to use their e-learning devices and they can interact with their teachers.

Distance Learning

The distance model, gives room for teaching to take place from a distance. In course of the learning, both learners and instructors interact from different locations during the classes. Most times, learning materials are packaged for students with pre-recorded lessons and ideas from the instructors for the learners to learn via any of the e-learning mediums. This means also requires special organisational and administrative arrangements so as to provide an effective learning atmosphere.

Blended Learning

Here there is a blending of the traditional model and other electronic learning media. Most times, students attend a face-to-face learning sessions after which they can switch to any electronic means of learning. This model is most times adopted by organisations and different educational institutions for better learning to take place.

Media of E-Learning

Media of e-learning are those avenues through which both instructors and learners can interact from distance not necessarily being physically present. There are different media but this paper in line with the definition given by Wentling et al (2000), identify the following as media of e-learning: radio, television, Computer & Internet. To Wang and his colleague's e-learning is learning that are basically generated and distributed via any electronic means. To them, the e-learning relies on computers and other electronic connections; but it is likely it will evolve into different systems made up of different channels such as wireless and satellite, and technologies such as cellular phones.

Radio

Radio as an electronic gadget operates with technology and signals which take place via radio waves. Radio waves are electromagnetic waves of frequency which operates via gigahertz (GHz). When a transmitter is assembled to an antenna, it generates electronic waves which radiates the waves and allows another radio that is connected to antenna to receive the signals. The issue of mobile or digital learning in recent times has continued to grow as it provides opportunity to deliver and receive knowledge and skill has been raised and is practiced in the developed nations of the world (Ayodele, 2010). Radio as a medium of e-learning can be used for the transmission of already recorded voice teachings through waves to students at different levels.

Primary, secondary and tertiary institutions can adopt radio platform as a medium in teaching their students and pupils under this lock down period. Also, lecturers and teachers alike could go on a live broadcast while reaching out to their different audiences.

Television

As an electronic gadget, the television transmit signals inform of images or moving objects with audio wave over a wire which converts light and sound to electrical waves and reconverts the waves into visible light rays and audible sound. Television also assists in the sending of movable signals from one place to another. It assists in sending audio and visuals above the limits of physical distance. Since the discovery of television, it has continuously influenced the way where by audio and visual lectures take place amongst other format for learning effectively and it has to a large extent determine how society is organised. Since the early 20th century, it has become a possible medium for education globally. Different countries and educational institutions now teach their pupils and students via televisions. Some lectures are recorded visually with the lecture on ground and then replayed via the television for easy passage of knowledge.

Computer

Computers are electronic devices which accept information, store it, process it and then gives out information. The computer is a technological gadget enables the leaders and teachers to interact and also learn. Algahtani (2011) sees computer as a medium to e-learning which allows for the adequate use of different hardware and software programmes for better functionality. As information technology continues to grow, the use and importance of computer can never be over emphasised.

The use of computer for e-learning can be in either of these two ways: computer-managed instruction and computer-assisted-learning. In the computer assisted-learning, computer gadgets are used rather than the traditional way of learning. It gives room for the building of interactive software's as a tool for learning activities within and outside the classroom while in the computer-managed-instruction, computer is adopted into use for the retrieval of information to help in the process of learning. These methods above enable computer users to better understand and make use of the available channels of learning.

Students who have computers can download different formats of lecture notes such as e-files, voice notes, recorded videos etc to enhance their learning. And this will aid their learning process and make them more technologically minded.

Internet

The internet provides e-learners the opportunity to make use of network interconnectivity with the help of different computers counted together around the globe. Almosa (2001) the internet learning process is an advancement of learning and teaching activities with the use of computers. This process makes materials available and adorable to users in the internet with readily available links to retrieve such information for learning. When people have access to the internet they could download and upload teaching materials which can be accessed at any point in time and place. With the availability of internet connection people can connect with themselves for any purpose.

Almosa (2001) contends that with the use of the internet, leaning can take place at any location with learners and students all benefiting. . This medium is basically an online medium of learning. This medium gives learners the opportunity to interact with the instructors and also among themselves via the internet simultaneously with the use of digital tools such as video-conference and chat-rooms. This medium gives room for swift response or fees back and it is more advantageous because learners are able to learn at a time that suits them. This medium gives students opportunity to engage their lecturers online as well as Carry out their works at their convenience.

Educational Development

Todaro and Smith (2011, p. 359) posit that education is a component of development and it plays a fundamental role in the development of human capacity which in turn enthrone societal growth. Education plays a greater role in the advancement of any society as it helps the people develop different capacities. There is, therefore, the need to develop the Nigerian education sector so as to compete with other advanced nations. Educational development is the process of helping those who teach to get better understanding of what they do through workshops or other avenues.

Educational development comprises the advancement of every aspect of the academic sector in Amy society. It covers the development of teachers, students and every actor in the educational sector. It also looks at *modus oparendi* of the different educational institutions; their mode of teachings, their research methodology, their mediums of teaching and how well the students are captured. Kremer (2003) posits that investment in education is a vital tool for development as a result of the different roles it plays in social development. Educational development has positive effects on both the economy, human capital and other sectors. More so, investment in education can greatly contribute to the expansion of human capabilities, which is a key aspect of development. Todaro and Smith (2011) believes that people benefits from education by reading, communicating, arguing, and being able to choose in a more informed way, and being taken more seriously by others and so on. They further stated that it could even include better decision-making, more engagement in the political process and positive spillover effects which could be seen around those around who work around the educated person. This increased human capability as a result of education is vital to consider as part of the significant benefits of education, and its essential place at the heart of development.

Educational development also comprises of the drafting of good educational policies that will help in standardising the sector for better performance. When government comes up with the right policies, it encourages the advancement of the educational sector. Educational development gives room for the purchase of the requisite tools for instructors and learners to meet. The introduction of technology and others like moral, cultural values in schools so as to help improve the standard of education.

Prospects of E-Learning and its Role in Educational Development in Nigeria

The Nigerian education sector was designed to take care of every student educational need which made it an education for all and education for way of life. The curriculum of education emphasised the use of both technology and other formal education learning process that is required to meet educational need of the students in the 21st century. The continuous growth of multi-media and other internet learning media for passing knowledge has brought about a paradigm shift in traditional ways of teaching (Wentling et al, 2000). With the wave of technological advancement spreading rounding the globe via technological advancement, educationist and others now have aching and learning media. Almost every school and educational institutions have recognised e-learning as having the prospect to transform people, knowledge, skills and performance (Henry, 2001). With the outbreak of the novel coronavirus in December 2020, many Nigerian institutions are gradually adopting different e-learning strategies in other to keep their students going. The Federal government through the Ministry of education instructed all schools to key into their e-learning platforms so as to continue with the academic calendar even as the pandemic continues to ravage the world and Nigeria (Adedigba, 2020).

The use of e-learning has become necessary in Nigerian so as to enable educationist and students advance our system of education from analog to digital mediums of learning. With e-learning comes the opportunity to switch from the analog system of teaching to a more digitalized pattern of teaching. This is because with e-learning, institutions will initiate several positive changes that will develop the system. The use of E-learning in education, especially for tertiary institutions has several benefits, and thus it is considered among the best mediums of education.

Different studies and authors such as Orji & Job (2013) states that any society that deploys the use of e-learning channels in their education sector will derive huge he benefits.

Society in general will grow fast and the people will be driven by technological changes that come with it. The flexible nature of e-learning gives everyone privilege of choosing the point where learning can take place. When students learn at their convenience, it gives them the chance of improving their learning speed. And instructors and students need not meet physically before learning can take place. Mba (20219) posits that a good primary school education underpins the development of a country's economy. But in Nigeria today, the number of public primary schools and teachers available for basic education are both woefully inadequate. This is exacerbated by the poor facilities at many primary schools. A World Bank 2018 survey of 435 private and public primary schools in Nigeria, that covered 2,968 teachers, showed that a teacher was absent from class for approximately 25% of the scheduled teaching time. This decreased teaching time, on average, to less than 33% than what was on the timetable (Mba, 2019). In most Nigerian schools today, you find out the large in a particular class. This situation affects both the instructors and learners as learning might not be effective. There will be too many distractions affecting the learning process but e-learning is flexible enough to capture everyone from their different positions with all achieving the essence of learning. Smedley (2010) states that e-learning avails both institutions and learners the much flexibility of learning at any point and time of the day; effectively without physical distraction. . Education will become more flexible and accessible by all in Nigeria when e-learning is adopted.

Another problem we face is that most times researchers and students find it difficult to access needed information or documents to enhance their study. When institutions adopt e-learning, it will enhances the standard of learning as people can now access different learning information from where ever they are. More so, students can carry out research and development studies which will in turn translate to national advancement and growth of both the economic, political, sectors of the society.

For learning to take place, interaction and engagement which will propel a feedback to help us come to the conclusion that there is progress must take place. E-learning creates avenue discussion between learners and teachers. It therefore helps in eliminating different education barriers. E-learning Promotes academic engagement between students. With the use of e-learning research students exchange ideas and share their views on different phenomenon. The use of e-learning for teaching will help reduce the work load from our teachers. The system of learning in Nigeria is built in such as way that the teachers play about 80% roles in the learning process of the student. But with e-learning, the student is given the chance to build themselves better. It gives them the confidence that they can fit into the society. It prepares the learners for the journey of life. Wagner, Hassanein & Head (2008) believes that e-Learning makes available extra prospects for interactivity between Learners and instructors during content delivery.

E-learning saves cost for students. It breaks the distance barriers for students who wish to travel long distance in other to access education. As students can have aches to the internet at their convenience. A Report given by Al Jazeera, in 2018, revealed that millions of Nigerian had no access to their class rooms because of the ongoing Boko Haram attacks. This is because about 1,400 school buildings in Borno State have been brought down by the insurgent's eight-year rebellion with more than 50 percent learning centres unable to open due to dance and the unsafe nature of the environment (UNICEF report, 2007). In situations as this, the government can use any of the e-learning mediums to teach the reach and teach school children so as to keep the school calendar running amidst the war Attacks. Therefore, students need not gather physically to learn but can do same virtually. Also, e-learning accommodates a higher number of students on course of the learning process. With the availability of internet services, computers can be inter-connected at different point for learners to learn from.

E-learning also accommodates the learning pace of every students and this is because students have opportunity to be taught according to their understanding. With the availability of recorded voice lessons, PDF documents, video teaching aids, students can learn again and again unlike the conventional pattern where the teacher gives room for questions only after the topic or class is ended. It can also help the government in times of shortage of academic manpower.

A single teacher can reach out to many students at different locations without stress. With the aid of applications such as Zoom, Whatsapp, Facebook, Twitter, etc., students can key into lectures online. This will help defeat inefficiency and then advance the standard of our education in Nigeria. Carol (2017) states that e-learning can be adopted as a management tool which can give both government and school-owners the opportunity to monitor the progress and activities of their staff so as to identify their incapability. It will help in the appraisal process of both students and instructors. Schools can use any of the e-channels to test the capacity of their students and pupils.

When these gaps are identified, a choice can now be made to either improve staff and learner or to bring new staff in to fulfil the requirements of the school. Both the learning students and employees can download e-learning materials to upgrade and improve themselves for better performance. It will further keep records of the activities and events of training and learning so as to help in the management and planning of teaching (Carol, 2017).

Challenges of E-learning in Nigeria

With the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown of schools across countries since March 2020, there is a shift towards virtual classrooms as a mode of education delivery. Students and lecturers now interact via electronic channels. For countries like Nigeria who has being struggling to adopt electronic learning, COVID-19 provides an opportunity for the country to avail itself of a learning platform that could, conveniently help both learners and instructors to continue learning. The use of technology for learning in Nigeria has some challenges. The following are some challenges of e-learning in Nigeria:

High Cost of Data

Many parents and students bemoan cost in purchasing data. The internet works with data. Data experts have says that the cost of buying data in West Africa is high. It takes about \$8 per kilobytes per second whereas in North Africa it cost about \$0.52 and even less in Europe (Oyetimi & Adewakunpril, 2020). With the high rate or cost of data in this part of the world, e-learning is bound to suffer and even fail.

Students from poor homes cannot purchase data for their studies and this will deprive them access to online learning.

Poor Power Supply

E-learning activities require constant power supply for efficient functionality. For a nation as Nigeria where some cities cannot boast of 24hours of power supply, electronic learning is bound to fail. Children or student from indigent homes who cannot afford generator will definitely miss out in the benefits of e-learning. For us to talk e-learning, because it is being done successfully in other climes, we have to be conscious of the country's peculiar circumstances.

Weak Network Services

In Nigeria, Telecommunications services have been poor. Network services are weak in some areas while in other rural areas the people have no presence of network service. With the unstable network, learners and instructors cannot exchange emails or even hold classes via video conferencing. Electronic learning requires strong network and adequate telecommunication services to succeed.

Poverty

In a report given by an international organization, Oxfam in the year 2019, about 69 per cent the Nigerian population live below poverty level (Adedayo, 2019). This report amongst others shows that the average citizen in Nigeria is likely to sleep hungry let alone having the resource to purchase computer, data or even generator to power these gadgets. Many parents find it difficult paying tuition fees for their children most times and this affects the academic performance of the children.

Poor Infrastructure

Infrastructural decadence poses a challenge to e-learning activities. The lack of basic infrastructures hinders the growth of technology in a society. Government must provide infrastructures that will entrench e-learning activities.

Lack of Government Commitment

For development to come to any society, the government plays a huge role. For electronic learning to survive in Nigeria, the different government institutions must be committed. The government lacks the political will to encourage the use of e-learning in our public intuitions. Government must be committed to bringing about positive changes in our academic system.

Illiteracy

When students lack the required know-how on how to operate computer and other electronic devices, it hinders them from learning electronically. Some students especially those from the less privileged homes without computer gadgets will find it hard using e-learning as a method of education.

Theoretical framework

Systems Theory

The systems theory in political science owes its origin to David Easton who is reputed to be the scholar that attempted to analyse politics from the perspective of systems in his famous work political system which appeared in 1953. His work which was regarded as the foundation of the behaviourist revolution in political science outlined eight major characteristics. He described the characteristics as the intellectual foundation stone of behaviourism which are regularities, verification, techniques, quantification, values, systemisation, pure science, and integration. In other words, a political system may be that system of interactions in any society through which authoritative allocations are made and implemented in the form of policies and decisions. The system theory sees society as a system functioning with different sub-units for the betterment of the entire system. The system theory works with different concepts such as inputs (demands), values, output (decisions), feedback loop, political environment. Systems theory conceives public policy as the response of the political system to demands from its environment. The political system consists of those institutions that make authoritative allocation of values binding on the society such as the economic, social, cultural and international systems which shape political process and whose activities are influenced by the political system.

Using systems approach, it is assumed that a state of interaction exists between public policy and environmental variables (Abdulsalami, 1987). When used in analyzing this study, we refer to Nigeria as a system made up of different sub systems such as economy, religion, political, cultural and then the educational sub systems.

For there to be educational development with the application of e-learning, every other unit of the society must function adequate because there is interdependence amongst the sub system. The economy as a sub system must thrive so as to provide the financial requirement for e-learning to take place. There must be political will by government to implement the e-learning policy for the agreement of our Political system and every other sub unit of the society must work together before we can have a paradigm shift from analog to digital learning process. If this doesn't happen, the use of e-learning as a means of teaching will continue to witness challenges.

Recommendations

The study made the following recommendations; Access to data is key for in e-learning to succeed in Nigeria. Telecommunication service providers must reduce the cost of purchasing data and if possible provide students with free access codes to educational sites in other to encourage them. The government should as well subsidise the purchase of data to enable students enjoy the internet.

For e-learning to be effective, there must be collaboration between government and telecommunications providers in solving some challenges associated with internet connectivity. Government must encourage ICT companies in Nigeria to develop software and other applications needed for e-learning to be produced locally. This is because foreign software and applications like Blackboard Learn, Canvas, Moodle, CertCentral and others can be said to be expensive.

Government must build on infrastructures. For e-learning to succeed the nation must improve in infrastructures like power supply. The power companies must improve in the supply of electricity. Network providers must also improve in their service provisions. Poor network affects digital services therefore telecommunication providers must up their game and endure adequate service delivery both in the cities and at the coastal areas. There must be commitment by government. The government must have strong political will to implement electronic learning into our institutions.

This political commitment will encourage them to make financial commitments towards the success of e-learning. Students from primary to tertiary institutions must be taught how to use smart gadgets foe learning. They must be given orientations on how to surf the internet for educational materials.

Conclusion

With the emergence and spread of information communication technology (ICT) round the globe, educational sector have the opportunity of improving for the better. Technological facilities have been made available for use in the teaching process. We now have different mediums of e-learning which we can use in teaching and learning at our own convenience. The use of iPad, radios, computers, television and the internet for e-learning is a welcome development. For education to advance in Nigeria, it is time we switch fully to the use of e-learning materials and media in our institutions. Our educational institutions must be encouraged to adopt the electronic ways of teaching in this 21st century like it is done in advanced nations.

In advanced nations, students need not meet physically with their lecturers in other to hold classes. And this has reduced academic corruption and inefficiency in their system. Nigeria can adopt these media as it will help in advancing our system by way of getting students and teachers more engaged, management can monitor academic performance directly without bias, students can learn and improve at their pace, academic management, it can as well save cost for government and school owners. E-learning to Zeitoun (2008) helps different societies to interconnect globally so as to make for a better learning process. With the availability of different technological gadgets, people now have the opportunity to access the internet to gather information. Nigeria has a lot to gain if and when we adopt e-learning into our educational system. This is because it will open up Nigeria to connect with other advanced nations of the world and thereby bringing about continuous development.

The benefits of electronic learning media abound and they have proven to be of help in the present and ever-changing world and in the educational sector. Electronic learning process when opted, will prepare Nigeria to compete with others in the world.

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